Alaska v. Wright

Summary

The requirement under 28 U. S. C. §2254(a) that a habeas petitioner be “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” is not met if the state judgment is simply a necessary predicate to a federal conviction.

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PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 152–154 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
April 26, 2021 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
Page Proof Pending Publication
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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152 OCTOBER TERM, 2020 
Per Curiam 
ALASKA v. WRIGHT 
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united 
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit 
No. 20–940. Decided April 26, 2021 
An Alaska jury convicted Sean Wright of sexual abuse charges, and he 
served his sentence for those state crimes. Wright then moved to Ten-
nessee, where he failed to register as a sex offender as required by 
federal law. See 34 U. S. C. §§ 20911, 20913. Wright pleaded guilty to 
failure to register and received a sentence of time served along with 
fve years of supervised release. During those federal proceedings in 
Tennessee, Wright fled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2254. He argued that the Alaska Supreme Court 
had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied 
his Sixth Amendment claims and affrmed his state conviction on the 
sexual abuse charges. The District Court denied Wright's petition be-
cause Wright was not “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court.” § 2254(a). The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that because 
Wright's state conviction was “a necessary predicate” to his federal con-
viction, Wright was in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment. 
Held: The Court of Appeals clearly erred. Section 2254(a) permits a fed-
eral court to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court.” That Wright's state conviction served as a predicate for his 
federal conviction did not render him “in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court” under § 2254(a). See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 
488 (per curiam ). 
Certiorari granted; 819 Fed. Appx. 544, vacated and remanded. 
Per Curiam. 
In 2009, an Alaska jury convicted Sean Wright of 13 counts 
of sexual abuse of a minor. See State v. Wright, 404 P. 3d 
166, 170 (Alaska 2017). Wright fnished serving his sentence 
in Alaska in 2016, and shortly thereafter he moved to Ten-
nessee. Once there, he failed to register as a sex offender 
as required by federal law. See Sex Offender Registration 
and Notifcation Act, 120 Stat. 591, 593, 34 U. S. C. §§ 20911,

Cite as: 593 U. S. 152 (2021) 153 
Per Curiam 
20913. Wright pleaded guilty to one count of failure to reg-
ister, see 18 U. S. C. § 2250(a), and ultimately received a sen-
tence of time served along with fve years of supervised 
release. See Judgment in United States v. Wright, No. 1:17– 
cr–00112, ECF Doc. No. 66 (ED Tenn.). 
During the course of those federal proceedings, Wright 
fled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the District of Alaska pursuant to 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2254. He argued that the Alaska Su-
preme Court had unreasonably applied clearly established 
federal law when it denied his Sixth Amendment claims and 
affrmed his 2009 state conviction and sentence. The Dis-
trict Court denied the motion on the threshold ground that 
Wright was not “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court.” § 2254(a). Noting that a proper motion under 
§ 2254(a) requires more than merely being “in custody” some-
where, the court reasoned that “the proper procedure for 
Wright to challenge his current federal custody would be a 
motion fled in the Eastern District of Tennessee pursuant 
to 28 U. S. C. § 2255.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. In its view, Wright's 
state conviction was “ `a necessary predicate' ” to his federal 
conviction, 819 Fed. Appx. 544, 545 (CA9 2020) (quoting 
Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F. 3d 1015, 1019 (CA9 2001)), so Wright 
was in fact in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state 
court. The panel declined to assess the District Court's 
view that § 2255, rather than § 2254, provided the proper 
route for Wright to challenge his current custody. 819 Fed. 
Appx., at 546, n. 1. One judge concurred and asserted that 
§ 2254 was the proper mechanism “because Wright is not at-
tacking the constitutionality of his federal conviction for fail-
ing to register as a sex offender in Tennessee; he is collater-
ally attacking the constitutionality of his predicate Alaska 
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor.” Id., at 546. 
The Court of Appeals clearly erred. Section 2254(a) per-
mits a federal court to entertain an application for a writ of 
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154 ALASKA v. WRIGHT 
Per Curiam 
habeas corpus on behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to 
the judgment of a State court.” In Maleng v. Cook, 490 
U. S. 488 (1989) (per curiam ), we held that a habeas peti-
tioner does not remain “in custody” under a conviction “after 
the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because 
of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to 
enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes 
of which he is convicted.” Id., at 492; see also id., at 
490 (noting the “in custody” requirement appears in both 
§§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a)). It made no difference, we said, 
that the possibility of a prior-conviction enhancement had 
materialized for the habeas petitioner in that case: “When 
the second sentence is imposed, it is pursuant to the second 
conviction that the petitioner is incarcerated and is therefore 
`in custody.' ” Id., at 492–493. 
That Wright's state conviction served as a predicate for 
his federal conviction thus did not render him “in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court” under § 2254(a). 
If Wright's second conviction had been for a state crime, he 
independently could have satisfed § 2254(a)'s “in custody” re-
quirement, see Lackawanna County District Attorney v. 
Coss, 532 U. S. 394, 401–402 (2001), though his ability to at-
tack the frst conviction by that means would have been lim-
ited, see id., at 402–404. Wright could not satisfy § 2254(a) 
on that independent basis for the simple reason that his sec-
ond judgment was entered by a federal court. 
* * * 
We express no view on the other theories Wright advanced 
before the District Court for meeting the requirements of 
§ 2254(a). We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, va-
cate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Retrieval chunks

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  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 Pages 152–154 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT April 26, 2021 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to not…

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  166, 170 (Alaska 2017). Wright fnished serving his sentence in Alaska in 2016, and shortly thereafter he moved to Ten- nessee. Once there, he failed to register as a sex offender as required by federal law. See Sex Offender Registration and Notifcation Act, 120 Stat. 591, 593, 34 U. S. C. §§ 20911, Cite as: 593 U…

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  Page Proof Pending Publication 154 ALASKA v. WRIGHT Per Curiam habeas corpus on behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” In Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 488 (1989) (per curiam ), we held that a habeas peti- tioner does not remain “in custody” under a conviction “after the sentence…