Arellano v. McDonough

Summary

The effective date of an award of service-related disability compensation to a veteran of the United States military determined pursuant to 38 U. S. C. §§5110(a)(1) and 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 1–14 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
January 23, 2023 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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CASES ADJUDGED 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
AT 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022 
ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the federal circuit 
No. 21–432. Argued October 4, 2022—Decided January 23, 2023 
This case concerns the effective date of an award of disability compensa-
tion to a veteran of the United States military. Approximately 30 years 
after Adolfo Arellano's honorable discharge from the Navy, Arellano ap-
plied to the Department of Veterans Affairs (V A) for disability compen-
sation based on his psychiatric disorders. A V A regional offce granted 
Arellano service-connected disability benefts after fnding that his dis-
orders resulted from trauma that he suffered while serving on an air-
craft carrier. Applying the default rule in 38 U. S. C. § 5110(a)(1), the 
V A assigned an effective date of June 3, 2011—the day that the agency 
received his claim—to Arellano's disability award. Arellano appealed, 
arguing that his award's effective date should be governed by an excep-
tion in § 5110(b)(1), which makes “[t]he effective date of an award 
of disability compensation . . . the day following the date of the veteran's 
discharge or release if application therefor is received within one year 
from such date of discharge or release.” Alleging that he had been 
too ill to know that he could apply for disability benefts, Arellano main-
tained that this exception's 1-year grace period should be equit-
ably tolled to make his award effective on or about the day after 
his discharge from military service in 1981. The V A's Board of Veter-
ans' Appeals denied Arellano's request, and the Court of Appeals 
1 
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2 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Syllabus 
for Veterans Claims affrmed. The Federal Circuit affrmed the 
judgment. 
Held: Section 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 6–14. 
(a) Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise discrete limita-
tions period set by Congress” when a litigant diligently pursues his 
rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent him from bringing a 
timely action. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10. The Court 
presumes that federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable 
tolling. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95– 
96. But this presumption is rebutted if equitable tolling is inconsistent 
with the statutory scheme. Here, the Secretary of the V A argues that 
§ 5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations and that, even if it were, any 
applicable presumption in favor of equitable tolling is rebutted by the 
statutory text and structure. The Court need not decide whether 
§ 5110(b)(1) is a statute of limitations. Even assuming that the excep-
tion sets a limitations period, there exists “good reason to believe that 
Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United 
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350. 
Section 5110(b)(1) operates as a limited exception to § 5110(a)(1)'s de-
fault rule, which states that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be 
fxed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than 
the date of receipt of application therefor.” The default rule applies 
“[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chapter”—a clause indi-
cating that Congress enumerated an exhaustive list of exceptions, with 
each confned to its specifc terms. According to the terms of the excep-
tion in § 5110(b)(1), “[t]he effective date of an award of disability compen-
sation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the veteran's 
discharge or release if application therefor is received within one year 
from such date of discharge or release.” Equitably tolling this provi-
sion would depart from the terms that Congress “specifcally pro-
vided.” § 5110(a)(1). 
The structure of § 5110—which sets out 16 exceptions that explain 
when various types of benefts qualify for an effective date earlier than 
the default—reinforces Congress's choice to set effective dates solely as 
prescribed in the text. These exceptions do not operate simply as time 
constraints, but also as substantive limitations on the amount of recov-
ery due, a structure strongly indicating that “Congress did not intend 
courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions 
into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. That 
many of the specifc exceptions refect equitable considerations height-
ens the structural inference, as does the fact that Congress generally 
capped retroactive benefts at roughly one year. When, as here, Con-

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Syllabus 
gress has already considered equitable concerns and limited the relief 
available, “additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” United 
States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49. Although hard and fast limits 
on retroactive benefts can create harsh results, Congress has the power 
to choose between rules, which prioritize effciency and predictability, 
and standards, which prioritize optimal results in individual cases. Cf. 
Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352–353. Congress opted for rules in this stat-
utory scheme, and an equitable extension of § 5110(b)(1)'s 1-year grace 
period would disrupt that choice. Pp. 6–12. 
(b) Arellano sees § 5110(b)(1) as a simple time limit and therefore a 
classic case for equitable tolling. But § 5110(b)(1) cannot be understood 
independently of § 5110(a)(1), which makes the date of claim receipt the 
effective date “[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chapter.” 
This language is an instruction to attend to specifcally enacted language 
to the exclusion of general, unenacted carveouts. Arellano relies on a 
separate exception in § 5110(b)(4)—which makes disability pension bene-
fts retroactive in certain cases where permanent and total disability pre-
vents a veteran from applying for an award at the time of disability 
onset—to argue that Congress wanted traditional principles of equitable 
tolling to apply to § 5110(b)(1). To the contrary, § 5110(b)(4) demon-
strates that Congress had on its radar the possibility that disability could 
delay an application for benefts and still Congress did not explicitly ac-
count for that possibility in § 5110(b)(1). Young v. United States, 535 
U. S. 43, distinguished. Finally, Arellano contends that the nature of the 
subject matter—veterans' benefts—counsels in favor of tolling because 
providing benefts to veterans is a context in which individualized equities 
are paramount. But the nature of the subject matter cannot overcome 
statutory text and structure that foreclose equitable tolling. Pp. 12–14. 
1 F. 4th 1059, affrmed. 
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
James R. Barney argued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the briefs was Kelly S. Horn. 
Sopan Joshi argued the cause for respondent. With him 
on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, and Deputy 
Solicitor General Stewart.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Constitutional 
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for 
Disabled American Veterans et al. by Amy F. Odom, Robert V. Chisholm,

4 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns the effective date of an award of dis-
ability compensation to a veteran of the United States mili-
tary. The governing statute provides that the effective date 
of the award “shall not be earlier” than the day on which the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (V A) receives the veteran's 
application for benefts. But the statute specifes 16 excep-
tions, one of which is relevant here: If the V A receives the 
application within a year of the veteran's discharge, the ef-
fective date is the day after the veteran's discharge. We 
must decide whether this exception is subject to equitable 
tolling, a doctrine that would allow some applications fled 
outside the 1-year period to qualify for the “day after dis-
charge” effective date. We hold that the provision cannot 
be equitably tolled. 
I 
A 
The United States offers benefts to any veteran who suf-
fers a service-connected disability. 38 U. S. C. §§ 1110, 1131. 
A veteran seeking these benefts must fle a claim with the 
V A. § 5101(a)(1)(A). “A regional offce of the V A then de-
termines whether the veteran satisfes all legal prerequi-
sites, including the requirement that military service caused 
or aggravated the disability.” George v. McDonough, 596 
U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2022). If the regional offce grants the 
application, it assigns an “effective date” to the award, and 
payments begin the month after that date. §§ 5110(a)(1), 
and Zachary Stolz; and for Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc., et al. by Mel-
anie L. Bostwick, Cesar A. Lopez-Morales, John B. Wells, and Harvey 
Weiner. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Edgewood Veterans et al. by Liam 
J. Montgomery, Charles L. McCloud, Diane Boyd Rauber, William A. 
Rivera, Leonard J. Selfon, and Linda E. Blauhut; for the Federal Circuit 
Bar Association by Nicholas F. Giove, Jonathan A. Herstoff, and Aakruti 
G. Vakharia; and for the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium 
by Angela K. Drake . 
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Opinion of the Court 
5111(a)(1). If the effective date precedes the date on which 
the V A received the claim, the veteran receives retroactive 
benefts. 
Section 5110 dictates how this date is calculated. The de-
fault rule is that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be 
fxed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be 
earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.” 
§ 5110(a)(1). This rule applies “[u]nless specifcally provided 
otherwise in this chapter.” Ibid. Sixteen exceptions in 
§ 5110 “provid[e] otherwise,” including one specifying that 
“[t]he effective date of an award of disability compensation to 
a veteran shall be the day following the date of the veteran's 
discharge or release if application therefor is received within 
one year from such date of discharge or release.” 
§ 5110(b)(1). On its face, this exception allows up to one 
year of retroactive benefts. But if the V A can treat an ap-
plication fled more than one year after discharge as if it 
had been fled within the statutory window, a veteran could 
potentially recover decades' worth of retroactive payments. 
B 
Adolfo Arellano served in the Navy from 1977 until his 
honorable discharge in 1981. Approximately 30 years later, 
the V A received Arellano's application for disability compen-
sation based on his psychiatric disorders. A V A regional 
offce found that Arellano's disorders resulted from trauma 
that he suffered while serving on an aircraft carrier that 
collided with another ship. So the regional offce granted 
Arellano benefts for his service-connected disabilities— 
schizoaffective disorder bipolar type with posttraumatic 
stress disorder. It assigned an effective date of June 3, 
2011, the day that the V A received his claim. 
Arellano appealed the regional offce's decision to the V A's 
Board of Veterans' Appeals. He acknowledged that he did 
not submit an application for benefts until June 2011. But 
he argued that the regional offce should have equitably 
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6 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Opinion of the Court 
tolled § 5110(b)(1)'s 1-year timeline to make his award effec-
tive as of the day after his discharge from service in 1981 or, 
at the latest, January 1, 1982. In support of equitable toll-
ing, Arellano alleged that he had been too ill to know that 
he could apply for service-connected disability benefts. The 
Board denied Arellano's request for equitable tolling, and the 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affrmed. 
The en banc Federal Circuit affrmed the judgment unani-
mously but divided equally on the supporting rationale. 
Half the court, adhering to Circuit precedent, maintained 
that § 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. 1 F. 4th 
1059, 1086 (2021) (Chen, J., concurring in judgment); see An-
drews v. Principi, 351 F. 3d 1134 (2003). The other half, 
rejecting Circuit precedent, reasoned that § 5110(b)(1) is sub-
ject to equitable tolling but that tolling was unwarranted on 
the facts of Arellano's case. 1 F. 4th, at 1099 (Dyk, J., con-
curring in judgment). 
We granted certiorari to resolve which side had the better 
interpretation of the statute. 595 U. S. ––– (2022). 
II 
Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise dis-
crete limitations period set by Congress.” Lozano v. Mon-
toya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10 (2014). In practice, it “pauses 
the running of, or `tolls,' a statute of limitations when a liti-
gant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraor-
dinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely 
action.” Ibid. The doctrine “is a traditional feature of 
American jurisprudence and a background principle against 
which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Boechler v. 
Commissioner, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022). Consistent with 
this jurisprudential backdrop, we presume that federal stat-
utes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling. Irwin v. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990). 
The Irwin presumption, however, is just that—a presump-
tion. It can be rebutted, and if equitable tolling is inconsist-
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Opinion of the Court 
ent with the statutory scheme, courts cannot stop the clock 
for even the most deserving plaintiff. John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008); 
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49 (1998). 
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs advances two reasons 
why § 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. The frst 
would head tolling off at the pass: He argues that § 5110(b)(1) 
is not a statute of limitations, so the presumption is wholly 
inapplicable. See Lozano, 572 U. S., at 13–14 (“[W]e have 
only applied” Irwin's presumption “to statutes of limita-
tions”). Rather than extinguishing a tardy claim (the func-
tion of a statute of limitations), § 5110(b)(1) caps the award 
for a successful claim (a different function). Brief for Re-
spondent 18–22. That it does so with reference to the time 
of fling, the Secretary says, does not convert it into a statute 
of limitations. Id., at 21. In any event, the Secretary adds, 
equitable tolling is at odds with the statutory text and struc-
ture—so even assuming that § 5110(b)(1) sets a limitations 
period, the presumption is rebutted. 
We need not address the Secretary's frst argument be-
cause the second is straightforward. The presumption is re-
butted if “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did 
not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United 
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). In this case, 
there is very good reason to draw that conclusion. Section 
5110 contains detailed instructions for when a veteran's 
claim for benefts may enjoy an effective date earlier than 
the one provided by the default rule. It would be inconsist-
ent with this comprehensive scheme for an adjudicator to 
extend effective dates still further through the doctrine of 
equitable tolling.
1 
1 Equitable tolling, a judicial doctrine, is typically applied by courts. 
See Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center , 568 U. S. 145, 158–159 
(2013). In this case, Arellano posits that the V A would apply the doctrine 
in the frst instance. Reply Brief 18–19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16–17. The 
Secretary counters that the doctrine is not presumptively available to 
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8 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Opinion of the Court 
A 
Start with the text. Section 5110(b)(1) operates as a lim-
ited exception to § 5110(a)(1)'s default rule, which states that 
“the effective date of an award . . . shall be fxed in accord-
ance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the 
date of receipt of application therefor.” The default applies 
“[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chapter”—a 
clause indicating that Congress enumerated an exhaustive 
list of exceptions, with each confned to its specifc terms. 
§ 5110(a)(1). According to the terms of the exception in 
§ 5110(b)(1), “[t]he effective date of an award of disability 
compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the date 
of the veteran's discharge or release if application therefor 
is received within one year from such date of discharge or 
release.” Equitably tolling this provision would depart 
from the terms that Congress “specifically provided.” 
§ 5110(a)(1). 
The structure of § 5110 reinforces Congress's choice to set 
effective dates solely as prescribed in the text. The statute 
sets out detailed instructions that explain when various 
types of benefts qualify for an effective date earlier than 
the default. There are 16 such exceptions—and equitable 
tolling is not on the list. See §§ 5110(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3), 
(b)(4)(A), (c), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (n). 
Notably, these exceptions do not operate simply as time con-
straints, but also as substantive limitations on the amount of 
recovery due. See, e. g., § 5110(g) (“In no event shall [an] 
award or increase [under this paragraph] be retroactive for 
more than one year from the date of application therefor or 
the date of administrative determination of entitlement, 
agencies because they possess no equitable power unless Congress grants 
it to them—which, he says, Congress has not done here. Brief for Re-
spondent 32–35. We need not settle this dispute. Our conclusion that 
the presumption is rebutted means that no adjudicator, whether an agency 
or a court, may equitably toll the effective date. 
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Opinion of the Court 
whichever is earlier”). We stated in Brockamp that an “ex-
plicit listing of exceptions” in a statute containing “detail” 
and describing “not only procedural limitations, but also sub-
stantive limitations on the amount of recovery” strongly in-
dicated that “Congress did not intend courts to read other 
unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions into the 
statute that it wrote.” 519 U. S., at 352. So too here. If 
Congress wanted the V A to adjust a claimant's entitlement 
to retroactive benefts based on unmentioned equitable fac-
tors, it is diffcult to see why it spelled out a long list of 
situations in which a claimant is entitled to adjustment— 
and instructed the V A to stick to the exceptions “specifcally 
provided.” § 5110(a)(1). 
That many of the specifc exceptions refect equitable con-
siderations heightens the structural inference. Several, in-
cluding § 5110(b)(1), apply when the event triggering the 
entitlement to benefts is disability or death—both circum-
stances in which prompt fling could be challenging for a vet-
eran or her survivors. See §§ 5110(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4)(A), (d); 
cf. Lozano, 572 U. S., at 10 (noting that equitable tolling may 
be appropriate when a person diligently pursues her rights 
but an “extraordinary circumstance prevents [her] from 
bringing a timely action”). One permits an earlier effective 
date for the award of benefts to a veteran's child, a claimant 
typically dependent on others for prompt fling. § 5110(e)(1). 
Still others permit retroactive benefts when facts change 
or new evidence emerges. See § 5110(h) (permitting retro-
active benefts when actual income would increase a pen-
sion that had been awarded based on anticipated income); 
§ 5110(i) (permitting retroactive benefts when “any disal-
lowed claim is readjudicated and thereafter allowed on 
the basis of new and relevant evidence resulting from the 
correction of” certain military records). Yet despite its at-
tention to fairness, Congress did not throw the door wide 
open in these circumstances or any other. In all but one 
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10 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Opinion of the Court 
instance, Congress capped retroactive benefts at roughly 
one year.2 
This pattern matters. That Congress accounted for equi-
table factors in setting effective dates strongly suggests that 
it did not expect an adjudicator to add a broader range of 
equitable factors to the mix. And its decision to consist-
ently cap retroactive benefts strongly suggests that it did 
not expect open-ended tolling to dramatically increase the 
size of an award. When Congress has already considered 
equitable concerns and limited the relief available, “addi-
tional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” Beggerly, 
524 U. S., at 48–49. 
Section 5110(b)(4), another disability-related exception to 
the default rule, illustrates the point. Recall that 
§ 5110(b)(1), the exception at issue here, adjusts the effective 
date of disability compensation to the day after a veteran's 
discharge from the military, so long as the V A receives the 
claim within one year of discharge. Arellano contends that 
his claim, fled 30 years after discharge, should relate back 
to the date of discharge because his disability prevented him 
2 Thirteen of the exceptions, including § 5110(b)(1), allow an effective 
date up to one year before the application-receipt date. See, e. g., 
§ 5110(b)(3) (“The effective date of an award of increased compensation 
shall be the earliest date as of which it is ascertainable that an increase 
in disability had occurred, if application is received within one year from 
such date” (emphasis added)). Two exceptions contemplate the possibility 
that the effective date of an award might stretch up to one day short of 
13 months before the application-receipt date. See §§ 5110(d) (“The effec-
tive date of an award of death compensation, dependency and indemnity 
compensation, or death pension for which application is received within 
one year from the date of death shall be the frst day of the month in 
which the death occurred”), (e)(1). The only one offering more than 13 
months of retroactive benefts concerns the death of an active-duty serv-
icemember. This provision permits an award of death compensation to 
be effective as of the month of death, no matter how long ago the death 
occurred—but still, retroactive benefts are permitted only if the V A re-
ceives the application within one year of the military's entry of a report 
or fnding of the servicemember's death. § 5110(j).

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Opinion of the Court 
from fling earlier than he did. But § 5110(b)(4), which ap-
plies to disability pensions rather than disability compensa-
tion, expressly accounts for this very concern: It makes pen-
sion benefts retroactive to the date of permanent and total 
disability if the disability prevented the veteran from apply-
ing for an award at the time of onset. §§ 5110(b)(4)(A), (B). 
The possibility that disability could cause delay was there-
fore on Congress's radar; still, Congress did not explicitly 
account for it in § 5110(b)(1). Moreover, while Arellano 
posits an open-ended grace period for § 5110(b)(1), § 5110(b) 
(4)(A) imposes a restrictive one: It applies only “if the vet-
eran applies for a retroactive award within one year” of “the 
date on which the veteran became permanently and totally 
disabled.” Why would Congress allow an unlimited grace 
period for an equitable concern unmentioned in § 5110(b)(1) 
when it established a limited grace period for the same con-
cern explicitly mentioned in § 5110(b)(4)? Tolling § 5110(b)(1) 
would single it out for special treatment; enforcing its terms 
keeps it consistent with the statutory scheme. 
The most compelling argument for equitable tolling is that 
hard and fast limits on retroactive benefts can create harsh 
results. The statutory default ties the start of benefts 
to the application-receipt date, a choice that incentivizes 
promptness and disfavors retroactive awards. The excep-
tions granting a 1-year grace period soften that choice in 
specifed circumstances, yet there are situations in which eq-
uity's fexible, open-ended approach would be more generous 
to a deserving claimant. With this in mind, Congress could 
have designed a scheme that allowed adjudicators to maxi-
mize fairness in every case. But Congress has the power to 
choose between rules, which prioritize effciency and predict-
ability, and standards, which prioritize optimal results in in-
dividual cases. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352–353 (observ-
ing that “Congress decided to pay the price of occasional 
unfairness in individual cases . . . in order to maintain a more 
workable tax enforcement system”). Congress opted for 
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12 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Opinion of the Court 
rules in this statutory scheme, and an equitable extension of 
§ 5110(b)(1)'s 1-year grace period would disrupt that choice. 
B 
Arellano contests all of this. Laser focused on 
§ 5110(b)(1), he argues that the provision's unadorned text 
contains none of the specifc, technical language that might 
otherwise rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. In ad-
dition, he emphasizes that there are “zero express exceptions 
to § 5110(b)(1)'s one-year clock,” which he describes as “fatal” 
to the Secretary's position. Reply Brief 14. As Arellano 
sees it, § 5110(b)(1) is a simple time limit and therefore a 
classic case for equitable tolling. 
If § 5110(b)(1) stood alone, there might be something to 
Arellano's argument. (Again, assuming that § 5110(b)(1) is 
a limitations period to which the Irwin presumption ap-
plies.) But § 5110(b)(1) cannot be understood independently 
of § 5110(a)(1), which makes the date of receipt the effective 
date “[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chap-
ter.” Arellano insists that the Secretary overreads “unless” 
by treating it as a signal that the enacted exceptions are 
exclusive. Brief for Petitioner 31–32. But the clause says 
more than “unless”—it says that the default applies “[u]n-
less specifcally provided otherwise.” § 5110(a)(1) (emphasis 
added). That is an instruction to attend to specifcally 
enacted language to the exclusion of general, unenacted 
carveouts. While Arellano claims to seek an equitable ex-
ception to a general rule, he actually seeks an equitable ex-
ception to an exception to a general rule. Structurally, that 
is a heavy lift. Moreover, § 5110(b)(1) is nestled within a list 
of 15 other exceptions to § 5110(a)(1)'s default rule, and, as 
we have already explained, the presence of this detailed, 
lengthy list raises the inference that the enumerated excep-
tions are exclusive. 
Arellano also resists the proposition that the express ac-
counting for disability-caused delay in § 5110(b)(4) hurts his 
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Opinion of the Court 
case. On the contrary, he insists that it works in his favor. 
Citing Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43 (2002), he main-
tains that an express tolling provision does not displace the 
presumption of tolling but rather demonstrates that a stat-
ute incorporates traditional equitable principles. Brief for 
Petitioner 37–38. According to Arellano, Congress's silence 
in § 5110(b)(1) merely shows that it wanted those traditional 
principles to apply at full strength. Ibid. ; Reply Brief 
19–20. 
We disagree. Section 5110(b)(4) does not help Arellano; 
for the reasons we have already explained, it illustrates why 
equitably tolling § 5110(b)(1) is incongruent with the statu-
tory scheme. Young is inapposite. There, we concluded 
that an “express tolling provision” for a time limit in a bank-
ruptcy statute supported equitable tolling of a different time 
limit in the same statute. 535 U. S., at 53. But that was 
largely because the express tolling provision authorized toll-
ing where equity would not otherwise have permitted it. 
Ibid. As a result, we interpreted the express tolling provi-
sion to “supplemen[t] rather than displac[e] principles of equi-
table tolling.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Here, however, 
§ 5110(b)(4) does not authorize tolling that equity would not 
otherwise have allowed. If anything, its conditional and 
narrow applicability limits tolling that might otherwise have 
occurred. Though Arellano makes a valiant effort to turn a 
negative into a positive, § 5110(b)(4) remains an obstacle to 
his interpretation. 
Finally, Arellano contends that “the `nature of the underly-
ing subject matter' ”—veterans' benefts—counsels in favor 
of tolling here. Brief for Petitioner 33–34. To support this 
proposition, he invokes Brockamp, which considered 
whether courts can equitably toll time limits for fling tax-
refund claims. 519 U. S., at 348. After holding that the 
statute's text and structure rebutted the Irwin presumption, 
we observed that the “nature of the underlying subject 
matter—tax collection—underscore[d] the linguistic point.” 
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14 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH 
Opinion of the Court 
Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. “Tax law, after all, is not nor-
mally characterized by case-specifc exceptions refecting in-
dividualized equities.” Ibid. By contrast, Arellano argues, 
providing benefts to veterans is a context in which individu-
alized equities are paramount. See King v. St. Vincent's 
Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220–221, n. 9 (1991) (“[P]rovisions for 
benefts to members of the Armed Services are to be con-
strued in the benefciaries' favor”). 
If the text and structure favored Arellano, the nature of 
the subject matter would garnish an already solid argument. 
But the nature of the subject matter cannot overcome text 
and structure that foreclose equitable tolling. Brockamp 
turned to the “nature of the underlying subject matter” only 
to “underscor[e] the linguistic point.” 519 U. S., at 352. 
Arellano, however, lacks the linguistic point. This is not a 
case in which competing interpretations are equally plausi-
ble; it is one in which Congress's choice is evident.
3 
* * * 
We hold that § 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling 
and affrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
3 We resolve only the applicability of equitable tolling to § 5110(b)(1). 
We do not address the applicability of other equitable doctrines, such as 
waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel. 
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Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
None

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 Pages 1–14 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT January 23, 2023 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  (a) Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise discrete limita- tions period set by Congress” when a litigant diligently pursues his rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent him from bringing a timely action. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10. The Court presumes that federal statutes of lim…

• #3

  into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. That many of the specifc exceptions refect equitable considerations height- ens the structural inference, as does the fact that Congress generally capped retroactive benefts at roughly one year. When, as here, Con- Page Proof Pending Publication Cite a…

• #4

  James R. Barney argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Kelly S. Horn. Sopan Joshi argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, and Deputy Solicitor General Stewart.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging…

• #5

  G. Vakharia; and for the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium by Angela K. Drake . Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023) 5 Opinion of the Court 5111(a)(1). If the effective date precedes the date on which the V A received the claim, the veteran receives retroactive benefts. Secti…

• #6

  he could apply for service-connected disability benefts. The Board denied Arellano's request for equitable tolling, and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affrmed. The en banc Federal Circuit affrmed the judgment unani- mously but divided equally on the supporting rationale. Half the court, adhering to Circ…

• #7

  tions”). Rather than extinguishing a tardy claim (the func- tion of a statute of limitations), § 5110(b)(1) caps the award for a successful claim (a different function). Brief for Re- spondent 18–22. That it does so with reference to the time of fling, the Secretary says, does not convert it into a statute of lim…

• #8

  release.” Equitably tolling this provision would depart from the terms that Congress “specifically provided.” § 5110(a)(1). The structure of § 5110 reinforces Congress's choice to set effective dates solely as prescribed in the text. The statute sets out detailed instructions that explain when various types of b…

• #9

  cf. Lozano, 572 U. S., at 10 (noting that equitable tolling may be appropriate when a person diligently pursues her rights but an “extraordinary circumstance prevents [her] from bringing a timely action”). One permits an earlier effective date for the award of benefts to a veteran's child, a claimant typically de…

• #10

  in disability had occurred, if application is received within one year from such date” (emphasis added)). Two exceptions contemplate the possibility that the effective date of an award might stretch up to one day short of 13 months before the application-receipt date. See §§ 5110(d) (“The effec- tive date of an aw…

• #11

  promptness and disfavors retroactive awards. The excep- tions granting a 1-year grace period soften that choice in specifed circumstances, yet there are situations in which eq- uity's fexible, open-ended approach would be more generous to a deserving claimant. With this in mind, Congress could have designed a sch…

• #12

  is a heavy lift. Moreover, § 5110(b)(1) is nestled within a list of 15 other exceptions to § 5110(a)(1)'s default rule, and, as we have already explained, the presence of this detailed, lengthy list raises the inference that the enumerated excep- tions are exclusive. Arellano also resists the proposition that the…

• #13

  we observed that the “nature of the underlying subject matter—tax collection—underscore[d] the linguistic point.” Page Proof Pending Publication 14 ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH Opinion of the Court Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. “Tax law, after all, is not nor- mally characterized by case-specifc exceptions refecting in-…