Escondido v. Emmons

Summary

The Ninth Circuit failed to conduct the analysis required by this Court’s precedents in determining whether two Escondido police officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Text

1 Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 
Per Curiam 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. MARTY 
EMMONS 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 17–1660. Decided January 7, 2019 
PER CURIAM. 
The question in this qualified immunity case is whether 
two police officers violated clearly established law when 
they forcibly apprehended a man at the scene of a reported
domestic violence incident. 
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, shows the following.  In April 2013, Escondido 
police received a 911 call from Maggie Emmons about a 
domestic violence incident at her apartment.  Emmons 
lived at the apartment with her husband, her two chil-
dren, and a roommate, Ametria Douglas.  Officer Jake 
Houchin responded to the scene and eventually helped
take a domestic violence re port from Emmons about inju-
ries caused by her husband.  The officers arrested her 
husband. He was later released. 
A few weeks later, on May 27, 2013, at about 2:30 p.m.,
Escondido police received a 911 call about another possible 
domestic disturbance at Emmons’ apartment.  That 911 
call came from Ametria Douglas’ mother, Trina Douglas.
Trina Douglas was not at the apartment, but she was on 
the phone with her daughter Ametria, who was at the 
apartment. Trina heard her daughter Ametria and Mag-
gie Emmons yelling at each other and heard her daughter
screaming for help. The call then disconnected, and Trina 
Douglas called 911.
Officer Houchin again responded, along with Officer 
Robert Craig.  The dispatcher informed the officers that
two children could be in the residence and that calls to the

2 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS 
Per Curiam 
apartment had gone unanswered. 
Police body-camera video of the officers’ actions at the 
apartment is in the record. 
The officers knocked on the door of the apartment.  No 
one answered. But a side window was open, and the
officers spoke with Emmons through that window, at-
tempting to convince her to open the door to the apart-
ment so that they could conduct a welfare check.  A man 
in the apartment also told Emmons to back away from the
window, but the officers said they could not identify the 
man. At some point during this exchange, Sergeant Kevin 
Toth, Officer Joseph Leffing well, and Officer Huy Quach 
arrived as backup.
A few minutes later, a man opened the apartment door 
and came outside.  At that point, Officer Craig was stand-
ing alone just outside the door. Officer Craig told the man 
not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried 
to brush past Officer Craig.  Officer Craig stopped the
man, took him quickly to the ground, and handcuffed him.
Officer Craig did not hit the man or display any weapon. 
The video shows that the man was not in any visible or 
audible pain as a result of the takedown or while on the 
ground.  Within a few minutes, officers helped the man up
and arrested him for a misdemeanor offense of resisting 
and delaying a police officer. 
The man turned out to be Maggie Emmons’ father, 
Marty Emmons.  Marty Emmons later sued Officer Craig
and Sergeant Toth, among others, under Rev. Stat. §1979, 
42 U. S. C. §1983.  He raised several claims, including, as 
relevant here, a claim of excessive force in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The suit sought money damages for
which Officer Craig and Sergeant Toth would be personally
liable. The District Court held  that the officers had prob -
able cause to arrest Marty Emmons for the misdemeanor 
offense. The Ninth Circuit did not disturb that finding, 
and there is no claim presently before us that the officers

3 Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 
Per Curiam 
lacked probable cause to arrest Marty Emmons.  The only
claim before us is that the o fficers used excessive force in 
effectuating the arrest. 
The District Court rejected th e claim of excessive force. 
168 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (SD Cal. 2016).  The District 
Court stated that the “video shows that the officers acted 
professionally and respectfully  in their encounter” at the 
apartment. Id., at 1275. Because only Officer Craig used 
any force at all, the District Court granted summary
judgment to Sergeant Toth on the excessive force claim. 
Applying this Court’s precedents on qualified immunity, 
the District Court also granted summary judgment to 
Officer Craig.  According to the District Court, the law did
not clearly establish that Officer Craig could not take 
down an arrestee in these circumstances.  The court ex-
plained that the officers were responding to a domestic
dispute, and that the encounter had escalated when the 
officers could not enter the apartment to conduct a welfare 
check. The District Court al so noted that when Marty 
Emmons exited the apartment, none of the officers knew
whether he was armed or dangerous, or whether he had 
injured any individuals inside the apartment.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial 
on the excessive force claims  against both Officer Craig
and Sergeant Toth.  716 Fed. Appx. 724 (CA9 2018). The 
Ninth Circuit’s entire relevant analysis of the qual-
ified immunity question consisted of the following: “The
right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at
the time of the events in question.  Gravelet-Blondin v. 
Shelton, 728 F. 3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013).”  Id., at 726. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to
Sergeant Toth, and vacate and remand as to Officer Craig. 
With respect to Sergeant Toth, the Ninth Circuit offered
no explanation for its decision. The court’s unexplained 
reinstatement of the excessive force claim against Ser-
geant Toth was erroneous—and quite puzzling in light of

4 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS 
Per Curiam 
the District Court’s conclusion  that “only Defendant Craig 
was involved in the excessive force claim” and that Em-
mons “fail[ed] to identify contrary evidence.”  168 F. Supp. 
3d, at 1274, n. 4. 
As to Officer Craig, the Nint h Circuit also erred.  As we 
have explained many times: “Qualified immunity attaches 
when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
able person would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) ( per curiam) (slip op., at 4) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see District of Columbia v. 
Wesby, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018); White v. Pauly, 580 
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) ( per curiam ); Mullenix v. Luna , 
577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (per curiam).
Under our cases, the clearly established right must be
defined with specificity. “This Court has repeatedly told 
courts . . . not to define clea rly established law at a high
level of generality.”  Kisela, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  That is particularly 
important in excessive force cases, as we have explained: 
“Specificity is especially important in the Fourth 
Amendment context, where the Court has recognized 
that it is sometimes difficu lt for an officer to deter-
mine how the relevant lega l doctrine, here excessive 
force, will apply to the fact ual situation the officer 
confronts. Use of excessive force is an area of the law 
in which the result depends very much on the facts of 
each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qual-
ified immunity unless existing precedent squarely
governs the specific facts at issue. . . . 
“[I]t does not suffice for a court simply to state that
an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive
force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the 
case for a trial on the question of reasonableness.  An 
officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly estab-

5 Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 
Per Curiam 
lished right unless the right’s contours were suffi-
ciently definite that any re asonable official in the de-
fendant’s shoes would have understood that he was 
violating it.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quotation 
altered). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals contravened those 
settled principles. The Court of Appeals should have
asked whether clearly established law prohibited the
officers from stopping and taking down a man in these 
circumstances.  Instead, the Court of Appeals defined the 
clearly established right at a high level of generality by 
saying only that the “right to be free of excessive force” 
was clearly established. With the right defined at that
high level of generality, the Court of Appeals then denied
qualified immunity to the officers and remanded the case 
for trial. 716 Fed. Appx., at 726.
Under our precedents, the Court of Appeals’ formulation
of the clearly established right was far too general.  To be 
sure, the Court of Appeals cited the Gravelet-Blondin case 
from that Circuit, which described a right to be “free from
the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere 
passive resistance. . . .”  728 F. 3d, at 1093.  Assuming
without deciding that a court of appeals decision may
constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified 
immunity, see City and County of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015), the Ninth Circuit’s 
Gravelet-Blondin case law involved police force against 
individuals engaged in passive resistance. The Court of 
Appeals made no effort to explain how that case law pro-
hibited Officer Craig’s actions in  this case.  That is a prob -
lem under our precedents: 
“[W]e have stressed the need to identify a case where
an officer acting under similar circumstances was
held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. . . . 
While there does not have to be a case directly on

6 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS 
Per Curiam 
point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of
the particular [action] beyond debate. . . . Of course, 
there can be the rare obvious case, where the unlaw-
fulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear
even though existing precedent does not address simi-
lar circumstances. . . . But a body of relevant case law 
is usually necessary to clearly establish the an-
swer . . . .” Wesby, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Court of Appeals failed to properly analyze whether 
clearly established law barred Officer Craig from stopping
and taking down Marty Emmons in this manner as Em-
mons exited the apartment. Therefore, we remand the 
case for the Court of Appeals to conduct the analysis re -
quired by our precedents with  respect to whether Officer
Craig is entitled to qualified immunity. 
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated in
part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered.

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  1 Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. MARTY EMMONS ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 17–1660. Decided January 7, 2019 PER CURIAM. The question in this qualified im…

• #2

  and came outside. At that point, Officer Craig was stand- ing alone just outside the door. Officer Craig told the man not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried to brush past Officer Craig. Officer Craig stopped the man, took him quickly to the ground, and handcuffed him. Officer Craig did not…

• #3

  injured any individuals inside the apartment. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the excessive force claims against both Officer Craig and Sergeant Toth. 716 Fed. Appx. 724 (CA9 2018). The Ninth Circuit’s entire relevant analysis of the qual- ified immunity question consisted of the followi…

• #4

  ified immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue. . . . “[I]t does not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on the question of reasonableness. An officer…

• #5

  there can be the rare obvious case, where the unlaw- fulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address simi- lar circumstances. . . . But a body of relevant case law is usually necessary to clearly establish the an- swer . . . .” Wesby, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip …