Caniglia v. Strom

Summary

Neither the holding nor logic of Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, justifies the removal of Caniglia’s firearms from his home by police officers under a “community caretaking exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 194–208 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 17, 2021 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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194 OCTOBER TERM, 2020 
Syllabus 
CANIGLIA v. STROM et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the rst circuit 
No. 20–157. Argued March 24, 2021—Decided May 17, 2021 
During an argument with his wife, petitioner Edward Caniglia placed a 
handgun on the dining room table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] 
and get it over with.” His wife instead left the home and spent the 
night at a hotel. The next morning, she was unable to reach her hus-
band by phone, so she called the police to request a welfare check. The 
responding offcers accompanied Caniglia's wife to the home, where they 
encountered Caniglia on the porch. The offcers called an ambulance 
based on the belief that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Ca-
niglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation on the 
condition that the offcers not confscate his frearms. But once Caniglia 
left, the offcers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claim-
ing that the offcers had entered his home and seized him and his fre-
arms without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to the offcers. The First 
Circuit affrmed, extrapolating from the Court's decision in Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, a theory that the offcers' removal of Canig-
lia and his frearms from his home was justifed by a “community care-
taking exception” to the warrant requirement. 
Held: Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifes such warrantless 
searches and seizures in the home. Cady held that a warrantless search 
of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured frearm did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that 
the offcers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to dis-
charge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as respond-
ing to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. 413 U. S., at 441. 
But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different, as the 
Cady opinion repeatedly stressed. Id., at 439, 440–442. The very core 
of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee is the right of a person to retreat 
into his or her home and “there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6. A recognition of the 
existence of “community caretaking” tasks, like rendering aid to motor-
ists in disabled vehicles, is not an open-ended license to perform them 
anywhere. Pp. 197–199. 
953 F. 3d 112, vacated and remanded.

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Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 195 
Syllabus 
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Roberts, 
C. J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 199. 
Alito, J., post, p. 200, and Kavanaugh, J ., post, p. 204, fled concurring 
opinions. 
Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the briefs were Jonathan L. Marcus, Emily J. Ken-
nedy, Thomas W. Lyons, and Rhiannon S. Huffman. 
Marc DeSisto argued the cause for respondents. With 
him on the brief were Michael A. DeSisto, Rebecca Tedford 
Partington, Kathleen M. Daniels, and Jonathan A. Herstoff. 
Morgan L. Ratner argued the cause for the United States 
as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the brief 
were Acting Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General McQuaid, Deputy Solicitor General Fei-
gin, and Ross B. Goldman.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American 
Association of Suicidology by Christopher S. Gontarz and Kelly M. Fra-
cassa; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Lisa S. Blatt, 
Charles L. McCloud, Clark M. Neily III, Ilya Shapiro, David D. Cole, 
Ezekiel Edwards, and Lynette Labinger; for the Constitutional Account-
ability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, David H. Gans, 
and Brian R. Frazelle; for the Firearms Policy Coalition et al. by Joseph 
G. S. Greenlee and David B. Kopel; for Gun Owners of America, Inc., et al. 
by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, and Herbert 
W. Titus; for the Institute for Justice by Joshua Windham and Robert 
Frommer; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. 
by Joshua L. Dratel; for The Rutherford Institute by Michael J. Lockerby, 
George E. Quillin, and John W. Whitehead; for the Second Amendment 
Foundation by Donald E. J. Kilmer, Jr.; and for the Second Amendment 
Law Center, Inc., et al. by Stephen P . Halbrook, C. D. Michel, Anna M. 
Barvir, and Matthew D. Cubeiro. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 
Iowa et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak, 
Solicitor General, Thomas B. Brunker, Deputy Solicitor General, David 
Simpson, Assistant Solicitor General, and Jeffrey S. Gray , and by the At-
torneys General for their respective States as follows: Thomas J. Miller 
of Iowa, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Austin

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196 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of 
an impounded vehicle for an unsecured frearm did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
U. S. 433 (1973). In reaching this conclusion, the Court ob-
served that police offcers who patrol the “public highways” 
are often called to discharge noncriminal “community care-
taking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or 
investigating accidents. Id., at 441. The question today is 
whether Cady's acknowledgment of these “caretaking” du-
ties creates a standalone doctrine that justifes warrantless 
searches and seizures in the home. It does not. 
I 
During an argument with his wife at their Rhode Island 
home, Edward Caniglia (petitioner) retrieved a handgun 
from the bedroom, put it on the dining room table, and asked 
his wife to “shoot [him] now and get it over with.” She de-
clined, and instead left to spend the night at a hotel. The 
next morning, when petitioner's wife discovered that she 
could not reach him by telephone, she called the police (re-
spondents) to request a welfare check. 
Respondents accompanied petitioner's wife to the home, 
where they encountered petitioner on the porch. Petitioner 
spoke with respondents and confrmed his wife's account of 
the argument, but denied that he was suicidal. Respond-
ents, however, thought that petitioner posed a risk to himself 
or others. They called an ambulance, and petitioner agreed 
Knudsen of Montana, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South 
Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, and Ken Paxton of Texas; 
and for the National Association of Counties et al. by John J. Korzen and 
Lisa Soronen. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by 
Daniel Woislaw and Steven M. Simpson; and for the Project for Privacy & 
Surveillance Accountability et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, Han-
nah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, Scott D. Goodwin, and Mahesha 
P . Subbaraman.

Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 197 
Opinion of the Court 
to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation—but only 
after respondents allegedly promised not to confscate his 
frearms. Once the ambulance had taken petitioner away, 
however, respondents seized the weapons. Guided by pe-
titioner's wife—whom they allegedly misinformed about 
his wishes—respondents entered the home and took two 
handguns. 
Petitioner sued, claiming that respondents violated the 
Fourth Amendment when they entered his home and seized 
him and his frearms without a warrant. The District Court 
granted summary judgment to respondents, and the First 
Circuit affrmed solely on the ground that the decision to 
remove petitioner and his frearms from the premises fell 
within a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant 
requirement. 953 F. 3d 112, 121–123, 131, and nn. 5, 9 (2020). 
Citing this Court's statement in Cady that police offcers 
often have noncriminal reasons to interact with motorists on 
“public highways,” 413 U. S., at 441, the First Circuit extrap-
olated a freestanding community-caretaking exception that 
applies to both cars and homes. 953 F. 3d, at 124 (“Threats 
to individual and community safety are not confned to the 
highways”). Accordingly, the First Circuit saw no need to 
consider whether anyone had consented to respondents' ac-
tions; whether these actions were justifed by “exigent cir-
cumstances”; or whether any state law permitted this kind 
of mental-health intervention. Id., at 122–123. All that 
mattered was that respondents' efforts to protect petitioner 
and those around him were “distinct from `the normal work 
of criminal investigation,' ” fell “within the realm of reason,” 
and generally tracked what the court viewed to be “sound 
police procedure.” Id., at 123–128, 132–133. We granted 
certiorari. 592 U. S. ––– (2020). 
II 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
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198 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Opinion of the Court 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “ `very 
core' ” of this guarantee is “ `the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion.' ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 
(2013). 
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all 
unwelcome intrusions “on private property,” ibid.—only “un-
reasonable” ones. We have thus recognized a few permissi-
ble invasions of the home and its curtilage. Perhaps most 
familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pursuant 
to a valid warrant. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. 
–––, ––– – ––– (2018). We have also held that law enforce-
ment offcers may enter private property without a warrant 
when certain exigent circumstances exist, including the need 
to “ `render emergency assistance to an injured occupant 
or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.' ” Ken-
tucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 470 (2011); see also Brig-
ham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404 (2006) (listing 
other examples of exigent circumstances). And, of course, 
offcers may generally take actions that “ `any private citi-
zen might do' ” without fear of liability. E. g., Jardines, 569 
U. S., at 8 (approaching a home and knocking on the front 
door). 
The First Circuit's “community caretaking” rule, however, 
goes beyond anything this Court has recognized. The deci-
sion below assumed that respondents lacked a warrant or 
consent, and it expressly disclaimed the possibility that they 
were reacting to a crime. The court also declined to con-
sider whether any recognized exigent circumstances were 
present because respondents had forfeited the point. Nor 
did it fnd that respondents' actions were akin to what a pri-
vate citizen might have had authority to do if petitioner's 
wife had approached a neighbor for assistance instead of 
the police. 
Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifed that ap-
proach. True, Cady also involved a warrantless search for 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 199 
Roberts, C. J., concurring 
a frearm. But the location of that search was an impounded 
vehicle—not a home—“ `a constitutional difference' ” that the 
opinion repeatedly stressed. 413 U. S., at 439; see also id., 
at 440–442. In fact, Cady expressly contrasted its treat-
ment of a vehicle already under police control with a search 
of a car “parked adjacent to the dwelling place of the owner.” 
Id., at 446–448 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 
443 (1971)). 
Cady 's unmistakable distinction between vehicles and 
homes also places into proper context its reference to “com-
munity caretaking.” This quote comes from a portion of the 
opinion explaining that the “frequency with which . . . vehi-
cle[s] can become disabled or involved in . . . accident[s] on 
public highways” often requires police to perform noncrimi-
nal “community caretaking functions,” such as providing aid 
to motorists. 413 U. S., at 441. But, this recognition that 
police offcers perform many civic tasks in modern society 
was just that—a recognition that these tasks exist, and not 
an open-ended license to perform them anywhere. 
* * * 
What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is 
reasonable for homes. Cady acknowledged as much, and 
this Court has repeatedly “declined to expand the scope of 
. . . exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit war-
rantless entry into the home.” Collins, 584 U. S., at 
–––. We thus vacate the judgment below and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Breyer 
joins, concurring. 
Fifteen years ago, this Court unanimously recognized that 
“[t]he role of a peace offcer includes preventing violence and 
restoring order, not simply rendering frst aid to casualties.” 
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200 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Alito, J., concurring 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 406 (2006). A war-
rant to enter a home is not required, we explained, when 
there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured 
or threatened with such injury.” Id., at 403; see also Michi-
gan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam ) (warrant-
less entry justifed where “there was an objectively reason-
able basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, 
or persons were in danger” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Nothing in today's opinion is to the contrary, and I 
join it on that basis. 
Justice Alito, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to ex-
plain my understanding of the Court's holding and to high-
light some important questions that the Court does not 
decide. 
1. The Court holds—and I entirely agree—that there is 
no special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of 
cases involving “community caretaking.” As I understand 
the term, it describes the many police tasks that go beyond 
criminal law enforcement. These tasks vary widely, and 
there is no clear limit on how far they might extend in the 
future. The category potentially includes any non -
law-enforcement work that a community chooses to assign, 
and because of the breadth of activities that may be de-
scribed as community caretaking, we should not assume that 
the Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness applies 
in the same way to everything that might be viewed as fall-
ing into this broad category. 
The Court's decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 
(1973), did not recognize any such “freestanding” Fourth 
Amendment category. See ante, at 197, 199. The opinion 
merely used the phrase “community caretaking” in passing. 
413 U. S., at 441. 
2. While there is no overarching “community caretaking” 
doctrine, it does not follow that all searches and seizures 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 201 
Alito, J., concurring 
conducted for non-law-enforcement purposes must be ana-
lyzed under precisely the same Fourth Amendment rules de-
veloped in criminal cases. Those rules may or may not be 
appropriate for use in various non-criminal-law-enforcement 
contexts. We do not decide that issue today. 
3. This case falls within one important category of cases 
that could be viewed as involving community caretaking: 
conducting a search or seizure for the purpose of preventing 
a person from committing suicide. Assuming that petitioner 
did not voluntarily consent to go with the offcers for a psy-
chological assessment,
1 he was seized and thus subjected to 
a serious deprivation of liberty. But was this warrantless 
seizure “reasonable”? We have addressed the standards re-
quired by due process for involuntary commitment to a men-
tal treatment facility, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 
427 (1979); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 
574–576 (1975); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 75–77, 83 
(1992), but we have not addressed Fourth Amendment re-
strictions on seizures like the one that we must assume oc-
curred here, i. e., a short-term seizure conducted for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether a person presents an imminent 
risk of suicide. Every State has laws allowing emergency 
seizures for psychiatric treatment, observation, or stabiliza-
tion, but these laws vary in many respects, including the 
categories of persons who may request the emergency ac-
tion, the reasons that can justify the action, the necessity 
of a judicial proceeding, and the nature of the proceeding.
2 
Mentioning these laws only in passing, petitioner asked us to 
1 The Court of Appeals assumed petitioner's consent was not voluntary 
because the police allegedly promised that they would not seize his 
guns if he went for a psychological evaluation. 953 F. 3d 112, 121 
(CA1 2020). The Court does not decide whether this assumption was 
justifed. 
2 See Brief for Petitioner 38–39, n. 4 (gathering state authorities); L. 
Hedman et al., State Laws on Emergency Holds for Mental Health Stabili-
zation, 67 Psychiatric Servs. 579 (2016).

202 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Alito, J., concurring 
render a decision that could call features of these laws into 
question. The Court appropriately refrains from doing so. 
4. This case also implicates another body of law that peti-
tioner glossed over: the so-called “red fag” laws that some 
States are now enacting. These laws enable the police to 
seize guns pursuant to a court order to prevent their use for 
suicide or the infiction of harm on innocent persons. See, 
e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 18125–18148 (West Cum. Supp. 
2021); Fla. Stat. § 790.401(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann., ch. 140, § 131T (2021). They typically specify 
the standard that must be met and the procedures that must 
be followed before frearms may be seized. Provisions of 
red fag laws may be challenged under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and those cases may come before us. Our decision 
today does not address those issues. 
5. One additional category of cases should be noted: those 
involving warrantless, nonconsensual searches of a home for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether a resident is in urgent 
need of medical attention and cannot summon help. At oral 
argument, The Chief Justice posed a question that high-
lighted this problem. He imagined a situation in which 
neighbors of an elderly woman call the police and express 
concern because the woman had agreed to come over for din-
ner at 6 p.m., but by 8 p.m., had not appeared or called even 
though she was never late for anything. The woman had 
not been seen leaving her home, and she was not answering 
the phone. Nor could the neighbors reach her relatives by 
phone. If the police entered the home without a warrant to 
see if she needed help, would that violate the Fourth Amend-
ment? Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8. 
Petitioner's answer was that it would. Indeed, he argued, 
even if 24 hours went by, the police still could not lawfully 
enter without a warrant. If the situation remained un-
changed for several days, he suggested, the police might be 
able to enter after obtaining “a warrant for a missing per-
son.” Id., at 9. 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 203 
Alito, J., concurring 
The Chief Justice's question concerns an important 
real-world problem. Today, more than ever, many people, 
including many elderly persons, live alone. 3 Many elderly 
men and women fall in their homes, 4 or become incapacitated 
for other reasons, and unfortunately, there are many cases 
in which such persons cannot call for assistance. In those 
cases, the chances for a good recovery may fade with each 
passing hour.
5 So in The Chief Justice's imaginary case, 
if the elderly woman was seriously hurt or sick and the po-
lice heeded petitioner's suggestion about what the Fourth 
Amendment demands, there is a fair chance she would not 
be found alive. This imaginary woman may have regarded 
her house as her castle, but it is doubtful that she would have 
wanted it to be the place where she died alone and in agony. 
Our current precedents do not address situations like this. 
We have held that the police may enter a home without a 
warrant when there are “exigent circumstances.” Payton 
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 590 (1980). But circumstances 
are exigent only when there is not enough time to get a war-
rant, see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 149 (2013); 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978), and warrants 
are not typically granted for the purpose of checking on a 
person's medical condition. Perhaps States should institute 
procedures for the issuance of such warrants, but in the 
meantime, courts may be required to grapple with the basic 
Fourth Amendment question of reasonableness. 
3 Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, The Rise of Living Alone, 
Fig. HH–4 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ library / 
visualizations/time-series/demo/families-and-households/hh-4.pdf; Ortiz-
Ospina, The Rise of Living Alone (Dec. 10, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/ 
living-alone; Smith, Cities With the Most Adults Living Alone (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.self.inc/ blog/adults-living-alone. 
4 See B. Moreland, R. Kakara, & A. Henry, Trends in Nonfatal Falls and 
Fall-Related Injuries Among Adults Aged ≥65 Years—United States, 
2012–2018, 69 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 875 (2020). 
5 See, e. g., J. Gurley, N. Lum, M. Sande, B. Lo, & M. Katz, Persons Found 
in Their Homes Helpless or Dead, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1710 (1996).

204 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
6. The three categories of cases discussed above are sim-
ply illustrative. Searches and seizures conducted for other 
non-law-enforcement purposes may arise and may present 
their own Fourth Amendment issues. Today's decision does 
not settle those questions. 
* * * 
In sum, the Court properly rejects the broad “community 
caretaking” theory on which the decision below was based. 
The Court's decision goes no further, and on that under-
standing, I join the opinion in full. 
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to 
underscore and elaborate on The Chief Justice's point that 
the Court's decision does not prevent police offcers from tak-
ing reasonable steps to assist those who are inside a home 
and in need of aid. See ante, at 199–200 (Roberts, C. J ., 
concurring). For example, as I will explain, police offcers 
may enter a home without a warrant in circumstances where 
they are reasonably trying to prevent a potential suicide or 
to help an elderly person who has been out of contact and 
may have fallen and suffered a serious injury. 
Ratifed in 1791 and made applicable to the States in 1868, 
the Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” As the consti-
tutional text establishes, the “ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Riley v. Califor-
nia, 573 U. S. 373, 381 (2014) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The Court has said that a warrant supported by prob-
able cause is ordinarily required for law enforcement offcers 
to enter a home. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. But drawing 
on common-law analogies and a commonsense appraisal of 
what is “reasonable,” the Court has recognized various situa-
tions where a warrant is not required. For example, the 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 205 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
exigent circumstances doctrine allows offcers to enter a 
home without a warrant in certain situations, including: to 
fght a fre and investigate its cause; to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence; to engage in hot pursuit of a feeing 
felon or prevent a suspect's escape; to address a threat to the 
safety of law enforcement offcers or the general public; to 
render emergency assistance to an injured occupant; or to 
protect an occupant who is threatened with serious injury. 
See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (plurality 
opinion); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 
U. S. 600, 612 (2015); Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 
462 (2011); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) (per 
curiam); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006); 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91, 100 (1990); Michigan v. 
Clifford, 464 U. S. 287, 293, and n. 4 (1984) (plurality opinion); 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 392–394 (1978); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509–510 (1978); United States v. San-
tana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary 
v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298–299 (1967); Ker v. California, 
374 U. S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion). 
Over the years, many courts, like the First Circuit in this 
case, have relied on what they have labeled a “community 
caretaking” doctrine to allow warrantless entries into the 
home for a non-investigatory purpose, such as to prevent a 
suicide or to conduct a welfare check on an older individual 
who has been out of contact. But as the Court today ex-
plains, any such standalone community caretaking doctrine 
was primarily devised for searches of cars, not homes. 
Ante, at 197–199; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 
447–448 (1973). 
That said, this Fourth Amendment issue is more labeling 
than substance. The Court's Fourth Amendment case law 
already recognizes the exigent circumstances doctrine, 
which allows an offcer to enter a home without a warrant if 
the “exigencies of the situation make the needs of law en-
forcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objec-
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206 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
tively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham 
City, 547 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also ante, at 198. As relevant here, one such recognized 
“exigency” is the “need to assist persons who are seriously 
injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 
U. S., at 403; see also ante, at 199–200 (Roberts, C. J., con-
curring). The Fourth Amendment allows offcers to enter a 
home if they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing” that such help is needed, and if the offcers' actions in-
side the home are reasonable under the circumstances. 
Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 
558 U. S., at 47–48. 
This case does not require us to explore all the contours of 
the exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to emergency-
aid situations because the offcers here disclaimed reliance 
on that doctrine. But to avoid any confusion going forward, 
I think it important to briefy describe how the doctrine ap-
plies to some heartland emergency-aid situations. 
As Chief Judge Livingston has cogently explained, al-
though this doctrinal area does not draw much attention 
from courts or scholars, “municipal police spend a good deal 
of time responding to calls about missing persons, sick neigh-
bors, and premises left open at night.” Livingston, Police, 
Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 
U. Chi. Leg. Forum 261, 263 (1998). And as she aptly noted, 
“the responsibility of police offcers to search for missing per-
sons, to mediate disputes, and to aid the ill or injured has 
never been the subject of serious debate; nor has” the “re-
sponsibility of police to provide services in an emergency.” 
Id., at 302. 
Consistent with that reality, the Court's exigency prece-
dents, as I read them, permit warrantless entries when po-
lice offcers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe 
that there is a current, ongoing crisis for which it is reason-
able to act now. See, e. g., Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612; Michi-
gan v. Fisher, 558 U. S., at 48–49; Brigham City , 547 U. S., 
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
at 406–407. The offcers do not need to show that the harm 
has already occurred or is mere moments away, because 
knowing that will often be diffcult if not impossible in cases 
involving, for example, a person who is currently suicidal or 
an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have 
fallen. If someone is at risk of serious harm and it is reason-
able for offcers to intervene now, that is enough for the off-
cers to enter. 
A few (non-exhaustive) examples illustrate the point. 
Suppose that a woman calls a healthcare hotline or 911 and 
says that she is contemplating suicide, that she has frearms 
in her home, and that she might as well die. The operator 
alerts the police, and two offcers respond by driving to the 
woman's home. They knock on the door but do not receive 
a response. May the offcers enter the home? Of course. 
The exigent circumstances doctrine applies because the of-
fcers have an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing 
that an occupant is “seriously injured or threatened with 
such injury.” Id., at 400, 403; cf. Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612 
(offcers could enter the room of a mentally ill person who 
had locked herself inside with a knife). After all, a suicidal 
individual in such a scenario could kill herself at any mo-
ment. The Fourth Amendment does not require offcers to 
stand idly outside as the suicide takes place.
1 
Consider another example. Suppose that an elderly man 
is uncharacteristically absent from Sunday church services 
and repeatedly fails to answer his phone throughout the day 
and night. A concerned relative calls the police and asks 
the offcers to perform a wellness check. Two offcers drive 
1 In 2019 in the United States, 47,511 people committed suicide. That 
number is more than double the number of annual homicides. See Dept. 
of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
D. Stone, C. Jones, & K. Mack, Changes in Suicide Rates––United States, 
2018–2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 261, 263 (2021) 
(MMWR); Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform 
Crime Report, Crime in the United States, 2019, p. 2 (2020). 
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208 CANIGLIA v. STROM 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
to the man's home. They knock but receive no response. 
May the offcers enter the home? Of course. 
Again, the offcers have an “objectively reasonable basis” 
for believing that an occupant is “seriously injured or threat-
ened with such injury.” Brigham City , 547 U. S., at 400, 
403. Among other possibilities, the elderly man may have 
fallen and hurt himself, a common cause of death or serious 
injury for older individuals. The Fourth Amendment does 
not prevent the offcers from entering the home and checking 
on the man's well-being.
2 
To be sure, courts, police departments, and police offcers 
alike must take care that offcers' actions in those kinds of 
cases are reasonable under the circumstances. But both of 
those examples and others as well, such as cases involving 
unattended young children inside a home, illustrate the kinds 
of warrantless entries that are perfectly constitutional under 
the exigent circumstances doctrine, in my view. 
With those observations, I join the Court's opinion in full. 
2 In 2018 in the United States, approximately 32,000 older adults died 
from falls. Falls are also the leading cause of injury for older adults. B. 
Moreland, R. Kakara, & A. Henry, Trends in Nonfatal Falls and Fall-
Related Injuries Among Adults Aged ≥ 65 Years––United States, 2012– 
2018, 69 MMWR 875 (2020). 
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Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 Pages 194–208 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 17, 2021 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different, as the Cady opinion repeatedly stressed. Id., at 439, 440–442. The very core of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his or her home and “there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Florida v. Jardi…

• #3

  Law Center, Inc., et al. by Stephen P . Halbrook, C. D. Michel, Anna M. Barvir, and Matthew D. Cubeiro. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Iowa et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak, Solicitor General, Thomas B. Brunker, Deputy Solicitor General, David …

• #4

  Surveillance Accountability et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, Han- nah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, Scott D. Goodwin, and Mahesha P . Subbaraman. Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 197 Opinion of the Court to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation—but only after respondents allegedly promised not to…

• #5

  To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all unwelcome intrusions “on private property,” ibid.—only “un- reasonable” ones. We have thus recognized a few permissi- ble invasions of the home and its curtilage. Perhaps most familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pursuant to a valid warrant. See C…

• #6

  opinion explaining that the “frequency with which . . . vehi- cle[s] can become disabled or involved in . . . accident[s] on public highways” often requires police to perform noncrimi- nal “community caretaking functions,” such as providing aid to motorists. 413 U. S., at 441. But, this recognition that police of…

• #7

  and because of the breadth of activities that may be de- scribed as community caretaking, we should not assume that the Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness applies in the same way to everything that might be viewed as fall- ing into this broad category. The Court's decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. …

• #8

  1 The Court of Appeals assumed petitioner's consent was not voluntary because the police allegedly promised that they would not seize his guns if he went for a psychological evaluation. 953 F. 3d 112, 121 (CA1 2020). The Court does not decide whether this assumption was justifed. 2 See Brief for Petitioner 38–39,…

• #9

  able to enter after obtaining “a warrant for a missing per- son.” Id., at 9. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021) 203 Alito, J., concurring The Chief Justice's question concerns an important real-world problem. Today, more than ever, many people, including…

• #10

  204 CANIGLIA v. STROM Kavanaugh, J., concurring 6. The three categories of cases discussed above are sim- ply illustrative. Searches and seizures conducted for other non-law-enforcement purposes may arise and may present their own Fourth Amendment issues. Today's decision does not settle those questions. * * * …

• #11

  protect an occupant who is threatened with serious injury. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (plurality opinion); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, 612 (2015); Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 462 (2011); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam); B…

• #12

  This case does not require us to explore all the contours of the exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to emergency- aid situations because the offcers here disclaimed reliance on that doctrine. But to avoid any confusion going forward, I think it important to briefy describe how the doctrine ap- plies to som…

• #13

  that an occupant is “seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Id., at 400, 403; cf. Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612 (offcers could enter the room of a mentally ill person who had locked herself inside with a knife). After all, a suicidal individual in such a scenario could kill herself at any mo- ment. The F…

• #14

  Moreland, R. Kakara, & A. Henry, Trends in Nonfatal Falls and Fall- Related Injuries Among Adults Aged ≥ 65 Years––United States, 2012– 2018, 69 MMWR 875 (2020). Page Proof Pending Publication