Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

Summary

The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, are overruled; the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 597 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 215–423 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
June 24, 2022 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2021 215 
Syllabus 
DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE MISSIS-
SIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al. v. JACKSON 
WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the fth circuit 
No. 19–1392. Argued December 1, 2021—Decided June 24, 2022 
Mississippi's Gestational Age Act provides that “[e]xcept in a medical 
emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall 
not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of an 
unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn 
human being has been determined to be greater than ffteen (15) weeks.” 
Miss. Code Ann. § 41–41–191(4)(b). Respondents—Jackson Women's 
Health Organization, an abortion clinic, and one of its doctors—challenged 
the Act in Federal District Court, alleging that it violated this Court's 
precedents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, in particular 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833. The District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of respondents and permanently enjoined enforcement of the 
Act, reasoning that Mississippi's 15-week restriction on abortion violates 
this Court's cases forbidding States to ban abortion pre-viability. The 
Fifth Circuit affrmed. Before this Court, petitioners defend the Act 
on the grounds that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that the 
Act is constitutional because it satisfes rational-basis review. 
Held: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey 
are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the 
people and their elected representatives. Pp. 234–302. 
(a) The critical question is whether the Constitution, properly under-
stood, confers a right to obtain an abortion. Casey's controlling opinion 
skipped over that question and reaffrmed Roe solely on the basis of 
stare decisis. A proper application of stare decisis, however, requires 
an assessment of the strength of the grounds on which Roe was based. 
The Court therefore turns to the question that the Casey plurality did 
not consider. Pp. 234–257. 
(1) First, the Court reviews the standard that the Court's cases 
have used to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment's reference 
to “liberty” protects a particular right. The Constitution makes no ex-
press reference to a right to obtain an abortion, but several constitu-
tional provisions have been offered as potential homes for an implicit 
constitutional right. Roe held that the abortion right is part of a right

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to privacy that springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. See 410 U. S., at 152–153. The Casey Court 
grounded its decision solely on the theory that the right to obtain an 
abortion is part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. Others have suggested that support can 
be found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, but 
that theory is squarely foreclosed by the Court's precedents, which es-
tablish that a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classifca-
tion and is thus not subject to the heightened scrutiny that applies to 
such classifcations. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 496, n. 20; 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic , 506 U. S. 263, 273– 
274. Rather, regulations and prohibitions of abortion are governed by 
the same standard of review as other health and safety measures. 
Pp. 235–237. 
(2) Next, the Court examines whether the right to obtain an abor-
tion is rooted in the Nation's history and tradition and whether it is an 
essential component of “ordered liberty.” The Court fnds that the 
right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradi-
tion. The underlying theory on which Casey rested—that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides substantive, as well 
as procedural, protection for “liberty”—has long been controversial. 
The Court's decisions have held that the Due Process Clause protects 
two categories of substantive rights—those rights guaranteed by the 
frst eight Amendments to the Constitution and those rights deemed 
fundamental that are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. In 
deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories, the ques-
tion is whether the right is “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” 
and whether it is essential to this Nation's “scheme of ordered liberty.” 
Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The term “liberty” alone provides little guidance. Thus, historical in-
quiries are essential whenever the Court is asked to recognize a new 
component of the “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause. In interpreting what is meant by “liberty,” the Court must 
guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what the Four-
teenth Amendment protects with the Court's own ardent views about 
the liberty that Americans should enjoy. For this reason, the Court 
has been “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the 
Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125. 
Guided by the history and tradition that map the essential compo-
nents of the Nation's concept of ordered liberty, the Court fnds the 
Fourteenth Amendment clearly does not protect the right to an abor-
tion. Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no support in 
American law for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state

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Syllabus 
constitutional provision had recognized such a right. Until a few years 
before Roe, no federal or state court had recognized such a right. Nor 
had any scholarly treatise. Indeed, abortion had long been a crime in 
every single State. At common law, abortion was criminal in at least 
some stages of pregnancy and was regarded as unlawful and could have 
very serious consequences at all stages. American law followed the 
common law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s expanded 
criminal liability for abortions. By the time the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was adopted, three-quarters of the States had made abortion a 
crime at any stage of pregnancy. This consensus endured until the day 
Roe was decided. Roe either ignored or misstated this history, and 
Casey declined to reconsider Roe's faulty historical analysis. 
Respondents' argument that this history does not matter fies in the 
face of the standard the Court has applied in determining whether an 
asserted right that is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution is never-
theless protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Solicitor Gen-
eral repeats Roe's claim that it is “doubtful . . . abortion was ever frmly 
established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruc-
tion of a quick fetus,” 410 U. S., at 136, but the great common-law au-
thorities—Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone—all wrote that a post-
quickening abortion was a crime. Moreover, many authorities asserted 
that even a pre-quickening abortion was “unlawful” and that, as a result, 
an abortionist was guilty of murder if the woman died from the attempt. 
The Solicitor General suggests that history supports an abortion right 
because of the common law's failure to criminalize abortion before quick-
ening, but the insistence on quickening was not universal, see Mills v. 
Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633; State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630, 632, and 
regardless, the fact that many States in the late 18th and early 19th 
century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions does not mean that 
anyone thought the States lacked the authority to do so. 
Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abortion right 
itself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey contend that the 
abortion right is an integral part of a broader entrenched right. Roe 
termed this a right to privacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described it 
as the freedom to make “intimate and personal choices” that are “central 
to personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851. Ordered liberty 
sets limits and defnes the boundary between competing interests. Roe 
and Casey each struck a particular balance between the interests of a 
woman who wants an abortion and the interests of what they termed 
“potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. But 
the people of the various States may evaluate those interests differently. 
The Nation's historical understanding of ordered liberty does not pre-

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vent the people's elected representatives from deciding how abortion 
should be regulated. Pp. 237–255. 
(3) Finally, the Court considers whether a right to obtain an abor-
tion is part of a broader entrenched right that is supported by other 
precedents. The Court concludes the right to obtain an abortion cannot 
be justifed as a component of such a right. Attempts to justify abor-
tion through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to defne one's 
“concept of existence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those 
criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights 
to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. What sharply distin-
guishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on 
which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions ac-
knowledged: Abortion is different because it destroys what Roe termed 
“potential life” and what the law challenged in this case calls an “unborn 
human being.” None of the other decisions cited by Roe and Casey 
involved the critical moral question posed by abortion. Accordingly, 
those cases do not support the right to obtain an abortion, and the 
Court's conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right 
does not undermine them in any way. Pp. 255–257. 
(b) The doctrine of stare decisis does not counsel continued accept-
ance of Roe and Casey. Stare decisis plays an important role and pro-
tects the interests of those who have taken action in reliance on a past 
decision. It “reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, sav-
ing parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.” Kimble v. 
Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 576 U. S. 446, 455. It “contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827. And it restrains judicial hubris by respecting 
the judgment of those who grappled with important questions in the 
past. But stare decisis is not an inexorable command, Pearson v. Calla-
han, 555 U. S. 223, 233, and “is at its weakest when [the Court] inter-
pret[s] the Constitution,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235. Some 
of the Court's most important constitutional decisions have overruled 
prior precedents. See, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483, 491 (overruling the infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U. S. 537, and its progeny). 
The Court's cases have identifed factors that should be considered 
in deciding when a precedent should be overruled. Janus v. State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. –––, ––– – –––. Five fac-
tors discussed below weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and 
Casey. Pp. 263–290. 
(1) The nature of the Court's error . Like the infamous decision in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, Roe was also egregiously wrong and on a collision 
course with the Constitution from the day it was decided. Casey per-

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petuated its errors, calling both sides of the national controversy to 
resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey necessarily declared a win-
ning side. Those on the losing side—those who sought to advance the 
State's interest in fetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their 
elected representatives to adopt policies consistent with their views. 
The Court short-circuited the democratic process by closing it to the 
large number of Americans who disagreed with Roe. Pp. 268–269. 
(2) The quality of the reasoning . Without any grounding in the 
constitutional text, history, or precedent, Roe imposed on the entire 
country a detailed set of rules for pregnancy divided into trimesters 
much like those that one might expect to fnd in a statute or regulation. 
See 410 U. S., at 163–164. Roe's failure even to note the overwhelming 
consensus of state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said 
about the common law was simply wrong. Then, after surveying his-
tory, the opinion spent many paragraphs conducting the sort of fact-
fnding that might be undertaken by a legislative committee, and did 
not explain why the sources on which it relied shed light on the meaning 
of the Constitution. As to precedent, citing a broad array of cases, the 
Court found support for a constitutional “right of personal privacy.” 
Id., at 152. But Roe confated the right to shield information from dis-
closure and the right to make and implement important personal deci-
sions without governmental interference. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 
589, 599–600. None of these decisions involved what is distinctive 
about abortion: its effect on what Roe termed “potential life.” When 
the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it imposed on the coun-
try, it asserted that its rules were “consistent with,” among other 
things, “the relative weights of the respective interests involved” and 
“the demands of the profound problems of the present day.” Roe, 410 
U. S., at 165. These are precisely the sort of considerations that legisla-
tive bodies often take into account when they draw lines that accommo-
date competing interests. The scheme Roe produced looked like legis-
lation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation that might be 
expected from a legislative body. An even more glaring defciency was 
Roe's failure to justify the critical distinction it drew between pre- and 
post-viability abortions. See id., at 163. The arbitrary viability line, 
which Casey termed Roe's central rule, has not found much support 
among philosophers and ethicists who have attempted to justify a right 
to abortion. The most obvious problem with any such argument is that 
viability has changed over time and is heavily dependent on factors— 
such as medical advances and the availability of quality medical care— 
that have nothing to do with the characteristics of a fetus. 
When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, it reaffrmed Roe's 
central holding, but pointedly refrained from endorsing most of its rea-

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soning. The Court abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and in-
stead grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. 505 U. S., at 846. The controlling opinion 
criticized and rejected Roe's trimester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and 
substituted a new and obscure “undue burden” test. Casey, in short, 
either refused to reaffrm or rejected important aspects of Roe's analy-
sis, failed to remedy glaring defciencies in Roe's reasoning, endorsed 
what it termed Roe's central holding while suggesting that a majority 
might not have thought it was correct, provided no new support for the 
abortion right other than Roe's status as precedent, and imposed a new 
test with no frm grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent. 
Pp. 269–280. 
(3) Workability. Deciding whether a precedent should be over-
ruled depends in part on whether the rule it imposes is workable—that 
is, whether it can be understood and applied in a consistent and predict-
able manner. Casey's “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the 
workability scale. The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the 
“undue burden” test by setting out three subsidiary rules, but these 
rules created their own problems. And the diffculty of applying 
Casey's new rules surfaced in that very case. Compare 505 U. S., at 
881–887, with id., at 920–922 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further 
evidence that Casey's “line between” permissible and unconstitutional 
restrictions “has proved to be impossible to draw with precision.” 
Janus, 585 U. S., at –––. Casey has generated a long list of Circuit 
conficts. Continued adherence to Casey's unworkable “undue burden” 
test would undermine, not advance, the “evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. 
Pp. 280–286. 
(4) Effect on other areas of law . Roe and Casey have led to the 
distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines, and that 
effect provides further support for overruling those decisions. See 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
part). Pp. 286–287. 
(5) Reliance interests. Overruling Roe and Casey will not upend 
concrete reliance interests like those that develop in “cases involving 
property and contract rights.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. In Casey, the 
controlling opinion conceded that traditional reliance interests were not 
implicated because getting an abortion is generally “unplanned activity,” 
and “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of 
any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.” 505 U. S., 
at 856. Instead, the opinion perceived a more intangible form of reli-
ance, namely, that “people [had] organized intimate relationships and

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made choices that defne their views of themselves and their places in 
society . . . in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail” and that “[t]he ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated 
by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” Ibid. The con-
tending sides in this case make impassioned and conficting arguments 
about the effects of the abortion right on the lives of women as well as 
the status of the fetus. The Casey plurality's speculative attempt to 
weigh the relative importance of the interests of the fetus and the 
mother represent a departure from the “original constitutional proposi-
tion” that “courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for 
the judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 
729–730. 
The Solicitor General suggests that overruling Roe and Casey would 
threaten the protection of other rights under the Due Process Clause. 
The Court emphasizes that this decision concerns the constitutional 
right to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be 
understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion. 
Pp. 287–290. 
(c) Casey identifed another concern, namely, the danger that the 
public will perceive a decision overruling a controversial “watershed” 
decision, such as Roe, as infuenced by political considerations or public 
opinion. 505 U. S., at 866–867. But the Court cannot allow its deci-
sions to be affected by such extraneous concerns. A precedent of this 
Court is subject to the usual principles of stare decisis under which 
adherence to precedent is the norm but not an inexorable command. If 
the rule were otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy would still be 
the law. The Court's job is to interpret the law, apply longstanding 
principles of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly. Pp. 290–292. 
(d) Under the Court's precedents, rational-basis review is the ap-
propriate standard to apply when state abortion regulations undergo 
constitutional challenge. Given that procuring an abortion is not a fun-
damental constitutional right, it follows that the States may regulate 
abortion for legitimate reasons, and when such regulations are chal-
lenged under the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson, 372 
U. S., at 729–730. That applies even when the laws at issue concern 
matters of great social signifcance and moral substance. A law regu-
lating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a 
“strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319. It 
must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature 
could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Id., 
at 320. 
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Mississippi's Gestational Age Act is supported by the Mississippi Leg-
islature's specifc fndings, which include the State's asserted interest in 
“protecting the life of the unborn.” § 2(b)(i)(7) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). These legitimate interests provide a rational basis for 
the Gestational Age Act, and it follows that respondents' constitutional 
challenge must fail. Pp. 300–301. 
(e) Abortion presents a profound moral question. The Constitution 
does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibit-
ing abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. The Court 
overrules those decisions and returns that authority to the people and 
their elected representatives. P. 302. 
945 F. 3d 265, reversed and remanded. 
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Gor-
such, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., post, p. 330 
and Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 336, fled concurring opinions. Roberts, 
C. J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 347. Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 359. 
Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General of Mississippi, argued 
the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Lynn 
Fitch, Attorney General, Whitney H. Lipscomb, Deputy At-
torney General, Justin L. Matheny, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, and Wilson Minor, Special Assistant Attorney General. 
Julie Rikelman argued the cause for respondents. With 
her on the brief were Hillary Schneller, Jenny Ma, Shayna 
Medley, Robert B. McDuff, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Anton Metlit-
sky, Claudia Hammerman, and Alexia D. Korberg. 
Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for the 
United States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With 
her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Fletcher, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Erica L. Ross, 
Michael S. Raab, and Dana Kaersvang.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Texas 
et al. by Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Judd E. Stone II, Solici-
tor General, Brent Webster , First Assistant Attorney General, and Kyle 
D. Highful and Beth Klusmann, Assistant Solicitors General, and by the 
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall 
of Alabama, Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Mark Brnovich of Arizona, Leslie 
Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of

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Opinion of the Court 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Ameri-
cans hold sharply conficting views. Some believe fervently 
that a human person comes into being at conception and that 
Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, 
Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of 
Louisiana, Eric Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Doug-
las J. Peterson of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Dave 
Yost of Ohio, John M. O'Connor of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Caro-
lina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Ten-
nessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and 
Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for African-American, Hispanic, Roman Catholic 
and Protestant Religious and Civil Rights Organizations et al. by Mathew 
D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gannam; for 
the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists by 
Andrew C. Nichols and Sean P . Gates; for the American Center for Law 
and Justice et al. by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, 
Walter M. Weber, Jordan A. Sekulow, Laura Hernandez, Matthew R. 
Clark, Nikolas T. Nikas, and Dorinda C. Bordlee; for the American Col-
lege of Pediatricians et al. by Christopher E. Mills; for the American Cor-
nerstone Institute et al. by Edward M. Wenger and David W. Childs; for 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty by Mark L. Rienzi, Eric C. Rass-
bach, Lori H. Windham, Adèle Auxier Keim, and William J. Haun; for 
the Center for Religious Expression by Nathan W. Kellum; for Cleveland 
Lawyers for Life by David F. Forte; for Concerned Women for America 
by Mario Diaz; for the Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund 
by Patrick M. McSweeney, Robert J. Cynkar, William J. Olson, Jeremiah 
L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, and J. Mark Brewer; for Democrats for Life 
of America et al. by Julian McPhillips; for the Elliot Institute by Jay 
Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, Walter M. Weber, Laura 
Hernandez, Cecilia Noland-Heil, Francis J. Manion, and Geoffrey R. 
Surtees; for the Ethics and Public Policy Center by Charles J. Cooper, 
Peter A. Patterson, John D. Ohlendorf, and Richard W. Garnett; for the 
European Centre for Law and Justice by Jordan A. Sekulow, Cecilia 
Noland-Heil, Andrew J. Ekonomou, and Walter M. Weber; for the Family 
Research Council by Thomas R. McCarthy and Travis Weber; for the Jew-
ish Pro-Life Foundation et al. by Allan E. Parker, Jr ., and R. Clayton 
Trotter; for Judicial Watch, Inc., by Meredith L. Di Liberto and James F. 
Peterson; for the National Catholic Bioethics Center et al. by William 
Wagner and Erin Elizabeth Mersino; for the National Right to Life Com-
mittee et al. by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson; for the Prolife

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224 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly 
that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to 
control her own body and prevents women from achieving 
full equality. Still others in a third group think that abor-
Center at the University of St. Thomas by Teresa S. Collett and Paul 
Benjamin Linton; for Reason for Life by Samuel D. Green; for Scholars 
of Jurisprudence et al. by Robert P . George, pro se; for Texas Right to Life 
by Jonathan F. Mitchell and Adam K. Mortara; for the Thomas More 
Society by Thomas Brejcha and Paul Benjamin Linton; for the Trinity 
Legal Center by Linda Boston Schlueter ; for the World Faith Foundation 
et al. by James L. Hirsen, Deborah J. Dewart, and Tami Fitzgerald; for 
Mary Kay Bacallao by George L. Lyon, Jr.; for Rep. Steve Carra et al. by 
Matthew E. Gronda and Philip L. Ellison; for Stephen G. Gilles by Ste-
phen G. Gilles, pro se; for Mary Ann Glendon et al. by Heather Gebelin 
Hacker; for Sen. Josh Hawley et al. by Sen. Hawley, pro se, and Michael 
K. Velchik; for Gov. Henry McMaster et al. by Thomas A. Limehouse, Jr., 
William Grayson Lambert, William G. Parker, Jr., David B. Dove, Brady 
Hall, Anita Milanovich, and Jeff Oldham; for Melinda Thybault et al. by 
Allan E. Parker, Jr., R. Clayton Trotter, and Mary J. Browning; for Moni-
que Chireau Wubbenhorst et al. by Heather Hacker; and for 375 Women 
Injured by Second and Third Trimester Late Term Abortions et al. by 
Allan E. Parker, Jr., R. Clayton Trotter, and Mary J. Browning . 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 
California et al. by Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Michael J. 
Mongan, Solicitor General, Renu R. George , Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, and Aimee Feinberg and Helen H. Hong, Deputy Solicitors Gen-
eral, and Karli Eisenberg, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, by An-
drew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, and by the Attor-
neys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Philip J. Weiser 
of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Dela-
ware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Clare E. Connors of 
Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. 
Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Mich-
igan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Hector Bald-
eras of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein of North 
Carolina, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, 
Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Vermont, 
Mark R. Herring of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson of Washington, and 
Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for the Abortion Care Network et al. by E. 
Joshua Rosenkranz, Jennifer Keighley, Rachel G. Shalev, and Elizabeth 
R. Moulton; for Abortion Funds and Practical Support Organizations by

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Opinion of the Court 
tion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, 
and those within this group hold a variety of views about 
the particular restrictions that should be imposed. 
For the frst 185 years after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, each State was permitted to address this issue in ac-
cordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this 
Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113. Even though the 
Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held 
that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim 
Stephanie Toti, Amanda Allen, and Melissa Shube; for the American Bar 
Association by Reginald M. Turner, Amanda Shafer Berman, Clifton S. 
Elgarten, Keith Harrison, and Monica R. Sterling; for the American Civil 
Liberties Union et al. by Brigitte Amiri, Jennifer Dalven, Louise Mell-
ing, and David D. Cole; for the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists et al. by Kimberly A. Parker, Shiri A. Hickman, and Alan 
E. Schoenfeld; for the American Historical Association et al. by Jessica 
Ellsworth, Kaitlyn A. Golden, and Alicia J. Paller; for Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State et al. by Richard B. Katskee; for the 
Autistic Self Advocacy Network et al. by Geoffrey M. Wyatt; for the Cali-
fornia Women's Law Center by Theane D. Evangelis and Lauren Blas; for 
Campaña Nacional por el Aborto Libre, Seguro y Accesible et al. by 
Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe; for Catholics for Choice et al. by Eugene M. Gel-
ernter and Saul B. Shapiro; for the Constitutional Accountability Center 
by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and David H. Gans; for Current 
and Former Prosecutors et al. by John P . Mastando III and David Weiss; 
for Economists by Anjali Srinivasan; for Howard University School of 
Law Human and Civil Rights Clinic by Tiffany R. Wright; for Human 
Rights Watch et al. by Jeffrey T. Green, Xiao Wang, Michael G. Bochenek, 
and Amanda Klasing; for International and Comparative Legal Scholars 
by Shannon Rose Selden and Martha F. Davis; for the International Fed-
eration of Gynecology and Obstetrics by Adam Gershenson, Kathleen 
Hartnett, and Angeline Chen; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law et al. by Damon Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, Wade Henderson, 
and Lena Zwarensteyn; for LGBTQ Organizations et al. by Deanne E. 
Maynard, Brian R. Matsui, Jamie A. Levitt, James E. Hough, Katie L. 
Viggiani, Shannon Minter, and Julianna Gonen; for Local Governments 
by Jonathan B. Miller, Jonathan K. Youngwood, Simona G. Strauss, 
Anne L. Morgan, Arturo G. Michel, Michael N. Feuer, Rodrigo A. Castro-
Silva, Diana P . Cortes, Lyndsey M. Olson, Dennis J. Herrera, James R. 
Williams, and Peter S. Holmes; for National Advocates for Pregnant

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226 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
that American law or the common law had ever recognized 
such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the consti-
tutionally irrelevant (e. g ., its discussion of abortion in antiq-
uity) to the plainly incorrect (e. g ., its assertion that abortion 
Women et al. by Lynn M. Paltrow and David T. Goldberg; for the National 
Asian Pacifc American Women's Forum et al. by Robert M. Palumbos and 
Niyati Shah; for the National Women's Law Center et al. by Fatima Goss 
Graves, Gretchen Borchelt, Heather Shumaker, Michelle Banker, Sunu 
Chandy, and Agnès Dunogué; for Organizations Dedicated to the Fight for 
Reproductive Justice by Jessica Ring Amunson; for Reproductive Justice 
Scholars by Gary N. Frischling and Erin M. Culbertson; for Social Sci-
ence Experts by Leah R. Bruno; for the Yale Law School Information 
Society Project by Priscilla J. Smith; for YWCA USA et al. by Angela 
C. Vigil, Lindsay Wright Brett, and Kimberly F. Rich; for Lee C. Bol-
linger by Orin Snyder and Joshua S. Lipshutz; for Cecilia Fire Thunder 
et al. by Lael Echo-Hawk; for Anthony Hawks by Stephen C. Leckar; for 
Serena Mayeri by Roberta A. Kaplan; for Scott Pyles by Scott Pyles, pro 
se; for 236 Members of Congress by John A. Freedman and Sally L. Pei; 
for 500 Women Athletes et al. by David A. Barrett; for 547 Deans et al. 
by Edward T. Waters, Phillip A. Escoriaza, and Rosie Dawn Griffn; and 
for 896 State Legislators by Claude G. Szyfer. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Advancing American Freedom, 
Inc., et al. by Renee K. Carlson, Teresa S. Collett, and Matthew J. Sheehan; 
for Advocates for Youth, Inc., et al. by Erica W. Harris; for the Alabama 
Center for Law and Liberty by Matthew J. Clark; for the American Soci-
ety for Legal History et al. by Catherine M. Foti, Karen R. King, Nicole 
L. Buseman, and Bronwyn C. Roantree; for Americans United for Life 
by Catherine Glenn Foster, Steven H. Aden, and Clarke D. Forsythe; for 
Biologists by Lynn D. Dowd; for Birth Equity Organizations et al. by Car-
olyn F. Corwin; for the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association et al. by 
Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, James A. Davids, and 
David A. Bruce; for Care Net et al. by Harold J. Cassidy, Joseph R. Zak-
hary, and Thomas J. Viggiano III; for the Catholic Medical Association 
et al. by Maura K. Quinlan; for the CatholicVote.org Education Fund by 
Scott W. Gaylord; for the Center for Family and Human Rights by Alexis 
I. Fragosa and Cathleen A. Ruse; for the Center for Medical Progress 
et al. by Charles S. LiMandri, Paul M. Jonna, Jeffrey M. Trissell, Har-
meet K. Dhillon, and Mark P . Meuser; for the Christian Legal Society 
et al. by Kimberlee Wood Colby, Kenneth W. Starr, and Bradley J. Lingo; 
for Christian Medical and Dental Associations by D. Kent Safriet and Ken-
neth C. Daines; for the Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional

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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 227 
Opinion of the Court 
was probably never a crime under the common law). After 
cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing 
on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded 
with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be 
found in a statute enacted by a legislature. 
Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso; for European 
Law Professors by Simon A. Steel and Stephen R. McAllister; for Euro-
pean Legal Scholars by Brian J. Field and Riddhi Dasgupta; for Experts, 
Researchers, and Advocates Opposing the Criminalization of People Who 
Have Abortions by Farah Diaz-Tello, Sara L. Ainsworth, Paul J. Law-
rence, Jessica A. Skelton, and Alanna Peterson; for the Feminist Majority 
Foundation et al. by John E. Hall and David M. Zionts; for the Foundation 
for Moral Law et al. by John A. Eidsmoe and Roy S. Moore; for the 
Foundation to Abolish Abortion et al. by Bradley W. Pierce; for Good 
Counsel, Inc., by Sean Collier; for Heartbeat International, Inc., by Dan-
ielle M. White; for Human Coalition Action et al. by Chelsey D. Youman; 
for Illinois Right to Life et al. by Thomas G. Olp and Rita Louise Lowery 
Gitchell; for Intercessors for America et al. by William J. Olson and Phil-
lip L. Jauregui; for the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty by Howard 
Slugh; for Legal Voice et al. by Kim Clark and Amanda J. Beane; for the 
LONANG Institute by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A. Pentiuk; for 
the March for Life Education and Defense Fund by Jonathan P . Lienhard; 
for Organizations of Women Lawyers—Women Lawyers on Guard Inc. 
et al. by Mia Guizzetti Hayes, Cory M. Amron, Elaine Metlin, and Karen 
M. Richardson; for the Pacifc Justice Institute by Frederick W. Clay-
brook, Jr., and David A. Bruce; for the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation 
by Maura K. Quinlan; for Priests for Life by Robert Joseph Muise and 
David Yerushalmi; for Scholars of Court Procedure by Anna-Rose Ma-
thieson and Susan Yorke; for the Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine 
et al. by Janice Mac Avoy, Jennifer L. Colyer, and Leigh G. Rome; for 
United Nations Mandate Holders by Emma Lindsay; for the United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. by Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., 
Jeffrey Hunter Moon, Michael F. Moses, Carl H. Esbeck, Christian J. 
Strickland, and Stephen J. Carmody; for Women Legislators et al. by H. 
Christopher Bartolomucci and Hannah C. Smith; for Randy Beck by 
Elizabeth Brooks Scherer; for David Boyle by David Boyle, pro se; for 
Maureen L. Condic et al. by Gene C. Schaerr and Scott D. Goodwin; for 
Joseph W. Dellapenna by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr.; for Jonathan Eng-
lish by Jonathan English, pro se; for Andy Gipson by William L. Smith, 
Sharon A. Rose, and Jared R. Butcher; for Kurt T. Lash by Kevin C. 
Walsh; for Robin Pierucci et al. by Catherine W. Short; for Hannah S.

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228 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was regu-
lated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at 
roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time, 
corresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to 
achieve “viability,” i. e., the ability to survive outside the 
womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had a 
legitimate interest in protecting “potential life,” 
1 it found 
that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-
viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for 
this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard 
to defend Roe's reasoning. One prominent constitutional 
scholar wrote that he “would vote for a statute very much 
like the one the Court end[ed] up drafting” if he were “a 
legislator,” but his assessment of Roe was memorable and 
brutal: Roe was “not constitutional law” at all and gave “al-
most no sense of an obligation to try to be.” 
2 
At the time of Roe, 30 States still prohibited abortion at 
all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third 
of the States had liberalized their laws, but Roe abruptly 
ended that political process. It imposed the same highly 
restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively 
struck down the abortion laws of every single State.
3 As 
Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision 
represented the “exercise of raw judicial power,” 410 U. S., 
et al. by Mary J. Browning, Allan E. Parker, Jr., and R. Clayton Trotter; 
for Lee J. Strang by Philip D. Williamson; for Connie Weiskopf et al. by 
Kristine L. Brown, pro se; for 22 State Policy Organizations by J. Thomas 
Smith; for 141 International Legal Scholars by Antony B. Kolenc and 
Stephen M. Krason; for 228 Members of Congress by Catherine Glenn 
Foster and Steven H. Aden; for 240 Women Scholars et al. by Teresa S. 
Collett, Erika Bachiochi, and Helen M. Alvaré; and for 396 State Legisla-
tors by Jeffrey A. Shafer . 
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). 
2 J. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale 
L. J. 920, 926, 947 (1973) (Ely) (emphasis deleted). 
3 L. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of 
Life and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1973) (Tribe).

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 229 
Opinion of the Court 
at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embit-
tered our political culture for a half century. 4 
Eventually, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court revisited Roe, but the 
Members of the Court split three ways. Two Justices ex-
pressed no desire to change Roe in any way.
5 Four others 
wanted to overrule the decision in its entirety. 6 And the 
three remaining Justices, who jointly signed the controlling 
opinion, took a third position.
7 Their opinion did not en-
dorse Roe's reasoning, and it even hinted that one or more 
of its authors might have “reservations” about whether the 
Constitution protects a right to abortion.
8 But the opinion 
concluded that stare decisis, which calls for prior decisions 
to be followed in most instances, required adherence to what 
it called Roe's “central holding”—that a State may not 
constitutionally protect fetal life before “viability”—even if 
that holding was wrong.
9 Anything less, the opinion 
claimed, would undermine respect for this Court and the rule 
of law. 
Paradoxically, the judgment in Casey did a fair amount 
of overruling. Several important abortion decisions were 
overruled in toto , and Roe itself was overruled in part.
10 
4 See R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N. Y . U. L. Rev. 1185, 
1208 (1992) (“Roe . . . halted a political process that was moving in a reform 
direction and thereby, I believed, prolonged divisiveness and deferred sta-
ble settlement of the issue”). 
5 See 505 U. S., at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id., at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). 
6 See id., at 944 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part); id., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
7 See id., at 843 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
8 Id., at 853. 
9 Id., at 860. 
10 Id., at 861, 870, 873 (overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986)). 
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230 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
Casey threw out Roe's trimester scheme and substituted a 
new rule of uncertain origin under which States were forbid-
den to adopt any regulation that imposed an “undue burden” 
on a woman's right to have an abortion.11 The decision pro-
vided no clear guidance about the difference between a “due” 
and an “undue” burden. But the three Justices who au-
thored the controlling opinion “call[ed] the contending sides 
of a national controversy to end their national division” by 
treating the Court's decision as the fnal settlement of the 
question of the constitutional right to abortion.
12 
As has become increasingly apparent in the intervening 
years, Casey did not achieve that goal. Americans continue 
to hold passionate and widely divergent views on abortion, 
and state legislatures have acted accordingly. Some have 
recently enacted laws allowing abortion, with few restric-
tions, at all stages of pregnancy. Others have tightly re-
stricted abortion beginning well before viability. And in 
this case, 26 States have expressly asked this Court to over-
rule Roe and Casey and allow the States to regulate or pro-
hibit pre-viability abortions. 
Before us now is one such state law. The State of Missis-
sippi asks us to uphold the constitutionality of a law that 
generally prohibits an abortion after the 15th week of preg-
nancy—several weeks before the point at which a fetus is 
now regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In defending 
this law, the State's primary argument is that we should re-
consider and overrule Roe and Casey and once again allow 
each State to regulate abortion as its citizens wish. On the 
other side, respondents and the Solicitor General ask us to 
reaffrm Roe and Casey, and they contend that the Missis-
sippi law cannot stand if we do so. Allowing Mississippi to 
prohibit abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, they argue, 
“would be no different than overruling Casey and Roe en-
tirely.” Brief for Respondents 43. They contend that “no 
11 505 U. S., at 874. 
12 Id., at 867.

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 231 
Opinion of the Court 
half-measures” are available and that we must either reaf-
frm or overrule Roe and Casey. Brief for Respondents 50. 
We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Con-
stitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right 
is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, includ-
ing the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now 
chiefy rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee 
some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but 
any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The right to abortion does not fall within this category. 
Until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was 
entirely unknown in American law. Indeed, when the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted, three quarters of the 
States made abortion a crime at all stages of pregnancy. 
The abortion right is also critically different from any other 
right that this Court has held to fall within the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protection of “liberty.” Roe's defenders char-
acterize the abortion right as similar to the rights recognized 
in past decisions involving matters such as intimate sexual 
relations, contraception, and marriage, but abortion is funda-
mentally different, as both Roe and Casey acknowledged, be-
cause it destroys what those decisions called “fetal life” and 
what the law now before us describes as an “unborn human 
being.” 
13 
Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey's controlling 
opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence 
to Roe's abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously 
wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally 
weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. 
And far from bringing about a national settlement of the 
13 Miss. Code Ann. § 41–41–191(4)(b) (2018). 
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232 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enfamed debate and 
deepened division. 
It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of 
abortion to the people's elected representatives. “The per-
missibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be 
resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by 
citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.” 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). That is what the Constitution 
and the rule of law demand. 
I 
The law at issue in this case, Mississippi's Gestational Age 
Act, see Miss. Code Ann. § 41–41–191 (2018), contains this 
central provision: “Except in a medical emergency or in the 
case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not inten-
tionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of 
an unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the 
unborn human being has been determined to be greater than 
ffteen (15) weeks.” § 4(b).
14 
To support this Act, the legislature made a series of fac-
tual fndings. It began by noting that, at the time of en-
actment, only six countries besides the United States “per-
mit[ted] nontherapeutic or elective abortion-on-demand after 
the twentieth week of gestation.” 
15 § 2(a). The legislature 
14 The Act defnes “gestational age” to be “the age of an unborn human 
being as calculated from the frst day of the last menstrual period of the 
pregnant woman.” § 3(f). 
15 Those other six countries were Canada, China, the Netherlands, North 
Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. See A. Baglini, Charlotte Lozier Insti-
tute, Gestational Limits on Abortion in the United States Compared to 
International Norms 6–7 (2014); M. Lee, Is the United States One of Seven 
Countries That “Allow Elective Abortions After 20 Weeks of Pregnancy?” 
Wash. Post (Oct. 9, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/ 
2017/10/09/is-the-united-states-one-of-seven-countries-that-allow-elective-
abortions-after-20-weeks-of-pregnancy (stating that the claim made by 
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Opinion of the Court 
then found that at 5 or 6 weeks' gestational age an “unborn 
human being's heart begins beating”; at 8 weeks the “unborn 
human being begins to move about in the womb”; at 9 weeks 
“all basic physiological functions are present”; at 10 weeks 
“vital organs begin to function,” and “[h]air, fngernails, and 
toenails . . . begin to form”; at 11 weeks “an unborn human 
being's diaphragm is developing,” and he or she may “move 
about freely in the womb”; and at 12 weeks the “unborn 
human being” has “taken on `the human form' in all relevant 
respects.” § 2(b)(i) (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 
124, 160 (2007)). It found that most abortions after 15 
weeks employ “dilation and evacuation procedures which in-
volve the use of surgical instruments to crush and tear the 
unborn child,” and it concluded that the “intentional commit-
ment of such acts for nontherapeutic or elective reasons is a 
barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, and 
demeaning to the medical profession.” § 2(b)(i)(8). 
Respondents are an abortion clinic, Jackson Women's 
Health Organization, and one of its doctors. On the day the 
Gestational Age Act was enacted, respondents fled suit in 
Federal District Court against various Mississippi offcials, 
alleging that the Act violated this Court's precedents es-
tablishing a constitutional right to abortion. The District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents 
and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act, reasoning 
that “viability marks the earliest point at which the State's 
interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify 
a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions” and that 15 
weeks' gestational age is “prior to viability.” Jackson 
the Mississippi Legislature and the Charlotte Lozier Institute was “backed 
by data”). A more recent compilation from the Center for Reproductive 
Rights indicates that Iceland and Guinea-Bissau are now also similarly 
permissive. See The World's Abortion Laws, Center for Reproductive 
Rights (Feb. 23, 2021), https://reproductiverights.org/maps/worlds -
abortion-laws/. 
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234 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
Women's Health Org. v. Currier , 349 F. Supp. 3d 536, 539– 
540 (SD Miss. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Fifth Circuit affrmed. 945 F. 3d 265 (2019). 
We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ––– (2021), to resolve the 
question whether “all pre-viability prohibitions on elective 
abortions are unconstitutional,” Pet. for Cert. i. Petitioners' 
primary defense of the Mississippi Gestational Age Act is 
that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that “the Act 
is constitutional because it satisfes rational-basis review.” 
Brief for Petitioners 49. Respondents answer that allowing 
Mississippi to ban pre-viability abortions “would be no differ-
ent than overruling Casey and Roe entirely.” Brief for Re-
spondents 43. They tell us that “no half-measures” are 
available: We must either reaffrm or overrule Roe and 
Casey. Brief for Respondents 50. 
II 
We begin by considering the critical question whether the 
Constitution, properly understood, confers a right to obtain 
an abortion. Skipping over that question, the controlling 
opinion in Casey reaffrmed Roe's “central holding” based 
solely on the doctrine of stare decisis, but as we will explain, 
proper application of stare decisis required an assessment of 
the strength of the grounds on which Roe was based. See 
infra, at 269–280. 
We therefore turn to the question that the Casey plurality 
did not consider, and we address that question in three steps. 
First, we explain the standard that our cases have used in 
determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment's refer-
ence to “liberty” protects a particular right. Second, we ex-
amine whether the right at issue in this case is rooted in our 
Nation's history and tradition and whether it is an essential 
component of what we have described as “ordered liberty.” 
Finally, we consider whether a right to obtain an abortion 
is part of a broader entrenched right that is supported by 
other precedents. 
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Opinion of the Court 
A 
1 
Constitutional analysis must begin with “the language of 
the instrument,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 186–189 
(1824), which offers a “fxed standard” for ascertaining what 
our founding document means, 1 J. Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States § 399, p. 383 (1833). 
The Constitution makes no express reference to a right to 
obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim that it pro-
tects such a right must show that the right is somehow im-
plicit in the constitutional text. 
Roe, however, was remarkably loose in its treatment of the 
constitutional text. It held that the abortion right, which is 
not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right to pri-
vacy, which is also not mentioned. See 410 U. S., at 152– 
153. And that privacy right, Roe observed, had been found 
to spring from no fewer than fve different constitutional pro-
visions—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Id., at 152. 
The Court's discussion left open at least three ways in 
which some combination of these provisions could protect the 
abortion right. One possibility was that the right was 
“founded . . . in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights 
to the people.” Id., at 153. Another was that the right was 
rooted in the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendment, or in some 
combination of those provisions, and that this right had been 
“incorporated” into the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment just as many other Bill of Rights provi-
sions had by then been incorporated. Ibid.; see also Mc-
Donald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 763–766 (2010) (majority 
opinion) (discussing incorporation). And a third path was 
that the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments played no role 
and that the right was simply a component of the “liberty” 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. Roe, 410 U. S., at 153. Roe expressed the “feel-
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236 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
[ing]” that the Fourteenth Amendment was the provision 
that did the work, but its message seemed to be that the 
abortion right could be found somewhere in the Constitution 
and that specifying its exact location was not of paramount 
importance.
16 The Casey Court did not defend this unfo-
cused analysis and instead grounded its decision solely on 
the theory that the right to obtain an abortion is part of 
the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. 
We discuss this theory in depth below, but before doing so, 
we briefy address one additional constitutional provision 
that some of respondents' amici have now offered as yet an-
other potential home for the abortion right: the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 24 (Brief for United 
States); see also Brief for Equal Protection Constitutional 
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae. Neither Roe nor Casey saw 
ft to invoke this theory, and it is squarely foreclosed by our 
precedents, which establish that a State's regulation of abor-
tion is not a sex-based classifcation and is thus not subject 
to the “heightened scrutiny” that applies to such classifca-
tions.
17 The regulation of a medical procedure that only one 
sex can undergo does not trigger heightened constitutional 
scrutiny unless the regulation is a “mere pretex[t] designed 
to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of 
one sex or the other.” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 496, 
n. 20 (1974). And as the Court has stated, the “goal of 
preventing abortion” does not constitute “invidiously dis-
criminatory animus” against women. Bray v. Alexandria 
16 The Court's words were as follows: “This right of privacy, whether it 
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, 
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy.” 410 U. S., at 153. 
17 See, e. g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U. S. 47, 57 (2017). 
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Opinion of the Court 
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 273–274 (1993) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, laws regulating 
or prohibiting abortion are not subject to heightened scru-
tiny. Rather, they are governed by the same standard of 
review as other health and safety measures.
18 
With this new theory addressed, we turn to Casey's bold 
assertion that the abortion right is an aspect of the “liberty” 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 505 U. S., at 846; Brief for Respondents 17; 
Brief for United States 21–22. 
2 
The underlying theory on which this argument rests—that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides 
substantive, as well as procedural, protection for “liberty”— 
has long been controversial. But our decisions have held 
that the Due Process Clause protects two categories of sub-
stantive rights. 
The frst consists of rights guaranteed by the frst eight 
Amendments. Those Amendments originally applied only 
to the Federal Government, Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. 
Mayor of Baltimore , 7 Pet. 243, 247–251 (1833) (opinion for 
the Court by Marshall, C. J.), but this Court has held that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “in-
corporates” the great majority of those rights and thus 
makes them equally applicable to the States. See McDon-
ald, 561 U. S., at 763–767, and nn. 12–13. The second cate-
gory—which is the one in question here—comprises a select 
list of fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere 
in the Constitution. 
In deciding whether a right falls into either of these cate-
gories, the Court has long asked whether the right is “deeply 
rooted in [our] history and tradition” and whether it is essen-
tial to our Nation's “scheme of ordered liberty.” Timbs v. 
18 We discuss this standard in Part VI of this opinion. 
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238 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); McDonald, 561 U. S., at 764, 767 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).19 And in conducting this inquiry, 
we have engaged in a careful analysis of the history of the 
right at issue. 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Timbs is a re-
cent example. In concluding that the Eighth Amendment's 
protection against excessive fnes is “fundamental to our 
scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition,” 586 U. S., at ––– (internal quota-
tion marks omitted), her opinion traced the right back to 
Magna Carta, Blackstone's Commentaries, and 35 of the 37 
state constitutions in effect at the ratifcation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 586 U. S., at ––– – –––. 
A similar inquiry was undertaken in McDonald, which 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to 
keep and bear arms. The lead opinion surveyed the origins 
of the Second Amendment, the debates in Congress about 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state consti-
tutions in effect when that Amendment was ratifed (at least 
22 of the 37 States protected the right to keep and bear 
arms), federal laws enacted during the same period, and 
other relevant historical evidence. 561 U. S., at 767–777. 
Only then did the opinion conclude that “the Framers and 
ratifers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to 
keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights neces-
sary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id., at 778; see also 
id., at 822–850 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (surveying history and reaching the same 
19 See also, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 148 (1968) (asking 
whether “a right is among those `fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' ”); Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) (requiring “a `principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental' ” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 
(1934))).

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Opinion of the Court 
result under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Im-
munities Clause). 
Timbs and McDonald concerned the question whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects rights that are expressly 
set out in the Bill of Rights, and it would be anomalous if 
similar historical support were not required when a putative 
right is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. Thus, 
in Glucksberg, which held that the Due Process Clause does 
not confer a right to assisted suicide, the Court surveyed 
more than 700 years of “Anglo-American common-law tradi-
tion,” 521 U. S., at 711, and made clear that a fundamental 
right must be “objectively, `deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition,' ” id., at 720–721. 
Historical inquiries of this nature are essential whenever 
we are asked to recognize a new component of the “liberty” 
protected by the Due Process Clause because the term “lib-
erty” alone provides little guidance. “Liberty” is a capa-
cious term. As Lincoln once said: “We all declare for lib-
erty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same 
thing.” 
20 In a well-known essay, Isaiah Berlin reported that 
“historians of ideas” had cataloged more than 200 different 
senses in which the term had been used.
21 
In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's reference to “liberty,” we must guard against the 
natural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment 
protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that 
Americans should enjoy. That is why the Court has long 
been “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not mentioned 
in the Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 
115, 125 (1992). “Substantive due process has at times been 
a treacherous feld for this Court,” Moore v. East Cleveland, 
431 U. S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion), and it has some-
times led the Court to usurp authority that the Constitution 
20 Address at Sanitary Fair at Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 18, 1864), reprinted 
in 7 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 301 (R. Basler ed. 1953) 
(emphasis deleted). 
21 Four Essays on Liberty 121 (1969).

240 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
entrusts to the people's elected representatives. See Re-
gents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225–226 
(1985). As the Court cautioned in Glucksberg, “[w]e must 
. . . exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break 
new ground in this feld, lest the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the Members of this Court.” 521 U. S., at 720 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
On occasion, when the Court has ignored the “[a]ppro-
priate limits” imposed by “ `respect for the teachings of his-
tory,' ” Moore, 431 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion), it has 
fallen into the freewheeling judicial policymaking that char-
acterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 
198 U. S. 45 (1905). The Court must not fall prey to such an 
unprincipled approach. Instead, guided by the history and 
tradition that map the essential components of our Nation's 
concept of ordered liberty, we must ask what the Fourteenth 
Amendment means by the term “liberty.” When we engage 
in that inquiry in the present case, the clear answer is that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the right to 
an abortion.
22 
22 That is true regardless of whether we look to the Amendment's Due 
Process Clause or its Privileges or Immunities Clause. Some scholars 
and Justices have maintained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that guarantees substantive 
rights. See, e. g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 813–850 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Duncan, 391 
U. S., at 165–166 (Black, J., concurring); A. Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation 
and Reconstruction 163–180 (1998) (Amar); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 
22–30 (1980); 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History 
of the United States 1089–1095 (1953). But even on that view, such a 
right would need to be rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. See 
Corfeld v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–552 (No. 3,230) (CC ED Pa. 1823) 
(describing unenumerated rights under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, Art. IV , § 2, as those “fundamental” rights “which have, at all 
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states”); Amar 176 (rely-
ing on Corfeld to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause); cf. Mc-
Donald, 561 U. S., at 819–820, 832, 854 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (reserving 
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B 
1 
Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no sup-
port in American law for a constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion. No state constitutional provision had recognized 
such a right. Until a few years before Roe was handed 
down, no federal or state court had recognized such a right. 
Nor had any scholarly treatise of which we are aware. And 
although law review articles are not reticent about advocat-
ing new rights, the earliest article proposing a constitutional 
right to abortion that has come to our attention was pub-
lished only a few years before Roe.
23 
Not only was there no support for such a constitutional 
right until shortly before Roe, but abortion had long been a 
crime in every single State. At common law, abortion was 
criminal in at least some stages of pregnancy and was 
regarded as unlawful and could have very serious conse-
quences at all stages. American law followed the common 
law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s ex-
panded criminal liability for abortions. By the time of the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-quarters of 
the States had made abortion a crime at any stage of preg-
nancy, and the remaining States would soon follow. 
Roe either ignored or misstated this history, and Casey 
declined to reconsider Roe's faulty historical analysis. It is 
therefore important to set the record straight. 
the question whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects “any 
rights besides those enumerated in the Constitution”). 
23 See R. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement 
and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N. C. L. Rev. 730 (1968) 
(Lucas); see also D. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality 334–335 (1994) (Gar-
row) (stating that Lucas was “undeniably the frst person to fully articu-
late on paper” the argument that “a woman's right to choose abortion was 
a fundamental individual freedom protected by the U. S. Constitution's 
guarantee of personal liberty”). 
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242 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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2 
a 
We begin with the common law, under which abortion was 
a crime at least after “quickening”—i. e., the frst felt move-
ment of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between 
the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.
24 
The “eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone, Coke, 
Hale, and the like),” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. –––, ––– 
(2020), all describe abortion after quickening as criminal. 
Henry de Bracton's 13th-century treatise explained that if a 
person has “struck a pregnant woman, or has given her poi-
son, whereby he has caused abortion, if the foetus be already 
formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated, he 
commits homicide.” 2 De Legibus et Consuetudinibus An-
gliae 279 (T. Twiss ed. 1879); see also 1 Fleta, ch. 23, re-
printed in 72 Selden Soc. 60–61 (H. Richardson & G. Sayles 
eds. 1955) (13th-century treatise).
25 
Sir Edward Coke's 17th-century treatise likewise asserted 
that abortion of a quick child was “murder” if the “childe be 
born alive” and a “great misprision” if the “childe dieth in 
her body.” 3 Institutes of the Laws of England 50–51 
24 The exact meaning of “quickening” is subject to some debate. Com-
pare Brief for Scholars of Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae 12–14, and n. 32 
(emphasis deleted) (“ `a quick child' ” meant simply a “live” child, and under 
the era's outdated knowledge of embryology, a fetus was thought to be-
come “quick” at around the sixth week of pregnancy), with Brief for Amer-
ican Historical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 2 (“quick” and 
“quickening” consistently meant “the woman's perception of fetal move-
ment”). We need not wade into this debate. First, it suffces for present 
purposes to show that abortion was criminal by at least the 16th or 18th 
week of pregnancy. Second, as we will show, during the relevant pe-
riod—i. e., the period surrounding the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the quickening distinction was abandoned as States crimi-
nalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See infra, at 246–250. 
25 Even before Bracton's time, English law imposed punishment for the 
killing of a fetus. See Leges Henrici Primi 222–223 (L. Downer ed. 1972) 
(imposing penalty for any abortion and treating a woman who aborted a 
“quick” child “as if she were a murderess”). 
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(1644). (“Misprision” referred to “some heynous offence 
under the degree of felony.” Id., at 139.) Two treatises by 
Sir Matthew Hale likewise described abortion of a quick 
child who died in the womb as a “great crime” and a “great 
misprision.” Pleas of the Crown 53 (P. Glazebrook ed. 1972); 
1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (Hale). And 
writing near the time of the adoption of our Constitution, 
William Blackstone explained that abortion of a “quick” child 
was “by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter” (citing 
Bracton), and at least a very “heinous misdemeanor” (citing 
Coke). 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 129–130 
(7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone). 
English cases dating all the way back to the 13th century 
corroborate the treatises' statements that abortion was a 
crime. See generally J. Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths 
of Abortion History 126, and n. 16, 134–142, 188–194, and 
nn. 84–86 (2006) (Dellapenna); J. Keown, Abortion, Doctors 
and the Law 3–12 (1988) (Keown). In 1732, for example, 
Eleanor Beare was convicted of “destroying the Foetus in 
the Womb” of another woman and “thereby causing her to 
miscarry.” 
26 For that crime and another “misdemeanor,” 
Beare was sentenced to two days in the pillory and three 
years' imprisonment.
27 
Although a pre-quickening abortion was not itself consid-
ered homicide, it does not follow that abortion was permissi-
ble at common law—much less that abortion was a legal 
right. Cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 713 (removal of “com-
mon law's harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance of 
suicide”). Quite to the contrary, in the 1732 case mentioned 
above, the judge said of the charge of abortion (with no men-
tion of quickening) that he had “never met with a case so 
barbarous and unnatural.” 
28 Similarly, an indictment from 
1602, which did not distinguish between a pre-quickening 
and post-quickening abortion, described abortion as “perni-
26 2 Gentleman's Magazine 931 (Aug. 1732). 
27 Id., at 932. 
28 Ibid. 
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244 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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cious” and “against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her 
crown and dignity.” Keown 7 (quoting R. v. Webb, Calendar 
of Assize Records, Surrey Indictments 512 (1980)). 
That the common law did not condone even pre-quickening 
abortions is confrmed by what one might call a proto-felony-
murder rule. Hale and Blackstone explained a way in which 
a pre-quickening abortion could rise to the level of a homi-
cide. Hale wrote that if a physician gave a woman “with 
child” a “potion” to cause an abortion, and the woman died, 
it was “murder” because the potion was given “unlawfully 
to destroy her child within her.” 1 Hale 429–430 (emphasis 
added). As Blackstone explained, to be “murder” a killing 
had to be done with “malice aforethought, . . . either express, 
or implied.” 4 Blackstone 198 (emphasis deleted). In the 
case of an abortionist, Blackstone wrote, “the law will imply 
[malice]” for the same reason that it would imply malice if a 
person who intended to kill one person accidentally killed a 
different person: 
“[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is 
murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which 
the law transfers from one to the other. The same is 
the case, where one lays poison for A; and B, against 
whom the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it, and 
it kills him; this is likewise murder. So also , if one 
gives a woman with child a medicine to procure abor-
tion, and it operates so violently as to kill the woman, 
this is murder in the person who gave it.” Id., at 200– 
201 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
29 
Notably, Blackstone, like Hale, did not state that this 
proto-felony-murder rule required that the woman be “with 
29 Other treatises restated the same rule. See 1 W. Russell & C. 
Greaves, Crimes and Misdemeanors 540 (5th ed. 1845) (“So where a person 
gave medicine to a woman to procure an abortion, and where a person put 
skewers into the womb of a woman for the same purpose, by which in both 
cases the women were killed, these acts were clearly held to be murder” 
(footnotes omitted)); 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown 230 (1803) (similar). 
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quick child”—only that she be “with child.” Id., at 201. 
And it is revealing that Hale and Blackstone treated abor-
tionists differently from other physicians or surgeons who 
caused the death of a patient “without any intent of doing 
[the patient] any bodily hurt.” Hale 429; see 4 Blackstone 
197. These other physicians—even if “unlicensed”—would 
not be “guilty of murder or manslaughter.” Hale 429. But 
a physician performing an abortion would, precisely because 
his aim was an “unlawful” one. 
In sum, although common-law authorities differed on the 
severity of punishment for abortions committed at different 
points in pregnancy, none endorsed the practice. Moreover, 
we are aware of no common-law case or authority, and 
the parties have not pointed to any, that remotely suggests 
a positive right to procure an abortion at any stage of 
pregnancy. 
b 
In this country, the historical record is similar. The “most 
important early American edition of Blackstone's Commen-
taries,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 594 
(2008), reported Blackstone's statement that abortion of 
a quick child was at least “a heinous misdemeanor,” 2 
St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 129–130 
(1803), and that edition also included Blackstone's discussion 
of the proto-felony-murder rule, 5 id., at 200–201. Manuals 
for justices of the peace printed in the Colonies in the 18th 
century typically restated the common-law rule on abortion, 
and some manuals repeated Hale's and Blackstone's state-
ments that anyone who prescribed medication “unlawfully to 
destroy the child” would be guilty of murder if the woman 
died. See, e. g., J. Parker, Conductor Generalis 220 (1788); 2 
R. Burn, Justice of the Peace, and Parish Offcer 221–222 (7th 
ed. 1762) (English manual stating the same).
30 
30 For manuals restating one or both rules, see J. Davis, Criminal Law 
96, 102–103, 339 (1838); Conductor Generalis 194–195 (1801) (printed in 
Philadelphia); Conductor Generalis 194–195 (1794) (printed in Albany); 
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The few cases available from the early colonial period cor-
roborate that abortion was a crime. See generally Della-
penna 215–228 (collecting cases). In Maryland in 1652, for 
example, an indictment charged that a man “Murtherously 
endeavoured to destroy or Murther the Child by him begot-
ten in the Womb.” Proprietary v. Mitchell, 10 Md. Ar-
chives 80, 183 (1652) (W. Browne ed. 1891). And by the 19th 
century, courts frequently explained that the common law 
made abortion of a quick child a crime. See, e. g., Smith v. 
Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 
(1851); State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 52–55 (1849); Common-
wealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 264–268 (1845). 
c 
The original ground for drawing a distinction between pre-
and post-quickening abortions is not entirely clear, but some 
have attributed the rule to the diffculty of proving that a 
pre-quickening fetus was alive. At that time, there were 
no scientifc methods for detecting pregnancy in its early 
stages,
31 and thus, as one court put it in 1872: “[U]ntil the 
period of quickening there is no evidence of life; and what-
ever may be said of the foetus, the law has fxed upon this 
Conductor Generalis 220 (1788) (printed in New York); Conductor Genera-
lis 198 (1749) (printed in New York); G. Webb, Offce and Authority of a 
Justice of Peace 232 (1736) (printed in Williamsburg); Conductor Generalis 
161 (1722) (printed in Philadelphia); see also J. Conley, Doing It by the 
Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in Eighteenth Cen-
tury America, 6 J. Legal Hist. 257, 265, 267 (1985) (noting that these manu-
als were the justices' “primary source of legal reference” and of “practical 
value for a wider audience than the justices”). 
For cases stating the proto-felony-murder rule, see, e. g., Common-
wealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 265 (1845); People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 
594, 595–596, 26 N. W. 291, 292–293 (1886); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 
131–132 (1868); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54–55 (1851). 
31 See E. Rigby, A System of Midwifery 73 (1841) (“Under all circum-
stances, the diagnosis of pregnancy must ever be diffcult and obscure 
during the early months”); see also id., at 74–80 (discussing rudimentary 
techniques for detecting early pregnancy); A. Taylor, A Manual of Medical 
Jurisprudence 418–421 (6th Am. ed. 1866) (same). 
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period of gestation as the time when the child is endowed 
with life” because “foetal movements are the frst clearly 
marked and well defned evidences of life .” Evans v. Peo-
ple, 49 N. Y . 86, 90 (emphasis added); Cooper, 22 N. J. L., at 
54 (“In contemplation of law life commences at the moment 
of quickening, at that moment when the embryo gives the 
frst physical proof of life , no matter when it frst received 
it” (emphasis deleted and added)). 
The Solicitor General offers a different explanation of the 
basis for the quickening rule, namely, that before quickening 
the common law did not regard a fetus “as having a `separate 
and independent existence.' ” Brief for United States 26 
(quoting Parker, 50 Mass., at 266). But the case on which 
the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also sug-
gested that the criminal law's quickening rule was out of step 
with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law, not-
ing that “to many purposes, in reference to civil rights, an 
infant in ventre sa mère is regarded as a person in being.” 
Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129); see also Evans, 49 N. Y ., at 
89; Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850); Morrow 
v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 
258 (1834); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, 321–322, 31 
Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1789). 
At any rate, the original ground for the quickening rule is 
of little importance for present purposes because the rule 
was abandoned in the 19th century. During that period, 
treatise writers and commentators criticized the quickening 
distinction as “neither in accordance with the result of medi-
cal experience, nor with the principles of the common law.” 
F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 1220, p. 606 (rev. 4th ed. 1857) 
(footnotes omitted); see also J. Beck, Researches in Medicine 
and Medical Jurisprudence 26–28 (2d ed. 1835) (describing 
the quickening distinction as “absurd” and “ injurious”).
32 In 
32 See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 209–210 (1879) (acknowl-
edging the common-law rule but arguing that “the law should punish abor-
tions and miscarriages, willfully produced, at any time during the period 
of gestation”); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850) (the quicken-
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248 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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1803, the British Parliament made abortion a crime at all 
stages of pregnancy and authorized the imposition of severe 
punishment. See Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58 
(1803). One scholar has suggested that Parliament's deci-
sion “may partly have been attributable to the medical man's 
concern that fetal life should be protected by the law at all 
stages of gestation.” Keown 22. 
In this country during the 19th century, the vast majority 
of the States enacted statutes criminalizing abortion at all 
stages of pregnancy. See Appendix A, infra (listing state 
statutory provisions in chronological order).
33 By 1868, the 
year when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed, three-
quarters of the States, 28 out of 37, had enacted statutes 
making abortion a crime even if it was performed before 
quickening.
34 See ibid. Of the nine States that had not yet 
ing rule “never ought to have been the law anywhere”); J. Bishop, Com-
mentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes § 744, p. 471 (1873) (“If we look 
at the reason of the law, we shall prefer” a rule that “discard[s] this doc-
trine of the necessity of a quickening”); I. Dana, Report of the Committee 
on the Production of Abortion, in 5 Transactions of the Maine Medical 
Association 37–39 (1866); Report on Criminal Abortion, in 12 Transactions 
of the American Medical Association 75–77 (1859); W. Guy, Principles of 
Forensic Medicine 133–134 (1845); J. Chitty, Practical Treatise on Medical 
Jurisprudence 438 (2d Am. ed. 1836); 1 T. Beck & J. Beck, Elements of 
Medical Jurisprudence 293 (5th ed. 1835); 2 T. Percival, The Works, Liter-
ary, Moral, and Medical 430 (1807); see also Keown 38–39 (collecting Eng-
lish authorities). 
33 See generally Dellapenna 315–319 (cataloging the development of the 
law in the States); E. Quay, Justifable Abortion—Medical and Legal Foun-
dations, 49 Geo. L. J. 395, 435–437, 447–520 (1961) (Quay) (same); J. Wither-
spoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes and The 
Fourteenth Amendment, 17 St. Mary's L. J. 29, 34–36 (1985) (Wither-
spoon) (same). 
34 Some scholars assert that only 27 States prohibited abortion at all sta-
ges. See, e. g., Dellapenna 315; Witherspoon 34–35, and 33, n. 15. Those 
scholars appear to have overlooked Rhode Island, which criminalized abor-
tion at all stages in 1861. See Acts and Resolves R. I. 1861, ch. 371, 
§ 1, p. 133 (criminalizing the attempt to “procure the miscarriage” of “any 
pregnant woman” or “any woman supposed by such person to be preg-

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 249 
Opinion of the Court 
criminalized abortion at all stages, all but one did so by 1910. 
See ibid. 
The trend in the Territories that would become the last 13 
States was similar: All of them criminalized abortion at all 
stages of pregnancy between 1850 (the Kingdom of Hawaii) 
and 1919 (New Mexico). See Appendix B, infra; see also 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 952 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part); Dellapenna 317–319. 
By the end of the 1950s, according to the Roe Court's own 
count, statutes in all but four States and the District of 
Columbia prohibited abortion “however and whenever per-
formed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the 
mother.” 410 U. S., at 139.
35 
This overwhelming consensus endured until the day Roe 
was decided. At that time, also by the Roe Court's own 
count, a substantial majority—30 States—still prohibited 
abortion at all stages except to save the life of the mother. 
nant,” without mention of quickening). The amici brief for the American 
Historical Association asserts that only 26 States prohibited abortion at 
all stages, but that brief incorrectly excludes West Virginia and Nebraska 
from its count. Compare Brief for American Historical Association 27–28 
(citing Quay), with Appendix A, infra. 
35 The statutes of three States (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsyl-
vania) prohibited abortions performed “unlawfully” or “without lawful 
justifcation.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Massachusetts, case law held that abortion was allowed when, according 
to the judgment of physicians in the relevant community, the procedure 
was necessary to preserve the woman's life or her physical or emotional 
health. Commonwealth v. Wheeler , 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N. E. 2d 4, 5 
(1944). In the other two States, however, there is no clear support in 
case law for the proposition that abortion was lawful where the mother's 
life was not at risk. See State v. Brandenburg, 137 N. J. L. 124, 58 A. 2d 
709 (1948); Commonwealth v. Trombetta, 131 Pa. Super. 487, 200 A. 107 
(1938). 
Statutes in the two remaining jurisdictions (the District of Columbia 
and Alabama) permitted “abortion to preserve the mother's health.” Roe, 
410 U. S., at 139. Case law in those jurisdictions does not clarify the 
breadth of these exceptions. 
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250 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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See id., at 118, and n. 2 (listing States). And though Roe 
discerned a “trend toward liberalization” in about “one-third 
of the States,” those States still criminalized some abortions 
and regulated them more stringently than Roe would allow. 
Id., at 140, and n. 37; Tribe 2. In short, the “Court's opinion 
in Roe itself convincingly refutes the notion that the abor-
tion liberty is deeply rooted in the history or tradition of our 
people.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 793 (1986) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
d 
The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is 
not deeply rooted in the Nation's history and traditions. On 
the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion 
on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest 
days of the common law until 1973. The Court in Roe could 
have said of abortion exactly what Glucksberg said of as-
sisted suicide: “Attitudes toward [abortion] have changed 
since Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned, 
and continue to prohibit, [that practice].” 521 U. S., 
at 719. 
3 
Respondents and their amici have no persuasive answer 
to this historical evidence. 
Neither respondents nor the Solicitor General disputes the 
fact that by 1868 the vast majority of States criminalized 
abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See Brief for Petition-
ers 12–13; see also Brief for American Historical Association 
et al. as Amici Curiae 27–28, and nn. 14–15 (conceding that 
26 out of 37 States prohibited abortion before quickening); 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 74–75 (respondents' counsel conceding the 
same). Instead, respondents are forced to argue that it 
“does [not] matter that some States prohibited abortion at 
the time Roe was decided or when the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment was adopted.” Brief for Respondents 20. But that 
argument fies in the face of the standard we have applied 
in determining whether an asserted right that is nowhere 
mentioned in the Constitution is nevertheless protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Not only are respondents and their amici unable to show 
that a constitutional right to abortion was established when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but they have 
found no support for the existence of an abortion right that 
predates the latter part of the 20th century—no state consti-
tutional provision, no statute, no judicial decision, no learned 
treatise. The earliest sources called to our attention are a 
few district court and state court decisions decided shortly 
before Roe and a small number of law review articles from 
the same time period.
36 
A few of respondents' amici muster historical arguments, 
but they are very weak. The Solicitor General repeats 
Roe's claim that it is “ `doubtful' . . . `abortion was ever frmly 
established as a common-law crime even with respect to the 
destruction of a quick fetus.' ” Brief for United States 26 
(quoting Roe, 410 U. S., at 136). But as we have seen, great 
common-law authorities like Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Black-
stone all wrote that a post-quickening abortion was a 
crime—and a serious one at that. Moreover, Hale and 
Blackstone (and many other authorities following them) as-
serted that even a pre-quickening abortion was “unlawful” 
and that, as a result, an abortionist was guilty of murder if 
the woman died from the attempt. 
36 See 410 U. S., at 154–155 (collecting cases decided between 1970 and 
1973); C. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or 
Ninth-Amendment Right About To Arise From the Nineteenth-Century 
Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty? 17 
N. Y . L. Forum 335, 337–339 (1971) (Means II); C. Means, The Law of New 
York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664–1968: A 
Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N. Y . L. Forum 411 (1968) (Means 
I); Lucas 730. 
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252 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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Instead of following these authorities, Roe relied largely 
on two articles by a pro-abortion advocate who claimed that 
Coke had intentionally misstated the common law because of 
his strong anti-abortion views.37 These articles have been 
discredited,38 and it has come to light that even members of 
Jane Roe's legal team did not regard them as serious scholar-
ship. An internal memorandum characterized this author's 
work as donning “the guise of impartial scholarship while 
advancing the proper ideological goals.” 
39 Continued reli-
ance on such scholarship is unsupportable. 
The Solicitor General next suggests that history supports 
an abortion right because the common law's failure to crimi-
nalize abortion before quickening means that “at the Found-
ing and for decades thereafter, women generally could termi-
nate a pregnancy, at least in its early stages.” 
40 Brief for 
37 See 410 U. S., at 135, n. 26 (citing Means II); 410 U. S., at 132–133, 
n. 21 (citing Means I). 
38 For critiques of Means's work, see, e. g., Dellapenna 143–152, 325–331; 
Keown 3–12; J. Finnis, “Shameless Acts” in Colorado: Abuse of Scholarship 
in Constitutional Cases, 7 Academic Questions 10, 11–12 (1994); R. Destro, 
Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amend-
ment, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1250, 1267–1282 (1975); R. Byrn, An American Trag-
edy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Ford. L. Rev. 807, 814–829 (1973). 
39 Garrow 500–501, and n. 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 In any event, Roe, Casey, and other related abortion decisions imposed 
substantial restrictions on a State's capacity to regulate abortions per-
formed after quickening. See, e. g., June Medical Services L. L. C. v. 
Russo, 591 U. S. ––– (2020) (holding a law requiring doctors performing 
abortions to secure admitting privileges to be unconstitutional); Whole 
Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582 (2016) (similar); Casey, 505 
U. S., at 846 (declaring that prohibitions on “abortion before viability” are 
unconstitutional); id., at 887–898 (holding that a spousal notifcation provi-
sion was unconstitutional). In addition, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 
(1973), has been interpreted by some to protect a broad right to obtain an 
abortion at any stage of pregnancy provided that a physician is willing to 
certify that it is needed due to a woman's “emotional” needs or “familial” 
concerns. Id., at 192. See, e. g., Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. 
Voinovich, 130 F. 3d 187, 209 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 523 U. S. 1036 
(1998); but see id ., at 1039 ( Thomas , J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
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United States 26–27; see also Brief for Respondents 21. But 
the insistence on quickening was not universal, see Mills, 13 
Pa., at 633; State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630, 632 (1880), and re-
gardless, the fact that many States in the late 18th and early 
19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions 
does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the 
authority to do so. When legislatures began to exercise that 
authority as the century wore on, no one, as far as we are 
aware, argued that the laws they enacted violated a funda-
mental right. That is not surprising since common-law au-
thorities had repeatedly condemned abortion and described 
it as an “unlawful” act without regard to whether it occurred 
before or after quickening. See supra, at 242–246. 
Another amicus brief relied upon by respondents (see 
Brief for Respondents 21) tries to dismiss the signifcance 
of the state criminal statutes that were in effect when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by suggesting that 
they were enacted for illegitimate reasons. According to 
this account, which is based almost entirely on statements 
made by one prominent proponent of the statutes, important 
motives for the laws were the fear that Catholic immigrants 
were having more babies than Protestants and that the avail-
ability of abortion was leading White Protestant women to 
“shir[k their] maternal duties.” Brief for American Histori-
cal Association et al. as Amici Curiae 20. 
Resort to this argument is a testament to the lack of any 
real historical support for the right that Roe and Casey rec-
ognized. This Court has long disfavored arguments based 
on alleged legislative motives. See, e. g., Erie v. Pap's 
A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 652 (1994); 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona 
v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (1931) (collecting cases). 
The Court has recognized that inquiries into legislative mo-
tives “are a hazardous matter.” O'Brien, 391 U. S., at 383. 
Even when an argument about legislative motive is backed 
by statements made by legislators who voted for a law, we 
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254 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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have been reluctant to attribute those motives to the legisla-
tive body as a whole. “What motivates one legislator to 
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what moti-
vates scores of others to enact it.” Id., at 384. 
Here, the argument about legislative motive is not even 
based on statements by legislators, but on statements made 
by a few supporters of the new 19th-century abortion laws, 
and it is quite a leap to attribute these motives to all the 
legislators whose votes were responsible for the enactment 
of those laws. Recall that at the time of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, over three-quarters of the States 
had adopted statutes criminalizing abortion (usually at all 
stages of pregnancy), and that from the early 20th century 
until the day Roe was handed down, every single State had 
such a law on its books. Are we to believe that the hun-
dreds of lawmakers whose votes were needed to enact these 
laws were motivated by hostility to Catholics and women? 
There is ample evidence that the passage of these laws 
was instead spurred by a sincere belief that abortion kills a 
human being. Many judicial decisions from the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries made that point. See, e. g., Nash v. 
Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 301, 31 P. 2d 273, 280 (1934); State v. 
Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 131–132, 167 P. 1019, 1022–1023 
(1917); Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 488, 73 S. 834, 836 
(1916); State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878, 879 (1913); 
State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 39–40, 105 N. E. 75, 77 (1913); 
State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86, 90 (1881); Dougherty v. Peo-
ple, 1 Colo. 514, 522–523 (1873); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 
131–132 (1868); Smith, 33 Me., at 57; see also Memphis Cen-
ter for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, 14 F. 4th 409, 446, 
and n. 11 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., concurring in judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing cases). 
One may disagree with this belief (and our decision is not 
based on any view about when a State should regard prena-
tal life as having rights or legally cognizable interests), but 
even Roe and Casey did not question the good faith of abor-
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Opinion of the Court 
tion opponents. See, e. g., Casey, 505 U. S., at 850 (“Men and 
women of good conscience can disagree . . . about the pro-
found moral and spiritual implications of terminating a preg-
nancy, even in its earliest stage”). And we see no reason to 
discount the signifcance of the state laws in question based 
on these amici's suggestions about legislative motive.
41 
C 
1 
Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abor-
tion right itself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey 
contend that the abortion right is an integral part of a 
broader entrenched right. Roe termed this a right to pri-
vacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described it as the freedom 
to make “intimate and personal choices” that are “central to 
personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851. Casey 
elaborated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to defne one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.” Ibid. 
The Court did not claim that this broadly framed right 
is absolute, and no such claim would be plausible. While 
individuals are certainly free to think and to say what they 
wish about “existence,” “meaning,” the “universe,” and “the 
41 Other amicus briefs present arguments about the motives of pro-
ponents of liberal access to abortion. They note that some such support-
ers have been motivated by a desire to suppress the size of the African-
American population. See Brief for African-American Organizations 
et al. as Amici Curiae 14–21; see also Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. 
and Ky., Inc., 587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
And it is beyond dispute that Roe has had that demographic effect. A 
highly disproportionate percentage of aborted fetuses are Black. See, 
e. g., Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), K. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United 
States, 2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Report, Surveillance Summaries, 
p. 20 (Nov. 26, 2021) (Table 6). For our part, we do not question the 
motives of either those who have supported or those who have opposed 
laws restricting abortions. 
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256 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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mystery of human life,” they are not always free to act in 
accordance with those thoughts. License to act on the basis 
of such beliefs may correspond to one of the many under-
standings of “liberty,” but it is certainly not “ordered 
liberty.” 
Ordered liberty sets limits and defnes the boundary be-
tween competing interests. Roe and Casey each struck a 
particular balance between the interests of a woman who 
wants an abortion and the interests of what they termed 
“potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150 (emphasis deleted); 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. But the people of the various 
States may evaluate those interests differently. In some 
States, voters may believe that the abortion right should be 
even more extensive than the right that Roe and Casey rec-
ognized. Voters in other States may wish to impose tight 
restrictions based on their belief that abortion destroys an 
“unborn human being.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41–41–191(4)(b). 
Our Nation's historical understanding of ordered liberty does 
not prevent the people's elected representatives from decid-
ing how abortion should be regulated. 
Nor does the right to obtain an abortion have a sound basis 
in precedent. Casey relied on cases involving the right to 
marry a person of a different race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S. 1 (1967); the right to marry while in prison, Turner v. 
Safey, 482 U. S. 78 (1987); the right to obtain contraceptives, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Carey v. Population Services 
Int'l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); the right to reside with relatives, 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); the right to 
make decisions about the education of one's children, Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 390 (1923); the right not to be sterilized without 
consent, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 
535 (1942); and the right in certain circumstances not to un-
dergo involuntary surgery, forced administration of drugs, or 
other substantially similar procedures, Winston v. Lee, 470 
U. S. 753 (1985), Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990), 
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Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). Respondents 
and the Solicitor General also rely on post-Casey decisions 
like Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right to engage 
in private, consensual sexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to marry a person of the same 
sex). See Brief for Respondents 18; Brief for United States 
23–24. 
These attempts to justify abortion through appeals to a 
broader right to autonomy and to defne one's “concept of 
existence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those 
criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamen-
tal rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. See 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F. 3d 1440, 1444 
(CA9 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc). None of these rights has any claim to being 
deeply rooted in history. Id., at 1440, 1445. 
What sharply distinguishes the abortion right from the 
rights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely is 
something that both those decisions acknowledged: Abortion 
destroys what those decisions call “potential life” and what 
the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an “unborn 
human being.” See Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “in-
herently different”); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (abortion is “a 
unique act”). None of the other decisions cited by Roe and 
Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion. 
They are therefore inapposite. They do not support the 
right to obtain an abortion, and by the same token, our con-
clusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right 
does not undermine them in any way. 
2 
In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion 
right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey's 
claim (which we accept for the sake of argument) that “the 
specifc practices of States at the time of the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” do not “mar[k] the outer limits 
of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth 
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258 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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Amendment protects.” 505 U. S., at 848. Abortion is noth-
ing new. It has been addressed by lawmakers for centuries, 
and the fundamental moral question that it poses is ageless. 
Defenders of Roe and Casey do not claim that any new 
scientifc learning calls for a different answer to the underly-
ing moral question, but they do contend that changes in soci-
ety require the recognition of a constitutional right to obtain 
an abortion. Without the availability of abortion, they 
maintain, people will be inhibited from exercising their free-
dom to choose the types of relationships they desire, and 
women will be unable to compete with men in the workplace 
and in other endeavors. 
Americans who believe that abortion should be restricted 
press countervailing arguments about modern developments. 
They note that attitudes about the pregnancy of unmarried 
women have changed drastically; that federal and state laws 
ban discrimination on the basis of pregnancy; 
42 that leave for 
pregnancy and childbirth are now guaranteed by law in 
many cases; 
43 that the costs of medical care associated with 
pregnancy are covered by insurance or government assist-
ance; 
44 that States have increasingly adopted “safe haven” 
42 See, e. g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e(k) (federal law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in employ-
ment); Dept. of Labor, Women's Bureau, Employment Protections for 
Workers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/wb/ 
pregnant-nursing-employment-protections (showing that 46 States and 
the District of Columbia have employment protections against pregnancy 
discrimination). 
43 See, e. g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 9, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 2612 (federal law guaranteeing employment leave for pregnancy and 
birth); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Access to Paid and Unpaid Family 
Leave in 2018, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/access-to-paid-and -
unpaid-family-leave-in-2018.htm (showing that 89 percent of civilian work-
ers had access to unpaid family leave in 2018). 
44 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires non-grandfathered health 
plans in the individual and small group markets to cover certain essential 
health benefts, which include maternity and newborn care. See 124 Stat. 
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laws, which generally allow women to drop off babies anony-
mously; 45 and that a woman who puts her newborn up for 
adoption today has little reason to fear that the baby will not 
fnd a suitable home.
46 They also claim that many people 
now have a new appreciation of fetal life and that when pro-
spective parents who want to have a child view a sonogram, 
they typically have no doubt that what they see is their 
daughter or son. 
Both sides make important policy arguments, but support-
ers of Roe and Casey must show that this Court has the 
authority to weigh those arguments and decide how abortion 
may be regulated in the States. They have failed to make 
that showing, and we thus return the power to weigh those 
arguments to the people and their elected representatives. 
163, 42 U. S. C. § 18022(b)(1)(D). The ACA also prohibits annual limits, 
see § 300gg–11, and limits annual cost-sharing obligations on such benefts, 
§ 18022(c). State Medicaid plans must provide coverage for pregnancy-
related services—including, but not limited to, prenatal care, delivery, and 
postpartum care—as well as services for other conditions that might com-
plicate the pregnancy. 42 CFR §§ 440.210(a)(2)(i)–(ii) (2020). State Med-
icaid plans are also prohibited from imposing deductions, cost-sharing, 
or similar charges for pregnancy-related services for pregnant women. 
42 U. S. C. §§ 1396o(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B). 
45 Since Casey, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted 
such laws. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Children's Bureau, Infant 
Safe Haven Laws 1–2 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs / 
safehaven.pdf (noting that safe haven laws began in Texas in 1999). 
46 See, e. g., CDC, Adoption Experiences of Women and Men and Demand 
for Children To Adopt by Women 18–44 Years of Age in the United States 
16 (Aug. 2008) (“[N]early 1 million women were seeking to adopt children 
in 2002 (i.e., they were in demand for a child), whereas the domestic supply 
of infants relinquished at birth or within the frst month of life and avail-
able to be adopted had become virtually nonexistent”); CDC, National 
Center for Health Statistics, Adoption and Nonbiological Parenting, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/key_statistics/a-keystat.htm#adoption 
(showing that approximately 3.1 million women between the ages of 18– 
49 had ever “[t]aken steps to adopt a child” based on data collected from 
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260 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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D 
1 
The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a con-
stitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a 
“ `deeply rooted' ” one, “ `in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion.' ” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; see post, at 370–372 
(joint opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor , and Kagan, JJ.). 
The dissent does not identify any pre-Roe authority that 
supports such a right—no state constitutional provision or 
statute, no federal or state judicial precedent, not even a 
scholarly treatise. Compare post, at 370–372, n. 2, with 
supra, at 241, and n. 23. Nor does the dissent dispute the 
fact that abortion was illegal at common law at least after 
quickening; that the 19th century saw a trend toward crimi-
nalization of pre-quickening abortions; that by 1868, a 
supermajority of States (at least 26 of 37) had enacted stat-
utes criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy; that 
by the late 1950s at least 46 States prohibited abortion “how-
ever and whenever performed” except if necessary to save 
“the life of the mother,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139; and that when 
Roe was decided in 1973 similar statutes were still in effect 
in 30 States. Compare post, at 370–372, nn. 2–3, with supra, 
at 248–250 and nn. 33–34.
47 
The dissent's failure to engage with this long tradition is 
devastating to its position. We have held that the “estab-
lished method of substantive-due-process analysis” requires 
that an unenumerated right be “ `deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition' ” before it can be recognized as 
a component of the “liberty” protected in the Due Process 
Clause. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; cf. Timbs, 586 U. S., 
at –––. But despite the dissent's professed fdelity to stare 
47 By way of contrast, at the time Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 
(1965), was decided, the Connecticut statute at issue was an extreme out-
lier. See Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. as 
Amicus Curiae in Griswold v. Connecticut, O. T. 1964, No. 496, p. 27. 
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decisis, it fails to seriously engage with that important prec-
edent—which it cannot possibly satisfy. 
The dissent attempts to obscure this failure by misrepre-
senting our application of Glucksberg. The dissent suggests 
that we have focused only on “the legal status of abortion in 
the 19th century,” post, at 384, but our review of this Na-
tion's tradition extends well past that period. As explained, 
for more than a century after 1868—including “another half-
century” after women gained the constitutional right to vote 
in 1920, see post, at 373; Amdt. 19—it was frmly established 
that laws prohibiting abortion like the Texas law at issue in 
Roe were permissible exercises of state regulatory authority. 
And today, another half century later, more than half of the 
States have asked us to overrule Roe and Casey. The dis-
sent cannot establish that a right to abortion has ever been 
part of this Nation's tradition. 
2 
Because the dissent cannot argue that the abortion right 
is rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, it contends 
that the “constitutional tradition” is “not captured whole at 
a single moment,” and that its “meaning gains content from 
the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial 
precedents.” Post, at 376 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). This vague formulation imposes no clear restraints on 
what Justice White called the “exercise of raw judicial 
power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (dissenting opinion), and while 
the dissent claims that its standard “does not mean anything 
goes,” post, at 375, any real restraints are hard to discern. 
The largely limitless reach of the dissenters' standard is 
illustrated by the way they apply it here. First, if the “long 
sweep of history” imposes any restraint on the recognition 
of unenumerated rights, then Roe was surely wrong, since 
abortion was never allowed (except to save the life of the 
mother) in a majority of States for over 100 years before 
that decision was handed down. Second, it is impossible to 
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Opinion of the Court 
defend Roe based on prior precedent because all of the prece-
dents Roe cited, including Griswold and Eisenstadt, were 
critically different for a reason that we have explained: None 
of those cases involved the destruction of what Roe called 
“potential life.” See supra, at 257. 
So without support in history or relevant precedent, Roe's 
reasoning cannot be defended even under the dissent's pro-
posed test, and the dissent is forced to rely solely on the fact 
that a constitutional right to abortion was recognized in Roe 
and later decisions that accepted Roe 's interpretation. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, those precedents are 
entitled to careful and respectful consideration, and we en-
gage in that analysis below. But as the Court has reiterated 
time and time again, adherence to precedent is not “ `an inex-
orable command.' ” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 
576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015). There are occasions when past 
decisions should be overruled, and as we will explain, this is 
one of them. 
3 
The most striking feature of the dissent is the absence of 
any serious discussion of the legitimacy of the States' inter-
est in protecting fetal life. This is evident in the analogy 
that the dissent draws between the abortion right and the 
rights recognized in Griswold (contraception), Eisenstadt 
(same), Lawrence (sexual conduct with member of the same 
sex), and Obergefell (same-sex marriage). Perhaps this is 
designed to stoke unfounded fear that our decision will im-
peril those other rights, but the dissent's analogy is objec-
tionable for a more important reason: what it reveals about 
the dissent's views on the protection of what Roe called “po-
tential life.” The exercise of the rights at issue in Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell does not destroy a 
“potential life,” but an abortion has that effect. So if the 
rights at issue in those cases are fundamentally the same as 
the right recognized in Roe and Casey, the implication is clear: 
The Constitution does not permit the States to regard the de-
struction of a “potential life” as a matter of any signifcance. 
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That view is evident throughout the dissent. The dissent 
has much to say about the effects of pregnancy on women, 
the burdens of motherhood, and the diffculties faced by poor 
women. These are important concerns. However, the dis-
sent evinces no similar regard for a State's interest in pro-
tecting prenatal life. The dissent repeatedly praises the 
“balance,” post, at 360, 364, 366, 368, 370, that the viability 
line strikes between a woman's liberty interest and the 
State's interest in prenatal life. But for reasons we discuss 
later, see infra, at 274–279, 280, and given in the opinion of 
The Chief Justice , post, at 349–352 (opinion concurring in 
judgment), the viability line makes no sense. It was not 
adequately justifed in Roe, and the dissent does not even 
try to defend it today. Nor does it identify any other point 
in a pregnancy after which a State is permitted to prohibit 
the destruction of a fetus. 
Our opinion is not based on any view about if and when 
prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after 
birth. The dissent, by contrast, would impose on the people 
a particular theory about when the rights of personhood 
begin. According to the dissent, the Constitution requires 
the States to regard a fetus as lacking even the most basic 
human right—to live—at least until an arbitrary point in a 
pregnancy has passed. Nothing in the Constitution or in 
our Nation's legal traditions authorizes the Court to adopt 
that “ `theory of life.' ” Post, at 366. 
III 
We next consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis 
counsels continued acceptance of Roe and Casey. Stare deci-
sis plays an important role in our case law, and we have 
explained that it serves many valuable ends. It protects the 
interests of those who have taken action in reliance on a past 
decision. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 856 (joint opinion); see 
also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991). It “re-
duces incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving 
parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.” 
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Kimble, 576 U. S., at 455. It fosters “evenhanded” decision-
making by requiring that like cases be decided in a like man-
ner. Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It “contributes to the actual 
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Ibid. And 
it restrains judicial hubris and reminds us to respect the 
judgment of those who have grappled with important ques-
tions in the past. “Precedent is a way of accumulating and 
passing down the learning of past generations, a font of es-
tablished wisdom richer than what can be found in any single 
judge or panel of judges.” N. Gorsuch, A Republic, If You 
Can Keep It 217 (2019). 
We have long recognized, however, that stare decisis is 
“not an inexorable command,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 
223, 233 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it “is 
at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution,” Agostini 
v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997). It has been said that it 
is sometimes more important that an issue “ `be settled than 
that it be settled right.' ” Kimble, 576 U. S., at 455 (quoting 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co ., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). But when it comes to the inter-
pretation of the Constitution—the “great charter of our lib-
erties,” which was meant “to endure through a long lapse of 
ages,” Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) 
(opinion for the Court by Story, J.)—we place a high value 
on having the matter “settled right.” In addition, when one 
of our constitutional decisions goes astray, the country is usu-
ally stuck with the bad decision unless we correct our own 
mistake. An erroneous constitutional decision can be fxed 
by amending the Constitution, but our Constitution is no-
toriously hard to amend. See Art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S., at 
456. Therefore, in appropriate circumstances we must be 
willing to reconsider and, if necessary, overrule constitu-
tional decisions. 
Some of our most important constitutional decisions have 
overruled prior precedents. We mention three. In Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court repu-

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 265 
Opinion of the Court 
diated the “separate but equal” doctrine, which had allowed 
States to maintain racially segregated schools and other 
facilities. Id., at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In so doing, the Court overruled the infamous decision in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with six other 
Supreme Court precedents that had applied the separate-
but-equal rule. See Brown, 347 U. S., at 491. 
In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), 
the Court overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 
261 U. S. 525 (1923), which had held that a law setting mini-
mum wages for women violated the “liberty” protected by 
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id., at 545. 
West Coast Hotel signaled the demise of an entire line of 
important precedents that had protected an individual lib-
erty right against state and federal health and welfare legis-
lation. See Lochner, 198 U. S. 45 (holding invalid a law set-
ting maximum working hours); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 
1 (1915) (holding invalid a law banning contracts forbidding 
employees to join a union); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 
264 U. S. 504 (1924) (holding invalid laws fxing the weight 
of loaves of bread). 
Finally, in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624 (1943), after the lapse of only three years, the Court 
overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 
(1940), and held that public school students could not be com-
pelled to salute the fag in violation of their sincere beliefs. 
Barnette stands out because nothing had changed during the 
intervening period other than the Court's belated recogni-
tion that its earlier decision had been seriously wrong. 
On many other occasions, this Court has overruled impor-
tant constitutional decisions. (We include a partial list in 
the footnote that follows.
48) Without these decisions, Amer-
48 See, e. g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex 
marriage), overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972); Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010) (right to engage 
in campaign-related speech), overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
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ican constitutional law as we know it would be unrecogniz-
able, and this would be a different country. 
No Justice of this Court has ever argued that the Court 
should never overrule a constitutional decision, but overrul-
Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), and partially overruling McConnell v. 
Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U. S. 778 (2009) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel), overruling Michigan 
v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 
(2004) (Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses), overruling Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right 
to engage in consensual, same-sex intimacy in one's home), overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 
(2002) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions), 
overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990); Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U. S. 203 (1997) (evaluating whether government aid violates the Estab-
lishment Clause), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985), and 
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985); Seminole Tribe 
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996) (lack of congressional power under 
the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity), overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989); 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991) (the Eighth Amendment does not 
erect a per se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial), overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 
496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S. 805 (1989); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986) (the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the 
defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the 
jury venire on account of race), overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 
202 (1965); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority , 469 
U. S. 528, 530 (1985) (rejecting the principle that the Commerce Clause 
does not empower Congress to enforce requirements, such as minimum 
wage laws, against the States “ `in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions' ”), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 
(1976); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983) (the Fourth Amendment re-
quires a totality of the circumstances approach for determining whether 
an informant's tip establishes probable cause), overruling Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 
(1969); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978) (the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not apply to Government appeals from orders granting de-
fense motions to terminate a trial before verdict), overruling United 
States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976) 
(gender-based classifcations are subject to intermediate scrutiny under 
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Opinion of the Court 
ing a precedent is a serious matter. It is not a step that 
should be taken lightly. Our cases have attempted to pro-
vide a framework for deciding when a precedent should be 
overruled, and they have identifed factors that should be 
the Equal Protection Clause), overruling Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 
(1948); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975) (jury system which oper-
ates to exclude women from jury service violates the defendant's Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury), overruling Hoyt 
v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57 (1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) 
(per curiam ) (the mere advocacy of violence is protected under the First 
Amendment unless it is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless 
action), overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967) (Fourth Amendment “protects peo-
ple, not places,” and extends to what a person “seeks to preserve as pri-
vate”), overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436 (1966) (procedural safeguards to protect the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination), overruling Crooker v. California, 357 
U. S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) (the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against 
abridgment by the States), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 
(1908), and Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Wesberry v. Sand-
ers, 376 U. S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (congressional districts should be apportioned 
so that “as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional elec-
tion is to be worth as much as another's”), overruling in effect Colegrove 
v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) 
(right to counsel for indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in state 
court under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments), overruling Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962) (federal 
courts have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to state re-
districting plans), effectively overruling in part Colegrove, 328 U. S. 549; 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule regarding the 
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
applies to the States), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949); 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) (racial restrictions on the right 
to vote in primary elections violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 
(1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) (congressional power to 
regulate employment conditions under the Commerce Clause), overruling 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

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considered in making such a decision. Janus v. State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– 
(2018); Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
In this case, fve factors weigh strongly in favor of overrul-
ing Roe and Casey: the nature of their error, the quality of 
their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they imposed 
on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas of the 
law, and the absence of concrete reliance. 
A 
The nature of the Court's error . An erroneous interpre-
tation of the Constitution is always important, but some are 
more damaging than others. 
The infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, was one such 
decision. It betrayed our commitment to “equality before 
the law.” 163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It was 
“egregiously wrong” on the day it was decided, see Ramos, 
590 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.), and as the Solic-
itor General agreed at oral argument, it should have been 
overruled at the earliest opportunity, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 
92–93. 
Roe was also egregiously wrong and deeply damaging. 
For reasons already explained, Roe's constitutional analysis 
was far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation 
of the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely 
pointed. 
Roe was on a collision course with the Constitution from 
the day it was decided, Casey perpetuated its errors, and 
those errors do not concern some arcane corner of the law of 
little importance to the American people. Rather, wielding 
nothing but “raw judicial power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 
U. S. 64 (1938) (Congress does not have the power to declare substantive 
rules of common law; a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must 
apply the substantive state law), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 
(1842).

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 269 
Opinion of the Court 
(White, J., dissenting), the Court usurped the power to ad-
dress a question of profound moral and social importance 
that the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people. 
Casey described itself as calling both sides of the national 
controversy to resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey 
necessarily declared a winning side. Those on the losing 
side—those who sought to advance the State's interest in 
fetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their elected rep-
resentatives to adopt policies consistent with their views. 
The Court short-circuited the democratic process by closing 
it to the large number of Americans who dissented in any 
respect from Roe. “Roe fanned into life an issue that has 
infamed our national politics in general, and has obscured 
with its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court in par-
ticular, ever since.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995–996 (opinion of 
Scalia, J.). Together, Roe and Casey represent an error that 
cannot be allowed to stand. 
As the Court's landmark decision in West Coast Hotel illus-
trates, the Court has previously overruled decisions that 
wrongly removed an issue from the people and the demo-
cratic process. As Justice White later explained, “decisions 
that fnd in the Constitution principles or values that cannot 
fairly be read into that document usurp the people's author-
ity, for such decisions represent choices that the people have 
never made and that they cannot disavow through corrective 
legislation. For this reason, it is essential that this Court 
maintain the power to restore authority to its proper pos-
sessors by correcting constitutional decisions that, on re-
consideration, are found to be mistaken.” Thornburgh, 476 
U. S., at 787 (dissenting opinion). 
B 
The quality of the reasoning . Under our precedents, the 
quality of the reasoning in a prior case has an important 
bearing on whether it should be reconsidered. See Janus, 
585 U. S., at –––; Ramos, 590 U. S., at ––– – ––– (opinion of 
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270 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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Kavanaugh, J.). In Part II, supra, we explained why Roe 
was incorrectly decided, but that decision was more than just 
wrong. It stood on exceptionally weak grounds. 
Roe found that the Constitution implicitly conferred a 
right to obtain an abortion, but it failed to ground its decision 
in text, history, or precedent. It relied on an erroneous his-
torical narrative; it devoted great attention to and presum-
ably relied on matters that have no bearing on the meaning 
of the Constitution; it disregarded the fundamental differ-
ence between the precedents on which it relied and the ques-
tion before the Court; it concocted an elaborate set of rules, 
with different restrictions for each trimester of pregnancy, 
but it did not explain how this veritable code could be teased 
out of anything in the Constitution, the history of abortion 
laws, prior precedent, or any other cited source; and its most 
important rule (that States cannot protect fetal life prior to 
“viability”) was never raised by any party and has never 
been plausibly explained. Roe's reasoning quickly drew 
scathing scholarly criticism, even from supporters of broad 
access to abortion. 
The Casey plurality, while reaffrming Roe's central hold-
ing, pointedly refrained from endorsing most of its reasoning. 
It revised the textual basis for the abortion right, silently 
abandoned Roe's erroneous historical narrative, and jetti-
soned the trimester framework. But it replaced that 
scheme with an arbitrary “undue burden” test and relied on 
an exceptional version of stare decisis that, as explained 
below, this Court had never before applied and has never 
invoked since. 
1 
a 
The weaknesses in Roe 's reasoning are well-known. 
Without any grounding in the constitutional text, history, or 
precedent, it imposed on the entire country a detailed set of 
rules much like those that one might expect to fnd in a stat-
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Opinion of the Court 
ute or regulation. See 410 U. S., at 163–164. Dividing 
pregnancy into three trimesters, the Court imposed special 
rules for each. During the frst trimester, the Court an-
nounced, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's at-
tending physician.” Id., at 164. After that point, a State's 
interest in regulating abortion for the sake of a woman's 
health became compelling, and accordingly, a State could 
“regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably 
related to maternal health.” Ibid. Finally, in “the stage 
subsequent to viability,” which in 1973 roughly coincided 
with the beginning of the third trimester, the State's interest 
in “the potentiality of human life” became compelling, and 
therefore a State could “regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
tion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.” Id., at 164–165. 
This elaborate scheme was the Court's own brainchild. 
Neither party advocated the trimester framework; nor did 
either party or any amicus argue that “viability” should 
mark the point at which the scope of the abortion right and 
a State's regulatory authority should be substantially trans-
formed. See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee in 
Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1972, No. 70–18; see also C. Forsythe, 
Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 127, 
141 (2012). 
b 
Not only did this scheme resemble the work of a legisla-
ture, but the Court made little effort to explain how these 
rules could be deduced from any of the sources on which 
constitutional decisions are usually based. We have already 
discussed Roe's treatment of constitutional text, and the 
opinion failed to show that history, precedent, or any other 
cited source supported its scheme. 
Roe featured a lengthy survey of history, but much of its 
discussion was irrelevant, and the Court made no effort to 
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272 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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explain why it was included. For example, multiple para-
graphs were devoted to an account of the views and practices 
of ancient civilizations where infanticide was widely ac-
cepted. See 410 U. S., at 130–132 (discussing ancient Greek 
and Roman practices).
49 When it came to the most impor-
tant historical fact—how the States regulated abortion when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted—the Court said al-
most nothing. It allowed that States had tightened their 
abortion laws “in the middle and late 19th century,” id., at 
139, but it implied that these laws might have been enacted 
not to protect fetal life but to further “a Victorian social con-
cern” about “illicit sexual conduct,” id., at 148. 
Roe's failure even to note the overwhelming consensus of 
state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said about 
the common law was simply wrong. Relying on two dis-
credited articles by an abortion advocate, the Court errone-
ously suggested—contrary to Bracton, Coke, Hale, Black-
stone, and a wealth of other authority—that the common law 
had probably never really treated post-quickening abortion 
as a crime. See id., at 136 (“[I]t now appear[s] doubtful that 
abortion was ever frmly established as a common-law crime 
even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus”). This 
erroneous understanding appears to have played an impor-
tant part in the Court's thinking because the opinion cited 
“the lenity of the common law” as one of the four factors that 
informed its decision. Id., at 165. 
After surveying history, the opinion spent many para-
graphs conducting the sort of fact-fnding that might be 
undertaken by a legislative committee. This included a 
lengthy account of the “position of the American Medical As-
sociation” and “[t]he position of the American Public Health 
49 See, e. g., C. Patterson, “Not Worth the Rearing”: The Causes of Infant 
Exposure in Ancient Greece, 115 Transactions Am. Philological Assn. 103, 
111–123 (1985); A. Cameron, The Exposure of Children and Greek Ethics, 
46 Classical Rev. 105–108 (1932); H. Bennett, The Exposure of Infants in 
Ancient Rome, 18 Classical J. 341–351 (1923); W. Harris, Child-Exposure 
in the Roman Empire, 84 J. Roman Studies 1 (1994). 
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Opinion of the Court 
Association,” as well as the vote by the American Bar Asso-
ciation's House of Delegates in February 1972 on proposed 
abortion legislation. Id., at 141, 144, 146 (emphasis deleted). 
Also noted were a British judicial decision handed down in 
1939 and a new British abortion law enacted in 1967. Id., 
at 137–138. The Court did not explain why these sources 
shed light on the meaning of the Constitution, and not one 
of them adopted or advocated anything like the scheme that 
Roe imposed on the country. 
Finally, after all this, the Court turned to precedent. Cit-
ing a broad array of cases, the Court found support for a 
constitutional “right of personal privacy,” id., at 152, but it 
confated two very different meanings of the term: the right 
to shield information from disclosure and the right to make 
and implement important personal decisions without govern-
mental interference. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599– 
600 (1977). Only the cases involving this second sense of the 
term could have any possible relevance to the abortion issue, 
and some of the cases in that category involved personal de-
cisions that were obviously very, very far afield. See 
Pierce, 268 U. S. 510 (right to send children to religious 
school); Meyer, 262 U. S. 390 (right to have children receive 
German language instruction). 
What remained was a handful of cases having something 
to do with marriage, Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (right to marry a 
person of a different race), or procreation, Skinner, 316 U. S. 
535 (right not to be sterilized); Griswold, 381 U. S. 479 (right 
of married persons to obtain contraceptives); Eisenstadt, 405 
U. S. 438 (same, for unmarried persons). But none of these 
decisions involved what is distinctive about abortion: its ef-
fect on what Roe termed “potential life.” 
When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it 
imposed on the country, it asserted that its rules were “con-
sistent with” the following: (1) “the relative weights of the 
respective interests involved,” (2) “the lessons and examples 
of medical and legal history,” (3) “the lenity of the common 
law,” and (4) “the demands of the profound problems of the

274 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
present day.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 165. Put aside the second 
and third factors, which were based on the Court's fawed 
account of history, and what remains are precisely the sort of 
considerations that legislative bodies often take into account 
when they draw lines that accommodate competing interests. 
The scheme Roe produced looked like legislation, and the 
Court provided the sort of explanation that might be ex-
pected from a legislative body. 
c 
What Roe did not provide was any cogent justifcation for 
the lines it drew. Why, for example, does a State have no 
authority to regulate frst trimester abortions for the pur-
pose of protecting a woman's health? The Court's only ex-
planation was that mortality rates for abortion at that stage 
were lower than the mortality rates for childbirth. Id., at 
163. But the Court did not explain why mortality rates 
were the only factor that a State could legitimately consider. 
Many health and safety regulations aim to avoid adverse 
health consequences short of death. And the Court did not 
explain why it departed from the normal rule that courts 
defer to the judgments of legislatures “in areas fraught with 
medical and scientifc uncertainties.” Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). 
An even more glaring defciency was Roe's failure to jus-
tify the critical distinction it drew between pre- and post-
viability abortions. Here is the Court's entire explanation: 
“With respect to the State's important and legitimate 
interest in potential life, the `compelling' point is at 
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably 
has the capability of meaningful life outside the womb.” 
410 U. S., at 163. 
As Professor Laurence Tribe has written, “[c]learly, this mis-
takes `a defnition for a syllogism.' ” Tribe 4 (quoting Ely 
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924). The defnition of a “viable” fetus is one that is capable 
of surviving outside the womb, but why is this the point at 
which the State's interest becomes compelling? If, as Roe 
held, a State's interest in protecting prenatal life is compel-
ling “after viability,” 410 U. S., at 163, why isn't that interest 
“equally compelling before viability”? Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 519 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 795 (White, J., 
dissenting)). Roe did not say, and no explanation is 
apparent. 
This arbitrary line has not found much support among 
philosophers and ethicists who have attempted to justify a 
right to abortion. Some have argued that a fetus should 
not be entitled to legal protection until it acquires the charac-
teristics that they regard as defning what it means to be 
a “person.” Among the characteristics that have been of-
fered as essential attributes of “personhood” are sentience, 
self-awareness, the ability to reason, or some combination 
thereof.
50 By this logic, it would be an open question 
50 See, e. g., P. Singer, Rethinking Life & Death 218 (1994) (defning a 
person as “a being with awareness of her or his own existence over time, 
and the capacity to have wants and plans for the future”); B. Steinbock, 
Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses 
9–13 (1992) (arguing that “the possession of interests is both necessary 
and suffcient for moral status” and that the “capacity for conscious aware-
ness is a necessary condition for the possession of interests” (emphasis 
deleted)); M. Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 The 
Monist 1, 5 (1973) (arguing that, to qualify as a person, a being must have 
at least one of fve traits that are “central to the concept of personhood”: 
(1) “consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the 
being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain”; (2) “reasoning (the 
developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems)”; (3) 
“self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either 
genetic or direct external control)”; (4) “the capacity to communicate, by 
whatever means, messages of an indefnite variety of types”; and (5) “the 
presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or 
both” (emphasis deleted)); M. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 Philoso-
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whether even born individuals, including young children or 
those afficted with certain developmental or medical condi-
tions, merit protection as “persons.” But even if one takes 
the view that “personhood” begins when a certain attribute or 
combination of attributes is acquired, it is very hard to see why 
viability should mark the point where “personhood” begins. 
The most obvious problem with any such argument is that 
viability is heavily dependent on factors that have nothing 
to do with the characteristics of a fetus. One is the state 
of neonatal care at a particular point in time. Due to the 
development of new equipment and improved practices, the 
viability line has changed over the years. In the 19th cen-
tury, a fetus may not have been viable until the 32d or 33d 
week of pregnancy or even later.
51 When Roe was decided, 
viability was gauged at roughly 28 weeks. See 410 U. S., at 
160. Today, respondents draw the line at 23 or 24 weeks. 
Brief for Respondents 8. So, according to Roe's logic, States 
now have a compelling interest in protecting a fetus with a 
gestational age of, say, 26 weeks, but in 1973 States did not 
have an interest in protecting an identical fetus. How can 
that be? 
Viability also depends on the “quality of the available med-
ical facilities.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 396 
phy & Pub. Affairs 37, 49 (Autumn 1972) (arguing that “having a right to 
life presupposes that one is capable of desiring to continue existing as a 
subject of experiences and other mental states”). 
51 See W. Lusk, Science and the Art of Midwifery 74–75 (1882) (explain-
ing that “[w]ith care, the life of a child born within [the eighth month of 
pregnancy] may be preserved”); id., at 326 (“Where the choice lies with 
the physician, the provocation of labor is usually deferred until the thirty-
third or thirty-fourth week”); J. Beck, Researches in Medicine and Medical 
Jurisprudence 68 (2d ed. 1835) (“Although children born before the comple-
tion of the seventh month have occasionally survived, and been reared, 
yet in a medico-legal point of view, no child ought to be considered as 
capable of sustaining an independent existence until the seventh month 
has been fully completed”); see also J. Baker, The Incubator and the Medi-
cal Discovery of the Premature Infant, J. Perinatology 321, 322 (2000) (ex-
plaining that, in the 19th century, infants born at seven to eight months' 
gestation were unlikely to survive beyond “the frst days of life”).

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 277 
Opinion of the Court 
(1979). Thus, a 24-week-old fetus may be viable if a woman 
gives birth in a city with hospitals that provide advanced care 
for very premature babies, but if the woman travels to a re-
mote area far from any such hospital, the fetus may no longer 
be viable. On what ground could the constitutional status of 
a fetus depend on the pregnant woman's location? And if 
viability is meant to mark a line having universal moral 
signifcance, can it be that a fetus that is viable in a big 
city in the United States has a privileged moral status not 
enjoyed by an identical fetus in a remote area of a poor 
country? 
In addition, as the Court once explained, viability is not 
really a hard-and-fast line. Ibid. A physician determining 
a particular fetus's odds of surviving outside the womb must 
consider “a number of variables,” including “gestational 
age,” “fetal weight,” a woman's “general health and nutri-
tion,” the “quality of the available medical facilities,” and 
other factors. Id., at 395–396. It is thus “only with diff-
culty” that a physician can estimate the “probability” of a 
particular fetus's survival. Id., at 396. And even if each 
fetus's probability of survival could be ascertained with cer-
tainty, settling on a “probabilit[y] of survival” that should 
count as “viability” is another matter. Ibid. Is a fetus via-
ble with a 10 percent chance of survival? 25 percent? 50 
percent? Can such a judgment be made by a State? And 
can a State specify a gestational age limit that applies in all 
cases? Or must these diffcult questions be left entirely to 
the individual “attending physician on the particular facts of 
the case before him”? Id., at 388. 
The viability line, which Casey termed Roe's central rule, 
makes no sense, and it is telling that other countries almost 
uniformly eschew such a line.
52 The Court thus asserted 
raw judicial power to impose, as a matter of constitutional 
52 According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, only the United 
States and the Netherlands use viability as a gestational limit on the avail-
ability of abortion on-request. See The World's Abortion Laws (Feb. 23, 
2021), https://reproductiverights.org/maps/worlds-abortion-laws. 
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278 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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law, a uniform viability rule that allowed the States less free-
dom to regulate abortion than the majority of western de-
mocracies enjoy. 
d 
All in all, Roe's reasoning was exceedingly weak, and aca-
demic commentators, including those who agreed with the 
decision as a matter of policy, were unsparing in their criti-
cism. John Hart Ely famously wrote that Roe was “not con-
stitutional law and g[ave] almost no sense of an obligation 
to try to be.” Ely 947 (emphasis deleted). Archibald Cox, 
who served as Solicitor General under President Kennedy, 
commented that Roe “read[s] like a set of hospital rules and 
regulations” that “[n]either historian, layman, nor lawyer 
will be persuaded . . . are part of . . . the Constitution.” The 
Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113– 
114 (1976). Laurence Tribe wrote that “even if there is 
a need to divide pregnancy into several segments with 
lines that clearly identify the limits of governmental power, 
`interest-balancing' of the form the Court pursues fails to 
justify any of the lines actually drawn.” Tribe 4–5. Mark 
Tushnet termed Roe a “totally unreasoned judicial opinion.” 
Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional 
Law 54 (1988). See also P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 157 
(1982); A. Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 
114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 110 (2000). 
Despite Roe's weaknesses, its reach was steadily extended 
in the years that followed. The Court struck down laws re-
quiring that second-trimester abortions be performed only 
in hospitals, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 433–439 (1983); that minors obtain 
parental consent, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976); that women give written 
consent after being informed of the status of the developing 
prenatal life and the risks of abortion, Akron, 462 U. S., at 
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Opinion of the Court 
442–445; that women wait 24 hours for an abortion, id., at 
449–451; that a physician determine viability in a particular 
manner, Colautti, 439 U. S., at 390–397; that a physician per-
forming a post-viability abortion use the technique most 
likely to preserve the life of the fetus, id., at 397–401; and 
that fetal remains be treated in a humane and sanitary man-
ner, Akron, 462 U. S., at 451–452. 
Justice White complained that the Court was engaging 
in “unrestrained imposition of its own, extraconstitutional 
value preferences.” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 794 (dissent-
ing opinion). And the United States as amicus curiae 
asked the Court to overrule Roe fve times in the decade 
before Casey, see 505 U. S., at 844 (joint opinion), and 
then asked the Court to overrule it once more in Casey 
itself. 
2 
When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, very little 
of Roe's reasoning was defended or preserved. The Court 
abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and instead 
grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 505 U. S., at 846. The 
Court did not reaffrm Roe's erroneous account of abortion 
history. In fact, none of the Justices in the majority said 
anything about the history of the abortion right. And as for 
precedent, the Court relied on essentially the same body of 
cases that Roe had cited. Thus, with respect to the stand-
ard grounds for constitutional decisionmaking—text, history, 
and precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe's 
reasoning. 
The Court also made no real effort to remedy one of the 
greatest weaknesses in Roe's analysis: its much-criticized 
discussion of viability. The Court retained what it called 
Roe's “central holding”—that a State may not regulate pre-
viability abortions for the purpose of protecting fetal life— 
but it provided no principled defense of the viability line. 
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505 U. S., at 860, 870–871. Instead, it merely rephrased 
what Roe had said, stating that viability marked the point at 
which “the independent existence of the second life can in 
reason and fairness be the object of state protection that now 
overrides the rights of the woman.” 505 U. S., at 870. Why 
“reason and fairness” demanded that the line be drawn at 
viability the Court did not explain. And the Justices who 
authored the controlling opinion conspicuously failed to say 
that they agreed with the viability rule; instead, they can-
didly acknowledged “the reservations [some] of us may have 
in reaffrming [that] holding of Roe.” Id., at 853. 
The controlling opinion criticized and rejected Roe's tri-
mester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and substituted a new 
“undue burden” test, but the basis for this test was obscure. 
And as we will explain, the test is full of ambiguities and is 
diffcult to apply. 
Casey, in short, either refused to reaffrm or rejected im-
portant aspects of Roe's analysis, failed to remedy glaring 
defciencies in Roe's reasoning, endorsed what it termed 
Roe's central holding while suggesting that a majority might 
not have thought it was correct, provided no new support 
for the abortion right other than Roe's status as precedent, 
and imposed a new and problematic test with no frm ground-
ing in constitutional text, history, or precedent. 
As discussed below, Casey also deployed a novel version 
of the doctrine of stare decisis. See infra, at 287–289. This 
new doctrine did not account for the profound wrongness of 
the decision in Roe, and placed great weight on an intangible 
form of reliance with little if any basis in prior case law. 
Stare decisis does not command the preservation of such a 
decision. 
C 
Workability. Our precedents counsel that another impor-
tant consideration in deciding whether a precedent should be 
overruled is whether the rule it imposes is workable—that 
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Opinion of the Court 
is, whether it can be understood and applied in a consistent 
and predictable manner. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 
778, 792 (2009); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 
164, 173 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayaca-
mas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 283–284 (1988). Casey's “undue 
burden” test has scored poorly on the workability scale. 
1 
Problems begin with the very concept of an “undue bur-
den.” As Justice Scalia noted in his Casey partial dissent, 
determining whether a burden is “due” or “undue” is “inher-
ently standardless.” 505 U. S., at 992; see also June Medical 
Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (Gor-
such, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether a burden is deemed undue 
depends heavily on which factors the judge considers and 
how much weight he accords each of them” (internal quota-
tion marks and alterations omitted)). 
The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the “undue 
burden” test by setting out three subsidiary rules, but these 
rules created their own problems. The frst rule is that “a 
provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 505 U. S., at 878 
(emphasis added); see also id., at 877. But whether a partic-
ular obstacle qualifes as “substantial” is often open to rea-
sonable debate. In the sense relevant here, “substantial” 
means “of ample or considerable amount, quantity, [or] size.” 
Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1897 (2d 
ed. 2001). Huge burdens are plainly “substantial,” and triv-
ial ones are not, but in between these extremes, there is a 
wide gray area. 
This ambiguity is a problem, and the second rule, which 
applies at all stages of a pregnancy, muddies things further. 
It states that measures designed “to ensure that the wom-
an's choice is informed” are constitutional so long as they do 
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282 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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not impose “an undue burden on the right.” Casey, 505 
U. S., at 878. To the extent that this rule applies to pre-
viability abortions, it overlaps with the frst rule and appears 
to impose a different standard. Consider a law that imposes 
an insubstantial obstacle but serves little purpose. As ap-
plied to a pre-viability abortion, would such a regulation be 
constitutional on the ground that it does not impose a “sub-
stantial obstacle”? Or would it be unconstitutional on the 
ground that it creates an “undue burden” because the burden 
it imposes, though slight, outweighs its negligible benefts? 
Casey does not say, and this ambiguity would lead to con-
fusion down the line. Compare June Medical, 591 U. S., 
at ––– – ––– (plurality opinion), with id., at ––– – ––– (Rob-
erts, C. J., concurring). 
The third rule complicates the picture even more. Under 
that rule, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the 
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a 
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the 
right.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 878 (emphasis added). This 
rule contains no fewer than three vague terms. It includes 
the two already discussed—“undue burden” and “substantial 
obstacle”—even though they are inconsistent. And it adds a 
third ambiguous term when it refers to “unnecessary health 
regulations.” The term “necessary” has a range of mean-
ings—from “essential” to merely “useful.” See Black's Law 
Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979); American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language 877 (1971). Casey did not explain 
the sense in which the term is used in this rule. 
In addition to these problems, one more applies to all three 
rules. They all call on courts to examine a law's effect on 
women, but a regulation may have a very different impact 
on different women for a variety of reasons, including their 
places of residence, fnancial resources, family situations, 
work and personal obligations, knowledge about fetal devel-
opment and abortion, psychological and emotional disposition 
and condition, and the frmness of their desire to obtain abor-
tions. In order to determine whether a regulation presents 
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Opinion of the Court 
a substantial obstacle to women, a court needs to know 
which set of women it should have in mind and how many 
of the women in this set must fnd that an obstacle is 
“substantial.” 
Casey provided no clear answer to these questions. It 
said that a regulation is unconstitutional if it imposes a sub-
stantial obstacle “in a large fraction of the cases in which [it] 
is relevant,” 505 U. S., at 895, but there is obviously no clear 
line between a fraction that is “large” and one that is not. 
Nor is it clear what the Court meant by “cases in which” 
a regulation is “relevant.” These ambiguities have caused 
confusion and disagreement. Compare Whole Woman's 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 627–628 (2016), with id., 
at 666–667, and n. 11 (Alito , J., dissenting). 
2 
The diffculty of applying Casey's new rules surfaced in 
that very case. The controlling opinion found that Pennsyl-
vania's 24-hour waiting period requirement and its informed-
consent provision did not impose “undue burden[s],” Casey, 
505 U. S., at 881–887, but Justice Stevens, applying the same 
test, reached the opposite result, id., at 920–922 (opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). That did not bode 
well, and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist aptly observed that 
“the undue burden standard presents nothing more workable 
than the trimester framework.” Id., at 964–966 (opinion 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
The ambiguity of the “undue burden” test also produced 
disagreement in later cases. In Whole Woman's Health, the 
Court adopted the cost-beneft interpretation of the test, 
stating that “[t]he rule announced in Casey . . . requires that 
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access 
together with the benefts those laws confer .” 579 U. S., at 
607 (emphasis added). But fve years later, a majority of the 
Justices rejected that interpretation. See June Medical, 
591 U. S. –––. Four Justices reaffrmed Whole Woman's 
Health's instruction to “weigh” a law's “benefts” against 
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284 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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“the burdens it imposes on abortion access.” 591 U. S., 
at ––– (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
But The Chief Justice—who cast the deciding vote— 
argued that “[n]othing about Casey suggested that a weigh-
ing of costs and benefts of an abortion regulation was a 
job for the courts.” Id., at ––– (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). And the four Justices in dissent rejected the plural-
ity's interpretation of Casey. See 591 U. S., at ––– (opinion 
of Alito, J., joined in relevant part by Thomas, Gorsuch, 
and Kavanaugh, JJ.); id., at ––– – ––– (opinion of Gorsuch, 
J.); id., at ––– – ––– (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (“[F]ive Mem-
bers of the Court reject the Whole Woman's Health cost-
beneft standard”). 
This Court's experience applying Casey has confrmed 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's prescient diagnosis that the undue-
burden standard was “not built to last.” 505 U. S., at 965 
(opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
3 
The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further 
evidence that Casey's “line between” permissible and uncon-
stitutional restrictions “has proved to be impossible to draw 
with precision.” Janus, 585 U. S., at –––. 
Casey has generated a long list of Circuit conficts. Most 
recently, the Courts of Appeals have disagreed about 
whether the balancing test from Whole Woman's Health cor-
rectly states the undue-burden framework.
53 They have 
disagreed on the legality of parental notifcation rules.54 
53 Compare Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th 430, 440 (CA5 
2021), EMW Women's Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Friedlander , 978 F. 3d 
418, 437 (CA6 2020), and Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F. 3d 912, 915 (CA8 2020) 
(per curiam ), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box, 991 
F. 3d 740, 751–752 (CA7 2021). 
54 Compare Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F. 3d 
352, 367 (CA4 1998), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. 
Adams, 937 F. 3d 973, 985–990 (CA7 2019), cert. granted, judgment va-
cated, 591 U. S. ––– (2020), and Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic 
v. Miller, 63 F. 3d 1452, 1460 (CA8 1995). 
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They have disagreed about bans on certain dilation and evac-
uation procedures.55 They have disagreed about when an 
increase in the time needed to reach a clinic constitutes an 
undue burden.
56 And they have disagreed on whether a 
State may regulate abortions performed because of the fe-
tus's race, sex, or disability.
57 
The Courts of Appeals have experienced particular diff-
culty in applying the large-fraction-of-relevant-cases test. 
They have criticized the assignment while reaching unpre-
dictable results.
58 And they have candidly outlined Casey's 
many other problems. 59 
55 Compare Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th, at 435–436, 
with West Ala. Women's Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1319, 1327 
(CA11 2018), and EMW Women's Surgical Center, P .S.C. v. Friedlander , 
960 F. 3d 785, 806–808 (CA6 2020). 
56 Compare Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F. 3d 531, 541 (CA9 
2004), with Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 438 F. 3d 595, 
605 (CA6 2006), and Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F. 3d 157, 
171–172 (CA4 2000). 
57 Compare Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F. 3d 512, 520–535 (CA6 
2021), with Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, 984 F. 3d 
682, 688–690 (CA8 2021). 
58 See, e. g., Bristol Regional Women's Center, P .C. v. Slatery, 7 F. 4th 
478, 485 (CA6 2021); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Strange, 3 F. 4th 1240, 
1269 (CA11 2021) (per curiam ); June Medical Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 
F. 3d 787, 814 (CA5 2018), rev'd, 591 U. S. ––– (2020); Preterm-Cleveland, 
994 F. 3d, at 534; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & Eastern Okla. v. Jegley, 
864 F. 3d 953, 958–960 (CA8 2017); McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F. 3d 1017, 
1029–1030 (CA9 2015); compare A Woman's Choice–East Side Women's 
Clinic v. Newman, 305 F. 3d 684, 699 (CA7 2002) (Coffey, J., concurring), 
with id., at 708 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
59 See, e. g., Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, 14 
F. 4th 409, 451 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F. 3d, at 524; Planned 
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Commissioner of Ind. State Dept. of 
Health, 888 F. 3d 300, 313 (CA7 2018) (Manion, J., concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. 
Box, 949 F. 3d 997, 999 (CA7 2019) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial 
of reh'g en banc) (“How much burden is `undue' is a matter of judgment, 
which depends on what the burden would be . . . and whether that burden 
is excessive (a matter of weighing costs against benefts, which one judge 
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Casey's “undue burden” test has proved to be unworkable. 
“[P]lucked from nowhere,” 505 U. S., at 965 (opinion of Rehn-
quist, C. J.), it “seems calculated to perpetuate give-it-a-try 
litigation” before judges assigned an unwieldy and inappro-
priate task. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, 
551 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). Continued adherence to that standard 
would undermine, not advance, the “evenhanded, predict-
able, and consistent development of legal principles.” 
Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. 
D 
Effect on other areas of law . Roe and Casey have led to 
the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doc-
trines, and that effect provides further support for overrul-
ing those decisions. See Ramos, 590 U. S., at ––– (opinion 
of Kavanaugh, J.); Janus, 585 U. S., at –––. 
Members of this Court have repeatedly lamented that “no 
legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullifcation by this 
Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case 
involving state regulation of abortion.” Thornburgh, 476 
U. S., at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Madsen v. 
Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 785 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); Whole Woman's Health, 579 U. S., at 631–633 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id., at 645–666, 678–684 (Alito, J., 
dissenting); June Medical, 591 U. S., at ––– – ––– (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting). 
The Court's abortion cases have diluted the strict standard 
for facial constitutional challenges.
60 They have ignored the 
is apt to do differently from another, and which judges as a group are apt 
to do differently from state legislators)”); National Abortion Federation 
v. Gonzales, 437 F. 3d 278, 290–296 (CA2 2006) (Walker, C. J., concurring); 
Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs., Corp. v. Owens, 287 
F. 3d 910, 931 (CA10 2002) (Baldock, J., dissenting). 
60 Compare United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987), with 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 895; see also supra, at 280–283. 
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Opinion of the Court 
Court's third-party standing doctrine.61 They have disre-
garded standard res judicata principles. 62 They have 
fouted the ordinary rules on the severability of unconstitu-
tional provisions, 63 as well as the rule that statutes should 
be read where possible to avoid unconstitutionality.64 And 
they have distorted First Amendment doctrines. 65 
When vindicating a doctrinal innovation requires courts to 
engineer exceptions to longstanding background rules, the 
doctrine “has failed to deliver the `principled and intelligible' 
development of the law that stare decisis purports to se-
cure.” Id., at ––– (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez 
v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986)). 
E 
Reliance interests. We last consider whether overruling 
Roe and Casey will upend substantial reliance interests. 
See Ramos, 590 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); 
Janus, 585 U. S., at ––– – –––. 
1 
Traditional reliance interests arise “where advance plan 
ning of great precision is most obviously a necessity.” 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 856 (joint opinion); see also Payne, 501 
U. S., at 828. In Casey, the controlling opinion conceded 
61 Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975), and Elk Grove 
Unifed School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 15, 17–18 (2004), with June 
Medical, 591 U. S., at ––– (Alito , J., dissenting), id., at ––– – ––– (Gor-
such, J., dissenting) (collecting cases), and Whole Woman's Health, 579 
U. S., at 632, n. 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
62 Compare id., at 598–606 (majority opinion), with id., at 645–666 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
63 Compare id., at 623–626 (majority opinion), with id., at 644–645 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
64 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 977–978 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); id., at 996–997 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
65 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703, 741–742 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); id., at 765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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288 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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that those traditional reliance interests were not implicated 
because getting an abortion is generally “unplanned activ-
ity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually immedi-
ate account of any sudden restoration of state authority to 
ban abortions.” 505 U. S., at 856. For these reasons, we 
agree with the Casey plurality that conventional, concrete 
reliance interests are not present here. 
2 
Unable to fnd reliance in the conventional sense, the con-
trolling opinion in Casey perceived a more intangible form 
of reliance. It wrote that “people [had] organized intimate 
relationships and made choices that defne their views of 
themselves and their places in society . . . in reliance on the 
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should 
fail” and that “[t]he ability of women to participate equally 
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” 
Ibid. But this Court is ill-equipped to assess “generalized 
assertions about the national psyche.” Id., at 957 (opinion 
of Rehnquist, C. J.). Casey's notion of reliance thus fnds 
little support in our cases, which instead emphasize very con-
crete reliance interests, like those that develop in “cases in-
volving property and contract rights.” Payne, 501 U. S., 
at 828. 
When a concrete reliance interest is asserted, courts are 
equipped to evaluate the claim, but assessing the novel and 
intangible form of reliance endorsed by the Casey plurality 
is another matter. That form of reliance depends on an em-
pirical question that is hard for anyone—and in particular, 
for a court—to assess, namely, the effect of the abortion right 
on society and in particular on the lives of women. The con-
tending sides in this case make impassioned and conficting 
arguments about the effects of the abortion right on the lives 
of women. Compare Brief for Petitioners 34–36; Brief for 
Women Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 13–20, 29–41, with 
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Brief for Respondents 36–41; Brief for National Women's 
Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 15–32. The contending 
sides also make conficting arguments about the status of the 
fetus. This Court has neither the authority nor the exper-
tise to adjudicate those disputes, and the Casey plurality's 
speculations and weighing of the relative importance of the 
fetus and mother represent a departure from the “original 
constitutional proposition” that “courts do not substitute 
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legisla-
tive bodies.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729–730 
(1963). 
Our decision returns the issue of abortion to those legisla-
tive bodies, and it allows women on both sides of the abortion 
issue to seek to affect the legislative process by infuencing 
public opinion, lobbying legislators, voting, and running for 
offce. Women are not without electoral or political power. 
It is noteworthy that the percentage of women who register 
to vote and cast ballots is consistently higher than the per-
centage of men who do so.
66 In the last election in Novem-
ber 2020, women, who make up around 51.5 percent of the 
population of Mississippi,
67 constituted 55.5 percent of the 
voters who cast ballots.68 
3 
Unable to show concrete reliance on Roe and Casey them-
selves, the Solicitor General suggests that overruling those 
decisions would “threaten the Court's precedents holding 
66 See Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau), An 
Analysis of the 2018 Congressional Election 6 (Dec. 2021) (Fig. 5) (showing 
that women made up over 50 percent of the voting population in every 
congressional election between 1978 and 2018). 
67 Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Mississippi (July 1, 2021), https://www. 
census.gov/quickfacts/MS. 
68 Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 
2020, Table 4b: Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and His-
panic Origin, for States: November 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/ 
tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-585.html.

290 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Opinion of the Court 
that the Due Process Clause protects other rights.” Brief 
for United States 26 (citing Obergefell, 576 U. S. 644; Law-
rence, 539 U. S. 558; Griswold, 381 U. S. 479). That is not 
correct for reasons we have already discussed. As even the 
Casey plurality recognized, “[a]bortion is a unique act” be-
cause it terminates “life or potential life.” 505 U. S., at 852; 
see also Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently differ-
ent from marital intimacy,” “marriage,” or “procreation”). 
And to ensure that our decision is not misunderstood or mis-
characterized, we emphasize that our decision concerns the 
constitutional right to abortion and no other right. Nothing 
in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on prece-
dents that do not concern abortion. 
IV 
Having shown that traditional stare decisis factors do not 
weigh in favor of retaining Roe or Casey, we must address 
one fnal argument that featured prominently in the Casey 
plurality opinion. 
The argument was cast in different terms, but stated sim-
ply, it was essentially as follows. The American people's be-
lief in the rule of law would be shaken if they lost respect 
for this Court as an institution that decides important cases 
based on principle, not “social and political pressures.” 505 
U. S., at 865. There is a special danger that the public will 
perceive a decision as having been made for unprincipled 
reasons when the Court overrules a controversial “water-
shed” decision, such as Roe. 505 U. S., at 866–867. A deci-
sion overruling Roe would be perceived as having been made 
“under fre” and as a “surrender to political pressure,” 505 
U. S., at 867, and therefore the preservation of public ap-
proval of the Court weighs heavily in favor of retaining Roe, 
see 505 U. S., at 869. 
This analysis starts out on the right foot but ultimately 
veers off course. The Casey plurality was certainly right 
that it is important for the public to perceive that our deci-
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Opinion of the Court 
sions are based on principle, and we should make every ef-
fort to achieve that objective by issuing opinions that care-
fully show how a proper understanding of the law leads to 
the results we reach. But we cannot exceed the scope of 
our authority under the Constitution, and we cannot allow 
our decisions to be affected by any extraneous infuences 
such as concern about the public's reaction to our work. Cf. 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989); Brown, 347 U. S. 483. 
That is true both when we initially decide a constitutional 
issue and when we consider whether to overrule a prior deci-
sion. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “The Judicial 
Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public opin-
ion, but from deciding by its best lights whether legislative 
enactments of the popular branches of Government comport 
with the Constitution. The doctrine of stare decisis is an 
adjunct of this duty, and should be no more subject to the 
vagaries of public opinion than is the basic judicial task.” 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 963 (opinion concurring in judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). In suggesting otherwise, the 
Casey plurality went beyond this Court's role in our constitu-
tional system. 
The Casey plurality “call[ed] the contending sides of a 
national controversy to end their national division,” and 
claimed the authority to impose a permanent settlement of 
the issue of a constitutional abortion right simply by saying 
that the matter was closed. Id., at 867. That unprece-
dented claim exceeded the power vested in us by the Consti-
tution. As Alexander Hamilton famously put it, the Consti-
tution gives the Judiciary “neither Force nor Will.” The 
Federalist No. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Our sole au-
thority is to exercise “judgment ”—which is to say, the au-
thority to judge what the law means and how it should apply 
to the case at hand. Ibid. The Court has no authority to 
decree that an erroneous precedent is permanently exempt 
from evaluation under traditional stare decisis principles. A 
precedent of this Court is subject to the usual principles of 
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292 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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stare decisis under which adherence to precedent is the norm 
but not an inexorable command. If the rule were otherwise, 
erroneous decisions like Plessy and Lochner would still be 
the law. That is not how stare decisis operates. 
The Casey plurality also misjudged the practical limits of 
this Court's infuence. Roe certainly did not succeed in end-
ing division on the issue of abortion. On the contrary, Roe 
“infamed” a national issue that has remained bitterly divi-
sive for the past half century. Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opin-
ion of Scalia, J.); see also R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial 
Voice, 67 N. Y . U. L. Rev. 1185, 1208 (1992) (Roe may have 
“halted a political process,” “prolonged divisiveness,” and 
“deferred stable settlement of the issue”). And for the past 
30 years, Casey has done the same. 
Neither decision has ended debate over the issue of a con-
stitutional right to obtain an abortion. Indeed, in this case, 
26 States expressly ask us to overrule Roe and Casey and to 
return the issue of abortion to the people and their elected 
representatives. This Court's inability to end debate on the 
issue should not have been surprising. This Court cannot 
bring about the permanent resolution of a rancorous national 
controversy simply by dictating a settlement and telling the 
people to move on. Whatever infuence the Court may have 
on public attitudes must stem from the strength of our opin-
ions, not an attempt to exercise “raw judicial power.” Roe, 
410 U. S., at 222 (White, J., dissenting). 
We do not pretend to know how our political system or 
society will respond to today's decision overruling Roe and 
Casey. And even if we could foresee what will happen, we 
would have no authority to let that knowledge infuence our 
decision. We can only do our job, which is to interpret the 
law, apply longstanding principles of stare decisis, and decide 
this case accordingly. 
We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a 
right to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled, and 
the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the 
people and their elected representatives. 
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Opinion of the Court 
V 
A 
1 
The dissent argues that we have “abandon[ed]” stare deci-
sis, post, at 387, but we have done no such thing, and it is 
the dissent's understanding of stare decisis that breaks with 
tradition. The dissent's foundational contention is that the 
Court should never (or perhaps almost never) overrule an 
egregiously wrong constitutional precedent unless the Court 
can “poin[t] to major legal or factual changes undermining 
[the] decision's original basis.” Post, at 394. To support 
this contention, the dissent claims that Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483, and other landmark cases overrul-
ing prior precedents “responded to changed law and to 
changed facts and attitudes that had taken hold throughout 
society.” Post, at 401. The unmistakable implication of 
this argument is that only the passage of time and new devel-
opments justifed those decisions. Recognition that the 
cases they overruled were egregiously wrong on the day 
they were handed down was not enough. 
The Court has never adopted this strange new version of 
stare decisis —and with good reason. Does the dissent 
really maintain that overruling Plessy was not justifed until 
the country had experienced more than a half-century of 
state-sanctioned segregation and generations of Black school 
children had suffered all its effects? Post, at 402. 
Here is another example. On the dissent's view, it must 
have been wrong for West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 
319 U. S. 624, to overrule Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 
310 U. S. 586, a bare three years after it was handed down. 
In both cases, children who were Jehovah's Witnesses re-
fused on religious grounds to salute the fag or recite the 
pledge of allegiance. The Barnette Court did not claim that 
its reexamination of the issue was prompted by any interven-
ing legal or factual developments, so if the Court had fol-
lowed the dissent's new version of stare decisis, it would 
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have been compelled to adhere to Gobitis and countenance 
continued First Amendment violations for some unspecifed 
period. 
Precedents should be respected, but sometimes the Court 
errs, and occasionally the Court issues an important decision 
that is egregiously wrong. When that happens, stare decisis 
is not a straitjacket. And indeed, the dissent eventually ad-
mits that a decision could “be overruled just because it is 
terribly wrong,” though the dissent does not explain when 
that would be so. Post, at 402. 
2 
Even if the dissent were correct in arguing that an egre-
giously wrong decision should (almost) never be overruled 
unless its mistake is later highlighted by “major legal or fac-
tual changes,” reexamination of Roe and Casey would be 
amply justifed. We have already mentioned a number of 
post-Casey developments, see supra, at 258–259, 283–287, 
but the most profound change may be the failure of the Casey 
plurality's call for “the contending sides” in the controversy 
about abortion “to end their national division,” 505 U. S., at 
867. That has not happened, and there is no reason to think 
that another decision sticking with Roe would achieve what 
Casey could not. 
The dissent, however, is undeterred. It contends that the 
“very controversy surrounding Roe and Casey” is an impor-
tant stare decisis consideration that requires upholding those 
precedents. See post, at 412–414. The dissent character-
izes Casey as a “precedent about precedent” that is perma-
nently shielded from further evaluation under traditional 
stare decisis principles. See post, at 414. But as we have 
explained, Casey broke new ground when it treated the na-
tional controversy provoked by Roe as a ground for refusing 
to reconsider that decision, and no subsequent case has relied 
on that factor. Our decision today simply applies longstand-
ing stare decisis factors instead of applying a version of the 
doctrine that seems to apply only in abortion cases. 
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Opinion of the Court 
3 
Finally, the dissent suggests that our decision calls into 
question Griswold, Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell. 
Post, at 362–363, 385, n. 8. But we have stated unequivo-
cally that “[n]othing in this opinion should be understood to 
cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” 
Supra, at 290. We have also explained why that is so: rights 
regarding contraception and same-sex relationships are in-
herently different from the right to abortion because the lat-
ter (as we have stressed) uniquely involves what Roe and 
Casey termed “potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150 (em-
phasis deleted); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. Therefore, a right 
to abortion cannot be justifed by a purported analogy to the 
rights recognized in those other cases or by “appeals to a 
broader right to autonomy.” Supra, at 257. It is hard to 
see how we could be clearer. Moreover, even putting aside 
that these cases are distinguishable, there is a further 
point that the dissent ignores: Each precedent is subject to its 
own stare decisis analysis, and the factors that our doc-
trine instructs us to consider like reliance and workability are 
different for these cases than for our abortion jurisprudence. 
B 
1 
We now turn to the concurrence in the judgment, which 
reproves us for deciding whether Roe and Casey should be 
retained or overruled. That opinion (which for convenience 
we will call simply “the concurrence”) recommends a “more 
measured course,” which it defends based on what it claims 
is “a straightforward stare decisis analysis.” Post, at 348 
(opinion of Roberts, C. J.). The concurrence would “leave 
for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion at 
all,” post, at 353, and would hold only that if the Constitution 
protects any such right, the right ends once women have had 
“a reasonable opportunity” to obtain an abortion, post, at 348. 
The concurrence does not specify what period of time is suf-
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fcient to provide such an opportunity, but it would hold 
that 15 weeks, the period allowed under Mississippi's law, is 
enough—at least “absent rare circumstances.” Post, at 348– 
349, 356. 
There are serious problems with this approach, and it is 
revealing that nothing like it was recommended by either 
party. As we have recounted, both parties and the Solicitor 
General have urged us either to reaffrm or overrule Roe 
and Casey. See supra, at 230–231. And when the specifc 
approach advanced by the concurrence was broached at oral 
argument, both respondents and the Solicitor General em-
phatically rejected it. Respondents' counsel termed it 
“completely unworkable” and “less principled and less work-
able than viability.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. The Solicitor Gen-
eral argued that abandoning the viability line would leave 
courts and others with “no continued guidance.” Id., at 101. 
What is more, the concurrence has not identifed any of the 
more than 130 amicus briefs fled in this case that advocated 
its approach. The concurrence would do exactly what it 
criticizes Roe for doing: pulling “out of thin air” a test that 
“[n]o party or amicus asked the Court to adopt.” Post, at 349. 
2 
The concurrence's most fundamental defect is its failure to 
offer any principled basis for its approach. The concurrence 
would “discar[d]” “the rule from Roe and Casey that a wom-
an's right to terminate her pregnancy extends up to the point 
that the fetus is regarded as `viable' outside the womb.” 
Post, at 349. But this rule was a critical component of the 
holdings in Roe and Casey, and stare decisis is “a doctrine of 
preservation, not transformation,” Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 384 (2010) (Roberts, 
C. J., concurring). Therefore, a new rule that discards the 
viability rule cannot be defended on stare decisis grounds. 
The concurrence concedes that its approach would “not be 
available” if “the rationale of Roe and Casey were inextrica-

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 297 
Opinion of the Court 
bly entangled with and dependent upon the viability stand-
ard.” Post, at 354. But the concurrence asserts that the 
viability line is separable from the constitutional right they 
recognized, and can therefore be “discarded” without dis-
turbing any past precedent. Post, at 353–354. That is sim-
ply incorrect. 
Roe's trimester rule was expressly tied to viability, see 
410 U. S., at 163–164, and viability played a critical role in 
later abortion decisions. For example, in Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, the Court reit-
erated Roe's rule that a “State may regulate an abortion to 
protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abortion” 
at “the stage subsequent to viability .” 428 U. S., at 61 (em-
phasis added). The Court then rejected a challenge to Mis-
souri's defnition of viability, holding that the State's defni-
tion was consistent with Roe's. 428 U. S., at 63–64. If 
viability was not an essential part of the rule adopted in Roe, 
the Court would have had no need to make that comparison. 
The holding in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, is even 
more instructive. In that case, the Court noted that prior 
cases had “stressed viability” and reiterated that “[v]iability 
is the critical point” under Roe. 439 U. S., at 388–389. It 
then struck down Pennsylvania's defnition of viability, id., 
at 389–394, and it is hard to see how the Court could have 
done that if Roe's discussion of viability was not part of its 
holding. 
When the Court reconsidered Roe in Casey, it left no doubt 
about the importance of the viability rule. It described the 
rule as Roe's “central holding,” 505 U. S., at 860, and repeat-
edly stated that the right it reaffrmed was “the right of the 
woman to choose to have an abortion before viability .” Id., 
at 846 (emphasis added). See id., at 871 (“The woman's 
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most 
central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a 
component of liberty we cannot renounce” (emphasis added)); 
id., at 872 (A “woman has a right to choose to terminate or 
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298 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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continue her pregnancy before viability” (emphasis added)); 
id., at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from mak-
ing the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before 
viability” (emphasis added)). 
Our subsequent cases have continued to recognize the cen-
trality of the viability rule. See Whole Woman's Health, 
579 U. S., at 589–590 (“[A] provision of law is constitutionally 
invalid, if the `purpose or effect' of the provision `is to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability' ” (emphasis de-
leted and added)); id., at 627 (“[W]e now use `viability' as 
the relevant point at which a State may begin limiting 
women's access to abortion for reasons unrelated to maternal 
health” (emphasis added)). 
Not only is the new rule proposed by the concurrence in-
consistent with Casey's unambiguous “language,” post, at 
354, it is also contrary to the judgment in that case and later 
abortion cases. In Casey, the Court held that Pennsylva-
nia's spousal-notifcation provision was facially unconstitu-
tional, not just that it was unconstitutional as applied to 
abortions sought prior to the time when a woman has had a 
reasonable opportunity to choose. See 505 U. S., at 887–898. 
The same is true of Whole Woman's Health, which held that 
certain rules that required physicians performing abortions 
to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital were fa-
cially unconstitutional because they placed “a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion.” 
579 U. S., at 591 (emphasis added). 
For all these reasons, stare decisis cannot justify the new 
“reasonable opportunity” rule propounded by the concur-
rence. If that rule is to become the law of the land, it must 
stand on its own, but the concurrence makes no attempt to 
show that this rule represents a correct interpretation of the 
Constitution. The concurrence does not claim that the right 
to a reasonable opportunity to obtain an abortion is “ `deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' ” and “ `implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.' ” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., 
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Opinion of the Court 
at 720–721. Nor does it propound any other theory that 
could show that the Constitution supports its new rule. 
And if the Constitution protects a woman's right to obtain 
an abortion, the opinion does not explain why that right 
should end after the point at which all “reasonable” women 
will have decided whether to seek an abortion. While the 
concurrence is moved by a desire for judicial minimalism, 
“we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply 
because it is narrow; it must also be right.” Citizens 
United, 558 U. S., at 375 (Roberts, C. J., concurring). For 
the reasons that we have explained, the concurrence's ap-
proach is not. 
3 
The concurrence would “leave for another day whether to 
reject any right to an abortion at all,” post, at 353, but “an-
other day” would not be long in coming. Some States have 
set deadlines for obtaining an abortion that are shorter than 
Mississippi's. See, e. g., Memphis Center for Reproductive 
Health v. Slatery, 14 F. 4th, at 414 (considering law with bans 
“at cascading intervals of two to three weeks” beginning at 
six weeks), reh'g en banc granted, 14 F. 4th 550 (CA6 2021). 
If we held only that Mississippi's 15-week rule is constitu-
tional, we would soon be called upon to pass on the constitu-
tionality of a panoply of laws with shorter deadlines or no 
deadline at all. The “measured course” charted by the con-
currence would be fraught with turmoil until the Court 
answered the question that the concurrence seeks to defer. 
Even if the Court ultimately adopted the new rule sug-
gested by the concurrence, we would be faced with the diff-
cult problem of spelling out what it means. For example, if 
the period required to give women a “reasonable” opportu-
nity to obtain an abortion were pegged, as the concurrence 
seems to suggest, at the point when a certain percentage of 
women make that choice, see post, at 348, 356, we would have 
to identify the relevant percentage. It would also be neces-
sary to explain what the concurrence means when it refers 
to “rare circumstances” that might justify an exception. 
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Post, at 356. And if this new right aims to give women a 
reasonable opportunity to get an abortion, it would be neces-
sary to decide whether factors other than promptness in de-
ciding might have a bearing on whether such an opportunity 
was available. 
In sum, the concurrence's quest for a middle way would 
only put off the day when we would be forced to confront 
the question we now decide. The turmoil wrought by Roe 
and Casey would be prolonged. It is far better—for this 
Court and the country—to face up to the real issue without 
further delay. 
VI 
We must now decide what standard will govern if state 
abortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and 
whether the law before us satisfies the appropriate 
standard. 
A 
Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-
priate standard for such challenges. As we have explained, 
procuring an abortion is not a fundamental constitutional 
right because such a right has no basis in the Constitution's 
text or in our Nation's history. See supra, at 234–263. 
It follows that the States may regulate abortion for legiti-
mate reasons, and when such regulations are challenged 
under the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their social 
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.” 
Ferguson, 372 U. S., at 729–730; see also Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U. S. 471, 484–486 (1970); United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938). That respect 
for a legislature's judgment applies even when the laws at 
issue concern matters of great social signifcance and moral 
substance. See, e. g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 365–368 (2001) (“treatment of the dis-
abled”); Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728 (“assisted suicide”); San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 
32–35, 55 (1973) (“fnancing public education”). 
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Opinion of the Court 
A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare 
laws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.” Hel-
ler v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319 (1993). It must be sustained if 
there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have 
thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Id., 
at 320; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 
313 (1993); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(per curiam ); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 
U. S. 483, 491 (1955). These legitimate interests include re-
spect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of 
development, Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157–158; the protection 
of maternal health and safety; the elimination of particularly 
gruesome or barbaric medical procedures; the preservation 
of the integrity of the medical profession; the mitigation of 
fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimination on the basis 
of race, sex, or disability. See id., at 156–157; Roe, 410 U. S., 
at 150; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728–731 (identifying simi-
lar interests). 
B 
These legitimate interests justify Mississippi's Gestational 
Age Act. Except “in a medical emergency or in the case of 
a severe fetal abnormality,” the statute prohibits abortion 
“if the probable gestational age of the unborn human being 
has been determined to be greater than ffteen (15) weeks.” 
Miss. Code Ann. § 41–41–191(4)(b). The Mississippi Legisla-
ture's fndings recount the stages of “human prenatal devel-
opment” and assert the State's interest in “protecting the life 
of the unborn.” § 2(b)(i). The legislature also found that 
abortions performed after 15 weeks typically use the dilation 
and evacuation procedure, and the legislature found the use 
of this procedure “for nontherapeutic or elective reasons [to 
be] a barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, 
and demeaning to the medical profession.” § 2(b)(i)(8); see 
also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 135–143 (describing such proce-
dures). These legitimate interests provide a rational basis 
for the Gestational Age Act, and it follows that respondents' 
constitutional challenge must fail. 
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VII 
We end this opinion where we began. Abortion presents 
a profound moral question. The Constitution does not pro-
hibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibit-
ing abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. We 
now overrule those decisions and return that authority to 
the people and their elected representatives. 
The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
APPENDICES 
A 
This appendix contains statutes criminalizing abortion at 
all stages of pregnancy in the States existing in 1868. The 
statutes appear in chronological order. 
1. Missouri (1825): 
Sec. 12. “That every person who shall wilfully and ma-
liciously administer or cause to be administered to or 
taken by any person, any poison, or other noxious, poi-
sonous or destructive substance or liquid, with an inten-
tion to harm him or her thereby to murder, or thereby 
to cause or procure the miscarriage of any woman then 
being with child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, 
shall suffer imprisonment not exceeding seven years, 
and be fned not exceeding three thousand dollars.” 
69 
2. Illinois (1827): 
Sec. 46. “Every person who shall wilfully and mali-
ciously administer, or cause to be administered to, or 
taken by any person, any poison, or other noxious or 
69 1825 Mo. Laws p. 283 (emphasis added); see also, Mo. Rev. Stat., Art. 
II, §§ 10, 36 (1835) (extending liability to abortions performed by instru-
ment and establishing differential penalties for pre- and post-quickening 
abortion). 
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Appendix A to opinion of the Court 
destructive substance or liquid, with an intention to 
cause the death of such person, or to procure the miscar-
riage of any woman, then being with child, and shall 
thereof be duly convicted, shall be imprisoned for a term 
not exceeding three years, and be fned in a sum not 
exceeding one thousand dollars.” 
70 
3. New York (1828): 
Sec. 9. “Every person who shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, drug 
or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any in-
strument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy 
such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to 
preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been ad-
vised by two physicians to be necessary for such pur-
pose, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter in the sec-
ond degree.” 
Sec. 21. “Every person who shall wilfully administer 
to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, substance 
or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any instru-
ment or other means whatever, with intent thereby to 
procure the miscarriage of any such woman, unless the 
same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of 
such woman, or shall have been advised by two phy-
sicians to be necessary for that purpose; shall, upon 
conviction, be punished by imprisonment in a county 
jail not more than one year, or by a fne not exceeding 
five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.” 
71 
70 Ill. Rev. Code § 46 (1827) (emphasis added); see also Ill. Rev. Code § 46 
(1833) (same); 1867 Ill. Laws p. 89 (extending liability to abortions “by 
means of any instrument[s]” and raising penalties to imprisonment “not 
less than two nor more than ten years”). 
71 N. Y . Rev. Stat., pt. 4, ch. 1, Tit. 2, § 9 (emphasis added); Tit. 6, § 21 
(1828) (emphasis added); 1829 N. Y . Laws p. 19 (codifying these provisions 
in the revised statutes). 
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4. Ohio (1834): 
Sec. 1. “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the 
State of Ohio, That any physician, or other person, who 
shall wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any 
medicine, drug, substance, or thing whatever, or shall 
use any instrument or other means whatever, with in-
tent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such 
woman, unless the same shall have been necessary to 
preserve the life of such woman, or shall have been ad-
vised by two physicians to be necessary for that pur-
pose, shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail not more than one year, or by 
fne not exceeding fve hundred dollars, or by a both such 
fne and imprisonment.” 
Sec. 2. “That any physician, or other person, who shall 
administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child, 
any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or shall use 
or employ any instrument, or other means, with intent 
thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall have 
been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or 
shall have been advised by two physicians to be neces-
sary for such purpose, shall, in case of the death of such 
child or mother in consequence thereof, be deemed 
guilty of a high misdemeanor, and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more 
than seven years, nor less than one year.” 
72 
5. Indiana (1835): 
Sec. 3. “That every person who shall wilfully admin-
ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-
stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any 
instrument or other means whatever, with intent 
thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman, 
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve 
the life of such woman, shall upon conviction be pun-
72 1834 Ohio Laws pp. 20–21 (emphasis deleted and added). 
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ished by imprisonment in the county jail any term of 
[time] not exceeding twelve months and be fned any 
sum not exceeding fve hundred dollars.” 73 
6. Maine (1840): 
Sec. 13. “Every person, who shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with child, whether such child be 
quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance whatever, 
or shall use or employ any instrument or other means 
whatever, with intent to destroy such child, and shall 
thereby destroy such child before its birth, unless the 
same shall have been done as necessary to preserve the 
life of the mother, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison, not more than fve years, or by fne, not 
exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment in the 
county jail, not more than one year.” 
Sec. 14. “Every person, who shall administer to any 
woman, pregnant with child, whether such child shall 
be quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance what-
ever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other 
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the mis-
carriage of such woman, unless the same shall have been 
done, as necessary to preserve her life, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the county jail, not more than one 
year, or by fne, not exceeding one thousand dollars.” 
74 
7. Alabama (1841): 
Sec. 2. “Every person who shall wilfully administer to 
any pregnant woman any medicines, drugs, substance 
or thing whatever, or shall use and employ any instru-
ment or means whatever with intent thereby to procure 
the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same shall be 
necessary to preserve her life, or shall have been ad-
vised by a respectable physician to be necessary for that 
73 1835 Ind. Laws p. 66 (emphasis added). 
74 Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 12, ch. 160, §§ 13–14 (1840) (emphasis added). 
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purpose, shall upon conviction, be punished by fne not 
exceeding fve hundred dollars, and by imprisonment in 
the county jail, not less than three, and not exceeding 
six months.” 
75 
8. Massachusetts (1845): 
Ch. 27. “Whoever, maliciously or without lawful justi-
fcation, with intent to cause and procure the miscar-
riage of a woman then pregnant with child, shall admin-
ister to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct her to 
take or swallow, any poison, drug, medicine or noxious 
thing, or shall cause or procure her with like intent, to 
take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or noxious 
thing; and whoever maliciously and without lawful justi-
fcation, shall use any instrument or means whatever 
with the like intent, and every person, with the like in-
tent, knowingly aiding and assisting such offender or of-
fenders, shall be deemed guilty of felony, if the woman 
die in consequence thereof, and shall be imprisoned not 
more than twenty years, nor less than fve years in the 
State Prison; and if the woman doth not die in conse-
quence thereof, such offender shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and shall be punished by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding seven years, nor less than one year, in the state 
prison or house of correction, or common jail, and by fne 
not exceeding two thousand dollars.” 
76 
9. Michigan (1846): 
Sec. 33. “Every person who shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, drug 
or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any in-
strument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy 
such child, unless the same shall have been necessary 
to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been 
75 1841 Ala. Acts p. 143 (emphasis added). 
76 1845 Mass. Acts p. 406 (emphasis added). 
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advised by two physicians to be necessary for such 
purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of 
such mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of 
manslaughter.” 
Sec. 34. “Every person who shall wilfully administer 
to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, substance 
or thing whatever, or shall employ any instrument or 
other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure 
the miscarriage of any such woman, unless the same 
shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such 
woman, or shall have been advised by two physicians to 
be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon conviction, be 
punished by imprisonment in a county jail not more than 
one year, or by a fne not exceeding fve hundred dollars, 
or by both such fne and imprisonment.” 
77 
10. Vermont (1846): 
Sec. 1. “Whoever maliciously, or without lawful justi-
fcation, with intent to cause and procure the miscarriage 
of a woman, then pregnant with child, shall administer 
to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct her to take 
or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or noxious thing, 
or shall cause or procure her, with like intent, to take or 
swallow any poison, drug, medicine or noxious thing, and 
whoever maliciously and without lawful justifcation, 
shall use any instrument or means whatever, with the 
like intent, and every person, with the like intent, know-
ingly aiding and assisting such offenders, shall be 
deemed guilty of felony, if the woman die in consequence 
thereof, and shall be imprisoned in the state prison, not 
more than ten years, nor less than fve years; and if the 
woman does not die in consequence thereof, such offend-
ers shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not ex-
77 Mich. Rev. Stat., Tit. 30, ch. 153, §§ 33–34 (1846) (emphasis added). 
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ceeding three years, nor less than one year, and pay a 
fne not exceeding two hundred dollars.” 78 
11. Virginia (1848): 
Sec. 9. “Any free person who shall administer to 
any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug or substance 
whatever, or use or employ any instrument or other 
means with intent thereby to destroy the child with 
which such woman may be pregnant, or to produce abor-
tion or miscarriage, and shall thereby destroy such child, 
or produce such abortion or miscarriage, unless the same 
shall have been done to preserve the life of such woman, 
shall be punished, if the death of a quick child be thereby 
produced, by confnement in the penitentiary, for not less 
than one nor more than fve years, or if the death of a 
child, not quick, be thereby produced, by confnement in 
the jail for not less than one nor more than twelve 
months.” 
79 
12. New Hampshire (1849): 
Sec. 1. “That every person, who shall wilfully admin-
ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-
stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any 
instrument or means whatever with intent thereby to 
procure the miscarriage of any such woman, unless the 
same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of 
such woman, or shall have been advised by two physi-
cians to be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon con-
viction, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail 
not more than one year, or by a fne not exceeding one 
thousand dollars, or by both such fne and imprisonment 
at the discretion of the Court.” 
Sec. 2. “Every person who shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, drug 
or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any in-
78 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves pp. 34–35 (emphasis added). 
79 1848 Va. Acts p. 96 (emphasis added). 
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strument or means whatever, with intent thereby to de-
stroy such child, unless the same shall have been neces-
sary to preserve the life of such woman, or shall have 
been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such 
purpose, shall, upon conviction, be punished by fne not 
exceeding one thousand dollars, and by confnement to 
hard labor not less than one year, nor more than ten 
years.” 
80 
13. New Jersey (1849): 
“That if any person or persons, maliciously or without 
lawful justifcation, with intent to cause and procure the 
miscarriage of a woman then pregnant with child, shall 
administer to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct 
her to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine, or 
noxious thing; and if any person or persons maliciously, 
and without lawful justifcation, shall use any instru-
ment, or means whatever, with the like intent; and every 
person, with the like intent, knowingly aiding and assist-
ing such offender or offenders, shall, on conviction 
thereof, be adjudged guilty of a high misdemeanor; and 
if the woman die in consequence thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fne, not exceeding one thousand dollars, or im-
prisonment at hard labour for any term not exceeding 
ffteen years, or both; and if the woman doth not die in 
consequence thereof, such offender shall, on conviction 
thereof, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and be 
punished by fne, not exceeding fve hundred dollars, or 
imprisonment at hard labour, for any term not exceeding 
seven years, or both.” 
81 
14. California (1850): 
Sec. 45. “And every person who shall administer or 
cause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-
stances, or shall use or cause to be used any instruments 
80 1849 N. H. Laws p. 708 (emphasis added). 
81 1849 N. J. Laws pp. 266–267 (emphasis added). 
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whatever, with the intention to procure the miscarriage 
of any woman then being with child, and shall be 
thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the State Prison for a term not less than two 
years, nor more than fve years: Provided, that no physi-
cian shall be affected by the last clause of this section, 
who, in the discharge of his professional duties, deems 
it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any woman in 
order to save her life.” 
82 
15. Texas (1854): 
Sec. 1. “If any person, with the intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman being with child, unlawfully 
and maliciously shall administer to her or cause to be 
taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall 
use any instrument or any means whatever, with like 
intent, every such offender, and every person counsel-
ling or aiding or abetting such offender, shall be pun-
ished by confnement to hard labor in the Penitentiary 
not exceeding ten years.” 
83 
16. Louisiana (1856): 
Sec. 24. “Whoever shall feloniously administer or 
cause to be administered any drug, potion, or any other 
thing to any woman, for the purpose of procuring a pre-
mature delivery, and whoever shall administer or cause 
to be administered to any woman pregnant with child, 
any drug, potion, or any other thing, for the purpose 
of procuring abortion, or a premature delivery, shall be 
imprisoned at hard labor, for not less than one, nor more 
than ten years.” 
84 
17. Iowa (1858): 
Sec. 1. “That every person who shall willfully admin-
ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-
82 1850 Cal. Stats. p. 233 (emphasis added and deleted). 
83 1854 Tex. Gen. Laws p. 58 (emphasis added). 
84 La. Rev. Stat. § 24 (1856) (emphasis added). 
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stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any 
instrument or other means whatever, with the intent 
thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman, 
unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life 
of such woman, shall upon conviction thereof, be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of 
not exceeding one year, and be fned in a sum not ex-
ceeding one thousand dollars.” 
85 
18. Wisconsin (1858): 
Sec. 11. “Every person who shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug, or 
substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instru-
ment or other means, with intent thereby to destroy 
such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to 
preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been ad-
vised by two physicians to be necessary for such pur-
pose, shall, in case the death of such child or of such 
mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree.” 
86 
Sec. 58. “Every person who shall administer to any 
pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman, or 
advise or procure any such woman to take, any medicine, 
drug, or substance or thing whatever, or shall use or 
employ any instrument or other means whatever, or ad-
vise or procure the same to be used, with intent thereby 
to procure the miscarriage of any such woman, shall 
upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail, not more than one year nor less than three 
months, or by fne, not exceeding fve hundred dollars, 
or by both fne and imprisonment, at the discretion of 
the court.” 
85 1858 Iowa Acts p. 93 (codifed in Iowa Rev. Laws § 4221) (emphasis 
added). 
86 Wis. Rev. Stat., ch. 164, § 11, ch. 169, § 58 (1858) (emphasis added). 
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19. Kansas (1859): 
Sec. 10. “Every person who shall administer to any 
woman, pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, 
drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or employ 
any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to 
destroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-
essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have 
been advised by a physician to be necessary for that pur-
pose, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter in the sec-
ond degree.” 
Sec. 37. “Every physician or other person who shall 
wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any medi-
cine, drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or em-
ploy any instrument or means whatsoever, with intent 
thereby to procure abortion or the miscarriage of any 
such woman, unless the same shall have been necessary 
to preserve the life of such woman, or shall have been 
advised by a physician to be necessary for that purpose, 
shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and punished by imprisonment in a county 
jail not exceeding one year, or by fne not exceeding 
five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.” 
87 
20. Connecticut (1860): 
Sec. 1. “That any person with intent to procure the 
miscarriage or abortion of any woman, shall give or 
administer to her, prescribe for her, or advise, or direct, 
or cause or procure her to take, any medicine, drug or 
substance whatever, or use or advise the use of any in-
strument, or other means whatever, with the like intent, 
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve 
the life of such woman, or of her unborn child, shall be 
deemed guilty of felony, and upon due conviction thereof 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the Connecticut 
87 1859 Kan. Laws pp. 233, 237 (emphasis added). 
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state prison, not more than fve years or less than one 
year, or by a fne of one thousand dollars, or both, at the 
discretion of the court.” 88 
21. Pennsylvania (1860): 
Sec. 87. “If any person shall unlawfully administer to 
any woman, pregnant or quick with child, or supposed 
and believed to be pregnant or quick with child, any 
drug, poison or other substance whatsoever, or shall un-
lawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever, 
with the intent to procure the miscarriage of such 
woman, and such woman, or any child with which she 
may be quick, shall die in consequence of either of said 
unlawful acts, the person so offending shall be guilty of 
felony, and shall be sentenced to pay a fne not exceeding 
fve hundred dollars, and to undergo an imprisonment, 
by separate or solitary confnement at labor, not exceed-
ing seven years.” 
Sec. 88. “If any person, with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman, shall unlawfully administer 
to her any poison, drug or substance whatsoever, or shall 
unlawfully use any instrument, or other means whatso-
ever, with the like intent, such person shall be guilty of 
felony, and being thereof convicted, shall be sentenced 
to pay a fne not exceeding fve hundred dollars, and un-
dergo an imprisonment, by separate or solitary con-
fnement at labor, not exceeding three years.” 
89 
22. Rhode Island (1861): 
Sec. 1. “Every person who shall be convicted of wil-
fully administering to any pregnant woman, or to any 
woman supposed by such person to be pregnant, any-
thing whatever, or shall employ any means whatever, 
with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such 
88 1860 Conn. Pub. Acts p. 65 (emphasis added). 
89 1861 Pa. Laws pp. 404–405 (emphasis added). 
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woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her 
life, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year, or fned 
not exceeding one thousand dollars.” 90 
23. Nevada (1861): 
Sec. 42. “[E]very person who shall administer, or 
cause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-
stance, or shall use, or cause to be used, any instruments 
whatever, with the intention to procure the miscarriage 
of any woman then being with child, and shall be 
thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the Territorial prison, for a term not less than 
two years, nor more than fve years; provided, that no 
physician shall be affected by the last clause of this sec-
tion, who, in the discharge of his professional duties, 
deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any 
woman in order to save her life.” 
91 
24. West Virginia (1863): 
West Virginia's Constitution adopted the laws of Virginia 
when it became its own State: 
“Such parts of the common law and of the laws of the 
State of Virginia as are in force within the boundaries 
of the State of West Virginia, when this Constitution 
goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto, shall 
be and continue the law of this State until altered or 
repealed by the Legislature.” 
92 
The Virginia law in force in 1863 stated: 
Sec. 8. “Any free person who shall administer to, or 
cause to be taken, by a woman, any drug or other thing, 
or use any means, with intent to destroy her unborn 
child, or to produce abortion or miscarriage, and shall 
thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
90 1861 R. I. Acts & Resolves p. 133 (emphasis added). 
91 1861 Nev. Laws p. 63 (emphasis added and deleted). 
92 W. Va. Const., Art. XI, § 8 (1862). 
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miscarriage, shall be confned in the penitentiary not 
less than one, nor more than fve years. No person, by 
reason of any act mentioned in this section, shall be pun-
ishable where such act is done in good faith, with the 
intention of saving the life of such woman or child.” 
93 
25. Oregon (1864): 
Sec. 509. “If any person shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with child, any medicine, drug or sub-
stance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument 
or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such 
child, unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the 
life of such mother, such person shall, in case the death 
of such child or mother be thereby produced, be deemed 
guilty of manslaughter.” 
94 
26. Nebraska (1866): 
Sec. 42. “Every person who shall willfully and mali-
ciously administer or cause to be administered to or 
taken by any person, any poison or other noxious or de-
structive substance or liquid, with the intention to cause 
the death of such person, and being thereof duly con-
victed, shall be punished by confnement in the peniten-
tiary for a term not less than one year and not more than 
seven years. And every person who shall administer 
or cause to be administered or taken, any such poison, 
substance or liquid, with the intention to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman then being with child, and 
shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be imprisoned for 
a term not exceeding three years in the penitentiary, 
and fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand 
dollars.” 
95 
93 Va. Code, Tit. 54, ch. 191, § 8 (1849) (emphasis added); see also W. Va. 
Code, ch. 144, § 8 (1870) (similar). 
94 Ore. Gen. Laws, Crim. Code, ch. 43, § 509 (1865) (emphasis added). 
95 Neb. Rev. Stat., Tit. 4, ch. 4, § 42 (1866) (emphasis added); see also 
Neb. Gen. Stat., ch. 58, §§ 6, 39 (1873) (expanding criminal liability for 
abortions by other means, including instruments). 
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27. Maryland (1868): 
Sec. 2. “And be it enacted, That any person who shall 
knowingly advertise, print, publish, distribute or circu-
late, or knowingly cause to be advertised, printed, pub-
lished, distributed or circulated, any pamphlet, printed 
paper, book, newspaper notice, advertisement or refer-
ence containing words or language, giving or conveying 
any notice, hint or reference to any person, or to the 
name of any person real or fctitious, from whom; or to 
any place, house, shop or offce, when any poison, drug, 
mixture, preparation, medicine or noxious thing, or any 
instrument or means whatever; for the purpose of pro-
ducing abortion, or who shall knowingly sell, or cause 
to be sold any such poison, drug, mixture, preparation, 
medicine or noxious thing or instrument of any kind 
whatever; or where any advice, direction, information or 
knowledge may be obtained for the purpose of causing 
the miscarriage or abortion of any woman pregnant 
with child, at any period of her pregnancy , or shall 
knowingly sell or cause to be sold any medicine, or who 
shall knowingly use or cause to be used any means what-
soever for that purpose, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for not less than three years, 
or by a fne of not less than fve hundred nor more than 
one thousand dollars, or by both, in the discretion of the 
Court; and in case of fne being imposed, one half thereof 
shall be paid to the State of Maryland, and one-half to 
the School Fund of the city or county where the offence 
was committed; provided, however, that nothing herein 
contained shall be construed so as to prohibit the super-
vision and management by a regular practitioner of 
medicine of all cases of abortion occurring spontane-
ously, either as the result of accident, constitutional de-
bility, or any other natural cause, or the production of 
abortion by a regular practitioner of medicine when, 
after consulting with one or more respectable physi-
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cians, he shall be satisfed that the foetus is dead, or that 
no other method will secure the safety of the mother.” 96 
28. Florida (1868): 
Ch. 3, Sec. 11. “Every person who shall administer to 
any woman pregnant with a quick child any medicine, 
drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any 
instrument, or other means, with intent thereby to de-
stroy such child, unless the same shall have been neces-
sary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have 
been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such 
purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of such 
mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree.” 
Ch. 8, Sec. 9. “Whoever, with intent to procure mis-
carriage of any woman, unlawfully administers to her, 
or advises, or prescribes for her, or causes to be taken 
by her, any poison, drug, medicine, or other noxious 
thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means 
whatever with the like intent, or with like intent aids 
or assists therein, shall, if the woman does not die in 
consequence thereof, be punished by imprisonment in 
the State penitentiary not exceeding seven years, nor 
less than one year, or by fne not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars.” 
97 
29. Minnesota (1873): 
Sec. 1. “That any person who shall administer to any 
woman with child, or prescribe for any such woman, or 
suggest to, or advise, or procure her to take any medi-
cine, drug, substance or thing whatever, or who shall 
use or employ, or advise or suggest the use or employ-
ment of any instrument or other means or force what-
ever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the miscar-
96 1868 Md. Laws p. 315 (emphasis deleted and added). 
97 1868 Fla. Laws, ch. 1637, pp. 64, 97 (emphasis added). 
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riage or abortion or premature labor of any such woman, 
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve 
her life, or the life of such child, shall, in case the death 
of such child or of such woman results in whole or in 
part therefrom, be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison for a term not more than ten (10) years 
nor less than three (3) years.” 
Sec. 2. “Any person who shall administer to any 
woman with child, or prescribe, or procure, or provide 
for any such woman, or suggest to, or advise, or procure 
any such woman to take any medicine, drug, substance 
or thing whatever, or shall use or employ, or suggest, or 
advise the use or employment of any instrument or 
other means or force whatever, with intent thereby to 
cause or procure the miscarriage or abortion or prema-
ture labor of any such woman, shall upon conviction 
thereof be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
for a term not more than two years nor less than one 
year, or by fne not more than fve thousand dollars nor 
less than fve hundred dollars, or by such fne and im-
prisonment both, at the discretion of the court.” 
98 
30. Arkansas (1875): 
Sec. 1. “That it shall be unlawful for any one to ad-
minister or prescribe any medicine or drugs to any 
woman with child, with intent to produce an abortion, 
or premature delivery of any foetus before the period of 
quickening, or to produce or attempt to produce such 
abortion by any other means; and any person offending 
against the provision of this section, shall be fned in 
any sum not exceeding one thousand ($1000) dollars, and 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one (1) nor 
more than fve (5) years; provided, that this section shall 
not apply to any abortion produced by any regular prac-
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ticing physician, for the purpose of saving the mother's 
life.” 99 
31. Georgia (1876): 
Sec. 2. “That every person who shall administer to 
any woman pregnant with a child, any medicine, drug, 
or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any in-
strument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy 
such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to 
preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been ad-
vised by two physicians to be necessary for such pur-
pose, shall, in case the death of such child or mother be 
thereby produced, be declared guilty of an assault with 
intent to murder.” 
Sec. 3. “That any person who shall wilfully administer 
to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug or sub-
stance, or anything whatever, or shall employ any in-
strument or means whatever, with intent thereby to 
procure the miscarriage or abortion of any such woman, 
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve 
the life of such woman, or shall have been advised by 
two physicians to be necessary for that purpose, shall, 
upon conviction, be punished as prescribed in section 
4310 of the Revised Code of Georgia.” 
100 
32. North Carolina (1881): 
Sec. 1. “That every person who shall wilfully adminis-
ter to any woman either pregnant or quick with child, 
or prescribe for any such woman, or advise or procure 
any such woman to take any medicine, drug or substance 
whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or 
other means with intent thereby to destroy said child, 
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve 
the life of such mother, shall be guilty of a felony, and 
99 1875 Ark. Acts p. 5 (emphasis added and deleted). 
100 1876 Ga. Acts & Resolutions p. 113 (emphasis added). 
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shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not less 
than one year nor more than ten years, and be fned at 
the discretion of the court.” 
Sec. 2. “That every person who shall administer to 
any pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman, 
or advise and procure such woman to take any medicine, 
drug or any thing whatsoever, with intent thereby to 
procure the miscarriage of any such woman, or to injure 
or destroy such woman, or shall use any instrument or 
application for any of the above purposes, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be impris-
oned in the jail or state penitentiary for not less than 
one year or more than fve years, and fned at the discre-
tion of the court.” 
101 
33. Delaware (1883): 
Sec. 2. “Every person who, with the intent to procure 
the miscarriage of any pregnant woman or women sup-
posed by such person to be pregnant, unless the same be 
necessary to preserve her life, shall administer to her, 
advise, or prescribe for her, or cause to be taken by her 
any poison, drug, medicine, or other noxious thing, or 
shall use any instrument or other means whatsoever, or 
shall aid, assist, or counsel any person so intending to 
procure a miscarriage, whether said miscarriage be ac-
complished or not, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon 
conviction thereof shall be fned not less than one hun-
dred dollars nor more than fve hundred dollars and be 
imprisoned for a term not exceeding fve years nor less 
than one year.” 
102 
34. Tennessee (1883): 
Sec. 1. “That every person who shall administer to 
any woman pregnant with child, whether such child be 
101 1881 N. C. Sess. Laws pp. 584–585 (emphasis added). 
102 1883 Del. Laws, ch. 226 (emphasis added). 
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quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance whatever, 
or shall use or employ any instrument, or other means 
whatever with intent to destroy such child, and shall 
thereby destroy such child before its birth, unless the 
same shall have been done with a view to preserve the 
life of the mother, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the penitentiary not less than one nor more than fve 
years.” 
Sec. 2. “Every person who shall administer any sub-
stance with the intention to procure the miscarriage of 
a woman then being with child, or shall use or employ 
any instrument or other means with such intent, unless 
the same shall have been done with a view to preserve 
the life of such mother, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than 
three years.” 
103 
35. South Carolina (1883): 
Sec. 1. “That any person who shall administer to any 
woman with child, or prescribe for any such woman, or 
suggest to or advise or procure her to take, any medi-
cine, substance, drug or thing whatever, or who shall 
use or employ, or advise the use or employment of, any 
instrument or other means of force whatever, with in-
tent thereby to cause or procure the miscarriage or 
abortion or premature labor of any such woman, unless 
the same shall have been necessary to preserve her life, 
or the life of such child, shall, in case the death of such 
child or of such woman results in whole or in part there-
from, be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the Peni-
tentiary for a term not more than twenty years nor less 
than fve years.” 
Sec. 2. “That any person who shall administer to any 
woman with child, or prescribe or procure or provide 
103 1883 Tenn. Acts pp. 188–189 (emphasis added). 
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for any such woman, or advise or procure any such 
woman to take, any medicine, drug, substance or thing 
whatever, or shall use or employ or advise the use or 
employment of, any instrument or other means of force 
whatever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the 
miscarriage or abortion or premature labor of any such 
woman, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by 
imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not more 
than fve years, or by fne not more than fve thousand 
dollars, or by such fne and imprisonment both, at the 
discretion of the Court; but no conviction shall be had 
under the provisions of Sectio[n] 1 or 2 of this Act upon 
the uncorroborated evidence of such woman.” 
104 
36. Kentucky (1910): 
Sec. 1. “It shall be unlawful for any person to pre-
scribe or administer to any pregnant woman, or to any 
woman whom he has reason to believe pregnant, at any 
time during the period of gestation, any drug, medicine 
or substance, whatsoever, with the intent thereby to 
procure the miscarriage of such woman, or with like in-
tent, to use any instrument or means whatsoever, unless 
such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her life; and 
any person so offending, shall be punished by a fne of 
not less than fve hundred nor more than one thousand 
dollars, and imprisoned in the State prison for not less 
than one nor more than ten years.” 
Sec. 2. “If by reason of any of the acts described in 
Section 1 hereof, the miscarriage of such woman is pro-
cured, and she does miscarry, causing the death of the 
unborn child, whether before or after quickening time, 
the person so offending shall be guilty of a felony, and 
confned in the penitentiary for not less than two, nor 
more than twenty-one years.” 
104 1883 S. C. Acts pp. 547–548 (emphasis added). 
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Sec. 3. “If, by reason of the commission of any of the 
acts described in Section 1 hereof, the woman to whom 
such drug or substance has been administered, or upon 
whom such instrument has been used, shall die, the per-
son offending shall be punished as now prescribed by 
law, for the offense of murder or manslaughter, as the 
facts may justify.” 
Sec. 4. “The consent of the woman to the performance 
of the operation or the administering of the medicines 
or substances, referred to, shall be no defense, and she 
shall be a competent witness in any prosecution under 
this act, and for that purpose she shall not be considered 
an accomplice.” 
105 
37. Mississippi (1952): 
Sec. 1. “Whoever, by means of any instrument, medi-
cine, drug, or other means whatever shall wilfully and 
knowingly cause any woman pregnant with child to 
abort or miscarry, or attempts to procure or produce an 
abortion or miscarriage, unless the same were done as 
necessary for the preservation of the mother's life, shall 
be imprisoned in the state penitentiary no less than one 
(1) year, nor more than ten (10) years; or if the death 
of the mother results therefrom, the person procuring, 
causing, or attempting to procure or cause the abortion 
or miscarriage shall be guilty of murder.” 
Sec. 2. “No act prohibited in section 1 hereof shall be 
considered as necessary for the preservation of the 
mother's life unless upon the prior advice, in writing, of 
two reputable licensed physicians.” 
Sec. 3. “The license of any physician or nurse shall be 
automatically revoked upon conviction under the provi-
sions of this act.” 
106 
105 1910 Ky. Acts pp. 189–190 (emphasis added). 
106 1952 Miss. Laws p. 289 (codifed at Miss. Code Ann. § 2223 (1956) (em-
phasis added)). 
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Appendix B to opinion of the Court 
B 
This appendix contains statutes criminalizing abortion at 
all stages in each of the Territories that became States and 
in the District of Columbia. The statutes appear in chrono-
logical order of enactment. 
1. Hawaii (1850): 
Sec. 1. “Whoever maliciously, without lawful justif-
cation, administers, or causes or procures to be adminis-
tered any poison or noxious thing to a woman then with 
child, in order to produce her mis-carriage, or mali-
ciously uses any instrument or other means with like 
intent, shall, if such woman be then quick with child, be 
punished by fne not exceeding one thousand dollars and 
imprisonment at hard labor not more than fve years. 
And if she be then not quick with child, shall be pun-
ished by a fne not exceeding fve hundred dollars, and 
imprisonment at hard labor not more than two years.” 
Sec. 2. “Where means of causing abortion are used for 
the purpose of saving the life of the woman, the surgeon 
or other person using such means is lawfully 
justifed.” 
107 
2. Washington (1854): 
Sec. 37. “Every person who shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine, 
drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any 
instrument, or other means, with intent thereby to de-
stroy such child, unless the same shall have been neces-
sary to preserve the life of such mother, shall, in case 
the death of such child or of such mother be thereby 
produced, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not more than twenty years, nor less than 
one year.” 
107 Haw. Penal Code, ch. 12, §§ 1–2 (1850) (emphasis added). Hawaii be-
came a State in 1959. See Presidential Proclamation No. 3309, 73 Stat. 
c74–c75. 
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Appendix B to opinion of the Court 
Sec. 38. “Every person who shall administer to any 
pregnant woman, or to any woman who he supposes to 
be pregnant, any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, 
or shall use or employ any instrument, or other means, 
thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, un-
less the same is necessary to preserve her life, shall on 
conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not 
more than fve years, nor less than one year, or be im-
prisoned in the county jail not more than twelve months, 
nor less than one month, and be fned in any sum not 
exceeding one thousand dollars.” 
108 
3. Colorado (1861): 
Sec. 42. “[E]very person who shall administer sub-
stance or liquid, or who shall use or cause to be used 
any instrument, of whatsoever kind, with the intention 
to procure the miscarriage of any woman then being 
with child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be 
imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years, and 
fned in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars; and 
if any woman, by reason of such treatment, shall die, 
the person or persons administering, or causing to be 
administered, such poison, substance or liquid, or using 
or causing to be used, any instrument, as aforesaid, shall 
be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and if convicted, be 
punished accordingly.” 
109 
4. Idaho (1864): 
Sec. 42. “[E]very person who shall administer or 
cause to be administered, or taken, any medicinal sub-
stance, or shall use or cause to be used, any instruments 
whatever, with the intention to procure the miscarriage 
108 Terr. of Wash. Stat., ch. 2, §§ 37–38, p. 81 (1854) (emphasis added). 
Washington became a State in 1889. See Presidential Proclamation No. 8, 
26 Stat. 1552–1553. 
109 1861 Terr. of Colo. Gen. Laws pp. 296–297 (emphasis added). Colo-
rado became a State in 1876. See Presidential Proclamation No. 6, 19 
Stat. 665–666. 
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326 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
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of any woman then being with child, and shall be 
thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the territorial prison for a term not less than 
two years, nor more than fve years: Provided, That no 
physician shall be effected by the last clause of this sec-
tion, who in the discharge of his professional duties, 
deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any 
woman in order to save her life.” 
110 
5. Montana (1864): 
Sec. 41. “[E]very person who shall administer, or 
cause to be administered, or taken, any medicinal sub-
stance, or shall use, or cause to be used, any instru-
ments whatever, with the intention to produce the mis-
carriage of any woman then being with child, and shall 
be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-
onment in the Territorial prison for a term not less than 
two years nor more than fve years. Provided, That no 
physician shall be affected by the last clause of this sec-
tion, who in the discharge of his professional duties, 
deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any 
woman in order to save her life.” 
111 
6. Arizona (1865): 
Sec. 45. “[E]very person who shall administer or 
cause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-
stances, or shall use or cause to be used any instruments 
whatever, with the intention to procure the miscarriage 
of any woman then being with child, and shall be 
thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the Territorial prison for a term not less than 
two years nor more than fve years: Provided, that no 
110 1863–1864 Terr. of Idaho Laws p. 443 (some emphasis added). Idaho 
became a State in 1890. See 26 Stat. 215–219. 
111 1864 Terr. of Mont. Laws p. 184 (some emphasis added). Montana 
became a State in 1889. See Presidential Proclamation No. 7, 26 Stat. 
1551–1552. 
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Appendix B to opinion of the Court 
physician shall be affected by the last clause of this sec-
tion, who in the discharge of his professional duties 
deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any 
woman in order to save her life.” 
112 
7. Wyoming (1869): 
Sec. 25. “[A]ny person who shall administer, or cause 
to be administered, or taken, any such poison, substance 
or liquid, or who shall use, or cause to be used, any in-
strument of whatsoever kind, with the intention to pro-
cure the miscarriage of any woman then being with 
child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be im-
prisoned for a term not exceeding three years, in the 
penitentiary, and fned in a sum not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars; and if any woman by reason of such treat-
ment shall die, the person, or persons, administering, or 
causing to be administered such poison, substance, or 
liquid, or using or causing to be used, any instrument, as 
aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and 
if convicted, be punished by imprisonment for a term 
not less than three years in the penitentiary, and fned 
in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, unless it 
appear that such miscarriage was procured or attempted 
by, or under advice of a physician or surgeon, with intent 
to save the life of such woman, or to prevent serious and 
permanent bodily injury to her.” 
113 
8. Utah (1876): 
Sec. 142. “Every person who provides, supplies, or ad-
ministers to any pregnant woman, or procures any such 
woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses 
112 Howell Code, ch. 10, § 45 (1865) (emphasis added). Arizona became a 
State in 1912. See Presidential Proclamation of Feb. 14, 1912, 37 Stat. 
1728–1729. 
113 1869 Terr. of Wyo. Gen. Laws p. 104 (emphasis added). Wyoming 
became a State in 1890. See 26 Stat. 222–226. 
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or employs any instrument or other means whatever, 
with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such 
woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her 
life, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
not less than two nor more than ten years.” 
114 
9. North Dakota (1877): 
Sec. 337. “Every person who administers to any preg-
nant woman, or who prescribes for any such woman, 
or advises or procures any such woman to take any 
medicine, drug or substance, or uses or employs any in-
strument, or other means whatever with intent thereby 
to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the 
same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the territorial prison not exceeding 
three years, or in a county jail not exceeding one 
year.” 
115 
10. South Dakota (1877): Same as North Dakota. 
11. Oklahoma (1890): 
Sec. 2187. “Every person who administers to any 
pregnant woman, or who prescribes for any such 
woman, or advises or procures any such woman to take 
any medicine, drug or substance, or uses or employs any 
instrument, or other means whatever, with intent 
thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, un-
less the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punish-
able by imprisonment in the Territorial prison not ex-
114 Terr. of Utah Comp. Laws § 1972 (1876) (emphasis added). Utah be-
came a State in 1896. See Presidential Proclamation No. 9, 29 Stat. 
876–877. 
115 Dakota Penal Code § 337 (1877) (emphasis added). (codifed at N. D. 
Rev. Code § 7177 (1895)), and S. D. Rev. Penal Code Ann. § 337 (1883). 
North and South Dakota became States in 1889. See Presidential Procla-
mation No. 5, 26 Stat. 1548–1551. 
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Appendix B to opinion of the Court 
ceeding three years, or in a county jail not exceeding 
one year.” 116 
12. Alaska (1899): 
Sec. 8. “That if any person shall administer to any 
woman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug, or 
substance whatever, or shall use any instrument or 
other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, 
unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life 
of such mother, such person shall, in case the death of 
such child or mother be thereby produced, be deemed 
guilty of manslaughter, and shall be punished 
accordingly.” 
117 
13. New Mexico (1919): 
Sec. 1. “Any person who shall administer to any preg-
nant woman any medicine , drug or substance whatever, 
or attempt by operation or any other method or means 
to produce an abortion or miscarriage upon such woman, 
shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fned not more than two thousand ($2,000.00) 
Dollars, nor less than fve hundred ($500.00) Dollars, or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary for a period of not less 
than one nor more than fve years, or by both such fne 
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court trying 
the case.” 
Sec. 2. “Any person committing such act or acts men-
tioned in section one hereof which shall culminate in the 
death of the woman shall be deemed guilty of murder in 
the second degree; Provided, however, an abortion may 
be produced when two physicians licensed to practice in 
116 Okla. Stat. § 2187 (1890) (emphasis added). Oklahoma became a State 
in 1907. See Presidential Proclamation of Nov. 16, 1907, 35 Stat. 2160– 
2161. 
117 1899 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 2, p. 3 (some emphasis added). Alaska be-
came a State in 1959. See Presidential Proclamation No. 3269, 73 Stat. c16. 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
the State of New Mexico, in consultation, deem it neces-
sary to preserve the life of the woman, or to prevent 
serious and permanent bodily injury.” 
Sec. 3. “For the purpose of the act, the term “preg-
nancy” is defned as that condition of a woman from the 
date of conception to the birth of her child.” 118 
* * * 
District of Columbia (1901): 
Sec. 809. “Whoever, with intent to procure the mis-
carriage of any woman, prescribes or administers to 
her any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or with 
like intent uses any instrument or means, unless when 
necessary to preserve her life or health and under the 
direction of a competent licensed practitioner of medi-
cine, shall be imprisoned for not more than fve years; 
or if the woman or her child dies in consequence of such 
act, by imprisonment for not less than three nor more 
than twenty years.” 
119 
Justice Thomas, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly holds 
that there is no constitutional right to abortion. Respond-
ents invoke one source for that right: the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee that no State shall “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The 
Court well explains why, under our substantive due process 
precedents, the purported right to abortion is not a form of 
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. Such a 
right is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal 
118 1919 N. M. Laws p. 6 (some emphasis added). New Mexico became 
a State in 1912. See Presidential Proclamation of Jan. 6, 1912, 37 Stat. 
1723–1724. 
119 § 809, 31 Stat. 1322 (1901) (emphasis added). 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he idea that the Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Due Process 
Clause to protect a right to abortion is farcical.” June Med-
ical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
I write separately to emphasize a second, more fundamen-
tal reason why there is no abortion guarantee lurking in the 
Due Process Clause. Considerable historical evidence indi-
cates that “due process of law” merely required executive 
and judicial actors to comply with legislative enactments and 
the common law when depriving a person of life, liberty, or 
property. See, e. g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 
623 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Other 
sources, by contrast, suggest that “due process of law” pro-
hibited legislatures “from authorizing the deprivation of a 
person's life, liberty, or property without providing him the 
customary procedures to which freemen were entitled by the 
old law of England.” United States v. Vaello Madero , 596 
U. S. 159, 168–169 (2022) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Either way, the Due Process 
Clause at most guarantees process. It does not, as the 
Court's substantive due process cases suppose, “forbi[d] the 
government to infringe certain `fundamental' liberty inter-
ests at all, no matter what process is provided.” Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993); see also, e. g., Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992). 
As I have previously explained, “substantive due process” 
is an oxymoron that “lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.” 
Johnson, 576 U. S., at 607–608 (opinion of Thomas, J.); see 
also, e. g., Vaello Madero, 596 U. S., at 169 (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (“[T]ext and history provide little support for mod-
ern substantive due process doctrine”). “The notion that a 
constitutional provision that guarantees only `process' before 
a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could defne 
the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the 
most casual user of words.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 
742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
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332 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Thomas, J., concurring 
ring in judgment); see also United States v. Carlton, 512 
U. S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The 
resolution of this case is thus straightforward. Because the 
Due Process Clause does not secure any substantive rights, 
it does not secure a right to abortion. 
The Court today declines to disturb substantive due proc-
ess jurisprudence generally or the doctrine's application in 
other, specifc contexts. Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain con-
traceptives) *; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right 
to engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage), 
are not at issue. The Court's abortion cases are unique, see 
ante, at 256–257, 289–290, 295, and no party has asked us to 
decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence must be preserved or revised,” McDonald, 561 U. S., 
at 813 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Thus, I agree that “[n]othing 
in [the Court's] opinion should be understood to cast doubt 
on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Ante, at 290. 
For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all 
of this Court's substantive due process precedents, including 
Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. Because any substan-
tive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,” 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment), we have a duty to “correct the 
error” established in those precedents, Gamble v. United 
States, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
*Griswold v. Connecticut purported not to rely on the Due Process 
Clause, but rather reasoned “that specifc guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights”—including rights enumerated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments—“have penumbras, formed by emanations,” that 
create “zones of privacy.” 381 U. S., at 484. Since Griswold, the Court, 
perhaps recognizing the facial absurdity of Griswold's penumbral argu-
ment, has characterized the decision as one rooted in substantive due proc-
ess. See, e. g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 663 (2015); Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997). 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
After overruling these demonstrably erroneous decisions, 
the question would remain whether other constitutional pro-
visions guarantee the myriad rights that our substantive due 
process cases have generated. For example, we could con-
sider whether any of the rights announced in this Court's 
substantive due process cases are “privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States” protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Amdt. 14, § 1; see McDonald, 561 U. S., at 806 
(opinion of Thomas, J.). To answer that question, we would 
need to decide important antecedent questions, including 
whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects any 
rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution and, if so, 
how to identify those rights. See id., at 854. That said, 
even if the Clause does protect unenumerated rights, the 
Court conclusively demonstrates that abortion is not one of 
them under any plausible interpretive approach. See ante, 
at 240, n. 22. 
Moreover, apart from being a demonstrably incorrect 
reading of the Due Process Clause, the “legal fction” of sub-
stantive due process is “particularly dangerous.” McDon-
ald, 561 U. S., at 811 (opinion of Thomas, J.); accord, Oberge-
fell, 576 U. S., at 722 (Thomas, J., dissenting). At least three 
dangers favor jettisoning the doctrine entirely. 
First, “substantive due process exalts judges at the ex-
pense of the People from whom they derive their authority.” 
Ibid . Because the Due Process Clause “speaks only to 
`process,' the Court has long struggled to defne what sub-
stantive rights it protects.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (some 
internal quotation marks omitted). In practice, the Court's 
approach for identifying those “fundamental” rights “un-
questionably involves policymaking rather than neutral legal 
analysis.” Carlton, 512 U. S., at 41–42 (opinion of Scalia, J.); 
see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at 812 (opinion of Thomas, J.) 
(substantive due process is “a jurisprudence devoid of a guid-
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334 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Thomas, J., concurring 
ing principle”). The Court divines new rights in line with 
“its own, extraconstitutional value preferences” and nulli-
fes state laws that do not align with the judicially created 
guarantees. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 794 (1986) (White, 
J., dissenting). 
Nowhere is this exaltation of judicial policymaking clearer 
than this Court's abortion jurisprudence. In Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court divined a right to abortion 
because it “fe[lt]” that “the Fourteenth Amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty” included a “right of privacy” that 
“is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id., at 153. In 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 
833 (1992), the Court likewise identifed an abortion guaran-
tee in “the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
but, rather than a “right of privacy,” it invoked an ethereal 
“right to defne one's own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Id., at 851. 
As the Court's preferred manifestation of “liberty” changed, 
so, too, did the test used to protect it, as Roe's author la-
mented. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 930 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part) (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, 
and far less manipulable, than the `undue burden' standard”). 
Now, in this case, the nature of the purported “liberty” 
supporting the abortion right has shifted yet again. Re-
spondents and the United States propose no fewer than 
three different interests that supposedly spring from the 
Due Process Clause. They include “bodily integrity,” “per-
sonal autonomy in matters of family, medical care, and faith,” 
Brief for Respondents 21, and “women's equal citizenship,” 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. That 50 
years have passed since Roe and abortion advocates still can-
not coherently articulate the right (or rights) at stake proves 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
the obvious: The right to abortion is ultimately a policy goal 
in desperate search of a constitutional justifcation. 
Second, substantive due process distorts other areas of 
constitutional law. For example, once this Court identifes 
a “fundamental” right for one class of individuals, it invokes 
the Equal Protection Clause to demand exacting scrutiny of 
statutes that deny the right to others. See, e. g., Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453–454 (1972) (relying on Griswold 
to invalidate a state statute prohibiting distribution of con-
traceptives to unmarried persons). Statutory classifcations 
implicating certain “nonfundamental” rights, meanwhile, re-
ceive only cursory review. See, e. g., Armour v. Indianapo-
lis, 566 U. S. 673, 680 (2012). Similarly, this Court deems 
unconstitutionally “vague” or “overbroad” those laws that 
impinge on its preferred rights, while letting slide those laws 
that implicate supposedly lesser values. See, e. g., Johnson, 
576 U. S., at 618–621 (opinion of Thomas, J.); United States 
v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). “In fact, our vagueness doctrine served as 
the basis for the frst draft of the majority opinion in Roe v. 
Wade,” and it since has been “deployed . . . to nullify even 
mild regulations of the abortion industry.” Johnson, 576 
U. S., at 620–621 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Therefore, regard-
less of the doctrinal context, the Court often “demand[s] 
extra justifcations for encroachments” on “preferred rights” 
while “relax[ing] purportedly higher standards of review for 
less-preferred rights.” Whole Woman's Health v. Heller-
stedt, 579 U. S. 582, 640–642 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Substantive due process is the core inspiration for many of 
the Court's constitutionally unmoored policy judgments. 
Third, substantive due process is often wielded to “disas-
trous ends.” Gamble, 587 U. S., at ––– (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). For instance, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 
(1857), the Court invoked a species of substantive due proc-
ess to announce that Congress was powerless to emancipate 
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336 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
slaves brought into the federal territories. See id., at 452. 
While Dred Scott “was overruled on the battlefelds of the 
Civil War and by constitutional amendment after Appomat-
tox,” Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 696 (Roberts, C. J., dissent-
ing), that overruling was “[p]urchased at the price of immea-
surable human suffering,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). Now today, the Court 
rightly overrules Roe and Casey—two of this Court's “most 
notoriously incorrect” substantive due process decisions, 
Timbs, 586 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Thomas, J.)—after more 
than 63 million abortions have been performed, see National-
Right to Life Committee, Abortion Statistics (Jan. 2022), 
https://www.nrlc.org/uploads/factsheets/FS01Abortionin 
theUS.pdf. The harm caused by this Court's forays into 
substantive due process remains immeasurable. 
* * * 
Because the Court properly applies our substantive due 
process precedents to reject the fabrication of a constitu-
tional right to abortion, and because this case does not pres-
ent the opportunity to reject substantive due process en-
tirely, I join the Court's opinion. But, in future cases, we 
should “follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forth 
certain substantive rights that cannot be taken away, and 
adds, beyond that, a right to due process when life, liberty, 
or property is to be taken away.” Carlton, 512 U. S., at 42 
(opinion of Scalia, J.). Substantive due process conficts with 
that textual command and has harmed our country in many 
ways. Accordingly, we should eliminate it from our juris-
prudence at the earliest opportunity. 
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring. 
I write separately to explain my additional views about 
why Roe was wrongly decided, why Roe should be overruled 
at this time, and the future implications of today's decision. 
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I 
Abortion is a profoundly diffcult and contentious issue be-
cause it presents an irreconcilable confict between the inter-
ests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and the 
interests in protecting fetal life. The interests on both sides 
of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty. 
On the one side, many pro-choice advocates forcefully 
argue that the ability to obtain an abortion is critically im-
portant for women's personal and professional lives, and for 
women's health. They contend that the widespread avail-
ability of abortion has been essential for women to advance 
in society and to achieve greater equality over the last 50 
years. And they maintain that women must have the free-
dom to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion. 
On the other side, many pro-life advocates forcefully argue 
that a fetus is a human life. They contend that all human 
life should be protected as a matter of human dignity and 
fundamental morality. And they stress that a signifcant 
percentage of Americans with pro-life views are women. 
When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail over 
the other at any given point in a pregnancy. Many Ameri-
cans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the preg-
nant woman. Many other Americans of good faith instead 
would prioritize the interests in protecting fetal life—at 
least unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to save 
the life of the mother. Of course, many Americans are con-
ficted or have nuanced views that may vary depending on 
the particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circum-
stances of a pregnancy. 
The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or 
morality of abortion. The issue before this Court is what 
the Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution 
does not take sides on the issue of abortion. The text of the 
Constitution does not refer to or encompass abortion. To 
be sure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects 
unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation's 
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338 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in 
American history and tradition, as the Court today thor-
oughly explains.
1 
On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore 
neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral 
and leaves the issue for the people and their elected repre-
sentatives to resolve through the democratic process in the 
States or Congress—like the numerous other diffcult ques-
tions of American social and economic policy that the Consti-
tution does not address. 
Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abor-
tion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral. The nine 
unelected Members of this Court do not possess the constitu-
tional authority to override the democratic process and to 
decree either a pro-life or a pro-choice abortion policy for all 
330 million people in the United States. 
Instead of adhering to the Constitution's neutrality, the 
Court in Roe took sides on the issue and unilaterally decreed 
that abortion was legal throughout the United States up to 
the point of viability (about 24 weeks of pregnancy). The 
Court's decision today properly returns the Court to a posi-
tion of neutrality and restores the people's authority to ad-
dress the issue of abortion through the processes of demo-
cratic self-government established by the Constitution. 
Some amicus briefs argue that the Court today should not 
only overrule Roe and return to a position of judicial neutral-
ity on abortion, but should go further and hold that the 
1 The Court's opinion today also recounts the pre-constitutional common-
law history in England. That English history supplies background in-
formation on the issue of abortion. As I see it, the dispositive point in 
analyzing American history and tradition for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment inquiry is that abortion was largely prohibited in most Ameri-
can States as of 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed, and 
that abortion remained largely prohibited in most American States until 
Roe was decided in 1973. 
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Constitution outlaws abortion throughout the United States. 
No Justice of this Court has ever advanced that position. I 
respect those who advocate for that position, just as I re-
spect those who argue that this Court should hold that the 
Constitution legalizes pre-viability abortion throughout the 
United States. But both positions are wrong as a constitu-
tional matter, in my view. The Constitution neither outlaws 
abortion nor legalizes abortion. 
To be clear, then, the Court's decision today does not out-
law abortion throughout the United States. On the con-
trary, the Court's decision properly leaves the question of 
abortion for the people and their elected representatives in 
the democratic process. Through that democratic process, 
the people and their representatives may decide to allow or 
limit abortion. As Justice Scalia stated, the “States may, if 
they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution 
does not require them to do so.” Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 979 (1992) (opinion 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
Today's decision therefore does not prevent the numerous 
States that readily allow abortion from continuing to readily 
allow abortion. That includes, if they choose, the amici 
States supporting the plaintiff in this Court: New York, Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Mexico, 
Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. By 
contrast, other States may maintain laws that more strictly 
limit abortion. After today's decision, all of the States may 
evaluate the competing interests and decide how to address 
this consequential issue.
2 
2 In his dissent in Roe, Justice Rehnquist indicated that an exception to 
a State's restriction on abortion would be constitutionally required when 
an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. See Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. S. 113, 173 (1973). Abortion statutes traditionally and currently 
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340 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
In arguing for a constitutional right to abortion that 
would override the people's choices in the democratic proc-
ess, the plaintiff Jackson Women's Health Organization and 
its amici emphasize that the Constitution does not freeze the 
American people's rights as of 1791 or 1868. I fully agree. 
To begin, I agree that constitutional rights apply to situa-
tions that were unforeseen in 1791 or 1868—such as applying 
the First Amendment to the Internet or the Fourth Amend-
ment to cars. Moreover, the Constitution authorizes the 
creation of new rights—state and federal, statutory and con-
stitutional. But when it comes to creating new rights, the 
Constitution directs the people to the various processes of 
democratic self-government contemplated by the Consti-
tution—state legislation, state constitutional amendments, 
federal legislation, and federal constitutional amendments. 
See generally Amdt. 9; Amdt. 10; Art. I, § 8; Art. V; J. Sut-
ton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of Ameri-
can Constitutional Law 7−21, 203−216 (2018); A. Amar, 
America's Constitution: A Biography 285−291, 315−347 
(2005). 
The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Mem-
bers of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the 
Constitution to create new rights and liberties based on our 
own moral or policy views. As Justice Rehnquist stated, 
this Court has not “been granted a roving commission, either 
by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon notions 
of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a 
majority of this Court.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 
467 (1972) (dissenting opinion); see Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. 
Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 292–293 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
provide for an exception when an abortion is necessary to protect the life 
of the mother. Some statutes also provide other exceptions. 
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
This Court therefore does not possess the authority either 
to declare a constitutional right to abortion or to declare a 
constitutional prohibition of abortion. See Casey, 505 U. S., 
at 953 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part); id., at 980 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
In sum, the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion 
and allows the people and their elected representatives to 
address the issue through the democratic process. In my 
respectful view, the Court in Roe therefore erred by taking 
sides on the issue of abortion. 
II 
The more diffcult question in this case is stare decisis— 
that is, whether to overrule the Roe decision. 
The principle of stare decisis requires respect for the 
Court's precedents and for the accumulated wisdom of the 
judges who have previously addressed the same issue. 
Stare decisis is rooted in Article III of the Constitution and 
is fundamental to the American judicial system and to the 
stability of American law. 
Adherence to precedent is the norm, and stare decisis im-
poses a high bar before this Court may overrule a precedent. 
This Court's history shows, however, that stare decisis is not 
absolute, and indeed cannot be absolute. Otherwise, as the 
Court today explains, many long-since-overruled cases such 
as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 
310 U. S. 586 (1940); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 
(1986), would never have been overruled and would still be 
the law. 
In his canonical Burnet opinion in 1932, Justice Brandeis 
stated that in “cases involving the Federal Constitution, 
where correction through legislative action is practically im-
possible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.” 
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406−407 
(1932) (dissenting opinion). That description of the Court's 
practice remains accurate today. Every current Member of 
this Court has voted to overrule precedent. And over the 
last 100 years beginning with Chief Justice Taft's appoint-
ment in 1921, every one of the 48 Justices appointed to this 
Court has voted to overrule precedent. Many of those Jus-
tices have voted to overrule a substantial number of very 
signifcant and longstanding precedents. See, e. g., Oberge-
fell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (overruling Baker v. Nel-
son); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) 
(overruling Plessy v. Ferguson); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital of D. C. and in effect Lochner v. New York). 
But that history alone does not answer the critical ques-
tion: When precisely should the Court overrule an erroneous 
constitutional precedent? The history of stare decisis in 
this Court establishes that a constitutional precedent may 
be overruled only when (i) the prior decision is not just 
wrong, but is egregiously wrong, (ii) the prior decision has 
caused signifcant negative jurisprudential or real-world con-
sequences, and (iii) overruling the prior decision would not 
unduly upset legitimate reliance interests. See Ramos v. 
Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in part). 
Applying those factors, I agree with the Court today that 
Roe should be overruled. The Court in Roe erroneously as-
signed itself the authority to decide a critically important 
moral and policy issue that the Constitution does not grant 
this Court the authority to decide. As Justice Byron White 
succinctly explained, Roe was “an improvident and extrava-
gant exercise of the power of judicial review” because “noth-
ing in the language or history of the Constitution” supports 
a constitutional right to abortion. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 
221−222 (dissenting opinion). 
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Of course, the fact that a precedent is wrong, even egre-
giously wrong, does not alone mean that the precedent 
should be overruled. But as the Court today explains, Roe 
has caused signifcant negative jurisprudential and real-
world consequences. By taking sides on a diffcult and con-
tentious issue on which the Constitution is neutral, Roe over-
reached and exceeded this Court's constitutional authority; 
gravely distorted the Nation's understanding of this Court's 
proper constitutional role; and caused signifcant harm to 
what Roe itself recognized as the State's “important and le-
gitimate interest” in protecting fetal life. 410 U. S., at 162. 
All of that explains why tens of millions of Americans— 
and the 26 States that explicitly ask the Court to overrule 
Roe—do not accept Roe even 49 years later. Under the 
Court's longstanding stare decisis principles, Roe should be 
overruled.
3 
But the stare decisis analysis here is somewhat more com-
plicated because of Casey. In 1992, 19 years after Roe, 
Casey acknowledged the continuing dispute over Roe. The 
Court sought to fnd common ground that would resolve the 
abortion debate and end the national controversy. After 
careful and thoughtful consideration, the Casey plurality re-
3 I also agree with the Court's conclusion today with respect to reliance. 
Broad notions of societal reliance have been invoked in support of Roe, 
but the Court has not analyzed reliance in that way in the past. For 
example, American businesses and workers relied on Lochner v. New York, 
198 U. S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 
525 (1923), to construct a laissez-faire economy that was free of substantial 
regulation. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), the 
Court nonetheless overruled Adkins and in effect Lochner. An entire 
region of the country relied on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), to 
enforce a system of racial segregation. In Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court overruled Plessy. Much of American soci-
ety was built around the traditional view of marriage that was upheld in 
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972), and that was refected in laws rang-
ing from tax laws to estate laws to family laws. In Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U. S. 644 (2015), the Court nonetheless overruled Baker. 
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affrmed a right to abortion through viability (about 24 
weeks), while also allowing somewhat more regulation of 
abortion than Roe had allowed. 4 
I have deep and unyielding respect for the Justices who 
wrote the Casey plurality opinion. And I respect the Casey 
plurality's good-faith effort to locate some middle ground or 
compromise that could resolve this controversy for America. 
But as has become increasingly evident over time, Casey's 
well-intentioned effort did not resolve the abortion debate. 
The national division has not ended. In recent years, a sig-
nifcant number of States have enacted abortion restrictions 
that directly confict with Roe. Those laws cannot be dis-
missed as political stunts or as outlier laws. Those numer-
ous state laws collectively represent the sincere and deeply 
held views of tens of millions of Americans who continue to 
fervently believe that allowing abortions up to 24 weeks is 
far too radical and far too extreme, and does not suffciently 
account for what Roe itself recognized as the State's “im-
portant and legitimate interest” in protecting fetal life. 
410 U. S., at 162. In this case, moreover, a majority of the 
States—26 in all—ask the Court to overrule Roe and return 
the abortion issue to the States. 
In short, Casey's stare decisis analysis rested in part on a 
predictive judgment about the future development of state 
laws and of the people's views on the abortion issue. But 
that predictive judgment has not borne out. As the Court 
today explains, the experience over the last 30 years conficts 
4 As the Court today notes, Casey's approach to stare decisis pointed 
in two directions. Casey reaffrmed Roe's viability line, but it expressly 
overruled the Roe trimester framework and also expressly overruled two 
landmark post-Roe abortion cases—Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986). See Casey, 
505 U. S., at 870, 872−873, 878−879, 882. Casey itself thus directly contra-
dicts any notion of absolute stare decisis in abortion cases. 
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
with Casey's predictive judgment and therefore undermines 
Casey's precedential force.5 
In any event, although Casey is relevant to the stare deci-
sis analysis, the question of whether to overrule Roe cannot 
be dictated by Casey alone. To illustrate that stare decisis 
point, consider an example. Suppose that in 1924 this Court 
had expressly reaffrmed Plessy v. Ferguson and upheld the 
States' authority to segregate people on the basis of race. 
Would the Court in Brown some 30 years later in 1954 have 
reaffrmed Plessy and upheld racially segregated schools 
simply because of that intervening 1924 precedent? Surely 
the answer is no. 
In sum, I agree with the Court's application today of the 
principles of stare decisis and its conclusion that Roe should 
be overruled. 
III 
After today's decision, the nine Members of this Court will 
no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abortion 
for all 330 million Americans. That issue will be resolved 
by the people and their representatives in the democratic 
process in the States or Congress. But the parties' argu-
ments have raised other related questions, and I address 
some of them here. 
First is the question of how this decision will affect other 
precedents involving issues such as contraception and mar-
riage—in particular, the decisions in Griswold v. Connecti-
5 To be clear, public opposition to a prior decision is not a basis for over-
ruling (or reaffrming) that decision. Rather, the question of whether to 
overrule a precedent must be analyzed under this Court's traditional stare 
decisis factors. The only point here is that Casey adopted a special stare 
decisis principle with respect to Roe based on the idea of resolving the 
national controversy and ending the national division over abortion. The 
continued and signifcant opposition to Roe, as refected in the laws and 
positions of numerous States, is relevant to assessing Casey on its own 
terms. 
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346 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
cut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); and Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015). I emphasize what the Court 
today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling 
of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast doubt on 
those precedents. 
Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related legal 
questions raised by today's decision are not especially diff-
cult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a State 
bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State 
to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based 
on the constitutional right to interstate travel. May a State 
retroactively impose liability or punishment for an abortion 
that occurred before today's decision takes effect? In my 
view, the answer is no based on the Due Process Clause or 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U. S. 347 (1964). 
Other abortion-related legal questions may emerge in the 
future. But this Court will no longer decide the fundamen-
tal question of whether abortion must be allowed throughout 
the United States through 6 weeks, or 12 weeks, or 15 weeks, 
or 24 weeks, or some other line. The Court will no longer 
decide how to evaluate the interests of the pregnant woman 
and the interests in protecting fetal life throughout preg-
nancy. Instead, those diffcult moral and policy questions 
will be decided, as the Constitution dictates, by the people 
and their elected representatives through the constitutional 
processes of democratic self-government. 
* * * 
The Roe Court took sides on a consequential moral and 
policy issue that this Court had no constitutional authority 
to decide. By taking sides, the Roe Court distorted the Na-
tion's understanding of this Court's proper role in the Ameri-
can constitutional system and thereby damaged the Court as 
an institution. As Justice Scalia explained, Roe “destroyed 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
the compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossi-
ble for the future, and required the entire issue to be re-
solved uniformly, at the national level.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 
995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
The Court's decision today properly returns the Court to 
a position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, 
and properly restores the people's authority to resolve the 
issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self-
government established by the Constitution. 
To be sure, many Americans will disagree with the Court's 
decision today. That would be true no matter how the 
Court decided this case. Both sides on the abortion issue 
believe sincerely and passionately in the rightness of their 
cause. Especially in those diffcult and fraught circum-
stances, the Court must scrupulously adhere to the Constitu-
tion's neutral position on the issue of abortion. 
Since 1973, more than 20 Justices of this Court have now 
grappled with the divisive issue of abortion. I greatly re-
spect all of the Justices, past and present, who have done 
so. Amidst extraordinary controversy and challenges, all of 
them have addressed the abortion issue in good faith after 
careful deliberation, and based on their sincere understand-
ings of the Constitution and of precedent. I have endeav-
ored to do the same. 
In my judgment, on the issue of abortion, the Constitution 
is neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neu-
tral, and this Court likewise must be scrupulously neutral. 
The Court today properly heeds the constitutional principle 
of judicial neutrality and returns the issue of abortion to the 
people and their elected representatives in the democratic 
process. 
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the judgment. 
We granted certiorari to decide one question: “Whether all 
pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconsti-

348 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
tutional.” Pet. for Cert. i. That question is directly impli-
cated here: Mississippi's Gestational Age Act, Miss. Code 
Ann. § 41–41–191 (2018), generally prohibits abortion after 
the ffteenth week of pregnancy—several weeks before a 
fetus is regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In urging 
our review, Mississippi stated that its case was “an ideal ve-
hicle” to “reconsider the bright-line viability rule,” and that 
a judgment in its favor would “not require the Court to over-
turn” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). Pet. 
for Cert. 5. 
Today, the Court nonetheless rules for Mississippi by doing 
just that. I would take a more measured course. I agree 
with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and 
Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare de-
cisis analysis. That line never made any sense. Our abor-
tion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman's right 
to choose to terminate her pregnancy. That right should 
therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable opportu-
nity to choose, but need not extend any further—certainly 
not all the way to viability. Mississippi's law allows a 
woman three months to obtain an abortion, well beyond the 
point at which it is considered “late” to discover a pregnancy. 
See A. Ayoola, Late Recognition of Unintended Pregnancies, 
32 Pub. Health Nursing 462 (2015) (pregnancy is discoverable 
and ordinarily discovered by six weeks of gestation). I see 
no sound basis for questioning the adequacy of that 
opportunity. 
But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple 
yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not 
necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is neces-
sary not to decide more. Perhaps we are not always perfect 
in following that command, and certainly there are cases that 
warrant an exception. But this is not one of them. Surely 
we should adhere closely to principles of judicial restraint 
here, where the broader path the Court chooses entails repu-
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
diating a constitutional right we have not only previously 
recognized, but also expressly reaffrmed applying the doc-
trine of stare decisis. The Court's opinion is thoughtful and 
thorough, but those virtues cannot compensate for the fact 
that its dramatic and consequential ruling is unnecessary to 
decide the case before us. 
I 
Let me begin with my agreement with the Court, on the 
only question we need decide here: whether to retain the 
rule from Roe and Casey that a woman's right to terminate 
her pregnancy extends up to the point that the fetus is re-
garded as “viable” outside the womb. I agree that this rule 
should be discarded. 
First, this Court seriously erred in Roe in adopting viabil-
ity as the earliest point at which a State may legislate to 
advance its substantial interests in the area of abortion. 
See ante, at 274–278. Roe set forth a rigid three-part 
framework anchored to viability, which more closely resem-
bled a regulatory code than a body of constitutional law. 
That framework, moreover, came out of thin air. Neither 
the Texas statute challenged in Roe nor the Georgia statute 
at issue in its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 
(1973), included any gestational age limit. No party or ami-
cus asked the Court to adopt a bright line viability rule. 
And as for Casey, arguments for or against the viability rule 
played only a de minimis role in the parties' briefng and in 
the oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–18, 51 (feeting 
discussion of the viability rule). 
It is thus hardly surprising that neither Roe nor Casey 
made a persuasive or even colorable argument for why the 
time for terminating a pregnancy must extend to viability. 
The Court's jurisprudence on this issue is a textbook illustra-
tion of the perils of deciding a question neither presented 
nor briefed. As has been often noted, Roe's defense of the 
line boiled down to the circular assertion that the State's 
interest is compelling only when an unborn child can live 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
outside the womb, because that is when the unborn child can 
live outside the womb. See 410 U. S., at 163–164; see also J. 
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 Yale L. J. 920, 924 (1973) (Roe's reasoning “mistake[s] a 
defnition for a syllogism”). 
Twenty years later, the best defense of the viability line 
the Casey plurality could conjure up was workability. See 
505 U. S., at 870. But see ante, at 277 (opinion of the Court) 
(discussing the diffculties in applying the viability standard). 
Although the plurality attempted to add more content by 
opining that “it might be said that a woman who fails to act 
before viability has consented to the State's intervention on 
behalf of the developing child,” Casey, 505 U. S., at 870, that 
mere suggestion provides no basis for choosing viability as 
the critical tipping point. A similar implied consent argu-
ment could be made with respect to a law banning abortions 
after ffteen weeks, well beyond the point at which nearly 
all women are aware that they are pregnant, A. 
Ayoola, M. Nettleman, M. Stommel, & R. Canady, Time of 
Pregnancy Recognition and Prenatal Care Use: A Popula-
tion-based Study in the United States 39 (2010) (Pregnancy 
Recognition). The dissent, which would retain the viability 
line, offers no justifcation for it either. 
This Court's jurisprudence since Casey, moreover, has 
“eroded” the “underpinnings” of the viability line, such as 
they were. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521 
(1995). The viability line is a relic of a time when we recog-
nized only two state interests warranting regulation of abor-
tion: maternal health and protection of “potential life.” Roe, 
410 U. S., at 162–163. That changed with Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 550 U. S. 124 (2007). There, we recognized a broader 
array of interests, such as drawing “a bright line that clearly 
distinguishes abortion and infanticide,” maintaining societal 
ethics, and preserving the integrity of the medical profes-
sion. Id., at 157–160. The viability line has nothing to do 
with advancing such permissible goals. Cf. id., at 171 (Gins-
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
burg, J., dissenting) (Gonzales “blur[red] the line, frmly 
drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abor-
tions”); see also R. Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability 
Rule, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 249, 276–279 (2009). 
Consider, for example, statutes passed in a number of ju-
risdictions that forbid abortions after twenty weeks of preg-
nancy, premised on the theory that a fetus can feel pain at 
that stage of development. See, e. g., Ala. Code § 26–23B–2 
(2018). Assuming that prevention of fetal pain is a legiti-
mate state interest after Gonzales, there seems to be no rea-
son why viability would be relevant to the permissibility of 
such laws. The same is true of laws designed to “protect[ ] 
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” and re-
strict procedures likely to “coarsen society” to the “dignity 
of human life.” Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157. Mississippi's 
law, for instance, was premised in part on the legislature's 
fnding that the “dilation and evacuation” procedure is a 
“barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, and 
demeaning to the medical profession.” Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 41–41–191(2)(b)(i)(8). That procedure accounts for most 
abortions performed after the frst trimester—two weeks 
before the period at issue in this case—and “involve[s] the 
use of surgical instruments to crush and tear the unborn 
child apart.” Ibid.; see also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 135. 
Again, it would make little sense to focus on viability when 
evaluating a law based on these permissible goals. 
In short, the viability rule was created outside the ordi-
nary course of litigation, is and always has been completely 
unreasoned, and fails to take account of state interests since 
recognized as legitimate. It is indeed “telling that other 
countries almost uniformly eschew” a viability line. Ante, 
at 277 (opinion of the Court). Only a handful of countries, 
among them China and North Korea, permit elective abor-
tions after twenty weeks; the rest have coalesced around a 
12–week line. See The World's Abortion Laws, Center for 
Reproductive Rights (Feb. 23, 2021) (online source archived 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
at www.supremecourt.gov) (Canada, China, Iceland, Guinea-
Bissau, the Netherlands, North Korea, Singapore, and Viet-
nam permit elective abortions after twenty weeks). The 
Court rightly rejects the arbitrary viability rule today. 
II 
None of this, however, requires that we also take the dra-
matic step of altogether eliminating the abortion right frst 
recognized in Roe. Mississippi itself previously argued as 
much to this Court in this litigation. 
When the State petitioned for our review, its basic request 
was straightforward: “clarify whether abortion prohibitions 
before viability are always unconstitutional.” Pet. for Cert. 
14. The State made a number of strong arguments that the 
answer is no, id., at 15–26—arguments that, as discussed, I 
fnd persuasive. And it went out of its way to make clear 
that it was not asking the Court to repudiate entirely the 
right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy: “To be 
clear, the questions presented in this petition do not require 
the Court to overturn Roe or Casey.” Id., at 5. Mississippi 
tempered that statement with an oblique one-sentence foot-
note intimating that, if the Court could not reconcile Roe and 
Casey with current facts or other cases, it “should not retain 
erroneous precedent.” Pet. for Cert. 5–6, n. 1. But the 
State never argued that we should grant review for that 
purpose. 
After we granted certiorari, however, Mississippi changed 
course. In its principal brief, the State bluntly announced 
that the Court should overrule Roe and Casey. The Consti-
tution does not protect a right to an abortion, it argued, and 
a State should be able to prohibit elective abortions if a ra-
tional basis supports doing so. See Brief for Petitioners 
12–13. 
The Court now rewards that gambit, noting three times 
that the parties presented “no half-measures” and argued 
that “we must either reaffrm or overrule Roe and Casey.” 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
Ante, at 230–231, 234, 296. Given those two options, the ma-
jority picks the latter. 
This framing is not accurate. In its brief on the merits, 
Mississippi in fact argued at length that a decision simply 
rejecting the viability rule would result in a judgment in its 
favor. See Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48. But even if the 
State had not argued as much, it would not matter. There 
is no rule that parties can confne this Court to disposing of 
their case on a particular ground—let alone when review was 
sought and granted on a different one. Our established 
practice is instead not to “formulate a rule of constitutional 
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it 
is to be applied.” Washington State Grange v. Washington 
State Republican Party , 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008) (quoting 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 
21 (1960). 
Following that “fundamental principle of judicial re -
straint,” Washington State Grange , 552 U. S., at 450, we 
should begin with the narrowest basis for disposition, pro-
ceeding to consider a broader one only if necessary to resolve 
the case at hand. See, e. g., Offce of Personnel Management 
v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 423 (1990). It is only where there 
is no valid narrower ground of decision that we should go on to 
address a broader issue, such as whether a constitutional deci-
sion should be overturned. See Federal Election Comm'n v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 482 (2007) (opinion 
of Roberts, C. J.) (declining to address the claim that a con-
stitutional decision should be overruled when the appellant 
prevailed on its narrower constitutional argument). 
Here, there is a clear path to deciding this case correctly 
without overruling Roe all the way down to the studs: recog-
nize that the viability line must be discarded, as the majority 
rightly does, and leave for another day whether to reject 
any right to an abortion at all. See Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 518, 521 (1989) (plurality opin-
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
ion) (rejecting Roe's viability line as “rigid” and “indetermi-
nate,” while also fnding “no occasion to revisit the holding 
of Roe” that, under the Constitution, a State must provide 
an opportunity to choose to terminate a pregnancy). 
Of course, such an approach would not be available if the 
rationale of Roe and Casey was inextricably entangled with 
and dependent upon the viability standard. It is not. Our 
precedents in this area ground the abortion right in a wom-
an's “right to choose.” See Carey v. Population Services 
Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 688–689 (1977) (“underlying foundation 
of the holdings” in Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U. S. 479 (1965), was the “right of decision in matters of 
childbearing”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 473 (1977) (Roe 
and other cases “recognize a constitutionally protected inter-
est in making certain kinds of important decisions free from 
governmental compulsion” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); id., at 473–474 (Roe “did not declare an unqualifed 
constitutional right to an abortion,” but instead protected 
“the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her 
freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Webster, 492 U. S., at 520 
(plurality opinion) (Roe protects “the claims of a woman to 
decide for herself whether or not to abort a fetus she [is] 
carrying”); Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 146 (a State may not “pro-
hibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy”). If that is the basis for Roe, Roe's via-
bility line should be scrutinized from the same perspective. 
And there is nothing inherent in the right to choose that 
requires it to extend to viability or any other point, so long 
as a real choice is provided. See Webster, 492 U. S., at 519 
(plurality opinion) (fnding no reason “why the State's inter-
est in protecting potential human life should come into exist-
ence only at the point of viability”). 
To be sure, in reaffrming the right to an abortion, Casey 
termed the viability rule Roe's “central holding.” 505 U. S., 
at 860. Other cases of ours have repeated that language. 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
See, e. g., Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 145–146. But simply de-
claring it does not make it so. The question in Roe was 
whether there was any right to abortion in the Constitution. 
See Brief for Appellants and Brief for Appellees, in Roe v. 
Wade, O. T. 1971, No. 70–18. How far the right extended 
was a concern that was separate and subsidiary, and—not 
surprisingly—entirely unbriefed. 
The Court in Roe just chose to address both issues in one 
opinion: It frst recognized a right to “choose to terminate 
[a] pregnancy” under the Constitution, see 410 U. S., at 129– 
159, and then, having done so, explained that a line should 
be drawn at viability such that a State could not proscribe 
abortion before that period, see id., at 163. The viability 
line is a separate rule feshing out the metes and bounds of 
Roe's core holding. Applying principles of stare decisis, I 
would excise that additional rule—and only that rule—from 
our jurisprudence. 
The majority lists a number of cases that have stressed 
the importance of the viability rule to our abortion prece-
dents. See ante, at 297–298. I agree that—whether it was 
originally holding or dictum—the viability line is clearly part 
of our “past precedent,” and the Court has applied it as such 
in several cases since Roe. Ante, at 297. My point is that 
Roe adopted two distinct rules of constitutional law: one, that 
a woman has the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy; 
two, that such right may be overridden by the State's legiti-
mate interests when the fetus is viable outside the womb. 
The latter is obviously distinct from the former. I would 
abandon that timing rule, but see no need in this case to 
consider the basic right. 
The Court contends that it is impossible to address Roe's 
conclusion that the Constitution protects the woman's right 
to abortion, without also addressing Roe's rule that the State's 
interests are not constitutionally adequate to justify a ban 
on abortion until viability. See ante, at 297. But we have 
partially overruled precedents before, see, e. g., United 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
States v. Miller, 471 U. S. 130, 142–144 (1985); Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 328–331 (1986); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U. S. 79, 90–93 (1986), and certainly have never held 
that a distinct holding defning the contours of a constitu-
tional right must be treated as part and parcel of the right 
itself. 
Overruling the subsidiary rule is suffcient to resolve this 
case in Mississippi's favor. The law at issue allows abortions 
up through ffteen weeks, providing an adequate opportunity 
to exercise the right Roe protects. By the time a pregnant 
woman has reached that point, her pregnancy is well into the 
second trimester. Pregnancy tests are now inexpensive and 
accurate, and a woman ordinarily discovers she is pregnant 
by six weeks of gestation. See A. Branum & K. Ahrens, 
Trends in Timing of Pregnancy Awareness Among US 
Women, 21 Maternal & Child Health J. 715, 722 (2017). Al-
most all know by the end of the frst trimester. Pregnancy 
Recognition 39. Safe and effective abortifacients, moreover, 
are now readily available, particularly during those early 
stages. See I. Adibi et al., Abortion, 22 Geo. J. Gender & L. 
279, 303 (2021). Given all this, it is no surprise that the vast 
majority of abortions happen in the frst trimester. See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Abortion Sur-
veillance—United States 1 (2020). Presumably most of the 
remainder would also take place earlier if later abortions 
were not a legal option. Ample evidence thus suggests that 
a 15-week ban provides suffcient time, absent rare circum-
stances, for a woman “to decide for herself ” whether to ter-
minate her pregnancy. Webster, 492 U. S., at 520 (plurality 
opinion).* 
*The majority contends that “nothing like [my approach] was recom-
mended by either party.” Ante, at 296. But as explained, Mississippi in 
fact pressed a similar argument in its flings before this Court. See Pet. 
for Cert. 15–26; Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48 (urging the Court to reject 
the viability rule and reverse); Reply Brief 20–22 (same). The approach 
also fnds support in prior opinions. See Webster, 492 U. S., at 518–521 
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Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment 
III 
Whether a precedent should be overruled is a question 
“entirely within the discretion of the court.” Hertz v. Wood-
man, 218 U. S. 205, 212 (1910); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) (stare decisis is a “principle of pol-
icy”). In my respectful view, the sound exercise of that dis-
cretion should have led the Court to resolve the case on the 
narrower grounds set forth above, rather than overruling 
Roe and Casey entirely. The Court says there is no “princi-
pled basis” for this approach, ante, at 296, but in fact it is 
frmly grounded in basic principles of stare decisis and judi-
cial restraint. 
The Court's decision to overrule Roe and Casey is a serious 
jolt to the legal system—regardless of how you view those 
cases. A narrower decision rejecting the misguided viabil-
ity line would be markedly less unsettling, and nothing more 
is needed to decide this case. 
Our cases say that the effect of overruling a precedent on 
reliance interests is a factor to consider in deciding whether 
to take such a step, and respondents argue that generations 
of women have relied on the right to an abortion in organiz-
ing their relationships and planning their futures. Brief for 
Respondents 36–41; see also Casey, 505 U. S., at 856 (making 
the same point). The Court questions whether these con-
cerns are pertinent under our precedents, see ante, at 288– 
289, but the issue would not even arise with a decision re-
jecting only the viability line: It cannot reasonably be argued 
that women have shaped their lives in part on the assump-
tion that they would be able to abort up to viability, as op-
posed to ffteen weeks. 
In support of its holding, the Court cites three seminal 
constitutional decisions that involved overruling prior prece-
(plurality opinion) (abandoning “key elements” of the Roe framework 
under stare decisis while declining to reconsider Roe's holding that the 
Constitution protects the right to an abortion). 
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dents: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), 
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), 
and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). 
See ante, at 264–265. The opinion in Brown was unanimous 
and eleven pages long; this one is neither. Barnette was 
decided only three years after the decision it overruled, 
three Justices having had second thoughts. And West Coast 
Hotel was issued against a backdrop of unprecedented eco-
nomic despair that focused attention on the fundamental 
flaws of existing precedent. It also was part of a sea 
change in this Court's interpretation of the Constitution, 
“signal[ing] the demise of an entire line of important prece-
dents,” ante, at 265—a feature the Court expressly disclaims 
in today's decision, see ante, at 257, 289–290. None of these 
leading cases, in short, provides a template for what the 
Court does today. 
The Court says we should consider whether to overrule 
Roe and Casey now, because if we delay we would be forced 
to consider the issue again in short order. See ante, at 299– 
300. There would be “turmoil” until we did so, according 
to the Court, because of existing state laws with “shorter 
deadlines or no deadline at all.” Ante, at 299. But under 
the narrower approach proposed here, state laws outlawing 
abortion altogether would still violate binding precedent. 
And to the extent States have laws that set the cutoff date 
earlier than ffteen weeks, any litigation over that timeframe 
would proceed free of the distorting effect that the viability 
rule has had on our constitutional debate. The same could 
be true, for that matter, with respect to legislative consider-
ation in the States. We would then be free to exercise our 
discretion in deciding whether and when to take up the issue, 
from a more informed perspective. 
* * * 
Both the Court's opinion and the dissent display a relent-
less freedom from doubt on the legal issue that I cannot

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 359 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
share. I am not sure, for example, that a ban on terminating 
a pregnancy from the moment of conception must be treated 
the same under the Constitution as a ban after ffteen weeks. 
A thoughtful Member of this Court once counseled that the 
diffculty of a question “admonishes us to observe the wise 
limitations on our function and to confne ourselves to decid-
ing only what is necessary to the disposition of the immedi-
ate case.” Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R. Co., 349 U. S. 
366, 372–373 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court). I would 
decide the question we granted review to answer—whether 
the previously recognized abortion right bars all abortion 
restrictions prior to viability, such that a ban on abortions 
after ffteen weeks of pregnancy is necessarily unlawful. 
The answer to that question is no, and there is no need to go 
further to decide this case. 
I therefore concur only in the judgment. 
Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice 
Kagan, dissenting. 
For half a century, Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 
833 (1992), have protected the liberty and equality of women. 
Roe held, and Casey reaffrmed, that the Constitution safe-
guards a woman's right to decide for herself whether to bear 
a child. Roe held, and Casey reaffrmed, that in the frst 
stages of pregnancy, the government could not make that 
choice for women. The government could not control a 
woman's body or the course of a woman's life: It could not 
determine what the woman's future would be. See Casey, 
505 U. S., at 853; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 171–172 
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Respecting a woman as an 
autonomous being, and granting her full equality, meant giv-
ing her substantial choice over this most personal and most 
consequential of all life decisions. 
Roe and Casey well understood the diffculty and divisive-
ness of the abortion issue. The Court knew that Americans 
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360 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
hold profoundly different views about the “moral[ity]” of 
“ terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.” 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 850. And the Court recognized that 
“the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the 
pregnancy in protecting” the “life of the fetus that may 
become a child.” Id., at 846. So the Court struck a bal-
ance, as it often does when values and goals compete. It 
held that the State could prohibit abortions after fetal via-
bility, so long as the ban contained exceptions to safeguard 
a woman's life or health. It held that even before viability, 
the State could regulate the abortion procedure in multiple 
and meaningful ways. But until the viability line was 
crossed, the Court held, a State could not impose a “sub-
stantial obstacle” on a woman's “right to elect the proce-
dure” as she (not the government) thought proper, in light 
of all the circumstances and complexities of her own life. 
Ibid. 
Today, the Court discards that balance. It says that from 
the very moment of fertilization, a woman has no rights to 
speak of. A State can force her to bring a pregnancy to 
term, even at the steepest personal and familial costs. An 
abortion restriction, the majority holds, is permissible when-
ever rational, the lowest level of scrutiny known to the law. 
And because, as the Court has often stated, protecting fetal 
life is rational, States will feel free to enact all manner of 
restrictions. The Mississippi law at issue here bars abor-
tions after the 15th week of pregnancy. Under the majori-
ty's ruling, though, another State's law could do so after ten 
weeks, or fve or three or one—or, again, from the moment 
of fertilization. States have already passed such laws, in 
anticipation of today's ruling. More will follow. Some 
States have enacted laws extending to all forms of abortion 
procedure, including taking medication in one's own home. 
They have passed laws without any exceptions for when the 
woman is the victim of rape or incest. Under those laws, a 
woman will have to bear her rapist's child or a young girl 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
her father's—no matter if doing so will destroy her life. So 
too, after today's ruling, some States may compel women to 
carry to term a fetus with severe physical anomalies—for 
example, one afficted with Tay-Sachs disease, sure to die 
within a few years of birth. States may even argue that a 
prohibition on abortion need make no provision for protect-
ing a woman from risk of death or physical harm. Across a 
vast array of circumstances, a State will be able to impose 
its moral choice on a woman and coerce her to give birth to 
a child. 
Enforcement of all these draconian restrictions will also 
be left largely to the States' devices. A State can of course 
impose criminal penalties on abortion providers, including 
lengthy prison sentences. But some States will not stop 
there. Perhaps, in the wake of today's decision, a state law 
will criminalize the woman's conduct too, incarcerating or 
fning her for daring to seek or obtain an abortion. And as 
Texas has recently shown, a State can turn neighbor against 
neighbor, enlisting fellow citizens in the effort to root out 
anyone who tries to get an abortion, or to assist another in 
doing so. 
The majority tries to hide the geographically expansive 
effects of its holding. Today's decision, the majority says, 
permits “each State” to address abortion as it pleases. 
Ante, at 302. That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor 
woman who cannot get the money to fy to a distant State 
for a procedure. Above all others, women lacking fnancial 
resources will suffer from today's decision. In any event, 
interstate restrictions will also soon be in the offng. After 
this decision, some States may block women from traveling 
out of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abor-
tion medications from out of State. Some may criminalize 
efforts, including the provision of information or funding, to 
help women gain access to other States' abortion services. 
Most threatening of all, no language in today's decision stops 
the Federal Government from prohibiting abortions nation-

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362 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
wide, once again from the moment of conception and without 
exceptions for rape or incest. If that happens, “the views 
of [an individual State's] citizens” will not matter. Ante, 
at 226. The challenge for a woman will be to fnance a trip 
not to “New York [or] California” but to Toronto. Ante, 
at 339 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result 
of today's decision is certain: the curtailment of women's 
rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. Yester-
day, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman confronted 
with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reasonable lim-
its) make her own decision about whether to bear a child, 
with all the life-transforming consequences that act involves. 
And in thus safeguarding each woman's reproductive free-
dom, the Constitution also protected “[t]he ability of women 
to participate equally in [this Nation's] economic and social 
life.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 856. But no longer. As of today, 
this Court holds, a State can always force a woman to give 
birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions. A State can 
thus transform what, when freely undertaken, is a wonder 
into what, when forced, may be a nightmare. Some women, 
especially women of means, will fnd ways around the State's 
assertion of power. Others—those without money or child-
care or the ability to take time off from work—will not be 
so fortunate. Maybe they will try an unsafe method of abor-
tion, and come to physical harm, or even die. Maybe they 
will undergo pregnancy and have a child, but at signifcant 
personal or familial cost. At the least, they will incur the 
cost of losing control of their lives. The Constitution will, 
today's majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guaran-
tees of liberty and equality for all. 
And no one should be confdent that this majority is done 
with its work. The right Roe and Casey recognized does 
not stand alone. To the contrary, the Court has linked it for 
decades to other settled freedoms involving bodily integrity, 
familial relationships, and procreation. Most obviously, the

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 363 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
right to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of the right 
to purchase and use contraception. See Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 
438 (1972). In turn, those rights led, more recently, to 
rights of same-sex intimacy and marriage. See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 
644 (2015). They are all part of the same constitutional fab-
ric, protecting autonomous decisionmaking over the most 
personal of life decisions. The majority (or to be more accu-
rate, most of it) is eager to tell us today that nothing it does 
“cast[s] doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” 
Ante, at 290; cf. ante, at 332 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advo-
cating the overruling of Griswold, Lawrence, and Oberge-
fell). But how could that be? The lone rationale for what 
the majority does today is that the right to elect an abortion 
is not “deeply rooted in history”: Not until Roe, the majority 
argues, did people think abortion fell within the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of liberty. Ante, at 257. The same could 
be said, though, of most of the rights the majority claims it 
is not tampering with. The majority could write just as 
long an opinion showing, for example, that until the mid-20th 
century, “there was no support in American law for a consti-
tutional right to obtain [contraceptives].” Ante, at 241. So 
one of two things must be true. Either the majority does 
not really believe in its own reasoning. Or if it does, all 
rights that have no history stretching back to the mid-19th 
century are insecure. Either the mass of the majority's 
opinion is hypocrisy, or additional constitutional rights are 
under threat. It is one or the other. 
One piece of evidence on that score seems especially sa-
lient: The majority's cavalier approach to overturning this 
Court's precedents. Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for a 
foundation stone of the rule of law: that things decided 
should stay decided unless there is a very good reason for 
change. It is a doctrine of judicial modesty and humility. 
Those qualities are not evident in today's opinion. The ma-
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364 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
jority has no good reason for the upheaval in law and society 
it sets off. Roe and Casey have been the law of the land for 
decades, shaping women's expectations of their choices when 
an unplanned pregnancy occurs. Women have relied on the 
availability of abortion both in structuring their relation-
ships and in planning their lives. The legal framework Roe 
and Casey developed to balance the competing interests in 
this sphere has proved workable in courts across the country. 
No recent developments, in either law or fact, have eroded 
or cast doubt on those precedents. Nothing, in short, has 
changed. Indeed, the Court in Casey already found all of 
that to be true. Casey is a precedent about precedent. It 
reviewed the same arguments made here in support of over-
ruling Roe, and it found that doing so was not warranted. 
The Court reverses course today for one reason and one rea-
son only: because the composition of this Court has changed. 
Stare decisis, this Court has often said, “contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process” by en-
suring that decisions are “founded in the law rather than in 
the proclivities of individuals.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U. S. 808, 827 (1991); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 
(1986). Today, the proclivities of individuals rule. The 
Court departs from its obligation to faithfully and impar-
tially apply the law. We dissent. 
I 
We start with Roe and Casey, and with their deep connec-
tions to a broad swath of this Court's precedents. To hear 
the majority tell the tale, Roe and Casey are aberrations: 
They came from nowhere, went nowhere—and so are easy 
to excise from this Nation's constitutional law. That is not 
true. After describing the decisions themselves, we explain 
how they are rooted in—and themselves led to—other rights 
giving individuals control over their bodies and their most 
personal and intimate associations. The majority does not 
wish to talk about these matters for obvious reasons; to do

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 365 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
so would both ground Roe and Casey in this Court's prece-
dents and reveal the broad implications of today's decision. 
But the facts will not so handily disappear. Roe and Casey 
were from the beginning, and are even more now, embedded 
in core constitutional concepts of individual freedom, and of 
the equal rights of citizens to decide on the shape of their 
lives. Those legal concepts, one might even say, have gone 
far toward defning what it means to be an American. For 
in this Nation, we do not believe that a government control-
ling all private choices is compatible with a free people. So 
we do not (as the majority insists today) place everything 
within “the reach of majorities and [government] offcials.” 
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 
(1943). We believe in a Constitution that puts some issues 
off limits to majority rule. Even in the face of public opposi-
tion, we uphold the right of individuals—yes, including 
women—to make their own choices and chart their own fu-
tures. Or at least, we did once. 
A 
Some half-century ago, Roe struck down a state law mak-
ing it a crime to perform an abortion unless its purpose was 
to save a woman's life. The Roe Court knew it was treading 
on diffcult and disputed ground. It understood that differ-
ent people's “experiences,” “values,” and “religious training” 
and beliefs led to “opposing views” about abortion. 410 
U. S., at 116. But by a 7-to-2 vote, the Court held that in 
the earlier stages of pregnancy, that contested and contes-
table choice must belong to a woman, in consultation with 
her family and doctor. The Court explained that a long line 
of precedents, “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty,” protected individual decision-
making related to “marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child rearing and education.” Id., 
at 152–153 (citations omitted). For the same reasons, the 
Court held, the Constitution must protect “a woman's deci-
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366 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id., at 
153. The Court recognized the myriad ways bearing a child 
can alter the “life and future” of a woman and other members 
of her family. Ibid. A State could not, “by adopting one 
theory of life,” override all “rights of the pregnant woman.” 
Id., at 162. 
At the same time, though, the Court recognized “valid in-
terest[s]” of the State “in regulating the abortion decision.” 
Id., at 153. The Court noted in particular “important inter-
ests” in “protecting potential life,” “maintaining medical 
standards,” and “safeguarding [the] health” of the woman. 
Id., at 154. No “absolut[ist]” account of the woman's right 
could wipe away those signifcant state claims. Ibid. 
The Court therefore struck a balance, turning on the stage 
of the pregnancy at which the abortion would occur. The 
Court explained that early on, a woman's choice must prevail, 
but that “at some point the state interests” become “domi-
nant.” Id., at 155. It then set some guideposts. In the 
frst trimester of pregnancy, the State could not interfere at 
all with the decision to terminate a pregnancy. At any time 
after that point, the State could regulate to protect the preg-
nant woman's health, such as by insisting that abortion pro-
viders and facilities meet safety requirements. And after 
the fetus's viability—the point when the fetus “has the capa-
bility of meaningful life outside the mother's womb”—the 
State could ban abortions, except when necessary to pre-
serve the woman's life or health. Id., at 163–164. 
In the 20 years between Roe and Casey, the Court ex-
pressly reaffrmed Roe on two occasions, and applied it on 
many more. Recognizing that “arguments [against Roe] 
continue to be made,” we responded that the doctrine of 
stare decisis “demands respect in a society governed by the 
rule of law.” Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 419–420 (1983). And we avowed 
that the “vitality” of “constitutional principles cannot be al-
lowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.” 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 476 U. S. 747, 759 (1986). So the Court, over and 
over, enforced the constitutional principles Roe had declared. 
See, e. g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 
U. S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990); 
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983); Planned Par-
enthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 
476 (1983); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976). 
Then, in Casey, the Court considered the matter anew, and 
again upheld Roe's core precepts. Casey is in signifcant 
measure a precedent about the doctrine of precedent—until 
today, one of the Court's most important. But we leave for 
later that aspect of the Court's decision. The key thing now 
is the substantive aspect of the Court's considered conclusion 
that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained 
and once again reaffrmed.” 505 U. S., at 846. 
Central to that conclusion was a full-throated restatement 
of a woman's right to choose. Like Roe, Casey grounded 
that right in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of “lib-
erty.” That guarantee encompasses realms of conduct not 
specifcally referenced in the Constitution: “Marriage is men-
tioned nowhere” in that document, yet the Court was “no 
doubt correct” to protect the freedom to marry “against 
state interference.” 505 U. S., at 847–848. And the guar-
antee of liberty encompasses conduct today that was not pro-
tected at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id., 
at 848. “It is settled now,” the Court said—though it was 
not always so—that “the Constitution places limits on a 
State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions 
about family and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity.” 
Id., at 849 (citations omitted); see id., at 851 (similarly de-
scribing the constitutional protection given to “personal de-
cisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, [and] 
family relationships”). Especially important in this web of 
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368 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
precedents protecting an individual's most “personal choices” 
were those guaranteeing the right to contraception. Ibid.; 
see id., at 852–853. In those cases, the Court had recog-
nized “the right of the individual” to make the vastly conse-
quential “decision whether to bear” a child. Id., at 851 (em-
phasis deleted). So too, Casey reasoned, the liberty clause 
protects the decision of a woman confronting an unplanned 
pregnancy. Her decision about abortion was central, in the 
same way, to her capacity to chart her life's course. See id., 
at 853. 
In reaffrming the right Roe recognized, the Court took 
full account of the diversity of views on abortion, and the 
importance of various competing state interests. Some 
Americans, the Court stated, “deem [abortion] nothing short 
of an act of violence against innocent human life.” 505 U. S., 
at 852. And each State has an interest in “the protection of 
potential life”—as Roe itself had recognized. 505 U. S., at 
871 (plurality opinion). On the one hand, that interest was 
not conclusive. The State could not “resolve” the “moral 
and spiritual” questions raised by abortion in “such a defini-
tive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter.” Id., 
at 850 (majority opinion). It could not force her to bear the 
“pain” and “physical constraints” of “carr[ying] a child to full 
term” when she would have chosen an early abortion. Id., 
at 852. But on the other hand, the State had, as Roe had 
held, an exceptionally significant interest in disallowing 
abortions in the later phase of a pregnancy. And it had an 
ever-present interest in “ensur[ing] that the woman's choice 
is informed” and in presenting the case for “choos[ing] child-
birth over abortion.” 505 U. S., at 878 (plurality opinion). 
So Casey again struck a balance, differing from Roe's in 
only incremental ways. It retained Roe's “central holding” 
that the State could bar abortion only after viability. 505 
U. S., at 860 (majority opinion). The viability line, Casey 
thought, was “more workable” than any other in marking the 
place where the woman's liberty interest gave way to a

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 369 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
State's efforts to preserve potential life. Id., at 870 (plural-
ity opinion). At that point, a “second life” was capable of 
“independent existence.” Ibid. If the woman even by then 
had not acted, she lacked adequate grounds to object to “the 
State's intervention on [the developing child's] behalf.” 
Ibid. At the same time, Casey decided, based on two dec-
ades of experience, that the Roe framework did not give 
States suffcient ability to regulate abortion prior to viabil-
ity. In that period, Casey now made clear, the State could 
regulate not only to protect the woman's health but also to 
“promot[e] prenatal life.” 505 U. S., at 873 (plurality opin-
ion). In particular, the State could ensure informed choice 
and could try to promote childbirth. See id., at 877–878. 
But the State still could not place an “undue burden”—or 
“substantial obstacle”—“in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion.” Id., at 878. Prior to viability, the woman, con-
sistent with the constitutional “meaning of liberty,” must 
“retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body.” 
Id., at 869. 
We make one initial point about this analysis in light of 
the majority's insistence that Roe and Casey, and we in de-
fending them, are dismissive of a “State's interest in protect-
ing prenatal life.” Ante, at 263. Nothing could get those 
decisions more wrong. As just described, Roe and Casey 
invoked powerful state interests in that protection, operative 
at every stage of the pregnancy and overriding the woman's 
liberty after viability. The strength of those state interests 
is exactly why the Court allowed greater restrictions on the 
abortion right than on other rights deriving from the Four-
teenth Amendment.
1 But what Roe and Casey also recog-
1 For this reason, we do not understand the majority's view that our 
analogy between the right to an abortion and the rights to contraception 
and same-sex marriage shows that we think “[t]he Constitution does not 
permit the States to regard the destruction of a `potential life' as a matter 
of any signifcance.” Ante, at 262. To the contrary. The liberty interests 
underlying those rights are, as we will describe, quite similar. See infra, 
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370 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
nized—which today's majority does not—is that a woman's 
freedom and equality are likewise involved. That fact—the 
presence of countervailing interests—is what made the abor-
tion question hard, and what necessitated balancing. The 
majority scoffs at that idea, castigating us for “repeatedly 
prais[ing] the `balance' ” the two cases arrived at (with the 
word “balance” in scare quotes). Ante, at 263. To the ma-
jority “balance” is a dirty word, as moderation is a foreign 
concept. The majority would allow States to ban abortion 
from conception onward because it does not think forced 
childbirth at all implicates a woman's rights to equality and 
freedom. Today's Court, that is, does not think there is any-
thing of constitutional signifcance attached to a woman's 
control of her body and the path of her life. Roe and Casey 
thought that one-sided view misguided. In some sense, that 
is the difference in a nutshell between our precedents and 
the majority opinion. The constitutional regime we have 
lived in for the last 50 years recognized competing interests, 
and sought a balance between them. The constitutional re-
gime we enter today erases the woman's interest and recog-
nizes only the State's (or the Federal Government's). 
B 
The majority makes this change based on a single ques-
tion: Did the reproductive right recognized in Roe and Casey 
exist in “1868, the year when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratifed”? Ante, at 248. The majority says (and with 
at 380–382. But only in the sphere of abortion is the state interest in 
protecting potential life involved. So only in that sphere, as both Roe and 
Casey recognized, may a State impinge so far on the liberty interest (bar-
ring abortion after viability and discouraging it before). The majority's 
failure to understand this fairly obvious point stems from its rejection of 
the idea of balancing interests in this (or maybe in any) constitutional 
context. Cf. New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 
1, 17, 22–26 (2022). The majority thinks that a woman has no liberty or 
equality interest in the decision to bear a child, so a State's interest in 
protecting fetal life necessarily prevails. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
this much we agree) that the answer to this question is no: 
In 1868, there was no nationwide right to end a pregnancy, 
and no thought that the Fourteenth Amendment provided 
one. 
Of course, the majority opinion refers as well to some later 
and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goes back as 
far as the 13th (the 13th!) century. See ante, at 242. But 
that turns out to be wheel-spinning. First, it is not clear 
what relevance such early history should have, even to the 
majority. See New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. 
Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 34 (2022) (“Historical evidence that long 
predates [ratifcation] may not illuminate the scope of the 
right”). If the early history obviously supported abortion 
rights, the majority would no doubt say that only the views 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratifers are germane. See 
id., at 35 (It is “better not to go too far back into antiquity,” 
except if olden “law survived to become our Founders' law”). 
Second—and embarrassingly for the majority—early law 
in fact does provide some support for abortion rights. 
Common-law authorities did not treat abortion as a crime 
before “quickening”—the point when the fetus moved in the 
womb.
2 And early American law followed the common-law 
rule.3 So the criminal law of that early time might be taken 
as roughly consonant with Roe's and Casey's different treat-
ment of early and late abortions. Better, then, to move for-
ward in time. On the other side of 1868, the majority occa-
sionally notes that many States barred abortion up to the 
2 See, e. g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 129– 
130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone); E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 
50 (1644). 
3 See J. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of Na-
tional Policy, 1800–1900, pp. 3–4 (1978). The majority offers no evidence 
to the contrary—no example of a founding-era law making pre-quickening 
abortion a crime (except when a woman died). See ante, at 245–246. 
And even in the mid-19th century, more than 10 States continued to allow 
pre-quickening abortions. See Brief for American Historical Association 
et al. as Amici Curiae 27, and n. 14. 
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372 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
time of Roe. See ante, at 248–250, 261. That is convenient 
for the majority, but it is window dressing. As the same 
majority (plus one) just informed us, “post-ratifcation adop-
tion or acceptance of laws that are inconsistent with the 
original meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot 
overcome or alter that text.” New York State Rife & Pistol 
Assn., Inc., 597 U. S., at 36. Had the pre-Roe liberalization 
of abortion laws occurred more quickly and more widely in 
the 20th century, the majority would say (once again) that 
only the ratifers' views are germane. 
The majority's core legal postulate, then, is that we in the 
21st century must read the Fourteenth Amendment just as 
its ratifers did. And that is indeed what the majority em-
phasizes over and over again. See ante, at 272 (“[T]he most 
important historical fact [is] how the States regulated abor-
tion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”); see 
also ante, at 231, 242, and n. 24, 248, 250–251, 253. If the 
ratifers did not understand something as central to freedom, 
then neither can we. Or said more particularly: If those 
people did not understand reproductive rights as part of the 
guarantee of liberty conferred in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, then those rights do not exist. 
As an initial matter, note a mistake in the just preceding 
sentence. We referred there to the “people” who ratifed 
the Fourteenth Amendment: What rights did those “people” 
have in their heads at the time? But, of course, “people” 
did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Men did. So it 
is perhaps not so surprising that the ratifers were not per-
fectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for 
women's liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal 
members of our Nation. Indeed, the ratifers—both in 1868 
and when the original Constitution was approved in 1788— 
did not understand women as full members of the community 
embraced by the phrase “We the People.” In 1868, the frst 
wave of American feminists were explicitly told—of course 
by men—that it was not their time to seek constitutional 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
protections. (Women would not get even the vote for an-
other half-century.) To be sure, most women in 1868 also 
had a foreshortened view of their rights: If most men could 
not then imagine giving women control over their bodies, 
most women could not imagine having that kind of autonomy. 
But that takes away nothing from the core point. Those 
responsible for the original Constitution, including the Four-
teenth Amendment, did not perceive women as equals, and 
did not recognize women's rights. When the majority says 
that we must read our foundational charter as viewed at 
the time of ratifcation (except that we may also check it 
against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to second-class 
citizenship. 
Casey itself understood this point, as will become clear. 
See infra, at 381. It recollected with dismay a decision 
this Court issued just fve years after the Fourteenth 
Amendment's ratifcation, approving a State's decision to 
deny a law license to a woman and suggesting as well that a 
woman had no legal status apart from her husband. See 505 
U. S., at 896–897 (majority opinion) (citing Bradwell v. State, 
16 Wall. 130 (1873)). “There was a time,” Casey explained, 
when the Constitution did not protect “men and women 
alike.” 505 U. S., at 896. But times had changed. A wom-
an's place in society had changed, and constitutional law had 
changed along with it. The relegation of women to inferior 
status in either the public sphere or the family was “no 
longer consistent with our understanding” of the Constitu-
tion. Id., at 897. Now, “[t]he Constitution protects all indi-
viduals, male or female,” from “the abuse of governmental 
power” or “unjustifed state interference.” Id., at 896, 898. 
So how is it that, as Casey said, our Constitution, read now, 
grants rights to women, though it did not in 1868? How is 
it that our Constitution subjects discrimination against them 
to heightened judicial scrutiny? How is it that our Constitu-
tion, through the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause, 
guarantees access to contraception (also not legally pro-

374 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
tected in 1868) so that women can decide for themselves 
whether and when to bear a child? How is it that until 
today, that same constitutional clause protected a woman's 
right, in the event contraception failed, to end a pregnancy 
in its earlier stages? 
The answer is that this Court has rejected the majority's 
pinched view of how to read our Constitution. “The Found-
ers,” we recently wrote, “knew they were writing a docu-
ment designed to apply to ever-changing circumstances over 
centuries.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 533–534 
(2014). Or in the words of the great Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, our Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to 
come,” and must adapt itself to a future “seen dimly,” if 
at all. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819). 
That is indeed why our Constitution is written as it is. The 
Framers (both in 1788 and 1868) understood that the world 
changes. So they did not defne rights by reference to the 
specifc practices existing at the time. Instead, the Framers 
defned rights in general terms, to permit future evolution 
in their scope and meaning. And over the course of our his-
tory, this Court has taken up the Framers' invitation. It 
has kept true to the Framers' principles by applying them 
in new ways, responsive to new societal understandings 
and conditions. 
Nowhere has that approach been more prevalent than in 
construing the majestic but open-ended words of the Four-
teenth Amendment—the guarantees of “liberty” and “equal-
ity” for all. And nowhere has that approach produced 
prouder moments, for this country and the Court. Consider 
an example Obergefell used a few years ago. The Court 
there confronted a claim, based on Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U. S. 702 (1997), that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“must be defned in a most circumscribed manner, with cen-
tral reference to specifc historical practices”—exactly the 
view today's majority follows. Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 671. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
And the Court specifcally rejected that view. 4 In doing 
so, the Court refected on what the proposed, historically 
circumscribed approach would have meant for interracial 
marriage. See ibid. The Fourteenth Amendment's ratif-
ers did not think it gave black and white people a right to 
marry each other. To the contrary, contemporaneous prac-
tice deemed that act quite as unprotected as abortion. Yet 
the Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), read the 
Fourteenth Amendment to embrace the Lovings' union. If, 
Obergefell explained, “rights were defned by who exercised 
them in the past, then received practices could serve as their 
own continued justifcation”—even when they confict with 
“liberty” and “equality” as later and more broadly under-
stood. 576 U. S., at 671. The Constitution does not freeze 
for all time the original view of what those rights guarantee, 
or how they apply. 
That does not mean anything goes. The majority wishes 
people to think there are but two alternatives: (1) accept the 
original applications of the Fourteenth Amendment and no 
others, or (2) surrender to judges' “own ardent views,” un-
grounded in law, about the “liberty that Americans should 
enjoy.” Ante, at 239. At least, that idea is what the major-
ity sometimes tries to convey. At other times, the majority 
(or, rather, most of it) tries to assure the public that it has 
no designs on rights (for example, to contraception) that 
arose only in the back half of the 20th century—in other 
words, that it is happy to pick and choose, in accord with 
individual preferences. See ante, at 257, 289–290, 295; ante, 
at 345–346 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); but see ante, at 332 
(Thomas, J., concurring). But that is a matter we discuss 
4 The majority ignores that rejection. See ante, at 231, 239, 260–261. 
But it is unequivocal: The Glucksberg test, Obergefell said, “may have been 
appropriate” in considering physician-assisted suicide, but “is inconsistent 
with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental 
rights, including marriage and intimacy.” 576 U. S., at 671. 
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376 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
later. See infra, at 382–387. For now, our point is differ-
ent: It is that applications of liberty and equality can evolve 
while remaining grounded in constitutional principles, consti-
tutional history, and constitutional precedents. The second 
Justice Harlan discussed how to strike the right balance 
when he explained why he would have invalidated a State's 
ban on contraceptive use. Judges, he said, are not “free to 
roam where unguided speculation might take them.” Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Yet 
they also must recognize that the constitutional “tradition” 
of this country is not captured whole at a single moment. 
Ibid. Rather, its meaning gains content from the long 
sweep of our history and from successive judicial prece-
dents—each looking to the last and each seeking to apply the 
Constitution's most fundamental commitments to new condi-
tions. That is why Americans, to go back to Obergefell's 
example, have a right to marry across racial lines. And it 
is why, to go back to Justice Harlan's case, Americans have a 
right to use contraceptives so they can choose for themselves 
whether to have children. 
All that is what Casey understood. Casey explicitly re-
jected the present majority's method. “[T]he specifc prac-
tices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” Casey stated, do not “mark[ ] the outer limits 
of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects.” 505 U. S., at 848.
5 To hold other-
5 In a perplexing paragraph in its opinion, the majority declares that it 
need not say whether that statement from Casey is true. See ante, at 
257–258. But how could that be? Has not the majority insisted for the 
prior 30 or so pages that the “specifc practice[ ]” respecting abortion at 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes its recognition as a con-
stitutional right? Ante, at 257. It has. And indeed, it has given no 
other reason for overruling Roe and Casey. Ante, at 241. We are not 
mindreaders, but here is our best guess as to what the majority means. 
It says next that “[a]bortion is nothing new.” Ante, at 258. So appar-
ently, the Fourteenth Amendment might provide protection for things 
wholly unknown in the 19th century; maybe one day there could be consti-
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
wise—as the majority does today—“would be inconsistent 
with our law.” Id., at 847. Why? Because the Court has 
“vindicated [the] principle” over and over that (no matter the 
sentiment in 1868) “there is a realm of personal liberty which 
the government may not enter”—especially relating to 
“bodily integrity” and “family life.” Id., at 847, 849, 851. 
Casey described in detail the Court's contraception cases. 
See id., at 848–849, 851–853. It noted decisions protecting 
the right to marry, including to someone of another race. 
See id., at 847–848 (“[I]nterracial marriage was illegal in 
most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt 
correct in fnding it to be an aspect of liberty protected 
against state interference”). In reviewing decades and dec-
ades of constitutional law, Casey could draw but one conclu-
sion: Whatever was true in 1868, “[i]t is settled now, as it 
was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that 
the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere 
with a person's most basic decisions about family and parent-
hood.” Id., at 849. 
And that conclusion still held good, until the Court's inter-
vention here. It was settled at the time of Roe, settled at 
the time of Casey, and settled yesterday that the Constitu-
tion places limits on a State's power to assert control over 
an individual's body and most personal decisionmaking. A 
multitude of decisions supporting that principle led to Roe's 
recognition and Casey's reaffrmation of the right to choose; 
and Roe and Casey in turn supported additional protections 
for intimate and familial relations. The majority has embar-
rassingly little to say about those precedents. It (literally) 
rattles them off in a single paragraph; and it implies that 
they have nothing to do with each other, or with the right 
to terminate an early pregnancy. See ante, at 256–257 (as-
serting that recognizing a relationship among them, as ad-
dressing aspects of personal autonomy, would ineluctably 
tutional protection for, oh, time travel. But as to anything that was 
known back then (such as abortion or contraception), no such luck. 
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378 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
“license fundamental rights” to illegal “drug use [and] prosti-
tution”). But that is fat wrong. The Court's precedents 
about bodily autonomy, sexual and familial relations, and 
procreation are all interwoven—all part of the fabric of our 
constitutional law, and because that is so, of our lives. Espe-
cially women's lives, where they safeguard a right to self-
determination. 
And eliminating that right, we need to say before further 
describing our precedents, is not taking a “neutral” position, 
as Justice Kavanaugh tries to argue. Ante, at 338, 341, 
343, 347 (concurring opinion). His idea is that neutrality lies 
in giving the abortion issue to the States, where some can 
go one way and some another. But would he say that the 
Court is being “scrupulously neutral” if it allowed New York 
and California to ban all the guns they want? Ante, at 338. 
If the Court allowed some States to use unanimous juries 
and others not? If the Court told the States: Decide for 
yourselves whether to put restrictions on church attendance? 
We could go on—and in fact we will. Suppose Justice Kav-
anaugh were to say (in line with the majority opinion) that 
the rights we just listed are more textually or historically 
grounded than the right to choose. What, then, of the right 
to contraception or same-sex marriage? Would it be “scru-
pulously neutral” for the Court to eliminate those rights too? 
The point of all these examples is that when it comes to 
rights, the Court does not act “neutrally” when it leaves ev-
erything up to the States. Rather, the Court acts neutrally 
when it protects the right against all comers. And to apply 
that point to the case here: When the Court decimates a 
right women have held for 50 years, the Court is not being 
“scrupulously neutral.” It is instead taking sides: against 
women who wish to exercise the right, and for States (like 
Mississippi) that want to bar them from doing so. Justice 
Kavanaugh cannot obscure that point by appropriating the 
rhetoric of even-handedness. His position just is what it is: 
A brook-no-compromise refusal to recognize a woman's right 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
to choose, from the frst day of a pregnancy. And that posi-
tion, as we will now show, cannot be squared with this Court's 
longstanding view that women indeed have rights (whatever 
the state of the world in 1868) to make the most personal 
and consequential decisions about their bodies and their lives. 
Consider frst, then, the line of this Court's cases protect-
ing “bodily integrity.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 849. “No right,” 
in this Court's time-honored view, “is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded,” than “the right of every individual 
to the possession and control of his own person.” Union 
Pacifc R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891); see Cru-
zan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269 (1990) 
(Every adult “has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body”). Or to put it more simply: Everyone, 
including women, owns their own bodies. So the Court has 
restricted the power of government to interfere with a per-
son's medical decisions or compel her to undergo medical pro-
cedures or treatments. See, e. g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 
753, 766–767 (1985) (forced surgery); Rochin v. California, 
342 U. S. 165, 166, 173–174 (1952) (forced stomach pumping); 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210, 229, 236 (1990) (forced 
administration of antipsychotic drugs). 
Casey recognized the “doctrinal affnity” between those 
precedents and Roe. 505 U. S., at 857. And that doctrinal 
affnity is born of a factual likeness. There are few greater 
incursions on a body than forcing a woman to complete a 
pregnancy and give birth. For every woman, those experi-
ences involve all manner of physical changes, medical treat-
ments (including the possibility of a cesarean section), and 
medical risk. Just as one example, an American woman is 
14 times more likely to die by carrying a pregnancy to term 
than by having an abortion. See Whole Woman's Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 618 (2016). That women happily 
undergo those burdens and hazards of their own accord 
does not lessen how far a State impinges on a woman's body 
when it compels her to bring a pregnancy to term. And 
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380 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
for some women, as Roe recognized, abortions are medically 
necessary to prevent harm. See 410 U. S., at 153. The ma-
jority does not say—which is itself ominous—whether a 
State may prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion 
when she and her doctor have determined it is a needed med-
ical treatment. 
So too, Roe and Casey ft neatly into a long line of decisions 
protecting from government intrusion a wealth of private 
choices about family matters, child rearing, intimate rela-
tionships, and procreation. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 851, 857; 
Roe, 410 U. S., at 152–153; see also ante, at 256–257 (listing 
the myriad decisions of this kind that Casey relied on). 
Those cases safeguard particular choices about whom to 
marry; whom to have sex with; what family members to live 
with; how to raise children—and crucially, whether and when 
to have children. In varied cases, the Court explained that 
those choices—“the most intimate and personal” a person 
can make—refect fundamental aspects of personal identity; 
they defne the very “attributes of personhood.” Casey, 505 
U. S., at 851. And they inevitably shape the nature and fu-
ture course of a person's life (and often the lives of those 
closest to her). So, the Court held, those choices belong to 
the individual, and not the government. That is the essence 
of what liberty requires. 
And liberty may require it, this Court has repeatedly said, 
even when those living in 1868 would not have recognized 
the claim—because they would not have seen the person 
making it as a full-fledged member of the community. 
Throughout our history, the sphere of protected liberty has 
expanded, bringing in individuals formerly excluded. In 
that way, the constitutional values of liberty and equality go 
hand in hand; they do not inhabit the hermetically sealed 
containers the majority portrays. Compare Obergefell, 576 
U. S., at 672–675, with ante, at 236–237. So before Roe and 
Casey, the Court expanded in successive cases those who 
could claim the right to marry—though their relationships 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
would have been outside the law's protection in the mid-19th 
century. See, e. g., Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (interracial couples); 
Turner v. Safey, 482 U. S. 78 (1987) (prisoners); see also, e. g., 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651–652 (1972) (offering 
constitutional protection to untraditional “family unit[s]”). 
And after Roe and Casey, of course, the Court continued in 
that vein. With a critical stop to hold that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected same-sex intimacy, the Court re-
solved that the Amendment also conferred on same-sex cou-
ples the right to marry. See Lawrence, 539 U. S. 558; Ober-
gefell, 576 U. S. 644. In considering that question, the Court 
held, “[h]istory and tradition,” especially as refected in the 
course of our precedent, “guide and discipline [the] inquiry.” 
Id., at 664. But the sentiments of 1868 alone do not and 
cannot “rule the present.” Ibid. 
Casey similarly recognized the need to extend the consti-
tutional sphere of liberty to a previously excluded group. 
The Court then understood, as the majority today does not, 
that the men who ratifed the Fourteenth Amendment and 
wrote the state laws of the time did not view women as full 
and equal citizens. See supra, at 373. A woman then, Casey 
wrote, “had no legal existence separate from her husband.” 
505 U. S., at 897. Women were seen only “as the center of 
home and family life,” without “full and independent legal 
status under the Constitution.” Ibid. But that could not 
be true any longer: The State could not now insist on the 
historically dominant “vision of the woman's role.” Id., at 
852. And equal citizenship, Casey realized, was inescapably 
connected to reproductive rights. “The ability of women to 
participate equally” in the “life of the Nation”—in all its eco-
nomic, social, political, and legal aspects—“has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” 
Id., at 856. Without the ability to decide whether and when 
to have children, women could not—in the way men took for 
granted—determine how they would live their lives, and how 
they would contribute to the society around them.

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382 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
For much that reason, Casey made clear that the prece-
dents Roe most closely tracked were those involving contra-
ception. Over the course of three cases, the Court had held 
that a right to use and gain access to contraception was part 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty. See 
Griswold, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt, 405 U. S. 438; Carey v. 
Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977). That clause, 
we explained, necessarily conferred a right “to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child.” Eisenstadt, 405 U. S., at 453; see Carey, 
431 U. S., at 684–685. Casey saw Roe as of a piece: In “criti-
cal respects the abortion decision is of the same character.” 
505 U. S., at 852. “[R]easonable people,” the Court noted, 
could also oppose contraception; and indeed, they could be-
lieve that “some forms of contraception” similarly implicate 
a concern with “potential life.” Id., at 853, 859. Yet the 
views of others could not automatically prevail against a 
woman's right to control her own body and make her own 
choice about whether to bear, and probably to raise, a child. 
When an unplanned pregnancy is involved—because either 
contraception or abortion is outlawed—“the liberty of the 
woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition.” 
Id., at 852. No State could undertake to resolve the moral 
questions raised “in such a defnitive way” as to deprive a 
woman of all choice. Id., at 850. 
Faced with all these connections between Roe/Casey and 
judicial decisions recognizing other constitutional rights, the 
majority tells everyone not to worry. It can (so it says) 
neatly extract the right to choose from the constitutional edi-
fce without affecting any associated rights. (Think of some-
one telling you that the Jenga tower simply will not collapse.) 
Today's decision, the majority frst says, “does not under-
mine” the decisions cited by Roe and Casey—the ones involv-
ing “marriage, procreation, contraception, [and] family rela-
tionships”—“in any way.” Ante, at 257; Casey, 505 U. S., at

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 383 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
851. Note that this frst assurance does not extend to rights 
recognized after Roe and Casey, and partly based on them— 
in particular, rights to same-sex intimacy and marriage. 
See supra, at 381. 6 On its later tries, though, the majority 
includes those too: “Nothing in this opinion should be under-
stood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abor-
tion.” Ante, at 290; see ante, at 295. That right is unique, 
the majority asserts, “because [abortion] terminates 
life or potential life.” Ante , at 290 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see ante, at 257, 295. So the majority de-
picts today's decision as “a restricted railroad ticket, good 
for this day and train only.” Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 
649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Should the audi-
ence for these too-much-repeated protestations be duly satis-
fed? We think not. 
The frst problem with the majority's account comes from 
Justice Thomas's concurrence—which makes clear he is not 
with the program. In saying that nothing in today's opinion 
casts doubt on non-abortion precedents, Justice Thomas 
explains, he means only that they are not at issue in this very 
case. See ante, at 336 (“[T]his case does not present the 
opportunity to reject” those precedents). But he lets us 
know what he wants to do when they are. “[I]n future cases,” 
he says, “we should reconsider all of this Court's substantive 
due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and 
Obergefell.” Ante, at 332; see also supra, 383, and n. 6. 
And when we reconsider them? Then “we have a duty” to 
“overrul[e] these demonstrably erroneous decisions.” Ante, 
6 And note, too, that the author of the majority opinion recently joined 
a statement, written by another member of the majority, lamenting that 
Obergefell deprived States of the ability “to resolve th[e] question [of 
same-sex marriage] through legislation.” Davis v. Ermold, 592 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2020) (statement of Thomas, J.). That might sound familiar. 
Cf. ante, at 269 (lamenting that Roe “short-circuited the democratic proc-
ess”). And those two Justices hardly seemed content to let the matter 
rest: The Court, they said, had “created a problem that only it can fx.” 
Davis, 592 U. S., at –––. 
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384 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
at 332–333. So at least one Justice is planning to use the 
ticket of today's decision again and again and again. 
Even placing the concurrence to the side, the assurance in 
today's opinion still does not work. Or at least that is so if 
the majority is serious about its sole reason for overturning 
Roe and Casey: the legal status of abortion in the 19th cen-
tury. Except in the places quoted above, the state interest 
in protecting fetal life plays no part in the majority's analy-
sis. To the contrary, the majority takes pride in not ex-
pressing a view “about the status of the fetus.” Ante, at 289; 
see ante, at 257 (aligning itself with Roe's and Casey's stance 
of not deciding whether life or potential life is involved); 
ante, at 263 (similar). The majority's departure from Roe 
and Casey rests instead—and only—on whether a woman's 
decision to end a pregnancy involves any Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interest (against which Roe and Casey balanced 
the state interest in preserving fetal life).
7 According to the 
majority, no liberty interest is present—because (and only 
because) the law offered no protection to the woman's choice 
in the 19th century. But here is the rub. The law also did 
not then (and would not for ages) protect a wealth of other 
7 Indulge a few more words about this point. The majority had a choice 
of two different ways to overrule Roe and Casey. It could claim that 
those cases underrated the State's interest in fetal life. Or it could claim 
that they overrated a woman's constitutional liberty interest in choosing 
an abortion. (Or both.) The majority here rejects the frst path, and we 
can see why. Taking that route would have prevented the majority from 
claiming that it means only to leave this issue to the democratic process— 
that it does not have a dog in the fght. See ante, at 263, 289. And 
indeed, doing so might have suggested a revolutionary proposition: that 
the fetus is itself a constitutionally protected “person,” such that an abor-
tion ban is constitutionally mandated. The majority therefore chooses 
the second path, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not con-
ceive of the abortion decision as implicating liberty, because the law in the 
19th century gave that choice no protection. The trouble is that the cho-
sen path—which is, again, the solitary rationale for the Court's decision— 
provides no way to distinguish between the right to choose an abortion 
and a range of other rights, including contraception. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
things. It did not protect the rights recognized in Lawrence 
and Obergefell to same-sex intimacy and marriage. It did 
not protect the right recognized in Loving to marry across 
racial lines. It did not protect the right recognized in 
Griswold to contraceptive use. For that matter, it did not 
protect the right recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942), not to be sterilized with-
out consent. So if the majority is right in its legal analy-
sis, all those decisions were wrong, and all those matters 
properly belong to the States too—whatever the particular 
state interests involved. And if that is true, it is impossible 
to understand (as a matter of logic and principle) how the 
majority can say that its opinion today does not threaten— 
does not even “undermine”—any number of other constitu-
tional rights. Ante, at 257.
8 
Nor does it even help just to take the majority at its word. 
Assume the majority is sincere in saying, for whatever rea-
son, that it will go so far and no further. Scout's honor. 
Still, the future signifcance of today's opinion will be decided 
in the future. And law often has a way of evolving without 
regard to original intentions—a way of actually following 
where logic leads, rather than tolerating hard-to-explain 
lines. Rights can expand in that way. Dissenting in Law-
rence, Justice Scalia explained why he took no comfort in the 
Court's statement that a decision recognizing the right to 
same-sex intimacy did “not involve” same-sex marriage. 
539 U. S., at 604. That could be true, he wrote, “only if one 
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to 
do with the decisions of this Court.” Id., at 605. Score one 
8 The majority briefy (very briefy) gestures at the idea that some stare 
decisis factors might play out differently with respect to these other con-
stitutional rights. But the majority gives no hint as to why. And the 
majority's (mis)treatment of stare decisis in this case provides little reason 
to think that the doctrine would stand as a barrier to the majority's redo-
ing any other decision it considered egregiously wrong. See infra, at 
387–414. 
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386 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
for the dissent, as a matter of prophecy. And logic and prin-
ciple are not one-way ratchets. Rights can contract in the 
same way and for the same reason—because whatever to-
day's majority might say, one thing really does lead to an-
other. We fervently hope that does not happen because of 
today's decision. We hope that we will not join Justice 
Scalia in the book of prophets. But we cannot understand 
how anyone can be confdent that today's opinion will be the 
last of its kind. 
Consider, as our last word on this issue, contraception. 
The Constitution, of course, does not mention that word. 
And there is no historical right to contraception, of the kind 
the majority insists on. To the contrary, the American legal 
landscape in the decades after the Civil War was littered 
with bans on the sale of contraceptive devices. So again, 
there seem to be two choices. See supra, at 363, 384–385. 
If the majority is serious about its historical approach, then 
Griswold and its progeny are in the line of fre too. Or if it 
is not serious, then . . . what is the basis of today's decision? 
If we had to guess, we suspect the prospects of this Court 
approving bans on contraception are low. But once again, 
the future signifcance of today's opinion will be decided in 
the future. At the least, today's opinion will fuel the fght 
to get contraception, and any other issues with a moral di-
mension, out of the Fourteenth Amendment and into state 
legislatures.
9 
Anyway, today's decision, taken on its own, is catastrophic 
enough. As a matter of constitutional method, the majori-
9 As this Court has considered this case, some state legislators have 
begun to call for restrictions on certain forms of contraception. See I. Ste-
venson, After Roe Decision, Idaho Lawmakers May Consider Restricting 
Some Contraception, Idaho Statesman (May 10, 2022), https://www.idaho 
statesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article261207007 . 
html; T. Weinberg, “Anything's on the Table”: Missouri Legislature May 
Revisit Contraceptive Limits Post-Roe , Missouri Independent (May 20, 
2022), https://www.missouriindependent.com/2022/05/20/anythings-on-the-
table-missouri-legislature-may-revisit-contraceptive-limits-post-roe/.

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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
ty's commitment to replicate in 2022 every view about the 
meaning of liberty held in 1868 has precious little to recom-
mend it. Our law in this constitutional sphere, as in most, 
has for decades upon decades proceeded differently. It has 
considered fundamental constitutional principles, the whole 
course of the Nation's history and traditions, and the step-
by-step evolution of the Court's precedents. It is disciplined 
but not static. It relies on accumulated judgments, not just 
the sentiments of one long-ago generation of men (who them-
selves believed, and drafted the Constitution to refect, that 
the world progresses). And by doing so, it includes those 
excluded from that olden conversation, rather than perpetu-
ating its bounds. 
As a matter of constitutional substance, the majority's 
opinion has all the faws its method would suggest. Because 
laws in 1868 deprived women of any control over their bod-
ies, the majority approves States doing so today. Because 
those laws prevented women from charting the course of 
their own lives, the majority says States can do the same 
again. Because in 1868, the government could tell a preg-
nant woman—even in the frst days of her pregnancy—that 
she could do nothing but bear a child, it can once more im-
pose that command. Today's decision strips women of 
agency over what even the majority agrees is a contested 
and contestable moral issue. It forces her to carry out the 
State's will, whatever the circumstances and whatever the 
harm it will wreak on her and her family. In the Fourteenth 
Amendment's terms, it takes away her liberty. Even before 
we get to stare decisis, we dissent. 
II 
By overruling Roe, Casey, and more than 20 cases re-
affrming or applying the constitutional right to abortion, 
the majority abandons stare decisis, a principle central to 
the rule of law . “Stare decisis” means “to stand by things 
decided.” Black's Law Dictionary 1696 (11th ed. 2019).

388 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
Blackstone called it the “established rule to abide by former 
precedents.” 1 Blackstone 69. Stare decisis “promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It maintains a stabil-
ity that allows people to order their lives under the law. See 
H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in 
the Making and Application of Law 568–569 (1994). 
Stare decisis also “contributes to the integrity of our con-
stitutional system of government” by ensuring that decisions 
“are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of indi-
viduals.” Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 265. As Hamilton wrote: 
It “avoid[s] an arbitrary discretion in the courts.” The Fed-
eralist No. 78, p. 529 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). And as Blackstone 
said before him: It “keep[s] the scale of justice even and 
steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opin-
ion.” 1 Blackstone 69. The “glory” of our legal system is 
that it “gives preference to precedent rather than . . . ju-
rists.” H. Humble, Departure From Precedent, 19 Mich. 
L. Rev. 608, 614 (1921). That is why, the story goes, Chief 
Justice John Marshall donned a plain black robe when he 
swore the oath of offce. That act personifed an American 
tradition. Judges' personal preferences do not make law; 
rather, the law speaks through them. 
That means the Court may not overrule a decision, even a 
constitutional one, without a “special justifcation.” Gamble 
v. United States, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Stare decisis is, 
of course, not an “inexorable command”; it is sometimes ap-
propriate to overrule an earlier decision. Pearson v. Calla-
han, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009). But the Court must have a 
good reason to do so over and above the belief “that the 
precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P . John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014). “[I]t is not 
alone suffcient that we would decide a case differently now 
than we did then.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 
576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015). 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
The majority today lists some 30 of our cases as overruling 
precedent, and argues that they support overruling Roe and 
Casey. But none does, as further described below and in the 
Appendix. See infra, at 417–423. In some, the Court only 
partially modifed or clarifed a precedent. And in the rest, 
the Court relied on one or more of the traditional stare deci-
sis factors in reaching its conclusion. The Court found, for 
example, (1) a change in legal doctrine that undermined or 
made obsolete the earlier decision; (2) a factual change that 
had the same effect; or (3) an absence of reliance because the 
earlier decision was less than a decade old. (The majority 
is wrong when it says that we insist on a test of changed 
law or fact alone, although that is present in most of the 
cases. See ante, at 293.) None of those factors apply here: 
Nothing—and in particular, no signifcant legal or factual 
change—supports overturning a half-century of settled law 
giving women control over their reproductive lives. 
First, for all the reasons we have given, Roe and Casey 
were correct. In holding that a State could not “resolve” 
the debate about abortion “in such a defnitive way that a 
woman lacks all choice in the matter,” the Court protected 
women's liberty and women's equality in a way comporting 
with our Fourteenth Amendment precedents. Casey, 505 
U. S., at 850. Contrary to the majority's view, the legal 
status of abortion in the 19th century does not weaken 
those decisions. And the majority's repeated refrain about 
“usurp[ing]” state legislatures' “power to address” a publicly 
contested question does not help it on the key issue here. 
Ante, at 269; see ante, at 224–226. To repeat: The point of 
a right is to shield individual actions and decisions “from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and offcials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts.” Barnette, 319 U. S., 
at 638; supra, at 365. However divisive, a right is not at the 
people's mercy.

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390 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
In any event “[w]hether or not we . . . agree” with a prior 
precedent is the beginning, not the end, of our analysis— 
and the remaining “principles of stare decisis weigh heavily 
against overruling” Roe and Casey. Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000). Casey itself applied those 
principles, in one of this Court's most important precedents 
about precedent. After assessing the traditional stare deci-
sis factors, Casey reached the only conclusion possible—that 
stare decisis operates powerfully here. It still does. The 
standards Roe and Casey set out are perfectly workable. 
No changes in either law or fact have eroded the two deci-
sions. And tens of millions of American women have relied, 
and continue to rely, on the right to choose. So under tradi-
tional stare decisis principles, the majority has no special 
justifcation for the harm it causes. 
And indeed, the majority comes close to conceding that 
point. The majority barely mentions any legal or factual 
changes that have occurred since Roe and Casey. It sug-
gests that the two decisions are hard for courts to imple-
ment, but cannot prove its case. In the end, the majority 
says, all it must say to override stare decisis is one thing: 
that it believes Roe and Casey “egregiously wrong.” Ante, 
at 294. That rule could equally spell the end of any prece-
dent with which a bare majority of the present Court dis-
agrees. So how does that approach prevent the “scale of 
justice” from “waver[ing] with every new judge's opinion”? 
1 Blackstone 69. It does not. It makes radical change too 
easy and too fast, based on nothing more than the new views 
of new judges. The majority has overruled Roe and Casey 
for one and only one reason: because it has always despised 
them, and now it has the votes to discard them. The major-
ity thereby substitutes a rule by judges for the rule of law. 
A 
Contrary to the majority's view, there is nothing unwork-
able about Casey's “undue burden” standard. Its primary 
focus on whether a State has placed a “substantial obstacle”

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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
on a woman seeking an abortion is “the sort of inquiry famil-
iar to judges across a variety of contexts.” June Medical 
Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (Rob-
erts, C. J., concurring in judgment). And it has given rise 
to no more confict in application than many standards this 
Court and others unhesitatingly apply every day. 
General standards, like the undue burden standard, are 
ubiquitous in the law, and particularly in constitutional adju-
dication. When called on to give effect to the Constitution's 
broad principles, this Court often crafts fexible standards 
that can be applied case-by-case to a myriad of unforeseeable 
circumstances. See Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 441 (“No court 
laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various 
circumstances” in which it must apply). So, for example, the 
Court asks about undue or substantial burdens on speech, on 
voting, and on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Arizona 
Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 
U. S. 721, 748 (2011); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433– 
434 (1992); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 
(1970). The Casey undue burden standard is the same. It 
also resembles general standards that courts work with daily 
in other legal spheres—like the “rule of reason” in antitrust 
law or the “arbitrary and capricious” standard for agency 
decisionmaking. See Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United 
States, 221 U. S. 1, 62 (1911); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of 
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 
463 U. S. 29, 42–43 (1983). Applying general standards to 
particular cases is, in many contexts, just what it means to 
do law. 
And the undue burden standard has given rise to no un-
usual diffculties. Of course, it has provoked some disagree-
ment among judges. Casey knew it would: That much “is to 
be expected in the application of any legal standard which 
must accommodate life's complexity.” 505 U. S., at 878 (plu-
rality opinion). Which is to say: That much is to be ex-
pected in the application of any legal standard. But the ma-
jority vastly overstates the divisions among judges applying

392 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
the standard. We count essentially two. The Chief Jus-
tice disagreed with other Justices in the June Medical ma-
jority about whether Casey called for weighing the benefts 
of an abortion regulation against its burdens. See 591 U. S., 
at ––– – –––; ante, at 283, 284, and n. 53. 10 We agree that 
the June Medical difference is a difference—but not one that 
would actually make a difference in the result of most cases 
(it did not in June Medical), and not one incapable of resolu-
tion were it ever to matter. As for lower courts, there is 
now a one-year-old, one-to-one Circuit split about how the 
undue burden standard applies to state laws that ban abor-
tions for certain reasons, like fetal abnormality. See ante, 
at 285, and n. 57. That is about it, as far as we can see.
11 
And that is not much. This Court mostly does not even 
10 Some lower courts then differed over which opinion in June Medical 
was controlling—but that is a dispute not about the undue burden stand-
ard, but about the “Marks rule,” which tells courts how to determine the 
precedential effects of a divided decision. 
11 The rest of the majority's supposed splits are, shall we say, unimpres-
sive. The majority says that lower courts have split over how to apply 
the undue burden standard to parental notifcation laws. See ante, at 284, 
and n. 54. But that is not so. The state law upheld had an exemption 
for minors demonstrating adequate maturity, whereas the ones struck 
down did not. Compare Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 
155 F. 3d 352, 383–384 (CA4 1998), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & 
Ky., Inc. v. Adams, 937 F. 3d 973, 981 (CA7 2019), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 591 U. S. ––– (2020), and Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic 
v. Miller, 63 F. 3d 1452, 1460 (CA8 1995). The majority says there is a 
split about bans on certain types of abortion procedures. See ante, at 
285, and n. 55. But the one court to have separated itself on that issue 
did so based on a set of factual fndings signifcantly different from those 
in other cases. Compare Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th 
430, 447–453 (CA5 2021), with EMW Women's Surgical Center , P .S.C. v. 
Friedlander , 960 F. 3d 785, 798–806 (CA6 2020), and West Ala. Women's 
Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1322–1324 (CA11 2018). Finally, 
the majority says there is a split about whether an increase in travel time 
to reach a clinic is an undue burden. See ante, at 285, and n. 56. But 
the cases to which the majority refers predate this Court's decision in 
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582 (2016), which clarifed 
how to apply the undue burden standard to that context. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
grant certiorari on one-year-old, one-to-one Circuit splits, be-
cause we know that a bit of disagreement is an inevitable 
part of our legal system. To borrow an old saying that 
might apply here: Not one or even a couple of swallows can 
make the majority's summer. 
Anyone concerned about workability should consider the 
majority's substitute standard. The majority says a law 
regulating or banning abortion “must be sustained if there 
is a rational basis on which the legislature could have 
thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.” 
Ante, at 301. And the majority lists interests like “respect 
for and preservation of prenatal life,” “protection of mater-
nal health,” elimination of certain “medical procedures,” 
“mitigation of fetal pain,” and others. Ibid. This Court 
will surely face critical questions about how that test applies. 
Must a state law allow abortions when necessary to protect 
a woman's life and health? And if so, exactly when? How 
much risk to a woman's life can a State force her to incur, 
before the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life kicks 
in? Suppose a patient with pulmonary hypertension has a 
30-to-50 percent risk of dying with ongoing pregnancy; is 
that enough? And short of death, how much illness or in-
jury can the State require her to accept, consistent with the 
Amendment's protection of liberty and equality? Further, 
the Court may face questions about the application of abor-
tion regulations to medical care most people view as quite 
different from abortion. What about the morning-after pill? 
IUDs? In vitro fertilization? And how about the use of 
dilation and evacuation or medication for miscarriage man-
agement? See generally L. Harris, Navigating Loss of 
Abortion Services—A Large Academic Medical Center Pre-
pares for the Overturn of Roe v. Wade , 386 New England J. 
Med. 2061 (2022).
12 
12 To take just the last, most medical treatments for miscarriage are 
identical to those used in abortions. See Kaiser Family Foundation (Kai-
ser), G. Weigel, L. Sobel, & A. Salganicoff, Understanding Pregnancy Loss 
in the Context of Abortion Restrictions and Fetal Harm Laws (Dec. 4, 2019), 
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394 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
Finally, the majority's ruling today invites a host of ques-
tions about interstate conficts. See supra, at 361–362; see 
generally D. Cohen, G. Donley, & R. Rebouché, The New 
Abortion Battleground, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2023). Can a 
State bar women from traveling to another State to obtain 
an abortion? Can a State prohibit advertising out-of-state 
abortions or helping women get to out-of-state providers? 
Can a State interfere with the mailing of drugs used for med-
ication abortions? The Constitution protects travel and 
speech and interstate commerce, so today's ruling will give 
rise to a host of new constitutional questions. Far from re-
moving the Courtfrom the abortion issue, the majority puts 
the Court at the center of the coming “interjurisdictional 
abortion wars.” Id., at 3. 
In short, the majority does not save judges from unwieldy 
tests or extricate them from the sphere of controversy. To 
the contrary, it discards a known, workable, and predictable 
standard in favor of something novel and probably far more 
complicated. It forces the Court to wade further into hotly 
contested issues, including moral and philosophical ones, that 
the majority criticizes Roe and Casey for addressing. 
B 
When overruling constitutional precedent, the Court has 
almost always pointed to major legal or factual changes un-
dermining a decision's original basis. A review of the Ap-
pendix to this dissent proves the point. See infra, at 417– 
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy / issue-brief/understanding -
pregnancy-loss-in-the-context-of-abortion-restrictions-and-fetal-harm -
laws/. Blanket restrictions on “abortion” procedures and medications 
therefore may be understood to deprive women of effective treatment for 
miscarriages, which occur in about 10 to 30 percent of pregnancies. See 
Health Affairs, J. Strasser, C. Chen, S. Rosenbaum, E. Schenk, & E. Dew-
hurst, Penalizing Abortion Providers Will Have Ripple Effects Across 
Pregnancy Care (May 3, 2022), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
forefront.20220503.129912/. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
423. Most “successful proponent[s] of overruling prece-
dent,” this Court once said, have carried “the heavy burden 
of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law 
dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield in favor 
of a greater objective.” Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 266. Cer-
tainly, that was so of the main examples the majority cites: 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). But it is 
not so today. Although nodding to some arguments others 
have made about “modern developments,” the majority does 
not really rely on them, no doubt seeing their slimness. 
Ante, at 258; see ante, at 259. The majority briefy invokes 
the current controversy over abortion. See ante, at 294. 
But it has to acknowledge that the same dispute has existed 
for decades: Confict over abortion is not a change but a con-
stant. (And as we will later discuss, the presence of that 
continuing division provides more of a reason to stick with, 
than to jettison, existing precedent. See infra, at 412–414.) 
In the end, the majority throws longstanding precedent to 
the winds without showing that anything signifcant has 
changed to justify its radical reshaping of the law. See ante, 
at 267–268. 
1 
Subsequent legal developments have only reinforced Roe 
and Casey. The Court has continued to embrace all the deci-
sions Roe and Casey cited, decisions which recognize a con-
stitutional right for an individual to make her own choices 
about “intimate relationships, the family,” and contraception. 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 857. Roe and Casey have themselves 
formed the legal foundation for subsequent decisions protect-
ing these profoundly personal choices. As discussed earlier, 
the Court relied on Casey to hold that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects same-sex intimate relationships. See 
Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 578; supra, at 381. The Court later 
invoked the same set of precedents to accord constitutional 
recognition to same-sex marriage. See Obergefell, 576 U. S., 
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396 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
at 665–666; supra, at 381. In sum, Roe and Casey are inex-
tricably interwoven with decades of precedent about the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra, at 379– 
382. While the majority might wish it otherwise, Roe and 
Casey are the very opposite of “ `obsolete constitutional 
thinking.' ” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 236 (1997) 
(quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 857). 
Moreover, no subsequent factual developments have un-
dermined Roe and Casey. Women continue to experience 
unplanned pregnancies and unexpected developments in 
pregnancies. Pregnancies continue to have enormous physi-
cal, social, and economic consequences. Even an uncompli-
cated pregnancy imposes signifcant strain on the body, un-
avoidably involving signifcant physiological change and 
excruciating pain. For some women, pregnancy and child-
birth can mean life-altering physical ailments or even death. 
Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a pregnancy to 
term dwarf those of having an abortion. See supra, at 379. 
Experts estimate that a ban on abortions increases maternal 
mortality by 21 percent, with white women facing a 13 per-
cent increase in maternal mortality while black women face 
a 33 percent increase.
13 Pregnancy and childbirth may also 
impose large-scale fnancial costs. The majority briefy re-
fers to arguments about changes in laws relating to health-
care coverage, pregnancy discrimination, and family leave. 
See ante, at 258–259. Many women, however, still do not 
have adequate healthcare coverage before and after preg-
nancy; and, even when insurance coverage is available, health-
13 See L. Harris, Navigating Loss of Abortion Services—A Large Aca-
demic Medical Center Prepares for the Overturn of Roe v. Wade, 386 New 
England J. Med. 2061, 2063 (2022). This projected racial disparity refects 
existing differences in maternal mortality rates for black and white 
women. Black women are now three to four times more likely to die 
during or after childbirth than white women, often from preventable 
causes. See Brief for Howard University School of Law Human and Civil 
Rights Clinic as Amicus Curiae 18. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
care services may be far away. 14 Women also continue to 
face pregnancy discrimination that interferes with their abil-
ity to earn a living. Paid family leave remains inaccessible 
to many who need it most. Only 20 percent of private-sec-
tor workers have access to paid family leave, including a 
mere 8 percent of workers in the bottom quartile of wage 
earners.
15 
The majority briefy notes the growing prevalence of safe 
haven laws and demand for adoption, see ante, at 258–259, 
and nn. 45–46, but, to the degree that these are changes at 
all, they too are irrelevant.
16 Neither reduces the health 
risks or fnancial costs of going through pregnancy and child-
birth. Moreover, the choice to give up parental rights after 
giving birth is altogether different from the choice not to 
carry a pregnancy to term. The reality is that few women 
denied an abortion will choose adoption.
17 The vast major-
14 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Issue Brief: Improving 
Access to Maternal Health Care in Rural Communities 4, 8, 11 (Sept. 
2019), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/OMH / 
equity-initiatives/rural-health/09032019-Maternal-Health-Care-in-Rural -
Communities.pdf. In Mississippi, for instance, 19 percent of women of 
reproductive age are uninsured and 60 percent of counties lack a single 
obstetrician-gynecologist. Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13. 
15 Dept. of Labor, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefts 
in the United States, Table 31 (Sept. 2020), https://www.bls.gov/ncs / 
gebs/ benefits/2020/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2020. 
pdf#page=299. 
16 Safe haven laws, which allow parents to leave newborn babies in des-
ignated safe spaces without threat of prosecution, were not enacted as an 
alternative to abortion, but in response to rare situations in which birthing 
mothers in crisis would kill their newborns or leave them to die. See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), R. Wilson, J. Klevens, 
D. Williams, & L. Xu, Infant Homicides Within the Context of Safe Haven 
Laws—United States, 2008–2017, 69 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re-
port 1385 (2020). 
17 A study of women who sought an abortion but were denied one be-
cause of gestational limits found that only 9 percent put the child up for 
adoption, rather than parenting themselves. See G. Sisson, L. Ralph, 
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398 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
ity will continue, just as in Roe and Casey's time, to shoulder 
the costs of childrearing. Whether or not they choose to par-
ent, they will experience the profound loss of autonomy 
and dignity that coerced pregnancy and birth always impose.18 
Mississippi's own record illustrates how little facts on the 
ground have changed since Roe and Casey, notwithstanding 
the majority's supposed “modern developments.” Ante, at 
258. Sixty-two percent of pregnancies in Mississippi are un-
planned, yet Mississippi does not require insurance to cover 
contraceptives and prohibits educators from demonstrating 
proper contraceptive use.
19 The State neither bans preg-
nancy discrimination nor requires provision of paid parental 
leave. Brief for Yale Law School Information Society Proj-
ect as Amicus Curiae 13 (Brief for Yale Law School); Brief 
for National Women's Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 
32. It has strict eligibility requirements for Medicaid and 
nutrition assistance, leaving many women and families with-
H. Gould, & D. Foster, Adoption Decision Making Among Women Seeking 
Abortion, 27 Women's Health Issues 136, 139 (2017). 
18 The majority fnally notes the claim that “people now have a new 
appreciation of fetal life,” partly because of viewing sonogram images. 
Ante, at 259. It is hard to know how anyone would evaluate such a claim 
and as we have described above, the majority's reasoning does not rely on 
any reevaluation of the interest in protecting fetal life. See supra, at 384, 
and n. 7. It is worth noting that sonograms became widely used in the 
1970s, long before Casey. Today, 60 percent of women seeking abortions 
have at least one child, and one-third have two or more. See CDC, K. 
Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2019, 70 Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report 6 (2021). These women know, even as they 
choose to have an abortion, what it is to look at a sonogram image and to 
value a fetal life. 
19 Guttmacher Institute, K. Kost, Unintended Pregnancy Rates at the 
State Level: Estimates for 2010 and Trends Since 2002, Table 1 (2015), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/stateup10.pdf ; 
Kaiser, State Requirements for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives 
(May 1, 2022), https://www.kff.org/state-category/womens-health/family -
planning; Miss. Code Ann. § 37–13–171(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (“In no case 
shall the instruction or program include any demonstration of how con-
doms or other contraceptives are applied”). 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
out basic medical care or enough food. See Brief for 547 
Deans, Chairs, Scholars and Public Health Professionals 
et al. as Amici Curiae 32–34 (Brief for 547 Deans). Al-
though 86 percent of pregnancy-related deaths in the State 
are due to postpartum complications, Mississippi rejected 
federal funding to provide a year's worth of Medicaid cover-
age to women after giving birth. See Brief for Yale Law 
School 12–13. Perhaps unsurprisingly, health outcomes in 
Mississippi are abysmal for both women and children. Mis-
sissippi has the highest infant mortality rate in the country, 
and some of the highest rates for preterm birth, low birth-
weight, cesarean section, and maternal death.
20 It is ap-
proximately 75 times more dangerous for a woman in the 
State to carry a pregnancy to term than to have an abortion. 
See Brief for 547 Deans 9–10. We do not say that every 
State is Mississippi, and we are sure some have made gains 
since Roe and Casey in providing support for women and 
children. But a state-by-state analysis by public health pro-
fessionals shows that States with the most restrictive abor-
tion policies also continue to invest the least in women's and 
children's health. See Brief for 547 Deans 23–34. 
The only notable change we can see since Roe and Casey 
cuts in favor of adhering to precedent: It is that American 
abortion law has become more and more aligned with other 
nations. The majority, like the Mississippi Legislature, 
claims that the United States is an extreme outlier when it 
20 See CDC, Infant Mortality Rates by State (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www. 
cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/infant_mortality_rates/infant_mortality. 
htm; Mississippi State Dept. of Health, Infant Mortality Report 2019 & 
2020, pp. 18–19 (2021), https://www.msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static / 
resources/18752.pdf; CDC, Percentage of Babies Born Low Birthweight 
by State (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/lbw 
_births/lbw.htm; CDC, Cesarean Delivery Rate by State (Feb. 25, 2022), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/cesarean_births/cesareans . 
htm; Mississippi State Dept. of Health, Mississippi Maternal Mortality Re-
port 2013–2016, pp. 5, 25 (Mar. 2021), https://www.msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/ 
_static/resources/8127.pdf. 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
comes to abortion regulation. See ante, at 232, and n. 15. 
The global trend, however, has been toward increased provi-
sion of legal and safe abortion care. A number of countries, 
including New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Iceland, permit 
abortions up to a roughly similar time as Roe and Casey set. 
See Brief for International and Comparative Legal Scholars 
as Amici Curiae 18–22. Canada has decriminalized abor-
tion at any point in a pregnancy. See id., at 13–15. Most 
Western European countries impose restrictions on abortion 
after 12 to 14 weeks, but they often have liberal exceptions 
to those time limits, including to prevent harm to a woman's 
physical or mental health. See id., at 24–27; Brief for Euro-
pean Law Professors as Amici Curiae 16–17, and Appendix. 
They also typically make access to early abortion easier, for 
example, by helping cover its cost.
21 Perhaps most notable, 
more than 50 countries around the world—in Asia, Latin 
America, Africa, and Europe—have expanded access to abor-
tion in the past 25 years. See Brief for International and 
Comparative Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae 28–29. In 
light of that worldwide liberalization of abortion laws, it is 
American States that will become international outliers 
after today. 
In sum, the majority can point to neither legal nor factual 
developments in support of its decision. Nothing that has 
happened in this country or the world in recent decades un-
dermines the core insight of Roe and Casey. It continues to 
be true that, within the constraints those decisions estab-
lished, a woman, not the government, should choose whether 
she will bear the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth, and 
parenting. 
2 
In support of its holding, see ante, at 264–265, the majority 
invokes two watershed cases overruling prior constitutional 
21 See D. Grossman, K. Grindlay, & B. Burns, Public Funding for Abor-
tion Where Broadly Legal, 94 Contraception 453, 458 (2016) (discussing 
funding of abortion in European countries). 
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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
precedents: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish and Brown v. 
Board of Education. But those decisions, unlike today's, re-
sponded to changed law and to changed facts and attitudes 
that had taken hold throughout society. As Casey recog-
nized, the two cases are relevant only to show—by stark con-
trast—how unjustifed overturning the right to choose is. 
See 505 U. S., at 861–864. 
West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital 
of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), and a whole line of cases begin-
ning with Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). Adkins 
had found a state minimum-wage law unconstitutional be-
cause, in the Court's view, the law interfered with a constitu-
tional right to contract. 261 U. S., at 554–555. But then 
the Great Depression hit, bringing with it unparalleled 
economic despair. The experience undermined—in fact, it 
disproved—Adkins's assumption that a wholly unregulated 
market could meet basic human needs. As Justice Jackson 
(before becoming a Justice) wrote of that time: “The older 
world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere outside the 
Court to be dead.” The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 85 
(1941). In West Coast Hotel, the Court caught up, recogniz-
ing through the lens of experience the faws of existing legal 
doctrine. See also ante, at 357–358 (Roberts, C. J., concur-
ring in judgment). The havoc the Depression had worked 
on ordinary Americans, the Court noted, was “common 
knowledge through the length and breadth of the land.” 300 
U. S., at 399. The laissez-faire approach had led to “the ex-
ploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insuffcient to 
meet the bare cost of living.” Ibid. And since Adkins was 
decided, the law had also changed. In several decisions, the 
Court had started to recognize the power of States to imple-
ment economic policies designed to enhance their citizens' 
economic well-being. See, e. g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U. S. 502 (1934); O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931). The statements in those deci-
sions, West Coast Hotel explained, were “impossible to recon-
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402 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
cile” with Adkins. 300 U. S., at 398. There was no escap-
ing the need for Adkins to go. 
Brown v. Board of Education overruled Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with its doctrine of “separate 
but equal.” By 1954, decades of Jim Crow had made clear 
what Plessy's turn of phrase actually meant: “inherent[ ] [in]-
equal[ity].” Brown, 347 U. S., at 495. Segregation was 
not, and could not ever be, consistent with the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, ratifed to give the former slaves full citi-
zenship. Whatever might have been thought in Plessy's 
time, the Brown Court explained, both experience and “mod-
ern authority” showed the “detrimental effect[s]” of state-
sanctioned segregation: It “affect[ed] [children's] hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” 347 U. S., at 
494. By that point, too, the law had begun to refect that 
understanding. In a series of decisions, the Court had held 
unconstitutional public graduate schools' exclusion of black 
students. See, e. g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U. S. 631 
(1948) (per curiam ); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U. S. 337 (1938). The logic of those cases, Brown held, 
“appl[ied] with added force to children in grade and high 
schools.” 347 U. S., at 494. Changed facts and changed law 
required Plessy's end. 
The majority says that in recognizing those changes, we 
are implicitly supporting the half-century interlude between 
Plessy and Brown. See ante, at 293. That is not so. 
First, if the Brown Court had used the majority's method of 
constitutional construction, it might not ever have overruled 
Plessy, whether 5 or 50 or 500 years later. Brown thought 
that whether the ratifcation-era history supported desegre-
gation was “[a]t best . . . inconclusive.” 347 U. S., at 489. 
But even setting that aside, we are not saying that a decision 
can never be overruled just because it is terribly wrong. 
Take West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 
which the majority also relies on. See ante, at 265, 293. 
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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 403 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
That overruling took place just three years after the initial 
decision, before any notable reliance interests had developed. 
It happened as well because individual Justices changed their 
minds, not because a new majority wanted to undo the deci-
sions of their predecessors. Both Barnette and Brown, 
moreover, share another feature setting them apart from the 
Court's ruling today. They protected individual rights with 
a strong basis in the Constitution's most fundamental com-
mitments; they did not, as the majority does here, take away 
a right that individuals have held, and relied on, for 50 years. 
To take that action based on a new and bare majority's decla-
ration that two Courts got the result egregiously wrong? 
And to justify that action by reference to Barnette? Or to 
Brown—a case in which the Chief Justice also wrote an (11-
page) opinion in which the entire Court could speak with one 
voice? These questions answer themselves. 
Casey itself addressed both West Coast Hotel and Brown, 
and found that neither supported Roe's overruling. In West 
Coast Hotel, Casey explained, “the facts of economic life” 
had proved “different from those previously assumed.” 505 
U. S., at 862. And even though “Plessy was wrong the day 
it was decided,” the passage of time had made that ever more 
clear to ever more citizens: “Society's understanding of the 
facts” in 1954 was “fundamentally different” than in 1896. 
Id., at 863. So the Court needed to reverse course. “In 
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed cir-
cumstances may impose new obligations.” Id., at 864. And 
because such dramatic change had occurred, the public could 
understand why the Court was acting. “[T]he Nation could 
accept each decision” as a “response to the Court's constitu-
tional duty.” Ibid. But that would not be true of a re-
versal of Roe—“[b]ecause neither the factual underpinnings 
of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it has 
changed.” 505 U. S., at 864. 
That is just as much so today, because Roe and Casey con-
tinue to refect, not diverge from, broad trends in American 
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404 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
society. It is, of course, true that many Americans, includ-
ing many women, opposed those decisions when issued and 
do so now as well. Yet the fact remains: Roe and Casey 
were the product of a profound and ongoing change in 
women's roles in the latter part of the 20th century. Only a 
dozen years before Roe, the Court described women as “the 
center of home and family life,” with “special responsibil-
ities” that precluded their full legal status under the Consti-
tution. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961). By 1973, 
when the Court decided Roe, fundamental social change was 
underway regarding the place of women—and the law had 
begun to follow. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971) 
(recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-
based discrimination). By 1992, when the Court decided 
Casey, the traditional view of a woman's role as only a wife 
and mother was “no longer consistent with our understand-
ing of the family, the individual, or the Constitution.” 505 
U. S., at 897; see supra, at 373, 381–382. Under that charter, 
Casey understood, women must take their place as full and 
equal citizens. And for that to happen, women must have 
control over their reproductive decisions. Nothing since 
Casey—no changed law, no changed fact—has undermined 
that promise. 
C 
The reasons for retaining Roe and Casey gain further 
strength from the overwhelming reliance interests those de-
cisions have created. The Court adheres to precedent not 
just for institutional reasons, but because it recognizes that 
stability in the law is “an essential thread in the mantle of 
protection that the law affords the individual.” Florida 
Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nurs-
ing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). So when overruling precedent “would dislodge [indi-
viduals'] settled rights and expectations,” stare decisis has 
“added force.” Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways 
Comm'n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991). Casey understood that

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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 405 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
to deny individuals' reliance on Roe was to “refuse to face 
the fact[s].” 505 U. S., at 856. Today the majority refuses 
to face the facts. “The most striking feature of the [major-
ity] is the absence of any serious discussion” of how its ruling 
will affect women. Ante, at 262. By characterizing Casey's 
reliance arguments as “generalized assertions about the na-
tional psyche,” ante, at 288, it reveals how little it knows or 
cares about women's lives or about the suffering its decision 
will cause. 
In Casey, the Court observed that for two decades individ-
uals “have organized intimate relationships and made” sig-
nifcant life choices “in reliance on the availability of abortion 
in the event that contraception should fail.” 505 U. S., at 
856. Over another 30 years, that reliance has solidifed. 
For half a century now, in Casey's words, “[t]he ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and social life 
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control 
their reproductive lives.” Ibid.; see supra, at 381–382. In-
deed, all women now of childbearing age have grown up ex-
pecting that they would be able to avail themselves of Roe's 
and Casey's protections. 
The disruption of overturning Roe and Casey will there-
fore be profound. Abortion is a common medical procedure 
and a familiar experience in women's lives. About 18 per-
cent of pregnancies in this country end in abortion, and about 
one quarter of American women will have an abortion before 
the age of 45.
22 Those numbers refect the predictable and 
life-changing effects of carrying a pregnancy, giving birth, 
and becoming a parent. As Casey understood, people today 
rely on their ability to control and time pregnancies when 
making countless life decisions: where to live, whether and 
how to invest in education or careers, how to allocate fnan-
cial resources, and how to approach intimate and family rela-
22 See CDC, K. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 
2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 7 (2021); Brief for Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 9.

406 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
tionships. Women may count on abortion access for when 
contraception fails. They may count on abortion access for 
when contraception cannot be used, for example, if they were 
raped. They may count on abortion for when something 
changes in the midst of a pregnancy, whether it involves fam-
ily or fnancial circumstances, unanticipated medical compli-
cations, or heartbreaking fetal diagnoses. Taking away the 
right to abortion, as the majority does today, destroys all 
those individual plans and expectations. In so doing, it 
diminishes women's opportunities to participate fully and 
equally in the Nation's political, social, and economic life. 
See Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae 13 (showing that 
abortion availability has “large effects on women's education, 
labor force participation, occupations, and earnings” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
The majority's response to these obvious points exists far 
from the reality American women actually live. The major-
ity proclaims that “ `reproductive planning could take virtu-
ally immediate account of any sudden restoration of state 
authority to ban abortions.' ” Ante, at 288 (quoting Casey, 
505 U. S., at 856).
23 The facts are: 45 percent of pregnancies 
in the United States are unplanned. See Brief for 547 Deans 
5. Even the most effective contraceptives fail, and effective 
contraceptives are not universally accessible.
24 Not all sex-
ual activity is consensual and not all contraceptive choices 
are made by the party who risks pregnancy. See Brief for 
Legal Voice et al. as Amici Curiae 18–19. The Mississippi 
23 Astoundingly, the majority casts this statement as a “conce[ssion]” 
from Casey with which it “agree[s].” Ante, at 287–288. In fact, Casey 
used this language as part of describing an argument that it rejected. See 
505 U. S., at 856. It is only today's Court that endorses this profoundly 
mistaken view. 
24 See Brief for 547 Deans 6–7 (noting that 51 percent of women who 
terminated their pregnancies reported using contraceptives during the 
month in which they conceived); Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14 (explaining fnancial and 
geographic barriers to access to effective contraceptives). 
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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 407 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
law at issue here, for example, has no exception for rape 
or incest, even for underage women. Finally, the majority 
ignores, as explained above, that some women decide to have 
an abortion because their circumstances change during a 
pregnancy. See supra, at 406. Human bodies care little for 
hopes and plans. Events can occur after conception, from 
unexpected medical risks to changes in family circumstances, 
which profoundly alter what it means to carry a pregnancy 
to term. In all these situations, women have expected that 
they will get to decide, perhaps in consultation with their 
families or doctors but free from state interference, whether 
to continue a pregnancy. For those who will now have to 
undergo that pregnancy, the loss of Roe and Casey could be 
disastrous. 
That is especially so for women without money. When we 
“count[ ] the cost of [Roe's] repudiation” on women who once 
relied on that decision, it is not hard to see where the great-
est burden will fall. Casey, 505 U. S., at 855. In States that 
bar abortion, women of means will still be able to travel to 
obtain the services they need.
25 It is women who cannot 
afford to do so who will suffer most. These are the women 
most likely to seek abortion care in the frst place. Women 
living below the federal poverty line experience unintended 
pregnancies at rates fve times higher than higher income 
women do, and nearly half of women who seek abortion care 
live in households below the poverty line. See Brief for 547 
Deans 7; Brief for Abortion Funds and Practical Support Or-
ganizations as Amici Curiae 8 (Brief for Abortion Funds). 
25 This statement of course assumes that States are not successful in 
preventing interstate travel to obtain an abortion. See supra, at 361, 394. 
Even assuming that is so, increased out-of-state demand will lead to longer 
wait times and decreased availability of service in States still providing 
abortions. See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 25– 
27. This is what happened in Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, 
and Nevada last fall after Texas effectively banned abortions past six 
weeks of gestation. See United States v. Texas, 595 U. S. 74, ––– (2021) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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408 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
Even with Roe's protection, these women face immense ob-
stacles to raising the money needed to obtain abortion care 
early in their pregnancy. See Brief for Abortion Funds 7– 
12.26 After today, in States where legal abortions are not 
available, they will lose any ability to obtain safe, legal abor-
tion care. They will not have the money to make the trip 
necessary; or to obtain childcare for that time; or to take 
time off work. Many will endure the costs and risks of preg-
nancy and giving birth against their wishes. Others will 
turn in desperation to illegal and unsafe abortions. They 
may lose not just their freedom, but their lives.
27 
Finally, the expectation of reproductive control is integral 
to many women's identity and their place in the Nation. See 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 856. That expectation helps defne a 
woman as an “equal citizen[ ],” with all the rights, privileges, 
and obligations that status entails. Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 
26 The average cost of a frst-trimester abortion is about $500. See 
Brief for Abortion Funds 7. Federal insurance generally does not cover 
the cost of abortion, and 35 percent of American adults do not have cash 
on hand to cover an unexpected expense that high. Guttmacher Institute, 
M. Donovan, In Real Life: Federal Restrictions on Abortion Coverage and 
the Women They Impact (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/ 
2017/01/real-life-federal-restrictions-abortion-coverage-and-women-they-
impact#:~:text=Although%20the%20Hyde%20Amendment%20bars, 
provide%20abortion%20coverage%20to%20enrollees; Brief for Abortion 
Funds 11. 
27 Mississippi is likely to be one of the States where these costs are 
highest, though history shows that it will have company. As described 
above, Mississippi provides only the barest fnancial support to pregnant 
women. See supra, at 398–399. The State will greatly restrict abortion 
care without addressing any of the fnancial, health, and family needs that 
motivate many women to seek it. The effects will be felt most severely, 
as they always have been, on the bodies of the poor. The history of state 
abortion restrictions is a history of heavy costs exacted from the most 
vulnerable women. It is a history of women seeking illegal abortions in 
hotel rooms and home kitchens; of women trying to self-induce abortions 
by douching with bleach, injecting lye, and penetrating themselves with 
knitting needles, scissors, and coat hangers. See L. Reagan, When Abor-
tion Was a Crime 42–43, 198–199, 208–209 (1997). It is a history of 
women dying.

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 409 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see supra, at 381. It refects 
that she is an autonomous person, and that society and the 
law recognize her as such. Like many constitutional rights, 
the right to choose situates a woman in relationship to others 
and to the government. It helps defne a sphere of freedom, 
in which a person has the capacity to make choices free of 
government control. As Casey recognized, the right “or-
der[s]” her “thinking” as well as her “living.” 505 U. S., at 
856. Beyond any individual choice about residence, or edu-
cation, or career, her whole life refects the control and au-
thority that the right grants. 
Withdrawing a woman's right to choose whether to con-
tinue a pregnancy does not mean that no choice is being 
made. It means that a majority of today's Court has 
wrenched this choice from women and given it to the States. 
To allow a State to exert control over one of “the most inti-
mate and personal choices” a woman may make is not only 
to affect the course of her life, monumental as those effects 
might be. Id., at 851. It is to alter her “views of [herself]” 
and her understanding of her “place[ ] in society” as someone 
with the recognized dignity and authority to make these 
choices. Id., at 856. Women have relied on Roe and Casey 
in this way for 50 years. Many have never known anything 
else. When Roe and Casey disappear, the loss of power, con-
trol, and dignity will be immense. 
The Court's failure to perceive the whole swath of expecta-
tions Roe and Casey created refects an impoverished view 
of reliance. According to the majority, a reliance interest 
must be “very concrete,” like those involving “property” or 
“contract.” Ante, at 288. While many of this Court's cases 
addressing reliance have been in the “commercial context,” 
Casey, 505 U. S., at 855, none holds that interests must be 
analogous to commercial ones to warrant stare decisis pro-
tection.
28 This unprecedented assertion is, at bottom, a rad-
28 The majority's sole citation for its “concreteness” requirement is 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991). But Payne merely discounted 
reliance interests in cases involving “procedural and evidentiary rules.” 
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410 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
ical claim to power. By disclaiming any need to consider 
broad swaths of individuals' interests, the Court arrogates 
to itself the authority to overrule established legal principles 
without even acknowledging the costs of its decisions for the 
individuals who live under the law, costs that this Court's 
stare decisis doctrine instructs us to privilege when deciding 
whether to change course. 
The majority claims that the reliance interests women 
have in Roe and Casey are too “intangible” for the Court to 
consider, even if it were inclined to do so. Ante, at 288. 
This is to ignore as judges what we know as men and women. 
The interests women have in Roe and Casey are perfectly, 
viscerally concrete. Countless women will now make differ-
ent decisions about careers, education, relationships, and 
whether to try to become pregnant than they would have 
when Roe served as a backstop. Other women will carry 
pregnancies to term, with all the costs and risk of harm that 
involves, when they would previously have chosen to obtain 
an abortion. For millions of women, Roe and Casey have 
been critical in giving them control of their bodies and their 
lives. Closing our eyes to the suffering today's decision will 
impose will not make that suffering disappear. The major-
ity cannot escape its obligation to “count[ ] the cost[s]” of 
its decision by invoking the “conficting arguments” of “con-
tending sides.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 855; ante, at 288. Stare 
decisis requires that the Court calculate the costs of a deci-
sion's repudiation on those who have relied on the decision, 
not on those who have disavowed it. See Casey, 505 U. S., 
at 855. 
More broadly, the majority's approach to reliance cannot 
be reconciled with our Nation's understanding of constitu-
Id., at 828. Unlike the individual right at stake here, those rules do “not 
alter primary conduct.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 252 (1998). 
Accordingly, they generally “do not implicate the reliance interests of pri-
vate parties” at all. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U. S. 99, 119 (2013) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 411 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
tional rights. The majority's insistence on a “concrete,” eco-
nomic showing would preclude a fnding of reliance on a wide 
variety of decisions recognizing constitutional rights—such 
as the right to express opinions, or choose whom to marry, 
or decide how to educate children. The Court, on the major-
ity's logic, could transfer those choices to the State without 
having to consider a person's settled understanding that the 
law makes them hers. That must be wrong. All those 
rights, like the right to obtain an abortion, profoundly affect 
and, indeed, anchor individual lives. To recognize that peo-
ple have relied on these rights is not to dabble in abstrac-
tions, but to acknowledge some of the most “concrete” and 
familiar aspects of human life and liberty. Ante, at 288. 
All those rights, like the one here, also have a societal 
dimension, because of the role constitutional liberties play in 
our structure of government. See, e. g., Dickerson, 530 
U. S., at 443 (recognizing that Miranda “warnings have be-
come part of our national culture” in declining to overrule 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)). Rescinding an 
individual right in its entirety and conferring it on the State, 
an action the Court takes today for the frst time in history, 
affects all who have relied on our constitutional system of 
government and its structure of individual liberties pro-
tected from state oversight. Roe and Casey have of course 
aroused controversy and provoked disagreement. But the 
right those decisions conferred and reaffrmed is part of soci-
ety's understanding of constitutional law and of how the 
Court has defned the liberty and equality that women are 
entitled to claim. 
After today, young women will come of age with fewer 
rights than their mothers and grandmothers had. The ma-
jority accomplishes that result without so much as consider-
ing how women have relied on the right to choose or what it 
means to take that right away. The majority's refusal even 
to consider the life-altering consequences of reversing Roe 
and Casey is a stunning indictment of its decision. 
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412 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
D 
One last consideration counsels against the majority's rul-
ing: the very controversy surrounding Roe and Casey. The 
majority accuses Casey of acting outside the bounds of the 
law to quell the confict over abortion—of imposing an un-
principled “settlement” of the issue in an effort to end “na-
tional division.” Ante, at 291. But that is not what Casey 
did. As shown above, Casey applied traditional principles 
of stare decisis—which the majority today ignores—in re-
affrming Roe. Casey carefully assessed changed circum-
stances (none) and reliance interests (profound). It consid-
ered every aspect of how Roe's framework operated. It 
adhered to the law in its analysis, and it reached the conclu-
sion that the law required. True enough that Casey took 
notice of the “national controversy” about abortion: The 
Court knew in 1992, as it did in 1973, that abortion was a 
“divisive issue.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 867–868; see Roe, 410 
U. S., at 116. But Casey's reason for acknowledging public 
confict was the exact opposite of what the majority insinu-
ates. Casey addressed the national controversy in order to 
emphasize how important it was, in that case of all cases, for 
the Court to stick to the law. Would that today's majority 
had done likewise. 
Consider how the majority itself summarizes this aspect 
of Casey: 
“The American people's belief in the rule of law would 
be shaken if they lost respect for this Court as an insti-
tution that decides important cases based on principle, 
not `social and political pressures.' There is a special 
danger that the public will perceive a decision as having 
been made for unprincipled reasons when the Court 
overrules a controversial `watershed' decision, such as 
Roe. A decision overruling Roe would be perceived as 
having been made `under fre' and as a `surrender to po-
litical pressure.' ” Ante, at 290 (citations omitted).

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Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
That seems to us a good description. And it seems to us 
right. The majority responds (if we understand it cor-
rectly): well, yes, but we have to apply the law. See ante, 
at 290–291. To which Casey would have said: That is ex-
actly the point. Here, more than anywhere, the Court needs 
to apply the law—particularly the law of stare decisis. 
Here, we know that citizens will continue to contest the 
Court's decision, because “[m]en and women of good con-
science” deeply disagree about abortion. Casey, 505 U. S., at 
850. When that contestation takes place—but when there 
is no legal basis for reversing course—the Court needs to be 
steadfast, to stand its ground. That is what the rule of law 
requires. And that is what respect for this Court depends on. 
“The promise of constancy, once given” in so charged an 
environment, Casey explained, “binds its maker for as long 
as” the “understanding of the issue has not changed so funda-
mentally as to render the commitment obsolete.” Id., at 
868. A breach of that promise is “nothing less than a breach 
of faith.” Ibid. “[A]nd no Court that broke its faith with 
the people could sensibly expect credit for principle.” Ibid. 
No Court breaking its faith in that way would deserve credit 
for principle. As one of Casey's authors wrote in another 
case, “Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to 
stare decisis” in “sensitive political contexts” where “parti-
san controversy abounds.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 985 
(1996) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
Justice Jackson once called a decision he dissented from a 
“loaded weapon,” ready to hand for improper uses. Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 246 (1944). We fear 
that today's decision, departing from stare decisis for no le-
gitimate reason, is its own loaded weapon. Weakening stare 
decisis threatens to upend bedrock legal doctrines, far be-
yond any single decision. Weakening stare decisis creates 
profound legal instability. And as Casey recognized, weak-
ening stare decisis in a hotly contested case like this one calls 
into question this Court's commitment to legal principle. It

414 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
makes the Court appear not restrained but aggressive, not 
modest but grasping. In all those ways, today's decision 
takes aim, we fear, at the rule of law. 
III 
“Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's 
decisionmaking.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 844 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Roe has stood for ffty years. Casey, a precedent 
about precedent specifcally confrming Roe, has stood for 
thirty. And the doctrine of stare decisis—a critical element 
of the rule of law—stands foursquare behind their continued 
existence. The right those decisions established and pre-
served is embedded in our constitutional law, both originat-
ing in and leading to other rights protecting bodily integrity, 
personal autonomy, and family relationships. The abortion 
right is also embedded in the lives of women—shaping their 
expectations, infuencing their choices about relationships 
and work, supporting (as all reproductive rights do) their 
social and economic equality. Since the right's recognition 
(and affrmation), nothing has changed to support what the 
majority does today. Neither law nor facts nor attitudes 
have provided any new reasons to reach a different result 
than Roe and Casey did. All that has changed is this Court. 
Mississippi—and other States too—knew exactly what 
they were doing in ginning up new legal challenges to Roe 
and Casey. The 15-week ban at issue here was enacted in 
2018. Other States quickly followed: Between 2019 and 
2021, eight States banned abortion procedures after six to 
eight weeks of pregnancy, and three States enacted all-out 
bans.
29 Mississippi itself decided in 2019 that it had not gone 
29 Guttmacher Institute, E. Nash, State Policy Trends 2021: The Worst 
Year for Abortion Rights in Almost Half a Century (Dec. 16, 2021), https:// 
www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/12/state-policy-trends-2021-worst-year-
abortion-rights-almost-half-century; Guttmacher Institute, E. Nash, 
L. Mohammed, O. Cappello, & S. Naide, State Policy Trends 2020: Re-
productive Health and Rights in a Year Like No Other (Dec. 15, 2020), 
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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 415 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
far enough: The year after enacting the law under review, 
the State passed a 6-week restriction. A state senator who 
championed both Mississippi laws said the obvious out loud. 
“[A] lot of people thought,” he explained, that “fnally, we 
have” a conservative Court “and so now would be a good 
time to start testing the limits of Roe.” 
30 In its petition for 
certiorari, the State had exercised a smidgen of restraint. 
It had urged the Court merely to roll back Roe and Casey, 
specifcally assuring the Court that “the questions presented 
in this petition do not require the Court to overturn” those 
precedents. Pet. for Cert. 5; see ante, at 352 (Roberts, 
C. J., concurring in judgment). But as Mississippi grew ever 
more confdent in its prospects, it resolved to go all in. It 
urged the Court to overrule Roe and Casey. Nothing but 
everything would be enough. 
Earlier this Term, this Court signaled that Mississippi's 
stratagem would succeed. Texas was one of the fstful of 
States to have recently banned abortions after six weeks of 
pregnancy. It added to that “fagrantly unconstitutional” 
restriction an unprecedented scheme to “evade judicial scru-
tiny.” Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. –––, ––– 
(2021) (Sotomayor , J., dissenting). And fve Justices ac-
ceded to that cynical maneuver. They let Texas defy this 
Court's constitutional rulings, nullifying Roe and Casey 
ahead of schedule in the Nation's second largest State. 
And now the other shoe drops, courtesy of that same fve-
person majority. (We believe that The Chief Justice's 
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2020/12/state-policy-trends-2020 -
reproductive-health-and-rights-year-no-other; Guttmacher Institute, E. 
Nash, L. Mohammed, O. Cappello, & S. Naide, State Policy Trends 2019: 
A Wave of Abortion Bans, But Some States Are Fighting Back (Dec. 10, 
2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends -
2019-wave-abortion-bans-some-states-are-fghting-back. 
30 A. Pittman, Mississippi's Six-Week Abortion Ban at 5th Circuit Ap-
peals Court Today, Jackson Free Press (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.jackson 
freepress.com/news/2019/oct/07/mississippis-six-week-abortion-ban-5th -
circuit-app/. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
416 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting 
opinion is wrong too, but no one should think that there is 
not a large difference between upholding a 15-week ban on 
the grounds he does and allowing States to prohibit abortion 
from the time of conception.) Now a new and bare majority 
of this Court—acting at practically the frst moment possi-
ble—overrules Roe and Casey. It converts a series of dis-
senting opinions expressing antipathy toward Roe and Casey 
into a decision greenlighting even total abortion bans. See 
ante, at 281, 283, 286–287, and nn. 61–64 (relying on former 
dissents). It eliminates a 50-year-old constitutional right 
that safeguards women's freedom and equal station. It 
breaches a core rule-of-law principle, designed to promote con-
stancy in the law. In doing all of that, it places in jeopardy 
other rights, from contraception to same-sex intimacy and 
marriage. And fnally, it undermines the Court's legitimacy. 
Casey itself made the last point in explaining why it would 
not overrule Roe—though some members of its majority 
might not have joined Roe in the frst instance. Just as we 
did here, Casey explained the importance of stare decisis; the 
inappositeness of West Coast Hotel and Brown; the absence 
of any “changed circumstances” (or other reason) justifying 
the reversal of precedent. 505 U. S., at 864; see supra, at 
387–390, 394–404. “[T]he Court,” Casey explained, “could 
not pretend” that overruling Roe had any “justifcation be-
yond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently 
from the Court of 1973.” 505 U. S., at 864. And to overrule 
for that reason? Quoting Justice Stewart, Casey explained 
that to do so—to reverse prior law “upon a ground no frmer 
than a change in [the Court's] membership”—would invite 
the view that “this institution is little different from the two 
political branches of the Government.” Ibid. No view, 
Casey thought, could do “more lasting injury to this Court 
and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to 
serve.” Ibid. For overruling Roe, Casey concluded, the 
Court would pay a “terrible price.” 505 U. S., at 864.

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 417 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
The Justices who wrote those words—O'Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter—they were judges of wisdom. They would not 
have won any contests for the kind of ideological purity some 
court watchers want Justices to deliver. But if there were 
awards for Justices who left this Court better than they 
found it? And who for that reason left this country better? 
And the rule of law stronger? Sign those Justices up. 
They knew that “the legitimacy of the Court [is] earned 
over time.” Id., at 868. They also would have recognized 
that it can be destroyed much more quickly. They worked 
hard to avert that outcome in Casey. The American public, 
they thought, should never conclude that its constitutional 
protections hung by a thread—that a new majority, adhering 
to a new “doctrinal school,” could “by dint of numbers” alone 
expunge their rights. Id., at 864. It is hard—no, it is im-
possible—to conclude that anything else has happened here. 
One of us once said that “[i]t is not often in the law that so 
few have so quickly changed so much.” S. Breyer, Breaking 
the Promise of Brown: The Resegregation of America's 
Schools 30 (2022). For all of us, in our time on this Court, 
that has never been more true than today. In overruling 
Roe and Casey, this Court betrays its guiding principles. 
With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many mil-
lions of American women who have today lost a fundamental 
constitutional protection—we dissent. 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix analyzes in full each of the 28 cases the 
majority says support today's decision to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). As ex-
plained herein, the Court in each case relied on traditional 
stare decisis factors in overruling. 
A great many of the overrulings the majority cites involve 
a prior precedent that had been rendered out of step with or 
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418 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
effectively abrogated by contemporary case law in light of 
intervening developments in the broader doctrine. See 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (holding the 
Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict in state 
prosecutions for serious offenses, and overruling Apodaca 
v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), because “in the years since 
Apodaca, this Court ha[d] spoken inconsistently about its 
meaning” and had undercut its validity “on at least eight 
occasions”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 608–609 (2002) 
(recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury fnd 
the aggravating factors necessary to impose a death sentence 
and, in so doing, rejecting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 
(1990), as overtaken by and irreconcilable with Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000)); Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U. S. 203, 235–236 (1997) (considering the Establishment 
Clause's constraint on government aid to religious instruc-
tion, and overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985), 
in light of several related doctrinal developments that had 
so undermined Aguilar and the assumption on which it 
rested as to render it no longer good law); Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U. S. 79, 93–96 (1986) (recognizing that a defend-
ant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial dis-
crimination in selection of a jury venire by relying solely on 
the facts in his case, and, based on subsequent developments 
in equal protection law, rejecting part of Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U. S. 202 (1965), which had imposed a more demanding 
evidentiary burden); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 
447–448 (1969) (per curiam ) (holding that mere advocacy of 
violence is protected by the First Amendment, unless in-
tended to incite it or produce imminent lawlessness, and re-
jecting the contrary rule in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 
357 (1927), as having been “thoroughly discredited by later 
decisions”); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351, 353 
(1967) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment extends to 
material and communications that a person “seeks to pre-
serve as private,” and rejecting the more limited construc-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 419 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
tion articulated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 
(1928), because “we have since departed from the narrow 
view on which that decision rested,” and “the underpinnings 
of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent 
decisions that the `trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no 
longer be regarded as controlling”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436, 463–467, 479, n. 48 (1966) (recognizing that the 
Fifth Amendment requires certain procedural safeguards for 
custodial interrogation, and rejecting Crooker v. California, 
357 U. S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 
(1958), which had already been undermined by Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964)); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 
6–9 (1964) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against “self-incrimination is also protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment against abridgment by the States,” and 
rejecting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), in light 
of a “marked shift” in Fifth Amendment precedents that had 
“necessarily repudiated” the prior decision); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335, 343–345 (1963) (acknowledging a right 
to counsel for indigent criminal defendants in state court 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and overrul-
ing the earlier precedent failing to recognize such a right, 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942)); 
31 Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U. S. 649, 659–662 (1944) (recognizing all-white primaries 
are unconstitutional after reconsidering in light of “the uni-
tary character of the electoral process” recognized in United 
States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), and overruling Grovey 
v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)); United States v. Darby, 312 
U. S. 100, 115–117 (1941) (recognizing Congress's Commerce 
Clause power to regulate employment conditions and ex-
plaining as “inescapable” the “conclusion . . . that Hammer 
31 We have since come to understand Gideon as part of a larger doctrinal 
shift—already underway at the time of Gideon—where “the Court began 
to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights 
contained in the frst eight Amendments.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 
U. S. 742, 763 (2010); see also id., at 766. 
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420 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
v. Dagenhart, [247 U. S. 251 (1918)],” and its contrary rule 
had “long since been” overtaken by precedent construing the 
Commerce Clause power more broadly); Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U. S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (applying state substantive 
law in diversity actions in federal courts and overruling 
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), because an intervening deci-
sion had “made clear” the “fallacy underlying the rule”). 
Additional cases the majority cites involved fundamental 
factual changes that had undermined the basic premise of the 
prior precedent. See Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 364 (2010) (expanding First Amend-
ment protections for campaign-related speech and citing 
technological changes that undermined the distinctions of 
the earlier regime and made workarounds easy, and overrul-
ing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 
(1990), and partially overruling McConnell v. Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003)); Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U. S. 36, 62–65 (2004) (expounding on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses and rejecting the prior 
framework, based on its practical failing to keep out core 
testimonial evidence, and overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U. S. 56 (1980)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651–652 (1961) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to the States, and overruling the contrary rule 
of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), after considering and 
rejecting “the current validity of the factual grounds upon 
which Wolf was based”). 
Some cited overrulings involved both signifcant doctrinal 
developments and changed facts or understandings that had 
together undermined a basic premise of the prior decision. 
See Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 
U. S. –––, –––, ––– – ––– (2018) (holding that requiring public-
sector union dues from nonmembers violates the First 
Amendment, and overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 
U. S. 209 (1977), based on “both factual and legal” develop-
ments that had “eroded the decision's underpinnings and left 
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Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 421 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
it an outlier among our First Amendment cases” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 
644, 659–663 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects the right of same-sex couples to marry in light 
of doctrinal developments, as well as fundamentally changed 
social understanding); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 572– 
578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 
(1986), after fnding anti-sodomy laws to be inconsistent with 
the Fourteenth Amendment in light of developments in the 
legal doctrine, as well as changed social understanding of 
sexuality); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 101 (1978) 
(overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975), 
three years after it was decided, because of developments in 
the Court's double jeopardy case law, and because interven-
ing practice had shown that government appeals from mid-
trial dismissals requested by the defendant were practicable, 
desirable, and consistent with double jeopardy values); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197–199, 210, n. 23 (1976) (holding 
that sex-based classifcations are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause, including because Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 
(1971), and other equal protection cases and social changes 
had overtaken any “inconsistent” suggestion in Goesaert v. 
Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948)); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 
522, 535–537 (1975) (recognizing as “a foregone conclusion 
from the pattern of some of the Court's cases over the past 
30 years, as well as from legislative developments at both 
federal and state levels,” that women could not be excluded 
from jury service, and explaining that the prior decision 
approving such practice, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57 (1961), 
had been rendered inconsistent with equal protection 
jurisprudence). 
Other overrulings occurred very close in time to the origi-
nal decision so did not engender substantial reliance and 
could not be described as having been “embedded” as “part 
of our national culture.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 
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422 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
U. S. 428, 443 (2000); see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 
(1991) (revising procedural rules of evidence that had barred 
admission of certain victim-impact evidence during the pen-
alty phase of capital cases, and overruling South Carolina v. 
Gathers, 490 U. S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 
U. S. 496 (1987), which had been decided two and four years 
prior, respectively); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 
U. S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state-
sovereign immunity under its Article I commerce power, and 
rejecting the result in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U. S. 1 (1989), seven years later; the decision in Union Gas 
never garnered a majority); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority , 469 U. S. 528, 531 (1985) (holding 
that local governments are not constitutionally immune from 
federal employment laws, and overruling National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), after “eight years” of 
experience under that regime showed Usery's standard was 
unworkable and, in practice, undermined the federalism 
principles the decision sought to protect). 
The rest of the cited cases were relatively minor in their 
effect, modifying part or an application of a prior precedent's 
test or analysis. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778 
(2009) (citing workability and practical concerns with addi-
tional layers of prophylactic procedural safeguards for de-
fendants' right to counsel, as had been enshrined in Michi-
gan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U. S. 213, 227–228 (1983) (replacing a two-pronged test under 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), in favor of a traditional totality-
of-the-circumstances approach to evaluate probable cause for 
issuance of a warrant); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 4 
(1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 209 (1962) (clarifying 
that the “political question” passage of the minority opinion 
in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946), was not control-
ling law). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 423 
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. 
In sum, none of the cases the majority cites is analogous 
to today's decision to overrule 50- and 30-year-old watershed 
constitutional precedents that remain unweakened by any 
changes of law or fact. 
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Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 215, line 6: “§ 41–41–191” is replaced with “§ 41–41–191(4)(b)” 
p. 222, line 3: “§ 2(b)(1)” is replaced with “§ 2(b)(1)(7) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)” 
p. 232, n. 15, last line: “preganacy” is replaced with “pregnancy” 
p. 244, n. 29, line 4: “womb of a” is inserted before “woman” 
p. 248, n. 32, line 8: “Medical Forensics” is replaced with “Forensic 
Medicine” 
p. 272, n. 49, line 2: “Philosophical” is replaced with “Philological” 
p. 283, line 12 from bottom: “(dissenting opinion)” is replaced with “(opin-
ion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)” 
p. 303, line 15: “in case the death of such child or of such mother be thereby 
produced” is deleted 
p. 303, line 21: “of” is replaced with “or” 
p. 309, line 2 from bottom: “medical” is replaced with “medicinal” 
p. 314, n. 90: “1861” is inserted before “R. I.” 
p. 327, n. 113, line 2: “1889” is replaced with “1890” 
p. 330, n. 118: “1919” is inserted before “N. M.” 
p. 334, line 13 from bottom: “concurring in judgment in part” is inserted 
after “concurring in part” 
p. 353, line 10 from bottom: “(opinion of Roberts, C. J.)” is inserted after 
“(2007)”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 597 U. S. Part 1 Pages 215–423 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 24, 2022 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  stare decisis. A proper application of stare decisis, however, requires an assessment of the strength of the grounds on which Roe was based. The Court therefore turns to the question that the Casey plurality did not consider. Pp. 234–257. (1) First, the Court reviews the standard that the Court's cases have used …

• #3

  deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories, the ques- tion is whether the right is “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” and whether it is essential to this Nation's “scheme of ordered liberty.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (internal quotation marks omitted). The term “liberty”…

• #4

  eral repeats Roe's claim that it is “doubtful . . . abortion was ever frmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruc- tion of a quick fetus,” 410 U. S., at 136, but the great common-law au- thorities—Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone—all wrote that a post- quickening abortion was a crim…

• #5

  criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. What sharply distin- guishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions ac- knowledged: Abortion is different…

• #6

  petuated its errors, calling both sides of the national controversy to resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey necessarily declared a win- ning side. Those on the losing side—those who sought to advance the State's interest in fetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their elected representatives to adopt …

• #7

  which Casey termed Roe's central rule, has not found much support among philosophers and ethicists who have attempted to justify a right to abortion. The most obvious problem with any such argument is that viability has changed over time and is heavily dependent on factors— such as medical advances and the availab…

• #8

  consistent development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. Pp. 280–286. (4) Effect on other areas of law . Roe and Casey have led to the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines, and that effect provides further support for overruling those decisions. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S…

• #9

  decision, such as Roe, as infuenced by political considerations or public opinion. 505 U. S., at 866–867. But the Court cannot allow its deci- sions to be affected by such extraneous concerns. A precedent of this Court is subject to the usual principles of stare decisis under which adherence to precedent is the no…

• #10

  such, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., post, p. 330 and Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 336, fled concurring opinions. Roberts, C. J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 347. Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 359. Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General of…

• #11

  and Protestant Religious and Civil Rights Organizations et al. by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gannam; for the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists by Andrew C. Nichols and Sean P . Gates; for the American Center for Law and Justice et al. by Jay Ala…

• #12

  Benjamin Linton; for Reason for Life by Samuel D. Green; for Scholars of Jurisprudence et al. by Robert P . George, pro se; for Texas Right to Life by Jonathan F. Mitchell and Adam K. Mortara; for the Thomas More Society by Thomas Brejcha and Paul Benjamin Linton; for the Trinity Legal Center by Linda Boston Schlu…

• #13

  Joshua Rosenkranz, Jennifer Keighley, Rachel G. Shalev, and Elizabeth R. Moulton; for Abortion Funds and Practical Support Organizations by Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 225 Opinion of the Court tion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this grou…

• #14

  and Lena Zwarensteyn; for LGBTQ Organizations et al. by Deanne E. Maynard, Brian R. Matsui, Jamie A. Levitt, James E. Hough, Katie L. Viggiani, Shannon Minter, and Julianna Gonen; for Local Governments by Jonathan B. Miller, Jonathan K. Youngwood, Simona G. Strauss, Anne L. Morgan, Arturo G. Michel, Michael N. Feu…

• #15

  by Catherine Glenn Foster, Steven H. Aden, and Clarke D. Forsythe; for Biologists by Lynn D. Dowd; for Birth Equity Organizations et al. by Car- olyn F. Corwin; for the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association et al. by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, James A. Davids, and David A. Bruce; for Care Net…

• #16

  LONANG Institute by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A. Pentiuk; for the March for Life Education and Defense Fund by Jonathan P . Lienhard; for Organizations of Women Lawyers—Women Lawyers on Guard Inc. et al. by Mia Guizzetti Hayes, Cory M. Amron, Elaine Metlin, and Karen M. Richardson; for the Pacifc Justice Instit…

• #17

  most no sense of an obligation to try to be.” 2 At the time of Roe, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but Roe abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the e…

• #18

  of law. Paradoxically, the judgment in Casey did a fair amount of overruling. Several important abortion decisions were overruled in toto , and Roe itself was overruled in part. 10 4 See R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N. Y . U. L. Rev. 1185, 1208 (1992) (“Roe . . . halted a political process that …

• #19

  sippi asks us to uphold the constitutionality of a law that generally prohibits an abortion after the 15th week of preg- nancy—several weeks before the point at which a fetus is now regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In defending this law, the State's primary argument is that we should re- consider and overru…

• #20

  Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey's controlling opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to Roe's abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a nationa…

• #21

  abortions-after-20-weeks-of-pregnancy (stating that the claim made by Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 233 Opinion of the Court then found that at 5 or 6 weeks' gestational age an “unborn human being's heart begins beating”; at 8 weeks the “unborn human being begins to move about in t…

• #22

  The Fifth Circuit affrmed. 945 F. 3d 265 (2019). We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ––– (2021), to resolve the question whether “all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional,” Pet. for Cert. i. Petitioners' primary defense of the Mississippi Gestational Age Act is that Roe and Casey wer…

• #23

  constitutional text. It held that the abortion right, which is not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right to pri- vacy, which is also not mentioned. See 410 U. S., at 152– 153. And that privacy right, Roe observed, had been found to spring from no fewer than fve different constitutional pro- visions—th…

• #24

  precedents, which establish that a State's regulation of abor- tion is not a sex-based classifcation and is thus not subject to the “heightened scrutiny” that applies to such classifca- tions. 17 The regulation of a medical procedure that only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened constitutional scruti…

• #25

  corporates” the great majority of those rights and thus makes them equally applicable to the States. See McDon- ald, 561 U. S., at 763–767, and nn. 12–13. The second cate- gory—which is the one in question here—comprises a select list of fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. In …

• #26

  19 See also, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 148 (1968) (asking whether “a right is among those `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' ”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) (requiring “a `principle of justice so rooted …

• #27

  20 Address at Sanitary Fair at Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 18, 1864), reprinted in 7 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 301 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (emphasis deleted). 21 Four Essays on Liberty 121 (1969). 240 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court entrusts to the people's elected representa…

• #28

  Clause, Art. IV , § 2, as those “fundamental” rights “which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states”); Amar 176 (rely- ing on Corfeld to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause); cf. Mc- Donald, 561 U. S., at 819–820, 832, 854 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (reserving Page Proof Pendi…

• #29

  2 a We begin with the common law, under which abortion was a crime at least after “quickening”—i. e., the frst felt move- ment of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy. 24 The “eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone, Coke, Hale, and the like),” Kahler v. Ka…

• #30

  under the degree of felony.” Id., at 139.) Two treatises by Sir Matthew Hale likewise described abortion of a quick child who died in the womb as a “great crime” and a “great misprision.” Pleas of the Crown 53 (P. Glazebrook ed. 1972); 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (Hale). And writing near the ti…

• #31

  cide. Hale wrote that if a physician gave a woman “with child” a “potion” to cause an abortion, and the woman died, it was “murder” because the potion was given “unlawfully to destroy her child within her.” 1 Hale 429–430 (emphasis added). As Blackstone explained, to be “murder” a killing had to be done with “mal…

• #32

  we are aware of no common-law case or authority, and the parties have not pointed to any, that remotely suggests a positive right to procure an abortion at any stage of pregnancy. b In this country, the historical record is similar. The “most important early American edition of Blackstone's Commen- taries,” Dis…

• #33

  31 and thus, as one court put it in 1872: “[U]ntil the period of quickening there is no evidence of life; and what- ever may be said of the foetus, the law has fxed upon this Conductor Generalis 220 (1788) (printed in New York); Conductor Genera- lis 198 (1749) (printed in New York); G. Webb, Offce and Authority o…

• #34

  infant in ventre sa mère is regarded as a person in being.” Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129); see also Evans, 49 N. Y ., at 89; Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850); Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (1834); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, 321–322, 31 Eng. Rep.…

• #35

  trine of the necessity of a quickening”); I. Dana, Report of the Committee on the Production of Abortion, in 5 Transactions of the Maine Medical Association 37–39 (1866); Report on Criminal Abortion, in 12 Transactions of the American Medical Association 75–77 (1859); W. Guy, Principles of Forensic Medicine 133–13…

• #36

  Historical Association asserts that only 26 States prohibited abortion at all stages, but that brief incorrectly excludes West Virginia and Nebraska from its count. Compare Brief for American Historical Association 27–28 (citing Quay), with Appendix A, infra. 35 The statutes of three States (Massachusetts, New Jer…

• #37

  and continue to prohibit, [that practice].” 521 U. S., at 719. 3 Respondents and their amici have no persuasive answer to this historical evidence. Neither respondents nor the Solicitor General disputes the fact that by 1868 the vast majority of States criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See Brief…

• #38

  1973); C. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About To Arise From the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty? 17 N. Y . L. Forum 335, 337–339 (1971) (Means II); C. Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of…

• #39

  U. S., at 846 (declaring that prohibitions on “abortion before viability” are unconstitutional); id., at 887–898 (holding that a spousal notifcation provi- sion was unconstitutional). In addition, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), has been interpreted by some to protect a broad right to obtain an abortion at an…

• #40

  A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 652 (1994); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (1931) (collecting cases). The Court has recognized that inquiries into legislative mo- tives “ar…

• #41

  part and dissenting in part) (citing cases). One may disagree with this belief (and our decision is not based on any view about when a State should regard prena- tal life as having rights or legally cognizable interests), but even Roe and Casey did not question the good faith of abor- Page Proof Pending Publicati…

• #42

  motives of either those who have supported or those who have opposed laws restricting abortions. Page Proof Pending Publication 256 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court mystery of human life,” they are not always free to act in accordance with those thoughts. License to act on the ba…

• #43

  Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). Respondents and the Solicitor General also rely on post-Casey decisions like Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to marry a person of the same sex). See Brief…

• #44

  ing moral question, but they do contend that changes in soci- ety require the recognition of a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Without the availability of abortion, they maintain, people will be inhibited from exercising their free- dom to choose the types of relationships they desire, and women will …

• #45

  they typically have no doubt that what they see is their daughter or son. Both sides make important policy arguments, but support- ers of Roe and Casey must show that this Court has the authority to weigh those arguments and decide how abortion may be regulated in the States. They have failed to make that showin…

• #46

  The dissent does not identify any pre-Roe authority that supports such a right—no state constitutional provision or statute, no federal or state judicial precedent, not even a scholarly treatise. Compare post, at 370–372, n. 2, with supra, at 241, and n. 23. Nor does the dissent dispute the fact that abortion was…

• #47

  Roe were permissible exercises of state regulatory authority. And today, another half century later, more than half of the States have asked us to overrule Roe and Casey. The dis- sent cannot establish that a right to abortion has ever been part of this Nation's tradition. 2 Because the dissent cannot argue that…

• #48

  one of them. 3 The most striking feature of the dissent is the absence of any serious discussion of the legitimacy of the States' inter- est in protecting fetal life. This is evident in the analogy that the dissent draws between the abortion right and the rights recognized in Griswold (contraception), Eisenstadt…

• #49

  the States to regard a fetus as lacking even the most basic human right—to live—at least until an arbitrary point in a pregnancy has passed. Nothing in the Constitution or in our Nation's legal traditions authorizes the Court to adopt that “ `theory of life.' ” Post, at 366. III We next consider whether the doct…

• #50

  of our constitutional decisions goes astray, the country is usu- ally stuck with the bad decision unless we correct our own mistake. An erroneous constitutional decision can be fxed by amending the Constitution, but our Constitution is no- toriously hard to amend. See Art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S., at 456. Therefore,…

• #51

  the footnote that follows. 48) Without these decisions, Amer- 48 See, e. g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage), overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972); Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010) (right to engage in campaign-related speech), ove…

• #52

  U. S. 528, 530 (1985) (rejecting the principle that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce requirements, such as minimum wage laws, against the States “ `in areas of traditional governmental func- tions' ”), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Illinois v. Gates, 4…

• #53

  incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Wesberry v. Sand- ers, 376 U. S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (congressional districts should be apportioned so that “as nearly as i…

• #54

  the law.” 163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It was “egregiously wrong” on the day it was decided, see Ramos, 590 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.), and as the Solic- itor General agreed at oral argument, it should have been overruled at the earliest opportunity, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 92–93. Roe w…

• #55

  fairly be read into that document usurp the people's author- ity, for such decisions represent choices that the people have never made and that they cannot disavow through corrective legislation. For this reason, it is essential that this Court maintain the power to restore authority to its proper pos- sessors by…

• #56

  The weaknesses in Roe 's reasoning are well-known. Without any grounding in the constitutional text, history, or precedent, it imposed on the entire country a detailed set of rules much like those that one might expect to fnd in a stat- Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 271 Opinion of …

• #57

  graphs were devoted to an account of the views and practices of ancient civilizations where infanticide was widely ac- cepted. See 410 U. S., at 130–132 (discussing ancient Greek and Roman practices). 49 When it came to the most impor- tant historical fact—how the States regulated abortion when the Fourteenth Am…

• #58

  Also noted were a British judicial decision handed down in 1939 and a new British abortion law enacted in 1967. Id., at 137–138. The Court did not explain why these sources shed light on the meaning of the Constitution, and not one of them adopted or advocated anything like the scheme that Roe imposed on the coun…

• #59

  pected from a legislative body. c What Roe did not provide was any cogent justifcation for the lines it drew. Why, for example, does a State have no authority to regulate frst trimester abortions for the pur- pose of protecting a woman's health? The Court's only ex- planation was that mortality rates for abortio…

• #60

  self-awareness, the ability to reason, or some combination thereof. 50 By this logic, it would be an open question 50 See, e. g., P. Singer, Rethinking Life & Death 218 (1994) (defning a person as “a being with awareness of her or his own existence over time, and the capacity to have wants and plans for the futur…

• #61

  viability was gauged at roughly 28 weeks. See 410 U. S., at 160. Today, respondents draw the line at 23 or 24 weeks. Brief for Respondents 8. So, according to Roe's logic, States now have a compelling interest in protecting a fetus with a gestational age of, say, 26 weeks, but in 1973 States did not have an inter…

• #62

  a particular fetus's odds of surviving outside the womb must consider “a number of variables,” including “gestational age,” “fetal weight,” a woman's “general health and nutri- tion,” the “quality of the available medical facilities,” and other factors. Id., at 395–396. It is thus “only with diff- culty” that a p…

• #63

  a need to divide pregnancy into several segments with lines that clearly identify the limits of governmental power, `interest-balancing' of the form the Court pursues fails to justify any of the lines actually drawn.” Tribe 4–5. Mark Tushnet termed Roe a “totally unreasoned judicial opinion.” Red, White, and Blue…

• #64

  cases that Roe had cited. Thus, with respect to the stand- ard grounds for constitutional decisionmaking—text, history, and precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe's reasoning. The Court also made no real effort to remedy one of the greatest weaknesses in Roe's analysis: its much-criticized discussion of …

• #65

  tant consideration in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled is whether the rule it imposes is workable—that Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 281 Opinion of the Court is, whether it can be understood and applied in a consistent and predictable manner. Montejo v. Louisiana, 5…

• #66

  an insubstantial obstacle but serves little purpose. As ap- plied to a pre-viability abortion, would such a regulation be constitutional on the ground that it does not impose a “sub- stantial obstacle”? Or would it be unconstitutional on the ground that it creates an “undue burden” because the burden it imposes, …

• #67

  line between a fraction that is “large” and one that is not. Nor is it clear what the Court meant by “cases in which” a regulation is “relevant.” These ambiguities have caused confusion and disagreement. Compare Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 627–628 (2016), with id., at 666–667, and n. 11 (A…

• #68

  Chief Justice Rehnquist's prescient diagnosis that the undue- burden standard was “not built to last.” 505 U. S., at 965 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 3 The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further evidence that Casey's “line between” permissible and uncon- stituti…

• #69

  171–172 (CA4 2000). 57 Compare Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F. 3d 512, 520–535 (CA6 2021), with Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, 984 F. 3d 682, 688–690 (CA8 2021). 58 See, e. g., Bristol Regional Women's Center, P .C. v. Slatery, 7 F. 4th 478, 485 (CA6 2021); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Stra…

• #70

  of Kavanaugh, J.); Janus, 585 U. S., at –––. Members of this Court have repeatedly lamented that “no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullifcation by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion.” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 814 (O'Connor, J., dis…

• #71

  61 Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975), and Elk Grove Unifed School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 15, 17–18 (2004), with June Medical, 591 U. S., at ––– (Alito , J., dissenting), id., at ––– – ––– (Gor- such, J., dissenting) (collecting cases), and Whole Woman's Health, 579 U. S., at 632, n. 1 (Thom…

• #72

  pirical question that is hard for anyone—and in particular, for a court—to assess, namely, the effect of the abortion right on society and in particular on the lives of women. The con- tending sides in this case make impassioned and conficting arguments about the effects of the abortion right on the lives of wome…

• #73

  panic Origin, for States: November 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/ tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-585.html. 290 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Opinion of the Court that the Due Process Clause protects other rights.” Brief for United States 26 (citing Obergefell, 576 U. S. 644…

• #74

  the results we reach. But we cannot exceed the scope of our authority under the Constitution, and we cannot allow our decisions to be affected by any extraneous infuences such as concern about the public's reaction to our work. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989); Brown, 347 U. S. 483. That is true both wh…

• #75

  “infamed” a national issue that has remained bitterly divi- sive for the past half century. Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opin- ion of Scalia, J.); see also R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N. Y . U. L. Rev. 1185, 1208 (1992) (Roe may have “halted a political process,” “prolonged divisiveness,” and “defe…

• #76

  changed facts and attitudes that had taken hold throughout society.” Post, at 401. The unmistakable implication of this argument is that only the passage of time and new devel- opments justifed those decisions. Recognition that the cases they overruled were egregiously wrong on the day they were handed down was n…

• #77

  867. That has not happened, and there is no reason to think that another decision sticking with Roe would achieve what Casey could not. The dissent, however, is undeterred. It contends that the “very controversy surrounding Roe and Casey” is an impor- tant stare decisis consideration that requires upholding those…

• #78

  measured course,” which it defends based on what it claims is “a straightforward stare decisis analysis.” Post, at 348 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). The concurrence would “leave for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion at all,” post, at 353, and would hold only that if the Constitution protects a…

• #79

  viability rule cannot be defended on stare decisis grounds. The concurrence concedes that its approach would “not be available” if “the rationale of Roe and Casey were inextrica- Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 297 Opinion of the Court bly entangled with and dependent upon the viability stand- ard.” Post, at 354. …

• #80

  continue her pregnancy before viability” (emphasis added)); id., at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from mak- ing the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability” (emphasis added)). Our subsequent cases have continued to recognize the cen- trality of the viability rule. See Whole Woma…

• #81

  should end after the point at which all “reasonable” women will have decided whether to seek an abortion. While the concurrence is moved by a desire for judicial minimalism, “we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right.” Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 375 (Robe…

• #82

  Court and the country—to face up to the real issue without further delay. VI We must now decide what standard will govern if state abortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and whether the law before us satisfies the appropriate standard. A Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appro- …

• #83

  at 150; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728–731 (identifying simi- lar interests). B These legitimate interests justify Mississippi's Gestational Age Act. Except “in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality,” the statute prohibits abortion “if the probable gestational age of the unborn huma…

• #84

  Sec. 46. “Every person who shall wilfully and mali- ciously administer, or cause to be administered to, or taken by any person, any poison, or other noxious or 69 1825 Mo. Laws p. 283 (emphasis added); see also, Mo. Rev. Stat., Art. II, §§ 10, 36 (1835) (extending liability to abortions performed by instru- ment …

• #85

  Sec. 1. “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That any physician, or other person, who shall wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, substance, or thing whatever, or shall use any instrument or other means whatever, with in- tent thereby to procure the miscarriage of a…

• #86

  life of the mother, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, not more than fve years, or by fne, not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment in the county jail, not more than one year.” Sec. 14. “Every person, who shall administer to any woman, pregnant with child, whether such child shall …

• #87

  meanor, and shall be punished by imprisonment not ex- ceeding seven years, nor less than one year, in the state prison or house of correction, or common jail, and by fne not exceeding two thousand dollars.” 76 9. Michigan (1846): Sec. 33. “Every person who shall administer to any woman pregnant with a quick chi…

• #88

  be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not ex- 77 Mich. Rev. Stat., Tit. 30, ch. 153, §§ 33–34 (1846) (emphasis added). Page Proof Pending Publication 308 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Appendix A to opinion of the Court ceeding three years, nor less than one year, and pay a fne not exceed…

• #89

  hard labor not less than one year, nor more than ten years.” 80 13. New Jersey (1849): “That if any person or persons, maliciously or without lawful justifcation, with intent to cause and procure the miscarriage of a woman then pregnant with child, shall administer to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct…

• #90

  ished by confnement to hard labor in the Penitentiary not exceeding ten years.” 83 16. Louisiana (1856): Sec. 24. “Whoever shall feloniously administer or cause to be administered any drug, potion, or any other thing to any woman, for the purpose of procuring a pre- mature delivery, and whoever shall administer…

• #91

  or by both fne and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.” 85 1858 Iowa Acts p. 93 (codifed in Iowa Rev. Laws § 4221) (emphasis added). 86 Wis. Rev. Stat., ch. 164, § 11, ch. 169, § 58 (1858) (emphasis added). Page Proof Pending Publication 312 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Appendix A to o…

• #92

  any woman, pregnant or quick with child, or supposed and believed to be pregnant or quick with child, any drug, poison or other substance whatsoever, or shall un- lawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever, with the intent to procure the miscarriage of such woman, and such woman, or any child with whic…

• #93

  West Virginia's Constitution adopted the laws of Virginia when it became its own State: “Such parts of the common law and of the laws of the State of Virginia as are in force within the boundaries of the State of West Virginia, when this Constitution goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto, shall be a…

• #94

  dollars.” 95 93 Va. Code, Tit. 54, ch. 191, § 8 (1849) (emphasis added); see also W. Va. Code, ch. 144, § 8 (1870) (similar). 94 Ore. Gen. Laws, Crim. Code, ch. 43, § 509 (1865) (emphasis added). 95 Neb. Rev. Stat., Tit. 4, ch. 4, § 42 (1866) (emphasis added); see also Neb. Gen. Stat., ch. 58, §§ 6, 39 (1873) (e…

• #95

  after consulting with one or more respectable physi- Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 317 Appendix A to opinion of the Court cians, he shall be satisfed that the foetus is dead, or that no other method will secure the safety of the mother.” 96 28. Florida (1868): Ch. 3, Sec. 11. “Eve…

• #96

  nor less than three (3) years.” Sec. 2. “Any person who shall administer to any woman with child, or prescribe, or procure, or provide for any such woman, or suggest to, or advise, or procure any such woman to take any medicine, drug, substance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ, or suggest, or advise the…

• #97

  the life of such woman, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon conviction, be punished as prescribed in section 4310 of the Revised Code of Georgia.” 100 32. North Carolina (1881): Sec. 1. “That every person who shall wilfully adminis- ter to any woman either …

• #98

  any woman pregnant with child, whether such child be 101 1881 N. C. Sess. Laws pp. 584–585 (emphasis added). 102 1883 Del. Laws, ch. 226 (emphasis added). Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 321 Appendix A to opinion of the Court quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance whatever, o…

• #99

  miscarriage or abortion or premature labor of any such woman, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not more than fve years, or by fne not more than fve thousand dollars, or by such fne and imprisonment both, at the discretion of the Court; but no conviction sh…

• #100

  abort or miscarry, or attempts to procure or produce an abortion or miscarriage, unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life, shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary no less than one (1) year, nor more than ten (10) years; or if the death of the mother results therefrom,…

• #101

  produced, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty years, nor less than one year.” 107 Haw. Penal Code, ch. 12, §§ 1–2 (1850) (emphasis added). Hawaii be- came a State in 1959. See Presidential Proclamation No. 3309, 73 Stat. c74–c75. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: …

• #102

  ment in the territorial prison for a term not less than two years, nor more than fve years: Provided, That no physician shall be effected by the last clause of this sec- tion, who in the discharge of his professional duties, deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any woman in order to save her life.” 1…

• #103

  penitentiary, and fned in a sum not exceeding one thou- sand dollars; and if any woman by reason of such treat- ment shall die, the person, or persons, administering, or causing to be administered such poison, substance, or liquid, or using or causing to be used, any instrument, as aforesaid, shall be deemed guil…

• #104

  less the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punish- able by imprisonment in the Territorial prison not ex- 114 Terr. of Utah Comp. Laws § 1972 (1876) (emphasis added). Utah be- came a State in 1896. See Presidential Proclamation No. 9, 29 Stat. 876–877. 115 Dakota Penal Code § 337 (1877) (emphasis added).…

• #105

  the State of New Mexico, in consultation, deem it neces- sary to preserve the life of the woman, or to prevent serious and permanent bodily injury.” Sec. 3. “For the purpose of the act, the term “preg- nancy” is defned as that condition of a woman from the date of conception to the birth of her child.” 118 * * *…

• #106

  property. See, e. g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 623 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Other sources, by contrast, suggest that “due process of law” pro- hibited legislatures “from authorizing the deprivation of a person's life, liberty, or property without providing him the customary pro…

• #107

  ante, at 256–257, 289–290, 295, and no party has asked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amendment jurispru- dence must be preserved or revised,” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Thus, I agree that “[n]othing in [the Court's] opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents t…

• #108

  them under any plausible interpretive approach. See ante, at 240, n. 22. Moreover, apart from being a demonstrably incorrect reading of the Due Process Clause, the “legal fction” of sub- stantive due process is “particularly dangerous.” McDon- ald, 561 U. S., at 811 (opinion of Thomas, J.); accord, Oberge- fell,…

• #109

  mented. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 930 (Blackmun, J., concur- ring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, and far less manipulable, than the `undue burden' standard”). Now, in this case, the nature of the purported “liberty” supporting the a…

• #110

  while “relax[ing] purportedly higher standards of review for less-preferred rights.” Whole Woman's Health v. Heller- stedt, 579 U. S. 582, 640–642 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Substantive due process is the core inspiration for many of the Court's constitutionally unmoored policy judgments. Third, substantive…

• #111

  I write separately to explain my additional views about why Roe was wrongly decided, why Roe should be overruled at this time, and the future implications of today's decision. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 337 Kavanaugh, J., concurring I Abortion is a profoundly diffcult and conte…

• #112

  liberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as the Court today thor- oughly explains. 1 On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected repre-…

• #113

  United States. But both positions are wrong as a constitu- tional matter, in my view. The Constitution neither outlaws abortion nor legalizes abortion. To be clear, then, the Court's decision today does not out- law abortion throughout the United States. On the con- trary, the Court's decision properly leaves the…

• #114

  creation of new rights—state and federal, statutory and con- stitutional. But when it comes to creating new rights, the Constitution directs the people to the various processes of democratic self-government contemplated by the Consti- tution—state legislation, state constitutional amendments, federal legislation,…

• #115

  Court's precedents and for the accumulated wisdom of the judges who have previously addressed the same issue. Stare decisis is rooted in Article III of the Constitution and is fundamental to the American judicial system and to the stability of American law. Adherence to precedent is the norm, and stare decisis im…

• #116

  sequences, and (iii) overruling the prior decision would not unduly upset legitimate reliance interests. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). Applying those factors, I agree with the Court today that Roe should be overruled. The Court in Roe erroneously as- …

• #117

  198 U. S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), to construct a laissez-faire economy that was free of substantial regulation. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), the Court nonetheless overruled Adkins and in effect Lochner. An entire region of the countr…

• #118

  4 As the Court today notes, Casey's approach to stare decisis pointed in two directions. Casey reaffrmed Roe's viability line, but it expressly overruled the Roe trimester framework and also expressly overruled two landmark post-Roe abortion cases—Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc- tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 41…

• #119

  continued and signifcant opposition to Roe, as refected in the laws and positions of numerous States, is relevant to assessing Casey on its own terms. Page Proof Pending Publication 346 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Kavanaugh, J., concurring cut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S…

• #120

  solved uniformly, at the national level.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Court's decision today properly returns the Court to a position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, and properly restores the people's authority to resolve the issu…

• #121

  hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). Pet. for Cert. 5. Today, the Court nonetheless rules for Mississippi by doing just that. I would take a more measured course. I agree with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare de- …

• #122

  See ante, at 274–278. Roe set forth a rigid three-part framework anchored to viability, which more closely resem- bled a regulatory code than a body of constitutional law. That framework, moreover, came out of thin air. Neither the Texas statute challenged in Roe nor the Georgia statute at issue in its companion …

• #123

  tion-based Study in the United States 39 (2010) (Pregnancy Recognition). The dissent, which would retain the viability line, offers no justifcation for it either. This Court's jurisprudence since Casey, moreover, has “eroded” the “underpinnings” of the viability line, such as they were. United States v. Gaudin, 5…

• #124

  child apart.” Ibid.; see also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 135. Again, it would make little sense to focus on viability when evaluating a law based on these permissible goals. In short, the viability rule was created outside the ordi- nary course of litigation, is and always has been completely unreasoned, and fails t…

• #125

  tution does not protect a right to an abortion, it argued, and a State should be able to prohibit elective abortions if a ra- tional basis supports doing so. See Brief for Petitioners 12–13. The Court now rewards that gambit, noting three times that the parties presented “no half-measures” and argued that “we mu…

• #126

  any right to an abortion at all. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 518, 521 (1989) (plurality opin- Page Proof Pending Publication 354 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment ion) (rejecting Roe's viability line as “rigid” and “indetermi- nate…

• #127

  Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment See, e. g., Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 145–146. But simply de- claring it does not make it so. The question in Roe was whether there was any right to abortion in the Constitution. See Brief for Appellants and Brief for Appellees, in Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1971, No. 70–18. How far t…

• #128

  tional right must be treated as part and parcel of the right itself. Overruling the subsidiary rule is suffcient to resolve this case in Mississippi's favor. The law at issue allows abortions up through ffteen weeks, providing an adequate opportunity to exercise the right Roe protects. By the time a pregnant wom…

• #129

  pled basis” for this approach, ante, at 296, but in fact it is frmly grounded in basic principles of stare decisis and judi- cial restraint. The Court's decision to overrule Roe and Casey is a serious jolt to the legal system—regardless of how you view those cases. A narrower decision rejecting the misguided viab…

• #130

  leading cases, in short, provides a template for what the Court does today. The Court says we should consider whether to overrule Roe and Casey now, because if we delay we would be forced to consider the issue again in short order. See ante, at 299– 300. There would be “turmoil” until we did so, according to the…

• #131

  guards a woman's right to decide for herself whether to bear a child. Roe held, and Casey reaffrmed, that in the frst stages of pregnancy, the government could not make that choice for women. The government could not control a woman's body or the course of a woman's life: It could not determine what the woman's f…

• #132

  ty's ruling, though, another State's law could do so after ten weeks, or fve or three or one—or, again, from the moment of fertilization. States have already passed such laws, in anticipation of today's ruling. More will follow. Some States have enacted laws extending to all forms of abortion procedure, including…

• #133

  tion medications from out of State. Some may criminalize efforts, including the provision of information or funding, to help women gain access to other States' abortion services. Most threatening of all, no language in today's decision stops the Federal Government from prohibiting abortions nation- Page Proof Pen…

• #134

  familial relationships, and procreation. Most obviously, the Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 363 Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting right to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of the right to purchase and use contraception. See Griswold v. Con- necticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 4…

• #135

  jority has no good reason for the upheaval in law and society it sets off. Roe and Casey have been the law of the land for decades, shaping women's expectations of their choices when an unplanned pregnancy occurs. Women have relied on the availability of abortion both in structuring their relation- ships and in p…

• #136

  lives. Those legal concepts, one might even say, have gone far toward defning what it means to be an American. For in this Nation, we do not believe that a government control- ling all private choices is compatible with a free people. So we do not (as the majority insists today) place everything within “the reach…

• #137

  could wipe away those signifcant state claims. Ibid. The Court therefore struck a balance, turning on the stage of the pregnancy at which the abortion would occur. The Court explained that early on, a woman's choice must prevail, but that “at some point the state interests” become “domi- nant.” Id., at 155. It th…

• #138

  that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffrmed.” 505 U. S., at 846. Central to that conclusion was a full-throated restatement of a woman's right to choose. Like Roe, Casey grounded that right in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of “lib- erty.” That guarantee encompasse…

• #139

  and spiritual” questions raised by abortion in “such a defini- tive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter.” Id., at 850 (majority opinion). It could not force her to bear the “pain” and “physical constraints” of “carr[ying] a child to full term” when she would have chosen an early abortion. Id., at 852.…

• #140

  decisions more wrong. As just described, Roe and Casey invoked powerful state interests in that protection, operative at every stage of the pregnancy and overriding the woman's liberty after viability. The strength of those state interests is exactly why the Court allowed greater restrictions on the abortion righ…

• #141

  at 380–382. But only in the sphere of abortion is the state interest in protecting potential life involved. So only in that sphere, as both Roe and Casey recognized, may a State impinge so far on the liberty interest (bar- ring abortion after viability and discouraging it before). The majority's failure to underst…

• #142

  130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone); E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 50 (1644). 3 See J. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of Na- tional Policy, 1800–1900, pp. 3–4 (1978). The majority offers no evidence to the contrary—no example of a founding-era law making pre-quickening abortion a cr…

• #143

  members of our Nation. Indeed, the ratifers—both in 1868 and when the original Constitution was approved in 1788— did not understand women as full members of the community embraced by the phrase “We the People.” In 1868, the frst wave of American feminists were explicitly told—of course by men—that it was not the…

• #144

  tion, through the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause, guarantees access to contraception (also not legally pro- 374 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting tected in 1868) so that women can decide for themselves whether and when to bear a child? How is it that…

• #145

  marriage. See ibid. The Fourteenth Amendment's ratif- ers did not think it gave black and white people a right to marry each other. To the contrary, contemporaneous prac- tice deemed that act quite as unprotected as abortion. Yet the Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), read the Fourteenth Amendment t…

• #146

  roam where unguided speculation might take them.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Yet they also must recognize that the constitutional “tradition” of this country is not captured whole at a single moment. Ibid. Rather, its meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and…

• #147

  the right to marry, including to someone of another race. See id., at 847–848 (“[I]nterracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in fnding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference”). In reviewing decades and dec- ades of constituti…

• #148

  in giving the abortion issue to the States, where some can go one way and some another. But would he say that the Court is being “scrupulously neutral” if it allowed New York and California to ban all the guns they want? Ante, at 338. If the Court allowed some States to use unanimous juries and others not? If the…

• #149

  including women, owns their own bodies. So the Court has restricted the power of government to interfere with a per- son's medical decisions or compel her to undergo medical pro- cedures or treatments. See, e. g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753, 766–767 (1985) (forced surgery); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165,…

• #150

  they defne the very “attributes of personhood.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. And they inevitably shape the nature and fu- ture course of a person's life (and often the lives of those closest to her). So, the Court held, those choices belong to the individual, and not the government. That is the essence of what liber…

• #151

  505 U. S., at 897. Women were seen only “as the center of home and family life,” without “full and independent legal status under the Constitution.” Ibid. But that could not be true any longer: The State could not now insist on the historically dominant “vision of the woman's role.” Id., at 852. And equal citizen…

• #152

  woman of all choice. Id., at 850. Faced with all these connections between Roe/Casey and judicial decisions recognizing other constitutional rights, the majority tells everyone not to worry. It can (so it says) neatly extract the right to choose from the constitutional edi- fce without affecting any associated ri…

• #153

  a statement, written by another member of the majority, lamenting that Obergefell deprived States of the ability “to resolve th[e] question [of same-sex marriage] through legislation.” Davis v. Ermold, 592 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (statement of Thomas, J.). That might sound familiar. Cf. ante, at 269 (lamenting that …

• #154

  that it does not have a dog in the fght. See ante, at 263, 289. And indeed, doing so might have suggested a revolutionary proposition: that the fetus is itself a constitutionally protected “person,” such that an abor- tion ban is constitutionally mandated. The majority therefore chooses the second path, arguing th…

• #155

  do with the decisions of this Court.” Id., at 605. Score one 8 The majority briefy (very briefy) gestures at the idea that some stare decisis factors might play out differently with respect to these other con- stitutional rights. But the majority gives no hint as to why. And the majority's (mis)treatment of stare …

• #156

  venson, After Roe Decision, Idaho Lawmakers May Consider Restricting Some Contraception, Idaho Statesman (May 10, 2022), https://www.idaho statesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article261207007 . html; T. Weinberg, “Anything's on the Table”: Missouri Legislature May Revisit Contraceptive Limits Pos…

• #157

  the rule of law . “Stare decisis” means “to stand by things decided.” Black's Law Dictionary 1696 (11th ed. 2019). 388 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting Blackstone called it the “established rule to abide by former precedents.” 1 Blackstone 69. Stare decisi…

• #158

  precedent, and argues that they support overruling Roe and Casey. But none does, as further described below and in the Appendix. See infra, at 417–423. In some, the Court only partially modifed or clarifed a precedent. And in the rest, the Court relied on one or more of the traditional stare deci- sis factors in …

• #159

  about precedent. After assessing the traditional stare deci- sis factors, Casey reached the only conclusion possible—that stare decisis operates powerfully here. It still does. The standards Roe and Casey set out are perfectly workable. No changes in either law or fact have eroded the two deci- sions. And tens of…

• #160

  circumstances. See Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 441 (“No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances” in which it must apply). So, for example, the Court asks about undue or substantial burdens on speech, on voting, and on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Arizona Free Enterprise Cl…

• #161

  10 Some lower courts then differed over which opinion in June Medical was controlling—but that is a dispute not about the undue burden stand- ard, but about the “Marks rule,” which tells courts how to determine the precedential effects of a divided decision. 11 The rest of the majority's supposed splits are, shall…

• #162

  thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.” Ante, at 301. And the majority lists interests like “respect for and preservation of prenatal life,” “protection of mater- nal health,” elimination of certain “medical procedures,” “mitigation of fetal pain,” and others. Ibid. This Court will surely face cr…

• #163

  moving the Courtfrom the abortion issue, the majority puts the Court at the center of the coming “interjurisdictional abortion wars.” Id., at 3. In short, the majority does not save judges from unwieldy tests or extricate them from the sphere of controversy. To the contrary, it discards a known, workable, and pre…

• #164

  continuing division provides more of a reason to stick with, than to jettison, existing precedent. See infra, at 412–414.) In the end, the majority throws longstanding precedent to the winds without showing that anything signifcant has changed to justify its radical reshaping of the law. See ante, at 267–268. 1 …

• #165

  impose large-scale fnancial costs. The majority briefy re- fers to arguments about changes in laws relating to health- care coverage, pregnancy discrimination, and family leave. See ante, at 258–259. Many women, however, still do not have adequate healthcare coverage before and after preg- nancy; and, even when i…

• #166

  15 Dept. of Labor, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefts in the United States, Table 31 (Sept. 2020), https://www.bls.gov/ncs / gebs/ benefits/2020/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2020. pdf#page=299. 16 Safe haven laws, which allow parents to leave newborn babies in des- ignated safe spaces …

• #167

  and as we have described above, the majority's reasoning does not rely on any reevaluation of the interest in protecting fetal life. See supra, at 384, and n. 7. It is worth noting that sonograms became widely used in the 1970s, long before Casey. Today, 60 percent of women seeking abortions have at least one chil…

• #168

  children's health. See Brief for 547 Deans 23–34. The only notable change we can see since Roe and Casey cuts in favor of adhering to precedent: It is that American abortion law has become more and more aligned with other nations. The majority, like the Mississippi Legislature, claims that the United States is an…

• #169

  In sum, the majority can point to neither legal nor factual developments in support of its decision. Nothing that has happened in this country or the world in recent decades un- dermines the core insight of Roe and Casey. It continues to be true that, within the constraints those decisions estab- lished, a woman,…

• #170

  meet the bare cost of living.” Ibid. And since Adkins was decided, the law had also changed. In several decisions, the Court had started to recognize the power of States to imple- ment economic policies designed to enhance their citizens' economic well-being. See, e. g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); …

• #171

  But even setting that aside, we are not saying that a decision can never be overruled just because it is terribly wrong. Take West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, which the majority also relies on. See ante, at 265, 293. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 403 Breyer, Sot…

• #172

  Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication 404 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting society. It is, of course, true that many Americans, includ- ing many women, opposed those decisions when issued and do so now as well. Yet the fact remains…

• #173

  ity] is the absence of any serious discussion” of how its ruling will affect women. Ante, at 262. By characterizing Casey's reliance arguments as “generalized assertions about the na- tional psyche,” ante, at 288, it reveals how little it knows or cares about women's lives or about the suffering its decision will…

• #174

  right to abortion, as the majority does today, destroys all those individual plans and expectations. In so doing, it diminishes women's opportunities to participate fully and equally in the Nation's political, social, and economic life. See Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae 13 (showing that abortion availabili…

• #175

  to term. In all these situations, women have expected that they will get to decide, perhaps in consultation with their families or doctors but free from state interference, whether to continue a pregnancy. For those who will now have to undergo that pregnancy, the loss of Roe and Casey could be disastrous. That …

• #176

  turn in desperation to illegal and unsafe abortions. They may lose not just their freedom, but their lives. 27 Finally, the expectation of reproductive control is integral to many women's identity and their place in the Nation. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 856. That expectation helps defne a woman as an “equal citiz…

• #177

  government control. As Casey recognized, the right “or- der[s]” her “thinking” as well as her “living.” 505 U. S., at 856. Beyond any individual choice about residence, or edu- cation, or career, her whole life refects the control and au- thority that the right grants. Withdrawing a woman's right to choose whethe…

• #178

  consider, even if it were inclined to do so. Ante, at 288. This is to ignore as judges what we know as men and women. The interests women have in Roe and Casey are perfectly, viscerally concrete. Countless women will now make differ- ent decisions about careers, education, relationships, and whether to try to bec…

• #179

  familiar aspects of human life and liberty. Ante, at 288. All those rights, like the one here, also have a societal dimension, because of the role constitutional liberties play in our structure of government. See, e. g., Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 443 (recognizing that Miranda “warnings have be- come part of our na…

• #180

  “divisive issue.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 867–868; see Roe, 410 U. S., at 116. But Casey's reason for acknowledging public confict was the exact opposite of what the majority insinu- ates. Casey addressed the national controversy in order to emphasize how important it was, in that case of all cases, for the Court to…

• #181

  case, “Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare decisis” in “sensitive political contexts” where “parti- san controversy abounds.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 985 (1996) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice Jackson once called a decision he dissented from a “loaded weapon,” ready to hand for imp…

• #182

  eight weeks of pregnancy, and three States enacted all-out bans. 29 Mississippi itself decided in 2019 that it had not gone 29 Guttmacher Institute, E. Nash, State Policy Trends 2021: The Worst Year for Abortion Rights in Almost Half a Century (Dec. 16, 2021), https:// www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/12/state-pol…

• #183

  A Wave of Abortion Bans, But Some States Are Fighting Back (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends - 2019-wave-abortion-bans-some-states-are-fghting-back. 30 A. Pittman, Mississippi's Six-Week Abortion Ban at 5th Circuit Ap- peals Court Today, Jackson Free Press (Oct. 7, 201…

• #184

  Casey thought, could do “more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.” Ibid. For overruling Roe, Casey concluded, the Court would pay a “terrible price.” 505 U. S., at 864. Cite as: 597 U. S. 215 (2022) 417 Appendix to opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan…

• #185

  Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (holding the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict in state prosecutions for serious offenses, and overruling Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), because “in the years since Apodaca, this Court ha[d] spoken inconsistently about its meaning” and had un…

• #186

  longer be regarded as controlling”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 463–467, 479, n. 48 (1966) (recognizing that the Fifth Amendment requires certain procedural safeguards for custodial interrogation, and rejecting Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958), which …

• #187

  Additional cases the majority cites involved fundamental factual changes that had undermined the basic premise of the prior precedent. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 364 (2010) (expanding First Amend- ment protections for campaign-related speech and citing technological changes tha…

• #188

  (overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975), three years after it was decided, because of developments in the Court's double jeopardy case law, and because interven- ing practice had shown that government appeals from mid- trial dismissals requested by the defendant were practicable, desirable, and…

• #189

  federal employment laws, and overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), after “eight years” of experience under that regime showed Usery's standard was unworkable and, in practice, undermined the federalism principles the decision sought to protect). The rest of the cited cases were rela…

• #190

  p. 222, line 3: “§ 2(b)(1)” is replaced with “§ 2(b)(1)(7) (internal quotation marks omitted)” p. 232, n. 15, last line: “preganacy” is replaced with “pregnancy” p. 244, n. 29, line 4: “womb of a” is inserted before “woman” p. 248, n. 32, line 8: “Medical Forensics” is replaced with “Forensic Medicine” p. 272, n…