Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz

Summary

Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002—which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign—unconstitutionally burdens core political speech.

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PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 289–327 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 16, 2022 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2021 289 
Syllabus 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. TED CRUZ 
FOR SENATE et al. 
appeal from the united states district court for the 
district of columbia 
No. 21–12. Argued January 19, 2022—Decided May 16, 2022 
During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign and consistent with federal 
law, see 11 CFR § 110.10; 52 U. S. C. § 30101(9)(A)(i), appellee Ted Cruz 
loaned $260,000 to his campaign committee, Ted Cruz for Senate (Com-
mittee). To repay these and other campaign debts, campaigns may 
continue to receive contributions after election day. See 11 CFR 
§ 110.1(b)(3)(i). Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (BCRA) restricts the use of post-election contributions by limiting 
the amount that a candidate may be repaid from such funds to $250,000. 
52 U. S. C. § 30116(j). Relevant here, the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) has promulgated regulations establishing three rules to imple-
ment that limitation: First, a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in 
candidate loans using contributions made “at any time.” 11 CFR 
§ 116.12(a). Second, to the extent the loans exceed $250,000, a campaign 
may use pre-election funds to repay the portion exceeding $250,000 only 
if the repayment occurs “within 20 days of the election.” § 116.11(c)(1). 
Third, when the 20-day post-election deadline expires, the campaign 
must treat any portion above $250,000 as a contribution to the campaign, 
precluding later repayment. § 116.11(c)(2). 
The Committee began repaying Cruz's loans after the 20-day post-
election window for repaying amounts over $250,000 had closed. It ac-
cordingly repaid Cruz only $250,000, leaving $10,000 of his personal 
loans unpaid. Cruz and the Committee fled this action in Federal Dis-
trict Court, alleging that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First 
Amendment and raising challenges to the FEC's implementing regula-
tion, § 116.11. The District Court granted Cruz and his Committee 
summary judgment on their constitutional claim, holding that the loan-
repayment limitation burdens political speech without suffcient justif-
cation, and dismissed as moot their challenges to the regulation. 
Held: 
1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement 
of Section 304. Pp. 295–302. 
(a) The Government recognizes that the Committee's present in-
ability to repay the fnal $10,000 of Cruz's loans constitutes an injury in 
fact both to Cruz and his Committee. It maintains, however, that ap-

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pellees lack Article III standing because these injuries are not traceable 
to the threatened enforcement of Section 304, see Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. First, the Government argues that 
appellees knowingly triggered the application of the loan-repayment 
limitation and thus their injuries are traceable to themselves, not the 
Government. This Court has never recognized an exception to Article 
III standing's traceability requirement for injuries that a party pur-
posely incurs. Moreover, this Court has made clear that an injury re-
sulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful 
enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury 
could be described in some sense as willingly incurred. See Evers v. 
Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202, 204 (per curiam ). Cases cited by the Govern-
ment—Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398, and Pennsylvania 
v. New Jersey, 426 U. S. 660 (per curiam )—do not alter that conclusion. 
In contrast to those cases, here the appellees' injuries are directly in-
ficted by the FEC's threatened enforcement of the provisions they now 
challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provi-
sions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will 
face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. Finally, the Govern-
ment's observation that it should not be blamed for appellees' injuries 
because the Committee had a legally available alternative—i. e., re-
paying Cruz's loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days of 
the election—misses the point. Demanding that the Committee do so 
would require it to forgo the exercise of the First Amendment right the 
Court must assume it has when assessing standing—the right to repay 
its campaign debts in full, at any time. Pp. 295–298. 
(b) The Government next argues that although appellees would 
have standing to challenge the FEC's implementing regulation, § 116.11, 
they do not have standing to challenge Section 304 itself. The Govern-
ment contends that the Committee used pre-election funds to repay the 
frst $250,000, and thus Section 304's cap on using post-election funds to 
repay a candidate's loan does not prohibit repayment of the fnal $10,000 
here. Instead, it is the agency's regulation—with its 20-day limit—that 
prevents repayment. Appellees insist that they used post-election 
funds—in the form of overlimit contributions to the 2018 campaign that 
were “redesignated” as contributions to the 2024 campaign—to repay 
Cruz's loans. Ordinarily, it would not matter whether a plaintiff was 
challenging the statute's enforcement or instead the enforcement of a 
regulation. Here, however, the parties assume that the distinction 
makes a difference because the subject-matter jurisdiction of the three-
judge District Court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement 
of the statute. See BCRA § 304(a). Even under the Government's ac-
count, the present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to re-

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cover the fnal $10,000 is traceable to the operation of Section 304 itself. 
An agency's regulation cannot “operate independently of” the statute 
that authorized it. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. –––, –––. Here, the 
FEC's 20-day rule was expressly promulgated to implement Section 304. 
Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and unenforceable, the agency's 20-day 
rule is as well, and the remedy appellees sought in the District Court 
would redress appellees' harm by preventing enforcement of the 
agency's 20-day rule. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561. In challenging 
the FEC's threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation, 
through its implementing regulation, appellees may raise constitutional 
claims against Section 304, the statutory provision that, through the 
agency's regulation, is being enforced. Cf. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. 
–––, ––– – –––. And because they are challenging “the constitutionality 
of [a] provision of [BCRA],” § 403(a), jurisdiction was proper in the 
three-judge District Court. Pp. 298–302. 
2. Section 304 of BCRA burdens core political speech without proper 
justifcation. Pp. 302–313. 
(a) The loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment 
rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on be-
half of their own candidacy through personal loans. Restricting the 
sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans in-
creases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which, in turn, 
deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns. This burden 
is no small matter. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for fnancing electoral 
campaigns, especially for new candidates and challengers. By inhibit-
ing a candidate from using this critical source of campaign funding, Sec-
tion 304 raises a barrier to entry—thus abridging political speech. 
Pp. 302–305. 
(b) The Government has not demonstrated that the loan-repayment 
limitation furthers a permissible goal. Any law that burdens First 
Amendment freedoms, even slightly, must be justifed by a permissible 
interest. Pp. 305–313. 
(i) The only permissible ground for restricting political speech 
recognized by this Court is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption 
or its appearance. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 
U. S. 185, 207. Here, the Government argues that the contributions at 
issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to 
repay a candidate's personal loans. But given that these contributions 
are already capped at $2,900 per election in order to prevent corruption 
or its appearance, the approach of adding an additional layer of regula-
tion is a signifcant indicator that the regulation may not be necessary 
for the interest it seeks to protect. See id, at 221. Because the Gov-
ernment is defending a restriction on speech, it must do more than “sim-

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292 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
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ply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured”; it must instead 
point to “record evidence or legislative fndings” demonstrating the need 
to address a special problem. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 618. “[M]ere con-
jecture” is “[in]adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.” Mc-
Cutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210. Yet the Government is unable to identify 
a single case of quid pro quo corruption in this context, even though 
most States do not impose a limit on the use of post-election contribu-
tions to repay candidate loans. Pp. 305–308. 
(ii) In the absence of direct evidence, the Government turns to a 
scholarly article, a poll, and statements by Members of Congress to show 
that the contributions used to repay candidate loans carry a heightened 
risk of at least the appearance of corruption. All of this evidence, how-
ever, concerns the sort of “corruption,” loosely conceived, that this 
Court has repeatedly explained is not legitimately regulated under the 
First Amendment. Nor is it equivalent to “legislative fndings” that 
demonstrate the need to address a special problem. Pp. 308–311. 
(iii) As a fallback argument, the Government analogizes post-
election contributions used to repay a candidate's loans to gifts because 
they enrich the candidate as opposed to the campaign's treasury. But 
this analogy is meaningful only if the baseline is that the campaign will 
default. The record suggests, however, that winning candidates are 
commonly repaid in full. For these candidates, post-election contribu-
tions bear little resemblance to a gift; they instead restore the candidate 
to the status quo ante. As for losing candidates, the Government does 
not provide any anticorruption rationale to explain why contributions 
to those candidates should be restricted. Finally, the Government ar-
gues for deference to Congress's “legislative judgment” that Section 304 
furthers an anticorruption goal. Given scant evidence of corruption, 
deference to Congress would be especially inappropriate where, as here, 
the legislative act may have been an effort to “insulate[ ] legislators 
from effective electoral challenge.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 404 (Breyer , J., concurring). In the end, it 
remains the role of this Court to decide whether a particular legislative 
choice is constitutional. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U. S. 115, 129. Pp. 311–313. 
542 F. Supp. 3d 1, affrmed. 
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, 
Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., 
fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, 
post, p. 314.

Cite as: 596 U. S. 289 (2022) 293 
Opinion of the Court 
Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for 
appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General 
Prelogar, Vivek Suri, Kevin Deeley, Harry J. Summers, and 
Haven G. Ward. 
Charles J. Cooper argued the cause for appellees. With 
him on the brief were John D. Ohlendorf and Chris Gober.* 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
In order to jumpstart a fedgling campaign or fnish strong 
in a tight race, candidates for federal offce often loan money 
to their campaign committees. A provision of federal law 
regulates the repayment of such loans. Among other 
things, it bars campaigns from using more than $250,000 of 
funds raised after election day to repay a candidate's per-
sonal loans. This limit on the use of post-election funds in-
creases the risk that candidate loans over $250,000 will not 
be repaid in full, inhibiting candidates from making such 
loans in the frst place. The question is whether this restric-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Brennan Cen-
ter for Justice at N. Y . U. School of Law by Claire Rajan and Daniel I. 
Weiner; for the Campaign Legal Center et al. by Paul M. Smith, Tara 
Malloy, Megan P . McAllen, Fred Wertheimer, Stuart C. McPhail, and 
Adam Rappaport; and for the Constitutional Accountability Center by 
Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and David H. Gans. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Institute for 
Free Speech by Donald A. Daugherty, Jr.; for the New Civil Liberties 
Alliance by Richard A. Samp; for Protect the First Foundation by Gene 
C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. 
Smith, and Kathryn E. Tarbert; for the Public Policy Legal Institute by 
Barnaby W. Zall; for the Republican National Committee by Michael E. 
Toner, Brandis L. Zehr, Stephen J. Obermeier, and Andrew G. Woodson; 
for United States Senators Roy Blunt et al. by Scott A. Keller; and for 
United States Senator Mitch McConnell by Donald F. McGahn II, Noel J. 
Francisco, Robert Luther III, Andrew J. M. Bentz, and J. Benjamin 
Aguiñaga. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for Public Citizen by 
Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve. 
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294 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
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tion violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and 
their campaigns to engage in political speech. 
I 
A 
Candidates for federal offce may, consistent with federal 
law, use various sources to fund their campaigns. A candi-
date may spend an unlimited amount of his own money in 
support of his campaign. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 
1, 52–54 (1976) (per curiam ). His campaign—a legal entity 
distinct from the candidate himself—may borrow an unlim-
ited amount from third-party lenders or from the candidate 
himself. See 11 CFR § 110.10 (2017); 52 U. S. C. § 30101(9) 
(A)(i); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 52–54. And campaigns 
may, of course, accept contributions directly from other orga-
nizations or from individuals, subject to monetary limita-
tions. Individual contributions are capped at $2,900 for the 
primary and $2,900 for the general election. See §§ 30116(a), 
(c); 86 Fed. Reg. 7869 (2021). Campaigns may continue to 
receive contributions after election day, so long as those con-
tributions go toward repaying campaign debts. See 11 
CFR § 110.1(b)(3)(i). 
Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 98, 52 U. S. C. § 30116(j), further re-
stricts the use of post-election funds. Under that provision, 
a candidate who loans money to his campaign may not be 
repaid more than $250,000 of such loans from contributions 
made to the campaign after the date of the election. Ibid. 
To implement that limit, the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) has promulgated regulations establishing three rules 
pertinent here: First, a campaign may repay up to $250,000 
in candidate loans using contributions made “at any time 
before, on, or after the date of the election.” 11 CFR 
§ 116.12(a). Second, to the extent the loans exceed $250,000, 
a campaign may use pre-election funds to repay the portion 
exceeding $250,000 only if the repayment occurs “within 20 
days of the election.” § 116.11(c)(1). And third, if more 
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than $250,000 remains unpaid when the 20-day post-election 
deadline expires, the campaign must treat the portion above 
$250,000 as a contribution to the campaign, precluding later 
repayment. § 116.11(c)(2). 
B 
Appellee Ted Cruz represents Texas in the United States 
Senate. This case arises from his 2018 reelection campaign, 
which was, at the time, the most expensive Senate race in 
history. Before election day, Cruz loaned $260,000 to the 
other appellee here, Ted Cruz for Senate (Committee). At 
the end of election day, however, the Committee was in the 
red by approximately $340,000. App. 285. It eventually 
began repaying Cruz's loans, but by that time the 20-day 
post-election window for repaying amounts over $250,000 
had closed. See 11 CFR §§ 116.11(c)(1), (2). The Commit-
tee accordingly repaid Cruz only $250,000, leaving $10,000 of 
his personal loans unpaid. 
Cruz and the Committee fled this action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging 
that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment. 
They also raised challenges to the FEC's implementing regu-
lation, 11 CFR § 116.11. A three-judge panel was convened 
to hear the case. See BCRA § 403(a)(1), 116 Stat. 113; see 
also 28 U. S. C. § 2284. 
The three-judge District Court granted Cruz and his Com-
mittee summary judgment on their constitutional claim, 
holding that the loan-repayment limitation burdens political 
speech without suffcient justifcation. 542 F. Supp. 3d 1 
(2021). The District Court also ordered that appellees' chal-
lenges to the regulation, previously held in abeyance, be dis-
missed as moot. The Government appealed directly to this 
Court, as authorized by 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We postponed 
consideration of our jurisdiction. 594 U. S. ––– (2021). 
II 
The Constitution limits federal courts to deciding “Cases” 
and “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. Among other things,

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that limitation requires a plaintiff to have standing. The 
requisite elements of Article III standing are well estab-
lished: A plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, (3) 
that is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 
(1992). 
As the Government recognizes, the Committee's present 
inability to repay the fnal $10,000 of Cruz's loans constitutes 
an injury in fact both to Cruz and to his Committee. See 
Reply Brief 8. Cruz, of course, suffers a $10,000 pocketbook 
harm. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. 451, 
464 (2017). And the bar on repayment injures the Commit-
tee by preventing it from discharging its obligation to repay 
its debt, which may inhibit that form of fnancing in the fu-
ture. The Government maintains, however, that these inju-
ries are not traceable to the threatened enforcement of Sec-
tion 304, for two reasons: frst, because the inability to repay 
Cruz's loans was “self-inficted,” and second, because it is the 
threatened enforcement of an agency regulation, not the 
statute itself, that causes the harm. We address each argu-
ment in turn. 
A 
First, the Government argues that appellees lack standing 
because their injuries were “self-inficted.” Brief for Appel-
lant 20. Because appellees knowingly triggered the applica-
tion of the loan-repayment limitation, the Government says, 
any resulting injury is in essence traceable to them, not the 
Government. The predicate for this argument is appellees' 
stipulation in the District Court that “the sole and exclusive 
motivation behind Senator Cruz's actions in making the 2018 
loan[s] and the [C]ommittee's actions in waiting to repay 
them was to establish the factual basis for this challenge.” 
App. 325. At bottom, the Government asks us to recognize 
an exception to traceability for injuries that a party pur-
posely incurs.

Cite as: 596 U. S. 289 (2022) 297 
Opinion of the Court 
We have never recognized a rule of this kind under Article 
III. To the contrary, we have made clear that an injury re-
sulting from the application or threatened application of an 
unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such applica-
tion, even if the injury could be described in some sense as 
willingly incurred. See Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202, 204 
(1958) (per curiam ) (that the plaintiff subjected himself to 
discrimination “for the purpose of instituting th[e] litigation” 
did not defeat his standing); Havens Realty Corp. v. Cole-
man, 455 U. S. 363, 374 (1982) (a “tester” plaintiff posing as 
a renter for purposes of housing-discrimination litigation still 
suffered an injury under Article III). 
The cases the Government cites do not alter our conclu-
sion. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398 (2013), 
for example, the plaintiffs attempted to manufacture stand-
ing by voluntarily taking costly and burdensome measures 
that they said were necessary to protect the confdentiality 
of their communications in light of the Government surveil-
lance policy they sought to challenge. Id., at 402. Their 
problem, however, was that they could not show that they 
had been or were likely to be subjected to that policy in 
any event. Id., at 416. Likewise, in Pennsylvania v. New 
Jersey, 426 U. S. 660 (1976) (per curiam ), we held that the 
unilateral decisions by a group of States to reimburse their 
residents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis to 
attack the legality of those taxes. Nothing in the chal-
lenged taxes required the plaintiff States to offer reimburse-
ments; accordingly, the fnancial injury those States suffered 
was due to their own independent response to taxes levied 
on others. Id., at 664. Here, by contrast, the appellees' in-
juries are directly inficted by the FEC's threatened enforce-
ment of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees 
chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not 
change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face 
genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. See 52 
U. S. C. § 30109(a)(5); 11 CFR § 111.24. 
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298 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
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One fnal point bears mentioning. The Government main-
tains that it should not be blamed for appellees' injuries be-
cause it provided the Committee with a legally available “al-
ternative” that would have avoided any liability—repaying 
Cruz's loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days 
of the election. But even if such funds were available, 
the Government's argument largely misses the point. For 
standing purposes, we accept as valid the merits of appellees' 
legal claims, so we must assume that the loan-repayment lim-
itation—including the 20-day rule—unconstitutionally bur-
dens speech. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975) 
(“standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's 
contention that particular conduct is illegal”). Demanding 
that the Committee comply with the Government's “alterna-
tive” would therefore require it to forgo the exercise of a 
First Amendment right we must assume it has—the right to 
repay its campaign debts in full, at any time. And this 
would require the Committee to subject itself to the very 
framework it says unconstitutionally burdens its speech. 
Such a principle fnds no support in our standing jurispru-
dence. See, e. g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 
U. S. 149, 158–159 (2014). 
B 
The Government next asserts that although appellees 
would have standing to challenge the FEC's implementing 
regulation, 11 CFR § 116.11, they do not have standing to 
challenge Section 304 itself. As a reminder, Section 304 pro-
hibits the use of post-election funds to repay a candidate's 
personal loans; it does not restrict the use of funds raised 
before the election. See 52 U. S. C. § 30116(j). That re-
striction comes instead from Section 304's implementing reg-
ulation, 11 CFR § 116.11. This regulation provides that nei-
ther pre-election nor post-election funds may be used to 
repay candidate loans above $250,000 outstanding 20 days 
after the election. §§ 116.11(c)(1)–(2). Such amounts must 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 289 (2022) 299 
Opinion of the Court 
instead be treated as contributions to the campaign, barring 
their repayment. 
Bearing that in mind, the Government contends that the 
record before the District Court reveals that the Committee 
used funds raised before the election to repay the frst 
$250,000 of Cruz's loans. For support, it naturally points to 
appellees' stipulation that “none of the $250,000 of the loan 
that was repaid was from contributions raised after the elec-
tion.” App. 329. Thus, the Government says, the Commit-
tee has not yet reached the cap in Section 304 on the use of 
post-election funds, and can still repay the remaining balance 
without running afoul of that statutory restriction. It is in-
stead the agency's regulation—with its 20-day limit—that 
prevents repayment of the fnal $10,000. This matters, the 
Government insists, because “[s]tanding is not dispensed in 
gross,” and plaintiffs must establish standing separately for 
each claim that they press and each form of relief that they 
seek. Brief for Appellant 17 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. 
Ramirez, 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021)). A challenge to the reg-
ulation, the Government argues, is separate from a challenge 
to the statute that authorized it. 
For their part, appellees insist that the record, properly 
interpreted, shows that the Committee used post-election 
funds to repay Cruz. During the period between election 
day and when the Committee repaid Cruz's loans, the Com-
mittee received more than $250,000 in “redesignated” contri-
butions to Cruz's 2024 campaign. Those contributions came 
from individuals who donated to the 2018 election in amounts 
exceeding their base limit and who, subsequent to the elec-
tion, redesignated the overlimit amount to the 2024 cam-
paign. See 11 CFR § 110.1(b)(5). Such funds, appellees say, 
qualify as “post-election contributions” for purposes of Sec-
tion 304, and may have been used to repay the frst $250,000 
of Cruz's loans. See § 116.12(a). 
These arguments have an Alice in Wonderland air about 
them, with the Government arguing that appellees would not 
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300 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Opinion of the Court 
violate the statute by repaying Cruz, and the appellees ar-
guing that they would. But this case has unfolded in an 
unusual way. After all, Cruz and the Committee likely 
would have had standing to bring a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge (as they do now) to Section 304 in a much easier man-
ner—by simply alleging and credibly demonstrating that 
Cruz wished to loan his campaign an amount larger than 
$250,000, but would not do so only because the loan-
repayment limitation made it unlikely that such amount 
would be repaid. See Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U. S., at 
158–159. In addition, it ordinarily would not matter 
whether a plaintiff was challenging the statute's enforcement 
or instead the enforcement of a regulation and, in doing so, 
raising arguments about the validity of the statute that 
authorized the regulation. Cf. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. 
–––, ––– – ––– (2021). The parties here, however, assume 
that the distinction makes a difference because the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the three-judge District Court is lim-
ited to actions challenging the enforcement of the statute. 
See BCRA § 403(a) (authorizing a three-judge court to hear 
any “action . . . brought for declaratory or injunctive relief 
to challenge the constitutionality of any provision of this Act 
or any amendment made by this Act”). 
It seems to us that the Government is likely correct that 
appellees have not shown that they exhausted Section 304's 
cap on the use of post-election funds. The loan-repayment 
limitation applies to contributions “made” after the date of 
the election. 52 U. S. C. § 30116(j). And a contribution is 
“considered to be made when the contributor relinquishes 
control” over it, which occurs when the contribution is “de-
livered” to the Committee or the candidate. 11 CFR 
§ 110.1(b)(6). The redesignated contributions on which ap-
pellees now rely, however, involve funds that were delivered 
to the Committee before the 2018 election. And those funds 
have remained under the Committee's control from that date, 
even if they were later redesignated to a different campaign. 
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Cite as: 596 U. S. 289 (2022) 301 
Opinion of the Court 
But we need not go further down this rabbit hole. Even 
under the Government's account, appellees have standing to 
challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304. The 
present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to re-
cover the fnal $10,000 Cruz loaned his campaign is, even if 
brought about by the agency's threatened enforcement of its 
regulation, traceable to the operation of Section 304 itself. 
An agency, after all, “literally has no power to act”—includ-
ing under its regulations—unless and until Congress author-
izes it to do so by statute. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n 
v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 374 (1986); see also FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 161 (2000). An 
agency's regulation cannot “operate independently of” the 
statute that authorized it. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2021). And here, the FEC's 20-day rule was ex-
pressly promulgated to implement Section 304. See 68 Fed. 
Reg. 3973 (2003). Indeed, the Government admitted at oral 
argument that it could fnd no other basis to authorize en-
forcement of this regulation, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, and “con-
cede[d]” that “the most likely result, if the statute were de-
clared invalid, is that the regulation would cease to be on 
the books or would cease to be enforceable,” ibid. Thus, if 
Section 304 is invalid and unenforceable—as Cruz and the 
Committee contend—the agency's 20-day rule is as well. 
And the remedy appellees sought in the District Court—an 
order enjoining the Government from taking any action to 
enforce the loan-repayment limitation, App. 27—would re-
dress appellees' harm by preventing enforcement of the 
agency's 20-day rule. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561. 
Contrary to the Government's suggestion, the foregoing 
analysis does not call into question the principle that “a 
plaintiff injured by one law does not thereby acquire stand-
ing to challenge a different law.” Brief for Appellant 17. 
It is true that a litigant cannot, “by virtue of his standing to 
challenge one government action, challenge other govern-
mental actions that did not injure him.” DaimlerChrysler 
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Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 353, n. 5 (2006). Here, however, 
appellees seek to challenge the one Government action that 
causes their harm: the FEC's threatened enforcement of the 
loan-repayment limitation, through its implementing regula-
tion. In doing so, they may raise constitutional claims 
against Section 304, the statutory provision that, through the 
agency's regulation, is being enforced. Cf. Collins, 594 
U. S., at ––– – –––. Even on the Government's version of the 
facts, then, we are satisfed that appellees have standing to 
challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304. And 
because they are challenging “the constitutionality of [a] pro-
vision of [BCRA],” § 403(a), jurisdiction was proper in the 
three-judge District Court. We thus proceed to the merits. 
III 
A 
The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent ap-
plication precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political 
offce.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 
(1971). It safeguards the ability of a candidate to use per-
sonal funds to fnance campaign speech, protecting his free-
dom “to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own 
candidacy.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54. This broad protec-
tion, we have explained, “refects our profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Id., at 14 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Government seems to agree with appellees that the 
loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights, 
at least to some extent, see Brief for Appellant 27–32, and 
we reach the same conclusion. This provision, by design 
and effect, burdens candidates who wish to make expendi-
tures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal 
loans. See 52 U. S. C. § 30101(9)(A)(i) (defning “expendi-
ture” to include loans); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 52. By 
restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to 
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repay candidate loans, Section 304 increases the risk that 
such loans will not be repaid. That in turn inhibits candi-
dates from loaning money to their campaigns in the frst 
place, burdening core speech. 
The data bear out the deterrent effect of Section 304. 
After BCRA was passed, there appeared a “clear clustering 
of [candidate] loans right at the $250,000 threshold.” A. Ovt-
chinnikov & P. Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns 26 (2020), 
Record 65–1 (Ovtchinnikov, Debt); see also Brief for United 
States Senator Roy Blunt et al. as Amici Curiae 6–7. 
There was no such clustering before the loan-repayment lim-
itation went into effect. The Government's evidence in the 
District Court, moreover, refects that the percentage of 
loans by Senate candidates for exactly $250,000 has increased 
tenfold since BCRA was passed. See App. 312–313. Sec-
tion 304, then, has altered “the propensity of many politicians 
to make large loans.” Ovtchinnikov, Debt 26; see also Brief 
for Protect the First Foundation as Amicus Curiae 10–11. 
In doing so, it has predictably restricted a candidate's speech 
on behalf of his own candidacy. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54. 
Quite apart from this record evidence, the burden on First 
Amendment expression is “evident and inherent” in the 
choice that candidates and their campaigns must confront. 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Ben-
nett, 564 U. S. 721, 745 (2011); see also id., at 746 (“we do not 
need empirical evidence to determinate that the law at issue 
is burdensome”); Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 
U. S. 724, 738–740 (2008) (requiring no empirical evidence of 
a burden). Although Section 304 “does not impose a cap on 
a candidate's expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an 
unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exer-
cises that First Amendment right.” Id., at 738–739. That 
penalty, of course, is the signifcant risk that a candidate will 
not be repaid if he chooses to loan his campaign more than 
$250,000. And that risk in turn may deter some candidates 
from loaning money to their campaigns when they otherwise 
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would, reducing the amount of political speech. This “drag” 
on a candidate's First Amendment right to use his own 
money to facilitate political speech is no less burdensome 
“simply because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily 
imposed choice.” Id., at 739. 
The “drag,” moreover, is no small matter. Debt is a ubiq-
uitous tool for fnancing electoral campaigns. The raw dol-
lar amount of loans made to campaigns in any one election 
cycle is in the nine fgures, “signifcantly exceeding” the 
amount of independent expenditures. Ovtchinnikov, Debt 
11. And personal loans from candidates themselves consti-
tute the bulk of this fnancing. See Brief for Appellant 35 
(“more than 90% of campaign debt consists of candidate 
loans”). In fact, candidates who self-fund usually do so 
using personal loans. See J. Steen, Self-Financed Candi-
dates in Congressional Elections 21 (2006). 
The ability to lend money to a campaign is especially im-
portant for new candidates and challengers. As a practical 
matter, personal loans will sometimes be the only way for 
an unknown challenger with limited connections to front-load 
campaign spending. See G. Jacobson, Money in Congres-
sional Elections 97–101 (1980). And early spending—and 
thus early expression—is critical to a newcomer's success. 
See Steen, Self-Financed Candidates in Congressional Elec-
tions, at 35, 171. A large personal loan also may be a useful 
tool to signal that the political outsider is confdent enough 
in his campaign to have skin in the game, attracting the at-
tention of donors and voters alike. See R. Biersack, 
P. Herrnson, C. Wilcox, Seeds for Success: Early Money in 
Congressional Elections, 18 Leg. Studies Q. 535, 537 (1993); 
see also Brief for United States Senator Roy Blunt et al. as 
Amici Curiae 13. By inhibiting a candidate from using this 
critical source of campaign funding, however, Section 304 
raises a barrier to entry—thus abridging political speech. 
The dissent cannot and does not claim that Section 304 
imposes no burden on candidate speech. See post, at 318 
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(opinion of Kagan, J.) (“every contribution regulation has 
some kind of indirect effect on electoral speech”). The dis-
sent instead dismisses that burden as minor and insignifcant. 
Post, at 316–319. As just explained, the extent of the bur-
den may vary depending on the circumstances of a particular 
candidate and particular election. But there is no doubt 
that the law does burden First Amendment electoral speech, 
and any such law must at least be justifed by a permissible 
interest. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 
U. S. 185, 210 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“When the Govern-
ment restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of 
proving the constitutionality of its actions.”). 
B 
With those First Amendment costs in mind, we turn to 
whether the loan-repayment limitation is justifed. The par-
ties debate whether strict or “closely drawn” scrutiny should 
apply in answering that question. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25. 
We need not resolve this dispute because, under either 
standard, the Government must prove at the outset that it 
is in fact pursuing a legitimate objective. See McCutcheon, 
572 U. S., at 210. It has not done so here. 
1 
This Court has recognized only one permissible ground for 
restricting political speech: the prevention of “quid pro quo” 
corruption or its appearance. See id., at 207; see also Fed-
eral Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985). We have consist-
ently rejected attempts to restrict campaign speech based 
on other legislative aims. For example, we have denied at-
tempts to reduce the amount of money in politics, see Mc-
Cutcheon, 572 U. S., at 191, to level electoral opportunities 
by equalizing candidate resources, see Bennett, 564 U. S., at 
749–750, and to limit the general infuence a contributor may 
have over an elected offcial, see Citizens United v. Federal 
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Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 359–360 (2010). However 
well intentioned such proposals may be, the First Amend-
ment—as this Court has repeatedly emphasized—prohibits 
such attempts to tamper with the “right of citizens to choose 
who shall govern them.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 227; see 
also Davis, 554 U. S., at 742; Bennett, 564 U. S., at 750. 
The Government argues that the contributions at issue 
raise a heightened risk of corruption because of the use to 
which they are put: repaying a candidate's personal loans. 
It also maintains that post-election contributions are par-
ticularly troubling because the contributor will know—not 
merely hope—that the recipient, having prevailed, will be in 
a position to do him some good. 
We greet the assertion of an anticorruption interest here 
with a measure of skepticism, for the loan-repayment limi-
tation is yet another in a long line of “prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis approach[es]” to regulating campaign fnance. 
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 221 (quoting Federal Election 
Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life , Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 479 
(2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)). Individual contributions 
to candidates for federal offce, including those made after 
the candidate has won the election, are already regulated in 
order to prevent corruption or its appearance. Such contri-
butions are capped at $2,900 per election, see 86 Fed. Reg. 
7869, and nontrivial contributions must be publicly disclosed, 
see 52 U. S. C. §§ 30104(b)(3)(A), (c)(1). The dissent's dire 
predictions about the impact of today's decision elide the fact 
that the contributions at issue remain subject to these re-
quirements. See post, at 315–316, 327. And the require-
ments are themselves prophylactic measures, given that 
“few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro 
quo arrangements.” Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357. 
Such a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach, we have ex-
plained, is a signifcant indicator that the regulation may not 
be necessary for the interest it seeks to protect. See Mc-
Cutcheon, 572 U. S., at 221; see also Bennett, 564 U. S., at 752 
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(“In the face of [the State's] contribution limits [and] strict 
disclosure requirements . . . it is hard to imagine what mar-
ginal corruption deterrence could be generated by [an addi-
tional measure].”). 
There is no cause for a different conclusion here. Because 
the Government is defending a restriction on speech as nec-
essary to prevent an anticipated harm, it must do more than 
“simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be 
cured.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. 
Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 618 (1996). It must 
instead point to “record evidence or legislative fndings” 
demonstrating the need to address a special problem. Ibid. 
We have “never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to 
carry a First Amendment burden.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., 
at 210 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC , 
528 U. S. 377, 392 (2000)). 
Yet the Government is unable to identify a single case of 
quid pro quo corruption in this context—even though most 
States do not impose a limit on the use of post-election con-
tributions to repay candidate loans. Cf. Brief for Campaign 
Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 17–18 (citing the 10 
States that do impose such a prohibition). Our previous 
cases have found the absence of such evidence signifcant. 
See Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357 (the Government did 
not claim that the political process was corrupted in the 26 
States that allowed unrestricted independent expenditures 
by corporations); McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 209, n. 7 (the 
Government presented no evidence of corruption in the 30 
States that did not impose aggregate limits on individual 
contributions). 
The Government instead puts forward a handful of media 
reports and anecdotes that it says illustrate the special risks 
associated with repaying candidate loans after an election. 
But as the District Court found, those reports “merely hy-
pothesize that individuals who contribute after the election 
to help retire a candidate's debt might have greater infuence 
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308 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
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with or access to the candidate.” 542 F. Supp. 3d, at 15. 
That is not the type of quid pro quo corruption the Govern-
ment may target consistent with the First Amendment. 
See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 207–208. 
The dissent at points shrugs off this distinction, see post, 
at 315, 325, n. 3, 326, but our cases make clear that “the 
Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere 
infuence or access.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 208. As we 
have explained, infuence and access “embody a central fea-
ture of democracy—that constituents support candidates 
who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are 
elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.” 
Id., at 192. 
To be sure, the “line between quid pro quo corruption and 
general infuence may seem vague at times, but the distinc-
tion must be respected in order to safeguard basic First 
Amendment rights.” Id., at 209. And in drawing that line, 
“the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of pro-
tecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Ibid. 
(quoting Wisconsin Right to Life , 551 U. S., at 457 (opinion 
of Roberts, C. J.)). 
2 
In the absence of direct evidence, the Government turns 
elsewhere. It contends that a scholarly article, a poll, and 
statements by Members of Congress show that these con-
tributions carry a heightened risk of at least the appearance 
of corruption. Essentially all the Government's evidence, 
however, concerns the sort of “corruption,” loosely con -
ceived, that we have repeatedly explained is not legitimately 
regulated under the First Amendment. 
The academic article—cited for various propositions by 
both sides—concludes that “indebted politicians” are “more 
likely to switch their votes” if they receive contributions 
from the banking or insurance industries. Ovtchinnikov, 
Debt 31. But the authors explicitly note that they cannot 
distinguish between voting pattern changes traceable to 
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legitimate donor infuence or access, and voting pattern 
changes as part of an illicit quid pro quo . See A. Ovtchin-
nikov & P. Valta, Self-Funding of Political Campaigns, 
Management Science, Articles in Advance 18 (April 7, 2022) 
(Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding). As noted, our precedents de-
mand adherence to that distinction. See, e. g., McCutcheon, 
572 U. S., at 209. The authors also state that their analysis 
is merely a “frst step” in understanding whether politicians' 
self-funding decisions impact voting behavior, because they 
cannot “pin down a causal link” yet. Ovtchinnikov, Self-
Funding 21. 
The online poll the Government asks us to consider sim-
ilarly misses the mark. The poll, conducted at the Gov-
ernment's behest for this litigation, reports that most 
respondents thought it “very likely” or “likely” that a person 
who “donate[s] money to a candidate's campaign after the 
election expect[s] a political favor in return.” App. 351–352. 
But it failed to ask whether those same respondents thought 
it likely that donors who contribute to a campaign before the 
election also are likely to expect political favors in return. 
Nor did the poll mention that the individual base limits still 
apply to such contributions. And it failed to defne the term 
“political favor,” leaving unclear the critical issue whether 
the respondents associated such contributions with the direct 
exchange of money for offcial acts, which Congress may reg-
ulate, or simply increased infuence and access, which Con-
gress may not. 
Finally, the Government places great weight on state-
ments made by certain Members of Congress during debates 
that preceded the enactment of BCRA. One Senator, for 
example, remarked that without the loan-repayment limita-
tion, a winning candidate who loaned money to his campaign 
could “get it back from [his] constituents [at] fundraising 
events” where he could ask, “How would you like me to vote 
now that I am a Senator?” 147 Cong. Rec. S2462 (March 
19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Domenici). Another stated that 
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310 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
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candidates “have a constitutional right to try to buy the of-
fce, but they do not have a constitutional right to resell it.” 
147 Cong. Rec. S2541 (March 20, 2001) (remarks of Sen. 
Hutchison). Nothing these legislators said, however, consti-
tutes actual evidence that the loan-repayment limitation was 
necessary to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appear-
ance. And a few stray foor statements are not the same as 
“legislative fndings” that might suggest a special problem 
to be addressed. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Comm., 518 U. S., at 618. 
All the above is pretty meager, given that we are consider-
ing restrictions on “the most fundamental First Amendment 
activities”—the right of candidates for political offce to make 
their case to the American people. Buckley, 434 U. S., at 14. 
In any event, the legislative record helps appellees just as 
much as the Government, given that some Senators evi-
dently viewed the limit as designed to protect incumbents 
like themselves from wealthy challengers. See 147 Cong. 
Rec. S2465 (March 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Sessions) 
(“[Section 304] prohibits wealthy candidates, who incur per-
sonal loans in connection with their campaign that exceed 
$250,000, from repaying those loans from any contributions 
made to the candidate. . . . I am glad I didn't face a person 
who could write a check for $60 million, $10 million—or $5 
million, for that matter. If so, I would like to be able to 
have a level playing feld so I could stay in the ball game.”); 
see also 147 Cong. Rec. S2541 (March 20, 2001) (remarks of 
Sen. Hutchison) (“Our purpose is to level the playing feld.”). 
That the limit may have been designed to protect incum-
bents should come as no surprise. Section 304 was enacted 
as part of the “Millionaire's Amendment” to BCRA, designed 
to hobble wealthy candidates mounting self-fnanced cam-
paigns. See Davis, 554 U. S., at 739. And it was debated 
together with another provision we have already held uncon-
stitutional, in part because it pursued the same impermissi-
ble goal of “level[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates 
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of different personal wealth.” Id., at 741. The connection 
between these two provisions casts further doubt on the 
anticorruption interest the Government now asserts in this 
case. 
3 
Perhaps to make up for its evidentiary shortcomings, the 
Government falls back on what it calls a “common sense” 
analogy: Post-election contributions used to repay a candi-
date's loans are akin to a “gift” because they “add to the 
candidate's personal wealth” as opposed to the campaign's 
treasury. Brief for Appellant 33. The risk of corruption is 
thus greater, the Government argues, because the donor is 
lining the pockets of a legislator or legislator-elect. 
The dissent at multiple points makes the same argument, 
contending that contributions that go toward repaying a can-
didate's loan “enrich the candidate personally,” allowing him 
to “buy a car or make tuition payments or join a country 
club.” Post, at 320, 327; see also post, at 315, 316, 321, 325– 
326. But this forgets that we are talking about repayment 
of a loan, not a gift. If the candidate did not have the 
money to buy a car before he made a loan to his campaign, 
repayment of the loan would not change that in any way. 
On top of that, contributions that go toward retiring a can-
didate's debt could only arguably enrich the candidate if the 
candidate does not otherwise expect to be repaid. In other 
words, the Government's gift comparison is meaningful only 
if the baseline is that the campaign will default. The Gov-
ernment, however, provides no reason to believe that most 
or even many winning candidates—the only candidates with 
whom its anticorruption interest is concerned—expect not to 
be repaid by their campaigns. To the contrary, the Govern-
ment has recognized throughout this litigation that winning 
candidates are commonly repaid in full. See App. 31–32 (cit-
ing the former FEC Commissioner's statement that “only 
winners have an easy time dealing with debt”); id., at 317 
(same); see also Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 11 (concluding 
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312 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
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that, even with BCRA's limitations on loan repayment in 
place, two out of three winning campaigns were able to repay 
a candidate's loans in full). For such a candidate, then, post-
election contributions bear little resemblance to a gift, be-
cause there is less of a chance that his campaign will default. 
Such contributions instead restore the candidate to the sta-
tus quo ante, a position to which he legitimately expected to 
return. As for losing candidates, they are of course in no 
position to grant offcial favors, and the Government does 
not provide any anticorruption rationale to explain why post-
election contributions to those candidates should be re-
stricted. See Brief for Appellant 45–46. 
The analogy also proves too much. By the Government's 
logic, post-election contributions to retire candidate loans are 
little different from gifts given directly to the candidate. 
But that logic is belied by how the Government treats the 
two categories of purported “gifts.” On the one hand, fed-
eral law fatly prohibits candidates from using campaign 
contributions for personal purposes. See 52 U. S. C. 
§ 30114(b)(2). And it forbids Senators from accepting gifts 
worth $250 or more. See 2 U. S. C. § 4725(a)(1). By con-
trast, the postulated “gift-by-loan-repayment” limits are 
simply the individual contribution limits, which are now 
more than ten times higher than the gift limit: $2,900 per 
election. And Section 304 allows over 86 such “gifts” before 
a campaign hits the Act's $250,000 cap. Either the Govern-
ment is openly tolerating a signifcant number of “gifts” far 
more generous than what it would normally think ft to allow, 
or post-election contributions that go toward retiring cam-
paign debt are in no real sense “gifts” to a candidate. We 
fnd the latter answer more persuasive. 
As a fnal argument, the Government claims that if the 
matter is otherwise in doubt, we should defer to Congress's 
“legislative judgment” that Section 304 furthers an anticor-
ruption goal. Brief for Appellant 39; see also post, at 321 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (also arguing that we have no “reason 
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Opinion of the Court 
to second-guess Congress's experience-based judgment”). 
Such deference, the Government contends, is grounded “in 
part on the understanding that Congress `is far better 
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast 
amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.' ” Brief 
for Appellant 40 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 195 (1997) (some internal quotation 
marks omitted)). But as explained, the evidence here is 
scant, and Congress's judgment is hardly based on “vast 
amounts of data.” Id., at 195. Moreover, deference to Con-
gress would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the 
legislative act may have been an effort to “insulate[ ] legisla-
tors from effective electoral challenge.” Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC, 528 U. S., at 404 (Breyer , J., concurring); 
see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 248–249 (2006) 
(plurality opinion). 
In the end, it remains our role to decide whether a particu-
lar legislative choice is constitutional. See Sable Communi-
cations of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 129 (1989); see 
also Randall, 548 U. S., at 248–249 (stressing need for “the 
exercise of independent judicial judgment” in case raising 
concern that “contribution limits that are too low [may] harm 
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mount-
ing effective campaigns against incumbent offceholders”). 
And here the Government has not shown that Section 304 
furthers a permissible anticorruption goal, rather than the 
impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of 
money in politics. 
* * * 
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Cruz and the 
Committee have standing to challenge the threatened en-
forcement of Section 304 of BCRA. We also conclude that 
this provision burdens core political speech without proper 
justifcation. The judgment of the District Court is affrmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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314 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Jus-
tice Sotomayor join, dissenting. 
A candidate for public offce extends a $500,000 loan to his 
campaign organization, hoping to recoup the amount from 
benefactors' post-election contributions. Once elected, he 
devotes himself assiduously to recovering the money; his 
personal bank account, after all, now has a gaping half-
million-dollar hole. The politician solicits donations from 
wealthy individuals and corporate lobbyists, making clear 
that the money they give will go straight from the campaign 
to him, as repayment for his loan. He is deeply grateful 
to those who help, as they know he will be—more grateful 
than for ordinary campaign contributions (which do not in-
crease his personal wealth). And as they paid him, so he 
will pay them. In the coming months and years, they 
receive government benefts—maybe favorable legislation, 
maybe prized appointments, maybe lucrative contracts. 
The politician is happy; the donors are happy. The only 
loser is the public. It inevitably suffers from government 
corruption. 
The campaign fnance measure at issue here has for two 
decades checked the crooked exchanges just described. The 
provision, Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, prohibited a candidate from using post-election 
donations to repay loans exceeding $250,000 that he made to 
his campaign. The theory of the legislation is easy to grasp. 
Political contributions that will line a candidate's own pock-
ets, given after his election to offce, pose a special danger 
of corruption. The candidate has a more-than-usual interest 
in obtaining the money (to replenish his personal fnances), 
and is now in a position to give something in return. The 
donors well understand his situation, and are eager to take 
advantage of it. In short, everyone's incentives are stacked 
to enhance the risk of dirty dealing. At the very least— 
even if an illicit exchange does not occur—the public will 
predictably perceive corruption in post-election payments di-
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
rectly enriching an offceholder. Congress enacted Section 
304 to protect against those harms. 
In striking down the law today, the Court greenlights all 
the sordid bargains Congress thought right to stop. The 
theory of the decision (unlike of the statute) is hard to 
fathom. The majority says that Section 304 violates the 
candidate's First Amendment rights by interfering with his 
ability to “self-fund” his campaign. Ante, at 302. But the 
candidate can in fact self-fund all he likes. The law impedes 
only his ability to use other people's money to fnance his 
campaign—much as standard (and permissible) contribution 
limits do. And even that third-party restriction is a modest 
one, applying only to post- (not pre-) election donations to 
repay sizable (not small) loans. So the majority overstates 
the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes. At the 
same time, the majority understates the anti-corruption val-
ues Section 304 serves. In the majority's view, there is 
“scant” danger here of quid pro quo corruption; loan repay-
ments produce only the “sort of `corruption' ” in which con-
tributors wield “greater infuence” over candidates than they 
otherwise would. Ante, at 307–308, 313. Assume away all 
objections to that distinction, which even the majority con-
cedes is “vague,” ante, at 308; for better or worse, it under-
lies this Court's recent campaign fnance decisions. Still, 
the conduct targeted by Section 304 threatens, if anything 
does, both corruption and the appearance of corruption of 
the quid pro quo kind. That is because the regulated trans-
actions—as Members of Congress well knew from experi-
ence—personally enrich those already elected to offce. In 
allowing those payments to go forward unrestrained, today's 
decision can only bring this country's political system into 
further disrepute. 
I 
In assessing a law's burden on speech, this Court's deci-
sions all distinguish between restricting expenditures and 
restricting contributions. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424

316 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
U. S. 1, 19–23 (1976) (per curiam ). (The majority glosses 
over that core distinction, for reasons that will soon become 
clear.) According to settled precedent, expenditure restric-
tions—caps on a campaign's or candidate's electoral spend-
ing—impose the greatest burdens on expression. The First 
Amendment, as the majority notes, “has its fullest and most 
urgent application” when a “legislative limit” prevents a 
candidate from “us[ing] personal funds to fnance campaign 
speech”—that is, speech “on behalf of his own candidacy.” 
Ante, at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). By con-
trast, laws focused on third-party contributions to a cam-
paign (a category the majority mostly prefers to ignore) 
typically “entail[ ] only a marginal restriction” on First 
Amendment interests. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. Take, for 
example, a simple limit on the amount someone can donate 
to a campaign, like the federal $2,900 ceiling. That kind of 
restriction, we have reasoned, in no way interferes with the 
donor's “freedom to discuss candidates and issues” through 
independent spending. Id., at 21. And it has only an indi-
rect effect on the campaign itself. To be sure, the cap makes 
raising money (for speech and other things) harder: It forces 
candidates “to raise funds from a greater number” of people 
and generally results in the campaign taking in less money 
than it otherwise would. Id., at 22. But the Court has 
viewed such limits as troublesome only if they are so low as 
to prevent candidates from raising “the resources necessary 
for effective advocacy.” Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 
247 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 
21). In the usual case, the incidental effect of a contribution 
restriction on a campaign's speech does not count as a sig-
nifcant First Amendment burden. See Randall, 548 U. S., 
at 246–247. 
Under that precedent, Section 304 “entails only a marginal 
restriction” on speech, because it regulates contributions 
alone. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. The provision leaves a 
campaign free to spend any amount of money for speech. 
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
Likewise, it leaves the candidate himself—here, Senator Ted 
Cruz—free to do so. The candidate can (in the majority's 
words) “use personal funds to fnance campaign speech” 
without limit; if he wishes, he can devote his whole fortune 
to “speech on behalf of his own candidacy.” Ante, at 302. 
Section 304 restricts only the use of third-party contri-
butions to support his efforts—which, as just shown, imposes 
a far more modest First Amendment burden. Recall 
how Section 304 works: It prevents post-election campaign 
contributions from going to repay large loans that the candi-
date has made to his campaign. So the provision limits— 
much as standard contribution caps do—only the candidate's 
ability to shift the costs of his electoral speech to others. 
Or said a bit differently, it addresses not a candidate's “self-
fund[ing],” ante, at 304, but only his reliance on third-party 
fnancing. 
And even that regulation of third-party contributions is a 
narrow one. Under Section 304, a campaign can always ac-
cept donations for small loans a candidate makes. And it 
can use pre-election donations to retire even his sizable loans. 
The statute just insists that donations for that purpose occur 
when speech is ongoing, and before everyone knows which 
candidate won (and so is in a position to return the favor by 
delivering government benefts). Consistent with our case-
law, that minor restriction on a candidate's use of other peo-
ple's money does not severely burden his (or anyone else's) 
expression. 
The majority's argument to the contrary focuses not on the 
restriction Section 304 actually imposes, but on the indirect 
effects the provision might have. The majority does not dis-
pute that Section 304 places no limits on the amount a candi-
date can spend for expression. See ante, at 303. Nor does 
(or could) the majority even claim that the provision caps 
what a candidate can lend his campaign. Instead, the ma-
jority argues that the law “may deter” a candidate from mak-
ing large loans because it curtails a potential source of repay-

318 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
ment—i. e., post-election donations. Ante, at 303. In that 
way, the majority insists, the law—though concededly regu-
lating only the use of contributions—functions to “restrict[ ] 
a candidate's speech.” Ibid.; see ante, at 305. 
But every contribution regulation has some kind of indi-
rect effect on electoral speech, and we have still understood 
them to impose only minimal burdens. Consider again a 
standard contribution ceiling, like the federal $2,900 cap. 
That limit, as we have acknowledged, makes raising money 
harder. See Randall, 548 U. S., at 247; Buckley, 424 U. S., 
at 20–21. And so it predictably gives a campaign less 
money to spend. (In fact, a lot less: Just think of a world in 
which a candidate could raise an unlimited sum from every 
supporter.) With the contribution cap in effect, the cam-
paign cannot pay for (nearly) as many advertisements, mail-
ings, signs, and so forth. And likewise, to return to the fact 
pattern here, the campaign has less money available than it 
otherwise would to repay a candidate's (or any other) loans. 
By the majority's logic, that downstream effect would mean 
the contribution cap imposes a signifcant First Amendment 
burden. But as noted above, we have always held to the 
contrary, save for the rare case in which the limit is so low 
as to preclude effective advocacy. See supra, at 315–316. 
There is no reason to treat Section 304 differently. In fact, 
its restriction on post-election contributions for loan repay-
ment probably has much smaller indirect effects on a cam-
paign's or candidate's speech than the contribution ceilings 
this Court has approved. (Again, just think of all the multi-
million-dollar donations those ceilings prevent.) So the ma-
jority's view cannot be right. 
And more fundamentally, the majority fails to appreciate 
what Section 304 has an indirect effect on: lending, rather 
than spending, money. In the majority's view, those two ac-
tivities count as one and the same. See ante, at 302–303. 
But they are not, in an obvious way. The expenditure of 
“personal funds” for speech, this Court has observed, “re-
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
duces the candidate's dependence” on donors—precisely be-
cause he is not trying to speak on their dime. Buckley, 424 
U. S., at 53. The loan of personal funds has the opposite 
effect, as further shown in this opinion's next part. When a 
candidate lends substantial funds to his campaign, he wants 
(maybe desperately needs) them returned; he thus risks— 
indeed, invites—dependence on donors, who alone can make 
him fnancially whole. Section 304 responds to that differ-
ence in whether a candidate is speaking independently, or 
instead relying on others' largesse. The provision at most 
deters a single mechanism for fnancing electoral activities, 
because it carries a heightened threat of corruption. 
II 
Preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance is a 
compelling interest by any measure. See Federal Election 
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U. S. 480, 496–497 (1985). Quid pro quo corruption— 
which extends beyond criminal bribery to “less blatant and 
specifc” arrangements—“subver[ts] the political process” 
and threatens “the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC , 
528 U. S. 377, 388–389 (2000) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). And the appearance of that corruption (though 
scarcely mentioned in the majority opinion) is “[o]f almost 
equal concern.” Id., at 388. Avoiding that appearance is 
“critical” if public “confdence in the system of representative 
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” Id., 
at 389. 
Serious dangers of actual and apparent quid pro quo cor-
ruption attend the transactions Section 304 regulates— 
again, the use of post-election contributions to repay a can-
didate's personal loans. Consider a simple comparison. 
When a campaign uses a donation to fund routine electoral 
activities (including speech), the money marginally aids the 
candidate's electoral odds, but in no way adds to his personal 
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320 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
wealth. By contrast, when a campaign uses a donation to 
repay the candidate's loan, every dollar given goes straight 
into the candidate's pocket. With each such contribution, 
his assets increase; he can now buy a car or make tuition 
payments or join a country club—all with his donors' dollars. 
So contributions going to loan repayment have exceptional 
value to the candidate—which his donors of course realize. 
And when the contributions occur after the election, their 
corrupting potential further increases. At that time, a 
campaign can use donations only to repay loans, of which 
some 97% come from candidates. See 11 CFR 110.1(b)(3)(i) 
(2017); A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Self-Funding of Politi-
cal Campaigns, Management Science, Articles in Advance 5 
(Apr. 7, 2022) (Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding). So post-
election donors can be confdent their money will enrich a 
candidate personally. And those donors have of course 
learned which candidate won. When they give money to 
repay the victor's loan, they know—not merely hope—he will 
be in a position to perform offcial favors. The recipe for 
quid pro quo corruption is thus in place: a donation to en-
hance the candidate's own wealth (the quid), made when he 
has become able to use the power of public offce to the do-
nor's advantage (the quo). The heightened threat of corrup-
tion—and, even more, of its appearance—is self-evident (ex-
cept, it seems, to observers allergic to all campaign fnance 
regulation). 
In addressing that special danger, Section 304 is anything 
but a “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis,” as the majority labels 
it. Ante, at 306. The idea behind that fancy-sounding epi-
thet is just that the statute is a needless precaution: The 
$2,900 contribution ceiling, the majority asserts, already pro-
vides generous protection against the corrupting potential of 
donations, so the loan-repayment provision is unnecessary. 
See ibid. But that claim ignores that Section 304 targets 
only a subset of contributions, which raise (as just described) 
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
unique corruption risks. When an added protection ad-
dresses an added danger, the existence of a basic protection 
(however ordinarily ample) fails to show the supplement's 
pointlessness. Regular seatbelts might suffce to protect 
drivers on the interstate, but special belts—and roll cages 
to boot—are essential measures on the racetrack. So too, a 
$2,900 cap might suffce to prevent corruption from normal 
campaign contributions—but not from post-election contri-
butions to repay a candidate's loan, and thus to enrich him 
personally. When Congress, as here, responds to a height-
ened threat with a heightened safeguard, the majority has 
no call to “greet” it “with a measure of skepticism.” Ibid. 
Nor does the majority have reason to second-guess Con-
gress's experience-based judgment about the specially cor-
rupting effects of post-election donations to repay candidate 
loans. The majority's frst attempt to counter that judg-
ment is that “we are talking about repayment of a loan”: 
“If the candidate did not have the money to buy a car before 
he made a loan to his campaign, repayment of the loan would 
not change that in any way.” Ante, at 311. But that alto-
gether misses the point. However much money the candi-
date had before he makes a loan to his campaign, he has less 
after it: The amount of the loan is the size of the hole in his 
bank account. So whatever he could buy with, say, 
$250,000—surely a car, but that's beside the point—he cannot 
buy any longer. Until, that is, donors pay him back. Then, 
the hole is flled, the bank account replenished, and the 
purchasing power restored. That is a signifcant fnancial 
gain to the offceholder, courtesy of donors. If they had 
not stepped up, the offceholder would have been $250,000 
poorer. 
The majority's second theory fares no better. Contribu-
tions to repay loans, the majority argues, do not really enrich 
an offceholder, because he has, from the beginning, “ex-
pect[ed] to be repaid.” Ibid. But the record provides no

322 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
support for that self-assured statement. Contra the major-
ity, the Government “has recognized throughout this litiga-
tion” not that winning candidates are usually repaid, but only 
that they are repaid more often than losing ones. Ibid.; see 
App. 31–32, 317.
1 That is no surprise—and the fact is af-
frmatively unhelpful for the majority's position, because it 
shows how post-election donations refect an expectation of 
payback from the recipient. Nothing else in the record (or 
outside it) is helpful to the majority either. The best empiri-
cal study suggests that a substantial portion of winning cam-
paigns fail to retire candidate loans, even when their 
amounts are too small to trigger Section 304's restrictions. 
See Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 11; see also Brief for Cam-
paign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13 (summa-
rizing research “show[ing] that most campaigns fail to 
pay off candidates' personal loans in any amount at any 
time,” in confrmation of the “[c]onventional wisdom” that 
post-election fundraising is “notoriously diffcult”). So a can-
didate with a loan outstanding has plenty of reason to feel 
anxious—and to see the loan's repayment as a gratitude-
inducing personal beneft. The donor takes him off a sharp 
hook. And even a candidate who expects repayment is far 
from impervious to corruption. He may have that conf-
dence exactly because he knows that a raft of lobbyists will 
1 The statement the majority quotes from a former FEC Commissioner 
does not support any broader understanding of the Government's claim. 
That statement appears in a parenthetical to a citation for the Govern-
ment's actual argument: that winning candidates “possess a greater capac-
ity” than losing ones do to get their loans repaid. App. 31. And the 
statement—that “only winners” have “an easy time dealing with debt”— 
means not that all or most winners do, but instead that no losers do. Id., 
at 31–32. The former Commissioner who made the remark had also 
served as counsel to a losing presidential campaign, and he was merely 
observing how hard that campaign had found it to repay debt. See P. Ov-
erby, How Will Clinton Resolve Campaign Debt? National Public Radio, 
May 14, 2008. 
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
be eager to pay for political benefts. And with his bank 
account depleted, he has a great temptation to perform his 
part in such an exchange. 2 
The common sense of Section 304—the obviousness of the 
theory behind it—lessens the need for the Government to 
identify past cases of quid pro quo corruption involving can-
didate loan repayments. As this Court has made clear, 
“[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed” to sustain a 
campaign fnance law “var[ies] up or down with the novelty 
and plausibility of the [law's] justifcation.” McConnell v. 
Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U. S. 93, 144 (2003). There 
is nothing novel or implausible about Section 304's ration-
ale—once again, that payments going to line an elected off-
cial's pockets pose an especial risk of corruption. It is in 
fact what everyone knows to be true—because everyone 
knows people (including politicians) will often do things for 
money. The majority suggests that we should discard our 
understanding of how the world works because the Govern-
ment has not come forward with adjudicated instances of 
corruption in the loan-repayment context. See ante, at 307. 
But quid pro quo exchanges, in that and every other setting, 
are nigh-impossible to detect and prove. That is indeed why 
we have campaign fnance laws like Section 304. They pro-
2 The majority also fails to recognize that post-election contributions can 
go toward interest payments, enabling a candidate to turn a tidy proft on 
top of recovering the amount loaned. Consider the case of one member 
of the U. S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. She 
loaned her campaign $150,000 at an 18% interest rate (no, that is not a 
typo), and over time collected more than $200,000 in interest payments. 
Much of that money came from fundraising events hosted by a lobbying 
frm representing members of the transportation industry. See A. Zajac, 
Interest on Campaign Loan Pays, L. A. Times, Feb. 14, 2009, p. B1. The 
example is extreme, but the FEC typically allows candidates to charge 
their campaigns—which then tap contributors for—a commercially reason-
able rate of interest. See FEC, Campaign Guide for Congressional Candi-
dates and Committees 101 (2021). 
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324 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
hibit conduct posing a heightened risk of corruption, so that 
the Government does not have to ferret out illicit exchanges 
case by case by case. To strike down Section 304 because 
the Government has not proved to a certainty some number 
of loan-repayments-for-political-paybacks is to miss the pro-
vision's essential point. 
In any event, the Government and its amici have mar-
shalled signifcant evidence showing that the loan repay-
ments Section 304 targets have exactly the dangers Con-
gress thought. See Brief for Appellant 37–40; Brief for 
Campaign Legal Center et al. 27–29. Here is a sampling 
from the record, involving jurisdictions unprotected by 
either Section 304 or a state equivalent. In Ohio, various 
law frms donated almost $200,000 to help the newly elected 
attorney general recoup his personal loans. Those donors 
later received more than 200 state contracts worth nearly 
$10 million in legal fees. See L. Bischoff, Donations Helping 
DeWine Pay Down Campaign Loan, Springfeld News-Sun, 
Feb. 2, 2012, p. A1. In Alaska, a lobbyist collected almost 
$100,000 for post-election repayment of the Governor's per-
sonal loans. A business in which he held an interest later 
received a $9 million state contract. See B. Curry, Alaska 
Gov. Sheffeld's Impeachment Inquiry Has Overtones of Wa-
tergate Scandal, L. A. Times, July 19, 1985, p. 11. In Ken-
tucky, two Governors loaned their campaigns millions of dol-
lars, “only to be repaid after the election by contributors 
seeking no-bid contracts.” J. Moore, Campaign Finance Re-
form in Kentucky: The Race for Governor, 85 Ky. L. J. 723, 
746 (1997). The scandal those transactions created led to a 
new state campaign-fnance law similar to Section 304. In 
upholding that statute, a court more cognizant than this one 
about how corruption works explained that “heavily in-
debted candidates” were “easy bedfellows for quid pro quo 
contributors.” Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 930 
(WD Ky. 1995). That is also true on the local level. In San 
Diego, to take just one instance, three city council members 
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
cast critical votes benefting lobbyists who had raised funds 
to retire their campaign debts. See C. Gustafson, Lobbyists 
See Beneft From Three City Offcials, San Diego Union-
Tribune, June 13, 2009, p. A1.
3 
An empirical study in the record confrms the dangers of 
corruption shown in those examples. The study frst found, 
based on data preceding Section 304's enactment, that po-
liticians carrying campaign debt were “signifcantly more 
likely” than their “debt-free counterparts” to “switch their 
votes” after receiving contributions from special interests. 
A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns 
(2020), in No. 1:19–cv–00908 (D DC, July 14, 2020), ECF Doc. 
65–1, p. 31. In other words, offceholders did more in ex-
change for donations repaying their personal loans than for 
other donations. The analysis next looked at Section 304's 
effect. Here, the data showed that politicians with debt ex-
ceeding the law's $250,000 threshold became “signifcantly 
less responsive” to contributions than before: They began to 
“behave remarkably similar to their debt free counterparts.” 
Id., at 28; see Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 3 (similarly stating 
that those politicians became more “independent of contribu-
tions from special interest[s]”). In other words, Section 
304 did just what Congress thought it would. By prevent-
ing post-election contributions from personally enriching po-
3 The majority asserts without explanation that these and other similar 
examples involve not quid pro quo corruption, but only contributors' exer-
cise of their “greater infuence” over candidates. Ante, at 307. Even ac-
cepting that distinction (as our caselaw does), the majority's claim is hard 
to understand. Here is the quid in the examples: a donation paying off a 
successful candidate's personal loan. And here is the quo: a government 
contract, or a key vote. However “vague” the “line between quid pro quo 
corruption and general infuence,” ante, at 308, those exchanges cross it. 
The majority must mean that the Government has not proved beyond a 
doubt that the trades in fact occurred. But again, that is the wrong 
standard given (1) the diffculty of such proof and (2) the signifcant risks 
of quid pro quo corruption inherent in the above fact patterns. See 
supra, at 323–324. 
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326 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 
Kagan, J., dissenting 
liticians, the provision diminished donor-responsive voting. 
The majority tries to undermine those fndings by quoting 
the kind of careful caveats always accompanying good social 
science. See ante, at 309; Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 21 
(noting that the study is a “frst step in understanding” and 
that more work is needed to “fully pin down” all aspects of 
causation). But the authors are confdent—and rightly so— 
in the fndings just described: that Section 304 markedly 
decreased the frequency with which offceholders voted as 
donors would like. And although the authors could not re-
sponsibly claim that all the shifted votes they tallied were 
part of quid pro quo deals—they are, after all, professors, 
not the FBI—they deduce from the data that politicians car-
rying campaign debt were “less likely to [be] sell[ing] access” 
than to be “sell[ing] votes.” Id., at 18. 
Finally, the record evidence addresses the “almost 
equal[ly]” important matter of the appearance of corruption. 
Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390; see supra, at 319. A 
Government-commissioned survey of public opinion found 
that 81% of respondents believed it “very likely” or “likely” 
that a person who “donate[s] money to a candidate's cam-
paign after the election expect[s] a political favor in return.” 
App. 351–353. That bears repeating: 81%—an overwhelm-
ing perception across all demographic categories, as well as 
across all party affliations and political ideologies. See 
ibid. As the court reviewing the Kentucky version of Sec-
tion 304 explained: “[T]here is an impression” when a contri-
bution repays a loan after an election that the contributor is 
simply “lining the candidate's pocket, as there is no ongoing 
campaign to which the contribution may be made.” Wilkin-
son, 876 F. Supp., at 930; see supra, at 324. The majority 
fyspecks the polling questions: Why didn't the poll defne 
“political favor”? Did the poll mention that the contribu-
tions had to comply with the $2,900 cap? And so forth. See 
ante, at 309. But really—is it likely that such tinkering 
would have made a real difference? The poll results were 
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Kagan, J., dissenting 
so lopsided because the post-election contributions Section 
304 targets—ones adding to the candidate's personal 
wealth—have so conspicuous a potential to corrupt. The 
public knows that to be true. The public's representatives 
in Congress knew it to be true. Only this Court—some-
how—does not. 
* * * 
“Democracy works only if the people have faith in those 
who govern.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). And the people cannot have faith 
in representatives who trade offcial acts for fnancial gain. 
Section 304 prevents that kind of corruption, at barely dis-
cernable cost to First Amendment freedoms. The provision 
limits one narrow use of third-party contributions to a cam-
paign, thus “entail[ing] only a marginal restriction” on 
speech. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. And the provision tar-
gets a practice posing exceptional risks of quid pro quo 
deals. Repaying a candidate's loan after he has won election 
cannot serve the usual purposes of a contribution: The money 
comes too late to aid in any of his campaign activities. All 
the money does is enrich the candidate personally at a time 
when he can return the favor—by a vote, a contract, an ap-
pointment. It takes no political genius to see the height-
ened risk of corruption—the danger of “I'll make you richer 
and you'll make me richer” arrangements between donors 
and offceholders. Section 304 has guarded against that 
threat for two decades, but no longer. In discarding the 
statute, the Court fuels non-public-serving, self-interested 
governance. It injures the integrity, both actual and appar-
ent, of the political process. I respectfully dissent. 
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Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 290, line 2 from bottom, “BRCA” is replaced with “BCRA”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 596 U. S. Part 1 Pages 289–327 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 16, 2022 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  summary judgment on their constitutional claim, holding that the loan- repayment limitation burdens political speech without suffcient justif- cation, and dismissed as moot their challenges to the regulation. Held: 1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304. Pp. 295–302. (a…

• #3

  (b) The Government next argues that although appellees would have standing to challenge the FEC's implementing regulation, § 116.11, they do not have standing to challenge Section 304 itself. The Govern- ment contends that the Committee used pre-election funds to repay the frst $250,000, and thus Section 304's cap…

• #4

  rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on be- half of their own candidacy through personal loans. Restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans in- creases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which, in turn, deters candidates from loaning mo…

• #5

  scholarly article, a poll, and statements by Members of Congress to show that the contributions used to repay candidate loans carry a heightened risk of at least the appearance of corruption. All of this evidence, how- ever, concerns the sort of “corruption,” loosely conceived, that this Court has repeatedly expla…

• #6

  In order to jumpstart a fedgling campaign or fnish strong in a tight race, candidates for federal offce often loan money to their campaign committees. A provision of federal law regulates the repayment of such loans. Among other things, it bars campaigns from using more than $250,000 of funds raised after electio…

• #7

  himself. See 11 CFR § 110.10 (2017); 52 U. S. C. § 30101(9) (A)(i); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 52–54. And campaigns may, of course, accept contributions directly from other orga- nizations or from individuals, subject to monetary limita- tions. Individual contributions are capped at $2,900 for the primary an…

• #8

  Cruz and the Committee fled this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment. They also raised challenges to the FEC's implementing regu- lation, 11 CFR § 116.11. A three-judge panel was convened to hear the case. See BCRA…

• #9

  lant 20. Because appellees knowingly triggered the applica- tion of the loan-repayment limitation, the Government says, any resulting injury is in essence traceable to them, not the Government. The predicate for this argument is appellees' stipulation in the District Court that “the sole and exclusive motivation …

• #10

  juries are directly inficted by the FEC's threatened enforce- ment of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. See 52 U. S. C. § 30109(a)(5)…

• #11

  Cite as: 596 U. S. 289 (2022) 299 Opinion of the Court instead be treated as contributions to the campaign, barring their repayment. Bearing that in mind, the Government contends that the record before the District Court reveals that the Committee used funds raised before the election to repay the frst $250,000…

• #12

  lenge (as they do now) to Section 304 in a much easier man- ner—by simply alleging and credibly demonstrating that Cruz wished to loan his campaign an amount larger than $250,000, but would not do so only because the loan- repayment limitation made it unlikely that such amount would be repaid. See Susan B. Anthon…

• #13

  ing under its regulations—unless and until Congress author- izes it to do so by statute. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 374 (1986); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 161 (2000). An agency's regulation cannot “operate independently of” the statute that authorized …

• #14

  three-judge District Court. We thus proceed to the merits. III A The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent ap- plication precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political offce.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971). It safeguards the ability of a candidate to use per- sonal funds …

• #15

  Quite apart from this record evidence, the burden on First Amendment expression is “evident and inherent” in the choice that candidates and their campaigns must confront. Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Ben- nett, 564 U. S. 721, 745 (2011); see also id., at 746 (“we do not need empirical eviden…

• #16

  tool to signal that the political outsider is confdent enough in his campaign to have skin in the game, attracting the at- tention of donors and voters alike. See R. Biersack, P. Herrnson, C. Wilcox, Seeds for Success: Early Money in Congressional Elections, 18 Leg. Studies Q. 535, 537 (1993); see also Brief for …

• #17

  by equalizing candidate resources, see Bennett, 564 U. S., at 749–750, and to limit the general infuence a contributor may have over an elected offcial, see Citizens United v. Federal Page Proof Pending Publication 306 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE Opinion of the Court Election Comm'n, 558 U. S.…

• #18

  Cite as: 596 U. S. 289 (2022) 307 Opinion of the Court (“In the face of [the State's] contribution limits [and] strict disclosure requirements . . . it is hard to imagine what mar- ginal corruption deterrence could be generated by [an addi- tional measure].”). There is no cause for a different conclusion here. B…

• #19

  at 315, 325, n. 3, 326, but our cases make clear that “the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere infuence or access.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 208. As we have explained, infuence and access “embody a central fea- ture of democracy—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and…

• #20

  ernment's behest for this litigation, reports that most respondents thought it “very likely” or “likely” that a person who “donate[s] money to a candidate's campaign after the election expect[s] a political favor in return.” App. 351–352. But it failed to ask whether those same respondents thought it likely that …

• #21

  Rec. S2465 (March 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Sessions) (“[Section 304] prohibits wealthy candidates, who incur per- sonal loans in connection with their campaign that exceed $250,000, from repaying those loans from any contributions made to the candidate. . . . I am glad I didn't face a person who could write a c…

• #22

  candidate does not otherwise expect to be repaid. In other words, the Government's gift comparison is meaningful only if the baseline is that the campaign will default. The Gov- ernment, however, provides no reason to believe that most or even many winning candidates—the only candidates with whom its anticorrupti…

• #23

  or post-election contributions that go toward retiring cam- paign debt are in no real sense “gifts” to a candidate. We fnd the latter answer more persuasive. As a fnal argument, the Government claims that if the matter is otherwise in doubt, we should defer to Congress's “legislative judgment” that Section 304 fu…

• #24

  Page Proof Pending Publication 314 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE Kagan, J., dissenting Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Jus- tice Sotomayor join, dissenting. A candidate for public offce extends a $500,000 loan to his campaign organization, hoping to recoup the amount from benefactor…

• #25

  theory of the decision (unlike of the statute) is hard to fathom. The majority says that Section 304 violates the candidate's First Amendment rights by interfering with his ability to “self-fund” his campaign. Ante, at 302. But the candidate can in fact self-fund all he likes. The law impedes only his ability to …

• #26

  trast, laws focused on third-party contributions to a cam- paign (a category the majority mostly prefers to ignore) typically “entail[ ] only a marginal restriction” on First Amendment interests. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. Take, for example, a simple limit on the amount someone can donate to a campaign, like the …

• #27

  fund[ing],” ante, at 304, but only his reliance on third-party fnancing. And even that regulation of third-party contributions is a narrow one. Under Section 304, a campaign can always ac- cept donations for small loans a candidate makes. And it can use pre-election donations to retire even his sizable loans. Th…

• #28

  the contribution cap imposes a signifcant First Amendment burden. But as noted above, we have always held to the contrary, save for the rare case in which the limit is so low as to preclude effective advocacy. See supra, at 315–316. There is no reason to treat Section 304 differently. In fact, its restriction on …

• #29

  equal concern.” Id., at 388. Avoiding that appearance is “critical” if public “confdence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” Id., at 389. Serious dangers of actual and apparent quid pro quo cor- ruption attend the transactions Section 304 regulates— again, the …

• #30

  $2,900 contribution ceiling, the majority asserts, already pro- vides generous protection against the corrupting potential of donations, so the loan-repayment provision is unnecessary. See ibid. But that claim ignores that Section 304 targets only a subset of contributions, which raise (as just described) Page Pr…

• #31

  322 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE Kagan, J., dissenting support for that self-assured statement. Contra the major- ity, the Government “has recognized throughout this litiga- tion” not that winning candidates are usually repaid, but only that they are repaid more often than losing ones. Ibid.; se…

• #32

  account depleted, he has a great temptation to perform his part in such an exchange. 2 The common sense of Section 304—the obviousness of the theory behind it—lessens the need for the Government to identify past cases of quid pro quo corruption involving can- didate loan repayments. As this Court has made clear, …

• #33

  the Government has not proved to a certainty some number of loan-repayments-for-political-paybacks is to miss the pro- vision's essential point. In any event, the Government and its amici have mar- shalled signifcant evidence showing that the loan repay- ments Section 304 targets have exactly the dangers Con- gr…

• #34

  likely” than their “debt-free counterparts” to “switch their votes” after receiving contributions from special interests. A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns (2020), in No. 1:19–cv–00908 (D DC, July 14, 2020), ECF Doc. 65–1, p. 31. In other words, offceholders did more in ex- change for donati…

• #35

  decreased the frequency with which offceholders voted as donors would like. And although the authors could not re- sponsibly claim that all the shifted votes they tallied were part of quid pro quo deals—they are, after all, professors, not the FBI—they deduce from the data that politicians car- rying campaign deb…

• #36

  paign, thus “entail[ing] only a marginal restriction” on speech. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. And the provision tar- gets a practice posing exceptional risks of quid pro quo deals. Repaying a candidate's loan after he has won election cannot serve the usual purposes of a contribution: The money comes too late to ai…