Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P. S. C.

Summary

The Court of Appeals erred in denying the Kentucky attorney general’s motion to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf in litigation concerning Kentucky House Bill 454.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 595 U. S. Part 2 
Pages 267–301 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
March 3, 2022 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2021 267 
Syllabus 
CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY v. 
EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C., et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the sixth circuit 
No. 20–601. Argued October 12, 2021—Decided March 3, 2022 
EMW Women's Surgical Center and two of its doctors fled a federal suit 
seeking to enjoin enforcement of Kentucky House Bill 454, legislation 
regulating the abortion procedure known as dilation and evacuation. 
Named defendants in EMW's lawsuit included two Commonwealth off-
cials, the attorney general and the cabinet secretary for Health and 
Family Services. EMW agreed to dismiss claims against the attorney 
general without prejudice. The stipulation of dismissal specifed that 
the attorney general's offce reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses 
. . . in any appeals arising out of this action” and agreed to be bound by 
“any fnal judgment . . . subject to any modifcation, reversal or vacation 
of the judgment on appeal.” App. 28–30. The secretary remained in 
the case and defended the challenged law. After a bench trial, the Dis-
trict Court held that HB 454 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's right 
to an abortion and issued a permanent injunction against the law's 
enforcement. 
The secretary fled a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, 
Kentucky elected a new attorney general, petitioner Daniel Cameron, 
and elected the former attorney general, Andrew Beshear, Governor. 
Governor Beshear appointed a new secretary for Health and Family 
Services who continued the defense of HB 454 on appeal. Prior to oral 
argument before the Sixth Circuit, Attorney General Cameron entered 
an appearance as counsel for the new secretary. A divided Sixth Cir-
cuit panel affrmed the District Court's judgment. The secretary then 
informed the attorney general's offce that the secretary would not fle 
a petition for rehearing en banc or a petition for a writ of certiorari 
challenging the Sixth Circuit panel's decision. Two days later, the at-
torney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the secretary and to 
intervene as a party on the Commonwealth's behalf. The secretary did 
not oppose that motion, but respondents did. The attorney general also 
fled a petition for rehearing en banc within the 14-day deadline for an 
existing party to seek rehearing. The Sixth Circuit denied the attorney 
general's motion to intervene. This Court granted certiorari limited to 
the question whether the Sixth Circuit should have permitted the attor-
ney general to intervene.

268 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Syllabus 
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in denying the attorney general's motion 
to intervene. Pp. 274–282. 
(a) This Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the attorney gen-
eral's motion to intervene should have been granted notwithstanding 
respondents' contention that the motion was jurisdictionally barred. 
See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp ., 546 U. S. 500, 506. Respondents concede 
that a court of appeals generally has jurisdiction to consider a non-
party's motion to intervene in a pending appeal. But respondents as-
sert that a narrow subset of non-parties—those bound by the district 
court judgment—must fle a timely notice of appeal to obtain appellate 
review and may not circumvent applicable jurisdictional time limits by 
fling a motion to intervene after the deadline for fling a notice of appeal 
has passed. Applying this theory, respondents contend that because 
the attorney general could have fled a notice of appeal but failed to do 
so within the time allowed by law, his motion for intervention should be 
treated like an untimely notice of appeal over which the Sixth Circuit 
lacked jurisdiction. Pp. 274–276. 
(1) No provision of law limits the jurisdiction of the courts of ap-
peals to entertain a motion for intervention fled by a non-party in this 
way, even assuming that party can be bound by the judgment that is 
appealed. Unless clear from its language, a statute or rule does not 
impose a jurisdictional requirement. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 
428, 439. Here, respondents cite no provision that deprives a court of 
appeals of jurisdiction in the way they suggest, and no such supporting 
language can be found in 28 U. S. C. § 2107, Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3 and 4, or any other provision of law. P. 275. 
(2) This Court refuses to adopt what would essentially be a categor-
ical claims-processing rule barring consideration of the attorney gener-
al's motion. When a non-party enters into an agreement to be bound 
by a judgment in accordance with the agreement's terms, it is hard to 
see why the non-party should be precluded from seeking intervention on 
appeal if the agreement preserves that opportunity. Here, the attorney 
general reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals 
arising out of this action.” That easily covers the right to seek rehear-
ing en banc and the right to fle a petition for a writ of certiorari. And 
that agreement makes clear that the judgment to which the attorney 
general agreed to be bound was the judgment that emerged after all 
appellate review concluded. Pp. 275–276. 
(b) Turning to the question whether the Court of Appeals properly 
denied the attorney general's motion to intervene, the Court notes that 
no statute or rule provides a general standard to apply in deciding 
whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. Guided by the “pol-
icies underlying intervention” in the district courts, Automobile Work-
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Syllabus 
ers v. Scofeld, 382 U. S. 205, 217, n. 10, including the legal “interest” 
that a party seeks to “protect” through intervention on appeal, Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), the Court concludes that the Sixth Circuit erred 
in denying the attorney general's motion to intervene. Pp. 276–282. 
(1) Resolution of a motion for permissive intervention is committed 
to the discretion of the court before which intervention is sought, see 
Automobile Workers, 382 U. S., at 217, n. 10; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
24(b)(1)(a). But a court fails to exercise its discretion soundly when it 
“base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,” Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp ., 496 U. S. 384, 405, and that is what happened here. 
The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the strength of the Ken-
tucky attorney general's interest in taking up the defense of HB 454 
when the secretary elected to acquiesce. A State “clearly has a legiti-
mate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes,” Maine 
v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137, and a State's opportunity to defend its laws 
in federal court should not be lightly cut off. The importance of ensur-
ing that States have a fair opportunity to defend their laws in federal 
court has been recognized by Congress. See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b); Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1). These provisions—even if not directly applica-
ble in this case because the secretary remained a party—refect the 
weighty interest that a State has in protecting its own laws. Respect 
for state sovereignty must also take into account the authority of a 
State to structure its executive branch in a way that empowers multiple 
offcials to defend its sovereign interests in federal court. See Virginia 
House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. –––, –––. The unusual 
course that this litigation took should not obscure the important consti-
tutional consideration at stake. Pp. 277–279. 
(2) The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors that 
bear on all applications for appellate intervention. The panel's assess-
ment of the timeliness of the attorney general's motion to intervene was 
mistaken. While an important consideration, timeliness depends on the 
circumstances, and the progression of the litigation is “not solely disposi-
tive.” NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 366. Here, the most impor-
tant circumstance relating to timeliness is that the attorney general 
sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that the Common-
wealth's interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties in the 
case. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394. Because 
the attorney general's need to intervene did not arise until the secretary 
ceased defending the state law, the timeliness of his motion should be 
assessed in relation to that point in time. NAACP v. New York, 413 
U. S. 345, distinguished. Pp. 279–281. 
(3) The panel's fnding that granting intervention would prejudice 
respondents was similarly fawed. While the attorney general's rehear-

270 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Syllabus 
ing petition pressed an issue (third-party standing) not raised in the 
secretary's appellate briefs, allowing intervention would not have neces-
sitated resolution of that issue. See, e. g., McDonald, 432 U. S., at 394. 
Moreover, respondents' loss of its claimed expectations around election 
of a Governor with a history of declining to defend abortion restrictions 
is not cognizable as unfair prejudice in the sense relevant here. 
Pp. 281–282. 
831 Fed. Appx. 748, reversed and remanded. 
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. 
Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 283. Kagan, J., fled an 
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, 
p. 288. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 292. 
Matthew F. Kuhn, Principal Deputy Solicitor General of 
Kentucky, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the 
briefs were Barry L. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, Vic-
tor B. Maddox, Associate Attorney General, and Brett R. 
Nolan, Deputy Solicitor General. 
Alexa Kolbi-Molinas argued the cause for respondents. 
With her on the brief were Andrew Beck, Jennesa Calvo-
Friedman, Jennifer Dalven, David D. Cole, Kendall Turner, 
Jeffrey L. Fisher, and Heather L. Gatnarek.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ari-
zona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Brunn W. 
Roysden III, Solicitor General, Drew C. Ensign and Michael S. Catlett, 
Deputy Solicitors General, Kate B. Sawyer, Assistant Solicitor General, 
and Joseph A. Kanefeld, by Dawn Cash, Acting Attorney General of Okla-
homa, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: 
Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of 
Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, 
Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Derek 
Schmidt of Kansas, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, 
Eric S. Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Douglas J. Pe-
terson of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, 
Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, 
Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes 
of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the Eagle Forum 
Education & Legal Defense Fund by Lawrence J. Joseph; and for Presi-
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Opinion of the Court 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns a state attorney general's attempt to 
intervene in a federal appellate proceeding for the purpose 
of defending the constitutionality of a state law. The issue 
arose after a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affrmed a decision holding a Kentucky 
statute unconstitutional. The Kentucky offcial who had 
been defending the law decided not to seek any further re-
view, but the Kentucky attorney general then moved to in-
tervene for the purpose of taking up the defense. The panel 
denied that motion, but we granted review. 
I 
In April 2018, the Kentucky Legislature adopted House 
Bill 454 (HB 454), which regulates the abortion procedure 
known as dilation and evacuation. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 311.787(1)–(2) (West 2021). EMW Women's Surgical Cen-
ter, a clinic that performs abortions, and two of its doctors 
fled this action in Federal District Court and sought to en-
join the enforcement of the new law. Their complaint 
named four defendants, and two of these, the attorney gen-
eral and the cabinet secretary for Health and Family Serv-
ices, played pivotal roles in the events that followed. The 
attorney general is a “[c]onstitutional State offce[r]” who is 
independently elected and serves until a successor is elected 
and qualifed. Ky. Const. § 91. The secretary, on the other 
hand, is appointed by the Governor and serves at his pleas-
ure. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11.065, 12.020, 63.080. 
The plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal without prejudice of 
the claims against the attorney general (at that time Andrew 
Beshear) and one other defendant.
1 In agreeing to the dis-
dent Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate Philip E. Berger et al. by 
David H. Thompson and Peter A. Patterson. 
Adam S. Gershenson and Kathleen R. Hartnett fled a brief for Federal 
Courts Scholars as amici curiae urging affrmance. 
1 The executive director of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure.

272 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Opinion of the Court 
missal of these claims, the attorney general reserved “all 
rights, claims, and defenses that [might] be available to him” 
and “specifcally reserve[d] all rights, claims, and defenses 
relating to whether he is a proper party in this action and 
in any appeals arising out of this action.” App. 28–30 (em-
phasis added). It was also stipulated “that any fnal judg-
ment in this action concerning the constitutionality of HB 
454 [would] be binding on the Offce of the Attorney General, 
subject to any modifcation, reversal or vacation of the judg-
ment on appeal.” Id., at 29–30 (emphasis added). 
After the dismissal of these parties, the secretary re-
mained in the case and conducted the defense of the chal-
lenged law.
2 Following a bench trial, the District Court held 
that HB 454 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's right to 
an abortion, EMW Women's Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Meier, 
373 F. Supp. 3d 807 (WD Ky. 2019), and it issued a permanent 
injunction against the law's enforcement. The secretary 
then fled a notice of appeal. App. 19. 
While the appeal was pending, Kentucky held its 2019 gen-
eral elections. Andrew Beshear won the race for Governor, 
and petitioner Daniel Cameron was elected to replace him as 
attorney general. On January 20, Governor Beshear ap-
pointed a new secretary for Health and Family Services, and 
the new secretary, represented by lawyers from the attorney 
general's offce, continued the defense of the challenged law. 
On January 28, one day before the appeal was argued, Attor-
ney General Cameron also entered an appearance as counsel 
for the secretary. Id., at 82–83. 
On June 2, 2020, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit af-
frmed the District Court's judgment. EMW Women's Sur-
gical Center, P .S.C. v. Friedlander , 960 F. 3d 785, 790–812. 
In dissent, Judge Bush argued that the plaintiffs lacked 
third-party standing and criticized the majority for refusing 
to wait for our decision on that issue in June Medical Serv-
2 The fourth defendant was the Commonwealth's attorney for the 30th 
Judicial Circuit. He did not join the secretary's appeal. EMW Women's 
Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Friedlander , 960 F. 3d 785, 792 (CA6 2020). 
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Opinion of the Court 
ices L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ––– (2020). Within a week 
after the panel's decision, the secretary informed the attor-
ney general's offce that he would not fle a petition for re-
hearing en banc or a petition for a writ of certiorari, App. 
153, 161, but the secretary agreed not to oppose the attorney 
general if he moved to intervene for the purpose of seeking 
further review. Id., at 153–154. Two days later, the attor-
ney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the secretary 
and to intervene as a party on behalf of the Commonwealth. 
Id., at 152. The secretary did not oppose that motion, but 
respondents did. Id., at 170–172. Five days later, and 
within the 14-day deadline for an existing party to seek re-
hearing, the attorney general tendered a petition for rehear-
ing en banc. Id., at 210–227; Fed. Rules App. Proc. 35(c) 
and 40(a)(1). 
By the same divided vote as before, the panel denied the 
attorney general's motion to intervene, citing Circuit prece-
dent under which intervention on appeal is judged by essen-
tially the same standard as intervention in district court. 
See Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F. 3d 278, 283 (CA6 2011). 
Applying that standard, the panel majority held, frst, that 
the attorney general's motion was untimely because it was 
not fled until years of litigation had passed and the panel 
had already decided the appeal; second, that no “ `substantial 
legal interest' ” was at stake because the attorney general 
was pursuing “ `extraordinary' ” forms of review (rehearing 
en banc and certiorari) to which litigants are not generally 
entitled; and third, that allowing intervention would preju-
dice respondents because the attorney general's rehearing 
petition included an argument (that respondents lacked 
third-party standing) that the secretary's briefs had not 
raised.
3 EMW Women's Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Fried-
lander, 831 Fed. Appx. 748, 749–753 (CA6 2020). 
3 In the District Court, an attorney representing the secretary had 
raised the issue during argument on the secretary's motion for a directed 
verdict, but the District Court refused to consider the issue on the ground 
that it should have been raised much earlier. Tr. 105 (Nov. 15, 2018). 
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274 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Opinion of the Court 
We granted certiorari limited to the question whether the 
Sixth Circuit should have permitted the attorney general to 
intervene. 592 U. S. ––– (2021). 
II 
In considering this question, we begin with respondents' 
contention that the attorney general's motion to intervene 
was jurisdictionally barred. Respondents never advanced 
this argument below, and the Sixth Circuit did not consider 
it. Nevertheless, we must assure ourselves that jurisdic-
tional requirements are met at all stages of the cases that 
come before us for review, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U. S. 500, 506 (2006). 
A 
Respondents' argument is narrow and somewhat compli-
cated. While implicitly conceding that a court of appeals 
generally has jurisdiction to consider a non-party's motion to 
intervene in a pending appeal, they claim that one narrow 
sub-set of non-parties is jurisdictionally barred: those non-
parties that are bound by the district court judgment. Re-
spondents' argument goes like this. Non-parties who are 
bound by a judgment can obtain appellate review by fling a 
notice of appeal within the time prescribed by law. See 28 
U. S. C. § 2107(a); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1). These time 
limits are jurisdictional, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 
209 (2007); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 
315 (1988); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 
U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam ). And because non-parties 
who are bound by a judgment can seek appellate review in 
this way, they cannot circumvent the jurisdictional time lim-
its for fling a notice of appeal by fling a motion to intervene 
after the deadline for fling a notice of appeal has passed. 
Applying this theory, respondents contend that the Court 
of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the attorney gen-
eral's motion. Because the attorney general agreed to be 
bound by the judgment, respondents maintain, he could have 
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Opinion of the Court 
fled a notice of appeal, but since he failed to do so within 
the time allowed by law, his motion for intervention should 
be treated like an untimely notice of appeal. 
B 
This argument fails for the simple reason that no provision 
of law limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in the 
way respondents suggest. We do not read a statute or rule 
to impose a jurisdictional requirement unless its language 
clearly does so. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 
439 (2011) (a provision is not jurisdictional when its language 
“provides no clear indication that Congress wanted that pro-
vision to be treated as having jurisdictional attributes”). 
Here, respondents cite no provision of law that deprives a 
court of appeals of jurisdiction to entertain a motion for in-
tervention that is fled by a non-party who is bound by the 
judgment that is appealed. No such language can be found 
in either 28 U. S. C. § 2107, the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3 and 4, or any other provision of law. We there-
fore see no basis for holding that petitioner's motion was 
jurisdictionally barred. 
C 
What respondents ask us to recognize is essentially a man-
datory claims-processing rule. Such rules are not jurisdic-
tional, and if a non-jurisdictional argument was not raised 
below, we generally will not consider it as an alternative 
ground for affrmance. See, e. g., Granfnanciera, S. A. v. 
Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 38 (1989). In this case, however, we 
do not rest our decision on respondents' failure to raise this 
argument in the Court of Appeals. Even if that argument 
had been preserved, we would not fnd it persuasive. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that parties bound by 
a judgment are generally permitted to appeal that judgment, 
we do not think it follows that a party may do so regardless 
of the ground on which the party is bound. Here, respond-
ents rely on the proposition that “[t]he Attorney General, 
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276 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Opinion of the Court 
like any other `person who agrees to be bound by the deter-
mination of issues in an action between others is bound in 
accordance with the terms of his agreement.' ” Brief for 
Respondents 15 (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880, 
893 (2008); emphasis added and alteration omitted). And 
when a non-party is bound by a judgment for this reason, it 
is hard to see why the non-party should be precluded from 
seeking intervention on appeal if the agreement preserves 
that opportunity. 
That is the situation here. In agreeing to be bound, the 
attorney general specifcally “reserve[d] all rights, claims, 
and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action,” 
App. 28–29, and this language easily covers the right to seek 
rehearing en banc and the right to fle a petition for a writ 
of certiorari. In addition, the stipulation of dismissal made 
clear that the judgment to which the attorney general 
agreed to be bound was the judgment that emerged after all 
appellate review concluded. See id., at 30 (judgment bind-
ing on attorney general's offce “subject to any modifcation, 
reversal or vacation of the judgment on appeal”). 
For these reasons, we refuse to adopt a categorical claims-
processing rule that bars consideration of the attorney gen-
eral's motion. In doing so, we do not attempt to set out a 
general rule governing the right of non-parties to appeal or 
to move for appellate intervention. 
III 
Having concluded that neither a jurisdictional requirement 
nor a mandatory claims-processing rule barred consideration 
of the attorney general's motion, we turn to the question 
whether the Court of Appeals properly denied that motion. 
No statute or rule provides a general standard to apply in 
deciding whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure make only one 
passing reference to intervention, and that reference con-
cerns the review of agency action. See Rule 15(d); Amalga-
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Opinion of the Court 
mated Transit Union Int'l, AFL–CIO v. Donovan, 771 F. 2d 
1551, 1553, n. 3 (CADC 1985). Without any rule that gov-
erns appellate intervention, we have looked elsewhere for 
guidance. Thus we have considered the “policies underlying 
intervention” in the district courts, Automobile Workers v. 
Scofeld, 382 U. S. 205, 217, n. 10 (1965), including the legal 
“interest” that a party seeks to “protect” through interven-
tion on appeal. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). 
A 
In defending the Kentucky law, the attorney general 
asserts a substantial legal interest that sounds in deeper, 
constitutional considerations. As we have observed, our 
Constitution “ `spli[t] the atom of sovereignty.' ” Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 751 (1999) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U. S. 489, 504, n. 17 (1999)). “The Constitution limited but 
did not abolish the sovereign powers of the States, which 
retained `a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.' ” Murphy 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. –––, ––– 
(2018) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961)). Paramount among the States' retained sovereign 
powers is the power to enact and enforce any laws that do 
not confict with federal law. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
Therefore, a State “clearly has a legitimate interest in the 
continued enforceability of its own statutes,” Maine v. Tay-
lor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986), and a federal court must “re-
spect . . . the place of the States in our federal system,” 
Arizonans for Offcial English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 75 
(1997). This means that a State's opportunity to defend its 
laws in federal court should not be lightly cut off. 
Respect for state sovereignty must also take into account 
the authority of a State to structure its executive branch in a 
way that empowers multiple offcials to defend its sovereign 
interests in federal court. See Virginia House of Delegates 
v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). In this case, al-
though the secretary for Health and Family Services appar-
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278 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Opinion of the Court 
ently enjoyed the authority under state law to defend the 
constitutionality of HB 454, the secretary shared that au-
thority with the attorney general. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15.020; see also Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 
516 S. W. 2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1974) (“There is no question as to 
the right of the Attorney General to appear and be heard in 
a suit brought by someone else in which the constitutionality 
of a statute is involved”). Indeed, it is the attorney general 
who is deemed Kentucky's “chief law offcer” with the au-
thority to represent the Commonwealth “in all cases.” Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15.020(1), (3). 
The importance of ensuring that States have a fair oppor-
tunity to defend their laws in federal court has been recog-
nized by Congress. Under 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b), when a 
state law “affecting the public interest is drawn in question” 
in any “court of the United States” and neither the State nor 
any state agency or offcer is a party, the court must notify 
the state attorney general, and the State must be allowed to 
intervene. See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1). Even if 
this provision is not directly applicable in this case because 
the secretary for Health and Family Services was still a 
party when the intervention motion was fled, it nevertheless 
refects the weighty interest that a State has in protecting 
its own laws. The way in which Kentucky divides executive 
authority and the unusual course that this litigation took 
should not obscure the important constitutional consider-
ation at stake.
4 
Resolution of a motion for permissive intervention is 
committed to the discretion of the court before which inter-
4 Justice Kagan argues that the Court need not address the constitu-
tional basis for Kentucky's interest in the defense of its laws, but that 
interest was a primary focus of the briefs and oral argument. And in-
deed, Justice Kagan agrees that “a State has a signifcant interest in 
enforcing its own laws.” Post, at 291 (opinion concurring in judgment). 
Such an interest depends on States' status as “separate sovereigns.” 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986).

Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 279 
Opinion of the Court 
vention is sought, see Automobile Workers, 382 U. S., at 217, 
n. 10; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b)(1)(a). But a court fails to 
exercise its discretion soundly when it “base[s] its ruling on 
an erroneous view of the law,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990), and that is what happened 
here. The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the 
strength of the Kentucky attorney general's interest in tak-
ing up the defense of HB 454 when the secretary for Health 
and Family Services elected to acquiesce.
5 
B 
The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors 
that bear on all applications for appellate intervention. The 
panel found that the attorney general's motion was not 
timely because it came after years of litigation in the District 
Court and after the panel had issued its decision, but its 
assessment of timeliness was mistaken. Timeliness is an 
important consideration in deciding whether intervention 
should be allowed, see, e. g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 24 (a) and 
(b)(1), but “[t]imeliness is to be determined from all the cir-
cumstances,” and “the point to which [a] suit has progressed 
is . . . not solely dispositive,” NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 
345, 365–366 (1973). 
Here, the most important circumstance relating to timeli-
ness is that the attorney general sought to intervene “as 
5 The dissent argues that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discre-
tion by denying the attorney general's intervention motion because his 
predecessor in offce had argued that he had no interest in the litigation. 
Post, at 292–293. The dissent argues that we should hold the attorney 
general to that representation. But the Court of Appeals did not rely on 
this argument, and for good reason. The attorney general was sued in 
his role as a state offcial who could enforce HB 454, and the attorney 
general had disclaimed any such enforcement authority. See Ex parte 
Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159–160 (1908). The attorney general now seeks to 
intervene not to defend a right to exercise enforcement powers under HB 
454, but in his role as the Commonwealth's “chief law offcer,” Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 15.020(1), who has the authority to defend Kentucky's inter-
ests in federal court when no other offcial is willing to do so. 
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280 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Opinion of the Court 
soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth's interests 
“would no longer be protected” by the parties in the case. 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394 (1977). 
Our decision in McDonald addressed a similar situation. 
There, a member of a putative plaintiff class moved to inter-
vene for the purpose of appealing the District Court's denial 
of class certifcation. Id., at 396. The District Court de-
nied that request because the class member had not “seen ft 
to come in here and seek any relief from this Court in any 
way” during “fve years” of litigation. Id., at 390. We held, 
however, that the motion was timely because it was fled 
soon after the movant learned that the class representatives 
would not appeal. 
The same logic applies here. The attorney general sought 
to intervene two days after learning that the secretary 
would not continue to defend HB 454. The motion was also 
fled within a week after the Sixth Circuit issued its decision 
and within the 14-day time limit for petitioning for rehearing 
en banc. Although the litigation by that time had proceeded 
for years, that factor is not dispositive. The attorney gener-
al's need to seek intervention did not arise until the secre-
tary ceased defending the state law, and the timeliness of his 
motion should be assessed in relation to that point in time. 
Respondents argue that the attorney general should have 
realized as soon as Governor Beshear took offce that his 
secretary for Health and Family Services might abandon the 
defense of HB 454. Respondents state that Governor Bes-
hear ran “on a pro-choice platform and . . . had repeatedly 
withdrawn from the defense of abortion restrictions when 
serving as Attorney General.” Brief for Respondents 28. 
But the new secretary whom he appointed after taking offce 
as Governor had continued to defend the law on appeal, and 
respondents do not explain why the attorney general should 
have known that the secretary would change course after 
the panel's decision was handed down. 
In arguing to the contrary, respondents point to our deci-
sion in NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, but they misread

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Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 281 
Opinion of the Court 
that decision. In that case, several parties unsuccessfully 
sought to intervene in a Voting Rights Act case after the 
United States, which had brought the action, consented to 
the entry of judgment in favor of the defendant. The Dis-
trict Court found that this request was untimely, and we 
affrmed, noting that the United States' answer to the com-
plaint, which had been fled almost a month earlier, had re-
vealed that the Government “was without information with 
which it could oppose the motion for summary judgment.” 
Id., at 367. That response, we concluded, should have 
alerted the would-be intervenors about the United States' 
likely course of action. Ibid. We also observed, among 
other things, that intervention had “ the potential for 
seriously disrupting” the approaching elections. Id., at 
368–369. 
The situation here is starkly different. As discussed, the 
attorney general's motion was timely, and intervention 
would not have produced anything like the disruption that 
the Court cited in NAACP v. New York. Thus, the panel 
was mistaken in fnding that the attorney general's motion 
was untimely. 
C 
The panel's fnding on prejudice was similarly fawed. 
The panel argued that intervention would prejudice respond-
ents because the attorney general's rehearing petition 
pressed an issue (third-party standing) that had not been 
raised in the secretary's briefs. 831 Fed. Appx., at 751, 752. 
But the lack of third-party standing was not the only argu-
ment advanced in the rehearing petition, App. 221–227, and 
in any event, allowing the attorney general to intervene 
would not have necessitated that the third-party standing 
issue be entertained. If the secretary for Health and Fam-
ily Services had not retired from the feld, he could have 
raised that same argument in a petition for rehearing or in 
a petition for certiorari. In that event, the relevant court 
(the Sixth Circuit in deciding whether to grant en banc re-
view and this Court in deciding whether to grant certiorari)

282 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Opinion of the Court 
could have considered whether the third-party standing ar-
gument should be considered despite the secretary's failure 
to raise the issue at an earlier point in the litigation. That 
the issue was raised in the attorney general's rehearing pe-
tition, as opposed to one filed by the secretary, was 
immaterial. 
Our decision in McDonald illustrates the panel's error. 
In that case, we held that the defendant was not “unfairly 
prejudiced simply because an appeal on behalf of putative 
class members was brought by [an unnamed class member] 
rather than by one of the original” parties, 432 U. S., at 394. 
The situation here is similar. 
Respondents advance one additional argument on the issue 
of prejudice. They claim that intervention would unfairly 
deprive them of a “reasonable expectation” stemming from 
Governor Beshear's election. Brief for Respondents 31. 
Respondents contend that Governor Beshear had a “his-
tory of refusing to defend abortion restrictions” and that 
they therefore reasonably thought that the secretary, who 
was appointed by the Governor, would not pursue “extraor-
dinary forms of relief if they prevailed in their appeal.” 
Ibid. 
The loss of this sort of claimed expectation does not 
amount to unfair prejudice in the sense relevant here. Re-
spondents may have hoped that the new Governor would 
appoint a secretary who would give up the defense of HB 
454, but they had no legally cognizable expectation that the 
secretary he chose or the newly elected attorney general 
would do so before all available forms of review had been 
exhausted. 
* * * 
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in denying 
the attorney general's motion to intervene. That court's 
judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
Justice Thomas, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court. I write to address another 
reason why respondents and their amici err in maintaining 
that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider At-
torney General Cameron's motion to intervene. 
As the Court explains, respondents now argue that Attor-
ney General Cameron is jurisdictionally barred from inter-
vening in the appeal because his predecessor, then-Attorney 
General Beshear, stipulated as a condition of his dismissal 
that the Kentucky attorney general's offce would be bound 
by the District Court's fnal judgment. According to re-
spondents, that stipulation required the attorney general to 
timely notice an appeal consistent with Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure 3 and 4 if he wished to challenge the Dis-
trict Court's judgment on appeal. To allow intervention in 
the appeal, respondents posit, would circumvent the jurisdic-
tional requirements of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
3 and 4. 
The Court rightly rejects respondents' novel argument be-
cause the attorney general's stipulation preserved his offce's 
right to participate in the appeal. See ante, at 275–276. But 
in addition to the infrmity the Court identifes, respondents' 
jurisdictional argument suffers from another, more basic 
faw: Rules 3 and 4 permit only “parties” to appeal a district 
court judgment, and the attorney general was not a “party” 
to the judgment after he was dismissed from the litigation. 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1) and 4(a) 
(1)(A) together require that any appeals from a district 
court judgment be pursued by fling a notice of appeal within 
30 days after entry of the judgment. See also 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2107(a). We have described this requirement as “jurisdic-
tional.” See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 
315 (1988); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 147 
(2012). We have also held that Rule 3(c)—requiring, among 
other things, that the notice of appeal “specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal,” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c)(1)(A)— 
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284 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Thomas, J., concurring 
is likewise jurisdictional. See Torres, 487 U. S., at 314–318; 
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 765–766 (2001). Rule 
3(c)(1)(A)'s requirement that the notice specify the “party” 
taking the appeal refects the “well settled” “rule that only 
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, 
may appeal an adverse judgment.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 
U. S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam ). For example, individuals 
who are “not parties to the underlying lawsuit” and fail to 
intervene in the District Court cannot appeal a District 
Court's judgment. Ibid. We are not at liberty to create 
“exceptions to this general rule,” even when “the nonparty 
has an interest that is affected by the trial court's judg-
ment.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the attorney general was not a “party” to the Dis-
trict Court's fnal judgment. Then-Attorney General Bes-
hear was originally a “party” to this suit because he was 
named as a defendant in the complaint. But the District 
Court later dismissed Attorney General Beshear's offce from 
the litigation in May 2018—about a year before fnal judg-
ment. A “party” dismissed from a lawsuit is no longer a 
“party” to it after his dismissal. Just as “intervention is the 
requisite method for a nonparty to become a party to a law-
suit,” United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 
556 U. S. 928, 933 (2009), dismissal is the quintessential (if 
not only) method for a party to become a nonparty, see, e. g., 
67A C. J. S., Parties § 86 (2013) (“Once a person is dismissed 
from a lawsuit, he or she is generally no longer a party to it”). 
One need hardly look beyond the case caption to see how 
dismissal ended the attorney general's status as a “party” 
to the litigation. To be sure, case captions are “ `not deter-
minative as to the identity of the parties to the action.' ” 
Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 935 (quoting 5A C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1321, p. 388 (3d ed. 
2004)). But they can be instructive, given that “ `[t]he desig-
nation of persons as parties is usually made in the caption of 
the summons or complaint.' ” Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
U. S. 1, 15 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 34, Comment a, Reporter's Note, 
p. 347 (1980)). Here, because respondents initially named 
then-Attorney General Beshear as the lead defendant in 
their complaint, the District Court's orders originally cap-
tioned the defendants as “ANDREW G. BESHEAR, et al.” 
E. g., App. 28. After the District Court dismissed the attor-
ney general on May 21, 2018, the court ordered the clerk to 
modify the case caption to “refect the remaining properly 
named Defendants”: “Meier, et al.” Id., at 5, 7; see also App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 104a (District Court fnal judgment listing 
the defendants as “ADAM W. MEIER et al.”). The District 
Court's modifcation of the caption confrms that when the 
court issued its judgment, the attorney general was no 
longer a “party.” 
Because the attorney general was not a “party” to the Dis-
trict Court's fnal judgment, respondents' jurisdictional ar-
gument necessarily fails. As a nonparty, the attorney gen-
eral could not notice an appeal under Rules 3 and 4. And 
because he could not notice an appeal, he could not possibly 
have been obligated to do so, rather than pursue interven-
tion—“the requisite method for a nonparty to become a 
party to a lawsuit.” Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 933. 
Respondents resist this conclusion and contend that the 
attorney general remained a “party” because then-Attorney 
General Beshear stipulated upon dismissal that “any fnal 
judgment in this action . . . will be binding on the Offce of 
the Attorney General, subject to any modifcation, reversal 
or vacation of the judgment on appeal.” App. 29–30. Re-
spondents' argument has a veneer of plausibility only be-
cause of our decision in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U. S. 1. 
There, a majority of this Court held that a nonnamed mem-
ber of a certifed class action was a “party” who could appeal 
the approval of a settlement to which he objected. Id., at 
10. Rejecting the settled bright-line rule that only a named 
party may appeal a fnal judgment, the Court adopted a 
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286 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Thomas, J., concurring 
vague, functionalist inquiry that determined “party” status 
“based on context.” Ibid. 
Applying that test, Devlin held that “nonnamed class 
members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being 
bound by the [judgment],” and it was “th[at] feature of class 
action litigation that require[d] that class members be al-
lowed to appeal the approval of a settlement.” Ibid. “To 
hold otherwise,” the Court explained, “would deprive non-
named class members of the power to preserve their own 
interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them.” 
Ibid. 
I joined Justice Scalia's dissent in Devlin, which reiterated 
that “ `parties' to a judgment are those named as such— 
whether as the original plaintiff or defendant in the com-
plaint giving rise to the judgment, or as `one who though not 
an original party becomes a party by intervention, substitu-
tion, or third-party practice.' ” 536 U. S., at 15 (quoting 
Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 77 (1987); alterations omitted). 
The Devlin Court's holding was, and is, “contrary” to that 
“well-established law.” 536 U. S., at 15. To reason, as 
Devlin did, that merely being bound by a judgment trans-
formed a nonnamed class member into a “party,” surely 
“c[a]me as news to law students everywhere.” Id., at 18; 
see also Marino, 484 U. S., at 304 (previously rejecting that 
individuals become “parties” merely because they have “an 
interest that is affected by the trial court's judgment”). 
After all, “[t]here are any number of persons who are not 
parties to a judgment yet are nonetheless bound by it.” 
Devlin, 536 U. S., at 18. For example, as pertinent here, 
when “ `[a] person agrees to be bound by the determination 
of issues in an action between others,' ” we call application 
of claim or issue preclusion to that person “nonparty preclu-
sion” precisely because agreeing to be bound by a judgment 
does not alone make one a “party” to it. Taylor v. Sturgell, 
553 U. S. 880, 893 (2008) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 40, at 390; emphasis added). 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
Devlin was demonstrably erroneous for the reasons set 
forth in Justice Scalia's dissent, and we should overrule it in 
an appropriate case. That said, Devlin does not control 
here. Several years after Devlin, in Eisenstein, we unani-
mously reiterated the principle that “[a] `party' to litigation 
is `[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought.' ” 556 
U. S., at 933 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 
2004)). Relying on Devlin's reasoning, the petitioner there 
argued that the United States must be a “party” within the 
meaning of Rule 4(a)(1)(B) because the Government is 
“bound by the judgment” in all actions under the False 
Claims Act “regardless of its participation in the case.” 556 
U. S., at 936. Consistent with our pre-Devlin cases, we reit-
erated that this fact was “not determinative” because “non-
parties may be bound by a judgment for a host of different 
reasons,” 556 U. S., at 936, none of which suffces to trans-
form them into parties. We distinguished Devlin's contrary 
reasoning by invoking the specifc “class-action nature of the 
suit” there, 556 U. S., at 934, n. 3, essentially cabining that 
precedent to class actions alone. And, true to Eisenstein, 
we have not once relied on Devlin outside the class-action 
context. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2018); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U. S. 
588, 593 (2013); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U. S 299, 313–315 
(2011). Devlin is therefore an aberration from our other-
wise consistent view that only a named party may fle a no-
tice of appeal under Rules 3 and 4. And because this case 
does not involve a class action, Devlin has no precedential 
force. 
* * * 
The Offce of the Kentucky Attorney General was not a 
named “party” to the District Court's fnal judgment. The 
attorney general, accordingly, could not notice an appeal 
from that judgment under Rules 3 and 4. And because the 
attorney general could not appeal the District Court's judg-
ment, Attorney General Cameron moved to intervene and 
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288 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Kagan, J., concurring in judgment 
pursue “the requisite method for a nonparty to become a 
party to a lawsuit.” Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 933. Far from 
evading the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, 
Cameron's motion to intervene was his only legitimate option 
to both comply with those Rules and participate in the ap-
peal as a party. For this reason, as well as those given in 
the opinion of the Court, respondents' jurisdictional argu-
ment fails. 
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer joins, con-
curring in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court that the Sixth Circuit should have 
allowed the attorney general to intervene in this suit after 
another state offcial ceased defending the challenged Ken-
tucky law. And my reasons for reaching that conclusion 
partly overlap with the Court's. But I would differently 
frame and respond to the serious threshold issue that re-
spondent EMW raises. I also see no need to rely on “consti-
tutional considerations” to resolve the intervention question 
before us. Ante, at 277 (opinion of the Court). 
I 
No jurisdictional rule, the Court and I agree, directly bars 
the attorney general's intervention here. The rule EMW 
relies on requires a losing party to fle a notice of appeal 
within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2107(a); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A). This Court has 
made clear that the timely-appeal rule is jurisdictional. 
See, e. g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209 (2007). So if 
a party (or a non-party having an equivalent right to appeal) 
fles an appeal on the 31st day after judgment, the appellate 
court lacks jurisdiction. But here the attorney general did 
not fle such a late appeal. He instead moved to intervene in 
an appeal timely brought by Kentucky's secretary for health 
(after the secretary decided to forgo en banc or Supreme 
Court review). And the provisions setting out the timely-
appeal rule do not address that situation. See ante, at 275. 
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Kagan, J., concurring in judgment 
The majority goes on to deny the existence of a “claims-
processing” rule preventing the attorney general's interven-
tion, see ante, at 275–276, but I think that terminology mis-
placed and distracting. We often consider whether timing 
requirements are “jurisdictional” rules or else “claims -
processing” rules. See, e. g., United States v. Kwai Fun 
Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 409–410 (2015). (The question comes 
up because only the latter may be waived or overcome by 
equitable considerations; the former are absolute bars to 
entertaining a matter. See ibid.) But here we know the an-
swer to that frequent question. As just stated, the timely-
appeal rule—the only rule anyone thinks relevant—is juris-
dictional. There is not a claims-processing rule in sight. 
And EMW nowhere suggests otherwise; it never asserts the 
existence of a claims-processing rule barring the attorney 
general's motion. 
The argument EMW makes—and it is a serious one—rests 
on the idea that litigants should not be allowed to use inter-
vention procedures to end-run jurisdictional rules. Con-
sider a hypothetical to illustrate the problem. Suppose a 
party (or a non-party having a right to appeal) misses the 
30-day deadline to fle a notice of appeal from a judgment. 
On the 31st day, he regrets his negligence and attempts to 
intervene in another party's appeal in the same case. 
Should the appellate court allow the intervention? Our 
precedent, along with common sense, suggests not—even 
though the timely-appeal rule, as noted above, does not ad-
dress issues of intervention. That is because permitting 
intervention there would effectively “vitiate[ ]” the “man-
datory nature of the [appellate] time limits.” Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988). Or other-
wise said, granting intervention would enable the party to 
circumvent those limits, by awarding him the “equivalent” 
of more “time for fling a notice of appeal.” Ibid.; see 
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F. 3d 515, 519 (CA10 2000) (“[I]nter-
vention is not a means to escape the consequences of noncom-
pliance” with the jurisdictional timely-appeal rule). That is 
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290 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Kagan, J., concurring in judgment 
the essence of EMW's objection. EMW contends that the 
attorney general, though a non-party, could have appealed 
the District Court's judgment because it bound his offce. 
But the attorney general chose at the time not to appeal. 
He should not now be allowed, EMW says, to sidestep the 
jurisdictional deadline he missed by means of intervening. 
See Brief for Respondents 10, 15–16, 19–21. 
But the anti-circumvention rationale for denying interven-
tion does not sensibly apply here because of the change in 
circumstances between the time to appeal and the time of 
the motion to intervene. Recall that the attorney general, 
by agreeing early on to the dismissal of the claims against 
him, effectively handed off defense of the challenged law to 
the health secretary. See ante, at 271–272. After the Dis-
trict Court ruled, the secretary continued to perform that 
function, appealing the court's decision to strike down the 
law. Assume here, as EMW argues, that the attorney gen-
eral also could have appealed.* Even if so, the attorney 
general had no reason to take that step: The secretary was 
handling the appeal, just as he had handled the trial court 
proceedings. It was only once the Sixth Circuit ruled and 
the secretary ceased defending the law—choosing not to 
seek en banc or Supreme Court review—that the (now new) 
attorney general had an urgent reason to rejoin the suit: If 
he did not, the law would be invalidated. The motion to 
intervene, then, was not an attempt to escape the conse-
quences of failing to adhere to appellate deadlines, as in the 
hypothetical offered above. The motion was instead a re-
sponse to a major shift in the litigation, creating a new de-
mand for the attorney general's participation. And that 
*That assumption is perfectly reasonable. The agreement of dismissal 
made the District Court's judgment binding on the attorney general's of-
fce (subject to any later revision or reversal). See App. 29–30. And a 
non-party bound by a judgment often has the same appeal rights as a 
party. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U. S. 1, 7–8 (2002) (discussing cases); 
C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 15A Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3902.1, pp. 186–189, n. 35 (2d ed. Supp. 2021) (same).

Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 291 
Kagan, J., concurring in judgment 
real-world fact answers EMW's argument. Granting the 
motion would not countenance an end-run around the timely-
appeal rule by giving the attorney general a do-over. It 
would simply recognize that only after the time for appeal 
had come and gone had a need arisen for the attorney gen-
eral to reenter the suit. 
II 
With that threshold objection answered, the issue becomes 
how the factors bearing on intervention motions play out. I 
agree with much of what the Court says on that issue (and 
also with its view that the attorney general's agreement did 
not preclude his intervention). But I see no reason to cast 
the analysis, even partially, in constitutional terms. See 
ante, at 277–279. Our longstanding practice is to avoid un-
necessary discussion of constitutional questions. See, e. g., 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345–348 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring). And contra the majority, no invocation of, 
or lofty observations about, the Constitution are here 
needed. The considerations governing intervention mo-
tions—applying equivalently to any person seeking to inter-
vene, including the attorney general—show why the Sixth 
Circuit went wrong in closing off the suit. See generally 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24. 
Most fundamentally, the attorney general had a strong 
reason for intervening. Once again, the secretary had de-
fended the challenged law as constitutional until the Sixth 
Circuit ruled; but he then decided to abandon the argument. 
If the attorney general could not assume the defense, and 
thus continue contesting EMW's claim, Kentucky could no 
longer enforce its statute. And it is of course true, as the 
majority says, that a State has a signifcant interest in en-
forcing its own laws. See ante, at 277. As a practical mat-
ter, then, the attorney general belonged in the suit, absent 
some good cause to exclude him. 
And as the Court concludes, no such cause was present. 
See ante, at 279–282. The intervention motion, though com-
ing late in the suit, was still timely. The attorney general 
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292 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
intervened as soon as he had a reason to do so—more spe-
cifcally, two days after he learned that the secretary would no 
longer defend the challenged law. See United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394 (1977) (holding that a motion 
to intervene was timely because it was made “as soon as it be-
came clear” that the movant's interests “would no longer be 
protected” by existing parties). And the motion was fled 
within the 14-day window for requesting an en banc rehear-
ing—so did nothing to delay the suit's normal progress. See 
Fed. Rules App. Proc. 35(c) and 40(a)(1). Nor did the motion 
otherwise prejudice EMW. The attorney general sought to 
pursue only the usual next steps of appellate review—what the 
secretary would have done had he not ceased defending the 
law. Of course, EMW would have preferred the secretary's 
action to bring the case to an end. But an unrealized gain of 
that kind does not count as a legally cognizable harm. See 
McDonald, 432 U. S., at 394 (holding that a litigant cannot 
claim “unfair[ ] prejudice[ ]” when one person takes over an 
appeal from another). Nothing, then, counterbalances the 
reasons for enabling the attorney general's inclusion. 
* * * 
So I arrive, if via a somewhat different path, at the same 
endpoint as the Court. In my view, the attorney general's 
motion to intervene was not an end-run around the timely-
appeal rule. And with that issue out of the way, this is a 
textbook case for intervention. The Sixth Circuit should 
have allowed the attorney general to step into the litigation 
to defend the challenged law. 
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting. 
In every case, there must be a “point of time when litiga-
tion shall be at an end.” Browder v. Director, Dept. of Cor-
rections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). To effectuate that endpoint, our legal sys-
tem requires parties to abide by representations made in a 
lawsuit regardless of later regrets. In this case, the attor-
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Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 293 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
ney general of Kentucky stipulated to his own dismissal as a 
party in the District Court and agreed to have another off-
cial represent Kentucky's interests. Only years later, and 
after the Court of Appeals affrmed the District Court's 
judgment, did the attorney general ask the Court of Appeals 
to allow him to return based on a position he had disavowed 
when securing his dismissal earlier in the litigation. The 
Court of Appeals refused his request to intervene. 
Generally, the decision whether to permit intervention in 
a case is left to the “sound discretion” of the court in which 
intervention is sought, as that court is the best positioned to 
assess potential ineffciencies and unfairness that might re-
sult. NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 366 (1973). The 
Court acknowledges that highly deferential standard, but 
nonetheless bends over backward to accommodate the attor-
ney general's reentry into the case. I fear today's decision 
will open the foodgates for government offcials to evade the 
consequences of litigation decisions made by their predeces-
sors of different political parties, undermining fnality and 
upsetting the settled expectations of courts, litigants, and 
the public alike. I respectfully dissent. 
I 
In March 2018, the Kentucky Legislature enacted 
House Bill 454 (H. B. 454), which prohibits “dilation and evac-
uation” abortions after 11 weeks of pregnancy except in 
medical emergencies. Respondents, a clinic and two of its 
physicians, challenged the law, contending that it violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an undue burden on the 
right to previability abortion. Respondents named four de-
fendants in the complaint, including the attorney general of 
Kentucky and the interim secretary of Kentucky's Cabinet 
for Health and Family Services (secretary).
1 Each was 
1 The other two defendants were the executive director of the Kentucky 
Board of Medical Licensure and the Commonwealth's Attorney for the 
30th Judicial Circuit of Kentucky. 
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294 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
named in his offcial capacity. At the time, Andrew Beshear, 
a Democrat, served as Kentucky's attorney general. The 
secretary served as part of the administration of Governor 
Matt Bevin, a Republican. 
Respondents sought a motion for a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction. In response, the attorney 
general disclaimed responsibility for enforcing the law. The 
attorney general explained that “H. B. 454 does not confer 
upon the Attorney General the authority or duty to enforce 
the provisions as enacted” and “does not provide the Attor-
ney General with any regulatory responsibility or other au-
thority to take any action.” Electronic Case Filing in No. 
3:18–cv–00224 (WD Ky., May 8, 2018) (ECF), Doc. 42, p. 1. 
He concluded that, as a result, “there is no act of the Attor-
ney General or his Offce for the Court to enjoin.” Ibid. 
The attorney general asserted no interest in defending the 
constitutionality of H. B. 454 on behalf of the State. 
Shortly thereafter, the attorney general and the respond-
ents submitted to the District Court a joint stipulation and 
proposed order of dismissal. The stipulation provided that 
the attorney general “agrees that any fnal judgment in this 
action concerning the constitutionality of HB 454 (2018) will 
be binding on the Offce of the Attorney General, subject to 
any modifcation, reversal or vacation of the judgment on 
appeal.” ECF Doc. 46, at 2. It also specifed that he re-
served “all rights, claims, and defenses” that were available 
to him, including those related to “whether he is a proper 
party in this action and in any appeals arising out of this 
action.” Id., at 1. The District Court entered the order 
dismissing the attorney general from the case. 
The attorney general did not participate in any further 
proceedings before the District Court. The secretary con-
tinued to defend H. B. 454. After a 5-day bench trial, the 
District Court issued a permanent injunction against the en-
forcement of H. B. 454, declaring it unconstitutional under 
this Court's precedents. Subsequently, the secretary alone 
fled a notice of appeal. 
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Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 295 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
After the secretary's appeal was fully briefed, but before 
argument, then-Attorney General Beshear was elected Gov-
ernor and Daniel Cameron, a Republican, was elected as 
Kentucky's new attorney general. Four of the secretary's 
lawyers moved to withdraw from the case, explaining that 
they would no longer be employed in their current positions. 
Some weeks later, the same four attorneys, now employed 
by the Offce of the Attorney General, appeared as counsel 
for the secretary. Attorney General Cameron also entered 
an appearance as counsel for the secretary. He did not seek 
to intervene. 
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment against the sec-
retary, affrming the District Court's judgment. After this 
decision, the secretary communicated to the attorney general 
that he did not intend to defend H. B. 454 further by, for 
example, fling a petition for rehearing en banc or seeking a 
writ of certiorari. Attorney General Cameron and the law-
yers from his offce who had appeared as counsel for the sec-
retary moved to withdraw, and the attorney general moved 
to intervene as a party in his own right. This was nearly 
fve months after the attorney general reappeared as counsel 
for the secretary and over two years after the District Court 
entered the stipulated order of dismissal. The attorney 
general also tendered a petition for rehearing en banc. 
The Court of Appeals denied the motion and dismissed the 
petition for rehearing en banc. It observed, among other 
things, that the attorney general's motion to intervene came 
“years into [the case's] progress,” after both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals had issued decisions. EMW 
Women's Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Friedlander , 831 Fed. 
Appx. 748, 750 (CA6 2020). It explained that having been 
“named . . . as a defendant” in the complaint and having 
“stipulated [to his own] dismissal,” the attorney general was 
unquestionably put on notice of the case long before the 
Court of Appeals issued its decision. Id., at 751. In the 
Court of Appeals' view, allowing the attorney general to in-
tervene at this late hour would give would-be intervenors

296 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
“every incentive to sit out litigation until [a court of appeals] 
issue[s] a decision contrary to their preferences, whereupon 
they can spring to action.” Id., at 750. The Court of Ap-
peals clarifed that it was “not reach[ing] the issue of 
whether Attorney General Cameron has a substantial legal 
interest in the subject matter of this case” nor “question[ing] 
whether states' attorneys general may appropriately inter-
vene to defend their states' laws,” but merely addressing the 
appropriateness of the attorney general's intervention under 
the circumstances of “this particular case.” Id., at 752, n. 4. 
This Court granted the attorney general's petition for cer-
tiorari, and now reverses. 
II 
I have no quarrel with the Court's holding that no jurisdic-
tional bar precluded the attorney general's intervention. 
On the facts of this case, however, I disagree with the 
Court's determination that the Court of Appeals' denial of 
the attorney general's motion to intervene constituted an 
abuse of discretion. The Court reaches that result only by 
giving short shrift to a critical and unusual aspect of this 
case: The attorney general's motion to intervene was based 
on arguments he had eschewed below and was fled only 
after judgments had been rendered by both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The attorney general's 
change in position alone requires affrmance. 
The Court correctly observes that “[r]esolution of a motion 
for permissive intervention is committed to the discretion of 
the court before which intervention is sought.” Ante, at 
278–279 (citing Automobile Workers v. Scofeld, 382 U. S. 
205, 217, n. 10 (1965); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b)(1)(a)). The 
Court may reverse, in other words, only if it determines that 
the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by denying the 
attorney general's motion for intervention. See generally 
NAACP, 413 U. S., at 366. 
The attorney general sought to intervene in the Court of 
Appeals “to ensure that [the State's] interests with respect 
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Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 297 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
to H. B. 454” were “fully defended.” ECF in No. 19–5516 
(CA6, June 11, 2020), Doc. 56, pp. 5, 8; see id., at 13 (noting 
that there is “no doubt” that Kentucky, “through Attorney 
General Cameron,” has a suffcient legal interest in the mat-
ter). In the District Court, however, the attorney general 
took a different view. There, he represented that he had no 
interest in the case because “H. B. 454 does not confer upon 
the Attorney General the authority or duty to enforce the 
provisions as enacted,” and insisted that the law “does not 
provide the Attorney General with any regulatory responsi-
bility or other authority to take any action related to the 
Act.” ECF Doc. 42, at 1. Based on this representation, re-
spondents entered into a stipulation agreement with the at-
torney general, and the District Court entered its dismissal 
order. 
As a general matter, “ `where a party assumes a certain 
position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining 
that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his in-
terests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially 
if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in 
the position formerly taken by him.' ” New Hampshire v. 
Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 
156 U. S. 680, 689 (1895); alteration omitted). This principle 
is not limited to private litigants. Courts and other parties 
are also “entitled to rely on [a] State's plausible interpreta-
tion of the law it is charged with enforcing.” Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 563 (2011). A state offcial's late-
breaking effort to change his theory of state law comes with 
costs to judicial effciency and fnality, and it disrupts the 
expectations not only of the adversarial litigant but of other 
parties who may have litigated based on their understanding 
of both the State's position and who would represent the 
State's interests.
2 
2 In the majority's view, the attorney general should not be held to his 
earlier representation because, although he secured his own dismissal in 
his offcial capacity and now seeks to intervene in his offcial capacity, his 
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298 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
The Court's failure to acknowledge the attorney general's 
switch in position leads it to an erroneous result. The Court 
primarily faults the Court of Appeals for “fail[ing] to account 
for the strength of the Kentucky attorney general's interest 
in taking up the defense of HB 454.” Ante, at 279. All 
agree that States and their authorized offcials have substan-
tial sovereign interests in defending their laws. The Offce 
of the Attorney General, however, previously represented 
that it had no interest in these proceedings. Had the attor-
ney general been a private litigant, that decision would have 
been binding: This Court regularly “has . . . refused to con-
sider a party's argument that contradicted a joint `stipulation 
[entered] at the outset of th[e] litigation.' ” Christian Legal 
Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U. S. 661, 677 (2010) (quoting Board of Regents 
of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 226 
(2000); alterations in original). Respect for state sover-
eignty does not entitle a state offcial to evade these well-
established consequences. Given the attorney general's 
change in position and the deferential standard of review, the 
Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion by denying his 
motion for intervention. 
Further, as the Court acknowledges, Kentucky law pro-
vides that the attorney general and other authorized state 
offcials, including the secretary, “shar[e] . . . authority” to 
defend the constitutionality of state laws, or to decline to do 
so. Ante, at 278; see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12.210(1) (West 
2021). The Court makes much of the attorney general's role 
theory of his role in the litigation is different. See ante , at 279, 
n. 5. The Court cites no authority for this “two hats theory,” Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 29, because it cannot. This Court's precedents recognize, of course, 
the distinction between litigating in one's personal capacity and one's off-
cial capacity. See, e. g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 
U. S. 534, 543–544 (1986). But the Court has never held that a state off-
cial can wear separate “hats” within his offcial capacity for distinct pur-
poses, with different legal effect. 
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Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 299 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
in defending Kentucky law, but gives short shrift to the man-
ner in which Kentucky has structured its law to allow other 
state offcers to represent the State's interests in court. 
When the attorney general stipulated to dismissal from the 
case, he acquiesced to the secretary's right under state law 
to represent Kentucky's interests in the manner that the sec-
retary saw ft. 
Notably, the Court's decision to allow intervention on ap-
peal is without precedent. Before the Court of Appeals, the 
attorney general was able to identify only two instances, 
both from the Ninth Circuit, in which a federal court of ap-
peals granted a post-decision motion to intervene, a fact that 
“points decisively against intervention” and hardly suggests 
that denial of intervention would be an abuse of discretion. 
831 Fed. Appx., at 750. Neither of those two cases involved 
a situation in which the intervenor on behalf of the State 
was a party to the case earlier in the proceedings, let alone 
one in which the intervenor had previously disclaimed his 
theory of intervention to obtain dismissal from the suit. See 
Day v. Apoliona, 505 F. 3d 963, 965–966 (CA9 2007); Peruta 
v. County of San Diego , 824 F. 3d 919, 941 (CA9 2016) (en 
banc). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has denied intervention on 
facts similar to these. In Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F. 2d 727 
(1991), the court considered a state attorney general's motion 
to intervene on appeal to defend the constitutionality of a 
state law where the attorney general had previously “argued 
for and won a dismissal of the suit against him in the district 
court.” Id., at 729. There, as here, the attorney general 
sought to intervene after the only remaining state defendant 
in the case declined to pursue the case further. Id., at 730. 
The court nonetheless held that “having argued in the dis-
trict court that he should not be a party, the Attorney Gen-
eral is estopped from now arguing that he should be.” Id., 
at 738. Other Courts of Appeals have similarly held that 
stipulations entered into by a public offcial in his offcial ca-
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Page Proof Pending Publication
300 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL 
CENTER, P. S. C. 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
pacity are binding on the offcial's successors. Morales Feli-
ciano v. Rullan, 303 F. 3d 1, 8 (CA1 2002); Vann v. United 
States Dept. of Interior , 701 F. 3d 927, 929 (CADC 2012); 
see generally 11A A. Miller, M. Kane, & C. Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2956 (3d ed. 2021). 
Perhaps the Court means to excuse the attorney general 
from his prior stipulation because of the intervening election. 
That election undoubtedly explains, as a practical matter, the 
attorney general's change in position. But the Court's rea-
soning would seem to apply equally if Attorney General 
Cameron had held offce since the outset of this lawsuit, 
made a calculated decision to stipulate to dismissal and let 
another state offcer take the lead, and later sought to 
reenter when that offcer decided not to pursue further 
appeals. 
Moreover, this is not the frst time a governmental offce 
has changed hands in the middle of a protracted lawsuit, and 
it certainly will not be the last. Elections have conse-
quences not just for the public but also for state offcers who 
may fnd themselves bound by strategic litigation choices 
made by their predecessors in offce. Shifts in the political 
winds do not support a special carveout to longstanding prin-
ciples of estoppel. Rules that protect reliance and fnality 
exist for good reason: Courts, litigants, and the public must 
be able to trust representations made in court. If anything, 
that reliance is only heightened when a government offcial 
represented that he had no interest in defending state law. 
* * * 
The question in this case is not whether a state attorney 
general may intervene, after a federal court of appeals al-
ready has rendered its judgment, for the purpose of defend-
ing a state law where no other state actor will do so. At 
issue is a more specifc question: whether the Court of Ap-
peals acted within its discretion by denying this attorney 
general leave to intervene when his offce previously stipu-

Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 301 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
lated to dismissal on grounds that contradicted his argument 
for intervention. Under these circumstances, I would not 
disturb the “sound discretion” of the court below. NAACP, 
413 U. S., at 366. I respectfully dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 267, line 17, “David” is changed to “Daniel”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 595 U. S. Part 2 Pages 267–301 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT March 3, 2022 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  challenging the Sixth Circuit panel's decision. Two days later, the at- torney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the secretary and to intervene as a party on the Commonwealth's behalf. The secretary did not oppose that motion, but respondents did. The attorney general also fled a petition for rehearing en b…

• #3

  (2) This Court refuses to adopt what would essentially be a categor- ical claims-processing rule barring consideration of the attorney gener- al's motion. When a non-party enters into an agreement to be bound by a judgment in accordance with the agreement's terms, it is hard to see why the non-party should be prec…

• #4

  ing that States have a fair opportunity to defend their laws in federal court has been recognized by Congress. See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1). These provisions—even if not directly applica- ble in this case because the secretary remained a party—refect the weighty interest that a State ha…

• #5

  Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 283. Kagan, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 288. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting o…

• #6

  been defending the law decided not to seek any further re- view, but the Kentucky attorney general then moved to in- tervene for the purpose of taking up the defense. The panel denied that motion, but we granted review. I In April 2018, the Kentucky Legislature adopted House Bill 454 (HB 454), which regulates th…

• #7

  that HB 454 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's right to an abortion, EMW Women's Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Meier, 373 F. Supp. 3d 807 (WD Ky. 2019), and it issued a permanent injunction against the law's enforcement. The secretary then fled a notice of appeal. App. 19. While the appeal was pending, Kentucky h…

• #8

  attorney general's motion to intervene, citing Circuit prece- dent under which intervention on appeal is judged by essen- tially the same standard as intervention in district court. See Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F. 3d 278, 283 (CA6 2011). Applying that standard, the panel majority held, frst, that the attorney g…

• #9

  notice of appeal within the time prescribed by law. See 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1). These time limits are jurisdictional, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209 (2007); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, …

• #10

  argument in the Court of Appeals. Even if that argument had been preserved, we would not fnd it persuasive. Assuming for the sake of argument that parties bound by a judgment are generally permitted to appeal that judgment, we do not think it follows that a party may do so regardless of the ground on which the pa…

• #11

  Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 277 Opinion of the Court mated Transit Union Int'l, AFL–CIO v. Donovan, 771 F. 2d 1551, 1553, n. 3 (CADC 1985). Without any rule that gov- erns appellate intervention, we have looked elsewhere for guidance. Thus we have considered the “policies underly…

• #12

  § 15.020; see also Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S. W. 2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1974) (“There is no question as to the right of the Attorney General to appear and be heard in a suit brought by someone else in which the constitutionality of a statute is involved”). Indeed, it is the attorney general who is d…

• #13

  ing up the defense of HB 454 when the secretary for Health and Family Services elected to acquiesce. 5 B The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors that bear on all applications for appellate intervention. The panel found that the attorney general's motion was not timely because it came after y…

• #14

  to come in here and seek any relief from this Court in any way” during “fve years” of litigation. Id., at 390. We held, however, that the motion was timely because it was fled soon after the movant learned that the class representatives would not appeal. The same logic applies here. The attorney general sought t…

• #15

  other things, that intervention had “ the potential for seriously disrupting” the approaching elections. Id., at 368–369. The situation here is starkly different. As discussed, the attorney general's motion was timely, and intervention would not have produced anything like the disruption that the Court cited in …

• #16

  was appointed by the Governor, would not pursue “extraor- dinary forms of relief if they prevailed in their appeal.” Ibid. The loss of this sort of claimed expectation does not amount to unfair prejudice in the sense relevant here. Re- spondents may have hoped that the new Governor would appoint a secretary who …

• #17

  court judgment be pursued by fling a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the judgment. See also 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a). We have described this requirement as “jurisdic- tional.” See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 147 (2012). We hav…

• #18

  Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 935 (quoting 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1321, p. 388 (3d ed. 2004)). But they can be instructive, given that “ `[t]he desig- nation of persons as parties is usually made in the caption of the summons or complaint.' ” Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 Page Proof …

• #19

  Page Proof Pending Publication 286 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. Thomas, J., concurring vague, functionalist inquiry that determined “party” status “based on context.” Ibid. Applying that test, Devlin held that “nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being boun…

• #20

  mously reiterated the principle that “[a] `party' to litigation is `[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought.' ” 556 U. S., at 933 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004)). Relying on Devlin's reasoning, the petitioner there argued that the United States must be a “party” within the meaning of Ru…

• #21

  I agree with the Court that the Sixth Circuit should have allowed the attorney general to intervene in this suit after another state offcial ceased defending the challenged Ken- tucky law. And my reasons for reaching that conclusion partly overlap with the Court's. But I would differently frame and respond to the…

• #22

  The argument EMW makes—and it is a serious one—rests on the idea that litigants should not be allowed to use inter- vention procedures to end-run jurisdictional rules. Con- sider a hypothetical to illustrate the problem. Suppose a party (or a non-party having a right to appeal) misses the 30-day deadline to fle a…

• #23

  general had no reason to take that step: The secretary was handling the appeal, just as he had handled the trial court proceedings. It was only once the Sixth Circuit ruled and the secretary ceased defending the law—choosing not to seek en banc or Supreme Court review—that the (now new) attorney general had an ur…

• #24

  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24. Most fundamentally, the attorney general had a strong reason for intervening. Once again, the secretary had de- fended the challenged law as constitutional until the Sixth Circuit ruled; but he then decided to abandon the argument. If the attorney general could not assume the defense, and…

• #25

  have allowed the attorney general to step into the litigation to defend the challenged law. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting. In every case, there must be a “point of time when litiga- tion shall be at an end.” Browder v. Director, Dept. of Cor- rections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978) (internal quotation marks …

• #26

  1 The other two defendants were the executive director of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure and the Commonwealth's Attorney for the 30th Judicial Circuit of Kentucky. Page Proof Pending Publication 294 CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. Sotomayor, J., dissenting named in his offcial capacity…

• #27

  Cite as: 595 U. S. 267 (2022) 295 Sotomayor, J., dissenting After the secretary's appeal was fully briefed, but before argument, then-Attorney General Beshear was elected Gov- ernor and Daniel Cameron, a Republican, was elected as Kentucky's new attorney general. Four of the secretary's lawyers moved to withdraw…

• #28

  peals clarifed that it was “not reach[ing] the issue of whether Attorney General Cameron has a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of this case” nor “question[ing] whether states' attorneys general may appropriately inter- vene to defend their states' laws,” but merely addressing the appropriateness …

• #29

  provide the Attorney General with any regulatory responsi- bility or other authority to take any action related to the Act.” ECF Doc. 42, at 1. Based on this representation, re- spondents entered into a stipulation agreement with the at- torney general, and the District Court entered its dismissal order. As a ge…

• #30

  [entered] at the outset of th[e] litigation.' ” Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 561 U. S. 661, 677 (2010) (quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 226 (2000); alterations in original). Respect for state sover- eignty does n…

• #31

  a situation in which the intervenor on behalf of the State was a party to the case earlier in the proceedings, let alone one in which the intervenor had previously disclaimed his theory of intervention to obtain dismissal from the suit. See Day v. Apoliona, 505 F. 3d 963, 965–966 (CA9 2007); Peruta v. County of S…

• #32

  may fnd themselves bound by strategic litigation choices made by their predecessors in offce. Shifts in the political winds do not support a special carveout to longstanding prin- ciples of estoppel. Rules that protect reliance and fnality exist for good reason: Courts, litigants, and the public must be able to t…