Chicago v. Fulton

Summary

The mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate 11 U. S. C. §362(a)(3), which operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 592 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 154–167 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
January 14, 2021 
DERRICK LINDSEY 
deputy reporter of decisions 
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154 OCTOBER TERM, 2020 
Syllabus 
CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS v. FULTON et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the seventh circuit 
No. 19–357. Argued October 13, 2020—Decided January 14, 2021 
The fling of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code automatically “creates 
an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 
11 U. S. C. § 541(a). Section 541 is intended to include within the estate 
any property made available by other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Section 542 is one such provision, as it provides that an entity 
in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall deliver to the 
trustee, and account for” that property. The fling of a petition also 
automatically “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to 
collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy forum, § 362(a), includ-
ing “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,” 
§ 362(a)(3). Here, each respondent fled a bankruptcy petition and re-
quested that the city of Chicago (City) return his or her vehicle, which 
had been impounded for failure to pay fnes for motor vehicle infractions. 
In each case, the City's refusal was held by a bankruptcy court to violate 
the automatic stay. The Seventh Circuit affrmed, concluding that by 
retaining possession of the vehicles the City had acted “to exercise con-
trol over” respondents' property in violation of § 362(a)(3). 
Held: The mere retention of estate property after the fling of a bank-
ruptcy petition does not violate § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Under that provision, the fling of a bankruptcy petition operates as a 
“stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. 
Taken together, the most natural reading of these terms is that 
§ 362(a)(3) prohibits affrmative acts that would disturb the status quo 
of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was fled. 
Respondents' alternative reading would create at least two serious 
problems. First, reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of property 
would render § 542's central command—that an entity in possession 
of certain estate property “shall deliver to the trustee . . . such 
property”—largely superfuous, even though § 542 appears to be the pro-
vision governing the turnover of estate property. Second, respondents' 
reading would render the commands of § 362(a)(3) and § 542 contradic-
tory. Section 542 carves out exceptions to the turnover command. 
Under respondents' reading, an entity would be required to turn over

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Cite as: 592 U. S. 154 (2020) 155 
Syllabus 
property under § 362(a)(3) even if that property were exempt from turn-
over under § 542. The history of the Bankruptcy Code confrms the 
better reading. The Code originally included both § 362(a)(3) and 
§ 542(a), but the former provision lacked the phrase “or to exercise control 
over property of the estate.” When that phrase was later added by 
amendment, Congress made no mention of transforming § 362(a)(3) into 
an affrmative turnover obligation. It is unlikely that Congress would 
have made such an important change simply by adding the phrase “exer-
cise control,” rather than by adding a cross-reference to § 542(a) or some 
other indication that it was so transforming § 362(a)(3). Pp. 158–162. 
926 F. 3d 916, vacated and remanded. 
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members 
joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 162. 
Craig Goldblatt argued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the briefs were Danielle Spinelli, Joel Millar, Isley 
Gostin, Mark A. Flessner, Benna Ruth Solomon, and My-
riam Zreczny Kasper. 
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for the United 
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the 
brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney 
General Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, and Mark 
B. Stern. 
Eugene R. Wedoff argued the cause for respondents. 
With him on the brief were John P . Wonais, Michael A. 
Miller, Catherine Steege, and Carl Wedoff.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the National Asso-
ciation of Counties et al. by Scott Burnett Smith, Amanda Kellar Karras, 
and Lisa E. Soronen; and for Ralph Brubaker et al. by Michael L. Cook. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American 
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Nusrat J. Choudhury, Rebecca Glenberg, 
David Cole, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. Sch-
weikert, William R. Maurer, Kirby Thomas West, Nila Bala, Charles 
Duan, and John W. Whitehead; for Bankruptcy Law Professors by David 
R. Kuney and Mary Joanne Dowd; for Geraci Law L. L. C. by Nathan E. 
Curtis and Peter F. Geraci; for the National Association of Bankruptcy 
Trustees by Dean A. Ziehl and Bradford J. Sandler; for the National 
Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees by Henry E. Hildebrand III

156 CHICAGO v. FULTON 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 
When a debtor fles a petition for bankruptcy, the Bank-
ruptcy Code protects the debtor's interests by imposing an 
automatic stay on efforts to collect prepetition debts outside 
the bankruptcy forum. Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Ma-
sonry, LLC , 589 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020). Those prohib-
ited efforts include “any act . . . to exercise control over prop-
erty” of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(3). The 
question in this case is whether an entity violates that prohi-
bition by retaining possession of a debtor's property after a 
bankruptcy petition is fled. We hold that mere retention of 
property does not violate § 362(a)(3). 
I 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the fling of a bankruptcy 
petition has certain immediate consequences. For one 
thing, a petition “creates an estate” that, with some excep-
tions, comprises “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement of the case.” 
§ 541(a)(1). Section 541 “is intended to include in the estate 
any property made available to the estate by other provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.” United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 205 (1983). One such provision, 
§ 542, is important for present purposes. Titled “Turnover 
of property to the estate,” § 542 provides, with just a few 
exceptions, that an entity (other than a custodian) in posses-
sion of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall deliver to 
the trustee, and account for” that property. 
A second automatic consequence of the fling of a bank-
ruptcy petition is that, with certain exceptions, the petition 
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to 
collect from the debtor outside of the bankruptcy forum. 
and James M. Davis; for the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Cen-
ter et al. by G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Henry J. Sommer , and Tara Twomey; 
and for John A. E. Pottow et al. by John A. E. Pottow, pro se. 
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Opinion of the Court 
§ 362(a). The automatic stay serves the debtor's interests 
by protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also 
benefts creditors as a group by preventing individual credi-
tors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of 
the others. Under the Code, an individual injured by any 
willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages, 
including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, may recover punitive damages.” § 362(k)(1). 
Among the many collection efforts prohibited by the stay 
is “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or 
of property from the estate or to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate .” § 362(a)(3) (emphasis added). The pro-
hibition against exercising control over estate property is 
the subject of the present dispute. 
In the case before us, the city of Chicago (City) impounded 
each respondent's vehicle for failure to pay fnes for motor 
vehicle infractions. Each respondent fled a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition and requested that the City return his 
or her vehicle. The City refused, and in each case a bank-
ruptcy court held that the City's refusal violated the auto-
matic stay. The Court of Appeals affrmed all of the judg-
ments in a consolidated opinion. In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916 
(CA7 2019). The court concluded that “by retaining posses-
sion of the debtors' vehicles after they declared bankruptcy,” 
the City had acted “to exercise control over” respondents' 
property in violation of § 362(a)(3). Id., at 924–925. We 
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Ap-
peals over whether an entity that retains possession of the 
property of a bankruptcy estate violates § 362(a)(3).
1 589 
U. S. ––– (2019). We now vacate the judgment below. 
1 Compare In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916, 924 (CA7 2019), In re Weber, 719 
F. 3d 72, 81 (CA2 2013), In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F. 3d 1147, 1151–1152 
(CA9 1996), and In re Knaus, 889 F. 2d 773, 774–775 (CA8 1989), with In 
re Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 132 (CA3 2019), and In re Cowen, 849 
F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017).

158 CHICAGO v. FULTON 
Opinion of the Court 
II 
The language used in § 362(a)(3) suggests that merely re-
taining possession of estate property does not violate the 
automatic stay. Under that provision, the fling of a bank-
ruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise 
control” over the property of the estate. Taken together, 
the most natural reading of these terms—“stay,” “act,” and 
“exercise control”—is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits affrmative 
acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as 
of the time when the bankruptcy petition was fled. 
Taking the provision's operative words in turn, the term 
“stay” is commonly used to describe an order that “sus-
pend[s] judicial alteration of the status quo.” Nken v. 
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 429 (2009) (brackets in original; in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). An “act” is “[s]omething 
done or performed . . . ; a deed.” Black's Law Dictionary 
30 (11th ed. 2019); see also Webster's New International Dic-
tionary 25 (2d ed. 1934) (“[t]hat which is done,” “the exercise 
of power,” “a deed”). To “exercise” in the sense relevant 
here means “to bring into play” or “make effective in action.” 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 795 (1993). 
And to “exercise” something like control is “to put in prac-
tice or carry out in action.” Webster's New International 
Dictionary, at 892. The suggestion conveyed by the combi-
nation of these terms is that § 362(a)(3) halts any affrmative 
act that would alter the status quo as of the time of the fling 
of a bankruptcy petition. 
We do not maintain that these terms defnitively rule out 
the alternative interpretation adopted by the court below 
and advocated by respondents. As respondents point out, 
omissions can qualify as “acts” in certain contexts, and the 
term “ `control' ” can mean “ `to have power over.' ” Thomp-
son v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F. 3d 699, 702 
(CA7 2009) (quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Diction-
ary 272 (11th ed. 2003)). But saying that a person engages 
in an “act” to “exercise” his or her power over a thing com-
municates more than merely “having” that power. Thus the 
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Opinion of the Court 
language of § 362(a)(3) implies that something more than 
merely retaining power is required to violate the disputed 
provision. 
Any ambiguity in the text of § 362(a)(3) is resolved decid-
edly in the City's favor by the existence of a separate provi-
sion, § 542, that expressly governs the turnover of estate 
property. Section 542(a), with two exceptions, provides as 
follows: 
“[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, cus-
tody, or control, during the case, of property that the 
trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this 
title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 
of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, 
such property or the value of such property, unless such 
property is of inconsequential value or beneft to the 
estate.” 
The exceptions to § 542(a) shield (1) transfers of estate prop-
erty made from one entity to another in good faith without 
notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and (2) good-
faith transfers to satisfy certain life insurance obligations. 
See §§ 542(c), (d). Reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere reten-
tion of property, as respondents advocate, would create at 
least two serious problems. 
First, it would render the central command of § 542 largely 
superfuous. “The canon against surplusage is strongest 
when an interpretation would render superfuous another 
part of the same statutory scheme.” Yates v. United States, 
574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion; internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted). Reading “any act . . . to exer-
cise control” in § 362(a)(3) to include merely retaining posses-
sion of a debtor's property would make that section a blanket 
turnover provision. But as noted, § 542 expressly governs 
“[t]urnover of property to the estate,” and subsection (a) de-
scribes the broad range of property that an entity “shall de-
liver to the trustee.” That mandate would be surplusage if 
§ 362(a)(3) already required an entity affrmatively to relin-

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160 CHICAGO v. FULTON 
Opinion of the Court 
quish control of the debtor's property at the moment a bank-
ruptcy petition is fled. 
Respondents and their amici contend that § 542(a) would 
still perform some work by specifying the party to whom the 
property in question must be turned over and by requiring 
that an entity “account for . . . the value of” the debtor's 
property if the property is damaged or lost. But that is a 
small amount of work for a large amount of text in a section 
that appears to be the Code provision that is designed to 
govern the turnover of estate property. Under this alterna-
tive interpretation, § 362(a)(3), not § 542, would be the chief 
provision governing turnover—even though § 362(a)(3) says 
nothing expressly on that question. And § 542 would be re-
duced to a footnote—even though it appears on its face to 
be the governing provision. The better account of the two 
provisions is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts out-
side the bankruptcy proceeding that would change the status 
quo, while § 542(a) works within the bankruptcy process to 
draw far-fung estate property back into the hands of the 
debtor or trustee. 
Second, respondents' reading would render the commands 
of § 362(a)(3) and § 542 contradictory. Section 542 carves out 
exceptions to the turnover command, and § 542(a) by its 
terms does not mandate turnover of property that is “of in-
consequential value or beneft to the estate.” Under re-
spondents' reading, in cases where those exceptions to turn-
over under § 542 would apply, § 362(a)(3) would command 
turnover all the same. But it would be “an odd construc-
tion” of § 362(a)(3) to require a creditor to do immediately 
what § 542 specifcally excuses. Citizens Bank of Md. v. 
Strumpf, 516 U. S. 16, 20 (1995). Respondents would have 
us resolve the conficting commands by engrafting § 542's ex-
ceptions onto § 362(a)(3), but there is no textual basis for 
doing so. 
The history of the Bankruptcy Code confrms what its text 
and structure convey. Both § 362(a)(3) and § 542(a) were in-

Cite as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021) 161 
Opinion of the Court 
cluded in the original Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2570, 2595. At the time, 
§ 362(a)(3) applied the stay only to “any act to obtain posses-
sion of property of the estate or of property from the estate.” 
Id., at 2570. The phrase “or to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate” was not added until 1984. Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 
371. 
Respondents do not seriously dispute that § 362(a)(3) 
imposed no turnover obligation prior to the 1984 amend-
ment. But transforming the stay in § 362 into an affrma-
tive turnover obligation would have constituted an impor-
tant change. And it would have been odd for Congress to 
accomplish that change by simply adding the phrase “exer-
cise control,” a phrase that does not naturally comprehend 
the mere retention of property and that does not admit of 
the exceptions set out in § 542. Had Congress wanted to 
make § 362(a)(3) an enforcement arm of sorts for § 542(a), the 
least one would expect would be a cross-reference to the lat-
ter provision, but Congress did not include such a crossrefer-
ence or provide any other indication that it was trans-
forming § 362(a)(3). The better account of the statutory 
history is that the 1984 amendment, by adding the phrase 
regarding the exercise of control, simply extended the stay 
to acts that would change the status quo with respect to 
intangible property and acts that would change the status 
quo with respect to tangible property without “obtain[ing]” 
such property. 
* * * 
Though the parties debate the issue at some length, we 
need not decide how the turnover obligation in § 542 oper-
ates. Nor do we settle the meaning of other subsections of 
§ 362(a).
2 We hold only that mere retention of estate prop-
2 In respondent Shannon's case, the Bankruptcy Court determined that 
by retaining Shannon's vehicle and demanding payment, the City also had 
violated §§ 362(a)(4) and (a)(6). Shannon presented those theories to the 
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162 CHICAGO v. FULTON 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
erty after the fling of a bankruptcy petition does not violate 
§ 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case. 
Justice Sotomayor, concurring. 
Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the 
fling of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay” of “any 
act . . . to exercise control over property of the [bankruptcy] 
estate.” 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(3). I join the Court's opinion 
because I agree that, as used in § 362(a)(3), the phrase “exer-
cise control over” does not cover a creditor's passive reten-
tion of property lawfully seized prebankruptcy. Hence, 
when a creditor has taken possession of a debtor's property, 
§ 362(a)(3) does not require the creditor to return the prop-
erty upon the fling of a bankruptcy petition. 
I write separately to emphasize that the Court has not 
decided whether and when § 362(a)'s other provisions may 
require a creditor to return a debtor's property. Those pro-
visions stay, among other things, “any act to create, perfect, 
or enforce any lien against property of the estate” and “any 
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against [a] debtor” 
that arose prior to bankruptcy proceedings. §§ 362(a)(4), (6); 
see, e. g., In re Kuehn, 563 F. 3d 289, 294 (CA7 2009) (holding 
that a university's refusal to provide a transcript to a 
student-debtor “was an act to collect a debt” that violated 
the automatic stay). Nor has the Court addressed how 
bankruptcy courts should go about enforcing creditors' sepa-
rate obligation to “deliver” estate property to the trustee 
Court of Appeals, but the court did not reach them. 926 F. 3d, at 926, 
n. 1. Neither do we. 
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Cite as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021) 163 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
or debtor under § 542(a). The City's conduct may very well 
violate one or both of these other provisions. The Court 
does not decide one way or the other. 
Regardless of whether the City's policy of refusing to re-
turn impounded vehicles satisfes the letter of the Code, it 
hardly comports with its spirit. “The principal purpose of 
the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ` “fresh start” ' ” to debt-
ors. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U. S. 365, 367 
(2007) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 286 (1991)). 
When a debtor fles for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, as re-
spondents did here, “the debtor retains possession of his 
property” and works toward completing a court-approved re-
payment plan. 549 U. S., at 367. For a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy to succeed, therefore, the debtor must continue earn-
ing an income so he can pay his creditors. Indeed, Chapter 
13 bankruptcy is available only to “individual[s] with regular 
income.” 11 U. S. C. § 109(e). 
For many, having a car is essential to maintaining em-
ployment. Take, for example, respondent George Peake. 
Before the City seized his car, Peake relied on his 
200,000-mile 2007 Lincoln MKZ to travel 45 miles each day 
from his home on the South Side of Chicago to his job in 
Joliet, Illinois. In June 2018, when the City impounded 
Peake's car for unpaid parking and red-light tickets, 
the vehicle was worth just around $4,300 (and was already 
serving as collateral for a roughly $7,300 debt). Without 
his car, Peake had to pay for rides to Joliet. He fled for 
bankruptcy, hoping to recover his vehicle and repay his 
$5,393.27 debt to the City through a Chapter 13 plan. 
The City, however, refused to return the car until either 
Peake paid $1,250 upfront or after the court confrmed 
Peake's bankruptcy plan. As a result, Peake's car remained 
in the City's possession for months. By denying Peake ac-
cess to the vehicle he needed to commute to work, the 
City jeopardized Peake's ability to make payments to all 
his creditors, the City included. Surely, Peake's vehicle 
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164 CHICAGO v. FULTON 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
would have been more valuable in the hands of its owner 
than parked in the City's impound lot. 1 
Peake's situation is far too common. 2 Drivers in low-
income communities across the country face similar vicious 
cycles: A driver is assessed a fne she cannot immediately 
pay; the balance balloons as late fees accrue; the local gov-
ernment seizes the driver's vehicle, adding impounding and 
storage fees to the growing debt; and the driver, now with-
out reliable transportation to and from work, fnds it all but 
impossible to repay her debt and recover her vehicle. See 
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 11–16, 31–32. Such drivers may turn to Chapter 13 
bankruptcy for a “fresh start.” Marrama, 549 U. S., at 367 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3 But without their ve-
hicles, many debtors quickly fnd themselves unable to make 
their Chapter 13 payments. The cycle thus continues, dis-
proportionately burdening communities of color, see Brief for 
American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 17, 
and interfering not only with debtors' ability to earn an 
income and pay their creditors but also with their access 
to childcare, groceries, medical appointments, and other 
necessities. 
1 Even though § 362(a)(3) does not require turnover, whether and when 
the City may sell impounded cars is an entirely different matter. See, 
e. g., In re Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017) (“It's not hard to come 
up with examples of . . . `acts' that `exercise control' over, but do not 
`obtain possession of,' the estate's property, e. g ., a creditor in possession 
who improperly sells property belonging to the estate”). 
2 See, e. g., Ramos, Chicago Seized and Sold Nearly 50,000 Cars Over 
Tickets Since 2011, Sticking Owners With Debt, WBEZ News (Jan. 7, 
2019) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov). 
3 The 10-year period from 2007 to 2017, for instance, saw a tenfold 
increase in the number of Chicagoans fling Chapter 13 bankruptcies 
that involved debt to the City. See Sanchez & Kambhampati, Driven 
Into Debt: How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bank-
ruptcy, ProPublica Illinois (Feb. 27, 2018) (online source archived at 
www.supremecourt.gov). 
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Sotomayor, J., concurring 
Although the Court today holds that § 362(a)(3) does not 
require creditors to turn over impounded vehicles, bank-
ruptcy courts are not powerless to facilitate the return of 
debtors' vehicles to their owners. Most obviously, the Court 
leaves open the possibility of relief under § 542(a). That sec-
tion requires any “entity,” subject to some exceptions, to 
turn over “property” belonging to the bankruptcy estate. 
11 U. S. C. § 542(a). The debtor, in turn, must be able to 
provide the creditor with “adequate protection” of its inter-
est in the returned property, § 363(e); for example, the debtor 
may need to demonstrate that her car is suffciently insured. 
In this way, § 542(a) maximizes value for all parties in-
volved in a bankruptcy: The debtor is able to use her asset, 
which makes it easier to earn an income; the debtor's un-
secured creditors, in turn, receive timely payments from the 
debtor; and the debtor's secured creditor, for its part, 
receives “adequate protection [to] replace the protection 
afforded by possession.” United States v. Whiting Pools, 
Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 207 (1983). Secured creditors cannot opt 
out of this arrangement. As even the City acknowledges, 
§ 542(a) “impose[s] a duty of turnover that is mandatory 
when the statute's conditions . . . are met.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 37. 
The trouble with § 542(a), however, is that turnover 
proceedings can be quite slow. The Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure treat most “proceeding[s] to recover . . . 
property” as “adversary proceedings.” Rule 7001(1). Such 
actions are, in simplifed terms, “essentially full civil lawsuits 
carried out under the umbrella of [a] bankruptcy case.” 
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496, 505 (2015). Be-
cause adversary proceedings require more process, they take 
more time. Of the turnover proceedings fled after July 
2019 and concluding before June 2020, the average case was 
pending for over 100 days. See Administrative Offce of the 
United States Courts, Time Intervals in Months From Filing 
to Closing of Adversary Proceedings Filed Under 11 U. S. C. 
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166 CHICAGO v. FULTON 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
§ 542 for the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2020, Wash-
ington, DC: Sept. 25, 2020. 
One hundred days is a long time to wait for a creditor to 
return your car, especially when you need that car to get to 
work so you can earn an income and make your bankruptcy-
plan payments. To address this problem, some courts have 
adopted strategies to hurry things along. At least one 
bankruptcy court has held that § 542(a)'s turnover obligation 
is automatic even absent a court order. See In re Larimer , 
27 B. R. 514, 516 (Idaho 1983). Other courts apparently will 
permit debtors to seek turnover by simple motion, in lieu of 
fling a full adversary proceeding, at least where the creditor 
has received adequate notice. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 81 (coun-
sel for the City stating that “[i]n most bankruptcy courts, if 
a creditor responds to a motion [for turnover] by” arguing 
that the debtor should have instituted an adversary proceed-
ing, the bankruptcy judge will ask whether the creditor re-
ceived “actual notice”); Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 32 (reporting that “some courts have granted [turn-
over] orders based solely on a motion”); but see, e. g., In re 
Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 128–131 (CA3 2019) (holding 
that debtors must seek turnover through adversary proceed-
ings). Similarly, even when a turnover request does take 
the form of an adversary proceeding, bankruptcy courts may 
fnd it prudent to expedite proceedings or order preliminary 
relief requiring temporary turnover. See, e. g., In re Reid, 
423 B. R. 726, 727–728 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 2010); see gener-
ally 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7065.02 (16th ed. 2019). 
Ultimately, however, any gap left by the Court's ruling 
today is best addressed by rule drafters and policymakers, 
not bankruptcy judges. It is up to the Advisory Committee 
on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to consider amendments 
to the Rules that ensure prompt resolution of debtors' re-
quests for turnover under § 542(a), especially where debtors' 
vehicles are concerned. Congress, too, could offer a statu-
tory fx, either by ensuring that expedited review is available 
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Cite as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021) 167 
Sotomayor, J., concurring 
for § 542(a) proceedings seeking turnover of a vehicle or by 
enacting entirely new statutory mechanisms that require 
creditors to return cars to debtors in a timely manner. 
Nothing in today's opinion forecloses these alternative so-
lutions. With that understanding, I concur. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 592 U. S. Part 1 Pages 154–167 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT January 14, 2021 DERRICK LINDSEY deputy reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to…

• #2

  § 362(a)(3) prohibits affrmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was fled. Respondents' alternative reading would create at least two serious problems. First, reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of property would render § 542's central c…

• #3

  ciation of Counties et al. by Scott Burnett Smith, Amanda Kellar Karras, and Lisa E. Soronen; and for Ralph Brubaker et al. by Michael L. Cook. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Nusrat J. Choudhury, Rebecca Glenberg, David Cole, Jennesa Calvo-Friedma…

• #4

  “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to collect from the debtor outside of the bankruptcy forum. and James M. Davis; for the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Cen- ter et al. by G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Henry J. Sommer , and Tara Twomey; and for John A. E. Pottow et al. by John A. E. Pottow…

• #5

  re Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 132 (CA3 2019), and In re Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017). 158 CHICAGO v. FULTON Opinion of the Court II The language used in § 362(a)(3) suggests that merely re- taining possession of estate property does not violate the automatic stay. Under that provision, the fling of…

• #6

  merely retaining power is required to violate the disputed provision. Any ambiguity in the text of § 362(a)(3) is resolved decid- edly in the City's favor by the existence of a separate provi- sion, § 542, that expressly governs the turnover of estate property. Section 542(a), with two exceptions, provides as fo…

• #7

  that appears to be the Code provision that is designed to govern the turnover of estate property. Under this alterna- tive interpretation, § 362(a)(3), not § 542, would be the chief provision governing turnover—even though § 362(a)(3) says nothing expressly on that question. And § 542 would be re- duced to a foot…

• #8

  the mere retention of property and that does not admit of the exceptions set out in § 542. Had Congress wanted to make § 362(a)(3) an enforcement arm of sorts for § 542(a), the least one would expect would be a cross-reference to the lat- ter provision, but Congress did not include such a crossrefer- ence or prov…

• #9

  or enforce any lien against property of the estate” and “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against [a] debtor” that arose prior to bankruptcy proceedings. §§ 362(a)(4), (6); see, e. g., In re Kuehn, 563 F. 3d 289, 294 (CA7 2009) (holding that a university's refusal to provide a transcript to a studen…

• #10

  Peake paid $1,250 upfront or after the court confrmed Peake's bankruptcy plan. As a result, Peake's car remained in the City's possession for months. By denying Peake ac- cess to the vehicle he needed to commute to work, the City jeopardized Peake's ability to make payments to all his creditors, the City included…

• #11

  that involved debt to the City. See Sanchez & Kambhampati, Driven Into Debt: How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bank- ruptcy, ProPublica Illinois (Feb. 27, 2018) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov). Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021) 165 Sotomayor, J., concu…

• #12

  Sotomayor, J., concurring § 542 for the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2020, Wash- ington, DC: Sept. 25, 2020. One hundred days is a long time to wait for a creditor to return your car, especially when you need that car to get to work so you can earn an income and make your bankruptcy- plan payments. To address…

• #13

  Nothing in today's opinion forecloses these alternative so- lutions. With that understanding, I concur. Page Proof Pending Publication