Edwards v. Vannoy

Summary

The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 255–309 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 17, 2021 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
Page Proof Pending Publication
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

OCTOBER TERM, 2020 255 
Syllabus 
EDWARDS v. V ANNOY, WARDEN 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the fth circuit 
No. 19–5807. Argued December 2, 2020—Decided May 17, 2021 
In 2007, a Louisiana jury found petitioner Thedrick Edwards guilty of 
armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. At the time, Louisiana law per-
mitted non-unanimous jury verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found 
the defendant guilty. In Edwards's case, 11 of 12 jurors returned a 
guilty verdict as to some crimes, and 10 of 12 jurors returned a guilty 
verdict as to others. After Edwards's conviction became fnal on direct 
review, Edwards fled a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the 
non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional right to a unani-
mous jury. The District Court rejected Edwards's claim as foreclosed 
by Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, and the Fifth Circuit denied a 
certifcate of appealability. While Edwards's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari was pending, the Court repudiated Apodoca and held that a state 
jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious 
offense. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––. Edwards now argues 
that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule applies retroactively on federal col-
lateral review. 
Held: The Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on fed-
eral collateral review. Pp. 262–276. 
(a) A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on direct review, 
even if the defendant's trial has already concluded. But the Court has 
stated that new rules of criminal procedure ordinarily do not apply ret-
roactively on federal collateral review. The Court has stated that a 
new procedural rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review 
only if the new rule constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal proce-
dure. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (plurality opinion). When the 
Teague Court frst articulated that “watershed” exception, however, the 
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of 
basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id., at 313. And in the 32 
years since Teague, the Court has never found that any new procedural 
rule actually satisfes the purported exception. Pp. 262–264. 
(b) To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on federal col-
lateral review, the Court must frst ask whether Ramos announced a 
new rule of criminal procedure and, if so, whether that rule falls within 
an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that apply retro-
actively on federal collateral review. The Court concludes that Ramos 
announced a new rule and that the jury-unanimity rule announced 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
256 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Syllabus 
by Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. 
Pp. 264–272. 
(1) The Ramos jury-unanimity rule is new because it was not “dic-
tated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction be-
came fnal,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301, or “apparent to all reasonable 
jurists” at that time, Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 528. On the 
contrary, before Ramos, many courts interpreted Apodaca to allow for 
non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. And the Ramos 
Court expressly repudiated Apodaca. Pp. 265–266. 
(2) The new rule announced in Ramos does not qualify as a “water-
shed” procedural rule that applies retroactively on federal collateral re-
view. In an attempt to distinguish Ramos from the long line of cases 
where the Court has declined to retroactively apply new procedural 
rules, Edwards emphasizes three aspects of Ramos: (i) the signifcance 
of the jury-unanimity right; (ii) Ramos's reliance on the original mean-
ing of the Constitution; and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing racial 
discrimination in the jury process. But the Court has refused to retro-
actively apply other momentous cases with similar attributes. In De-
Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, the Court declined to retroactively 
apply Duncan v. Louisiana, 395 U. S. 145, even though Duncan estab-
lished the jury right itself. In Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, the 
Court declined to retroactively apply Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 
36, even though Crawford relied on the original meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment to restrict the use of hearsay evidence against criminal 
defendants. And in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (per curiam ), the 
Court declined to retroactively apply Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 
even though Batson held that state prosecutors may not discriminate 
on the basis of race when exercising individual peremptory challenges. 
There is no good rationale for treating Ramos differently from Duncan, 
Crawford, and Batson. Pp. 267–271. 
(3) Given the Court's numerous precedents holding that landmark 
and historic decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure do 
not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, the Court acknowl-
edges that the watershed exception is moribund and that no new rules 
of criminal procedure can satisfy the purported exception for watershed 
rules. Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actu-
ally applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, 
misleads judges, and wastes the resources of defense counsel, prosecu-
tors, and courts. Moreover, no one can reasonably rely on an exception 
that is non-existent in practice, so no reliance interests can be affected 
by forthrightly acknowledging reality. The watershed exception must 
“be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U. S. 
–––, ––– (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 271–272. 
Affrmed.

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 257 
Syllabus 
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 
C. J., Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., 
fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 276. 
Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, 
p. 282. Kagan, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Soto-
mayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 295. 
André Bélanger argued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the briefs were Yigal Bander, James P . Manasseh, 
Collin P . Wedel, Andrew B. Talai, Jeffrey T. Green, and 
Naomi A. Igra. 
Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Solicitor General of Louisiana, 
argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief 
were Jeff Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana, Shae Mc-
Phee, Deputy Solicitor General, Josiah M. Kollmeyer, Assist-
ant Solicitor General, Hillar Moore , Stacy Wright, and Jef-
frey M. Harris. 
Christopher G. Michel argued the cause for the United 
States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on 
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Acting Assist-
ant Attorney General Rabbitt, Deputy Solicitor General 
Feigin, and Sofa M. Vickery.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American 
Civil Liberties Union et al. by David D. Cole, Lisa S. Blatt, Amy Mason 
Saharia, Cassandra Stubbs, Brian W. Stull, Ezekiel Edwards, Jennesa 
Calvo-Friedman, Bruce Hamilton, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. Schweik-
ert, Arthur Rizer, and John W. Whitehead; for the Center on Race, In-
equality, and the Law et al. by Deborah N. Archer and Vincent M. South-
erland; for the DKT Liberty Project by Jessica Ring Amunson; for 
Former Judges et al. by Michael R. Dreeben, Jeremy R. Girton, Yaira 
Dubin, Seth P . Waxman, and Alan E. Schoenfeld; for Human Rights for 
Kids et al. by Bennett L. Cohen, Tony Torain, James Dold, Suzanne La 
Pierre, John Ellem, and Carol A. Kolinchak; for Law Professors et al. 
by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Laura G. Ferguson, Timothy P . O'Toole, 
and Barbara E. Bergman; and for JonRe Taylor by Thomas Frampton. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 
Oregon by Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Benjamin 
Gutman, Solicitor General, and Doug M. Petrina and Christopher A. Per-
due, Assistant Attorneys General; and for the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
258 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Last Term in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ––– (2020), 
this Court held that a state jury must be unanimous to con-
vict a criminal defendant of a serious offense. Ramos repu-
diated this Court's 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 
U. S. 404, which had allowed non-unanimous juries in state 
criminal trials. The question in this case is whether the 
new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos applies 
retroactively to overturn fnal convictions on federal collat-
eral review. Under this Court's retroactivity precedents, 
the answer is no. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announc-
ing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not 
apply retroactively on federal collateral review. See Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639–640, and n. 20 (1965). 
Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that princi-
ple, this Court has announced many important new rules of 
criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of 
those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review. 
See, e. g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 421 (2007) (Con-
Rico by Isaías Sánchez-Báez, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Carlos 
Lugo-Fiol. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Federal Public Defender for 
the District of Oregon et al. by Stephen R. Sady and Shaun S. McCrea; 
for the Innocence Project New Orleans by Richard Davis; for the 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Matthew O. 
Gatewood, Kristen Clarke, Jon M. Greenbaum, Arthur Ago, Noah 
Baron, and John H. Fleming; for Louisiana Professors of Law by Her-
bert V. Larson, Jr.; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 
Inc., by Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; for the 
Promise of Justice Initiative et al. by G. Ben Cohen, E. King Alexander, 
Jr., and Letty S. Di Giulio; for the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice 
Center et al. by Devi M. Rao, Amir H. Ali, and John Mills; and for Ed-
ward L. Tarpley, Jr., et al. by Allison A. Davis and Chris J. K. Swift. 
A brief of amici curiae was fled for Jonathan F. Mitchell et al. by Adam 
K. Mortara, pro se, and Taylor A. R. Meehan.

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 259 
Opinion of the Court 
frontation Clause rule recognized in Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), does not apply retroactively). And 
for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined 
to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collat-
eral review. See, e. g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 
635 (1968) (per curiam ) (jury-trial rule recognized in Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), does not apply 
retroactively). 
In light of the Court's well-settled retroactivity doctrine, 
we conclude that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule likewise 
does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. 
We therefore affrm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
I 
On the night of May 13, 2006, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
Thedrick Edwards and an accomplice kidnapped Ryan Eaton, 
a student at LSU. As Eaton was getting out of his car, Ed-
wards and his accomplice confronted Eaton at gunpoint and 
forced him back into the car. Edwards and his accomplice 
then jumped into the car with Eaton. They drove with 
Eaton to an ATM where they hoped to withdraw money 
using Eaton's card. When they discovered that Eaton did 
not have any money in his account, they drove to Eaton's 
apartment. Once there, they bound and blindfolded Eaton, 
rummaged through his apartment, and took some of his be-
longings to Eaton's car. 
After they were back in the car, Edwards and his accom-
plice coerced Eaton into arranging a meeting with Eaton's 
girlfriend. They then drove to the girlfriend's apartment 
and, at gunpoint, forced Eaton to knock on the door. When 
Eaton's girlfriend opened the door, Edwards and his accom-
plice rushed inside. Both Edwards and his accomplice were 
armed, and Edwards's accomplice had his gun drawn. Ed-
wards and his accomplice instructed Eaton, Eaton's girl-
friend, and two other women in the apartment to lie on the 
foor. Edwards then raped one of the women. His accom-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
260 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
plice raped another woman. As they left, they grabbed 
some personal property from the apartment. Edwards and 
his accomplice hurried back into Eaton's car and drove 
around the corner. They then abandoned the car and fed. 
Two days later, Edwards and his accomplice confronted 
another man at gunpoint and forced him to withdraw money 
from an ATM. 
Within a day of the second incident, the police collected 
substantial evidence implicating Edwards in both episodes. 
The police obtained warrants to search his residence and to 
arrest him. The day after the police executed the search 
warrant but before an arrest, Edwards turned himself in to 
the police and confessed to his crimes. The police video-
taped Edwards's confession. (The video is part of the joint 
appendix. See supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx.) 
Edwards was indicted in Louisiana state court for armed 
robbery, kidnapping, and rape. Edwards pled not guilty and 
went to trial. Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress the 
videotaped confession on the ground that the confession was 
involuntary. The trial court denied the suppression motion. 
At trial, the jury heard Edwards's confession and other 
evidence against him, including the testimony of eyewit-
nesses. The jury convicted Edwards of fve counts of armed 
robbery, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of rape. 
At the time, Louisiana law permitted guilty verdicts if at 
least 10 of the 12 jurors found the defendant guilty. The 
jury convicted Edwards by an 11-to-1 vote on one of the 
armed robbery counts, the two kidnapping counts, and the 
rape count. The jury convicted Edwards by a 10-to-2 vote 
on the four remaining armed robbery counts. 
At sentencing, the trial judge stated: “I can say without 
hesitation that this is the most egregious case that I've had 
before me.” Record 1113. The judge sentenced Edwards 
to life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana First

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 261 
Opinion of the Court 
Circuit Court of Appeal affrmed the conviction and sentence. 
In March 2011, Edwards's conviction became fnal on direct 
review. 
After his conviction became fnal, Edwards applied for 
state post-conviction relief in the Louisiana courts. The 
Louisiana courts denied relief. 
In 2015, Edwards fled a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Louisiana. He argued that the non-unanimous jury ver-
dict violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury. 
The District Court rejected that claim as foreclosed by this 
Court's 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404. 
In Apodaca, this Court ruled that the Constitution does 
not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. 
The Apodaca majority consisted of a plurality opinion by 
four Justices and an opinion concurring in the judgment by 
Justice Powell. In his opinion, Justice Powell acknowledged 
that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury in 
federal criminal trials. 406 U. S., at 371. But in his view, 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate that right 
against the States, meaning that a unanimous jury was not 
constitutionally required in state criminal trials. Id., at 373, 
376–377. In subsequent years, many federal and state 
courts viewed Justice Powell's opinion as the controlling 
opinion from Apodaca. See, e. g., Timbs v. Indiana, 586 
U. S. –––, –––, n. 1 (2019); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 
742, 766, n. 14 (2010). 
In Edwards's case, the District Court likewise followed 
Justice Powell's opinion from Apodaca and concluded that a 
unanimous jury is not constitutionally required in state crim-
inal trials. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
denied a certifcate of appealability. 2019 WL 8643258 (May 
20, 2019). Edwards then petitioned for a writ of certiorari 
in this Court, arguing that the Constitution requires a unani-
mous jury in state criminal trials. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

262 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
II 
While Edwards's petition for certiorari was pending, this 
Court decided Ramos and rejected Justice Powell's opinion 
in Apodaca. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ––– (2020); 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972). The Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth 
Amendment right to a unanimous jury against the States. 
Therefore, in state court as well as federal court, a jury must 
be unanimous to convict a defendant of a serious offense.
1 
The Court's decision in Ramos directly affected Louisiana 
and Oregon, which were the only two States that still al-
lowed non-unanimous juries. For those States, this Court's 
decision in Ramos immediately triggered a pressing ques-
tion: Does Ramos apply retroactively to overturn fnal con-
victions on federal collateral review? We granted certiorari 
in Edwards's case to decide that question. 590 U. S. ––– 
(2020). We conclude that Ramos does not apply retroac-
tively on federal collateral review. 
A 
A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on direct 
review, even if the defendant's trial has already concluded. 
See Griffth v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987). But 
under the habeas corpus statute as interpreted by this 
Court, a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not 
apply retroactively to overturn fnal convictions on federal 
collateral review. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310 
(1989) (plurality opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 
313–314 (1989).
2 
1 Ramos does not apply to defendants charged with petty offenses, 
which typically are offenses that carry a maximum prison term of six 
months or less. 590 U. S., at –––, n. 7. See also Blanton v. North Las 
Vegas, 489 U. S. 538, 543 (1989) (defning petty offense). 
2 Before Griffth v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), the Court sometimes 
would decline to apply new procedural rules even to cases on direct review. 
See, e. g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 721 (1966) (rule announced 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 263 
Opinion of the Court 
In stating that new procedural rules ordinarily do not 
apply retroactively on federal collateral review, Teague rein-
forced what had already been the Court's regular practice 
for several decades under the retroactivity standard articu-
lated in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). Link-
letter set forth a balancing test for determining retroactivity. 
But even under Linkletter, “new rules that constituted clear 
breaks with the past generally were not given retroactive 
effect,” including on federal collateral review. Teague, 489 
U. S., at 304 (plurality opinion). 
As the Court has explained, applying “constitutional rules 
not in existence at the time a conviction became fnal seri-
ously undermines the principle of fnality which is essential 
to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Id., at 309. 
Here, for example, applying Ramos retroactively would po-
tentially overturn decades of convictions obtained in reliance 
on Apodaca. Moreover, conducting scores of retrials years 
after the crimes occurred would require signifcant state re-
sources. See Teague, 489 U. S., at 310 (plurality opinion). 
And a State may not be able to retry some defendants at all 
because of “lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing wit-
nesses.” Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255, 260 (1986) (per cu-
riam) (internal quotation marks omitted). When previously 
convicted perpetrators of violent crimes go free merely be-
cause the evidence needed to conduct a retrial has become 
stale or is no longer available, the public suffers, as do the 
victims. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U. S. 66, 72 
(1986). Even when the evidence can be reassembled, con-
ducting retrials years later inficts substantial pain on crime 
victims who must testify again and endure new trials. In 
this case, the victims of the robberies, kidnappings, and 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), applies only to cases in which 
the trial began after the date of the Miranda decision). Griffth ended 
that practice and declared that new rules apply to all cases on direct 
review. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

264 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
rapes would have to relive their trauma and testify again, 15 
years after the crimes occurred. 
Put simply, the “costs imposed upon the States by retroac-
tive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas 
corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefts of this appli-
cation.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted). For that reason, 
the Court has repeatedly stated that new rules of criminal 
procedure ordinarily do not apply retroactively on federal 
collateral review. 
The Court has identifed only one possible exception to 
that principle. The Court has stated that a new procedural 
rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review only 
if it constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. 
Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). But the Teague 
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed 
“components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id., 
at 313; see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 417 
(2007); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 352 (2004); Tyler 
v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 667, n. 7 (2001). And in the 32 years 
since Teague, as we will explain, the Court has never found 
that any new procedural rule actually satisfes that pur-
ported exception.
3 
B 
To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on fed-
eral collateral review, we must answer two questions. 
First, did Ramos announce a new rule of criminal proce-
dure, as opposed to applying a settled rule? A new rule 
3 By contrast, a new substantive rule—for example, a rule that particu-
lar conduct cannot constitutionally be criminalized—usually applies retro-
actively on federal collateral review. See Welch v. United States, 578 
U. S. 120, 128–129 (2016). The parties here agree, as do we, that the rule 
announced in Ramos is procedural. The Ramos rule affects “only the 
manner of determining the defendant's culpability,” not the “range of con-
duct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” Schriro v. Summer-
lin, 542 U. S. 348, 353 (2004) (emphasis deleted). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 265 
Opinion of the Court 
ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral 
review. 
Second, if Ramos announced a new rule, does it fall within 
an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that 
apply retroactively on federal collateral review? 
1 
Ramos held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict 
a defendant of a serious offense. In so holding, Ramos an-
nounced a new rule. 
A rule is new unless it was “dictated by precedent exist-
ing at the time the defendant's conviction became fnal.” 
Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). In other words, 
a rule is new unless, at the time the conviction became fnal, 
the rule was already “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” 
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 528 (1997). The stark-
est example of a decision announcing a new rule is a decision 
that overrules an earlier case. See Whorton, 549 U. S., 
at 416. 
The jury-unanimity requirement announced in Ramos was 
not dictated by precedent or apparent to all reasonable ju-
rists when Edwards's conviction became fnal in 2011. On 
the contrary, before Ramos, many courts interpreted Apo-
daca to allow for non-unanimous jury verdicts in state crimi-
nal trials.
4 In addition, in Ramos itself, six Members of the 
4 See, e. g., Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, –––, n. 1 (2019) (the “Sixth 
Amendment requires jury unanimity in federal, but not state, criminal 
proceedings”); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 766, n. 14 (2010) (“The 
Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury 
requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not 
require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials”); Schad v. Ari-
zona, 501 U. S. 624, 634, n. 5 (1991) (plurality opinion) (a “state criminal 
defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous 
jury verdict”); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130, 137 (1979) (the Court 
has “approved the use of certain nonunanimous verdicts in cases involving 
12-person juries”); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U. S. 618, 625 (1976) (the 
“holding in Apodaca” was that “the jury's verdict need not be unani-
Page Proof Pending Publication

266 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
Court acknowledged that Apodaca allowed non-unanimous 
jury verdicts in state criminal trials. See 590 U. S., at ––– 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part); id., at ––– (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring in part); id., at ––– – ––– (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in judgment); id., at ––– (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, 
C. J., and Kagan, J., dissenting). And other Members of the 
Court recognized that Apodaca at least muddied the waters 
of the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Id., at –––, 
and n. 36 (plurality opinion). In short, even in Ramos itself, 
the Court indicated that the decision was not dictated by 
precedent or apparent to all reasonable jurists. 
Edwards responds that the Court's decision in Ramos 
must have applied a settled rule, not a new rule, because 
the decision adhered to the original meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment's right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's incorporation of that right (and others) against 
the States. That argument confates the merits question 
presented in Ramos with the retroactivity question pre-
sented here. On the merits question, the critical point, as 
the Court thoroughly explained in Ramos, is that the Consti-
tution's text and history require a unanimous jury in state 
criminal trials. On the retroactivity question, the critical 
point is that reasonable jurists who considered the question 
before Ramos interpreted Apodaca to allow non-unanimous 
jury verdicts in state criminal trials. 
By renouncing Apodaca and expressly requiring unani-
mous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, Ramos plainly 
announced a new rule for purposes of this Court's retroactiv-
ity doctrine. And new rules of criminal procedure ordi-
narily do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. 
mous”); Smith v. Swarthout, 742 F. 3d 885, 895, n. 4 (CA9 2014) (“The 
Supreme Court has instructed that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not require a unanimous verdict in state criminal prosecutions”); 
see also 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure 
§ 22.1(e), p. 23 (4th ed. 2015) (the “Sixth Amendment does not require jury 
unanimity in state criminal trials”). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 267 
Opinion of the Court 
2 
Having determined that Ramos announced a new rule re-
quiring jury unanimity, we must consider whether that new 
rule falls within an exception for watershed rules of crimi-
nal procedure that apply retroactively on federal collateral 
review. 
This Court has stated that the watershed exception is “ex-
tremely narrow” and applies only when, among other things, 
the new rule alters “our understanding of the bedrock proce-
dural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” 
Whorton, 549 U. S., at 417–418 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In the abstract, those various adjectives—watershed, nar-
row, bedrock, essential—do not tell us much about whether 
a particular decision of this Court qualifes for the watershed 
exception. In practice, the exception has been theoretical, 
not real. The Court has identifed only one pre-Teague pro-
cedural rule as watershed: the right to counsel recognized in 
the Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U. S. 335, 344–345 (1963). See Whorton, 549 U. S., at 419, 
421. The Court has never identifed any other pre-Teague 
or post-Teague rule as watershed. None. 
Moreover, the Court has fatly proclaimed on multiple oc-
casions that the watershed exception is unlikely to cover any 
more new rules. Even 32 years ago in Teague itself, the 
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that additional watershed 
rules would “emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). 
And since Teague, the Court has often reiterated that “it is 
unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge.” Whorton, 
549 U. S., at 417 (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted); see also Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 417 (2004); 
Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352; Tyler, 533 U. S., at 667, n. 7; 
Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 (1993); Sawyer, 497 
U. S., at 243; Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 416 (1990). 
Consistent with those many emphatic pronouncements, the 
Court since Teague has rejected every claim that a new pro-
Page Proof Pending Publication

268 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
cedural rule qualifes as a watershed rule. For example, in 
Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S., at 408, the Court declined to retro-
actively apply the rule announced in Mills v. Maryland, 486 
U. S. 367, 384 (1988), that capital juries may not be required 
to disregard certain mitigating factors. In O'Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U. S. 151, 153 (1997), the Court refused to retroac-
tively apply the rule announced in Simmons v. South Caro-
lina, 512 U. S. 154, 156 (1994), that a capital defendant must 
be able, in certain circumstances, to inform the sentencing 
jury that he is parole ineligible. In Lambrix v. Singletary, 
520 U. S., at 539–540, the Court declined to retroactively 
apply the rule announced in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 
1079, 1082 (1992) (per curiam ), that sentencers may not 
weigh invalid aggravating circumstances before recommend-
ing or imposing the death penalty. In Sawyer v. Smith, 497 
U. S., at 229, the Court refused to retroactively apply the 
rule announced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 323 
(1985), which prohibited a death sentence by a jury led to 
the false belief that responsibility for the sentence rested 
elsewhere. 
The list of cases declining to retroactively apply a new rule 
of criminal procedure extends back long before Teague to 
some of this Court's most historic criminal procedure deci-
sions. For example, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 
721 (1966), the Court declined to retroactively apply Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444–445 (1966), which re-
quired that police inform individuals in custody of certain 
constitutional rights before questioning them. And in Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 639–640, the Court refused to 
retroactively apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961), 
which incorporated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule against the States. 
Edwards seeks to distinguish Ramos from the long line of 
cases where the Court has declined to retroactively apply 
new procedural rules. Edwards emphasizes three aspects 
of Ramos: (i) the signifcance of the jury-unanimity right; (ii) 
Ramos's reliance on the original meaning of the Constitution; 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 269 
Opinion of the Court 
and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing racial discrimina-
tion in the jury process. 
But Edwards's attempts to distinguish Ramos are unavail-
ing because the Court has already considered and rejected 
those kinds of arguments in prior retroactivity cases. 
First, Edwards emphasizes the signifcance of the jury-
unanimity right for criminal defendants. But that argu-
ment for retroactivity cannot be squared with the Court's 
decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and 
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968) (per curiam ). In 
Duncan, the Court repudiated several precedents and ruled 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial in 
a state criminal case. 391 U. S., at 149–150, 154–155. Not-
withstanding the extraordinary signifcance of Duncan in 
guaranteeing a jury trial and expanding the rights of crimi-
nal defendants, the Court in DeStefano declined to retroac-
tively apply the jury right. 392 U. S., at 633; see also Sum-
merlin, 542 U. S., at 356–358 (relying on DeStefano and 
rejecting retroactivity of jury right recognized in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 589 (2002)). We cannot discern a 
principled basis for retroactively applying the subsidiary 
Ramos jury-unanimity right when the Court in DeStefano 
declined to retroactively apply the broader jury right itself.
5 
5 Edwards argues that the Ramos rule mirrors the rule announced in 
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130, 134 (1979). In Burch, the Court held 
that six-person jury verdicts must be unanimous. According to Edwards, 
the Court retroactively applied Burch in Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 
323 (1980). But the Justices who concurred in the judgment and supplied 
the decisive opinion in Brown said only that the Burch rule should apply 
to all cases on direct review. 447 U. S., at 337 (opinion of Powell, J., joined 
by Stevens, J.). They did not say that the rule should apply retroactively 
on federal collateral review. So Brown does not help Edwards here. 
The Court's decision in Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U. S. 203 (1972) 
(per curiam), is no more helpful to Edwards. In In re Winship, the Court 
held that a jury must fnd guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 397 U. S. 
358, 364 (1970). And in Ivan V., the Court held that the rule announced 
in Winship applied in a case on direct review. 407 U. S., at 205. But in 
its numerous retroactivity cases, this Court has never identifed the 
Winship rule as a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retro-
Page Proof Pending Publication

270 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
Second, Edwards stresses that Ramos relied on the origi-
nal meaning of the Sixth Amendment. But that argument 
for retroactivity is inconsistent with Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), and Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 
406 (2007). In Crawford, the Court relied on the original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to 
overrule precedent and restrict the use of hearsay evidence 
against criminal defendants. 541 U. S., at 60–69. Notwith-
standing Crawford's reliance on the original meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment, the Court in Whorton declined to retro-
actively apply Crawford. 549 U. S., at 421. 
Third, Edwards says that Ramos prevents racial discrimi-
nation by ensuring that the votes of all jurors, regardless 
of race, matter in the jury room. But that argument for 
retroactivity cannot prevail in light of Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U. S. 79 (1986), and Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) 
(per curiam ). In Batson, the Court overruled precedent 
and revolutionized day-to-day jury selection by holding that 
state prosecutors may not discriminate on the basis of race 
when exercising individual peremptory challenges. 476 
U. S., at 92–93, 96–98. Nonetheless, the Court in Allen de-
clined to retroactively apply Batson. 478 U. S., at 261; see 
also Teague, 489 U. S., at 295–296 (reaffrming Allen). 
The Court's decisions in Duncan, Crawford, and Batson 
were momentous and consequential. All three decisions 
fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the 
actively on federal collateral review. That no doubt explains why, in his 
submissions to this Court, Edwards himself did not cite Ivan V. in support 
of his retroactivity argument. 
In any event, Brown and Ivan V. were pre-Teague decisions. See 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Because Teague tightened the pre-
vious standard set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), 
for applying a decision retroactively on federal collateral review, pre-
Teague decisions holding that a rule is retroactive are not as relevant as 
pre-Teague decisions holding that a rule is not retroactive, such as 
DeStefano. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 271 
Opinion of the Court 
United States and signifcantly expanded the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants. One involved the jury-trial 
right, one involved the original meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause, and one involved racial discrim-
ination in jury selection. Yet the Court did not apply any 
of those decisions retroactively on federal collateral review. 
Ramos is likewise momentous and consequential. But we 
see no good rationale for treating Ramos differently from 
Duncan , Crawford , and Batson . Consistent with the 
Court's long line of retroactivity precedents, we hold that 
the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively 
on federal collateral review.
6 
In so concluding, we recognize that the Court's many ret-
roactivity precedents taken together raise a legitimate ques-
tion: If landmark and historic criminal procedure decisions— 
including Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Crawford, Batson, and 
now Ramos—do not apply retroactively on federal collateral 
review, how can any additional new rules of criminal proce-
dure apply retroactively on federal collateral review? At 
this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only 
candid answer is that none can—that is, no new rules of 
criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We 
cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants 
and courts. In Teague itself, the Court recognized that the 
purported exception was unlikely to apply in practice, be-
cause it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of 
basic due process have yet to emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313 
(plurality opinion). The Court has often repeated that “it 
is unlikely that any of these watershed rules has yet to 
emerge.” Tyler, 533 U. S., at 667, n. 7 (alteration and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., Whorton, 549 
6 The Ramos rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral re-
view. States remain free, if they choose, to retroactively apply the jury-
unanimity rule as a matter of state law in state post-conviction proceed-
ings. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 282 (2008). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

272 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
U. S., at 417; Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352. And for decades, 
the Court has rejected watershed status for new procedural 
rule after new procedural rule, amply demonstrating that 
the purported exception has become an empty promise. 
Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never 
actually applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, 
distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes the resources 
of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts. Moreover, no 
one can reasonably rely on an exception that is non-existent 
in practice, so no reliance interests can be affected by forth-
rightly acknowledging reality. It is time—probably long 
past time—to make explicit what has become increasingly 
apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New proce-
dural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral 
review. The watershed exception is moribund. It must 
“be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Herrera v. Wyo-
ming, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
3 
We respectfully offer four responses to the dissent. 
First, in the dissent's view, if a right is important enough 
to justify overruling or repudiating precedent (as in Ramos), 
then it often is important enough to apply retroactively as 
a watershed rule of criminal procedure. But the Court's 
precedents say the opposite and demonstrate that the dis-
sent's position erroneously inverts stare decisis and Teague. 
Teague recognized that the Court would occasionally an-
nounce new rules of criminal procedure by overruling or re-
pudiating existing precedents. Teague further explained, 
however, that it was “unlikely” that such new procedural 
rules would apply retroactively on federal collateral review. 
489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). In other words, under 
this Court's longstanding case law, it is easier to overrule or 
repudiate a precedent—as the Court did in Mapp, Miranda, 
Duncan, Batson, and Crawford, for example—than it is to 
apply the new procedural rule retroactively on federal collat-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 273 
Opinion of the Court 
eral review—as demonstrated by the Court's corresponding 
non-retroactivity decisions in Linkletter, Johnson, DeStef-
ano, Allen, and Whorton. 
The Ramos Court fully understood all of this. Although 
Ramos stopped short of expressly deciding this retroactivity 
question (because it was not squarely presented), Ramos dis-
cussed retroactivity and plainly foreshadowed today's deci-
sion. The lead opinion in Ramos—which was joined in rele-
vant part by two of today's dissenters, Justice Breyer and 
Justice Sotomayor—explained that overruling or repudi-
ating Apodaca was not likely to signifcantly affect Louisi-
ana's and Oregon's reliance interests in preserving fnal con-
victions because Ramos was not likely to apply retroactively 
on federal collateral review. In particular, the lead opinion 
said that the States' “worries” about Ramos applying retro-
actively and overturning hundreds of fnal convictions out-
stripped “the facts” because “Teague's test is a demanding 
one, so much so that this Court has yet to announce a new 
rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos, 
590 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Gorsuch, J.); see also id., at ––– – 
––– (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). The lead opinion 
added that Teague is “demanding by design, expressly cali-
brated to address the reliance interests States have in the 
fnality of their criminal judgments.” Id., at ––– (opinion of 
Gorsuch, J.). In light of that explicit language in Ramos, 
the Court's decision today can hardly come as a surprise. 
In short, the Court's holding today—namely, that Ramos 
does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review— 
carefully adheres to Ramos and tracks the Court's many 
longstanding precedents on retroactivity. 
Second, the dissent suggests that the Court knows that 
Ramos should apply retroactively under the watershed ex-
ception, but wants to avoid applying Ramos retroactively, 
and for that reason has decided to just eliminate the water-
shed exception altogether. That suggestion is unfounded. 
Ramos was a momentous decision, and those of us who 
Page Proof Pending Publication

274 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Opinion of the Court 
joined it continue to agree with it. But as we have ex-
plained, Ramos itself analyzed the Court's retroactivity prec-
edents and foretold today's decision on retroactivity. We 
are simply following through on what Ramos (as well as the 
Court's many other precedents) already said about retroac-
tivity to now squarely hold that Ramos does not apply retro-
actively on federal collateral review. If we thought other-
wise and believed that Ramos qualifed under the Court's 
precedents as a rule that applies retroactively, we would cer-
tainly say so. But applying our retroactivity precedents, we 
have concluded that Ramos does not apply retroactively— 
just as the Court has previously held that other historic 
cases like Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Batson, and Crawford 
did not apply retroactively. After reaching that conclusion, 
we then took account of the overall jurisprudential landscape 
of the last several decades in Teague cases and acknowledged 
what has become unmistakably clear: The purported water-
shed exception is moribund. 
Third, on that last point, the dissent responds that Teague 
nominally identifed a retroactivity exception for watershed 
procedural rules and that we should do so as well. But the 
problem, as we see it, is that Teague simultaneously said that 
it was “unlikely” that new procedural rules would qualify as 
watershed. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). So Teague 
took with one hand what it seemingly gave with the other. 
And in the 32 years since Teague, this Court has never once 
held that a new procedural rule qualifes for the purported 
watershed exception. What is more, the Court has regu-
larly repeated that Teague 's watershed exception would 
likely never be satisfed. The Court today need not and 
does not overrule any post-Teague cases that held the water-
shed exception satisfed because there are no post-Teague 
cases that held the watershed exception satisfed. 
As noted above, no stare decisis values would be served 
by continuing to indulge the fction that Teague's purported 
watershed exception endures. No one can reasonably rely 
on a supposed exception that has never operated in practice. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 275 
Opinion of the Court 
And perpetuating what has become an illusory exception 
misleads litigants and judges, and needlessly expends the 
scarce resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts. 
At this point, given that landmark cases like Mapp, Mi-
randa, Duncan, Batson, Crawford, and now Ramos have not 
applied retroactively, we are simply acknowledging reality 
and stating the obvious: The purported watershed exception 
retains no vitality. 
Fourth, the dissent asserts that the Court is not living up 
to the promise of Ramos for criminal defendants. To begin 
with, the dissent cannot reasonably charge the Court with 
failing to live up to Ramos given that Ramos itself explicitly 
forecast today's decision on retroactivity. Moreover, with 
respect, Justice Kagan dissented in Ramos. To be sure, 
the dissent's position on the jury-unanimity rule in Ramos 
was perfectly legitimate, as is the dissent's position on retro-
activity in today's case. And it is of course fair for a dissent 
to vigorously critique the Court's analysis. But it is another 
thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn around 
and impugn today's majority for supposedly shortchanging 
criminal defendants. To properly assess the implications for 
criminal defendants, one should assess the implications of 
Ramos and today's ruling together. And criminal defend-
ants as a group are better off under Ramos and today's deci-
sion, taken together, than they would have been if Justice 
Kagan's dissenting view had prevailed in Ramos. If the 
dissent's view had prevailed in Ramos, no defendant would 
ever be entitled to the jury-unanimity right—not on collat-
eral review, not on direct review, and not in the future. By 
contrast, under the Court's holdings in Ramos and this case, 
criminal defendants whose cases are still on direct review or 
whose cases arise in the future will have the beneft of the 
jury-unanimity right announced in Ramos. The rhetoric in 
today's dissent is misdirected. Different Members of the 
Court have reached different conclusions in Ramos and in 
this case, but each Member of the Court has acted in good 
faith in deciding the diffcult questions before us. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

276 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Thomas, J., concurring 
* * * 
To summarize the Court's retroactivity principles: New 
substantive rules alter “the range of conduct or the class of 
persons that the law punishes.” Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 
353. Those new substantive rules apply to cases pending in 
trial courts and on direct review, and they also apply retroac-
tively on federal collateral review. New procedural rules 
alter “only the manner of determining the defendant's cul-
pability.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Those new procedural 
rules apply to cases pending in trial courts and on direct 
review. But new procedural rules do not apply retroac-
tively on federal collateral review. 
Ramos announced a new rule of criminal procedure. It 
does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. 
We affrm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, 
concurring. 
I join the majority in full because it correctly charts its 
way through precedent to hold expressly what we have long 
implied: “New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on 
federal collateral review.” Ante, at 272. I write separately 
to highlight that we could also have resolved this case by 
applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA directs 
federal courts to deny “any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court” unless the state court's decision 
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). In 2011, petitioner 
urged a Louisiana court to hold that the Federal Constitution 
requires jury unanimity, and the court rejected that claim on 
the merits. That conclusion was consistent with Apodaca v. 
Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), in which this Court deter-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 277 
Thomas, J., concurring 
mined that the Constitution does not require unanimous jury 
verdicts for state criminal convictions. AEDPA thus leaves 
no room for this Court—or any federal court—to grant 
relief. 
I 
A 
Congress frst prescribed federal habeas jurisdiction in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. That statute did not clearly defne 
the scope of relief, but “the black-letter principle of the com-
mon law [was] that the writ was simply not available at all 
to one convicted of crime by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.” 
1 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 465– 
466 (1963) (Bator); see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 663 
(1996) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830)). And the 
writ did not extend at all to prisoners confned under state 
authority. Bator 465. 
Congress expanded the writ in the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. This Act extended the writ to 
prisoners in state custody but again provided only “bare 
guidelines” about the scope of the writ.
2 Wright v. West, 
505 U. S. 277, 285 (1992) (plurality opinion). At frst, this 
Court continued to apply the common-law rule that allowed 
1 Section 14 of the Judiciary Act provided that “courts of the United 
States . . . shall have power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus” and that 
“justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, 
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an 
inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas 
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are 
in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are 
committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be 
brought into court to testify.” 1 Stat. 81–82. 
2 The relevant language of the Act stated that courts, “in addition to the 
authority already conferred by [the Judiciary Act of 1789], shall have 
power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may 
be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any 
treaty or law of the United States.” 14 Stat. 385. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
278 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Thomas, J., concurring 
a state petitioner to challenge only “the jurisdiction of the 
court that had rendered the judgment under which he was 
in custody.” Ibid. But the Court later “expand[ed] the cat-
egory of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas pur-
poses.” Ibid. In 1874, for example, this Court found juris-
dictional defects whenever state courts imposed sentences 
under unconstitutional statutes or imposed sentences not au-
thorized by a statute. Ibid. (collecting cases). And a few 
decades later, the Court expanded relief to situations where, 
in the eyes of the federal court, “no state court had provided 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate” a prisoner's federal 
claims. Ibid. But absent a “jurisdictional” defect, a state 
court judgment was entitled to “ ` absolute respect' ” as long 
as the prisoner “ `had been given an adequate opportunity to 
obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the 
state courts.' ” Ibid. That rule left no room to grant relief 
simply because a state court made an error of law. 
In 1953, this Court abruptly changed course and decided 
that federal courts could grant a writ of habeas corpus sim-
ply because they disagreed with a state court's judgment. 
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 463. Around the same 
time, this Court declared that many constitutional rights 
of criminal procedure—some old, and some new—applied 
against the States. See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 
(1961) (exclusionary rule); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 
335 (1963) (right to a court-appointed attorney); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) (right to be informed of right 
against self-incrimination). That combination predictably 
raised tough questions: Should new rules apply retroactively 
to fnal state-court judgments, allowing federal courts to 
grant habeas relief even if state courts did not err when issu-
ing their decisions? And if so, by what authority could fed-
eral courts grant that relief? 
Admitting that “the Constitution neither prohibits nor re-
quires retrospective effect,” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S.

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 279 
Thomas, J., concurring 
618, 629 (1965), the Court took an atextual and ad hoc ap-
proach, presumably based on its interpretation of the 1867 
Act. The Court declared that some federal decisions apply 
retroactively to fnal state convictions, thus allowing federal 
courts to grant habeas relief depending on the “merits and 
demerits in each case.” Ibid. To guide the analysis, Link-
letter announced several factors for federal courts to con-
sider: “the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose 
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further 
or retard its operation.” Ibid. 
This rule did “not le[ad] to consistent results,” so two dec-
ades later the Court tried a new interpretation of the 1867 
Act. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 302 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 278 (2008) 
(“Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of 
this Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute”). 
Relevant here, Teague allowed federal courts to give new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactive effect 
on habeas review only if the new rule was “watershed,” 
“ `bedrock,' ” or “ `essential.' ” 489 U. S., at 311 (emphasis 
deleted).
3 
B 
Teague, however, was not the fnal word on how federal 
courts should review the decisions of state courts. In 1996, 
Congress enacted AEDPA, the most signifcant change to 
3 Two years before Teague, this Court overruled cases that had allowed 
courts to apply the balancing test in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 
618 (1965), to cases on direct review, holding instead that the Constitution 
required courts to apply new procedural rules retroactively to cases 
on direct appellate review. Griffth v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987). 
Teague also explained that new rules that “accord constitutional pro-
tection to . . . primary activity” retroactively apply to cases on fed-
eral collateral review. 489 U. S., at 307, 310–311. These are considered 
substantive rules. See Welch v. United States , 578 U. S. 120, 128 
(2016). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

280 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Thomas, J., concurring 
the habeas corpus statute since 1867. AEDPA flled in the 
“bare guidelines” of the 1867 Act by creating a comprehen-
sive system for addressing federal habeas claims brought by 
state prisoners. See Wright, 505 U. S., at 285. 
Directly relevant here are two provisions that ensure that 
state courts have the primary role in adjudicating these 
claims. First, a prisoner must exhaust his claims in state 
court before he can seek relief in federal court. If “any 
available [state-law] procedure” remains open, a federal 
“writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” §§ 2254(b)– 
(c). Second, once a state court has had the opportunity to 
decide that claim, AEDPA demands that federal courts re-
spect that judgment. The law precludes relief “with respect 
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim” either 
(1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d). 
It is not enough for a federal court to disagree with the state 
court—much less disagree on a point of law that this Court 
had not yet settled when the state court issued its judgment. 
Rather, the state court's decision must confict with clearly 
established law and be obviously wrong “beyond any possi-
bility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Rich-
ter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011); Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 
38–40 (2011). 
II 
A 
Here, the system worked as designed. Edwards pre-
sented his unanimous jury claim to a Louisiana court. And 
the state court reasonably relied on Apodaca in rejecting 
that claim. AEDPA is clear about what happens next— 
relief “shall not be granted.” § 2254(d). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 281 
Thomas, J., concurring 
Our analysis could have begun and ended there—with 
§ 2254(d)(1)'s plain text. Congress, through AEDPA, has 
made clear that federal courts cannot provide relief in this 
case. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. 190, 221 
(2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Bollman, 4 
Cranch 75, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[T]he power to award 
the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be 
given by written law”). 
B 
The Court, instead, relies on Teague. I join the Court's 
opinion because it correctly applies precedent and leads to 
the same judgment, but I would be remiss if I did not point 
out two other problems with Teague. 
First, it has never been clear what gave this Court author-
ity to grant habeas relief to state prisoners based on “new” 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Teague did not 
explain why the 1867 Act gave federal courts this power. 
Moreover, Teague primarily focused on moving the law in 
the opposite direction of Linkletter 's permissive approach to 
collaterally reviewing fnal state convictions. See Danforth, 
552 U. S., at 278 (“Teague . . . situated the rule it announced 
in th[e] line of cases adjusting the scope of federal habeas 
relief in accordance with equitable and prudential considera-
tions”). Even if federal courts had this power, we never de-
cided whether Congress' most recent version of the habeas 
statute—AEDPA—continued to allow such relief. Given all 
that, the majority wisely closes a door to retroactive relief 
that likely never existed in the frst place. 
Second, the Court's reliance on Teague today and in the 
past should not be construed to signal that AEDPA is an 
afterthought in analyzing a claim like petitioner's or that 
Teague could justify relief where AEDPA forecloses 
it. AEDPA does contemplate that some new constitutional 
rules might be retroactive in narrow circumstances. See 
§§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (evidentiary hearings), 2244(b)(2)(A) 
(second-or-successive bar), 2244(d)(1)(C) (statute of limita-
Page Proof Pending Publication

282 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
tions). But it does not contemplate retroactive rules upset-
ting a state court's adjudication of an issue that reasonably 
applied the law at the time. Section 2254(d)—the absolute 
bar on claims that state courts reasonably denied—has no 
exception for retroactive rights. Congress' decision to cre-
ate retroactivity exceptions to the statute of limitations and 
to the bar on second-or-successive petitions but not for 
§ 2254(d) is strong evidence that Teague could never have led 
to relief here. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 
(1983).
4 The plain text applies regardless of what a previous 
interpretation of a previous statute says. 5 
* * * 
A state court rejected petitioner's claim that he was enti-
tled to a unanimous jury verdict. That adjudication was not 
unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law. 
AEDPA's explicit directive thus independently resolves this 
case: “a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” 
§ 2254(d). 
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins, 
concurring. 
Sometimes this Court leaves a door ajar and holds out the 
possibility that someone, someday might walk through it— 
4 As Justice Gorsuch correctly points out, federal courts have “equita-
ble discretion to decide whether to issue the writ or to provide a remedy,” 
which includes the powers to create doctrines such as harmless error. 
Post, at 289 (concurring opinion). And federal courts can rely on those 
doctrines as well as statutory bars to deny relief. That is why, as Justice 
Gorsuch explains, an equitable retroactivity bar with no watershed ex-
ception can independently justify denying relief. Post, at 291, n. 5. 
5 The Constitution does not require that habeas relief be available for 
new “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. See, e. g., Brown v. Allen, 
344 U. S. 443, 532–533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); Linkletter, 
381 U. S., at 629. Teague also acknowledged that a later change in law 
does not require invalidating a fnal judgment. See 489 U. S., at 308–309 
(plurality opinion). And again, habeas corpus traditionally did not apply 
at all to prisoners sentenced by a court with valid jurisdiction. See Bator 
465–466. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 283 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
though no one ever has or, in truth, ever will. In Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), the Court suggested that one day 
it might apply a new “watershed” rule of criminal procedure 
retroactively to undo a fnal state court conviction. But that 
day never came to pass. Instead, over the following three 
decades this Court denied “watershed” status to one rule 
after another. Rules guaranteeing individuals the right to 
confront their accusers. Rules ensuring that only a jury 
may decide a defendant's fate in a death penalty case. Rules 
preventing racially motivated jury selection. All failed to 
win retroactive application. Today, the Court candidly ad-
mits what has been long apparent: Teague held out a “false 
hope” and the time has come to close its door. Ante, at 272. 
We take this step not because this Court's criminal proce-
dure rulings are somehow unimportant. Any decision seek-
ing to enforce liberties enshrined in the Constitution has 
a claim to “watershed” importance. Instead, we abandon 
Teague's test because it poses a question this Court has no 
business asking. 
I 
Though we often refer to the writ of habeas corpus, the 
common law knew several. See Ex parte Bollman , 4 
Cranch 75, 97–98 (1807). All had one thing in common: 
Each required a custodian to produce (habeas) a prisoner's 
person ( corpus). But they served different ends. Some 
writs were tools for moving a prisoner from one court to 
another—whether for a new prosecution ( ad respondendum) 
or to execute a prior judgment ( ad satisfaciendum). Others 
functioned more like a subpoena to procure a prisoner's pres-
ence to testify in court ( ad testifcandum ). Others still 
served to remove a case from an inferior court to a superior 
one ( cum causa). 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 129–131 (1768). 
Among them all, however, only one came to be known as 
“The Great Writ.” The writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum was a mechanism for asking “why the liberty of [a] sub-
jec[t] is restrained.” Id., at 131 (emphasis added). Lead-
Page Proof Pending Publication

284 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
ing up to the English Civil War, monarchs sometimes jailed 
their subjects summarily and indefnitely, with little explana-
tion and even less process. E. g., Darnel's Case , 3 How. 
St. Tr. 1–59 (K. B. 1627). In response, common law courts 
developed the ad subjiciendum writ to force the Crown to 
provide reasons for its actions and, if necessary, to ensure 
adequate process—like a criminal trial—to justify any fur-
ther detention. See Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1, ¶¶ 5, 
8 (1628). In other words, “habeas corpus [w]as the instru-
ment by which due process could be insisted upon.” Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 555 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Great though it was, the writ's power was never limitless. 
A prisoner confned under a fnal judgment of conviction by 
a court of competent jurisdiction stood on different footing 
than one confned by the King without trial. A court might 
issue the writ asking, “What is the reason for confnement?” 
But if the return came back: “Because he's serving a custo-
dial sentence after being convicted of a crime,” the inquiry 
was usually at an end. See Opinion on the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, Wilm. 77, 88, 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36 (K. B. 1758); cf. 
Anonymus, Cart. 221, 124 Eng. Rep. 928 (C. P. 1671); Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, ¶¶ 2, 20. Custody pur-
suant to a fnal judgment was proof that a defendant had 
received the process due to him. See, e. g., Bushell's Case, 
Vaugh. 135, 142–143, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–1010 (C. P. 
1670). 
In 1789, Congress authorized federal courts to issue the 
habeas writ. 1 Cong. ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; Ex parte 
Bollman, 4 Cranch, at 93–94. When called upon to inter-
pret that statute, this Court defned the scope of habeas 
review by looking “to the common law.” Id., at 93–94. 
Unsurprisingly, it proceeded to restate the longstanding 
rule associated with criminal judgments: Ad subjiciendum 
provided no recourse for a prisoner confned pursuant to 
a fnal judgment of conviction. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 
193, 209 (1830). As Chief Justice Marshall rhetorically 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 285 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
asked, “is not that judgment in itself suffcient cause?” Id., 
at 202 (emphasis added). 
If the answer was nearly always yes, one important excep-
tion existed both here and in England. A habeas court 
could grant relief if the court of conviction lacked jurisdiction 
over the defendant or his offense. Id., at 202–203. Still, 
the exception was “confned” to that “limited class of cases.” 
Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 21 (1876). One judge could 
not grant relief just because he might have decided the 
merits of the case differently than another had. As this 
Court put it, a perceived “error in the judgment or pro-
ceedings, under and by virtue of which the party is impris-
oned, constitute[d] no ground for” relief. Ex parte Sie-
bold, 100 U. S. 371, 375 (1880). Any other approach, the 
Court explained, risked converting the habeas writ into “a 
mere writ of error,” little more than a chance to redo a trial 
or its appeal. Ibid. 
Originally, Congress allowed federal courts to issue habeas 
writs only to federal custodians. Reconstruction changed 
that. After the Civil War, Congress granted federal courts 
the power to issue habeas writs to state authorities as well. 
See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 39 Cong. ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
1 
Even then, however, this Court continued to interpret the 
habeas statute consistent with historical practice. If a pris-
oner was in custody pursuant to a fnal state court judgment, 
1 That Act conferred on federal courts the “power to grant writs of ha-
beas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of” federal law. § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (emphasis added). 
Two earlier statutes extended federal habeas jurisdiction to state custodi-
ans, but only for a much narrower class of cases. In 1833, Congress au-
thorized federal courts to issue habeas process to state custodians detain-
ing federal offcers for acts taken to implement federal law. Act of Mar. 
2, 1833, § 7, 4 Stat. 634–635. This provision lives on in 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2241(c)(2). And in 1842, Congress permitted federal courts to issue ha-
beas process to state custodians detaining foreign offcials whose acts im-
plicated the law of nations. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, Ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539. It, 
too, lives on in 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(4). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

286 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
a federal court was powerless to revisit those proceedings 
unless the state court had acted without jurisdiction. E. g., 
In re Graham, 138 U. S. 461, 462 (1891); Tinsley v. Anderson, 
171 U. S. 101, 104–106 (1898); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 
184, 185–186 (1899); Medcraf v. Hodge, 245 U. S. 630, 630 
(1917) (per curiam ). 
Under the view that prevailed in this country for most of 
our history, and in England for even longer, Teague's ques-
tion about the “retroactive” application of “watershed” rules 
of criminal procedure to undo fnal criminal judgments would 
have made no sense. Because a fnal judgment of convic-
tion, pursuant to a full-fedged criminal trial, was the process 
due to a criminal serving a custodial sentence, the habeas 
writ had served its purpose. A fnal judgment evidenced a 
lawful basis for confnement and was “binding on all the 
world.” Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet., at 207. 
II 
Only in the middle of the twentieth century did things 
really begin to change. In 1915, this Court suggested that 
a state court's extreme departure from “established modes” 
of criminal trial practice, such as proceeding under the spec-
ter of mob violence, might be akin to the loss of “jurisdic-
tion,” at least if no corrective mechanism like an appeal ex-
isted. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 326, 335–336 (1915). 
But if that represented an innovation, it was a modest one. 
The same cannot be said for Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 
464, 478 (1953). There, this Court effectively recast habeas 
as another way for federal courts to redress practically any 
error of federal law they might fnd in state court proceed-
ings. Never mind that state courts are obligated to follow 
federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Never mind that 
those courts may have already passed on a defendant's argu-
ment about his federal rights. See id., at 487; id., at 497– 
501 (Frankfurter, J.). Never mind, too, that the defendant 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 287 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
may have lost on appeal within the state court system, and 
even petitioned this Court for direct review. See id., at 
456–457; id., at 489–497 (Frankfurter, J.). Everyone accepts 
that, in our criminal justice system today, a judgment be-
comes fnal only after the completion of a trial and the ap-
pellate process, including the opportunity to seek certiorari 
from this Court on questions of federal law. See Clay v. 
United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003).
2 Yet, even after all 
that, Brown held, a federal district court could still vacate a 
fnal state court judgment based on any perceived error of 
federal law it might detect—and do so though the entire 
state judicial system and this Court had seen nothing amiss. 
344 U. S., at 465–487; id., at 506–507 (Frankfurter, J.). 
The result? As Justice Jackson warned, habeas became 
little more than an ordinary appeal with an extraordinary 
Latin name. The Court “so departed from [the fnality] 
principle that the profession now believes that the issues 
[federal courts] actually consider [in] habeas corpus are 
substantially the same as would be considered on appeal.” 
Id., at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). “The fatal 
sentence that in real life writes fnis to many causes”— 
Judgment affrmed. or Certiorari denied.—became “in legal 
theory . . . a complete blank.” Id., at 543. Justice Jackson 
feared that this result not only “trivializ[ed] . . . the 
writ,” but promised practical problems too. Id., at 536. A 
large new “haystack” of frivolous habeas petitions was sure 
to follow, making it that much harder for courts to identify 
2 When a sovereign furnishes an opportunity to appeal (as state and 
federal governments now do), it necessarily invites an appellate court to 
revisit an initial merits determination. See J. Baker, An Introduction to 
English Legal History 148–153 (5th ed. 2019) (describing development of 
the appeal at common law); G. Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary (1729) (de-
fning “appeal”). Under an appellate system, then, “none of th[e] [preced-
ing decisions] are fnal” in an ultimate sense until any appeals are con-
cluded. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 411 
(1768). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

288 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
the meritorious “needle.” Id., at 537. The only solution 
Justice Jackson could see was to hold fast to the traditional 
rule: A fnal judgment, after completion of trial and the ex-
haustion of any direct appellate review, was res judicata, and 
the sole exception was a lack of jurisdiction. Id., at 543– 
544. 
Brown not only upended centuries of settled precedent 
and invited practical problems; it produced anomalies as well. 
The very same term it decided Brown, this Court rejected 
Brown's fx-any-error approach for fnal judgments issued by 
military courts. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 142 (1953) 
(plurality opinion); id., at 147 (Minton, J., concurring in judg-
ment). So only state convicts—not United States service 
members—were afforded an additional avenue for appellate 
relief in the garb of habeas corpus proceedings. It turned 
out, too, that only state courts—not executive tribunals— 
were forced to suffer the indignity of having their fnal judg-
ments reopened. So federal courts wound up with more 
power to reopen the judgments of a different sovereign's 
courts than the administrative proceedings of the federal 
government itself. See Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F. 2d 
633, 641 (CA5 1959); M. Howe, Foreword: The Supreme 
Court, 1952 Term, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 160–162 (1953). 
With time, these implications became clear and, as Justice 
Jackson predicted, Brown's innovation proved unsustainable. 
The haystack just grew too large. During the 1960s, this 
Court incorporated the exclusionary rule against the States. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961). It announced a 
Sixth Amendment right to a public defender. Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 339–340, 342 (1963). It barred 
the government from speaking to the defendant outside de-
fense counsel's presence. Massiah v. United States, 377 
U. S. 201, 204–206 (1964). And it announced a new script 
governing police interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436, 467–477 (1966). This proliferation of new fed-
eral procedural rights, combined with a federal post -
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 289 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
conviction mechanism that functioned like an ordinary ap-
peal, soon yielded a giant haystack of habeas petitions. 
For years, this Court struggled to devise rules for sorting 
the hay from the needles. Its approach varied wildly and 
inconsistently over time. In a few cases, the Court held a 
new rule of criminal procedure should not apply retroac-
tively to settled convictions. Tehan v. United States ex. rel. 
Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 409, n. 3, 419 (1966); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, 639–640 (1965). On occasion, 
though, it extended the beneft of a new rule to litigants with 
fnal criminal judgments—sometimes only to the named peti-
tioner in this Court, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 377 
(1964), other times to everyone laboring under a fnal judg-
ment, McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U. S. 575, 575 (1964) (per cu-
riam). Justice Harlan called these divergent results “an ex-
traordinary collection of rules.” Desist v. United States, 394 
U. S. 244, 256–257 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He even 
wondered whether they could “properly be considered the 
legitimate products of a court of law.” Id., at 259. 
III 
It was only in this world that Teague's question about the 
retroactive application of new “watershed” rules of criminal 
procedure could even begin to make sense. In an effort to 
bring some coherence to the area, the Court refocused its 
attention on the terms of the federal habeas statute. The 
statute provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be 
granted”—not that they must be granted. 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2241(a) (emphasis added); see also § 2243. The law thus in-
vests federal courts with equitable discretion to decide 
whether to issue the writ or to provide a remedy. Withrow 
v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 716 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).
3 
3 That is how this Court reads nearly identical text in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act (DJA). Because the DJA says federal courts “ `may de-
clare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party,' ” district 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
290 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to de-
velop doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer to 
its historic offce. It decided that some claims are not cogni-
zable on federal habeas review if state courts provide a 
mechanism for review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494– 
495 (1976). It established procedural default rules to pre-
vent habeas petitioners from evading independent and ade-
quate state law grounds for sustaining their convictions. 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 86–87 (1977). It crafted 
a heightened harmless error standard, calibrated to refect 
the fnality interests at stake in the post-conviction context. 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633–638 (1993). And 
it applied abuse-of-the-writ rules to prevent an endless cycle 
of petition and re-petition by prisoners with nothing but time 
on their hands. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 489–493 
(1991). 
Chief among these new-but-old developments was Teague. 
Drawing on the historic role of habeas, the Court held that 
newly recognized rules of criminal procedure should not nor-
mally apply to cases “which have become fnal.” 489 U. S., 
at 304–310.
4 Hard experience since Brown had reminded 
the Court that fnality, “the idea that at some point a crimi-
nal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, a termination, `is 
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.' ” 
Prost v. Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578, 582 (CA10 2011). One 
might “always continue to ask” whether a particular judg-
ment was “correct.” P. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 
441, 446–448 (1963). But if the rule of law means anything, 
it means the fnal result of proceedings in courts of com-
petent jurisdiction establishes what is correct “in the eyes 
courts “possess discretion” to award declaratory relief. Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co., 515 U. S. 277, 282, 286 (1995). 
4 Although the lead opinion in Teague garnered only a plurality, a major-
ity of the Court adopted the plurality's rule later that same year in Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313 (1989).

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 291 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
of the law.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 399–400 
(1993).5 
IV 
While Teague did much to return the writ to its original 
station, it didn't quite complete the journey. After insisting 
that fnal judgments cannot be reopened as a “general rule,” 
Teague left some wiggle room. It added that some new 
rules of criminal procedure might yet apply retroactively if 
they had “watershed” signifcance. 489 U. S., at 311. Why? 
Because “ `time and growth in social capacity, as well as judi-
cial perceptions,' ” might “ `alter our understanding of the 
bedrock procedural elements' ” necessary to satisfy notions 
of “ `fairness.' ” Ibid. To help the world know what a wa-
tershed rule might look like, the Court described it in vari-
ous ways—“bedrock,” “fundamental,” “central,” an “absolute 
prerequisite.” Id., at 311–314. A rule ftting that bill, 
Teague said, would do two things: (1) “ `signifcantly im-
prove' ” existing procedures for determining factual guilt or 
innocence and (2) “implicate the fundamental fairness of the 
trial.” Id., at 312–313.
6 
5 Apparently believing our judge-made doctrines did not go far enough, 
Congress added further “new restrictions” of its own in the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Felker v. Turpin, 518 
U. S. 651, 664 (1996). But AEDPA creates only additional conditions to 
relief; it did not do away with the discretion afforded courts in the habeas 
statute, or the various rules this Court has formulated in the exercise of 
that discretion. As this Court has (unanimously) explained, “AEDPA did 
not codify Teague” and the one “neither abrogates [n]or qualifes the 
other.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 39 (2011). That is why Teague's 
retroactivity bar operates “in addition” to AEDPA's relitigation bar in 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d). Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam ). 
Because a retroactivity bar and a relitigation bar both pose threshold bar-
riers, Justice Thomas's concurrence highlights how AEDPA provides an 
additional reason why the Fifth Circuit correctly denied a certifcate of 
appealability here. Ante, at 280 (concurring opinion); see Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 350 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
6 Teague also discussed an exception to the fnality rule for certain “sub-
stantive rules.” Because the parties agree that Ramos involved only a 
Page Proof Pending Publication

292 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
But all these words have yielded nothing. In more than 
three decades since Teague, not a single new rule of criminal 
procedure has satisfed its “watershed” test. Ante, at 267– 
272. Nor is it as if we have lacked promising candidates. 
This Court has refused “watershed” status to new rules that 
seek to ensure death penalty decisions are made by jurors 
rather than judges. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 
348 (2004) (denying watershed status to Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U. S. 584 (2002)). New rules designed to ensure race 
discrimination plays no role in jury selection met the same 
fate even before Teague. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 
(1986) (per curiam ) (denying retroactive application to Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)). Rules that sought 
to realign our jurisprudence with the original meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause have failed to 
qualify too. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406 (2007) 
(denying watershed status to Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U. S. 36 (2004)). 
The Court's decision today retraces this familiar path. It 
denies “watershed” status to Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 
U. S. ––– (2020), a decision that (like Crawford) returned us 
to the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment—and one 
that (like Ring and Batson) concerns a vital aspect of the 
jury trial right. The Court explains why this result neces-
sarily follows from our post-Teague precedents: If so many 
other highly consequential rulings have failed to clear 
Teague's bar, it's hard to see how Ramos might. One could 
new rule of criminal procedure, little need be said about Teague's “substan-
tive rule” exception. But it is worth noting that substantive rules, which 
place certain conduct “ `beyond the power of the criminal law-making au-
thority to proscribe,' ” 489 U. S., at 307, bear at least some resemblance to 
this Court's early cases fnding a lack of jurisdiction over a defendant or 
an offense. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S., at 376; Ex parte Parks, 93 
U. S., at 20–21. Perhaps this aspect of Teague can be understood as accu-
rately invoking the jurisdictional exception to the fnality rule; perhaps 
not. See Brown, 344 U. S., at 533, n. 4 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). 
But that question is for another day. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 293 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
even say that any other result would defy this Court's recent 
precedents. Ante, at 270–271. 
At the same time, though, one might also say these prece-
dents illustrate how mystifying the whole Teague project has 
been from its inception. If Teague only prohibits the retro-
active application of new rules of criminal procedure, after 
all, it's not exactly obvious why that prohibition applies to 
cases like Crawford or Ramos. Both decisions sought to re-
align this Court's decisions with the original meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment; in that sense, the rights they recognized 
were anything but new. And to the extent Teague asks 
whether a new rule is “fundamental” or “bedrock,” it's hard 
to see how rights originally memorialized in the Constitution 
could fail to qualify. Certainly, this Court is in no position 
to second-guess the judgment of those who wrote and rati-
fed the Constitution. Surely, too, many of the other rules 
of criminal procedure this Court has found less than “funda-
mental” since Teague seem anything but that to those whose 
lives they affect. Nor is it only Teague's results that mys-
tify. The test itself has been fraught with contradictions 
from the start. It asks litigants to be on the lookout for new 
procedural protections “ `implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.' ” Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 417 (2004). At the 
same time, we have been told, the fact that “a new proce-
dural rule is `fundamental' in some abstract sense is not 
enough.” Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352. 
For me, it's here where the history canvassed above mat-
ters. This Court's (in)activity since Teague only begins to 
make sense when viewed against the backdrop of the tradi-
tional rule that old judgments are impervious to new chal-
lenges. Yes, this Court's decisions should apply to all cases 
pending in trial courts and on direct appeal. But they 
should not apply retroactively in habeas. The reason has 
nothing to do with whether Members of this Court happen 
to think the rules they announce are “new” in some sense 
or insuffciently “fundamental” in another. It's simpler than

Page Proof Pending Publication
294 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Gorsuch, J., concurring 
that: The writ of habeas corpus does not authorize federal 
courts to reopen a judgment issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction once it has become fnal. Supra, at 283–286. 
It's here, too, where today's decision makes its real contri-
bution. If Teague pointed us back in the direction of the 
traditional rule, each of the cases that has followed in its 
wake has edged us, step-by-step, closer still. Today's deci-
sion advances the progress by making express what has long 
been barely implicit: The “watershed” exception for new 
rules of criminal procedure is no exception at all. Ante, at 
272. Not only does this development do much to honor the 
traditional understanding of habeas review and the great 
weight of this Court's precedents throughout its history. It 
also allows us to retire a test that was unknown in law until 
1989 and whose contours remain unknowable decades later. 
It frees this Court from the dreary task of needing to concoct 
reasons to denigrate the importance of obviously important 
rules like those discussed in Ramos, Ring, Batson, and 
Crawford, which affect the lives and liberty of countless indi-
viduals. It does away with the strange business of having 
to repackage old rules as new ones. And it eliminates 
the need for litigants and lower courts to endure years of 
protracted litigation—tangling with a contradictory test 
and seemingly inexplicable precedents—all sure to achieve 
nothing. The Court's candor today is admirable—and 
correct.
7 
7 The dissent criticizes today's decision as a departure from modern habeas 
precedent. Post, at 296; post, at 297, n. 2; post, at 305–307. But the dis-
sent's history is selective. The dissent champions decisions from the 1950s, 
'60s, and '70s. But it disregards how those decisions departed from a cen-
tury of this Court's precedents and the common law before that. Supra, 
at 286–289. At the same time, the dissent's account overlooks this Court's 
precedents refusing to afford retroactive application in every case since 
the 1980s. Post, at 303–304; post, at 305–306, n. 7. The dissent may prefer 
decisions within a particular 30-year window. But it is too much to say 
this preference is required to “[r]espec[t] stare decisis.” Post, at 295, n. 1.

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 295 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
With these observations, I am pleased to join the Court's 
opinion. My vote in similar cases to come will, I hope, “be 
guided as nearly as [possible] by the principles set forth 
herein.” Brown, 344 U. S., at 548 (Jackson, J., concurring 
in result). 
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Jus-
tice Sotomayor join, dissenting. 
“A verdict, taken from eleven, [i]s no verdict at all,” this 
Court proclaimed just last Term. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 
U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Citing centuries of history, the Court in Ramos 
termed the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury 
“vital,” “essential,” “indispensable,” and “fundamental” to 
the American legal system. Id., at –––, –––, –––. The 
Court therefore saw ft to disregard stare decisis and over-
turn a 50-year-old precedent enabling States to convict crim-
inal defendants based on non-unanimous verdicts.
1 And in 
taking that weighty step, the Court also vindicated core 
principles of racial justice. For in the Court's view, the state 
laws countenancing non-unanimous verdicts originated in 
white supremacism and continued in our own time to have 
racially discriminatory effects. See id., at ––– – –––; id., 
at ––– (Sotomayor , J., concurring in part); id., at ––– – ––– 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). Put all that together, 
and it is easy to see why the opinions in Ramos read as 
historic. Rarely does this Court make such a fundamental 
change in the rules thought necessary to ensure fair criminal 
process. If you were scanning a thesaurus for a single word 
1 I dissented in Ramos precisely because of its abandonment of stare 
decisis. See 590 U. S., at ––– – ––– (Alito , J., dissenting); see also Kimble 
v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015) (“Respecting 
stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions”). Now that Ramos 
is the law, stare decisis is on its side. I take the decision on its own terms, 
and give it all the consequence it deserves. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
296 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
to describe the decision, you would stop when you came to 
“watershed.” 
Yet the Court insists that Ramos's holding does not count 
as a “watershed” procedural rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 
U. S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion). The result of to-
day's ruling is easily stated. Ramos will not apply retroac-
tively, meaning that a prisoner whose appeals ran out before 
the decision can receive no aid from the change in law it 
made. So Thedrick Edwards, unlike Evangelisto Ramos, 
will serve the rest of his life in prison based on a 10-to-2 
jury verdict. Only the reasoning of today's holding resists 
explanation. The majority cannot (and indeed does not) 
deny, given all Ramos said, that the jury unanimity require-
ment fts to a tee Teague's description of a watershed proce-
dural rule. Nor can the majority explain its result by rely-
ing on precedent. Although faunting decisions since Teague 
that held rules non-retroactive, the majority comes up with 
none comparable to this case. Search high and low the set-
tled law of retroactivity, and the majority still has no reason 
to deny Ramos watershed status. 
So everything rests on the majority's last move—the over-
turning of Teague's watershed exception. If there can never 
be any watershed rules—as the majority here asserts out of 
the blue—then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one. The re-
sult follows trippingly from the premise. But adopting the 
premise requires departing from judicial practice and princi-
ple. In overruling a critical aspect of Teague, the majority 
follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis. It discards 
precedent without a party requesting that action. And it 
does so with barely a reason given, much less the “special 
justifcation” our law demands. Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P . John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014). The majority 
in that way compounds its initial error: Not content to misap-
ply Teague's watershed provision here, see ante, at 267–271, 
the majority forecloses any future application, see ante, at 
271–272. It prevents any procedural rule ever—no matter

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 297 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
how integral to adjudicative fairness—from benefting a de-
fendant on habeas review. Thus does a settled principle of 
retroactivity law die, in an effort to support an insupport-
able ruling. 
I 
Start with what Teague and its progeny repeatedly said 
about what makes a new rule of criminal procedure “water-
shed” (so that, before today, the rule applied retroactively).
2 
A watershed rule, we held, is “implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.” Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Such a rule addresses 
one of “the bedrock procedural elements” of the criminal 
process. Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Or similarly stated, it 
plays a “fundamental” and “central[ ]” role in a trial. Beard 
v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 418, 420 (2004). More specifcally, a 
new rule, to qualify as watershed, must be “essential to [the 
trial's] fairness.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 418 
(2007); see Teague, 489 U. S., at 312 (plurality opinion). And 
it must go to the defendant's guilt or innocence, “prevent[ing] 
an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction.” 
Whorton, 549 U. S., at 418 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Teague, 489 U. S., at 312 (plurality opinion). Those 
requirements set a high bar. But they capture—or anyway, 
were once meant to—a “small core of rules” needed to fairly 
adjudicate a defendant's guilt. Beard, 542 U. S., at 417. 
The frst clue that the unanimity rule falls within Teague's 
small core is that the Court thought its adoption justifed 
overturning precedent. Ramos didn't just announce a new 
rule. It reversed a prior, well-settled one. As the majority 
recounts, “Ramos repudiated this Court's 1972 decision in 
2 Prior to Teague, the Court gave retroactive effect to a somewhat wider 
range of new procedural rules. See ante, at 282, n. 5; Danforth v. Minne-
sota, 552 U. S. 264, 271–273 (2008). To fnd the no-retroactivity-ever rule 
that the majority announces today, a time traveler would have to go back 
to around 1950—when the Bill of Rights' protections for criminal defend-
ants did not even apply to the States. See ibid. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
298 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, which had allowed non-
unanimous juries in state criminal trials.” Ante, at 258. 
Such a toppling of precedent needs a special justifcation— 
more than a run-of-the-mill claim of error. To meet that de-
mand, the Ramos majority described Apodaca as fouting the 
essential “meaning of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial 
right,” as revealed in both historical practice and judicial de-
cisions. 590 U. S., at –––. Two concurring Justices added, 
to support discarding this “egregiously wrong” precedent, 
that the unanimity rule prevents improper verdicts: Apo-
daca “sanctions the conviction” of some defendants who 
would otherwise defeat the State's efforts “to [meet] its bur-
den” of proving guilt. 590 U. S., at ––– (Kavanaugh, J.); id., 
at ––– (Sotomayor, J.). And the majority and concurrences 
alike invoked racial justice to support abandoning stare 
decisis, explaining how a non-unanimity rule has posed a spe-
cial danger of canceling Black jurors' votes. See id., at ––– 
– –––, –––; id., at ––– (Sotomayor, J.); id., at ––– – ––– (Kav-
anaugh, J.); infra, at 301–302. At bottom, then, the Court 
took the unusual step of overruling precedent for the most 
fundamental of reasons: the need to ensure, in keeping 
with the Nation's oldest traditions, fair and dependable 
adjudications of a defendant's guilt. In this much alone, 
Ramos's reasoning evokes this Court's descriptions of wa-
tershed rules.
3 
3 The majority misunderstands my point about the interaction between 
stare decisis and Teague. I am not saying that if a “right is important 
enough to justify overruling” precedent, then it is “important enough to 
apply retroactively.” Ante, at 272. (If that were my claim, this dissent 
would be far shorter.) Rather, the overruling of precedent—and more, 
the justifcations given to support that overruling—are elements to con-
sider when deciding on a rule's watershed status. Or, as I say above, “a 
frst clue.” Here, that clue cuts against the majority: Ramos overturned 
precedent (rather than just announcing a new rule) on grounds strikingly 
reminiscent of Teague's criteria for watershed status. Still more clues, 
pointing in the same direction, appear in the coming pages . . . .

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 299 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
And putting talk of stare decisis aside, there remains much 
more in Ramos to echo Teague. If, as today's majority says, 
Teague is full of “adjectives,” ante, at 267, so too is Ramos— 
and mostly the same ones. Jury unanimity, the Court pro-
nounced, is an “essential element[ ]” of the jury trial right, 
and thus is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” 
590 U. S., at ––– – –––. The Court discussed the rule's “an-
cient” history—“400 years of English and American cases 
requiring unanimity” leading up to the Sixth Amendment. 
Id., at –––, –––. As early as the 14th century, English com-
mon law recognized jury unanimity as a “vital right.” Id., 
at –––. Adopting that view, the early American States like-
wise treated unanimity as an “essential feature of the jury 
trial.” Id., at –––. So by the time the Framers drafted the 
Sixth Amendment, “the right to a jury trial meant a trial in 
which the jury renders a unanimous verdict.” Id., at ––– 
(emphasis in original). Because that was so, no jury verdict 
could stand (or in some metaphysical sense, even exist) ab-
sent full agreement: “A verdict, taken from eleven, was no 
verdict at all.” Id., at ––– – ––– (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Unanimity served as a critical safeguard, needed 
to protect against wrongful deprivations of citizens' “hard-
won liberty.” Id., at –––. Or as Justice Story summarized 
the law a few decades after the Founding: To obtain a convic-
tion, “unanimity in the verdict of the jury is indispensable.” 
Id., at –––. 
If a rule so understood isn't a watershed one, then nothing 
is. (And that is, of course, what the majority eventually says.) 
Once more, from the quotations just above: “fundamental,” 
“essential,” “vital,” “indispensable.” No wonder today's 
majority declares a new-found aversion to “adjectives”—or, 
as a concurring opinion says, “all these words.” Ante, at 
267; ante, at 292 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The una-
nimity rule, as Ramos described it, is as “bedrock” as bed-
rock comes. Teague, 489 U. S., at 315 (plurality opinion). It

300 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
is as grounded in the Nation's constitutional traditions—with 
centuries-old practice becoming part of the Sixth Amend-
ment's original meaning. And it is as central to the Nation's 
idea of a fair and reliable guilty verdict. When can the 
State punish a defendant for committing a crime? Return 
again to Ramos, this time going back to Blackstone: Only 
when “the truth of [an] accusation” is “confrmed by the 
unanimous suffrage” of a jury “of his equals and neighbours.” 
590 U. S., at ––– (quoting 4 Commentaries on the Laws 
of England 343 (1769)). For only then is the jury's fnding 
of guilt certain enough—secure enough, mistake-proof 
enough—to take away the person's freedom. 
Twice before, this Court retroactively applied rules that 
are similarly integral to jury verdicts. First, in Ivan V. v. 
City of New York, 407 U. S. 203, 204 (1972) (per curiam ), 
we gave “complete retroactive effect” to the rule of In re 
Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), that a jury must fnd guilt 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Like Ramos, Winship rested 
on an “ancient” legal tradition incorporated into the Consti-
tution. 397 U. S., at 361. As in Ramos, that tradition 
served to “safeguard men” from “unjust convictions, with re-
sulting forfeitures” of freedom. 397 U. S., at 362. And as 
in Ramos, that protection plays a “vital” part in “the Amer-
ican scheme of criminal procedure.” 397 U. S., at 363– 
364. With all that established, the Ivan V. Court needed 
just two pages to hold Winship retroactive, highlighting the 
reasonable-doubt standard's “indispensable” role in “reduc-
ing the risk” of wrongful convictions. 407 U. S., at 204–205. 
Second, in Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323 (1980), we ret-
roactively applied the rule of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 
130 (1979), that a six-person guilty verdict must be unani-
mous. Think about that for a moment: We held retroactive 
a unanimity requirement, no different from the one here save 
that it applied to a smaller jury. The reasoning should 
by now sound familiar. Allowing conviction by a non-
unanimous jury “impair[s]” the “purpose and functioning of 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 301 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
the jury,” undermining the Sixth Amendment's very “es-
sence.” Brown, 447 U. S., at 331 (plurality opinion). It 
“raises serious doubts about the fairness of [a] trial.” Id., at 
335, n. 13. And it fails to “assure the reliability of [a guilty] 
verdict.” Id., at 334. So when a jury has divided, as when it 
has failed to apply the reasonable-doubt standard, “there has 
been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 280 (1993).
4 
And something still more supports retroactivity here, for 
the opinions in Ramos (unlike in Winship or Burch) relied 
on a strong claim about racial injustice. The Court detailed 
the origins of Louisiana's and Oregon's non-unanimity rules, 
locating them (respectively) in a convention to “establish the 
supremacy of the white race” and “the rise of the Ku Klux 
Klan.” 590 U. S., at ––– (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Those rules, the Court explained, were meant “to dilute the 
infuence [on juries] of racial, ethnic, and religious minori-
ties”—and particularly, “to ensure that African-American 
4 The majority argues that Ivan V. and Brown applied these new rules 
only to cases on direct appeal. See ante, at 269–270, n. 5. But that isn't 
right. Although Ivan V. itself involved a direct appeal, the Court has 
made clear that the “complete retroactive effect” Ivan V. gave Winship 
included cases in habeas. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 
537, 562–563, n. 21 (1982). And similarly, lower courts uniformly under-
stood Brown to govern habeas cases, even though a concurring opinion 
(which supplied the ruling's ffth and sixth votes) addressed only cases on 
direct appeal. See, e. g., Atkins v. Listi, 625 F. 2d 525, 526 (CA5 1980); see 
also Brown, 447 U. S., at 337 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J.). 
Those applications to habeas cases make sense because the Court of that 
time did not often distinguish in its retroactivity rulings between direct 
and collateral review. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 300–301 (1967). 
For that reason, the majority must fall back on the argument that “Brown 
and Ivan V. were pre-Teague decisions” and “Teague tightened the previ-
ous standard” for retroactivity. Ante, at 270, n. 5. That is true enough, 
see supra, at 297, n. 2, but irrelevant here given Brown and Ivan V 's 
reasoning. As just noted, each of those decisions said everything a court 
would say today in designating a new rule “watershed”—in essence, that 
the rule is central to the process of fairly deciding on a defendant's guilt. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

302 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
juror service would be meaningless.” Ibid. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Two concurring opinions linked that 
history to current practice. “In light of the[ir] racist ori-
gins,” Justice Kavanaugh stated, “it is no surprise that 
non-unanimous juries can make a difference”—that “[t]hen 
and now” they can “negate the votes of black jurors, espe-
cially in cases with black defendants.” Id., at –––; see id., 
at ––– (Sotomayor , J.). But that statement precludes to-
day's result. If the old rule functioned “as an engine of dis-
crimination against black defendants,” id., at ––– (Kava-
naugh, J.), its replacement must “implicat[e]” (as watershed 
rules do) “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the crim-
inal proceeding,” Beard, 542 U. S., at 417 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Or as Justice Kavanaugh put the point 
more concretely, the unanimity rule then helps prevent 
“racial prejudice” from resulting in wrongful convictions. 
Ramos, 590 U. S., at –––. The rule should therefore apply 
not just forward but back, to all convictions rendered absent 
its protection. 
II 
The majority argues in reply that the jury unanimity rule 
is not so fundamental because . . . . Well, no, scratch that. 
Actually, the majority doesn't contest anything I've said 
about the foundations and functions of the unanimity re-
quirement. Nor could the majority reasonably do so. For 
everything I've said about the unanimity rule comes straight 
out of Ramos's majority and concurring opinions. Just 
check the citations: I've added barely a word to what those 
opinions (often with soaring rhetoric) proclaim. Start with 
history. The ancient foundations of the unanimous jury 
rule? Check. The inclusion of that rule in the Sixth 
Amendment's original meaning? Check. Now go to func-
tion. The fundamental (or bedrock or central) role of the 
unanimous jury in the American system of criminal justice? 
Check. The way unanimity fgures in ensuring fairness in 
criminal trials and protecting against wrongful guilty ver-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 303 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
dicts? Check. The link between those purposes and safe-
guarding the jury system from (past and present) racial 
prejudice? Check. In sum: As to every feature of the una-
nimity rule conceivably relevant to watershed status, Ramos 
has already given the answer—check, check, check—and to-
day's majority can say nothing to the contrary.
5 
Instead, the majority relies on decisions holding non-
retroactive various other—even though dissimilar—proce-
dural rules. In making that argument from past practice, 
the majority adopts two discrete tactics. Call the frst 
“throw everything against the wall.” Call the second “slice 
and dice.” Neither can avail to render the jury unanimity 
rule anything less than what Ramos thought it—as the ma-
jority concedes, “momentous.” Ante, at 270. 
As its frst move, the majority lists as many decisions hold-
ing rules non-retroactive as it can muster. See ante, at 267– 
269 (reviewing a “long line of cases”). The premise here is 
that sheer volume matters: The majority presents the cata-
log as if every rule is as important as every other and as if 
comparing any to the unanimity requirement is beside the 
point. But that idea founders on this Court's constant re-
frain that watershed rules are only a small subset of proce-
5 The majority does try to say that the plurality opinion in Ramos none-
theless “plainly foreshadowed today's decision” by noting that Teague's 
watershed test was “demanding by design,” in recognition of the States' 
reliance interests. Ante, at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also ante, at 274–275 (repeating the assertion twice more). But the 
Ramos plurality's description of the watershed test was nothing more than 
objective fact: Yes, the watershed test was purposefully demanding. As 
to whether the watershed test was so demanding as to exclude the jury 
unanimity rule, here is what the plurality had to say: “Whether the right 
to jury unanimity applies to cases on collateral review is a question for 
a future case where the parties will have a chance to brief the issue and 
we will beneft from their adversarial presentation.” Ramos, 590 U. S., 
at –––. Not a lot of “plain[ ] foreshadow[ing]” there. Only a fair bit of 
wisdom about how to resolve legal issues—which, as I'll later discuss, the 
majority could usefully have considered before overruling the watershed 
exception. See infra, at 306–307. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

304 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
dural rules. See, e. g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 
(1993). For under that view (as under the very meaning of 
“watershed”), nothing could be less surprising than that non-
watershed rules greatly outnumber watershed ones. That 
inexorable fact cannot refute the designation of any given 
rule—much less of jury unanimity—as watershed. And the 
majority's kitchen-sink list becomes yet less probative of the 
issue here because most of its bulk comes from decisions on 
sentencing. See ante, at 267–268 (citing Beard, 542 U. S., at 
408; O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 153 (1997); Lambrix 
v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 540 (1997); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 
U. S. 227, 229 (1990); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 
352 (2004)). But Teague itself explains why sentencing pro-
cedures are not watershed: A watershed rule, the Court said 
there, must go to the jury's “determination of innocence or 
guilt.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion); see Beard, 542 
U. S., at 417. So the majority's indiscriminate inventory of 
non-retroactive rules cannot get it home. 
Enter the majority's second stratagem, which tries to con-
quer by dividing. Here, the majority picks out “three 
aspects of Ramos” pointing toward watershed status, and 
names one prior decision to match each of the three. Ante, 
at 268. So in addressing the unanimity rule's “signifcance,” 
the majority notes that the Court once held the jury-trial 
right non-retroactive. Ante, at 269 (citing DeStefano v. 
Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam ) and Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)). In tackling Ramos's re-
turn to “original meaning,” the majority points to our deci-
sion that an originalist rule about hearsay evidence should 
not apply backward. Ante, at 270 (citing Whorton, 549 U. S., 
at 421 and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004)). 
And in discussing Ramos's role in “prevent[ing] racial dis-
crimination,” the majority invokes our denial of retroactivity 
to a rule making it easier to prove race-based peremptory 
strikes. Ante, at 270 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255, 
261 (1986) (per curiam ) and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 
79 (1986)). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 305 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
What the majority doesn't fnd—or even pretend to—is 
any decision corresponding to Ramos on all of those dimen-
sions. Take just a pair of examples. The Court has never 
suggested that requiring a bench trial has race-based pur-
poses or effects. See DeStefano, 392 U. S., at 633–635.
6 
Similarly, the Court thought its new rule on hearsay evi-
dence of less than towering import: Calling the rule “limited 
in scope,” we doubted that it would have any effect on the 
“accuracy of factfnding.” Whorton, 549 U. S., at 419. I'll 
resist making like points about other permutations because 
the main point here is a general one. The majority must 
slice and dice in this way—dividing Ramos into three for 
purposes of comparison—because it cannot fnd any rule 
analogous to jury unanimity on all relevant fronts. And that 
is for a simple reason: No procedure adopted since Teague so 
comprehensively fulflls that decision's criteria for retroactiv-
ity. If any rule is watershed, it is jury unanimity. See 
supra, at 299–300. 
So the majority is left to overrule Teague's holding on wa-
tershed rules.
7 On the last page or so of its merits discus-
6 Even on the metric of signifcance alone, the Court has not previously 
ranked the jury-unanimity and jury-trial rights as today's majority does. 
As earlier noted, the Court in Brown found a unanimity rule retroactive 
despite its earlier holding that the jury-trial right was not. See supra, 
at 300–301. The Court explained that the accuracy and fairness concerns 
raised by divided juries—where, by defnition, at least one person retains 
reasonable doubt—exceed those arising from judicial verdicts. See 
Brown, 447 U. S., at 334–335, n. 13 (plurality opinion). In insisting 
otherwise, the majority falls prey to a common greater-includes-the-lesser 
fallacy—akin to the view that if a State can eliminate a jury, it can impose 
jury rules of whatever kind it likes. See ante, at 269 (reasoning 
that the treatment of a “broader” right controls that of a “subsidiary” 
right); Brown, 447 U. S., at 334–335, n. 13 (rejecting precisely that 
view). 
7 In describing the majority as overruling Teague, I do not mean it over-
rules only Teague. That decision doesn't stand alone in stating the water-
shed exception as governing law. As I count, the Court has recited the 
exception 17 more times before today. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
577 U. S. 190, 198 (2016); Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120, 128 (2016); 
Page Proof Pending Publication

306 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
sion (before it turns to pre-butting this dissent), the majority 
eliminates the watershed exception, declaring it “long past 
time” to do so. Ante, at 272. Teague had said there would 
not be “many” (retroactive) watershed rules. 489 U. S., at 
313 (plurality opinion). The majority now says there will be 
none at all. If that is so, of course, jury unanimity cannot 
be watershed. Finally, the majority offers an intelligible 
reason for declining to apply Ramos retroactively. 
But in taking that road, the majority breaks a core judicial 
rule: respect for precedent. Stare decisis is a foundation 
stone of the rule of law, “promot[ing] the evenhanded, pre-
dictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fos-
ter[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to 
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). Adherence to 
precedent is, of course, “not an inexorable command.” Id., 
at 828. Ramos itself teaches that much. But Ramos also 
shows how high stare decisis sets the bar for overruling a 
prior decision. To reverse course, we insist on compelling 
reasons, thorough explanation, and careful attention to com-
peting interests. But not here. The majority crawls under, 
rather than leaps over, the stare decisis bar. 
To begin with, no one here asked us to overrule Teague. 
This Court usually confnes itself to the issues raised and 
briefed by the parties. See, e. g., United States v. Sineneng-
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U. S. 342, 347, n. 3 (2013); Danforth, 552 
U. S., at 266, 274–275; Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 416 (2007); 
Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 416–417 (2004); Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S. 
266, 271, n. 5 (2002) (per curiam ); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 665 (2001); 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 619–620 (1998); O'Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U. S. 151, 156–157 (1997); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 
539 (1997); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U. S. 152, 170 (1996); Caspari v. Boh-
len, 510 U. S. 383, 396 (1994); Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S., 461, 477– 
478 (1993); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333, 345 (1993); Saffe v. Parks, 
494 U. S. 484, 494–495 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 241–242 
(1990). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 307 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
Smith, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (discussing “the principle of 
party presentation”). There may be reasons to ignore that 
rule in one or another everyday case. But to do so in 
pursuit of overturning precedent is nothing short of extraor-
dinary. Cf. Ramos, 590 U. S., at –––, n. 4 (Kavanaugh, J.) 
(An “important factor” protecting stare decisis “is that the 
Court typically does not overrule a precedent unless a party 
requests overruling”). We are supposed to (fairly) apply 
the prevailing law until a party asks us to change it. And 
when a party does make that request, we are supposed to 
attend to countervailing arguments—which no one here had 
a chance to make. That orderly process, skipped today, is 
what enables a court to arrive at a considered decision about 
whether to overthrow precedent. 
Equally striking, the majority gives only the sketchiest 
of reasons for reversing Teague's watershed exception. In 
deciding whether to depart from precedent, the Court usu-
ally considers—and usually at length—a familiar set of fac-
tors capable of providing the needed special justifcation. 
See, e. g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. –––, ––– 
(2019) (listing such considerations). The majority can't be 
bothered with that customary, and disciplining, practice; it 
barely goes through the motions. Seldom has this Court so 
casually, so off-handedly, tossed aside precedent. In its page 
of analysis, the majority offers just one ground for its deci-
sion—that since Teague, the Court has not identifed a new 
rule as watershed, and so “the purported exception has be-
come an empty promise.” Ante, at 272. But even viewed 
in the abstract, that argument does not fy. That the Court 
has not found a watershed rule since Teague does not mean 
it could or would not in the future. Teague itself understood 
that point: It saw value in the watershed exception even 
while recognizing that watershed rules would be few and far 
between. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). And viewed 
in the context of this case, the majority's argument positively 
Page Proof Pending Publication

308 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
craters. For the majority today comes face-to-face with a 
rule that perfectly fts each of Teague's criteria: Jury unanim-
ity, as described in Ramos, is watershed—even though no 
prior rule was. See supra, at 297–302. That airtight match 
between Ramos and Teague refutes the majority's one stated 
reason for overruling the latter decision. The majority 
could not rely on the absence of watershed rules to topple 
Teague if it had just faithfully applied that decision to this 
case. 
In choosing otherwise, the majority imposes a steep price 
for overruling Apodaca in Ramos. Taking with one hand 
what it gave with the other, the Court curtails Ramos's ef-
fects by expunging Teague's provision for watershed rules. 
And so too the Court limits the consequences of any similarly 
fundamental change in criminal procedure that may emerge 
in the future. For the frst time in many decades (since long 
before Teague, see supra, at 297, n. 2), those convicted under 
rules found not to produce fair and reliable verdicts will be 
left without recourse in federal courts.
8 
I would not discard Teague's watershed exception and so 
keep those unfairly convicted people from getting new trials. 
Instead, I would accept the consequences of last Term's hold-
ing in Ramos. A decision like that comes with a promise, 
or at any rate should. If the right to a unanimous jury is so 
8 The majority's fnal claim is that it is properly immune from this 
criticism—that I cannot “turn around and impugn” its ruling—because 
“criminal defendants as a group are better off under Ramos and today's 
decision, taken together, than they would have been if [my] dissenting 
view had prevailed in Ramos.” Ante, at 275. The suggestion is surpris-
ing. It treats judging as scorekeeping—and more, as scorekeeping about 
how much our decisions, or the aggregate of them, beneft a particular 
kind of party. I see the matter differently. Judges should take cases one 
at a time, and do their best in each to apply the relevant legal rules. And 
when judges err, others should point out where they went astray. No one 
gets to bank capital for future cases; no one's past decisions insulate them 
from criticism. The focus always is, or should be, getting the case before 
us right. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 309 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
fundamental—if a verdict rendered by a divided jury is “no 
verdict at all”—then Thedrick Edwards should not spend his 
life behind bars over two jurors' opposition. I respectfully 
dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 593 U. S. Part 1 Pages 255–309 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 17, 2021 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id., at 313. And in the 32 years since Teague, the Court has never found that any new procedural rule actually satisfes the purported exception. Pp. 262–264. (b) To determine whether Ramos applies retroact…

• #3

  Court declined to retroactively apply Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, even though Batson held that state prosecutors may not discriminate on the basis of race when exercising individual peremptory challenges. There is no good rationale for treating Ramos differently from Duncan, Crawford, and Batson. Pp. 267–271…

• #4

  *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by David D. Cole, Lisa S. Blatt, Amy Mason Saharia, Cassandra Stubbs, Brian W. Stull, Ezekiel Edwards, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, Bruce Hamilton, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. Schweik- ert, Arthur Rizer, and John W. Whitehead…

• #5

  those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review. See, e. g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 421 (2007) (Con- Rico by Isaías Sánchez-Báez, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Carlos Lugo-Fiol. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Federal Public Defender for the District of Oregon et al. by St…

• #6

  apartment. Once there, they bound and blindfolded Eaton, rummaged through his apartment, and took some of his be- longings to Eaton's car. After they were back in the car, Edwards and his accom- plice coerced Eaton into arranging a meeting with Eaton's girlfriend. They then drove to the girlfriend's apartment an…

• #7

  on the four remaining armed robbery counts. At sentencing, the trial judge stated: “I can say without hesitation that this is the most egregious case that I've had before me.” Record 1113. The judge sentenced Edwards to life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana First Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 261 Opini…

• #8

  in Apodaca. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ––– (2020); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972). The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury against the States. Therefore, in state court as well as federal court, a jury must be unanimous to convict a d…

• #9

  U. S., at 304 (plurality opinion). As the Court has explained, applying “constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became fnal seri- ously undermines the principle of fnality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Id., at 309. Here, for example, applying Ramos re…

• #10

  Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id., at 313; see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 417 (2007); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 352 (2004); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 667, n. 7 (2001). And in the 32 years since Teague, as …

• #11

  daca to allow for non-unanimous jury verdicts in state crimi- nal trials. 4 In addition, in Ramos itself, six Members of the 4 See, e. g., Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, –––, n. 1 (2019) (the “Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity in federal, but not state, criminal proceedings”); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. …

• #12

  before Ramos interpreted Apodaca to allow non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. By renouncing Apodaca and expressly requiring unani- mous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, Ramos plainly announced a new rule for purposes of this Court's retroactiv- ity doctrine. And new rules of criminal proc…

• #13

  549 U. S., at 417 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 417 (2004); Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352; Tyler, 533 U. S., at 667, n. 7; Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 (1993); Sawyer, 497 U. S., at 243; Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 416 (1990). Consistent …

• #14

  new procedural rules. Edwards emphasizes three aspects of Ramos: (i) the signifcance of the jury-unanimity right; (ii) Ramos's reliance on the original meaning of the Constitution; Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 269 Opinion of the Court and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing ra…

• #15

  358, 364 (1970). And in Ivan V., the Court held that the rule announced in Winship applied in a case on direct review. 407 U. S., at 205. But in its numerous retroactivity cases, this Court has never identifed the Winship rule as a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retro- Page Proof Pending Publica…

• #16

  pre-Teague decisions holding that a rule is not retroactive, such as DeStefano. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 271 Opinion of the Court United States and signifcantly expanded the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. One involved the jury-trial right, one involved the orig…

• #17

  rule after new procedural rule, amply demonstrating that the purported exception has become an empty promise. Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actually applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes the resources of defense counsel, pr…

• #18

  vant part by two of today's dissenters, Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor—explained that overruling or repudi- ating Apodaca was not likely to signifcantly affect Louisi- ana's and Oregon's reliance interests in preserving fnal con- victions because Ramos was not likely to apply retroactively on federal collat…

• #19

  cases like Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Batson, and Crawford did not apply retroactively. After reaching that conclusion, we then took account of the overall jurisprudential landscape of the last several decades in Teague cases and acknowledged what has become unmistakably clear: The purported water- shed exception is …

• #20

  activity in today's case. And it is of course fair for a dissent to vigorously critique the Court's analysis. But it is another thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn around and impugn today's majority for supposedly shortchanging criminal defendants. To properly assess the implications for crimina…

• #21

  to highlight that we could also have resolved this case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effec- tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA directs federal courts to deny “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court” unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or i…

• #22

  in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.” 1 Stat. 81–82. 2 The relevant language of the Act stated that courts, “in addition to the authority already conferred by [the Judici…

• #23

  grant habeas relief even if state courts did not err when issu- ing their decisions? And if so, by what authority could fed- eral courts grant that relief? Admitting that “the Constitution neither prohibits nor re- quires retrospective effect,” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. Cite as: 593 U. S. 255 (2021) 279 Th…

• #24

  the habeas corpus statute since 1867. AEDPA flled in the “bare guidelines” of the 1867 Act by creating a comprehen- sive system for addressing federal habeas claims brought by state prisoners. See Wright, 505 U. S., at 285. Directly relevant here are two provisions that ensure that state courts have the primary r…

• #25

  The Court, instead, relies on Teague. I join the Court's opinion because it correctly applies precedent and leads to the same judgment, but I would be remiss if I did not point out two other problems with Teague. First, it has never been clear what gave this Court author- ity to grant habeas relief to state priso…

• #26

  unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law. AEDPA's explicit directive thus independently resolves this case: “a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” § 2254(d). Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring. Sometimes this Court leaves a door ajar and holds out the p…

• #27

  a claim to “watershed” importance. Instead, we abandon Teague's test because it poses a question this Court has no business asking. I Though we often refer to the writ of habeas corpus, the common law knew several. See Ex parte Bollman , 4 Cranch 75, 97–98 (1807). All had one thing in common: Each required a cu…

• #28

  Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, ¶¶ 2, 20. Custody pur- suant to a fnal judgment was proof that a defendant had received the process due to him. See, e. g., Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 142–143, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–1010 (C. P. 1670). In 1789, Congress authorized federal courts to issue the habeas writ. …

• #29

  beas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of” federal law. § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (emphasis added). Two earlier statutes extended federal habeas jurisdiction to state custodi- ans, but only for a much narrower class of cases. In 1833, Congress au- thorized federal co…

• #30

  error of federal law they might fnd in state court proceed- ings. Never mind that state courts are obligated to follow federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Never mind that those courts may have already passed on a defendant's argu- ment about his federal rights. See id., at 487; id., at 497– 501 (Frankfurter, …

• #31

  fning “appeal”). Under an appellate system, then, “none of th[e] [preced- ing decisions] are fnal” in an ultimate sense until any appeals are con- cluded. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 411 (1768). Page Proof Pending Publication 288 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY Gorsuch, J., concurring the meritoriou…

• #32

  conviction mechanism that functioned like an ordinary ap- peal, soon yielded a giant haystack of habeas petitions. For years, this Court struggled to devise rules for sorting the hay from the needles. Its approach varied wildly and inconsistently over time. In a few cases, the Court held a new rule of criminal pr…

• #33

  495 (1976). It established procedural default rules to pre- vent habeas petitioners from evading independent and ade- quate state law grounds for sustaining their convictions. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 86–87 (1977). It crafted a heightened harmless error standard, calibrated to refect the fnality interes…

• #34

  bedrock procedural elements' ” necessary to satisfy notions of “ `fairness.' ” Ibid. To help the world know what a wa- tershed rule might look like, the Court described it in vari- ous ways—“bedrock,” “fundamental,” “central,” an “absolute prerequisite.” Id., at 311–314. A rule ftting that bill, Teague said, woul…

• #35

  discrimination plays no role in jury selection met the same fate even before Teague. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam ) (denying retroactive application to Bat- son v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)). Rules that sought to realign our jurisprudence with the original meaning of the Sixth Amendmen…

• #36

  were anything but new. And to the extent Teague asks whether a new rule is “fundamental” or “bedrock,” it's hard to see how rights originally memorialized in the Constitution could fail to qualify. Certainly, this Court is in no position to second-guess the judgment of those who wrote and rati- fed the Constituti…

• #37

  1989 and whose contours remain unknowable decades later. It frees this Court from the dreary task of needing to concoct reasons to denigrate the importance of obviously important rules like those discussed in Ramos, Ring, Batson, and Crawford, which affect the lives and liberty of countless indi- viduals. It does…

• #38

  principles of racial justice. For in the Court's view, the state laws countenancing non-unanimous verdicts originated in white supremacism and continued in our own time to have racially discriminatory effects. See id., at ––– – –––; id., at ––– (Sotomayor , J., concurring in part); id., at ––– – ––– (Kavanaugh, J…

• #39

  the blue—then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one. The re- sult follows trippingly from the premise. But adopting the premise requires departing from judicial practice and princi- ple. In overruling a critical aspect of Teague, the majority follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis. It discards precedent wi…

• #40

  rule. It reversed a prior, well-settled one. As the majority recounts, “Ramos repudiated this Court's 1972 decision in 2 Prior to Teague, the Court gave retroactive effect to a somewhat wider range of new procedural rules. See ante, at 282, n. 5; Danforth v. Minne- sota, 552 U. S. 264, 271–273 (2008). To fnd the n…

• #41

  the justifcations given to support that overruling—are elements to con- sider when deciding on a rule's watershed status. Or, as I say above, “a frst clue.” Here, that clue cuts against the majority: Ramos overturned precedent (rather than just announcing a new rule) on grounds strikingly reminiscent of Teague's c…

• #42

  nimity rule, as Ramos described it, is as “bedrock” as bed- rock comes. Teague, 489 U. S., at 315 (plurality opinion). It 300 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY Kagan, J., dissenting is as grounded in the Nation's constitutional traditions—with centuries-old practice becoming part of the Sixth Amend- ment's original meaning. An…

• #43

  “raises serious doubts about the fairness of [a] trial.” Id., at 335, n. 13. And it fails to “assure the reliability of [a guilty] verdict.” Id., at 334. So when a jury has divided, as when it has failed to apply the reasonable-doubt standard, “there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amend- …

• #44

  Page Proof Pending Publication 302 EDWARDS v. V ANNOY Kagan, J., dissenting juror service would be meaningless.” Ibid. (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Two concurring opinions linked that history to current practice. “In light of the[ir] racist ori- gins,” Justice Kavanaugh stated, “it is no surprise that …

• #45

  has already given the answer—check, check, check—and to- day's majority can say nothing to the contrary. 5 Instead, the majority relies on decisions holding non- retroactive various other—even though dissimilar—proce- dural rules. In making that argument from past practice, the majority adopts two discrete tacti…

• #46

  watershed rules greatly outnumber watershed ones. That inexorable fact cannot refute the designation of any given rule—much less of jury unanimity—as watershed. And the majority's kitchen-sink list becomes yet less probative of the issue here because most of its bulk comes from decisions on sentencing. See ante, …

• #47

  in scope,” we doubted that it would have any effect on the “accuracy of factfnding.” Whorton, 549 U. S., at 419. I'll resist making like points about other permutations because the main point here is a general one. The majority must slice and dice in this way—dividing Ramos into three for purposes of comparison—b…

• #48

  none at all. If that is so, of course, jury unanimity cannot be watershed. Finally, the majority offers an intelligible reason for declining to apply Ramos retroactively. But in taking that road, the majority breaks a core judicial rule: respect for precedent. Stare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of la…

• #49

  requests overruling”). We are supposed to (fairly) apply the prevailing law until a party asks us to change it. And when a party does make that request, we are supposed to attend to countervailing arguments—which no one here had a chance to make. That orderly process, skipped today, is what enables a court to arr…

• #50

  And so too the Court limits the consequences of any similarly fundamental change in criminal procedure that may emerge in the future. For the frst time in many decades (since long before Teague, see supra, at 297, n. 2), those convicted under rules found not to produce fair and reliable verdicts will be left with…