Carney v. Adams

Summary

Because plaintiff Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 262, he has failed to demonstrate Article III standing to challenge the Delaware Constitution’s political balance requirement for appointments to the State’s major courts.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 592 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 53–68 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
December 10, 2020 
DERRICK LINDSEY 
deputy reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2020 53 
Syllabus 
CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE v. ADAMS 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the third circuit 
No. 19–309. Argued October 5, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020 
Delaware's Constitution contains a political balance requirement for ap-
pointments to the State's major courts. No more than a bare majority 
of judges on any of its fve major courts “shall be of the same political 
party.” Art. IV , § 3. In addition, on three of those courts, those mem-
bers not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political 
party.” Ibid. Respondent James R. Adams, a Delaware lawyer and 
political independent, sued in Federal District Court, claiming that Del-
aware's “bare majority” and “major party” requirements violate his 
First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligi-
ble to become a judge unless he joins a major political party. The Dis-
trict Court held that Adams had standing to challenge both require-
ments and that Delaware's balancing scheme was unconstitutional. The 
Third Circuit affrmed in part and reversed in part. It held that Adams 
did have standing to challenge the major party requirement, because it 
categorically excludes independents from becoming judges on three 
courts, but that he lacked standing to challenge the bare majority re-
quirement, which does not preclude independents from eligibility for 
any vacancy. 
Held: Because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply 
for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he has failed to show a 
“personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III 
standing. Pp. 58–66. 
(a) Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here. First, stand-
ing requires an “ `injury in fact' ” that must be “concrete and particular-
ized,” as well as “ `actual or imminent.' ” Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U. S. 555, 560. Second, a grievance that amounts to nothing 
more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen's interest in the 
proper application of the law does not count as an “injury in fact” and 
does not show standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 706. 
Pp. 58–59. 
(b) Adams has not shown the necessary “injury in fact.” To establish 
that he will suffer a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury be-
yond a generalized grievance, Adams must at least show that he is likely 
to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future, if he 
were not barred because of political affliation. He can show this only

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54 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
Syllabus 
if he is “ `able and ready' ” to apply. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 
244, 262. Adams' only supporting evidence is two statements he made 
that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Dela-
ware's fve courts. Those statements must be considered in the context 
of the record. Pp. 59–63. 
(c) The record evidence fails to show that, at the time he commenced 
the lawsuit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the 
reasonably foreseeable future. First, Adams' statements stand alone, 
without any other supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possi-
ble judicial openings or other such preparations. Second, the context 
suggests an abstract, generalized grievance, not an actual desire to be-
come a judge. For example, Adams did not apply for numerous existing 
judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat and eligible for 
those vacancies. He then read a law review article arguing that Dela-
ware's judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded inde-
pendents, changed his political affliation to independent, and fled this 
lawsuit shortly thereafter. Third, a holding that Adams' few words of 
general intent were suffcient to show an “injury in fact” would signif-
cantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine preventing this Court 
from providing advisory opinions. Finally, precedent supports the con-
clusion that an injury in fact requires an intent that is concrete. See, 
e. g., Lujan, supra. And arguably similar cases in which standing was 
found all contained more evidence that the plaintiff was “able and 
ready” than Adams has provided. See, e. g., Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200. Pp. 63–66. 
922 F. 3d. 166, vacated and remanded. 
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, 
p. 66. 
Michael W. McConnell argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the briefs were Steffen N. Johnson, Brian J. 
Levy, Randy J. Holland, David C. McBride, Martin S. 
Lessner, and Pilar G. Kraman. 
David L. Finger argued the cause and fled a brief for 
respondent.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Brennan Cen-
ter for Justice at NYU School of Law by Richard W. Clary and Wendy R. 
Weiser; for the Campaign Legal Center by Caitlin Halligan, Philippe

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Opinion of the Court 
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns a Delaware constitutional provision 
that requires that appointments to Delaware's major courts 
refect a partisan balance. Delaware's Constitution states 
that no more than a bare majority of members of any of its 
fve major courts may belong to any one political party. Art. 
IV , § 3. It also requires, with respect to three of those 
courts, that the remaining members belong to “the other 
major political party.” Ibid. 
The plaintiff, a Delaware lawyer, brought this lawsuit 
in federal court. He claimed that Delaware's party-
membership requirements for its judiciary violate the Fed-
eral Constitution. We agreed to consider the constitutional 
question, but only if the plaintiff has standing to raise that 
question. We now hold that he does not. 
I 
The Delaware Constitution contains a political balance re-
quirement applicable to membership on all fve of its courts: 
Selendy, Paul M. Smith, Adav Noti, and Erin Chlopak; for the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States of America by Gregory G. Garre 
and Daryl Joseffer; for the Delaware State Bar Association by Richard 
A. Forsten, William E. Manning, and James D. Taylor, Jr.; for Former 
Chief Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court by Virginia A. Seitz and 
Kathleen Moriarty Mueller; for Former Governors of the State of Dela-
ware by Theodore N. Mirvis and Kevin S. Schwartz; for the Republican 
National Committee by Richard B. Raile and Katherine L. McKnight; for 
State and Local Government Associations by Kirti Datla and Lisa Soro-
nen; and for Brian D. Feinstein et al. by Eric F. Citron and Erica Oleszc-
zuk Evans. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Lawyers and 
Professors by Joel Edan Friedlander; for the Libertarian National Com-
mittee by Oliver B. Hall; and for Public Citizen by Kaitlin E. Leary, Scott 
L. Nelson, Allison M. Zieve, and Alan B. Morrison. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Cato Institute by Eugene Vo-
lokh and Ilya Shapiro; for the Conference of Chief Justices by Robert L. 
Byer and Keith R. Fisher; for Professors et al. by Rodney A. Smolla, pro 
se; and for Anthony Daunt et al. by Jason Torchinsky. 
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56 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
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the Supreme Court, the Chancery Court, the Superior Court, 
the Family Court, and the Court of Common Pleas. The 
provision says that no more than a bare majority of judges 
on any of these courts “shall be of the same political party.” 
Ibid. (We shall call this requirement the “bare majority” 
requirement.) The Delaware Constitution also contains a 
second requirement applicable only to the Supreme Court, 
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court. It says that 
the remaining members of those three courts (those not in 
the bare majority) “shall be of the other major political 
party.” Ibid. (We shall call this the “major party” require-
ment.) Thus, all fve courts are subject to the “bare major-
ity” requirement, and three of the fve courts are additionally 
subject to the “major party” requirement. 
On February 21, 2017, plaintiff-respondent James R. 
Adams sued Delaware's Governor, John Carney, in Federal 
District Court. Adams, then a newly registered political in-
dependent, claimed that both of Delaware's political balance 
requirements violated his First Amendment right to freedom 
of association by making him ineligible to become a judge 
unless he rejoined a major political party. 
Governor Carney moved to dismiss for lack of standing, 
and Adams fled an amended complaint in an attempt to rec-
tify the problem. App. 1–2, 17–18. After discovery largely 
centered on Adams' history and intentions in seeking a 
judgeship, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. 
Governor Carney argued (1) that Adams lacked standing to 
assert his constitutional claim, and (2) that, in any event, the 
requirements were constitutional. Adams argued only that 
he was entitled to summary judgment on the merits because 
the political balance requirements made independents like 
him ineligible for a judgeship. 
The District Court denied Governor Carney's summary 
judgment motion. Id., at 165; App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. It 
held that Adams had standing to challenge both the “major 
party” requirement for membership on the Supreme Court, 
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court and the “bare 
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majority” requirement for membership on the Family Court 
and the Court of Common Pleas. App. 173–175; App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 70a–72a. It then granted summary judgment to 
Adams on the merits, App. 165; App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a, 
holding that Delaware's balancing scheme as a whole was un-
constitutional, App. 175–181; App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a–81a. 
Governor Carney appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court affrmed 
in part and reversed in part. Adams v. Governor of Del., 
922 F. 3d 166 (2019). Like the District Court, it held that 
Adams had standing to challenge the major party require-
ment, id., at 175, but unlike the District Court, it held that 
Adams did not have standing to challenge the bare majority 
requirement (in any of the fve courts), id., at 174–175. The 
court held that the bare majority requirement itself does 
not preclude independents from eligibility for any vacancy. 
Ibid. 
The court then focused on the major party requirement, 
which applies only to three of the fve courts. Did that con-
stitutional provision bar independent voters from becoming 
judges on those courts? If so, was that bar constitutional? 
If not, was that provision severable from the rest of the Dela-
ware Constitution's political balance provisions, in particular, 
from the bare majority requirement as applied to the Su-
preme Court, the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court? 
The Third Circuit concluded that the major party require-
ment categorically excludes independents and members of 
third parties from becoming judges on the Supreme Court, 
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court. 922 F. 3d, at 
182–183. It held that the major party requirement conse-
quently violates the Federal Constitution's First Amend-
ment. Ibid. And it held that the major party requirement 
is not severable from the bare majority requirement. Id., at 
183–184. The Circuit concluded that both requirements (as 
applied to those three courts) are invalid. Ibid. 
Governor Carney then fled a petition for a writ of certio-
rari. He asked us to consider, frst, whether the major party

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58 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
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requirement is constitutional and, then, if it is not, whether 
it is severable from the bare majority requirement. Pet. for 
Cert. i. We granted his petition but asked that the parties 
frst address the question whether Adams has demonstrated 
Article III standing to bring this lawsuit. 
II 
A 
This case begins and ends with standing. The Constitu-
tion grants Article III courts the power to decide “Cases” 
or “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. We have long understood 
that constitutional phrase to require that a case embody a 
genuine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby pre-
venting the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions. 
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96–97 (1968); Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) 
(“[I]t was not for courts to pass upon . . . abstract, intellec-
tual problems but only if a concrete, living contest between 
adversaries called for the arbitrament of law”). The doc-
trine of standing implements this requirement by insisting 
that a litigant “prove that he has suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 704 (2013); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). 
Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here. 
First, standing requires an “ `injury in fact' ” that must be 
“concrete and particularized,” as well as “ `actual or immi-
nent.' ” Id., at 560. It cannot be “ ` “conjectural or hypo-
thetical.” ' ” Ibid. Second, a grievance that amounts to 
nothing more than an abstract and generalized harm to a 
citizen's interest in the proper application of the law does 
not count as an “injury in fact.” And it consequently does 
not show standing. Hollingsworth, supra, at 706; see also 
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 439–441 (2007) (per curiam )

Cite as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020) 59 
Opinion of the Court 
(describing this Court's “lengthy pedigree” in refusing to 
serve as a forum for generalized grievances). 
In other words, a plaintiff cannot establish standing by 
asserting an abstract “general interest common to all mem-
bers of the public,” id., at 440, “no matter how sincere” or 
“deeply committed” a plaintiff is to vindicating that general 
interest on behalf of the public, Hollingsworth, supra, at 
706–707. Justice Powell explained the reasons for this limi-
tation. He found it “inescapable” that to fnd standing 
based upon that kind of interest “would signifcantly alter 
the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift 
away from a democratic form of government.” United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188 (1974) (concurring 
opinion). He added that “[w]e should be ever mindful of the 
contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to per-
mit general oversight of the elected branches of government 
by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judi-
cial branch.” Ibid.; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War , 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975). Cf. Federal Election 
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 21–25 (1998) (fnding standing 
where a group of voters suffered concrete, though wide-
spread, harm when they were prevented from accessing pub-
licly disclosable voting-related material). 
B 
We here must ask whether Adams established that, at the 
time he fled suit, Delaware's major party provision caused 
him a concrete, particularized “injury in fact” over and above 
the abstract generalized grievance suffered by all citizens of 
Delaware who (if Adams is right) must live in a State subject 
to an unconstitutional judicial selection criterion. We have 
examined the record that was before the District Court at 
summary judgment, keeping in mind that Adams bears the 
burden of establishing standing as of the time he brought 
this lawsuit and maintaining it thereafter. Lujan, supra, 
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60 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
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at 561 (plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing); 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv-
ices (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 191 (2000) (standing is as-
sessed “at the time the action commences”); id., at 189 (“ `The 
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commence-
ment of the litigation . . . must continue throughout its exist-
ence' ”); see also Lujan, supra, at 569, n. 4. And we con-
clude that Adams did not show the necessary “injury in fact.” 
Adams suffered a “generalized grievance” of the kind we 
have just described. He, like all citizens of Delaware, must 
live and work within a State that (in his view) imposes un-
constitutional requirements for eligibility on three of its 
courts. Lawyers, such as Adams, may feel sincerely and 
strongly that Delaware's laws should comply with the Fed-
eral Constitution. Accord, Hollingsworth, 570 U. S., at 706. 
But that kind of interest does not create standing. Rather, 
the question is whether Adams will suffer a “ `personal and 
individual' ” injury beyond this generalized grievance—an 
injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather 
than “conjectural or hypothetical.” Id., at 705–706. 
Adams says he has. He claims that Delaware's major 
party requirement in fact prevents him, a political independ-
ent, from having his judicial application considered for three 
of Delaware's courts. To prove this kind of harm, however, 
Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become 
a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if Delaware did 
not bar him because of political affliation. And our cases 
make clear that he can show this only if he is “ `able and 
ready' ” to apply. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 262 
(2003); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993). 
We have examined the summary judgment record to deter-
mine whether Adams made this showing. And, as we have 
said, we conclude that he has not. 
The only evidence supporting Adams is two statements he 
made in his deposition and in his answer to interrogatories 
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that he wants to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any 
of Delaware's fve courts. He said: 
“I would apply for any judicial position that I thought I 
was qualifed for, and I believe I'm qualifed for any posi-
tion that would come up . . . [o]n any of the courts. I 
would feel less comfortable on Chancery than any other 
court. I would feel most comfortable on Superior 
Court, Family Court, Court of Common Pleas, state Su-
preme Court based on my background, experience, and 
what I have done in my career.” App. 34. 
He added in his answer to interrogatories: 
“Adams . . . would seriously consider and apply for any 
judicial position for which he feels he is qualifed. . . . 
Adams believes that he meets the minimum qualifca-
tions to apply for any judicial offcer position.” Id., at 
62–63. 
Those statements, however, must be considered in the con-
text of the record, which contains evidence showing that, at 
the time he brought this lawsuit, Adams was not “able and 
ready” to apply. 
First, the record showed that, between 2012 and 2016, dur-
ing which time Adams was a practicing lawyer and a regis-
tered Democrat, Delaware's fve courts had a combined total 
of 14 openings for which Adams, then a Democrat, would 
have been eligible. Id., at 51–56, 144–164. Yet he did not 
apply for any of them. When deposed during discovery, 
Adams said that in 2014 he had wanted to apply for a Su-
preme Court or Superior Court judgeship. Id., at 35, 43– 
46, 62. Adams said that he could not do so because only 
Republicans were eligible for those positions that year. 
Ibid. He was wrong about that. In particular, there were 
three vacancies on those two courts in 2014 for which he, as 
a Democrat, was eligible. Id., at 51–54. Adams later con-
ceded that he had indeed been eligible to apply for those 
vacancies, but he had not done so. Id., at 43–46. 
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62 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
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Second, on December 31, 2015, after roughly 12 years as a 
lawyer for the Delaware Department of Justice, Adams re-
tired. Id., at 32, 58. In February 2016, Adams changed his 
bar membership from “Active” to “Emeritus” status. Id., at 
61. He then returned to “Active” status in January 2017. 
Ibid. In his deposition, he stated that at about that same 
time in the “[b]eginning of the year, January/February,” he 
read a law review article arguing that Delaware's judicial 
eligibility requirements were unconstitutional because they 
excluded independents. Id., at 38; see Friedlander, Is Dela-
ware's “Other Major Political Party” Really Entitled to Half 
of Delaware's Judiciary? 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 1139 (2016). 
Adams called the article's author and said, “ `I just read your 
Law Review . . . article. I'd like to pursue this.' ” App. 38. 
The author suggested several attorneys who might handle 
the matter. Ibid. 
Third, shortly thereafter, on February 13, 2017, Adams 
changed his political affliation from Democrat to unaffliated 
independent. Id., at 67. Before that, he had been a Demo-
crat his “whole life” and actively involved in the Delaware 
Democratic Party. Id., at 41. Leaving the party made it 
less likely that he would become a judge. But doing so 
made it possible for him to vindicate his view of the law as 
set forth in the article. 
Fourth, after Adams became a political independent on 
February 13, 2017, he fled this lawsuit eight days later on 
February 21. Id., at 1. 
Fifth, Adams said in his answer to interrogatories that he 
“has no knowledge of what judicial positions may become 
open in the next year.” Id., at 62. 
Sixth, other than the act of fling the lawsuit itself, the 
summary judgment record contains no evidence of conversa-
tions or other actions taken by Adams suggesting that he 
was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship. 
During his deposition, Adams provided explanations for 
this negative evidence. He said that his failure to apply for 
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Opinion of the Court 
available judgeships at the time when he was eligible re-
fected his lack of interest in being a judge at that time. He 
was then content to work at the Department of Justice. Id., 
at 35; Brief for Respondent 17–18. Adams added that his 
return from retirement to “Active” bar membership in 2017 
showed that he decided on becoming a judge later in life and 
after a change in administration at the Delaware Depart-
ment of Justice. App. 33. (Adams did not explain his fail-
ure to apply in 2014, though, when, he said, he was interested 
in a judgeship.) Adams further explained that his contem-
poraneous change of political affliation was because he 
“tend[s] to be much more progressive and liberal than [D]em-
ocrats in Delaware.” Id., at 41. Although he had been a 
lifelong Democrat, and actively involved with the Delaware 
Democratic Party, he said then that he “probably consider[s]” 
himself “more of a Bernie [Sanders] independent.” Id., at 
42. Finally, in Adams' view, the lack of other evidence 
proves little or nothing about his intentions. 
C 
This is a highly fact-specifc case. In our view, three con-
siderations, taken together, convince us that the record evi-
dence fails to show that, at the time he commenced the law-
suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in 
the reasonably foreseeable future. First, as we have just 
laid out, Adams' words “I would apply . . . ” stand alone 
without any actual past injury, without reference to an an-
ticipated timeframe, without prior judgeship applications, 
without prior relevant conversations, without efforts to de-
termine likely openings, without other preparations or inves-
tigations, and without any other supporting evidence. 
Second, the context offers Adams no support. It suggests 
an abstract, generalized grievance, not an actual desire to 
become a judge. Indeed, Adams' failure to apply previously 
when he was eligible, his reading of the law review article, 
his change of party affliation, and his swift subsequent fling 
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64 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
Opinion of the Court 
of the complaint show a desire to vindicate his view of the 
law, as articulated in the article he read. 
Third, if we were to hold that Adams' few words of general 
intent—without more and against all contrary evidence— 
were suffcient here to show an “injury in fact,” we would 
signifcantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine prevent-
ing this Court from providing advisory opinions at the re-
quest of one who, without other concrete injury, believes that 
the government is not following the law. Adams did not 
show that he was “able and ready” to apply for a vacancy in 
the reasonably imminent future. Adams has not suffciently 
differentiated himself from a general population of individu-
als affected in the abstract by the legal provision he attacks. 
We do not decide whether a statement of intent alone under 
other circumstances could be enough to show standing. But 
we are satisfed that Adams' words alone are not enough here 
when placed in the context of this particular record. 
Precedent supports the conclusion that an injury in fact 
requires an intent that is concrete. In Lujan, for example, 
organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation sought to 
enjoin enforcement of a federal regulation that they believed 
would unlawfully harm endangered species. Lujan, 504 
U. S., at 563–564. The organizations' members had pre-
viously visited the species' habitats abroad, and they said 
that they intended to return to those foreign habitats in the 
future. Ibid. This Court recognized that having to view 
a species-impoverished habitat could constitute a cognizable 
injury. Id., at 562–563. But it pointed out that the plain-
tiffs had not described any concrete plans to visit those habi-
tats, nor had they said when they would do so. Id., at 563– 
564. The Court said that the organizations had set forth 
only “ `some day' intentions.” Id., at 564. And “some day 
intentions” do “not support a fnding of the `actual or immi-
nent' injury that our cases require.” Ibid. 
For another thing, arguably similar cases in which this 
Court has found standing all contained more evidence that 
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the plaintiff was “able and ready” than Adams has provided 
here. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200 
(1995), for example, a subcontractor challenging a race-based 
program for allocating contracts established standing by 
showing that it “bids on every guardrail project in Colo-
rado,” that the defendant “is likely to let contracts involving 
guardrail work . . . at least once per year in Colorado,” and 
that the plaintiff “is very likely to bid on each such contract.” 
Id., at 212. 
In Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U. S., at 666, the 
Court held that an association of contractors had standing to 
attack as unlawful a race-based set-aside program for award-
ing contracts. The contractors showed that they were “able 
and ready to bid on [future] contracts,” for it was undisputed 
that they had “regularly bid on construction contracts in 
Jacksonville, and that they would have bid on contracts set 
aside pursuant to the city's ordinance were they so able.” 
Id., at 666, 668. The Court noted that it “must assume that 
[these allegations] are true” because they were not chal-
lenged in any way. Id., at 668–669. 
In Gratz, 539 U. S., at 262, we held that a plaintiff had 
standing to attack as unlawful a university's affrmative ac-
tion admissions policy. The plaintiff had applied for admis-
sion to the university as a freshman applicant in the recent 
past and been rejected. Ibid. He said he intended to apply 
to transfer to the university in the near future, should the 
university cease using affrmative action in its transfer ad-
missions process. Ibid. And the university had a “rolling” 
transfer program open for application each year, so there 
was no doubt that the plaintiff's injury was imminent. Id., 
at 256. The Court therefore concluded that he was “ `able 
and ready' ” to apply as a transfer student. Id., at 262. Un-
like Adams, none of these plaintiffs relied on a bare state-
ment of intent alone against the context of a record that 
shows nothing more than an abstract generalized grievance. 
Rather, each introduced at least some evidence that, e. g.,

66 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
they had applied in the past, there were regular opportuni-
ties available with relevant frequency, and they were “able 
and ready” to apply for them. 
By way of contrast, our precedents have also said that a 
plaintiff need not “translat[e]” his or her “desire for a job . . . 
into a formal application” where that application would be 
merely a “futile gesture.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U. S. 324, 365–366 (1977); see also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex 
rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 944, n. 2 (1982). And we have 
said that an “aggrieved party `need not allege that he would 
have obtained the beneft but for the [unlawful] barrier 
in order to establish standing.' ” Adarand Constructors, 
supra, at 211; see also Gratz, supra, at 262; Associated Gen. 
Contractors, supra, at 666. We do not here depart from or 
modify these or any other of the precedents to which we 
have referred. 
Rather, our holding follows from a straightforward appli-
cation of precedent to the particular summary judgment rec-
ord before us. And, as we have explained, in the context 
set forth by the evidence, Adams has not shown that he was 
“able and ready” to apply in the imminent future. Conse-
quently, he has failed to show that “personal,” “concrete,” and 
“imminent” injury upon which our standing precedents insist. 
For these reasons, we reverse the Third Circuit's decision 
in respect to standing, vacate the judgment, and remand 
with instructions to dismiss the case. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case. 
Justice Sotomayor, concurring. 
I agree that respondent Adams did not demonstrate Arti-
cle III standing to bring this suit. Because the constitu-
tional questions in this case will likely be raised again, I 
write separately to highlight two important considerations 
that may inform their answers. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020) 67 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
First, there are potentially material differences between 
two separate rules the Delaware Constitution imposes on its 
courts: the “major party” requirement and the “bare major-
ity” requirement. Bare majority requirements preclude any 
single political party from having more than a bare majority 
of the seats in a public body. Such requirements have ex-
isted in various forums for roughly 150 years, currently fea-
ture in a large number of public bodies, and have been shown 
to help achieve ideological diversity. Major party require-
ments like Delaware's, by contrast, preclude anyone who is 
not a member of the two major political parties from serving 
in a public body. They are far rarer than their bare majority 
cousins, and they arguably impose a greater burden on First 
Amendment associational rights. These differences may re-
quire distinct constitutional analyses. 
Second, that possibility, in turn, raises the question 
whether Delaware's major party and bare majority require-
ments are severable from one another, such that one require-
ment could remain even if the other were constitutionally 
unenforceable. It is worth noting that federal courts are not 
ideally positioned to address such a sensitive issue of state 
constitutional law. They may therefore be well advised to 
consider certifying such a question to the State's highest 
court. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U. S. 137, 139 (1996) (per 
curiam) (“Severability [of a state statute] is of course a mat-
ter of state law”); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor , 472 
U. S. 612, 624 (1985) (“It is for the New Mexico courts to 
decide, as a matter of state law, whether the state legislature 
would have enacted the statute without the invalid portion”); 
see also Arizonans for Offcial English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 
43, 77 (1997) (encouraging certifcation of “novel or unsettled 
questions of state law” to “hel[p] build a cooperative judicial 
federalism” (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in 
original)); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 662, n. 16 (1978) 
(certifying a question of state law sua sponte because it was 
“one in which state governments have the highest interest”).

68 CARNEY v. ADAMS 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
Certifcation may be especially warranted in a case such as 
this, where invalidating a state constitutional provision 
would affect the structure of one of the State's three major 
branches of government. 
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Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 592 U. S. Part 1 Pages 53–68 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT December 10, 2020 DERRICK LINDSEY deputy reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to …

• #2

  more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen's interest in the proper application of the law does not count as an “injury in fact” and does not show standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 706. Pp. 58–59. (b) Adams has not shown the necessary “injury in fact.” To establish that he will suffer …

• #3

  bers joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 66. Michael W. McConnell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Steffen N. Johnson, Brian J. Levy, Randy J. Holland, David C. McBride, Martin S. …

• #4

  mittee by Oliver B. Hall; and for Public Citizen by Kaitlin E. Leary, Scott L. Nelson, Allison M. Zieve, and Alan B. Morrison. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Cato Institute by Eugene Vo- lokh and Ilya Shapiro; for the Conference of Chief Justices by Robert L. Byer and Keith R. Fisher; for Professors et a…

• #5

  party” requirement for membership on the Supreme Court, the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court and the “bare Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020) 57 Opinion of the Court majority” requirement for membership on the Family Court and the Court of Common Ple…

• #6

  requirement is constitutional and, then, if it is not, whether it is severable from the bare majority requirement. Pet. for Cert. i. We granted his petition but asked that the parties frst address the question whether Adams has demonstrated Article III standing to bring this lawsuit. II A This case begins and e…

• #7

  tation. He found it “inescapable” that to fnd standing based upon that kind of interest “would signifcantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188 (1974) (concurring opinion). He added that “[w]e…

• #8

  eral Constitution. Accord, Hollingsworth, 570 U. S., at 706. But that kind of interest does not create standing. Rather, the question is whether Adams will suffer a “ `personal and individual' ” injury beyond this generalized grievance—an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than “conjectu…

• #9

  ing which time Adams was a practicing lawyer and a regis- tered Democrat, Delaware's fve courts had a combined total of 14 openings for which Adams, then a Democrat, would have been eligible. Id., at 51–56, 144–164. Yet he did not apply for any of them. When deposed during discovery, Adams said that in 2014 he ha…

• #10

  “has no knowledge of what judicial positions may become open in the next year.” Id., at 62. Sixth, other than the act of fling the lawsuit itself, the summary judgment record contains no evidence of conversa- tions or other actions taken by Adams suggesting that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship. …

• #11

  his change of party affliation, and his swift subsequent fling Page Proof Pending Publication 64 CARNEY v. ADAMS Opinion of the Court of the complaint show a desire to vindicate his view of the law, as articulated in the article he read. Third, if we were to hold that Adams' few words of general intent—without …

• #12

  here. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200 (1995), for example, a subcontractor challenging a race-based program for allocating contracts established standing by showing that it “bids on every guardrail project in Colo- rado,” that the defendant “is likely to let contracts involving guardrail work…

• #13

  merely a “futile gesture.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 365–366 (1977); see also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 944, n. 2 (1982). And we have said that an “aggrieved party `need not allege that he would have obtained the beneft but for the [unlawful] barrier in order to establi…

• #14

  Amendment associational rights. These differences may re- quire distinct constitutional analyses. Second, that possibility, in turn, raises the question whether Delaware's major party and bare majority require- ments are severable from one another, such that one require- ment could remain even if the other were c…