Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

Summary

The speaker of the North Carolina State House of Representatives and the president pro tempore of the North Carolina State Senate are entitled to intervene in this litigation challenging North Carolina’s voter-ID law.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 597 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 179–214 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
June 23, 2022 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2021 179 
Syllabus 
BERGER et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the fourth circuit 
No. 21–248. Argued March 21, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022 
In 2018, North Carolina amended its Constitution to provide that “[v]oters 
offering to vote in person shall present photographic identifcation.” 
Art. VI, § 2(4). To implement the constitutional mandate, the General 
Assembly approved S. B. 824. The Governor vetoed the bill, the Gen-
eral Assembly overrode the veto, and S. B. 824 went into effect. The 
state conference of the NAACP then sued the Governor and members of 
the State Board of Elections (collectively, Board), a state agency whose 
members are both appointed and removable by the Governor. The 
NAACP alleged that S. B. 824 offends the Federal Constitution. The 
Board was defended by the State's attorney general, who, like the Gov-
ernor, is an independently elected offcial. The attorney general at the 
time was a former state senator who voted against an earlier voter-ID 
law and fled a declaration in support of a legal challenge against it. 
The speaker of the State House of Representatives and president pro 
tempore of the State Senate (hereinafter, legislative leaders) moved to 
intervene, arguing that, without their participation, important state in-
terests would not be adequately represented in light of the Governor's 
opposition to S. B. 824, the Board's allegiance to the Governor and its 
tepid defense of S. B. 824 in parallel state-court proceedings, and the 
attorney general's opposition to earlier voter-ID efforts. 
The District Court applied a presumption that the legislative leaders' 
interests would be adequately represented by the Governor, Board, and 
the attorney general and denied their motion to intervene. Unsatisfed 
with the Board's defense following the denial of their motion, the legisla-
tive leaders sought to lodge an amicus brief and accompanying materi-
als, but the District Court refused to consider them, struck them from 
the record, and granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement 
of S. B. 824. The Fourth Circuit considered both District Court rulings 
in separate appeals before separate panels. On the preliminary injunc-
tion ruling, the panel held that the District Court had abused its discre-
tion because the record contained insuffcient evidence to show that S. B. 
824 violated the Federal Constitution. On the intervention ruling, a 
separate panel agreed with the legislative leaders and held that the 
District Court had erred when denying them leave to intervene. Even-

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180 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Syllabus 
tually, however, the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear the matter en banc 
and ruled that the legislative leaders were not entitled to intervene in 
the District Court proceedings. This Court agreed to hear the matter 
to resolve disagreements among the courts of appeals on the proper 
treatment of motions to intervene in cases like this one. 
Held: North Carolina's legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this 
litigation. Pp. 190–200. 
(a) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides that a “court 
must permit anyone to intervene” who, (1) “[o]n timely motion,” (2) 
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect 
its interest,” (3) “unless existing parties adequately represent that in-
terest.” No one disputes the timeliness of the motion to intervene here. 
The Court thus addresses the Rule's two remaining requirements. 
States possess “ `a legitimate interest in the continued enforce[ment] 
of [their] own statutes,' ” Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center, 
P . S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 277, and States may organize themselves in a 
variety of ways. When a State chooses to allocate authority among 
different offcials who do not answer to one another, different interests 
and perspectives, all important to the administration of state govern-
ment, may emerge. See, e. g., Brnovich v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 594 U. S. –––. Appropriate respect for these realities suggests 
that federal courts should rarely question that a State's interests will 
be practically impaired or impeded if its duly authorized representatives 
are excluded from participating in federal litigation challenging state 
law. Nor are state interests the only interests at stake. Permitting 
the participation of lawfully authorized state agents promotes informed 
federal-court decisionmaking and avoids the risk of setting aside duly 
enacted state law based on an incomplete understanding of relevant 
state interests. This Court's teachings on these scores have been many, 
clear, and recent. See, e. g., Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-
Hill, 587 U. S. –––; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693. 
These precedents and the principles they represent are dispositive 
here. North Carolina law explicitly provides that “[t]he Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 
as agents of the State, by and through counsel of their choice,” “shall 
jointly have standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assembly as 
a party in any judicial proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute 
or provision of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1–72.2(b). And the State has made plain that it considers the leaders 
of the General Assembly “necessary parties” to suits like this one. 
§ 120–32.6(b).

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Syllabus 
The Board submits that North Carolina law does not afford the leg-
islative leaders authority to represent state interests. But that argu-
ment is diffcult to square with the express statutory language. Alter-
natively, the Board argues that the statutes authorizing the legislative 
leaders to participate here violate the State Constitution by usurping 
power vested in the executive branch alone. That logic is hard to fol-
low, however, given the Board's concession that the legislative leaders 
may intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), and likely as a matter 
of right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general ceases to defend 
the law. 
The NAACP offers a different reply, pointing out that Rule 24(a)(2) 
permits intervention only by “new” parties. And, it submits, the legis-
lative leaders are already effectively “existing” parties to this suit chal-
lenging the enforcement of state law. That argument rests on a prem-
ise that is both formally and functionally mistaken. First, the NAACP 
has not sued the State but only certain state offcers, and, so far, the 
legislative leaders are not among them. Functionally, however, this 
suit implicates North Carolina's sovereign interests regardless of the 
named parties. And, where a State chooses to divide its sovereign au-
thority among different offcials and authorize their participation in a 
suit challenging state law, a full consideration of the State's practical 
interests may require the involvement of different voices with different 
perspectives. Pp. 191–195. 
(b) Concerning Rule 24(a)(2)'s third requirement, lower courts have 
adopted a variety of tests for evaluating whether an existing defendant 
already “adequately represent[s]” the same interests a proposed inter-
venor seeks to vindicate. Here, both the District Court and the en banc 
Court of Appeals improperly applied a “presumption” that the Board 
adequately represented the legislative leaders' interests and held that 
the leaders could not overcome this presumption. But Rule 24(a)(2)'s 
test in this regard presents proposed intervenors with only a minimal 
challenge: It promises intervention to those who bear an interest that 
may be practically impaired or impeded “unless existing parties ade-
quately represent that [same] interest.” See, e. g., Trbovich v. Mine 
Workers, 404 U. S. 528. Some lower courts have suggested that a pre-
sumption of adequate representation remains appropriate in certain 
classes of cases. But even taken on their own terms, none of these 
presumptions applies to cases like this one. For instance, some lower 
courts have adopted a presumption of adequate representation in cases 
where a movant's interests are identical to those of an existing party. 
But even the Board concedes that this presumption applies only when 
interests fully overlap.

182 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
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This litigation illustrates how divided state governments sometimes 
warrant participation by multiple state offcials in federal court. Here, 
the legislative leaders seek to give voice to a perspective different from 
the Board's. They assert an unalloyed interest in vindicating state law 
from constitutional challenge, without an eye to crosscutting administra-
tive concerns—concerns that have colored the Board's defense thus far. 
The NAACP worries that allowing the legislative leaders to intervene 
could “make trial management impossible.” While a proliferation of 
motions to intervene may be a cause for concern in some cases, this case 
is not one. Federal courts routinely handle cases involving multiple 
offcials sometimes represented by different attorneys taking different 
positions. See, e. g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U. S. 30. 
Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative leaders to this case 
may pose, those burdens fall well within the bounds of everyday case 
management. Pp. 195–200. 
999 F. 3d 915, reversed. 
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 
C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Bar-
rett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 200. 
David H. Thompson argued the cause for petitioners. 
With him on the briefs was Peter A. Patterson. 
Elisabeth S. Theodore argued the cause for NAACP re-
spondents. With her on the brief were Andrew T. Tutt, Ste-
phen K. Wirth, Penda D. Hair, and Irving Joyner. 
Sara G. Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General of North Carolina, 
argued the cause for state respondents. With her on the 
brief were Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General of North Caro-
lina, Ryan Y. Park, Solicitor General, James W. Dog -
gett, Deputy Solicitor General, Sripriya Narasimhan, and 
Olga E. Vysotskaya de Brito, Terence Steed, Mary Carla 
Babb, and Laura McHenry, Special Deputy Attorneys 
General.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ari-
zona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Brunn W. 
Roysden III, Solicitor General, Drew C. Ensign and Michael S. Catlett, 
Deputy Solicitors General, and Joseph A. Kanefeld, and by the Attorneys 
General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Ala-
bama, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin 
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Opinion of the Court 
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At the heart of this lawsuit lies a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a North Carolina election law. But the merits 
of that dispute are not before us, only an antecedent question 
of civil procedure: Are two leaders of North Carolina's state 
legislature entitled to participate in the case under the terms 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)? 
I 
A 
Within wide constitutional bounds, States are free to 
structure themselves as they wish. Often, they choose to 
Knudsen of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Alan Wilson of 
South Carolina, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the 
American Legislative Exchange Council by Jason Torchinsky, Phillip M. 
Gordon, and Jonathon Paul Hauenschild; for the Honest Elections Proj-
ect by Jonathan P . Lienhard and Dallin B. Holt; for the Lawyers Democ-
racy Fund et al. by Richard B. Raile; for the Republican State Leadership 
Committee by Charles R. Spies; for the Wisconsin Legislature by Jeffrey 
Matthew Harris and Taylor A. R. Meehan; and for Former North Carolina 
Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Orr by Andrew H. Erteschik and John 
M. Durnovich. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Federal Courts 
Scholars by Adam S. Gershenson and Kathleen R. Hartnett; and for Re-
tired Federal Judges by Michael J. Gottlieb and Mark T. Stancil. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of Minnesota et al. by 
Keith Ellison, Attorney General of Minnesota, Liz Kramer, Solicitor Gen-
eral, Jason Marisam, Assistant Attorney General, and Alethea Huyser, 
Special Assistant Attorney General, by Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General 
of Wisconsin, and Brian P . Keenan and Anthony Russomanno, Assistant 
Attorneys General, by Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General of 
New Jersey, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdic-
tions as follows: William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Dela-
ware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Kwame Raoul of Illi-
nois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Dana Nessel 
of Michigan, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Letitia James of New York, Ellen 
F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, and Thomas J. 
Donovan, Jr., of Vermont; for the Liberty Justice Center by Daniel R. 
Suhr and Jeffrey D. Jennings; and for the Republican National Committee 
by David A. Warrington and Harmeet K. Dhillon.

184 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Opinion of the Court 
conduct their affairs through a variety of branches, agencies, 
and elected and appointed officials. These constituent 
pieces sometimes work together to achieve shared goals; 
other times they reach very different judgments about im-
portant policy questions and act accordingly. This diffusion 
of governmental powers within and across institutions may 
be an everyday feature of American life. But it can also 
pose its diffculties when a State's laws or policies are chal-
lenged in federal court. 
Suppose someone seeks to attack a state law on the ground 
that it is inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Gener-
ally, States themselves are immune from suit in federal 
court. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 284 (2011). 
So usually a plaintiff will sue the individual state offcials 
most responsible for enforcing the law in question and seek 
injunctive or declaratory relief against them. See Ex parte 
Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159–160 (1908). Despite the artifce, 
of course, a State will as a practical matter often retain a 
strong interest in this kind of litigation. After all, however 
captioned, a suit of this sort can implicate “the continued 
enforceability of [the State's] own statutes.” Maine v. Tay-
lor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986). To defend its practical inter-
ests, the State may choose to mount a legal defense of the 
named offcial defendants and speak with a “single voice,” 
often through an attorney general. Virginia House of Dele-
gates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). 
Still, not every State has structured itself this way. Some 
have chosen to authorize multiple offcials to defend their 
practical interests in cases like these. See ibid. North 
Carolina falls into this camp. The State's attorney general 
wields some authority to represent individual offcial defend-
ants in federal litigation. See Martin v. Thornburg, 320 
N. C. 533, 545–546, 359 S. E. 2d 472, 479 (1987); N. C. Const., 
Art. III, §§ 7(1), (2) (establishing the offce of attorney gen-
eral and declaring that his “duties shall be prescribed by 
law”). But North Carolina's General Assembly has also em-
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powered the leaders of its two legislative houses to partici-
pate in litigation on the State's behalf under certain circum-
stances and with counsel of their own choosing. See N. C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2 (2021). 
The reasons why a State might choose to proceed this way 
are understandable enough. Sometimes leaders in different 
branches of government may see the State's interests at 
stake in litigation differently. Some States may judge that 
important public perspectives would be lost without a mech-
anism allowing multiple offcials to respond. It seems North 
Carolina has some experience with just these sorts of issues. 
More than once a North Carolina attorney general has op-
posed laws enacted by the General Assembly and declined 
to defend them fully in federal litigation. See, e. g., North 
Carolina v. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP , 
581 U. S. 985, 986 (2017) (Roberts, C. J., statement respect-
ing denial of certiorari); App. 79; see also N. Devins & S. Pra-
kash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Ap-
proaches to the Duty To Defend, 124 Yale L. J. 2100, 2152, 
n. 217, 2187 (2015). 
B 
The facts of this case also illustrate how divided state gov-
ernment can lead to disagreements over the defense of state 
law in federal court. In November 2018, the people of North 
Carolina amended the State Constitution to provide that 
“[v]oters offering to vote in person shall present photo-
graphic identifcation [(photo ID)].” Art. VI, § 2(4). The 
people further provided that “[t]he General Assembly shall 
enact general laws governing the requirements of such 
photographic identifcation, which may include exceptions.” 
Ibid. Consistent with that directive, the General Assembly 
eventually approved Senate Bill 824 (S. B. 824). 2017 Gen. 
Assem., 2018 Reg. Sess. Under that law's terms, those 
seeking to vote must do one of three things: present an ac-
ceptable photo ID, complete a provisional ballot and later 
produce a photo ID, or submit a form explaining why they

186 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Opinion of the Court 
cannot present a photo ID. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 163A–1145.1(a), (c), (d), as added by § 1.2(a), 2018 N. C. 
Sess. Laws 144, pp. 73–74. Photo ID cards are available free 
of charge in each of the State's 100 counties without the need 
for corroborating documentation. § 163A–869.1, as added by 
§ 1.1(a), id., at 72–73. After the law's passage, the Governor 
vetoed the bill, the General Assembly responded by over-
riding that veto, and S. B. 824 went into effect on Decem-
ber 19, 2018. 
The next day, the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) sued the Governor and 
the members of the State Board of Elections (collectively, 
Board). The Governor appoints the Board's members and 
may remove them under certain circumstances. See N. C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 143B–16, 163–19, 163–40. In its lawsuit, 
the NAACP alleged that S. B. 824 offends the Federal Con-
stitution. The State's attorney general assumed responsi-
bility for defending the Board. See § 114–2. Like the Gov-
ernor, the attorney general is an independently elected 
offcial. See N. C. Const., Art. III, § 7(1). Much like the 
Governor, too, while serving as a state senator the attorney 
general voted against an earlier voter-ID law and fled a dec-
laration in support of a legal challenge against it. See North 
Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 337–338, 357–359 (MDNC 2014). 
Soon, the speaker of the State House of Representatives 
and president pro tempore of the State Senate (legislative 
leaders) moved to intervene. App. 52. They noted that 
North Carolina law expressly authorizes them “to intervene 
on behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial 
proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provision 
of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1–72.2(b). They observed that, in cases of this sort, state 
law further provides that “both the General Assembly and 
the Governor constitute the State of North Carolina.” § 1– 
72.2(a). And the legislative leaders suggested that, without 
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their participation, important state interests would not be 
adequately represented in light of the Governor's opposition 
to S. B. 824, the Board's allegiance to the Governor, and the 
attorney general's opposition to earlier voter-ID efforts. 
App. 65–70. Finally, the legislative leaders pointed to paral-
lel state-court proceedings in which they claimed the Board 
had offered only a “tepid” defense of S. B. 824. Id., at 127, 
n. 1. 
The District Court denied the motion to intervene. North 
Carolina State Con ference of NAACP v. Cooper , 332 
F. R. D. 161 (MDNC 2019). In doing so, the court applied a 
“presumption” that the legislative leaders' interests would 
be adequately represented by the Governor and Board and 
their legal representative, the attorney general. Id., at 168– 
170. On the court's view, the legislative leaders might some-
day have an interest suffcient to warrant intervention if the 
existing parties refused to offer any defense of S. B. 824. 
Id., at 166. But because nothing like that had yet happened, 
the District Court denied the motion to intervene without 
prejudice to renewal later. Id., at 172–173. 
In time, the legislative leaders took up the District Court's 
offer to renew their motion. They pointed to this Court's 
intervening decision in Bethune-Hill, which “clarifed” that 
legislative leaders sometimes may be legally entitled to in-
tervene and represent “the interest of the State in defending 
the constitutionality of ” a state law. App. 159. They also 
updated the District Court on the Board's conduct in state-
court proceedings. There, the Board had conceded that its 
“ `primary objective' ” wasn't defending S. B. 824, but obtain-
ing guidance regarding which law it would need to enforce 
in an upcoming election (S. B. 824 or preexisting law). Id., 
at 156. Seizing on this concession, the state-court plaintiffs 
argued that even the Board did not think it would ultimately 
prevail on the merits. Id., at 157. In the end, however, the 
District Court was unmoved by these developments. It de-
nied the legislative leaders' renewed motion and addressed

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188 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
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Opinion of the Court 
Bethune-Hill only in a footnote stating that the decision did 
not “change the calculus.” North Carolina State Confer-
ence of NAACP v. Cooper, 2019 WL 5840845, *2, n. 3 
(MDNC, Nov. 7, 2019). 
As the federal litigation proceeded without the legislative 
leaders, the NAACP sought a preliminary injunction to pre-
vent the Board from enforcing S. B. 824 in upcoming elec-
tions. By this point, the District Court had dismissed the 
Governor from the suit. Only the Board members, repre-
sented by the attorney general, remained as defendants. In 
support of its motion for injunctive relief, the NAACP of-
fered fve expert reports. In reply, the Board did not op-
pose the motion on timeliness grounds even though the 
NAACP had waited nine months before seeking what it de-
scribed as critical emergency relief. See App. 311–313; 
Memorandum of Law in No. 1:18–cv–1034 (MDNC, Sept. 17, 
2019), ECF Doc. 73. Nor did the Board produce competing 
expert reports. Instead, it supplied a single affdavit from 
its executive director and stressed again the need for clarity 
about which law to apply. App. 312. Once more unsatisfed 
with the vigor of the Board's response, the legislative leaders 
sought to lodge an amicus brief, fve expert reports, and 
several other declarations. At the end of the day, however, 
the District Court refused to consider the amicus brief and 
accompanying materials, struck them from the record, and 
granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of 
S. B. 824. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. 
Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 54 (MDNC 2019). 
C 
The Fourth Circuit took up the District Court's prelimi-
nary injunction and intervention rulings in separate appeals 
before separate panels. While these appeals were pending, 
the Board did not seek an interim stay of the District Court's 
preliminary injunction. Apparently, it chose not to do so 
“due to the disruptive effect such relief would have had on”

Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 189 
Opinion of the Court 
election administration. App. 366, n. 8. As a result, S. B. 
824 was not enforced during the State's March 2020 pri-
mary election. 
In the appeal concerning the District Court's preliminary 
injunction ruling, the legislative leaders sought leave to in-
tervene and the Fourth Circuit granted their motion. See 
Order in North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. 
Raymond, No. 20–1092 (CA4, Mar. 27, 2020), ECF Doc. 43. 
Meanwhile, the Governor fled an amicus brief contending 
that the District Court had not gone far enough: “[The] pre-
liminary injunctio[n] should be made permanent, and . . . this 
unconstitutional law should never go into effect.” App. 844. 
After considering all the submissions before it, a unanimous 
panel of the Court of Appeals largely agreed with the legisla-
tive leaders and reversed. North Carolina State Confer-
ence of NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F. 3d 295, 298 (2020). The 
panel held that the District Court had abused its discretion 
in issuing the preliminary injunction because the record con-
tained insuffcient evidence to show that S. B. 824 violated 
the Federal Constitution. In particular, the panel explained 
that North Carolina's law “is more protective of the right 
to vote than other states' voter ID laws that courts have 
approved.” Id., at 310. Later, the Court of Appeals denied 
rehearing en banc; no judge noted a dissent. Any further 
District Court proceedings were thus left to unfold without 
a preliminary injunction in place. 
Separately and hoping to participate in those future pro-
ceedings, the legislative leaders asked another panel of the 
Fourth Circuit to vacate the District Court's decision deny-
ing their motion to intervene. The legislative leaders 
stressed that state law expressly authorizes them to partici-
pate in cases like this one, and they argued that they satis-
fed all the requirements for intervention as a matter of right 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). For its part, 
the Court of Appeals again agreed with the legislative lead-
ers, this time holding that the District Court had erred when 
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190 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
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Opinion of the Court 
denying them leave to intervene. 970 F. 3d 489, 503–504, 
506 (2020). 
Eventually, however, the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear 
the matter en banc and changed course. A nine-judge ma-
jority ruled that the legislative leaders were not entitled to 
intervene in District Court proceedings because they could 
not overcome a “heightened presumption” that the Board al-
ready “adequately represented” their interests. 999 F. 3d 
915, 927, 932–934 (2021). Six judges dissented. Among 
other things, the dissenters suggested that the majority had 
erred by “ignor[ing] North Carolina's law requesting two 
agents in cases challenging the constitutionality of its duly-
enacted statutes” and by “setting the bar for the Intervenors 
to clear too high.” Id., at 945 (opinion of Quattlebaum, J.); 
see also id., at 939 (opinion of Wilkinson, J.); id., at 941 (opin-
ion of Niemeyer, J.). 
The legislative leaders responded by petitioning this Court 
to review the Fourth Circuit's en banc ruling. We agreed 
to hear the matter in order to resolve disagreements among 
the circuits about the proper treatment of motions to inter-
vene in cases like this one. 595 U. S. ––– (2021). 
II 
Our starting point lies in Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. As relevant here, the Rule pro-
vides that a “court must permit anyone to intervene” who, 
(1) “[o]n timely motion,” (2) “claims an interest relating to 
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, 
and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practi-
cal matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect 
its interest,” (3) “unless existing parties adequately repre-
sent that interest.” Everyone before us agrees that the leg-
islative leaders' motion to intervene was timely. The only 
disagreements we face concern the Rule's two remaining 
requirements. 
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Opinion of the Court 
A 
We focus frst on the question whether the legislative lead-
ers have claimed an interest in the resolution of this lawsuit 
that may be practically impaired or impeded without their 
participation. No one questions that States possess “ `a le-
gitimate interest in the continued enforce[ment] of [their] 
own statutes.' ” Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Cen-
ter, P . S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 277 (2022) (quoting Taylor, 477 
U. S., at 137). No one questions that States may organize 
themselves in a variety of ways. After all, the separation 
of government powers has long been recognized as vital to 
the preservation of liberty, and it is through the power to 
“structure . . . its government, and the character of those 
who exercise government authority, [that] a State defnes it-
self as a sovereign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 
(1991). Nor does anyone question that, when a State 
chooses to allocate authority among different offcials who do 
not answer to one another, different interests and perspec-
tives, all important to the administration of state govern-
ment, may emerge. See, e. g., Brnovich v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee , 594 U. S. ––– (2021) (Arizona's secretary 
of state and attorney general took opposite sides). 
Appropriate respect for these realities suggests that fed-
eral courts should rarely question that a State's interests 
will be practically impaired or impeded if its duly authorized 
representatives are excluded from participating in federal 
litigation challenging state law. To hold otherwise would 
not only evince disrespect for a State's chosen means of dif-
fusing its sovereign powers among various branches and of-
fcials. It would not only risk turning a deaf federal ear to 
voices the State has deemed crucial to understanding the full 
range of its interests. It would encourage plaintiffs to make 
strategic choices to control which state agents they will face 
across the aisle in federal court. It would tempt litigants to 
select as their defendants those individual offcials they 
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Opinion of the Court 
consider most sympathetic to their cause or most inclined to 
settle favorably and quickly. All of which would risk a hob-
bled litigation rather than a full and fair adversarial testing 
of the State's interests and arguments. 
Nor are state interests the only interests at stake. Re-
specting the States' “plan[s] for the distribution of govern-
mental powers” also serves important national interests. 
Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League , 415 
U. S. 605, 615, n. 13 (1974). It better enables the States to 
serve as a “balance” to federal authority. Bond v. United 
States, 564 U. S. 211, 221 (2011). It permits States to accom-
modate government to local conditions and circumstances. 
See ibid. And it allows States to serve as laboratories of 
“innovation and experimentation” from which the federal 
government itself may learn and from which a “mobile citi-
zenry” benefts. Gregory, 501 U. S., at 458. Finally, a fed-
eral court tasked with testing the constitutionality of state 
law wields weighty “authority over a State's most fundamen-
tal political processes.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 751 
(1999). Permitting the participation of lawfully authorized 
state agents promotes informed federal-court decision-
making and avoids the risk of setting aside duly enacted 
state law based on an incomplete understanding of relevant 
state interests. 
This Court's teachings on these scores have been many, 
clear, and recent. Earlier this Term in Cameron, we ex-
plained that a State is free to “empowe[r] multiple offcials 
to defend its sovereign interests in federal court.” 595 
U. S., at 277. Three Terms ago in Bethune-Hill, we ob-
served that “ `a State must be able to designate agents to 
represent it in federal court' ” and may authorize its legisla-
ture “to litigate on the State's behalf, either generally or in 
a defned class of cases.” 587 U. S., at ––– – –––. “[T]he 
choice belongs to” the sovereign State. Id., at –––. In Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, this Court stressed that “state law may 
provide for other offcials,” besides an attorney general, “to 
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Opinion of the Court 
speak for the State in federal court” as some States have 
done for their “presiding legislative offcers.” 570 U. S. 693, 
710 (2013). And in Karcher v. May, this Court held that 
two state legislative leaders “authori[zed] under state law to 
represent the State's interests” in federal court could defend 
state laws there as parties. 484 U. S. 72, 75, 81–82 (1987). 
These principles and precedents are dispositive here. 
North Carolina has expressly authorized the legislative lead-
ers to defend the State's practical interests in litigation of 
this sort. State law provides that “[t]he Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of 
the Senate, as agents of the State, by and through counsel of 
their choice,” “shall jointly have standing to intervene on 
behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial 
proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provision 
of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1–72.2(b). Even beyond these instructions, the State has 
made plain that it considers the leaders of the General 
Assembly “necessary parties” to suits like this one. § 120– 
32.6(b). 
Tellingly, the Board seems to agree that, if North Carolina 
law authorizes participation by the legislative leaders on be-
half of the State, a federal court should fnd the interest 
requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) satisfed. Brief for State Re-
spondents 20, 28. The Board submits only that, in fact, 
North Carolina law does not afford the legislative leaders 
that authority. Id., at 49–50. But while we are hardly the 
fnal arbiters of North Carolina law, the Board's argument 
seems more than a little diffcult to square with the express 
statutory language above. One of these provisions is even 
entitled, “General Assembly Acting on Behalf of the State of 
North Carolina in Certain Actions.” § 120–32.6(b). It pro-
vides that the legislative leaders may defend state laws “as 
agents of the State.” Ibid. 
Retreating, the Board argues alternatively that the stat-
utes authorizing the legislative leaders to participate here 
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Opinion of the Court 
violate the State Constitution by usurping authority vested 
in the executive branch. Brief for State Respondents 50– 
55; N. C. Const., Art. I, § 6. But the Board's logic is hard to 
follow given its concession that the legislative leaders may 
intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), and likely as a mat-
ter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general ceases 
to represent the Board. Brief for State Respondents 2, 48, 
55. Nor, for that matter, does the Board identify anything 
to support its suggestion that the State's executive branch 
holds a constitutional monopoly on representing North Caro-
lina's practical interests in court. Instead, the parties direct 
us to a provision stating that the General Assembly may 
determine the scope of the attorney general's powers. See 
N. C. Const., Art. III, § 7(2); Bailey v. State, 353 N. C. 142, 
152–153, 540 S. E. 2d 313, 320 (2000). And, as we have seen, 
while the General Assembly has afforded the attorney gen-
eral considerable authority, it has also reserved to itself some 
authority to defend state law on behalf of the State. See 
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 120–32.6(b). In fact, it seems the 
General Assembly has sometimes even entrusted the defense 
of state interests to private persons. See § 1–608(b) (per-
mitting private citizens to bring false-claims actions “for 
the State”). 
The NAACP offers a different reply. It points out that 
Rule 24(a)(2) permits intervention only by “new” parties. 
And, it submits, the legislative leaders are already effec-
tively “existing” parties to this suit challenging the enforce-
ment of state law. Brief for NAACP Respondents 12–14. 
But whatever other problems may attend this argument, it 
rests on a premise that is both formally and functionally mis-
taken. As a formal matter and consistent with principles of 
sovereign immunity, the NAACP has not sued the State. 
Only state offcers are or may be “parties” here—and, so far, 
the legislative leaders are not among them. See Young, 209 
U. S., at 159–160. Functionally, of course, this suit impli-
cates North Carolina's sovereign interests regardless of the 
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Opinion of the Court 
named parties. See Part I–A, supra. Yet, contrary to the 
premise implicit in the NAACP's argument, a plaintiff who 
chooses to name this or that offcial defendant does not neces-
sarily and always capture all relevant state interests. In-
stead and as we have seen, where a State chooses to divide 
its sovereign authority among different offcials and author-
ize their participation in a suit challenging state law, a full 
consideration of the State's practical interests may require 
the involvement of different voices with different perspec-
tives. To hold otherwise would risk allowing a private 
plaintiff to pick its preferred defendants and potentially si-
lence those whom the State deems essential to a fair under-
standing of its interests. 
B 
The only remaining question we face concerns adequacy 
of representation. Interpreting Rule 24(a)(2), lower courts 
have adopted a variety of tests for evaluating whether an 
existing defendant already “adequately represent[s]” the 
same interests a proposed intervenor seeks to vindicate. In 
this case, both the District Court and the en banc Court of 
Appeals applied a “presumption” that the Board adequately 
represented the legislative leaders' interests and held that 
the leaders could not overcome this presumption. 999 F. 3d, 
at 934; Cooper, 332 F. R. D., at 171. 
Once more, we cannot agree. As an initial matter, Rule 
24(a)(2) promises intervention to those who bear an interest 
that may be practically impaired or impeded “unless existing 
parties adequately represent that interest.” In some cases, 
too, this Court has described the Rule's test as presenting 
proposed intervenors with only a minimal challenge. 
Take Trbovich v. Mine Workers, in which this Court ad-
dressed a request to intervene by a private party who as-
serted a related interest to that of an existing government 
party. 404 U. S. 528 (1972). There, the Secretary of Labor 
sued to set aside a union election. The same union member 
who fled the administrative complaint that triggered the 
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196 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
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Opinion of the Court 
Secretary's suit sought to intervene under Rule 24(a). Id., 
at 529–530. At a high level of abstraction, the union mem-
ber's interest and the Secretary's might have seemed closely 
aligned. Even so, this Court rejected the Secretary's sug-
gestion that he should be presumed an adequate representa-
tive of the union member's interests “unless the court . . . 
fnd[s] that the Secretary has failed to perform his statutory 
duty.” Id., at 538. The Court acknowledged that the Sec-
retary's and the union member's interests were “related,” 
but it emphasized that the interests were not “identical”— 
the union member sought relief against his union, full stop; 
meanwhile, the Secretary also had to bear in mind broader 
public-policy implications. Id., at 538–539. Rather than 
endorse a presumption of adequacy, the Court held that a 
movant's burden in circumstances like these “should be 
treated as minimal.” Id., at 538, n. 10. 
To be sure, some lower courts have suggested that a pre-
sumption of adequate representation remains appropriate in 
certain classes of cases. But even taken on their own terms, 
none of these presumptions applies to cases like ours. For 
example, the Fourth Circuit has endorsed a presumption of 
adequate representation where a member of the public seeks 
to intervene to defend a law alongside the government. See 
999 F. 3d, at 932–933. There, the Fourth Circuit has rea-
soned, a court may presume that legally authorized govern-
ment agents will adequately represent the public's interest 
in its chosen laws. Here, by contrast, the legislative leaders 
are among those North Carolina has expressly authorized to 
participate in litigation to protect the State's interests in its 
duly enacted laws. Id., at 951 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting). 
Similarly, some lower courts have adopted a presumption 
of adequate representation in cases where a movant's inter-
ests are identical to those of an existing party. See 7C 
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 1909 (3d ed. Supp. 2022) (Wright & Miller). But even 
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Opinion of the Court 
the Board concedes that this presumption applies only when 
interests “overla[p] fully.” Brief for State Respondents 26. 
Where “the absentee's interest is similar to, but not identical 
with, that of one of the parties,” that normally is not enough 
to trigger a presumption of adequate representation. 7C 
Wright & Miller § 1909. And again, a presumption like that 
holds no purchase here. North Carolina has authorized dif-
ferent agents to defend its practical interests precisely be-
cause, thanks to how it has structured its government, each 
may be expected to vindicate different points of view on the 
State's behalf. For a federal court to presume a full overlap 
of interests when state law more nearly presumes the oppo-
site would make little sense and do much violence to our 
system of cooperative federalism. In cases like ours, state 
agents may pursue “related” state interests, but they cannot 
be fairly presumed to bear “identical” ones. Trbovich, 404 
U. S., at 538. 
In the end, to resolve this case we need not decide whether 
a presumption of adequate representation might sometimes 
be appropriate when a private litigant seeks to defend a law 
alongside the government or in any other circumstance. We 
need only acknowledge that a presumption of adequate rep-
resentation is inappropriate when a duly authorized state 
agent seeks to intervene to defend a state law. In its en 
banc decision, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “a proposed 
intervenor's governmental status makes a heightened pre-
sumption of adequacy more appropriate, not less.” 999 
F. 3d, at 933; accord, Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. 
Kaul, 942 F. 3d 793, 801 (CA7 2019). But, respectfully, that 
gets things backward. Any presumption against interven-
tion is especially inappropriate when wielded to displace a 
State's prerogative to select which agents may defend its 
laws and protect its interests. Normally, a State's chosen 
representatives should be greeted in federal court with 
respect, not adverse presumptions. If the intervenor in 
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198 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Opinion of the Court 
Trbovich faced only a “minimal” burden, it cannot be that 
duly designated state agents seeking to vindicate state law 
should have to clear some higher hurdle. 
Setting aside the lower courts' erroneous presumptions, 
the proper resolution of today's case follows quickly. Cast-
ing aspersions on no one, this litigation illustrates how di-
vided state governments sometimes warrant participation 
by multiple state offcials in federal court. See 999 F. 3d, at 
939–941 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Recall just some of the 
facts of this case. See Parts I–B and I–C, supra. When 
confronted with a motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
Board declined to offer expert-witness affdavits in support 
of S. B. 824, even though its opponent offered many and the 
legislative leaders sought to supplement the record with 
their own. After the District Court issued its (ultimately 
overturned) injunction, the Board declined to seek a stay. 
That tactical choice, motivated by the Board's overriding 
concern for stability and certainty, meant that the State 
could not enforce its new law during a statewide election. 
Throughout, Board members have been appointed and poten-
tially removable by a Governor who vetoed S. B. 824 and 
who fled his own briefs in this litigation calling the law “un-
constitutional” and arguing that it “should never go into ef-
fect.” See supra, at 189. And at all times, the Board has 
been represented by an attorney general who, though no 
doubt a vigorous advocate for his clients' interests, is also an 
elected offcial who may feel allegiance to the voting public 
or share the Board's administrative concerns. 
The legislative leaders seek to give voice to a different 
perspective. Their “primary objective” is not clarifying 
which law applies. See supra, at 187. They are not bur-
dened by misgivings about the law's wisdom. If allowed to 
intervene, the legislative leaders say, they will focus on de-
fending the law vigorously on the merits without an eye to 
crosscutting administrative concerns. And, they add, the 
differences between their interest and the Board's in this 
case demonstrate why state law empowers them to partici-

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Opinion of the Court 
pate in litigation over the validity of state legislation—alive 
as it is to the possibility that different branches of govern-
ment may seek to vindicate different and valuable state in-
terests. Perhaps recognizing all this, the Fourth Circuit it-
self allowed the legislative leaders to intervene in the appeal 
from the District Court's preliminary injunction ruling. 
The same result should follow here. 
By way of reply, the NAACP—but not the Board—worries 
that allowing the legislative leaders to intervene could 
“make trial management impossible.” Brief for NAACP 
Respondents 26; but see Tr. of Oral Arg. 64 (noting that the 
Board has “no problem litigating alongside” the legislative 
leaders). We are not insensitive to the concern. In some 
other case, a proliferation of motions to intervene may be a 
cause for caution. At some point, too, it may be that the 
interests of existing parties will come to overlap fully with 
the interests of any remaining proposed intervenor. 
But that case is not this case. Not only do the legislative 
leaders bring a distinct state interest to bear on this litiga-
tion. No one has suggested that a cascade of motions lies 
on the horizon here. Recall that the NAACP initially 
named the Governor as a defendant. Absent his eventual 
dismissal from this litigation, the Governor might have been 
able to hire his own outside counsel while the attorney gen-
eral continued to represent the Board. See Martin, 320 
N. C., at 547–548, 359 S. E. 2d, at 480. Introducing the legis-
lative leaders and their counsel after the Governor's de-
parture may not represent a neat one-for-one swap. But 
litigation on this scale is hardly inconsistent with what the 
Board and the NAACP originally anticipated. 
Nor is it unusual. In matters ranging from civil-rights 
actions to suits testing the constitutionality of state or fed-
eral legislation, federal courts routinely handle cases involv-
ing multiple offcials sometimes represented by different 
attorneys taking different positions. See, e. g., Whole Wom-
an's Health v. Jackson, 595 U. S. 30 (2021); Brnovich, 594 
U. S. –––; United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744 (2013);

200 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (1990); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam ). This Court 
even hears cases in which offcials from a single State have 
sued each other in federal court. See, e. g., Virginia Offce 
for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247 (2011). 
Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative leaders 
to this case may pose, those burdens fall well within the 
bounds of everyday case management.* 
* 
Through the General Assembly, the people of North Caro-
lina have authorized the leaders of their legislature to defend 
duly enacted state statutes against constitutional challenge. 
Ordinarily, a federal court must respect that kind of sover-
eign choice, not assemble presumptions against it. Having 
satisfied the terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a)(2), North Carolina's legislative leaders are entitled to 
intervene in this litigation. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is 
Reversed. 
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting. 
When an individual or entity moves to intervene in a pend-
ing lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), a 
federal court is not authorized to grant the motion if an ex-
*The parties disagree whether our review of this case should be gov-
erned by a de novo or abuse-of-discretion standard. We fnd it unneces-
sary to resolve that question because, even under the latter and more 
forgiving standard, a misunderstanding of applicable law generally consti-
tutes reversible error. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 
384, 405 (1990). And here the lower courts erred as a matter of law at 
both relevant steps of the Rule 24(a)(2) analysis, frst by failing to afford 
due respect to North Carolina's law designating the legislative leaders as 
its agents in litigation of this sort, and then by “setting the [intervention] 
bar . . . too high.” 999 F. 3d 915, 945 (CA4 2021) (Quattlebaum, J., dissent-
ing). Likewise, because we hold that the legislative leaders are entitled 
to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2), we need not decide 
their alternative request for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). 
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
isting party to the case adequately represents the movant's 
interests. Today, however, the Court holds that two leaders 
of the North Carolina General Assembly are entitled to in-
tervene as a matter of right to represent the State's interest 
in defending the constitutionality of North Carolina law, even 
though that interest is already being ably pursued on the 
State's behalf by an existing state party to the litigation. 
The Court's decision is wrong for two reasons. First, the 
Court goes astray by creating a presumption that a State is 
inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever 
state law designates as a State's representative is allowed to 
intervene, even where the interests that the intervenors 
seek to represent are identical to those of an existing party. 
That presumption of inadequacy improperly permits state 
law, as opposed to federal law, to determine whether an ex-
isting party adequately represents a particular interest. 
Second, the Court errs by implying that the attorney gener-
al's defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue 
here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy. I respect-
fully dissent. 
I 
The underlying dispute in this case concerns the constitu-
tionality of North Carolina's voter-identifcation law, Senate 
Bill 824 (S. B. 824), enacted in 2018. The North Carolina 
State Conference of the NAACP (NAACP respondents) sued 
members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
(state respondents) and the Governor in Federal District 
Court, alleging that the law violated the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by, 
among other things, discriminating against Black and Latino 
voters. The state attorney general appeared as counsel to 
represent the Governor and state respondents. See N. C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 114–2 (2021) (providing that the attorney 
general has a “duty” “to appear for the State” in any matter 
“in which the State may be a party or interested” and to 
“represent all State departments, agencies, institutions, com-
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202 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
missions, bureaus or other organized activities of the State”). 
NAACP respondents also fled a parallel challenge to S. B. 
824 in state court. See Holmes v. Moore, No. 18–CV–15292 
(Super. Ct. Wake Cty., N. C.). 
Shortly after the federal suit was fled, Philip E. Berger, 
the president pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and 
Timothy K. Moore, the speaker of the North Carolina House 
of Representatives (petitioners here), fled a motion to inter-
vene “on behalf of the General Assembly.” App. 55. They 
sought to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a)(2), claiming a “signifcantly protectable in-
terest in the validity of S.B. 824.” App. 61. Petitioners 
cited, among other things, a state statute conferring upon 
them standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assem-
bly in cases challenging state law. Id., at 61–62 (citing N. C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2). In the alternative, petitioners 
sought permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(b). 
The District Court denied the motion without prejudice, 
explaining that petitioners lacked “a signifcantly protectable 
interest in . . . defending the constitutionality of S.B. 824 
sufficient to warrant a right to intervene under Rule 
24(a)(2)” because the Governor and state respondents re-
mained in the suit and were adequately defending the chal-
lenged law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 168. The court also rea-
soned that allowing petitioners to intervene would “ `hinder, 
rather than enhance, judicial economy' ” and would “ `unnec-
essarily complicate and delay' the various stages of this 
case,” including discovery, dispositive motions, and trial. 
Id., at 180. The court granted petitioners' motion to partici-
pate in the suit as amici, however, and assured petitioners 
that they could renew their motion to intervene if the attor-
ney general, as counsel for the existing state parties, “de-
clined to defend the lawsuit.” Id., at 157.
1 Petitioners did 
1 Petitioners submitted an amicus brief supporting state respondents' 
opposition to NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction. 
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
not appeal. Shortly thereafter, the District Court granted 
the Governor's motion to dismiss him from the suit. The 
attorney general continued representing state respondents 
in the litigation. 
Six weeks after the District Court denied their original 
intervention motion, petitioners fled a renewed motion, 
again seeking both to intervene as a matter of right and per-
missively. Petitioners primarily reiterated arguments made 
in their frst motion for intervention, adding that this Court's 
decision in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 
U. S. ––– (2019), “clarifed” the interests they sought to rep-
resent. App. 159. They also asserted that the attorney 
general's conduct in the parallel state-court litigation, in 
which petitioners were codefendants, supported petitioners' 
argument for intervention. Specifcally, petitioners argued 
that the attorney general moved to dismiss fve of six claims 
in the state-court litigation, but not the sixth; failed to de-
fend against NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary 
injunction; and “did not seriously engage” in discovery. Id., 
at 164. 
The District Court again denied the motion, explaining 
that it was “abundantly clear that [state respondents are] 
actively and adequately defending this lawsuit.” App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 189. The court recounted that state respond-
ents had “consistently `denied all substantive allegations of 
unconstitutionality' in this case” and had fled an “expansive” 
brief opposing NAACP respondents' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on the merits. Ibid. The court also re-
jected petitioners' argument that the attorney general's con-
duct in the pending state-court litigation was inadequate. 
The court explained that the attorney general's decision not 
to move to dismiss the sixth state-court claim in that sepa-
rate litigation “fell well within the range of reasonable litiga-
tion strategies”; that the attorney general secured reversal 
of the state-court preliminary injunction on appeal; and that 
the attorney general “ `participated in extensive fact discov-
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204 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
ery' ” in the state-court litigation. Id., at 191, 192. The 
court therefore found “no sound basis on which to speculate 
. . . that [state respondents] and [the] Attorney General 
w[ould] abandon their duty to defend S.B. 824 in this case,” 
given that, by all appearances, they had fully executed that 
duty in both the federal- and state-court litigation thus far. 
Id., at 193. 
The District Court also rejected petitioners' request for 
permissive intervention. In the court's view, petitioners' 
contentions in the federal litigation, including their repeated 
skepticism of state respondents' ability to defend state law 
vigorously, demonstrated that intervention “would only dis-
tract from the pressing issues in this case.” Id., at 193–194. 
Over a dissent by Judge Harris, the Court of Appeals va-
cated the District Court's order and remanded for reconsid-
eration of petitioners' request to intervene. The Court of 
Appeals voted to take the case en banc, however, and af-
frmed the District Court's denial of intervention. 
The en banc court began by stressing that its jurisdiction 
was limited to reviewing the order from which petitioners 
had chosen to appeal. Because petitioners had not appealed 
the District Court's denial of their frst intervention motion 
seeking to “represen[t] the General Assembly's `institutional 
interest' in enforcement of S.B. 824,” the Court of Appeals 
determined it could not review petitioners' claim that they 
were representing that particular institutional interest. 999 
F. 3d 915, 926 (CA4 2021). The en banc court instead ad-
dressed petitioners' argument that they were mandatorily 
entitled to represent the interest of the State in defending 
the constitutionality of S. B. 824. 
In its merits analysis, the en banc court observed that 
Rule 24(a)(2) contains several requirements, including that a 
proposed intervenor demonstrate both “ `an interest in the 
subject matter of the action' ” and “ `that the [proposed inter-
venor's] interest is not adequately represented by exist-
ing parties to the litigation.' ” Id., at 927 (citing Fed. Rule 
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2)). The court noted that petitioners had 
not asked the District Court and the Court of Appeals to 
consider whether state law was relevant to Rule 24(a)(2)'s 
adequacy requirement, as opposed to its interest require-
ment. See 999 F. 3d, at 930, n. 3. The court concluded that 
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2, the state statute authorizing 
petitioners to intervene in cases challenging state law, bore 
on only the interest requirement. The court explained that 
“[a] state's policy judgment about the value of legislative in-
tervention may bestow a protectable interest in certain court 
cases, but it does not override [a federal court's] normal 
standards for evaluating the adequacy of existing represen-
tation in those cases.” 999 F. 3d, at 929, n. 3 (emphasis 
added). 
The court assumed (as to the former requirement) that 
petitioners had established a protectable interest in the sub-
ject matter of the litigation, but held (as to the latter require-
ment) that this “purported interest in defending S.B. 824 on 
behalf of the State of North Carolina” was “adequately rep-
resented by existing parties to the litigation.” Id., at 927. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that petitioners had “no right 
to intervene in federal court under Rule 24(a)(2).” Ibid. 
This Court granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2021). 
II 
At the heart of this case is Rule 24(a)(2), which governs 
intervention as of right. As relevant here, Rule 24(a)(2) 
provides that a court “must permit anyone to intervene” 
who, (1) “[o]n timely motion,” (2) “claims an interest relating 
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the ac-
tion, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to 
protect its interest,” (3) “unless existing parties adequately 
represent that interest.” This case requires the Court to 
address how state laws affect mandatory intervention under 
Rule 24(a)(2). 
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206 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
I begin with points of agreement: The Court and I agree 
that “States may organize themselves in a variety of ways.” 
Ante, at 191; see Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S., at ––– – ––– (con-
trasting Virginia's choice to vest “[a]uthority and responsibil-
ity for representing the State's interests in civil litigation . . . 
exclusively with the State's Attorney General” with other 
States' decisions to authorize other agents “to litigate on the 
State's behalf ”). We agree that a State is free to designate 
who will represent it in federal court. See Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 710 (2013) (observing that although 
“[t]hat agent is typically the State's attorney general,” 
States may make a different choice); see also Planned Par-
enthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F. 3d 793, 802 (CA7 2019) 
(“[W]e can see no reason why a federal court would bat an 
eye if a state required its attorney general to withdraw from 
his representation and allow another entity, including a legis-
lature, to take over a case”). We also agree that state law 
can create a protectable interest in the resolution of a federal 
lawsuit. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986) (“[A] 
State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued en-
forceability of its own statutes”).
2 
I part ways with the Court because it is clear that Rule 
24(a)(2) does not give a State the right to have multiple par-
ties represent the same interest. Rather, Rule 24(a)(2) ex-
plicitly authorizes additional parties to intervene in pending 
litigation only if their interests are not adequately repre-
sented by an existing party. 
The Court instead concludes that the undisputed principles 
discussed above establish a presumption that a State's inter-
ests are not adequately represented “if [any of] its duly au-
thorized representatives are excluded from participating in 
2 We also agree that there is no need to decide whether a presumption 
of adequate representation is sometimes appropriate, ante, at 197, or what 
standard of review governs our analysis, ante, at 200, n. I disagree, how-
ever, with the Court's conclusion that the courts below erred under any 
standard and that reversal is required. 
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Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 207 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
federal litigation challenging state law.” Ante, at 191 (stat-
ing that “federal courts should rarely question that a State's 
interests will be practically impaired or impeded” in these 
circumstances). In the Court's view, because North Caro-
lina law provides that “[t]he Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate” 
“shall jointly have standing to intervene on behalf of the 
General Assembly as a party in any judicial proceeding chal-
lenging a North Carolina statute or provision of the North 
Carolina Constitution,” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2(b), “a 
federal court should fnd the interest requirement of Rule 
24(a)(2) satisfed,” ante, at 193. The Court so holds despite 
the fact that state respondents already represent the State's 
interests in this litigation in a manner that the District Court 
found adequate, and where the attorney general's defense of 
the constitutionality of the voter-identifcation law has thus 
far proved successful. 
The Court's presumption of inadequacy is novel. Neither 
petitioners nor the Court identify a single precedent in 
which a state actor was entitled to intervene as of right to 
defend a statute that another state actor already was defend-
ing. Rather, the issue in all cases the Court cites was 
whether any state offcial would be allowed to defend a 
State's interest when an offcial charged with doing so de-
clined to do so. Cf. Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical 
Center, P . S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 279, n. 5 (2022) (allowing Ken-
tucky attorney general to intervene in federal appellate pro-
ceeding “to defend Kentucky's interests” once “no other of-
fcial [was] willing to do so”); Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 
75, 81–82 (1987) (holding that two state legislators could in-
tervene to defend the constitutionality of state law after the 
attorney general declined to do so); Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S., 
at ––– (rejecting argument that the Virginia House of Dele-
gates and its Speaker, who intervened specifcally to repre-
sent their “own” interests rather than those of the State as 
a whole, could displace the attorney general as representa-
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208 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
tive of the State); see also Hollingsworth, 570 U. S., at 707, 
713 (holding that proponents of a ballot initiative who “ha[d] 
no role . . . in the enforcement of ” the initiative and were not 
“agents of the State” lacked standing to defend it on appeal). 
None of these precedents establish that state law can re-
quire a federal court to allow additional state actors to in-
tervene when another state actor is already ably and fully 
representing the State's interests in the litigation. To the 
contrary, it is well settled that the question whether an in-
terest is being “adequately represented” is one of federal 
law, not state law. See 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1905 (3d ed. Supp. 2022) 
(Wright, Miller, & Kane) (citing cases and observing that 
“[i]t is wholly clear that the right to intervene in a civil 
action pending in a United States District Court is gov-
erned by Rule 24 and not by state law”). Petitioners them-
selves, until they arrived at this Court, never adopted the 
view that state law can supplant a federal court's responsibil-
ity to decide adequacy of representation in an individual 
case. 
The Court's conclusion that state law can dictate what 
counts as “adequate” representation also suffers from practi-
cal infrmities. If state law can require a federal court to 
allow a second state actor to intervene to represent a differ-
ent “perspective,” ante, at 198, what is to stop a State from 
designating 3, 4, or 10 or more offcials as necessary parties 
to suits challenging state law? The Court acknowledges 
this concern but offers no limiting principle grounded in Rule 
24(a)(2). Ante, at 199. That is because it cannot: Under the 
Court's logic, a federal court would have no choice but to 
allow all 10 or more state offcials to intervene. 
This result contravenes Rule 24(a)(2) and the practical re-
alities of litigation that it refects. Federal law gives dis-
trict courts responsibility to assess, in the frst instance, the 
adequacy of a party's representation because those courts 
are most familiar with that representation and are responsi-
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Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 209 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
ble for managing their dockets and streamlining proceedings. 
Rule 24(a)(2) thus does not require district courts to allow 
intervention where interests are adequately represented be-
cause such intervention would be duplicative and ineffcient. 
This Rule accounts for the fact that mandatory intervention 
imposes costs on the original parties, on the court, and on all 
others whose interests depend on timely resolution of a 
given case. Forcing federal courts “to accommodate [a] ca-
cophony of parties,” 999 F. 3d, at 934, as the Court's logic 
today requires, will result in an “intractable procedural 
mess,” leaving district courts with “no basis for divining the 
true position of the [State] on issues like the meaning of state 
law, or even for purposes of doctrines like judicial estoppel.” 
Kaul, 942 F. 3d, at 801–802; see New Jersey v. New York, 345 
U. S. 369, 373 (1953) (per curiam ) (declining to be drawn into 
“intramural dispute” within a State). 
It is diffcult to overstate the burden the Court's holding 
will foist on district courts. Each intervenor will be entitled 
to fle its own brief concerning every motion and will be enti-
tled to its own discovery. Even when state agents' positions 
align, this multitude of parties will clog federal courts and 
delay the administration of justice.
3 When state agents' po-
sitions diverge, courts will also be put in the unenviable posi-
tion of determining “which of [a State's] representatives . . . 
better represents it.” 999 F. 3d, at 934. Out of respect for 
federalism, if nothing else, we should not interpret state law 
to hijack federal courts' ability to manage litigation involving 
States. See Virginia Offce for Protection and Advocacy v. 
Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 272 (2011) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) 
3 This case is the perfect example. The District Court scheduled trial 
for January 2021, but postponed it to January 2022 pending resolution of 
petitioners' appeal of their second motion for intervention. See 999 F. 3d, 
at 923. After certiorari was granted, the District Court stayed trial 
pending this Court's disposition of the case. Now that the District Court 
will be obligated to allow petitioners to intervene, trial inevitably will be 
delayed much further.

210 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
(noting the “indignity” suffered by a State when “a federal 
judge . . . decide[s] an internal state dispute”). 
III 
Aided by its new presumption of inadequacy, the Court 
concludes that state respondents inadequately represented 
petitioners' stated interests. The Court states that in so 
holding, it “[c]ast[s] aspersions on no one.” Ante, at 198. In 
the Court's view, however, petitioners (unlike state respond-
ents and their counsel, the attorney general) “are not bur-
dened by misgivings about the law's wisdom,” and therefore 
should be allowed to intervene to “give voice to a different 
perspective.” Ibid. The implication of the Court's holding 
is clear: The attorney general's performance fell short of rep-
resenting adequately the State's interests in the constitu-
tionality of its law, and for that reason, petitioners should be 
allowed to intervene. 
This is simply wrong. As a preliminary matter, petition-
ers and state respondents share the same interest: ensuring 
the validity and enforcement of S. B. 824. Cf. Trbovich v. 
Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1972) (allowing inter-
vention as of right where an intervenor's interests as an indi-
vidual union member were “not identical” to those of the 
existing party in the suit, the Secretary of Labor, who sought 
to represent the public interest). Here, state respondents 
explain that they “represen[t] . . . the State's interest in de-
fending its laws.” Brief for State Respondents 18. Their 
counsel, the attorney general, is required to do the same 
under North Carolina law. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 114–2. Identically, petitioners represent that they seek to 
defend “the State's vital interest in defending the constitu-
tionality of North Carolina's election laws.” Brief for Peti-
tioners 15–16. Indeed, petitioners cannot now seek to repre-
sent any unique interest of the General Assembly in the 
litigation because they abandoned that argument by failing to 
appeal the District Court's original order denying interven-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 211 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
tion on that basis. By their own admission, then, petitioners 
seek only to represent the State's interest in defending state 
law, an interest that state respondents already represent. 
The Court insists that petitioners' “perspective” neverthe-
less differs from that of state respondents, by focusing on 
“defending the law vigorously on the merits without an eye 
to crosscutting administrative concerns” such as obtaining 
guidance for the administration of upcoming elections. 
Ante, at 198; see Brief for Petitioners 48 (“The differing per-
spectives of Petitioners and State Board Respondents are a 
product of their different relationships to the State”). The 
Court's position rests in part on the assumption that leaders 
of the General Assembly have a unique interest that should 
be represented in the litigation. As noted, however, the 
case's procedural posture forecloses that argument because 
petitioners forfeited it.
4 
In any event, the difference in perspective the Court per-
ceives boils down only to a disagreement over trial strategy. 
As the Court rightly concedes, the State has a strong inter-
est in the orderly administration of its elections. See ante, 
at 198 (acknowledging state respondents' interest in “stabil-
ity and certainty” in an upcoming election). That is not, 
however, the only state interest that state respondents, rep-
resented by the attorney general, sought to defend. The 
attorney general has insisted all along that the interests he 
seeks to represent, and indeed is required to represent under 
state law, include defending the constitutionality of North 
Carolina laws like the voter-identifcation law at issue here. 
See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 114–2. These state interests are 
not mutually exclusive. The attorney general's choice to 
4 The argument that petitioners may intervene to represent a different 
“perspective” might have been a better ft for permissive intervention 
under Rule 24(b), rather than intervention as a matter of right under Rule 
24(a)(2). Petitioners, however, did not ask this Court to review the Dis-
trict Court's conclusion that they were not entitled to permissive 
intervention.

212 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
emphasize the State's interest in election administration at 
a particular stage of the litigation, while simultaneously 
maintaining a frm position on the constitutionality of S. B. 
824, was merely a choice about litigation strategy. It is a 
choice with which petitioners might disagree, but it does not 
render state respondents' representation inadequate. See 
7C Wright, Miller, & Kane § 1909 (“A mere difference of opin-
ion concerning the tactics with which the litigation should be 
handled does not make inadequate the representation of 
those whose interests are identical with that of an existing 
party”); accord, Kaul, 942 F. 3d, at 810–811 (Sykes, J., concur-
ring); Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and 
Election Practices, 172 F. 3d 104, 112 (CA1 1999). 
Properly understood, the attorney general's representa-
tion of state respondents satisfes any standard of adequacy. 
As the District Court explained, the attorney general “ac-
tively and adequately defend[ed] this lawsuit.” App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 189. He “consistently denied all substantive alle-
gations of unconstitutionality in this case.” Ibid. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). And he moved to dismiss the 
suit on federalism grounds, fled an “expansive brief ” oppos-
ing NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion on the merits, and has moved for summary judgment on 
all claims. Ibid. 
The Court faults the attorney general for emphasizing “ad-
ministrative concerns” in his brief on the merits and for not 
offering expert reports to support his opposition to a prelim-
inary injunction. See ante, at 198. Petitioners also take 
issue with the attorney general's decision not to seek a stay 
of the District Court's preliminary injunction pending ap-
peal. Brief for Petitioners 12, 50. But these are precisely 
the sort of strategic decisions that government attorneys 
make every day; in fact, petitioners themselves declined to 
seek a stay in the parallel litigation in state court. The 
Court's retrospective criticism of the attorney general's liti-
gation strategy is insuffcient to establish that state respond-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 213 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
ents inadequately represented the State's interests. See 
Saldano v. Roach, 363 F. 3d 545, 555 (CA5 2004) (“Simply 
because the [intervenor] would have made a different deci-
sion does not mean that the Attorney General is inade-
quately representing the State's interest—and hence, the [in-
tervenor's] claimed interest—especially since state law 
specifcally gives the Attorney General the discretion to 
make these kinds of decisions”). 
If any doubt remains, the results delivered by the attorney 
general's representation should eliminate it. The attorney 
general sought and secured on appeal a reversal of the Dis-
trict Court's preliminary injunction. He also won the Gov-
ernor's dismissal from the suit. It is hardly persuasive to 
fyspeck the attorney general's litigation approach when that 
very approach has vindicated the State's interests. 
Finally, the Court alludes to petitioners' argument that 
state respondents' representation of petitioners' interests 
was inadequate because the Governor (who vetoed S. B. 824 
and personally opposed the law) exercised appointment au-
thority over state respondents. Ante, at 198. The Court is 
right not to fully embrace this argument, which implies that 
the attorney general and the career professionals in his offce 
are incapable of executing their statutory duty to represent 
North Carolina in litigation and defend its interests. See 
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 114–2. Petitioners' “startling ac-
cusation” fies in the face of the presumption that public off-
cials can be trusted to exercise their offcial duties and over-
looks the attorney general's vigorous advocacy to date. 999 
F. 3d, at 937; see United States v. Chemical Foundation, 
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 15 (1926) (courts should “presume that [pub-
lic offcials] have properly discharged their offcial duties”). 
As the Court of Appeals explained, that the Governor or the 
attorney general “may have expressed policy views at odds 
with S.B. 824 in the past is no ground for a federal court to 
infer that [the attorney general] would abdicate his offcial 
duty to the State by subterfuge, mounting a sham defense of 
Page Proof Pending Publication

214 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
the statute.” 999 F. 3d, at 937. To suggest otherwise does 
a grave “disservice to the dignifed work of government law-
yers who each day put aside their own policy and political 
preferences to advocate dutifully on behalf of their govern-
ments and the general public.” Ibid. 
In short, the Court's conclusion that state respondents in-
adequately represented petitioners' interests is a fction that 
the record does not support. In addition, the Court's arm-
chair hypothesizing improperly displaces the District Court's 
frsthand experience in managing this litigation. 
* * * 
States are entitled to structure themselves as they wish 
and to decide who should represent their interests in federal 
litigation. State law may not, however, override the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure by requiring federal courts to 
allow intervention by multiple state representatives who all 
seek to represent the same state interest that an existing 
state party is already capably defending. Because the 
Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 192, line 4 from bottom: “set” is replaced with “class”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 597 U. S. Part 1 Pages 179–214 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 23, 2022 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  tive leaders sought to lodge an amicus brief and accompanying materi- als, but the District Court refused to consider them, struck them from the record, and granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of S. B. 824. The Fourth Circuit considered both District Court rulings in separate appeals before separa…

• #3

  be practically impaired or impeded if its duly authorized representatives are excluded from participating in federal litigation challenging state law. Nor are state interests the only interests at stake. Permitting the participation of lawfully authorized state agents promotes informed federal-court decisionmaking…

• #4

  legislative leaders are not among them. Functionally, however, this suit implicates North Carolina's sovereign interests regardless of the named parties. And, where a State chooses to divide its sovereign au- thority among different offcials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, a full…

• #5

  is not one. Federal courts routinely handle cases involving multiple offcials sometimes represented by different attorneys taking different positions. See, e. g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U. S. 30. Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative leaders to this case may pose, those burdens fall well…

• #6

  South Carolina, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the American Legislative Exchange Council by Jason Torchinsky, Phillip M. Gordon, and Jonathon Paul Hauenschild; for the Honest Elections Proj- ect by Jonathan P . Lienhard and Dallin B. Holt; for the Lawyers Democ- racy Fund et al. by Richard B. …

• #7

  that it is inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Gener- ally, States themselves are immune from suit in federal court. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 284 (2011). So usually a plaintiff will sue the individual state offcials most responsible for enforcing the law in question and seek injunctive or dec…

• #8

  to defend them fully in federal litigation. See, e. g., North Carolina v. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP , 581 U. S. 985, 986 (2017) (Roberts, C. J., statement respect- ing denial of certiorari); App. 79; see also N. Devins & S. Pra- kash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Ap- proaches to…

• #9

  offcial. See N. C. Const., Art. III, § 7(1). Much like the Governor, too, while serving as a state senator the attorney general voted against an earlier voter-ID law and fled a dec- laration in support of a legal challenge against it. See North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 3…

• #10

  legislative leaders sometimes may be legally entitled to in- tervene and represent “the interest of the State in defending the constitutionality of ” a state law. App. 159. They also updated the District Court on the Board's conduct in state- court proceedings. There, the Board had conceded that its “ `primary ob…

• #11

  Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 54 (MDNC 2019). C The Fourth Circuit took up the District Court's prelimi- nary injunction and intervention rulings in separate appeals before separate panels. While these appeals were pending, the Board did not seek an interim stay of the District Court's preliminary injunction. Appa…

• #12

  the Court of Appeals again agreed with the legislative lead- ers, this time holding that the District Court had erred when Page Proof Pending Publication 190 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP Opinion of the Court denying them leave to intervene. 970 F. 3d 489, 503–504, 506 (2020). Eventual…

• #13

  gitimate interest in the continued enforce[ment] of [their] own statutes.' ” Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Cen- ter, P . S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 277 (2022) (quoting Taylor, 477 U. S., at 137). No one questions that States may organize themselves in a variety of ways. After all, the separation of government powers…

• #14

  serve as a “balance” to federal authority. Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. 211, 221 (2011). It permits States to accom- modate government to local conditions and circumstances. See ibid. And it allows States to serve as laboratories of “innovation and experimentation” from which the federal government itself may…

• #15

  behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provision of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2(b). Even beyond these instructions, the State has made plain that it considers the leaders of the General Assembly “necessary p…

• #16

  authority to defend state law on behalf of the State. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 120–32.6(b). In fact, it seems the General Assembly has sometimes even entrusted the defense of state interests to private persons. See § 1–608(b) (per- mitting private citizens to bring false-claims actions “for the State”). The N…

• #17

  at 934; Cooper, 332 F. R. D., at 171. Once more, we cannot agree. As an initial matter, Rule 24(a)(2) promises intervention to those who bear an interest that may be practically impaired or impeded “unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” In some cases, too, this Court has described the Rule'…

• #18

  are among those North Carolina has expressly authorized to participate in litigation to protect the State's interests in its duly enacted laws. Id., at 951 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting). Similarly, some lower courts have adopted a presumption of adequate representation in cases where a movant's inter- ests are id…

• #19

  laws and protect its interests. Normally, a State's chosen representatives should be greeted in federal court with respect, not adverse presumptions. If the intervenor in Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication 198 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP Opinion of the Court…

• #20

  case demonstrate why state law empowers them to partici- Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 199 Opinion of the Court pate in litigation over the validity of state legislation—alive as it is to the possibility that different branches of govern- ment may seek to vindicate different and va…

• #21

  ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam ). This Court even hears cases in which offcials from a single State have sued each other in federal court. See, e. g., Virginia Offce for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247 (2011). Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative leaders to this case …

• #22

  in defending the constitutionality of North Carolina law, even though that interest is already being ably pursued on the State's behalf by an existing state party to the litigation. The Court's decision is wrong for two reasons. First, the Court goes astray by creating a presumption that a State is inadequately r…

• #23

  sought to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), claiming a “signifcantly protectable in- terest in the validity of S.B. 824.” App. 61. Petitioners cited, among other things, a state statute conferring upon them standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assem- bly in cases chal…

• #24

  which petitioners were codefendants, supported petitioners' argument for intervention. Specifcally, petitioners argued that the attorney general moved to dismiss fve of six claims in the state-court litigation, but not the sixth; failed to de- fend against NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction; a…

• #25

  frmed the District Court's denial of intervention. The en banc court began by stressing that its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the order from which petitioners had chosen to appeal. Because petitioners had not appealed the District Court's denial of their frst intervention motion seeking to “represen[t] t…

• #26

  to intervene in federal court under Rule 24(a)(2).” Ibid. This Court granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2021). II At the heart of this case is Rule 24(a)(2), which governs intervention as of right. As relevant here, Rule 24(a)(2) provides that a court “must permit anyone to intervene” who, (1) “[o]n timely motio…

• #27

  The Court instead concludes that the undisputed principles discussed above establish a presumption that a State's inter- ests are not adequately represented “if [any of] its duly au- thorized representatives are excluded from participating in 2 We also agree that there is no need to decide whether a presumption o…

• #28

  tervene to defend the constitutionality of state law after the attorney general declined to do so); Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S., at ––– (rejecting argument that the Virginia House of Dele- gates and its Speaker, who intervened specifcally to repre- sent their “own” interests rather than those of the State as a whole,…

• #29

  trict courts responsibility to assess, in the frst instance, the adequacy of a party's representation because those courts are most familiar with that representation and are responsi- Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 179 (2022) 209 Sotomayor, J., dissenting ble fo…

• #30

  will be obligated to allow petitioners to intervene, trial inevitably will be delayed much further. 210 BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP Sotomayor, J., dissenting (noting the “indignity” suffered by a State when “a federal judge . . . decide[s] an internal state dispute”). III Aided by it…

• #31

  law, an interest that state respondents already represent. The Court insists that petitioners' “perspective” neverthe- less differs from that of state respondents, by focusing on “defending the law vigorously on the merits without an eye to crosscutting administrative concerns” such as obtaining guidance for the …

• #32

  render state respondents' representation inadequate. See 7C Wright, Miller, & Kane § 1909 (“A mere difference of opin- ion concerning the tactics with which the litigation should be handled does not make inadequate the representation of those whose interests are identical with that of an existing party”); accord,…

• #33

  general sought and secured on appeal a reversal of the Dis- trict Court's preliminary injunction. He also won the Gov- ernor's dismissal from the suit. It is hardly persuasive to fyspeck the attorney general's litigation approach when that very approach has vindicated the State's interests. Finally, the Court all…

• #34

  eral Rules of Civil Procedure by requiring federal courts to allow intervention by multiple state representatives who all seek to represent the same state interest that an existing state party is already capably defending. Because the Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. Page Proof Pending Publicati…