BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Summary

Where defendant energy companies premised 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, §1442, the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider all grounds for removal rejected by the District Court.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 230–254 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 17, 2021 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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230 OCTOBER TERM, 2020 
Syllabus 
BP P. L. C. et al. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF 
BALTIMORE 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the fourth circuit 
No. 19–1189. Argued January 19, 2021—Decided May 17, 2021 
Baltimore's Mayor and City Council (collectively City) sued various energy 
companies in Maryland state court alleging that the companies con-
cealed the environmental impacts of the fossil fuels they promoted. 
The defendant companies removed the case to federal court invoking a 
number of grounds for federal jurisdiction, including the federal offcer 
removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1442. The City argued that none of the 
defendants' various grounds for removal justifed retaining federal juris-
diction, and the district court agreed, issuing an order remanding the 
case back to state court. Although an order remanding a case to state 
court is ordinarily unreviewable on appeal, Congress has determined 
that appellate review is available for those orders “remanding a case to 
the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 
1443 of [Title 28].” § 1447(d). The Fourth Circuit read this provision 
to authorize appellate review only for the part of a remand order decid-
ing the § 1442 or § 1443 removal ground. It therefore held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the district court's rejection of the defendants' 
other removal grounds. 
Held: The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider all of the defendants' grounds for removal under § 1447(d). 
Pp. 237–247. 
(a) The ordinary meaning of § 1447(d)'s text permits appellate review 
of the district court's entire remand order when a defendant relies on 
§ 1442 or § 1443 as a ground for removal. The relevant portion of 
§ 1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court 
from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title 
shall be reviewable by appeal.” The “order remanding a case” here 
rejected all of the defendants' grounds for removal because (subject to 
exceptions not applicable here) the district court was not at liberty to 
remove the City's case from its docket until it determined that it lacked 
any authority to entertain the suit. See, e. g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. 
v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 356; see also Sprint Communications, Inc. v. 
Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 72 (“[C]ourts are obliged to decide cases within 
the scope of federal jurisdiction” assigned to them). And this case was 
removed “pursuant to” § 1442 because the defendants relied on § 1442 as

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Syllabus 
a ground for removal when satisfying the requirements of § 1446. It 
makes no difference that the defendants removed the case “pursuant to” 
multiple federal statutes. The general removal statute contemplates 
this possibility when it speaks of actions “removed solely under” the 
diversity jurisdiction statute. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). And 
§ 1447(d) contains no comparable language limiting appellate review to 
cases removed solely under § 1442 or § 1443. The parties' dueling ob-
servations that Congress knows how to authorize appellate courts to 
review every issue in a remand order, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3595(c)(1), 
and that Congress also knows how to limit appellate review to particu-
lar “questions” rather than the whole “order,” see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1295(a)(7), confrms the wisdom of focusing on the language Congress 
did employ. The City's novel contention that the defendants never 
really removed the case pursuant to § 1442 because no federal court here 
held that the statute indeed authorized removal is mistaken and has 
never been adopted by any court. Pp. 237–240. 
(b) The Court's most analogous precedent, Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, resolves any remaining doubt about 
the best reading of § 1447(d). That case involved a dispute about the 
meaning of § 1292(b)—a statute allowing a district court to certify “an 
order” to the court of appeals if it “involves a controlling question of 
law.” The Court held that the statute's grant of appellate review for 
the “order,” meant the entire order was reviewable, not just the part of 
the order containing the “controlling question of law.” Id., at 205. The 
City suggests that the statute's use of the word “involves” shows that 
the reviewable issues on appeal can be broader than the certifed ques-
tion. But nothing in Yamaha turned on the presence of the word “in-
volves.” Instead, as here, the Court focused on the statute's use of the 
word “order.” The Court's decisions in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 
590, and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, do not support the City 
because both decisions were driven by concerns unique to their statu-
tory contexts; their reasoning is not easily generalizable to other juris-
dictional statutes; and neither comes nearly as close to the mark as 
Yamaha. The Court's decisions in Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF 
Bio, Inc., 556 U. S. 635, and Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermans-
dorfer, 423 U. S. 336—which permitted rather than foreclosed appellate 
review of certain remand orders—similarly do not help the City's cause 
because they say nothing about the part of § 1447(d) at issue today. Fi-
nally, the City argues that, when Congress amended § 1447(d) to add the 
exception for federal offcer removal under § 1442 to the existing excep-
tion for civil rights cases under § 1443, Congress ratifed lower court 
decisions that had read the prior version of § 1447(d) as permitting re-

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232 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Syllabus 
view only of the part of the remand order addressing § 1443's civil rights 
removal ground. It is most unlikely that a smattering of lower court 
opinions could ever represent a “broad and unquestioned” judicial con-
sensus that Congress must have been aware of and is presumed to have 
endorsed. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 
335, 349. And it certainly cannot do so where, as here, “the text and 
structure of the statute are to the contrary.” Id., at 352. Pp. 240–245. 
(c) The City's policy arguments do not alter the result because “even 
the most formidable” policy arguments cannot “overcome” a clear statu-
tory directive, Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U. S. 41, 56, n. 4. While the City 
argues that allowing exceptions to the bar on appellate review of re-
mand orders will impair judicial effciency, that is the balance that Con-
gress struck for cases removed pursuant to § 1442 or § 1443. And allow-
ing full appellate review may actually help expedite some cases. The 
City's contention that the Court's reading of § 1447(d) will invite defend-
ants to frivolously add § 1442 or § 1443 to their other grounds for re-
moval has already been addressed by other statutes and rules, such as 
§ 1447(c), which permits a district court to order a party to pay the costs 
and expenses of removal, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)–(c), 
which authorizes courts to sanction frivolous arguments. The Court 
declines to consider the merits of the defendants' removal grounds and 
remands for the Fourth Circuit to consider those matters in the frst 
instance. Pp. 245–247. 
952 F. 3d 452, vacated and remanded. 
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 
C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., 
joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 247. Alito, J., 
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for petitioners. 
With him on the briefs were William T. Marks, Tanya S. 
Manno, Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Daniel J. Toal, Peter D. 
Keisler, C. Frederick Beckner III, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., 
Thomas G. Hungar, David C. Frederick, Brendan J. Crim-
mins, Daniel S. Severson, Philip H. Curtis, Matthew T. 
Heartney, Kathleen Taylor Sooy, Tracy A. Roman, Honor 
R. Costello, Nathan P . Eimer, Pamela R. Hanebutt, Ryan J. 
Walsh, Michelle N. Lipkowitz, Thomas K. Prevas, Sean C. 
Grimsley, Jameson R. Jones, Martha Thomsen, Megan 
Berge, Shannon S. Broome, and Shawn Patrick Regan.

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Counsel 
Brinton Lucas argued the cause for the United States as 
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were 
Acting Solicitor General Wall, Assistant Attorney General 
Clark, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, and Jonathan D. 
Brightbill and Eric Grant, Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, Jennifer Scheller Neumann, and Avi M. Kupfer. 
Victor M. Sher argued the cause for respondents. With 
him on the brief were Matthew K. Edling, and Martin D. 
Quiñones.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Indi-
ana et al. by Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. 
Fisher, Solicitor General, Kian J. Hudson, Deputy Solicitor General, and 
Corrine L. Youngs and Julia C. Payne, Deputy Attorneys General, by 
Clyde Sniffen, Jr., Acting Attorney General of Alaska, and by the Attor-
neys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Ala-
bama, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Lynn 
Fitch of Mississippi, Eric Schmitt of Missouri, Douglas J. Peterson of Ne-
braska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Alan Wilson of South Caro-
lina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean 
D. Reyes of Utah; for the American Petroleum Institute by William M. 
Jay, Andrew Kim, and Paul G. Afonso; for the Atlantic Legal Foundation 
by Lawrence S. Ebner; for DRI–The Voice of the Defense Bar by Matthew 
T. Nelson; for Energy Policy Advocates by Matthew D. Hardin; for the 
National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Philip S. Goldberg, Linda 
E. Kelly, and Patrick Hedren; for the Washington Legal Foundation by 
John M. Masslon II and Cory L. Andrews; and for Gen. Richard B. Myers 
(Ret.) et al. by Tristan L. Duncan. Zachary D. Tripp fled a brief for the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as amicus curiae 
urging vacatur. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of New 
York et al. by Letitia James, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D. 
Underwood, Solicitor General, Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, 
and Matthew W. Grieco, Assistant Solicitor General, by Peter F. Neronha, 
Attorney General of Rhode Island, Neil F. X. Kelly, Assistant Attorney 
General, and Tricia O'Hare Jedele and Alison B. Hoffman, Special Assist-
ant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective 
jurisdictions as follows: Xavier Becerra of California, William Tong of 
Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, 
Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel

234 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case began when Baltimore's mayor and city council 
sued various energy companies for promoting fossil fuels 
while allegedly concealing their environmental impacts. 
But the merits of that claim have nothing to do with this 
appeal. The only question before us is one of civil proce-
dure: Does 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) permit a court of appeals to 
review any issue in a district court order remanding a case 
to state court where the defendant premised removal in part 
on the federal offcer removal statute, § 1442, or the civil 
rights removal statute, § 1443? 
I 
Three years ago, Baltimore's mayor and city council (we 
refer to them collectively as the City) fled suit in Maryland 
state court. The City's complaint included a number of 
state-law causes of action, but most centered on the defend-
ants' alleged failure to warn about the dangers of their prod-
ucts—and the injuries the City says it suffered as a result. 
Soon after the City fled suit, the defendants removed the 
case to federal court. In support of their action, the defend-
ants invoked a variety of federal statutes. Most relevant 
for our purposes, they pointed to a provision that promises 
a federal forum for any action against an “offcer (or any 
person acting under that offcer) of the United States or of 
of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron Ford of Nevada, Gurbir 
S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Joshua H. Stein 
of North Carolina, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Thomas J. Donovan, 
Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, and Robert W. Ferguson of 
Washington; for the Chesapeake Bay Foundation et al. by Ian Fein, Pete 
Huffman, and Jon A. Mueller; for State and Local Government Groups 
by Robert S. Peck and Lisa Soronen; for Erwin Chemerinsky et al. by 
William A. Rossbach; and for Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. by Gerson 
H. Smoger. 
Marco B. Simons, Richard L. Herz, Michelle C. Harrison, Kevin S. 
Hannon, and David Bookbinder fled a brief for Boulder County, Colorado 
et al. as amici curiae. 
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Opinion of the Court 
any agency thereof, in an offcial or individual capacity, for 
or relating to any act under color of such offce.” 28 
U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1). 
This statute authorized the removal of the City's suit, the 
defendants said, because some of their challenged explora-
tion, drilling, and production operations took place at the fed-
eral government's behest. The companies also identifed a 
number of other statutes that they believed independently 
supported removal: the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331; the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 92 Stat. 657, 
43 U. S. C. § 1349(b); the admiralty jurisdiction statute, 28 
U. S. C. § 1333; and the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 
U. S. C. § 1452. 
Once the case arrived in federal court, the City fled a mo-
tion seeking to have it remanded back to state court. The 
City argued that none of the companies' grounds for removal 
justifed retaining federal jurisdiction. In an extensive 
order, the district court reviewed each of the defendants' 
cited bases for removal before ultimately agreeing with the 
City and remanding the case to state court. 
Normally that would have ended the matter. Since at 
least 1949, federal appellate courts have generally lacked the 
power to review a district court order remanding a case to 
state court. See Act of May 24, 1949, § 84, 63 Stat. 102. 
But like most rules, this one has accrued exceptions with 
time. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created an 
exception allowing appellate review for cases “ `removed pur-
suant to' ” 28 U. S. C. § 1443, a provision that guarantees a 
federal forum for certain federal civil rights claims. See 
§ 901, 78 Stat. 266. So before a civil rights case is returned 
to state court, a federal court of appeals usually can inter-
vene to test the soundness of the district court's remand 
order. 
In 2011, Congress added a similar exception for suits 
against federal offcers or agencies removed pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. § 1442. See Removal Clarifcation Act, § 2, 125 Stat.

236 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
545–546. Here, too, Congress has deemed it appropriate to 
allow appellate review before a district court may remand a 
case to state court. All told, then, the law as it stands today 
provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court 
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the 
State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 
1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or 
otherwise.” 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d). 
After the district court ordered the City's case remanded 
to state court, the defendants sought to appeal—and this 
much everyone seemed to agree they were free to do. After 
all, the defendants had relied on the federal offcer removal 
statute found in § 1442 when they removed the case to fed-
eral court—and the current version of § 1447(d) permits an 
appeal in just these circumstances. The real trouble began 
only when it came to the scope of the defendants' appeal. 
The Fourth Circuit read § 1447(d) as authorizing it to review 
only the part of the district court's remand order discussing 
§ 1442. As a result, the court of appeals refused to consider 
whether the district court may have erred when it rejected 
the defendants' other grounds for removal. Finding (only) 
the district court's § 1442 analysis sound, the Fourth Circuit 
proceeded to affrm. 952 F. 3d 452 (2020). 
This ruling highlighted a circuit split. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, for example, has reasoned that § 1447(d) extends appel-
late review to the whole of an “ `order remanding a case to 
the State court from which it was removed pursuant to sec-
tion 1442 or 1443.' ” See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 
F. 3d 805, 811 (2015). On that reading of the statute, appel-
late review is not confned to a defendant's removal argu-
ments under the federal offcer and civil rights removal stat-
utes. Instead, a court of appeals may review the merits of 
all theories for removal that a district court has rejected. 
Because the courts of appeals disagree over the scope of 
their appellate authority under § 1447(d), we agreed to take 
this case to resolve the question. 591 U. S. ––– (2020). 
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Opinion of the Court 
II 
A 
When called on to interpret a statute, this Court generally 
seeks to discern and apply the ordinary meaning of its terms 
at the time of their adoption. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 
U. S. 155, 160 (2021). Here, the relevant portion of § 1447(d) 
provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court 
from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 
of this title shall be reviewable by appeal.” 
To our minds, the frst telling clue lies in the statute's use 
of the term “order.” Whether we look to the time of 
§ 1447(d)'s adoption or amendment, a judicial “order” meant 
then what it means today: a “written direction or command 
delivered by . . . a court or judge.” 
1 So an “order remanding 
a case” was (and is) a formal command from a district court 
returning the case to state court. In this case, the district 
court's remand order rejected all of the defendants' grounds 
for removal. For good reason too. Normally, federal juris-
diction is not optional; subject to exceptions not relevant 
here, “courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of 
federal jurisdiction” assigned to them. Sprint Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 72 (2013). So the district 
court wasn't at liberty to remove the City's case from its 
docket until it determined that it lacked any authority to 
entertain the suit. See, e. g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Co-
hill, 484 U. S. 343, 356 (1988). From this it would seem to 
follow that, when a district court's removal order rejects all 
of the defendants' grounds for removal, § 1447(d) authorizes 
a court of appeals to review each and every one of them. 
After all, the statute allows courts of appeals to examine the 
whole of a district court's “order,” not just some of its parts 
or pieces. 
1 Black's Law Dictionary 1322 (11th ed. 2019); see also id., at 1206 (9th 
ed. 2009); id., at 1247 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“Every direction of a court or 
judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment”); id., 
at 1247 (4th ed. 1951) (same); id., at 1298 (3d ed. 1933) (same).

238 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
Of course, § 1447(d) extends appellate review only to some 
orders—those remanding a “case . . . removed pursuant to 
section 1442 or 1443.” But it's hard to see how that qualif-
cation changes the calculus. To remove a case, a defendant 
must comply with 28 U. S. C. § 1446. Essentially, that stat-
ute requires the defendant to provide affected parties and 
courts with a notice stating its grounds for removal. 
§§ 1446(a), (d). The combination of these actions “effect[s] 
the removal.” § 1446(d). To remove a case “pursuant to” 
§ 1442 or § 1443, then, just means that a defendant's notice of 
removal must assert the case is removable “in accordance 
with or by reason of ” one of those provisions.
2 Here, every-
one admits the defendants' notice of removal did just that by 
citing § 1442 as one of its grounds for removal. Once that 
happened and the district court ordered the case remanded 
to state court, the whole of its order became reviewable on 
appeal. 
Nor does it matter if (as here) a defendant removes a case 
“pursuant to” multiple federal statutes. Often enough, 
parties act pursuant to a variety of legal authorities. A 
criminal defendant may suggest he is eligible for sentencing 
relief pursuant to multiple provisions. E. g., Pepper v. 
United States, 562 U. S. 476, 481, n. 1 (2011). A civil litigant 
might fle a complaint pursuant to more than one statute. 
E. g., Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2019). Likewise, a party may assert multiple 
grounds for removing a case to federal court—as the defend-
ants did here. Indeed, the general removal statute contem-
plates just this possibility when, in contrast, it speaks of 
actions “removed solely under” the diversity jurisdiction 
statute. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Yet, the partic-
ular provision at issue before us does not contain any compa-
2 Black's Law Dictionary, at 1401 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); id., at 1401 (4th ed. 
1951); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. –––, ––– (2018) (“in 
accordance with”); Black's Law Dictionary, at 1493 (11th ed. 2019) (“[i]n 
compliance with; in accordance with; under”; “[a]s authorized by”). 
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Opinion of the Court 
rable language like that limiting appellate review solely to 
issues under § 1442 or § 1443. Instead and again, § 1447(d) 
permits appellate review of the district court's remand 
order—without any further qualifcation. 
B 
How does the City reply? It suggests that exceptions to 
statutory rules should be construed narrowly—and that our 
reading of § 1447(d)'s exception to its general rule against 
appellate review is too permissive. 
We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the factual prem-
ise underlying the City's argument is surely contestable. 
One might just as easily conceive of § 1447(d)'s usual rule 
barring appellate review as itself an exception to the even 
more general rule that fnal district court orders are appeal-
able under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. More fundamentally, the 
City's legal premise is also in error. This Court has “ `no 
license to give statutory exemptions anything but a fair 
reading.' ” Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader 
Media, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (brackets omitted). Excep-
tions and exemptions are no less part of Congress's work 
than its rules and standards—and all are worthy of a court's 
respect. That a law might temper its pursuit of one goal 
by accommodating others can come as no surprise. Often 
legislation becomes possible only because of such compro-
mises. Often lawmakers tread in areas fraught with com-
peting social demands where everyone agrees trade-offs are 
required. Whatever the reason for a legislative compro-
mise, we have no right to place our thumbs on one side of 
the scale or the other. Henson v. Santander Consumer 
USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017). 
Alternatively, the City suggests that, if Congress had 
wanted appellate courts to review every issue in a remand 
order, it would have said as much. Sometimes, the City ob-
serves, Congress does exactly that, expressly directing 
courts to resolve “all” legal issues in certain cases. See 
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240 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
Brief for Respondent 21 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 3595(c)(1); 5 
U. S. C. § 1508; 38 U. S. C. § 7104(a); and 33 U. S. C. § 1320(f)). 
But the defendants remind us that Congress also knows how 
to limit appellate review to particular “questions” rather 
than the whole of a district court's “order”; sometimes it does 
just that too. See Brief for Petitioners 18 (citing 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1295(a)(7); 38 U. S. C. § 7292(b)(1); 42 U. S. C. § 8514(a)(2); 52 
U. S. C. § 30110; 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2); 50 U. S. C. § 1803(j)). 
In the end, all of the parties' fencing about language Con-
gress didn't use persuades us of only one thing—that we are 
best served by focusing on the language it did employ. 
All of which leaves the City to offer a different argument 
from a new direction. Now, the City contends, the defend-
ants never really removed this case pursuant to § 1442. On 
this account, a case is not “removed pursuant to section 1442 
or 1443” until a federal court (district or appellate) holds that 
one of these statutes authorizes removal. Because that 
never happened here, the City reasons, the defendants were 
not entitled to any appellate review. But this argument 
isn't only novel—the City didn't pursue it below and no court 
of appeals has adopted it. It is also mistaken. As we've 
seen, it is generally a defendant's actions under § 1446 that 
“effect the removal.” Once a defendant complies with 
§ 1446, a state court may not proceed “further unless and 
until the case is remanded.” 28 U. S. C. § 1446(d). That's 
why normally it's the plaintiff who must seek judicial inter-
vention if it wishes to have the matter remanded to state 
court—just as the City did here. 
III 
A 
To the extent any doubt remains about how best to read 
§ 1447(d), we believe our most analogous precedent resolves 
it. In Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 
199, 204 (1996), this Court faced a dispute about the meaning 
of 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). That statute allows a district court

Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 241 
Opinion of the Court 
to certify “an order” to the court of appeals if it “involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion,” and if “an immediate ap-
peal from the order may materially advance the ultimate ter-
mination of the litigation.” In Yamaha, the Court asked the 
parties to address whether § 1292(b) authorizes appellate 
courts to review any question contained in the district 
court's order—or whether it allows those courts to address 
only the “controlling question of law” the district court certi-
fed for further review. 
The answer there is telling here. The Court held that, 
“[a]s the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction ap-
plies to the order certifed to the court of appeals, and is 
not tied to the particular question formulated by the district 
court.” 516 U. S., at 205. Although appellate courts “may 
not reach beyond the certifed order to address other orders 
made in the case,” they “may address any issue fairly in-
cluded within the certifed order because it is the order that 
is appealable, and not the controlling question identifed by 
the district court.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Exactly the same might be said of our case: “[B]ecause 
it is the [district court's removal] order that is appealable,” 
a court of appeals “may address any issue fairly included 
within” it. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The City seeks to distinguish Yamaha but we don't see 
how we fairly might. The City observes that § 1292(b) 
allows an appeal from an order that “involves” a controlling 
question of law. By using the word “involves,” the City sub-
mits, Congress sought to make plain that the reviewable is-
sues on appeal can be broader than the certifed controlling 
question of law. And, the City stresses, the word “involves” 
does not appear in § 1447(d). But that is beside the point. 
Nothing in Yamaha turned on the presence of the word “in-
volves” in § 1292(b). Instead, the Court's reasoning cen-
tered on the statute's use of the word “order.” By allowing 
appellate courts to review a district court's “order,” the 
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242 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
Court explained, Congress had allowed review of any issue 
fairly encompassed within it. That reasoning applies with 
no less force here. 
B 
If Yamaha does much to undermine its argument, the City 
seeks to draw support from other of this Court's cases. 
Principally, it points to Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 
(1875), and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 (1908). But 
both decisions were driven by concerns unique to their statu-
tory contexts; their reasoning is not easily generalizable to 
other jurisdictional statutes; and neither comes nearly as 
close to the mark as Yahama. 
Start with Murdock . That case involved 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257, a statute permitting this Court to review certain 
state court “judgments or decrees.” Concerned with the 
constitutional implications of allowing federal courts to re-
view questions of state law, the Court in Murdock construed 
the statute as authorizing this Court to examine only issues 
of federal law contained within state court judgments and 
decrees. See 20 Wall., at 630–632. Along the way, the 
Court took pains to reserve the question whether Congress 
could ever authorize this Court to review matters of state 
law already defnitively resolved by state courts. Id., at 
633. By contrast, no comparable concern with the Constitu-
tion's federal structure exists here. At some level, of 
course, removal practices implicate questions of comity be-
tween federal and state authorities. But today we are 
asked to decide only whether a federal court of appeals may 
review one or many federal law rulings issued by an inferior 
federal court. That comparatively humble question lies no-
where near Murdock's bounds. 
Keitel involved the now-repealed Criminal Appeals Act. 
That law authorized the government to appeal adverse crim-
inal “decision[s] or judgment[s]” based on certain enumer-
ated grounds, such as the invalidity of a federal statute. See 
ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. For its part, the Court held that 
this language allowed the government to appeal only the stat-
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 243 
Opinion of the Court 
utorily enumerated questions. 211 U. S., at 398–399. Like 
Murdock, the Court in Keitel rested heavily on the statute's 
context in reaching its conclusion. A new entitlement 
allowing the government to appeal an adverse criminal judg-
ment was, in the Court's view, “exceptional.” 211 U. S., at 
399. Meanwhile, here again, nothing in our case implicates 
that concern. 
Closer to home, the City directs our attention to Carlsbad 
Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U. S. 635, 638 (2009), 
and Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 
336, 345–346 (1976). Those cases addressed the frst clause 
of § 1447(d), which generally bars appellate review of re-
mand orders. Carlsbad and Thermtron held this bar ap-
plies only to remand orders premised on a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure; other 
remand orders remain appealable. See Carlsbad, 556 U. S., 
at 638. The Court said this conclusion was necessary to 
make sense of § 1447(d)'s interaction with § 1447(c). See id., 
at 638. 
None of this, however, helps the City's cause. Some have 
questioned Carlsbad and Thermtron. See, e. g., 556 U. S., 
at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring); id., at 642–643 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Kakarala v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., 578 U. S. 
914 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
But even taken on their own terms, both decisions permitted 
rather than foreclosed appellate review of certain remand 
orders. And the fact that this Court deemed certain orders 
appealable under the statute's frst clause simply does not 
settle, one way or another, the scope of appellate review 
under the statute's second clause. 
Having exhausted our cases, the City seeks support in 
lower court decisions. It draws our attention to 2011 when 
Congress amended § 1447(d) to authorize appellate review of 
remand orders in cases removed under the federal offcer 
statute. By that time, the City says, a number of courts of 
appeals had already interpreted the prior version of § 1447(d) 
that allowed appeals from remand orders in cases removed 
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244 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
under the Civil Rights Act. And many of those courts had 
read § 1447(d) as permitting them to review only the part of 
a remand order addressing the civil rights removal ground. 
From this fact, the City reasons, it follows that Congress 
implicitly ratifed and endorsed parallel limits on appellate 
review when it adopted its 2011 amendments. 
Again, we do not see it. It seems most unlikely to us that 
a smattering of lower court opinions could ever represent 
the sort of “judicial consensus so broad and unquestioned 
that we must presume Congress knew of and endorsed it.” 
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 
335, 349 (2005). And it certainly cannot do so where, as 
here, “the text and structure of the statute are to the con-
trary.” Id., at 352. This Court bears no “warrant to ignore 
clear statutory language on the ground that other courts 
have done so.” Milner v. Department of Navy , 562 U. S. 
562, 576 (2011). Our duty is to follow the law as we fnd it, 
not to follow rotely whatever lower courts once might have 
said about it. 
Separately, the City worries that our interpretation might 
upset lower court decisions on a different question. The 
City points out that, when a district court remands a case, it 
may require the defendant to pay certain of the plaintiff's 
fees and costs. See 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c). While § 1447(d) 
generally precludes appellate review of remand orders, many 
lower courts have suggested that these § 1447(c) fee and cost 
awards are nonetheless reviewable on appeal. The City 
contends that our reading of § 1447(d) could put an end to all 
that. It could, the City reasons, because if an “order re-
manding a case” really means the whole order, then the stat-
ute may bar appellate review of fee and cost awards con-
tained within those orders. That much, however, does not 
necessarily follow. Often enough fee and cost awards are 
treated as collateral to the merits and independently appeal-
able. See, e. g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co ., 486 
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Opinion of the Court 
U. S. 196, 200 (1988). In any event, the question is not pre-
sented in this case and we do not purport to resolve it. 
IV 
The City concludes by asking us to consider the policy con-
sequences that follow from giving the text its ordinary mean-
ing. Barring appellate review of remand orders, the City 
says, serves the worthy goal of allowing the parties to get 
on with litigating the merits of their cases in state court. 
Meanwhile, the City submits, allowing exceptions to this 
rule promises only to impair that effciency interest. 
The diffculties with this argument are by now familiar. 
As this Court has explained, “even the most formidable” pol-
icy arguments cannot “overcome” a clear statutory directive. 
Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U. S. 41, 56, n. 4 (2012). Besides, 
everyone agrees that the statute tempers its obvious concern 
with effciency when it comes to cases removed pursuant to 
§ 1442 or § 1443. For that subset of cases, Congress has ex-
pressed a heightened concern for accuracy, authorized appel-
late review, and accepted the delay it can entail. The fact 
that the law as written allows appellate courts to examine 
all (and not just some) removal grounds in these cases per-
haps just demonstrates, as Judge Easterbrook has sug-
gested, a congressional judgment that the “marginal delay 
from adding . . . extra issue[s] to a case where the time 
for briefng, argument, and decision has already been ac-
cepted is likely to be small.” See Lu Junhong , 792 F. 3d, 
at 813. 
In fact, allowing a fuller form of appellate review may ac-
tually help expedite some appeals. Suppose a court of ap-
peals fnds the § 1442 or § 1443 issue a diffcult and close one, 
but believes removal is clearly and easily warranted on 
another basis. Allowing the court to address that easier 
question and avoid harder ones may facilitate a prompter 
resolution of the proceeding for all involved. At the least, a 
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246 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Opinion of the Court 
rational Congress could have thought that considerations 
like these warranted allowing a court of appeals the power 
to review the whole of a district court's remand order rather 
than just certain select aspects of it. 
That leaves the City to argue about different conse-
quences. It warns that our interpretation will invite 
gamesmanship: Defendants may frivolously add § 1442 or 
§ 1443 to their other grounds for removal, all with an eye to 
ensuring appellate review down the line if the case is re-
manded. But the answers here too are familiar. Once 
more, this Court's task is to discern and apply the law's plain 
meaning as faithfully as we can, not “to assess the conse-
quences of each approach and adopt the one that produces 
the least mischief.” Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U. S. 205, 217 
(2010). 
Nor is it as if Congress has been blind to the City's con-
cerns. As the City itself acknowledges, thanks to § 1447(c) 
a district court may order a defendant to pay the plaintiff's 
costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) if it frivolously 
removes a case from state court. Additionally, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to sanction frivolous 
arguments made in virtually any context. Rules 11(b)–(c). 
Congress, thus, has already addressed the City's concerns in 
other statutes and rules—just not in § 1447(d). To the ex-
tent that experience may prove these other measures insuf-
fcient, Congress is of course free to revise its work anytime. 
But that forum, not this one, is the proper place for such 
lawmaking. 
* 
The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it was powerless 
to consider all of the defendants' grounds for removal under 
§ 1447(d). In light of that error, the defendants ask us to 
consider some of those additional grounds ourselves. That 
task, however, does not implicate the circuit split that we 
took this case to resolve and we believe the wiser course is 
to leave these matters for the Fourth Circuit to resolve 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 247 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
in the frst instance. See Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. 
–––, –––, n. 4 (2021). The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is 
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case. 
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting. 
Civil defendants in state court may remove a case to fed-
eral district court by asserting one or more bases for federal 
jurisdiction. If the district court concludes that the case 
was improperly removed, it issues an order remanding the 
case back to state court. For more than a century, the rule 
has been that such remand orders are generally not subject 
to appellate review. See In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 
451, 453–454 (1890). This rule, codifed at 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1447(d), “refects Congress's longstanding policy of not per-
mitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a re-
moved case by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdic-
tion of the district court to which the cause is removed.” 
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 
224, 238 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Originally, there were no exceptions to § 1447(d)'s bar on 
appellate review. See § 1447(d) (1946 ed., Supp. III). Then, 
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created 
appellate jurisdiction over “ `order[s] remanding a case to the 
State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 
1443,' ” the civil rights removal statute. § 901, 78 Stat. 266, 
28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) (1964 ed.). In 2011, Congress extended 
this exception to cases removed pursuant to § 1442, the fed-
eral offcer removal statute. See § 1447(d) (2012 ed.). 
The Court today holds that a defendant who invokes either 
§ 1442 or § 1443 when removing a case to federal court is 
entitled to appellate review of not just those grounds, but 
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248 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
also any other grounds for removal the defendant asserts. I 
disagree. That interpretation lets defendants sidestep 
§ 1447(d)'s bar on appellate review by shoehorning a § 1442 
or § 1443 argument into their case for removal. In other 
words, it lets the exception swallow the rule. Furthermore, 
when Congress amended § 1447(d) to permit appellate review 
of decisions under § 1442, every Court of Appeals to have 
addressed the question interpreted § 1447(d) to permit appel-
late review of arguments under § 1443 only, not of other ar-
guments for removal addressed in the same order. If Con-
gress wanted to disturb that consensus, it would have said 
so. I respectfully dissent. 
I 
Section 1447(d) permits appellate review of “an order re-
manding a case to the State court from which it was removed 
pursuant to section 1442 or 1443.” Everyone agrees how 
this provision operates in two scenarios. First, if a defend-
ant removes a suit to federal court without invoking either 
§ 1442 or § 1443, appellate courts may not review the district 
court's remand order. Second, if a defendant removes a suit 
solely under § 1442 or § 1443, appellate review is available for 
the remand order addressing that single ground for removal. 
But what if a defendant removes a case to federal court 
on multiple grounds, only one of which is § 1442 or § 1443? 
Section 1447(d) does not speak clearly to that scenario. In 
some statutes, Congress takes care to specify when it means 
“this and only this ground.” See, e. g., § 1446(b)(2)(A) (ad-
dressing civil actions “removed solely under section 
1441(a)”). Other times, Congress makes clear that reliance 
on a certain ground even “in part” will suffce. See, e. g., 
§ 1295(a)(2) (providing for jurisdiction in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit over certain district court deci-
sions “if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or 
in part, on section 1346 of this title”). Section 1447(d) con-
tains neither kind of clarifying language, leaving uncertain 
how the provision applies to cases that are not removed 
under § 1442 or § 1443 alone. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs of 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 249 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U. S. A.) Inc., 965 F. 3d 792, 
805 (CA10 2020) (Section 1447(d) “does not expressly contem-
plate the situation in which removal is done pursuant to one 
of these sections and other grounds” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
There are three possible ways forward. The frst possibil-
ity is that § 1447(d) permits appellate review of any asserted 
basis for removal so long as the suit was removed in part 
pursuant to § 1442 or § 1443. That is the interpretation 
urged by petitioners and adopted by the Court today. See 
ante, at 237–239. The problem with this interpretation is 
that it stretches the exception in § 1447(d) too far. It allows 
defendants to bootstrap their entire case for removal into the 
court of appeals simply by tacking on an argument under 
§ 1442 or § 1443. Indeed, under this interpretation, a de-
fendant could formally abandon its argument under § 1442 or 
§ 1443 and seek an appeal exclusively of other grounds for 
removal. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–36, 40–41. That bizarre 
outcome, inexplicable in light of the manifest objective of 
limiting the exceptions in § 1447(d), cautions heavily against 
this interpretation. 
Another possibility is that a suit removed pursuant to mul-
tiple grounds is not a suit removed pursuant to § 1442 or 
§ 1443 at all, meaning no appellate review whatsoever is 
available under § 1447(d). For good reason, no one advo-
cates this interpretation. Such a rule would certainly avoid 
prolonged disputes about whether a case belongs in state or 
federal court, but only by denying appellate review for 
claims of jurisdiction under the federal-offcer and civil-
rights removal statutes. That result is hard to square with 
Congress' express directive that such claims get a second 
look. 
The third possibility is that § 1447(d) allows appellate re-
view of a defendant's assertion of removal jurisdiction under 
the federal-offcer or civil-rights removal statute alone. 
Any other grounds for removal would remain subject to 
§ 1447(d)'s bar on appellate review. This interpretation best 
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250 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
accords with “Congress's longstanding policy of not permit-
ting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed 
case” with lengthy jurisdictional disputes, Powerex Corp., 
551 U. S., at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted), while 
still allowing review of the two grounds Congress carved out 
for special treatment. It also follows this Court's usual pol-
icy of construing both statutory exceptions and procedures 
for removal narrowly. See Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 48, 
60 (2013) (Statutory exceptions are to be “narrowly [con-
strued] in order to preserve the primary operation of the 
provision” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Syngenta 
Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 32 (2002) 
(“[S]tatutory procedures for removal are to be strictly con-
strued” out of respect for state sovereignty). 
Over the course of several decades, eight Courts of Ap-
peals (every one to consider the question) adopted this third 
view of § 1447(d).* See, e. g., Patel v. Del Taco , Inc., 446 
F. 3d 996, 998 (CA9 2006); Alabama v. Conley, 245 F. 3d 1292, 
1293, n. 1 (CA11 2001) (per curiam ); Thornton v. Holloway, 
70 F. 3d 522, 524 (CA8 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co . 
v. Baasch, 644 F. 2d 94, 96–97 (CA2 1981) (per curiam ); De-
troit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Assn. v. Detroit, 597 
F. 2d 566, 567–568 (CA6 1979) (per curiam ); Noel v. McCain, 
538 F. 2d 633, 635 (CA4 1976); Robertson v. Ball, 534 F. 2d 
63, 65–66 (CA5 1976) (per curiam ); Pennsylvania ex rel. 
Gittman v. Gittman, 451 F. 2d 155, 156–157 (CA3 1971) 
(per curiam ). 
Congress legislated against the backdrop of this consensus 
when, in 2011, it amended § 1447(d) to extend its appellate-
*The Tenth Circuit had also reached this conclusion prior to Congress 
amending § 1447(d), albeit in an unpublished opinion. See Sanchez v. 
Onuska, 2 F. 3d 1160 (Table), 1993 WL 307897, *1 (1993) (per curiam ). 
The Tenth Circuit has since reaffrmed that holding in a published opinion. 
See Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cty . v. Suncor Energy (U. S. A.) 
Inc., 965 F. 3d 792, 802, n. 6 (2020). 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 251 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
review exception, which previously applied to § 1443 alone, 
to cover § 1442 as well. Critically, Congress did not amend 
the remainder of the provision. Instead, it simply added the 
words “1442 or.” See Removal Clarifcation Act, 125 Stat. 
546. Had Congress disagreed with the settled interpreta-
tion of § 1447(d), it presumably would have done something 
about it. 
The Court dismisses the possibility of congressional ratif-
cation by characterizing an unbroken line of decisions from 
two-thirds of the Courts of Appeals spanning nearly half a 
century as “a smattering of lower court opinions.” Ante, at 
244. I would not assume that so many decisions reaching 
the same conclusion over such a long period were beneath 
Congress' notice. “ `If a word or phrase has been given a 
uniform interpretation by inferior courts, a later version of 
that act perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry for-
ward that interpretation.' ” Texas Dept. of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
576 U. S. 519, 536 (2015) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012); 
ellipses omitted). That Congress did not disturb the pre-
vailing interpretation of § 1447(d) is a compelling reason this 
Court should not either. 
II 
The Court sees things differently. In its view, it “does 
[not] matter” whether “a defendant removes a case `pursuant 
to' multiple federal statutes” or just one. Ante, at 238. 
Either way, § 1447(d) grants the court of appeals jurisdiction 
over the “order” remanding the case back to state court. 
According to the Court, once the court of appeals takes juris-
diction over an order, it necessarily takes jurisdiction over 
all grounds for removal encompassed within it. 
In support of this theory, the Court looks to Yamaha 
Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199 (1996). That 
case concerned 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), a distinct statute that 
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252 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
permits appellate review of an interlocutory “order not oth-
erwise appealable” if the district court certifes that the 
order “involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 
§ 1292(b). Looking to “the text of § 1292(b),” the Yamaha 
Court determined that, having taken jurisdiction over a 
§ 1292(b) order, a court of appeals may reach any issue fairly 
encompassed within it. 516 U. S., at 205. In the Court's 
view today, Yamaha means that appellate review of a re-
mand order under § 1447(d) must likewise be plenary. 
Yamaha does not do the work the Court says it does. 
Section 1292(b) provides that an interlocutory order is ap-
pealable if it merely “involves” a certifed issue. There was 
thus no question in Yamaha that § 1292(b) accounts for certi-
fed orders that address multiple issues, some of which are 
not “controlling question[s] of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion.” § 1292(b). Sec-
tion 1447(d) lacks comparable language about what happens 
when a party removes a case on multiple grounds. That is 
precisely what makes it ambiguous. 
The Court is left with the premise that appellate jurisdic-
tion over an order (as with a judgment, decree, or sentence) 
usually means jurisdiction over all legal issues addressed 
within it. Ante, at 237–239. I agree that this premise will 
often hold true. But not always, as the Court itself recog-
nizes. See ante, at 242–243 (discussing Murdock v. Mem-
phis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875), and United States v. Keitel, 211 
U. S. 370 (1908)). Context matters. To recap, in 1964, Con-
gress created a limited exception for claims of removal under 
§ 1443 to what had long been an absolute prohibition on ap-
pellate review of remand orders. After nearly half a cen-
tury of courts interpreting that exception narrowly, Con-
gress extended the exception to § 1442 without otherwise 
amending § 1447(d). Section 1447(d) only unambiguously 
permits appellate review over remand orders that are based 
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Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 253 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
solely on one of those two grounds. Granting defendants 
appellate review of other grounds of removal whenever they 
tack on an argument under § 1442 or § 1443 would allow the 
exception to trump the rule. In these circumstances, the 
Court should seek an interpretation of § 1447(d) that not only 
respects its carveout for arguments under § 1442 and § 1443 
but also preserves its general bar on appellate review. 
III 
Unfortunately, I fear today's decision will reward defend-
ants for raising strained theories of removal under § 1442 or 
§ 1443 by allowing them to circumvent the bar on appellate 
review entirely. Look no further than this case. In 2018, 
the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore sued petitioners for 
allegedly concealing the connection between fossil fuels and 
climate change. Petitioners listed eight grounds for re-
moval to federal court, including § 1442. But petitioners 
now ask only for a ruling that removal was proper under 
§ 1441(a) (i. e., federal-question jurisdiction). Had petition-
ers relied solely on § 1441(a) before the District Court, as 
they do now, no one disputes their argument would be unre-
viewable on appeal. 
Not to worry, petitioners assure us: The threat of sanctions 
will suffciently deter gamesmanship. While sanctions help 
ward off egregious misconduct, they are no failsafe. See, 
e. g., Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U. S. 132, 141 
(2005) (“Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award at-
torney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party 
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal”). 
A federal-offcer claim can be so weak it is not worth pursu-
ing on appeal, but not so meritless as to warrant sanctions. 
Again, look to this case. Petitioners no longer advance their 
argument under § 1442, calling it only “substantial.” Brief 
for Petitioners 35. Yet that argument somehow opens a 
back door to appellate review that would otherwise be closed 
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254 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
to them. Meanwhile, Baltimore, which has already waited 
nearly three years to begin litigation on the merits, is con-
signed to waiting once more. 
* * * 
Section 1447(d) places “broad restrictions on the power of 
federal appellate courts to review district court orders re-
manding removed cases to state court.” Things Remem-
bered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995). After to-
day's decision, defendants can sidestep these restrictions by 
making near-frivolous arguments for removal under § 1442 
or § 1443. Congress, of course, can amend § 1447(d) to make 
even clearer that appellate review of a district court remand 
order extends to only § 1442 or § 1443. Because I believe 
§ 1447 already bears that meaning, I respectfully dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 Pages 230–254 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 17, 2021 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  rejected all of the defendants' grounds for removal because (subject to exceptions not applicable here) the district court was not at liberty to remove the City's case from its docket until it determined that it lacked any authority to entertain the suit. See, e. g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343,…

• #3

  tion. But nothing in Yamaha turned on the presence of the word “in- volves.” Instead, as here, the Court focused on the statute's use of the word “order.” The Court's decisions in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, do not support the City because both decisions were drive…

• #4

  § 1447(c), which permits a district court to order a party to pay the costs and expenses of removal, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)–(c), which authorizes courts to sanction frivolous arguments. The Court declines to consider the merits of the defendants' removal grounds and remands for the Fourth Circui…

• #5

  braska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Alan Wilson of South Caro- lina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the American Petroleum Institute by William M. Jay, Andrew Kim, and Paul G. Afonso; for the Atlantic Legal Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner; for DRI–The V…

• #6

  state-law causes of action, but most centered on the defend- ants' alleged failure to warn about the dangers of their prod- ucts—and the injuries the City says it suffered as a result. Soon after the City fled suit, the defendants removed the case to federal court. In support of their action, the defend- ants inv…

• #7

  City and remanding the case to state court. Normally that would have ended the matter. Since at least 1949, federal appellate courts have generally lacked the power to review a district court order remanding a case to state court. See Act of May 24, 1949, § 84, 63 Stat. 102. But like most rules, this one has accr…

• #8

  This ruling highlighted a circuit split. The Seventh Cir- cuit, for example, has reasoned that § 1447(d) extends appel- late review to the whole of an “ `order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to sec- tion 1442 or 1443.' ” See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F. 3d 805, 811 (201…

• #9

  a court of appeals to review each and every one of them. After all, the statute allows courts of appeals to examine the whole of a district court's “order,” not just some of its parts or pieces. 1 Black's Law Dictionary 1322 (11th ed. 2019); see also id., at 1206 (9th ed. 2009); id., at 1247 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (…

• #10

  2 Black's Law Dictionary, at 1401 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); id., at 1401 (4th ed. 1951); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. –––, ––– (2018) (“in accordance with”); Black's Law Dictionary, at 1493 (11th ed. 2019) (“[i]n compliance with; in accordance with; under”; “[a]s authorized by”). Page Proof Pending …

• #11

  Brief for Respondent 21 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 3595(c)(1); 5 U. S. C. § 1508; 38 U. S. C. § 7104(a); and 33 U. S. C. § 1320(f)). But the defendants remind us that Congress also knows how to limit appellate review to particular “questions” rather than the whole of a district court's “order”; sometimes it does just …

• #12

  court's order—or whether it allows those courts to address only the “controlling question of law” the district court certi- fed for further review. The answer there is telling here. The Court held that, “[a]s the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction ap- plies to the order certifed to the court of a…

• #13

  § 1257, a statute permitting this Court to review certain state court “judgments or decrees.” Concerned with the constitutional implications of allowing federal courts to re- view questions of state law, the Court in Murdock construed the statute as authorizing this Court to examine only issues of federal law con…

• #14

  make sense of § 1447(d)'s interaction with § 1447(c). See id., at 638. None of this, however, helps the City's cause. Some have questioned Carlsbad and Thermtron. See, e. g., 556 U. S., at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring); id., at 642–643 (Scalia, J., concurring); Kakarala v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., 578 U. S. 914 …

• #15

  may require the defendant to pay certain of the plaintiff's fees and costs. See 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c). While § 1447(d) generally precludes appellate review of remand orders, many lower courts have suggested that these § 1447(c) fee and cost awards are nonetheless reviewable on appeal. The City contends that our r…

• #16

  tually help expedite some appeals. Suppose a court of ap- peals fnds the § 1442 or § 1443 issue a diffcult and close one, but believes removal is clearly and easily warranted on another basis. Allowing the court to address that easier question and avoid harder ones may facilitate a prompter resolution of the proc…

• #17

  Cite as: 593 U. S. 230 (2021) 247 Sotomayor, J., dissenting in the frst instance. See Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. –––, –––, n. 4 (2021). The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Alito took no part in the co…

• #18

  addressed the question interpreted § 1447(d) to permit appel- late review of arguments under § 1443 only, not of other ar- guments for removal addressed in the same order. If Con- gress wanted to disturb that consensus, it would have said so. I respectfully dissent. I Section 1447(d) permits appellate review of …

• #19

  that it stretches the exception in § 1447(d) too far. It allows defendants to bootstrap their entire case for removal into the court of appeals simply by tacking on an argument under § 1442 or § 1443. Indeed, under this interpretation, a de- fendant could formally abandon its argument under § 1442 or § 1443 and s…

• #20

  peals (every one to consider the question) adopted this third view of § 1447(d).* See, e. g., Patel v. Del Taco , Inc., 446 F. 3d 996, 998 (CA9 2006); Alabama v. Conley, 245 F. 3d 1292, 1293, n. 1 (CA11 2001) (per curiam ); Thornton v. Holloway, 70 F. 3d 522, 524 (CA8 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co . v. Baas…

• #21

  ellipses omitted). That Congress did not disturb the pre- vailing interpretation of § 1447(d) is a compelling reason this Court should not either. II The Court sees things differently. In its view, it “does [not] matter” whether “a defendant removes a case `pursuant to' multiple federal statutes” or just one. An…

• #22

  phis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875), and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 (1908)). Context matters. To recap, in 1964, Con- gress created a limited exception for claims of removal under § 1443 to what had long been an absolute prohibition on ap- pellate review of remand orders. After nearly half a cen- tury of courts…

• #23

  for Petitioners 35. Yet that argument somehow opens a back door to appellate review that would otherwise be closed Page Proof Pending Publication 254 BP P. L. C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE Sotomayor, J., dissenting to them. Meanwhile, Baltimore, which has already waited nearly three years to begin li…