Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

Summary

In a suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 107–117 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
April 21, 2022 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2021 107 
Syllabus 
CASSIRER et al. v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA 
COLLECTION FOUNDATION 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the ninth circuit 
No. 20–1566. Argued January 18, 2022—Decided April 21, 2022 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. § 1602 
et seq., governs whether a foreign state or instrumentality is amenable 
to suit in an American court. The question in this case is what choice-
of-law rule a court should use to determine the applicable substantive 
law in an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims. That issue arises in a 
dispute concerning the ownership of an Impressionist painting: Camille 
Pissarro's Rue Saint-Honoré in the Afternoon, Effect of Rain. Lilly 
Cassirer inherited the painting, which a family member had purchased 
from Pissarro's agent in 1900. After the Nazis came to power in Ger-
many, Lilly surrendered Rue Saint-Honoré to them to obtain an exit 
visa. Lilly and her grandson, Claude, eventually ended up in the 
United States. The family's post-war search for Rue Saint-Honoré was 
unsuccessful. In the early 1990s, the painting was purchased by the 
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, an entity created and con-
trolled by the Kingdom of Spain. Claude learned several years later 
that Rue Saint-Honoré was listed in a catalogue of the Foundation's 
museum. 
Claude sued the Foundation, asserting various property-law claims 
based on the allegation that he owned Rue Saint-Honoré and was enti-
tled to its return. Because the Foundation is an “instrumentality” of 
the Kingdom of Spain, the complaint invoked the FSIA to establish the 
court's jurisdiction. See § 1603(b). The FSIA provides foreign states 
and their instrumentalities with immunity from suit unless the claim 
falls within a specifed exception. See §§ 1605–1607. The courts below 
held that the Nazi confscation of Rue Saint-Honoré brought Claude's 
suit against the Foundation within the FSIA exception for expropriated 
property. See § 1605(a)(3). That meant the Cassirer family's suit could 
go forward. To determine what property law governed the dispute, 
the courts below had to apply a choice-of-law rule. The Cassirer plain-
tiffs urged the use of California's choice-of-law rule; the Foundation ad-
vocated a rule based in federal common law. The courts below picked 
the federal option. That option, they then held, commanded use of the 
property law of Spain, not California. Applying Spanish law, the courts 
determined that the Foundation was the rightful owner. This Court

108 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION 
FOUNDATION 
Syllabus 
granted certiorari to resolve a confict among the Courts of Appeals as 
to what choice-of-law rule a court should apply in an FSIA case raising 
non-federal claims. 
Held: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state 
or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by 
using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a 
private party. Here, that means applying the forum State's choice-of-
law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. 
The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immunity 
from civil actions unless a statutory exception applies (including the 
expropriation exception found to apply here). See §§ 1604–1607. Yet 
the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law determin-
ing the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed amenable 
to suit. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior 
de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620. To the contrary, Section 1606 of the stat-
ute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a for-
eign state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign 
state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as 
a private individual under like circumstances.” When a foreign 
state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liabil-
ity (the same substantive law) as a private party. See id., at 622, 
n. 11. 
Section 1606 dictates the selection of a choice-of-law rule: It must 
mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private par-
ties. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same 
substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability. Consider two 
suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-state-
controlled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If 
the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substan-
tive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits' 
outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be 
“liable to the same manner and to the same extent.” 
In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California's choice-of-law 
rule—because that is the rule a court would use in comparable private 
litigation. Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a private mu-
seum, brought as this case was in California and asserting non-federal 
claims. If the private suit were fled in state court, California's choice-
of-law rule would govern. And if the private suit were fled in federal 
court, the same would be true, because a federal court sitting in diver-
sity borrows the forum State's choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co . v. 
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co ., 313 U. S. 487, 496. If California's choice-of-law 
rule applies in the private-museum suit, it must also apply in the suit 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 107 (2022) 109 
Opinion of the Court 
here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to ensure—as Sec-
tion 1606 demands—that the Foundation, although a Spanish instrumen-
tality, will be liable in the same way as a private party. 
Even absent the clarity of Section 1606, the Court would likely reach 
the same result. Scant justifcation exists for federal common lawmak-
ing in this context. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace 
state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal inter-
ests.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 
640. While foreign relations is an interest of that kind, here even the 
Federal Government disclaims any necessity for a federal choice-of-law 
rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims. Pp. 113–117. 
824 Fed. Appx. 452, vacated and remanded. 
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
David Boies argued the cause for petitioners. With him 
on the briefs were David A. Barrett, Stephen N. Zack, An-
drew S. Brenner, Scott E. Gant, Samuel J. Dubbin, and 
Laura W. Brill. 
Masha G. Hansford argued the cause for the United States 
as amicus curiae supporting petitioners. With her on the 
brief were Acting Solicitor General Fletcher, Acting Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General 
Kneedler, Sharon Swingle, and Lewis S. Yelin. 
Thaddeus J. Stauber argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the brief was Sarah Erickson André.* 
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA), 28 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq., a foreign state or instru-
*Charles J. Cooper and P . Davis Cooper fled a brief for Professors of 
Law as amici curiae urging reversal. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for B'nai B'rith International et al. by 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney and Jennifer A. Kreder; for Comunidad Judía 
de Madrid et al. by Bernardo M. Cremades Román and Patrick T. Byrne; 
and for The 1939 Society et al. by Benjamin G. Shatz, Stanley A. Gold-
man, and Stanley W. Levy. 
Nicholas M. O'Donnell and Mark B. Feldman fled a brief for Mr. Feld-
man, pro se, as amicus curiae urging vacatur. 
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110 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION 
FOUNDATION 
Opinion of the Court 
mentality is amenable in specifed circumstances to suit in 
an American court. In this case, the plaintiffs brought such 
a suit to recover expropriated property. The question pre-
sented is what choice-of-law rule the court should use to 
determine the applicable substantive law. The answer is: 
whatever choice-of-law rule the court would use if the de-
fendant were not a foreign-state actor, but instead a private 
party. Here, that means applying the forum State's choice-
of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. 
I 
Although the legal issue before us is prosaic, the case's 
subject matter and background are anything but. At issue 
is the ownership of an Impressionist painting depicting a 
Paris streetscape: Camille Pissarro's Rue Saint-Honoré in 
the Afternoon, Effect of Rain (shown in this opinion's appen-
dix). Pissarro's agent sold the painting in 1900 to Paul Cas-
sirer, a member of a prominent German Jewish family own-
ing an art gallery and publishing house. Some quarter 
century later, Lilly Cassirer inherited the painting and dis-
played it in her Berlin home (as also pictured in the appen-
dix). But in 1933, the Nazis came to power. After years of 
intensifying persecution of German Jews, Lilly decided in 
1939 that she had to do anything necessary to escape the 
country. To obtain an exit visa to England, where her 
grandson Claude Cassirer had already relocated, she surren-
dered the painting to the Nazis. The underlying question 
in this case—which this opinion will not resolve—is whether 
the Cassirer family can get the painting back. 
The post-war search for Rue Saint-Honoré was a long one. 
Lilly and Claude, who both eventually ended up in the 
United States, had no success tracking down the painting. 
After being legally declared the rightful owner, Lilly agreed 
in 1958 to accept compensation from the German Federal Re-
public—about $250,000 in today's dollars. (The painting is 
now thought to be worth tens of millions.) In fact, Rue 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 107 (2022) 111 
Opinion of the Court 
Saint-Honoré was nearby: Like the Cassirers, the painting 
had also arrived in the United States after the war, and sat 
in a private collection in St. Louis from 1952 to 1976. In 
that year, the Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza (de-
scended from the founder of a German steel empire) pur-
chased the painting and brought it back to Europe. Rue 
Saint-Honoré hung at his residence in Switzerland until the 
early 1990s. At that time, the Baron sold much of his art 
collection, including Rue Saint-Honoré, to an entity the 
Kingdom of Spain created and controlled, called the Thyssen-
Bornemisza Collection Foundation. In addition to fnancing 
the $300 million-plus purchase, the Spanish Government pro-
vided the Foundation with a palace in Madrid to serve as a 
museum for the collection. The museum, as museums do, 
published a catalogue of its holdings. An acquaintance of 
Claude's saw the catalogue and made the connection, telling 
him in 1999 where Rue Saint-Honoré was now located. 
(Lilly had by then long since died, with Claude as her sole 
heir.) 
After informal efforts to recover the painting failed, 
Claude sued the Foundation in federal court in the Central 
District of California, near where he then lived. His com-
plaint asserted various property-law claims, all alleging that 
he owned Rue Saint-Honoré and was entitled to its return. 
And because the Foundation is an “instrumentality” of the 
Kingdom of Spain, the complaint invoked the FSIA to estab-
lish the court's jurisdiction. See § 1603(b) (describing an in-
strumentality as a legally separate but state-controlled en-
tity). The FSIA governs whether a foreign state or 
instrumentality is amenable to suit in an American court. 
It provides the sovereign actor with immunity unless the 
claim against it falls within a specifed exception. See 
§§ 1605–1607. The complaint here asserted that the stat-
ute's expropriation exception applied. That exception re-
moves immunity for cases involving “rights in property 
taken in violation of international law.” § 1605(a)(3). At a 
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112 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION 
FOUNDATION 
Opinion of the Court 
prior stage of this litigation, the courts below held that the 
Nazi confscation of Rue Saint-Honoré brought Claude's suit 
against the Foundation within the expropriation exception. 
See 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1176–1177 (CD Cal. 2006), aff'd, 616 
F. 3d 1019, 1037 (CA9 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 564 U. S. 
1037 (2011). That determination, which is no longer at issue, 
meant that the suit could go forward. (Claude, though, 
would not live to see anything further; he passed away in 
2010, and his heirs became the plaintiffs.) 
1 
But go forward pursuant to what law? The courts had 
to decide whose property law (Spain's? California's?) should 
govern the suit, and thus determine the painting's rightful 
owner. Resolving that question required application of a 
choice-of-law rule—a means of selecting which jurisdiction's 
law governs the determination of liability. Yet there an-
other issue lurked. For the parties contested which choice-
of-law rule should apply—serving up, so to speak, a choice 
of choice-of-law principles. The Cassirer plaintiffs urged 
the use of California's choice-of-law rule; the defendant Foun-
dation advocated a rule based in federal common law. The 
courts below, relying on a minimally reasoned Ninth Circuit 
precedent, picked the federal option. See 153 F. Supp. 3d 
1148, 1154 (CD Cal. 2015), aff'd, 862 F. 3d 951, 961 (CA9 2017), 
cert. denied, 584 U. S. ––– (2018). That federal choice-of-law 
rule, they further held, commanded the use of Spanish (not 
Californian) property law to resolve the ownership issue. 
See 153 F. Supp. 3d, at 1155, aff'd, 862 F. 3d, at 963. Finally, 
the courts below determined after a trial that under Spanish 
law the Foundation was the rightful owner, because it pur-
chased Rue Saint-Honoré without knowing the painting was 
stolen and had held it long enough to gain title through pos-
session. See No. 05–cv–03459 (CD Cal., Apr. 30, 2019), ECF 
1 Claude's children, David and Ava Cassirer, along with the Jewish Fed-
eration of San Diego County, succeeded to his claims. Some years later, 
Ava also died; her estate is now a substitute plaintiff. 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 107 (2022) 113 
Opinion of the Court 
Doc. 621, pp. 26–30, aff'd, 824 Fed. Appx. 452, 454–455 
(CA9 2020). 
The Cassirers sought our review, limited to a single issue: 
whether a court in an FSIA case raising non-federal claims 
(relating to property, torts, contracts, and so forth) should 
apply the forum State's choice-of-law rule, or instead use a 
federal one. We granted certiorari, 594 U. S. ––– (2021), be-
cause that question has generated a split in the Courts of 
Appeals. The Ninth Circuit stands alone in using a federal 
choice-of-law rule to pick the applicable substantive law. All 
other Courts of Appeals to have addressed the issue apply 
the choice-of-law rule of the forum State.
2 We agree with 
that more common approach, and now vacate the judgment 
below. 
II 
The FSIA, as indicated above, creates a uniform body of 
federal law to govern the amenability of foreign states and 
their instrumentalities to suit in the United States. See 
supra, at 111. The statute frst lays down a baseline princi-
ple of foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions. See 
§ 1604. It then lists a series of exceptions from that princi-
ple (including the expropriation exception found to apply 
here). See §§ 1605–1607; supra, at 111. The result is to 
spell out, as a matter of federal law, the suits against foreign 
sovereigns that American courts do, and do not, have power 
to decide. 
Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substan-
tive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instru-
mentality” deemed amenable to suit. First Nat. City Bank 
v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 
2 See Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civ. Aviation of People's Republic 
of China, 923 F. 2d 957, 959–961 (CA2 1991); Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems, Inc. v. Ministry of Defense of Republic of Venezuela, 575 F. 3d 
491, 498 (CA5 2009); O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F. 3d 361, 381, n. 8 (CA6), 
cert. denied, 558 U. S. 819 (2009); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 
F. 3d 835, 841 (CADC 2009). 
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114 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION 
FOUNDATION 
Opinion of the Court 
620 (1983). To the contrary, Section 1606 of the statute 
provides: 
“As to any claim for relief with respect to which a 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity under [the 
FSIA], the foreign state shall be liable in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances.” 
So when a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject 
to the same rules of liability as a private party. Which is 
just to say that the substantive law applying to the latter 
also applies to the former. See First Nat. City Bank, 462 
U. S., at 622, n. 11. As one court put the point, Section 1606 
directs a “pass-through” to the substantive law that would 
govern a similar suit between private individuals. Oveissi 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F. 3d 835, 841 (CADC 2009). 
The provision thus ensures that a foreign state, if found ineli-
gible for immunity, must answer for its conduct just as any 
other actor would. 
And in so doing, Section 1606 also dictates the selection of 
a choice-of-law rule: It, too, must mirror the rule that would 
apply in a similar suit between private parties. For only 
the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same 
substantive law—and thus (see above) guarantee the same 
liability. See Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civ. Aviation 
of People's Republic of China, 923 F. 2d 957, 959–960 (CA2 
1991) (“[T]he same choice of law analysis” is needed to 
“apply[ ] identical substantive laws,” and so to “ensure iden-
tity of liability” between a foreign state and a private indi-
vidual). Consider two suits seeking recovery of a paint-
ing—one suit against a foreign-state-controlled museum (as 
here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-
law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive 
law in fact chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so 
might the suits' outcomes. In one case, say, the plaintiff 
would recover the art, and in the other not. Contrary to 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 107 (2022) 115 
Opinion of the Court 
Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable in the 
same manner and to the same extent.” 
In this case, then, Section 1606 requires the use of Califor-
nia's choice-of-law rule—because that is the rule a court 
would use in comparable private litigation. Consider the 
just-hypothesized suit against a private museum for return 
of a piece of art, brought as this case was in California. The 
claims asserted (again, as in this case) turn only on state or 
foreign property law, with no substantive federal component. 
If the private suit were fled in state court, California's 
choice-of-law rule would of course govern. And if the pri-
vate suit were fled in federal court, under diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction, the same would be true. According 
to long-settled precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity 
borrows the forum State's choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon 
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496 (1941). So 
the private-museum suit would begin with the application 
of California's choice-of-law rule, to decide on the governing 
substantive law. And if that choice-of-law rule applies in 
the private-museum suit, so too it must apply in the suit 
here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to en-
sure—as Section 1606 demands—that the Foundation, al-
though a Spanish instrumentality, will be liable in the same 
way as a private party. 
In choosing instead to apply a federal choice-of-law rule, 
the courts below could well have created a mismatch be-
tween the Foundation's liability and a private defendant's. 
As described earlier, those courts found that the federal rule 
commanded the use of Spanish property law to determine 
Rue Saint-Honoré 's rightful owner. See supra , at 112. 
Spanish law (as the courts below understood it) made every-
thing depend on whether, at the time of acquisition, the 
Foundation knew the painting was stolen: If the Foundation 
did not know—as the courts in fact found—then it owned the 
painting by virtue of possession. See ECF Doc. 621, at 26– 
30, aff'd, 824 Fed. Appx., at 454–455. But now consider the 
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116 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION 
FOUNDATION 
Opinion of the Court 
possible result if the courts below had instead applied Cali-
fornia's choice-of-law rule, as they would have done in a pri-
vate suit. The Cassirer plaintiffs contend that the Califor-
nia rule would lead to the application of California property 
law. See Brief for Petitioners 13. And they argue that 
under California property law, even a good-faith purchaser 
of stolen property cannot prevail against the rightful pre-
theft owner. See ibid. We do not today decide those ques-
tions; they remain in the hands of the lower courts. But if 
the Cassirers are right, the use of a federal choice-of-law rule 
in the courts below stopped Section 1606 from working: That 
rule led to the Foundation keeping the painting when a pri-
vate museum would have had to give it back. 
And even were Section 1606 not so clear, we would likely 
reach the same result, because we see scant justifcation for 
federal common lawmaking in this context. Judicial cre-
ation of federal common law to displace state-created rules 
must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” 
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 
630, 640 (1981). Foreign relations is of course an interest of 
that kind. But even the Federal Government, participating 
here in support of the Cassirers' position, disclaims any ne-
cessity for a federal choice-of-law rule in FSIA suits raising 
non-federal claims. See Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 9, 20–23. As the Government notes, such FSIA 
suits arise only when a foreign state has lost its broad immu-
nity and become subject to standard-fare legal claims involv-
ing property, contract, or the like. See id., at 9. No one 
would think federal law displaces the substantive rule of de-
cision in those suits; and we see no greater warrant for fed-
eral law to supplant the otherwise applicable choice-of-law 
rule. See id., at 21 (State choice-of-law rules do not “ordi-
narily pose a greater threat to foreign relations than” state-
law principles determining “the rights and liabilities of the 
parties”). Courts outside the Ninth Circuit have long ap-
plied state choice-of-law rules in FSIA suits. See supra, at 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 107 (2022) 117 
Opinion of the Court 
113, and n. 2. Yet the Government says it knows of no case 
in which that practice has created foreign relations concerns. 
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20–21. 3 So the Ninth Circuit's use of a 
federal choice-of-law rule in FSIA cases has been a solution 
in search of a problem, rejecting without any reason the 
usual role of state law. 
* * * 
The path of our decision has been as short as the hunt for 
Rue Saint-Honoré was long; our ruling is as simple as the 
confict over its rightful owner has been vexed. A foreign 
state or instrumentality in an FSIA suit is liable just as a 
private party would be. See § 1606. That means the stand-
ard choice-of-law rule must apply. In a property-law dis-
pute like this one, that standard rule is the forum State's 
(here, California's)—not any deriving from federal common 
law. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
3 Were such an unusual case to occur, the Government states that it 
would be “best addressed by applying limits on the application of state 
law derived from the Constitution, applicable treaties or statutes, interna-
tional comity, the Act of State doctrine, or other sources refecting dis-
tinctly federal interests—rather than displacing state choice-of-law rules 
across the board.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21; see Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 20–23, 25–26. We express no view on whether or when im-
posing such limits on state law would be proper.

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Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
None

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 596 U. S. Part 1 Pages 107–117 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT April 21, 2022 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to not…

• #2

  suit against the Foundation within the FSIA exception for expropriated property. See § 1605(a)(3). That meant the Cassirer family's suit could go forward. To determine what property law governed the dispute, the courts below had to apply a choice-of-law rule. The Cassirer plain- tiffs urged the use of California's…

• #3

  controlled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substan- tive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits' outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable to the same manner and to t…

• #4

  Thaddeus J. Stauber argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Sarah Erickson André.* Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq., a foreign state or instru- *Charles J. Cooper and P . Davis Cooper fled a b…

• #5

  the Cassirer family can get the painting back. The post-war search for Rue Saint-Honoré was a long one. Lilly and Claude, who both eventually ended up in the United States, had no success tracking down the painting. After being legally declared the rightful owner, Lilly agreed in 1958 to accept compensation from …

• #6

  ute's expropriation exception applied. That exception re- moves immunity for cases involving “rights in property taken in violation of international law.” § 1605(a)(3). At a Page Proof Pending Publication 112 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION FOUNDATION Opinion of the Court prior stage of this litigatio…

• #7

  Opinion of the Court Doc. 621, pp. 26–30, aff'd, 824 Fed. Appx. 452, 454–455 (CA9 2020). The Cassirers sought our review, limited to a single issue: whether a court in an FSIA case raising non-federal claims (relating to property, torts, contracts, and so forth) should apply the forum State's choice-of-law rule,…

• #8

  So when a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liability as a private party. Which is just to say that the substantive law applying to the latter also applies to the former. See First Nat. City Bank, 462 U. S., at 622, n. 11. As one court put the point, Section 1606 directs a …

• #9

  citizenship jurisdiction, the same would be true. According to long-settled precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity borrows the forum State's choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496 (1941). So the private-museum suit would begin with the application of California's…

• #10

  ation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981). Foreign relations is of course an interest of that kind. But even the Federal Government, participating here in supp…

• #11

  would be “best addressed by applying limits on the application of state law derived from the Constitution, applicable treaties or statutes, interna- tional comity, the Act of State doctrine, or other sources refecting dis- tinctly federal interests—rather than displacing state choice-of-law rules across the board.…