City of Tahlequah v. Bond

Summary

Officers Girdner and Vick are entitled to qualified immunity in this excessive force action brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983; the Tenth Circuit’s contrary holding is not based on a single precedent finding a Fourth Amendment violation under similar circumstances.

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PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 595 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 9–14 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
October 18, 2021 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
Page Proof Pending Publication
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2021 9 
Syllabus 
CITY OF TAHLEQUAH, OKLAHOMA, et al. v. BOND, 
as special administrator of the ESTATE OF 
ROLLICE, DECEASED 
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united 
states court of appeals for the tenth circuit 
No. 20–1668. Decided October 18, 2021 
Three police offcers responded to a 911 call from Dominic Rollice's ex-
wife, Joy, who requested assistance because Rollice was in her garage, 
intoxicated, and would not leave. Joy met the responding offcers out 
front and led them to the side entrance of her garage. There, the off-
cers encountered Rollice and began speaking with him from the door-
way. Offcer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for weapons; 
Rollice refused. Police body-camera video captured what happened 
next. Offcer Girdner took a step toward the doorway, causing Rollice 
to take a step back, turn around, and walk toward the back of the garage 
where his tools were hanging over a workbench. Offcer Girdner fol-
lowed, with the other offcers close behind. The offcers stated that 
they ordered Rollice to stop, but he instead kept walking. He then 
grabbed a hammer from over the workbench and turned to face the 
offcers. Rollice grasped the hammer as if preparing to swing a base-
ball bat, and the offcers responded by backing up, drawing their guns, 
and yelling at Rollice to drop the hammer. He did not. Rollice instead 
took a few steps to his right, coming out from behind a piece of furniture 
so that he had an unobstructed path to Offcer Girdner. He then raised 
the hammer back behind his head and took a stance as if he was about 
to throw the hammer or charge at the offcers. In response, Offcers 
Girdner and Vick fred their weapons, killing him. 
Rollice's estate fled suit against, among others, Offcers Girdner and 
Vick, alleging that the offcers were liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for 
violating Rollice's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive 
force. The District Court granted the offcers' motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that the offcers' use of force was reasonable and, 
even if not, that qualifed immunity prevented the case from going fur-
ther. The Tenth Circuit reversed based on the panel majority's applica-
tion of Tenth Circuit precedent. 
Held: The offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity from suit. The doc-
trine of qualifed immunity shields offcers from civil liability if their 
conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

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10 CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND 
Per Curiam 
Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231. Qualifed immunity protects “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” District 
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). A clearly established rule is not one merely suggested by then-
existing precedent; the rule's contours must be so well defned that a 
reasonable offcer would know that his conduct was unlawful in the situ-
ation confronted. Ibid. The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled 
principles here. None of the decisions on which the Court of Appeals 
relied comes close to establishing that the offcers' conduct was unlawful. 
Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identifed a single 
precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment violation under similar circum-
stances. The offcers were thus entitled to qualifed immunity. Given 
that conclusion, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether the 
offcers violated the Fourth Amendment, or whether recklessly creating 
a situation that requires deadly force can itself violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Certiorari granted; 981 F. 3d 808, reversed. 
Per Curiam. 
On August 12, 2016, Dominic Rollice's ex-wife, Joy, called 
911. Rollice was in her garage, she explained, and he was 
intoxicated and would not leave. Joy requested police as-
sistance; otherwise, “it's going to get ugly real quick.” 981 
F. 3d 808, 812 (CA10 2020). The dispatcher asked whether 
Rollice lived at the residence. Joy said he did not but ex-
plained that he kept tools in her garage. 
Offcers Josh Girdner, Chase Reed, and Brandon Vick re-
sponded to the call. All three knew that Rollice was Joy's 
ex-husband, was intoxicated, and would not leave her home. 
Joy met the offcers out front and led them to the side 
entrance of the garage. There the offcers encountered Rol-
lice and began speaking with him in the doorway. Rollice 
expressed concern that the offcers intended to take him to 
jail; Offcer Girdner told him that they were simply trying 
to get him a ride. Rollice began fdgeting with something 
in his hands and the offcers noticed that he appeared ner-
vous. Offcer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for 
weapons. Rollice refused.

Cite as: 595 U. S. 9 (2021) 11 
Per Curiam 
Police body-camera video captured what happened next. 
As the conversation continued, Offcer Girdner gestured with 
his hands and took one step toward the doorway, causing 
Rollice to take one step back. Rollice, still conversing with 
the offcers, turned around and walked toward the back of 
the garage where his tools were hanging over a workbench. 
Offcer Girdner followed, the others close behind. No offcer 
was within six feet of Rollice. The video is silent, but the 
offcers stated that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice 
kept walking. He then grabbed a hammer from the back 
wall over the workbench and turned around to face the off-
cers. Rollice grasped the handle of the hammer with both 
hands, as if preparing to swing a baseball bat, and pulled it 
up to shoulder level. The offcers backed up, drawing their 
guns. At this point the video is no longer silent, and the 
offcers can be heard yelling at Rollice to drop the hammer. 
He did not. Instead, Rollice took a few steps to his right, 
coming out from behind a piece of furniture so that he had 
an unobstructed path to Offcer Girdner. He then raised the 
hammer higher back behind his head and took a stance as if 
he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the offcers. 
In response, Offcers Girdner and Vick fred their weapons, 
killing Rollice. 
Rollice's estate fled suit against, among others, Offcers 
Girdner and Vick, alleging that the offcers were liable under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983, for violating Rollice's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from excessive force. The offcers moved 
for summary judgment, both on the merits and on qualifed 
immunity grounds. The District Court granted their mo-
tion. Burke v. Tahlequah, 2019 WL 4674316, *6 (ED Okla., 
Sept. 25, 2019). The offcers' use of force was reasonable, it 
concluded, and even if not, qualifed immunity prevented the 
case from going further. Ibid. 
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
versed. 981 F. 3d, at 826. The Court began by explaining 
that Tenth Circuit precedent allows an offcer to be held lia-
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12 CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND 
Per Curiam 
ble for a shooting that is itself objectively reasonable if the 
offcer's reckless or deliberate conduct created a situation re-
quiring deadly force. Id., at 816. Applying that rule, the 
Court concluded that a jury could fnd that Offcer Girdner's 
initial step toward Rollice and the offcers' subsequent “cor-
nering” of him in the back of the garage recklessly created 
the situation that led to the fatal shooting, such that their 
ultimate use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Id., at 
823. As to qualifed immunity, the Court concluded that 
several cases, most notably Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F. 3d 837 
(CA10 1997), clearly established that the offcers' conduct 
was unlawful. 981 F. 3d, at 826. This petition followed. 
We need not, and do not, decide whether the offcers vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment in the frst place, or whether 
recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can 
itself violate the Fourth Amendment. On this record, the 
offcers plainly did not violate any clearly established law. 
The doctrine of qualifed immunity shields offcers from 
civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009). As we have explained, qualifed 
immunity protects “ `all but the plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law.' ” District of Columbia v. 
Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 
U. S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
We have repeatedly told courts not to defne clearly estab-
lished law at too high a level of generality. See, e.g., Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011). It is not enough 
that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the 
“rule's contours must be so well defned that it is `clear to a 
reasonable offcer that his conduct was unlawful in the situa-
tion he confronted.' ” Wesby, 583 U. S., at 63 (quoting Sau-
cier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001)). Such specifcity is 
“especially important in the Fourth Amendment context,” 
where it is “sometimes diffcult for an offcer to determine 
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Cite as: 595 U. S. 9 (2021) 13 
Per Curiam 
how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will 
apply to the factual situation the offcer confronts.” Mul-
lenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam ) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled principles 
here. Not one of the decisions relied upon by the Court of 
Appeals—Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F. 3d 1204 (CA10 
2019), Hastings v. Barnes, 252 Fed. Appx. 197 (CA10 2007), 
Allen, 119 F. 3d 837, and Sevier v. Lawrence, 60 F. 3d 695 
(CA10 1995)—comes close to establishing that the offcers' 
conduct was unlawful. The Court relied most heavily on 
Allen. But the facts of Allen are dramatically different 
from the facts here. The offcers in Allen responded to a 
potential suicide call by sprinting toward a parked car, 
screaming at the suspect, and attempting to physically wrest 
a gun from his hands. 119 F. 3d, at 841. Offcers Girdner 
and Vick, by contrast, engaged in a conversation with Rol-
lice, followed him into a garage at a distance of 6 to 10 feet, 
and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. We can-
not conclude that Allen “clearly established” that their con-
duct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was 
unlawful. 
The other decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals 
are even less relevant. As for Sevier, that decision merely 
noted in dicta that deliberate or reckless preseizure conduct 
can render a later use of force excessive before dismissing 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 60 F. 3d, at 700–701. 
To state the obvious, a decision where the court did not even 
have jurisdiction cannot clearly establish substantive consti-
tutional law. Regardless, that formulation of the rule is 
much too general to bear on whether the offcers' particular 
conduct here violated the Fourth Amendment. See al-Kidd, 
563 U. S., at 742. Estate of Ceballos, decided after the 
shooting at issue, is of no use in the clearly established in-
quiry. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 200, n. 4 
(2004) (per curiam ). And Hastings, an unpublished deci-
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14 CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND 
Per Curiam 
sion, involved offcers initiating an encounter with a poten-
tially suicidal individual by chasing him into his bedroom, 
screaming at him, and pepper-spraying him. 252 Fed. 
Appx., at 206. Suffce it to say, a reasonable offcer could 
miss the connection between that case and this one. 
Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identi-
fed a single precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion under similar circumstances. The offcers were thus 
entitled to qualifed immunity. 
The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to fle 
briefs amici curiae are granted, and the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional 
edits were made: 
p. 14, line 6, “have” is replaced with “has”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 595 U. S. Part 1 Pages 9–14 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT October 18, 2021 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

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  force. The District Court granted the offcers' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the offcers' use of force was reasonable and, even if not, that qualifed immunity prevented the case from going fur- ther. The Tenth Circuit reversed based on the panel majority's applica- tion of Tenth Circuit precedent. …

• #3

  entrance of the garage. There the offcers encountered Rol- lice and began speaking with him in the doorway. Rollice expressed concern that the offcers intended to take him to jail; Offcer Girdner told him that they were simply trying to get him a ride. Rollice began fdgeting with something in his hands and the of…

• #4

  versed. 981 F. 3d, at 826. The Court began by explaining that Tenth Circuit precedent allows an offcer to be held lia- Page Proof Pending Publication 12 CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND Per Curiam ble for a shooting that is itself objectively reasonable if the offcer's reckless or deliberate conduct created a situation…

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  apply to the factual situation the offcer confronts.” Mul- lenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled principles here. Not one of the decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals—Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F. 3d 1204 (C…

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  tion under similar circumstances. The offcers were thus entitled to qualifed immunity. The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to fle briefs amici curiae are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publicati…