Cruz v. Arizona

Summary

The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding below—that Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613, did not represent a “significant change in the law” for purposes of permitting Cruz to file a successive petition for state postconviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g)—is not an adequate state-law ground supporting that judgment.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 17–38 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
February 22, 2023 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
Page Proof Pending Publication
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
OCTOBER TERM, 2022 17 
Syllabus 
CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
certiorari to the supreme court of arizona 
No. 21–846. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided February 22, 2023 
Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz was found guilty of capital murder by 
an Arizona jury and sentenced to death. Both at trial and on direct 
appeal, Cruz argued that under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 
154, he should have been allowed to inform the jury that a life sentence 
in Arizona would be without parole. The trial court and Arizona Su-
preme Court held that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme did not trig-
ger application of Simmons. After Cruz's conviction became fnal, this 
Court held in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (per curiam ), that it was 
fundamental error to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona. 
578 U. S., at 615. Cruz then sought to raise the Simmons issue again 
in a state postconviction petition under Arizona Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 32.1(g), which permits a defendant to bring a successive petition if 
“there has been a signifcant change in the law that, if applicable to the 
defendant's case, would probably overturn the defendant's judgment or 
sentence.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding 
that Lynch was not “a signifcant change in the law.” 
Held: The Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch was not a signif-
cant change in the law is an exceptional case where a state-court judg-
ment rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-
court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose 
review of the federal claim. Pp. 25–32. 
(a) This Court does not decide a question of federal law in a case if the 
state-court judgment “rests on a state law ground that is independent 
of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Cole-
man v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729. In this case the Court focuses 
on the requirement of adequacy; whether Arizona's “state procedural 
ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law,” Beard v. Kindler, 
558 U. S. 53, 60. A state procedural ruling that is “ `frmly established 
and regularly followed' ” will ordinarily “be adequate to foreclose review 
of a federal claim.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 376. This case is an 
exception, however, implicating this Court's rule that “an unforeseeable 
and unsupported state-court decision on a question of state procedure 
does not constitute an adequate ground to preclude this Court's review 
of a federal question.” Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354. 
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court's decision that Cruz's 
motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy Arizona Rule of Crimi-

18 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Syllabus 
nal Procedure 32.1(g) because Lynch did not result in “a signifcant 
change in the law.” That court reasoned that Lynch was not a signif-
cant change in the law because it relied on Simmons, which was clearly 
established law at the time of Cruz's trial. It so held even though 
Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent foreclosing Simmons relief 
for Arizona capital defendants, and even though the Arizona Supreme 
Court had previously explained that the “archetype” of a “signifcant 
change in the law” is the overruling of “previously binding case law.” 
State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178. While the 
court reasoned that a signifcant change in the application of a law is 
not the same as a signifcant change in the law itself, Arizona can point 
to no other Rule 32.1(g) decision supporting that distinction. This in-
terpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and conficts with prior Ari-
zona case law. The novelty arises from the way in which the Arizona 
Supreme Court disregarded the effect of Lynch on Arizona law. Ordi-
narily, Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) focus on how a decision 
changes the law that is operative in the State. Here, however, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court disregarded the many state precedents overruled 
by Lynch, focusing instead on whether Lynch had wrought a signifcant 
change in federal law. Because the Arizona Supreme Court's interpre-
tation is so novel and unforeseeable, it cannot constitute an adequate 
state procedural ground for the challenged decision. 
Arizona's interpretation generates a catch-22 for Cruz and other simi-
larly situated capital defendants that only serves to compound its nov-
elty. To obtain relief under Rule 32.1(g), a defendant must establish 
not just a signifcant change in the law but also that the law in question 
applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288. Prior to the 
Arizona Supreme Court's decision below, it was possible to show that 
Lynch both was a “signifcant change in the law” and satisfed retro-
activity because it merely applied Simmons. On the interpretation 
adopted below, however, the argument that Lynch applied “settled” fed-
eral law for retroactivity purposes also implies that Lynch does not 
represent a “signifcant change in the law.” Earlier Rule 32.1(g) deci-
sions did not generate this catch-22. Given the Court's conclusion that 
the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Rule 32.1(g) to Lynch is so 
novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate state proce-
dural ground, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the 
decision below is also independent of federal law. Pp. 25–29. 
(b) Counterarguments presented in this case offer various reformul-
ations of the argument that Lynch was not a “signifcant change in the 
law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but they fail to grapple with the basic 
point that Lynch reversed previously binding Arizona Supreme Court 
precedent. The fact that Lynch was a summary reversal did not justify 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 19 
Syllabus 
the Arizona Supreme Court in treating Lynch differently than other 
transformative decisions of this Court. Although Lynch did not change 
this Court's interpretation of Simmons, it did change the operation of 
Simmons by Arizona courts in a way that matters for Rule 32.1(g). 
And it makes no difference that Lynch did not alter federal law. The 
analytic focus of Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) has always been 
on the impact to Arizona law. Nor does this Court's interpretation 
forestall Arizona's ability to develop its Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence in 
new contexts. That the Arizona Supreme Court had never before ap-
plied Rule 32.1(g) to a summary reversal did not present a new context 
in this case. Finally, no effective parallel can be drawn between Rule 
32.1(g) and very different procedural rules governing federal prisoners, 
e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2255(f), (h). Pp. 29–32. 
251 Ariz. 203, 487 P. 3d 991, vacated and remanded. 
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 
C. J., and Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., 
fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, JJ., 
joined, post, p. 32. 
Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the briefs were Katherine B. Wellington, Wil-
liam E. Havemann, Jon M. Sands, and Cary Sandman. 
Joseph A. Kanefeld argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the briefs were Mark Brnovich, Attorney Gen-
eral of Arizona, Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, 
Jeffrey L. Sparks, Deputy Solicitor General, and Erin Ben-
nett, Laura P . Chiasson, and Ginger Jarvis, Assistant Attor-
neys General.* 
*Melanie L. Bostwick, Thomas M. Bondy , and Melanie Hallums fled 
a brief for Federal Courts Scholars as amici curiae urging reversal. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for the Arizona Capital 
Representation Project et al. by Elizabeth G. Bentley; for LatinoJustice 
PRLDEF et al. by Bruce H. Schneider , Lourdes Rosado, Janai S. Nelson, 
and Samuel Spital; and for the Ohio Justice & Policy Center et al. by 
Michael E. Bern, Michael L. Zuckerman, and Easha Anand. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers et al. by Noah A. Levine, Jeffrey L. Fisher , David 
D. Cole, and Jared G. Keenan; and for Jonathan F. Mitchell et al. by Adam 
K. Mortara and Mr. Mitchell, both pro se. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

20 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz, a defendant sentenced 
to death, argued at trial and on direct appeal that his due 
process rights had been violated by the trial court's failure 
to permit him to inform the jury that a life sentence in Ari-
zona would be without parole. See Simmons v. South Caro-
lina, 512 U. S. 154, 161–162 (1994) (plurality opinion); id., at 
178 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Those courts re-
jected Cruz's Simmons argument, believing, incorrectly, that 
Arizona's sentencing and parole scheme did not trigger appli-
cation of Simmons. See State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, 160, 
181 P. 3d 196, 207 (2008). 
After the Arizona Supreme Court repeated that mistake 
in a series of cases, this Court summarily reversed the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 
(2016) (per curiam ), and held that it was fundamental error 
to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona. 578 
U. S., at 615. 
Relying on Lynch, Cruz fled a motion for state postconvic-
tion relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). 
That Rule permits a defendant to bring a successive petition 
if “there has been a signifcant change in the law that, if 
applicable to the defendant's case, would probably overturn 
the defendant's judgment or sentence.” Ariz. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 32.1(g) (Cum. Supp. 2022); see also ibid. (Cum. Supp. 
2017). 
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding 
that Lynch was not a “signifcant change in the law.” 251 
Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). The Arizona Su-
preme Court reached this conclusion despite having repeat-
edly held that an overruling of precedent is a signifcant 
change in the law. See id., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994 (The 
“ `archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court 
overrules previously binding case law' ”). 
The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Ari-
zona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch was not a signif-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 21 
Opinion of the Court 
cant change in the law for purposes of Rule 32.1(g) is an 
adequate and independent state-law ground for the judg-
ment. It is not. 
I 
A 
Cruz argued at trial and on direct appeal that the trial 
court violated his due process rights under Simmons by not 
allowing him to inform the jury that the only sentencing al-
ternative to death in his case was life without parole. 
Prior to Cruz's trial, this Court had repeatedly reaffrmed 
Simmons' holding. In case after case, the Court explained 
that when “a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at 
issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available 
to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, 
due process entitles the defendant `to inform the jury of [his] 
parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in argu-
ments by counsel.' ” Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U. S. 36, 
39 (2001) (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U. S. 156, 165 
(2000) (plurality opinion)); see also Kelly v. South Carolina, 
534 U. S. 246, 248, 251–252 (2002). 
The same year this Court decided Simmons, Arizona 
amended its parole statute to abolish parole for all felonies 
committed after 1993. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41–1604.09(I) 
(1) (1994). Nevertheless, Arizona's capital sentencing stat-
ute continued to list two alternatives to death: (1) “natural 
life,” which barred release “on any basis,” and (2) “life” with 
the possibility of “release” after at least 25 years. § 13– 
751(A). Because of the elimination of parole, however, the 
only “release” available to capital defendants convicted after 
1993 was, and remains, executive clemency. 
Despite the elimination of parole for capital defendants, 
the Arizona Supreme Court held, in a series of cases 
commencing with Cruz's direct appeal, that Simmons did 
not apply in Arizona because the State's sentencing scheme 
was suffciently distinct from the one at issue in Sim-
Page Proof Pending Publication

22 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Opinion of the Court 
mons.1 That line of cases culminated in State v. Lynch, 238 
Ariz. 84, 357 P. 3d 119 (2015). There, the Arizona Supreme 
Court refused to apply Simmons on the ground that Lynch 
could have received a life sentence under § 13–751(A) and 
thus been eligible for “executive clemency” after 25 years. 
238 Ariz., at 103–104, 357 P. 3d, at 138–139. 
This Court summarily reversed in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 
U. S. 613, holding that Simmons applies with full force in 
Arizona. The Court noted that “Simmons expressly re-
jected the argument that the possibility of clemency dimin-
ishes a capital defendant's right to inform a jury of his parole 
ineligibility.” 578 U. S., at 615. The Court also observed 
that Simmons foreclosed the State's alternative argument 
that relied on the potential for future legislative reforms to 
Arizona's parole statute. 578 U. S., at 616. 
B 
In 2005, Cruz was convicted and sentenced to death for 
the murder of a Tucson police offcer. Cruz's conviction oc-
curred over a decade after the decision in Simmons, but be-
came fnal before the decision in Lynch. 
At trial, Cruz repeatedly sought to inform the jury of his 
parole ineligibility. Citing Simmons, Cruz expressed con-
cern that unless he had “the opportunity to present the miti-
gating factor that he will not be released from prison,” jurors 
would be left to “speculate” about Arizona's capital sentenc-
ing scheme and whether it allows for parole. App. 28–29. 
The trial court “conclude[d] that Simmons is distinguish-
able” and did not act on Cruz's concern. Id., at 41. 
Cruz also informed the trial court of his intent to call 
as a witness the chairman of the Arizona Board of Execu-
1 See, e. g., State v. Benson, 232 Ariz. 452, 465, 307 P. 3d 19, 32 (2013); 
State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, 293, 283 P. 3d 12, 24 (2012); State v. Chappell, 
225 Ariz. 229, 240, 236 P. 3d 1176, 1187 (2010); State v. Hargrave, 225 Ariz. 
1, 14–15, 234 P. 3d 569, 582–583 (2010); State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 18, 226 
P. 3d 370, 387 (2010). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 23 
Opinion of the Court 
tive Clemency to testify that the board no longer had au-
thority to parole any capital defendants. In response, the 
State sought to prevent Cruz from offering evidence as to 
“the prospects of parole for an inmate sentenced to life im-
prisonment.” Id., at 45. The trial court precluded the 
testimony. 
During the aggravation/mitigation phase of an Arizona 
capital trial, the jury must frst determine whether an aggra-
vating circumstance exists. The jury here found a single 
aggravating factor that Cruz knowingly killed a police off-
cer. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–703(F)(10) (2003) (re-
numbered as § 13–751(F)(8)). The jury then heard from 16 
defense witnesses who testifed to Cruz's good behavior in 
prison, his abuse and neglect as a child, his posttraumatic 
stress disorder, and his history of drug use, including around 
the time of the offense. 
After counsel made closing arguments, the judge in-
structed the jury that Cruz was eligible for three penalties: 
(1) “Death by lethal injection”; (2) “Life imprisonment with 
no possibility of parole or release from imprisonment on any 
basis”; and (3) “Life imprisonment with a possibility of parole 
or release from imprisonment” after 25 years. App. 94. 
The reference to parole was plainly wrong. See Lynch, 578 
U. S., at 615 (the only “release” available under Arizona law 
is executive clemency, not parole). The judge further in-
structed the jury that its only choice was whether or not to 
sentence Cruz to death; if the jury did not vote for death, the 
judge would then choose between the two remaining possible 
sentences. The jury sentenced Cruz to death. 
Three jurors, unprompted by Cruz, issued a press release 
the next day. The jurors explained that this had been a 
“gut-wrenching decision” and that “[t]here was not one per-
son on the jury who did not cry.” App. 144. They reported 
that they would rather have voted for life without the possi-
bility of parole, but that they were not given that option. A 
fourth juror later stated in a declaration: “If I could have

Page Proof Pending Publication
24 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Opinion of the Court 
voted for a life sentence without parole, I would have voted 
for that option.” Id., at 269. 
Cruz thereafter moved for a new trial, arguing that the 
instructions did not give the jury “an accurate and complete 
understanding of the consequences of a non-death verdict.” 
Id., at 137. The trial judge denied the motion. He con-
cluded, erroneously, that the jury had been “correctly in-
structed on the law,” and found it “entirely speculative” 
whether Cruz would be considered for parole after 25 years. 
Id., at 169–170. 
On direct appeal, Cruz again pressed his Simmons claim. 
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected it. Repeating the 
same legal error made by the trial court, the court reasoned 
that Simmons was distinguishable because “[n]o state law 
would have prohibited Cruz's release on parole after serving 
twenty-fve years.” Cruz, 218 Ariz., at 160, 181 P. 3d, at 207. 
Having raised his Simmons claim on direct review, Cruz 
was precluded from raising it again in his initial state post-
conviction petition. See Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(2). 
C 
After Cruz's conviction became fnal, this Court decided 
Lynch, thereby reaffrming that Simmons applies in Ari-
zona. Cruz then fled a successive motion for state postcon-
viction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 32.1(g). That Rule permits a successive petition for 
postconviction relief if “there has been a signifcant change 
in the law that, if applicable to the defendant's case, would 
probably overturn the defendant's judgment or sentence.” 
Cruz argued that Lynch was a signifcant change in the law 
because it “had transformative effects on previously binding 
Arizona law.” App. 387. 
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after holding 
that Lynch was “not a signifcant change in the law.” 251 
Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. As the Arizona Supreme 
Court itself noted, it had interpreted Rule 32.1(g) to require

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 25 
Opinion of the Court 
“ `some transformative event, a clear break from the past.' ” 
Id., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994 (quoting State v. Shrum, 220 
Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178 (2009)). “ `The archetype 
of such a change occurs when an appellate court overrules 
previously binding case law.' ” Ibid. Nevertheless, the Ar-
izona Supreme Court held that Lynch was not a signifcant 
change in the law because “the law relied upon by the Su-
preme Court in [Lynch]—Simmons—was clearly established 
at the time of Cruz's trial . . . despite the misapplication of 
that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at 206, 203 P. 3d, 
at 994. 
In so holding, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Cruz's 
argument that Lynch should qualify as a signifcant change 
in the law under Rule 32.1(g) “because it signifcantly 
changed how Arizona applied federal law.” 251 Ariz., at 
207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. The Arizona Supreme Court re-
sponded, without citation to any of its prior cases, that Rule 
32.1(g) requires “a signifcant change in the law, whether 
state or federal—not a signifcant change in the application 
of the law.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
This Court granted Cruz's petition for certiorari, 596 
U. S. ––– (2022), limited to the question whether the Arizona 
Supreme Court's holding that Rule 32.1(g) precluded post-
conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law 
ground for the judgment. 
II 
“This Court will not take up a question of federal law in a 
case `if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law 
ground that is independent of the federal question and ade-
quate to support the judgment.' ” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 
362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 
729 (1991) (emphasis added in Kemna)). Here the Court fo-
cuses on the second of these requirements: adequacy. 
“The question whether a state procedural ruling is ade-
quate is itself a question of federal law.” Beard v. Kindler, 
558 U. S. 53, 60 (2009). Ordinarily, a violation of a state pro-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
26 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Opinion of the Court 
cedural rule that is “ `frmly established and regularly fol-
lowed' . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal 
claim.” Lee, 534 U. S., at 376. Nevertheless, in “excep-
tional cases,” a “generally sound rule” may be applied in a 
way that “renders the state ground inadequate to stop con-
sideration of a federal question.” Ibid. This is one of those 
exceptional cases. 
In particular, this case implicates this Court's rule, re-
served for the rarest of situations, that “an unforeseeable 
and unsupported state-court decision on a question of state 
procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to pre-
clude this Court's review of a federal question.” Bouie v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354 (1964). “Novelty in 
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart re-
view in this Court applied for by those who, in justifed reli-
ance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of 
their federal constitutional rights.” NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958). This Court has 
applied this principle for over a century. See, e. g., Enter-
prise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 
157, 165 (1917) (holding that a state ground was adequate 
where it was not “without fair support or so unfounded as to 
be essentially arbitrary or merely a device to prevent a review 
of the other [federal] ground of the judgment”). And this 
Court has continued to reaffrm this important rule. See 
Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 320 (2011) (“A state ground, 
no doubt, may be found inadequate when `discretion has been 
exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable requirements 
without fair or substantial support in prior state law' ” (quot-
ing 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996) (Wright & Miller))). 
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court's decision 
that Cruz's motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy 
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). Rule 32.1(g) 
allows defendants to fle a successive or untimely postconvic-
tion petition if there has been “a signifcant change in the

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 27 
Opinion of the Court 
law.” Arizona courts have interpreted that phrase to re-
quire a “transformative event, a `clear break from the past.' ” 
Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 P. 3d, at 1178 (quoting State v. 
Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 182, 823 P. 2d 41, 49 (1991) (some 
internal quotation marks omitted)). “The archetype of such 
a change occurs when an appellate court overrules pre-
viously binding case law.” Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 
P. 3d, at 1178. 
Straightforward application of these principles should 
have led to the conclusion that Lynch was a “signifcant 
change in the law” under Rule 32.1(g). Lynch overruled 
binding Arizona precedent. Before Lynch, Arizona courts 
held that capital defendants were not entitled to inform the 
jury of their parole ineligibility. After Lynch, Arizona 
courts recognize that capital defendants have a due process 
right to provide the jury with that information when future 
dangerousness is at issue. It is hard to imagine a clearer 
break from the past. 
Instead of reaching that conclusion, however, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that Lynch was not “a signifcant 
change in the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. It 
reasoned that Lynch could not be a signifcant change be-
cause Lynch relied on Simmons, and Simmons “was clearly 
established at the time of Cruz's trial . . . despite the misap-
plication of that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at 
206, 487 P. 3d, at 994. The court added that it was not 
enough that Lynch changed how Arizona courts applied fed-
eral law because “Rule 32.1(g) requires a signifcant change in 
the law . . . not a signifcant change in the application of the 
law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995 (emphasis in original). 
This interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and in 
confict with prior Arizona case law. The State points to no 
other instance in which the overturning of binding Arizona 
precedent failed to satisfy Rule 32.1(g)'s “signifcant change 
in the law” requirement. Nor has the State identifed 
any other Rule 32.1(g) decision distinguishing between a 
Page Proof Pending Publication

28 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Opinion of the Court 
“change in the law” and a “change in the application of 
the law.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). The application of 
Rule 32.1(g) below is thus the opposite of frmly established 
and regularly followed. 
What makes the interpretation so novel is the way in 
which it disregards the effect of Lynch on the law in Arizona. 
Ordinarily, Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) focus on 
how a decision changes the law that is operative in Arizona, 
regardless of whether the intervening decision is a state or 
federal one. See, e. g., Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 119, 203 P. 3d, 
at 1179 (holding that a state decision did not satisfy Rule 
32.1(g) because it did not “overrule any prior opinion”); State 
v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206, 208–209, 386 P. 3d 392, 394–395 
(2016) (fnding a “signifcant change in the law” where a prec-
edent of this Court changed the law applied in Arizona); 
State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 540, 260 P. 3d 1102, 1105 (App. 
2011) (same); see also State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 412, 492 
P. 3d 1020, 1030 (2021) (determining that a decision of this 
Court was not a “signifcant change in the law” in part be-
cause it did not “effec[t] a change in Arizona law”). Here, 
however, the Arizona Supreme Court considered only 
whether there had been a signifcant change in federal law, 
disregarding the fact that Lynch overruled binding Arizona 
Supreme Court precedents, to dramatic effect for capital de-
fendants in Arizona. 
The consequences of the interpretation below compound 
its novelty. Arizona requires a petitioner seeking Rule 
32.1(g) relief to establish not just a “signifcant change in the 
law,” but also that the law in question applies retroactively 
under this Court's analysis in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 
(1989). See, e. g., State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 389, 64 P. 3d 
828, 831 (2003) (applying Teague). Under Arizona's long-
standing Rule 32.1(g) precedents, it is possible to satisfy both 
criteria. See, e. g., Order in State v. Rose, No. CR2007– 
149013–002, pp. 19–23 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty., Ariz., Aug. 
14, 2020) (determining in another case, prior to the decision 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 29 
Opinion of the Court 
below, that Lynch was both a “signifcant change in the law” 
and satisfed retroactivity because it “merely applied the rule 
of Simmons”). On the interpretation adopted below, how-
ever, it is impossible for Cruz, and similarly situated capital 
defendants, to obtain relief. To show retroactivity, Cruz 
argued before the Arizona Supreme Court that Lynch ap-
plied “settled” federal law. Under the decision below, how-
ever, that same argument implies that Lynch was not a 
“signifcant change in the law.” The fact that the Arizona 
Supreme Court's decision in this case generates this catch-
22, whereas earlier Rule 32.1(g) decisions did not, further 
underscores the novelty of the decision and its departure 
from pre-existing Arizona Supreme Court law. 
Under these unusual circumstances, the Arizona Supreme 
Court's application of Rule 32.1(g) to Lynch was so novel 
and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate state 
procedural ground. It is therefore not necessary to reach 
the further issue whether the decision below is independent 
of federal law.
2 
III 
The State and the dissent offer various reformulations of 
the argument that Lynch was not a “signifcant change in 
the law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but each fails to grapple 
with the basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding 
Arizona Supreme Court precedent. 
Both the State and the dissent argue that the Arizona Su-
preme Court was justifed in treating Lynch differently than 
other transformative decisions of this Court, such as Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), and Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U. S. 356 (2010), because Lynch was a summary reversal and 
so did not “impos[e] a new or changed interpretation of state 
2 The Court also does not need to reach Cruz's additional arguments that 
the decision below refects an attitude of hostility toward Simmons v. 
South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion), and Lynch v. Ari-
zona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam ), and impermissibly discriminates 
against federal law by nullifying Cruz's rights under Simmons. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
30 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Opinion of the Court 
or federal law.” Brief for Respondent 12. As the dissent 
puts the argument: Lynch “did not change the law in Ari-
zona.” Post, at 37 (opinion of Barrett, J.). 
These arguments miss the point. While Lynch did not 
change this Court's interpretation of Simmons, it did change 
the operative (and mistaken) interpretation of Simmons by 
Arizona courts . Lynch thus changed the law in Arizona in 
the way that matters for purposes of Rule 32.1(g): It over-
ruled previously binding Arizona Supreme Court precedent 
preventing capital defendants from informing the jury of 
their parole ineligibility.
3 
Contrary to the dissent, post, at 34–35, it makes no differ-
ence that Lynch did not alter federal law. While Arizona 
Supreme Court decisions applying Rule 32.1(g) to federal de-
cisions such as Ring and Padilla have understandably noted 
the effect those decisions had on both federal and state law, 
the analytic focus of Arizona courts has always been on the 
impact to Arizona law. See supra, at 28; see also Towery, 
204 Ariz., at 390, 64 P. 3d, at 832 (Ring “imposes a new bur-
den on the state. Thus we conclude that Ring [satisfes Rule 
32.1(g)]”). That focus is unsurprising given that Rule 
32.1(g) is a state procedural rule governing the availability 
of state postconviction relief in state court. 
The State next objects that a decision against it would 
forestall Arizona's ability to “fesh out” its Rule 32.1(g) juris-
prudence in new contexts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. That is in-
correct. The Arizona Supreme Court is free to extend its 
prior Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence, including by applying the 
Rule to new situations as they arise. What the Arizona Su-
preme Court cannot do is foreclose federal review by adopt-
3 At oral argument, the State also argued that Lynch, at the very least, 
was not a “signifcant” change in the law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–36. By 
any measure, though, Lynch was a “transformative event,” State v. 
Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178 (2009), in Arizona. In fact, 
the State conceded Lynch was a “clear break” from the past in Arizona 
courts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36.

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 31 
Opinion of the Court 
ing a “ `novel and unforeseeable' ” approach to Rule 32.1(g) 
that lacks “ `fair or substantial support in prior state law.' ” 
Walker, 562 U. S., at 320 (quoting 16B Wright & Miller 
§ 4026, at 386). 
The dissent argues that this case did present a new con-
text because the Arizona Supreme Court had never before 
applied Rule 32.1(g) to a summary reversal. There was no 
reason, however, to treat this case any differently than past 
cases. Whereas the Arizona Supreme Court had previously 
looked to the effect of an intervening federal or state deci-
sion on Arizona law, supra, at 28, here it focused exclusively 
on whether there had been a change in federal law. The 
court thus disregarded that Lynch overruled “previously 
binding case law” in Arizona, the “archetype” of a signifcant 
change in the law. Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 P. 3d, at 
1178.
4 
Finally, the dissent attempts to draw a parallel between 
Rule 32.1(g) and certain procedural rules governing federal 
4 The Arizona Supreme Court claims it was acting consistently with its 
Shrum decision in this case. 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. That 
assertion does not stand up under inspection. In Shrum, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that an Arizona decision did not constitute a “signif-
cant change in the law” because it “did not change any interpretation of 
Arizona constitutional law . . . and no precedent was overruled, all of which 
meant `the law remained precisely the same.' ” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 
P. 3d, at 995 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 119, 203 P. 3d, at 1179). In 
this case, the court reasoned it was acting consistently with Shrum be-
cause Lynch “did not change any interpretation of federal constitutional 
law . . . and no Supreme Court precedent was overruled or modifed.” 
251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. The language used, however, reveals 
the inconsistency. While in Shrum the Arizona Supreme Court looked 
for a change in Arizona law, including whether any “precedent was over-
ruled,” in this case the court instead asked only whether federal law had 
changed or whether federal “Supreme Court precedent was overruled.” 
No precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States was overruled, 
but precedent of the Arizona Supreme Court certainly was. Under the 
Arizona Supreme Court's ordinary approach, then, there was a “signifcant 
change in the law.” 
Page Proof Pending Publication

32 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
prisoners seeking to fle delayed or successive § 2255 mo-
tions. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2255(f), (h). The parallel breaks 
down, however, because the rules are different. Unlike 
§ 2255(h)(2), which requires “a new rule of [federal] constitu-
tional law,” and § 2255(f)(3), which requires a right “newly 
recognized by the [U. S.] Supreme Court,” the relevant por-
tion of Arizona's Rule 32.1(g) simply requires “a signifcant 
change in the law.” As the Arizona Supreme Court has re-
peatedly interpreted that Rule, Lynch should qualify be-
cause it overruled binding Arizona precedent, creating a 
clear break from the past in Arizona courts. The Arizona 
Supreme Court's contrary decision was unprecedented and 
unforeseeable. Only violations of state rules that are 
“ `frmly established and regularly followed' . . . will be ade-
quate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee, 534 U. S., 
at 376. That standard is not met here. 
* * * 
In exceptional cases where a state-court judgment rests 
on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural decision 
lacking fair or substantial support in prior state law, that 
decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal ques-
tion. The Arizona Supreme Court applied Rule 32.1(g) in a 
manner that abruptly departed from and directly conficted 
with its prior interpretations of that Rule. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is vacated, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Thomas, Justice 
Alito, and Justice Gorsuch join, dissenting. 
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is 
the product of two fundamental features of our jurisdiction. 
First, this Court is powerless to revise a state court's inter-
pretation of its own law. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 33 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
636 (1875). We thus cannot disturb state-court rulings on 
state-law questions that are independent of federal law. 
Second, Article III empowers federal courts to render judg-
ments, not advisory opinions. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 
(1792). So if an independent state ground of decision is ade-
quate to sustain the judgment, we lack jurisdiction over the 
entire dispute. Anything we said about alternative federal 
grounds would not affect the ultimate resolution of the case 
and would therefore be advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 
117, 126 (1945). 
The Court holds that the Arizona Supreme Court's appli-
cation of Rule 32.1(g) is inadequate to support the judgment 
below. That assertion is jarring, because the bar for fnding 
inadequacy is extraordinarily high. When, as here, the ar-
gument is based on the state court's inconsistent or novel 
application of its law, the bar is met only by a decision so 
blatantly disingenuous that it reveals hostility to federal 
rights or those asserting them. See Walker v. Martin, 562 
U. S. 307, 321 (2011). Given the respect we owe state courts, 
that is not a conclusion we should be quick to draw—and 
ordinarily, we are not quick to draw it. 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson illustrates how un-
principled a state-court decision must be before we treat it 
as inadequate. 357 U. S. 449 (1958). There, the NAACP 
asked the Alabama Supreme Court to vacate a civil contempt 
order as unconstitutional. That court denied review on the 
ground that the NAACP had improperly pursued a writ of 
certiorari, when it should have sought a writ of mandamus. 
Id., at 454–455. We held this procedural ruling inadequate 
because it was irreconcilable with the Alabama Supreme 
Court's “past unambiguous holdings.” Id., at 456. Though 
a multitude of that court's own precedents contradicted its 
ruling, one in particular stood out: The court had evaluated 
similar constitutional claims brought by a petitioner in ca-
hoots with the Ku Klux Klan, even though he had also pur-
sued a writ of certiorari. Id., at 456–457. The subtext of

34 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
the Alabama Supreme Court's decision unmistakably re-
vealed its hostility toward the NAACP's federal rights. See 
also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 425 (1991) (Georgia Su-
preme Court decision was inadequate because it applied 
precedent that was inapplicable “by its own terms”); Barr v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149–150 (1964) (South Caro-
lina Supreme Court ruling was inadequate because that 
court had proceeded differently in an “identical” case a few 
weeks later). 
Today's Court, while admitting that the novelty prong of 
inadequacy is “reserved for the rarest of situations,” ante, at 
26, concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court's application 
of Rule 32.1(g) falls in the same category as Patterson. I 
respectfully disagree. Unlike the state courts in cases like 
Patterson, the Arizona Supreme Court did not contradict its 
own settled law. Instead, it confronted a new question and 
gave an answer reasonably consistent with its precedent. 
The ordinary rule in Arizona is that criminal defendants 
must present any constitutional challenges on direct review 
or in a timely postconviction-review petition. Ariz. Rules 
Crim. Proc. 32.2(a), 32.4(b)(3)(A) (2020). Rule 32.1(g) allows 
a second or delayed bite at the postconviction-relief apple 
when “there has been a signifcant change in the law that, if 
applicable to the defendant's case, would probably overturn 
the defendant's judgment or sentence.” 
On several occasions, the Arizona Supreme Court has ad-
dressed whether an intervening judicial decision constitutes 
a “signifcant change in the law” for purposes of Rule 32.1(g). 
For instance, it has considered whether this Court's decisions 
signifcantly changed the content of federal law. E. g., State 
v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 412, 492 P. 3d 1020, 1030 (2021) (a 
decision that “affrmed the Supreme Court's jurisprudence” 
was not a signifcant change); State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 
206, 209, 386 P. 3d 392, 395 (2016); see also State v. Poblete, 
227 Ariz. 537, 540, 260 P. 3d 1102, 1105 (App. 2011). It has 
also analyzed whether intervening state-court decisions sig-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 35 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
nifcantly changed Arizona law. E. g., State v. Shrum, 220 
Ariz. 115, 119–120, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1179–1180 (2009); State v. 
Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 179, 182, 823 P. 2d 41, 46, 49 (1991); 
State v. Rendon, 161 Ariz. 102, 104, 776 P. 2d 353, 355 (1989). 
Cruz's case, however, raised a question of frst impression: 
whether a “signifcant change” occurs when an intervening 
decision reaffrms existing law, but rectifes an erroneous ap-
plication of that law. That was the effect of Lynch v. Ari-
zona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam ), which corrected the 
Arizona Supreme Court's application of Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994), and its progeny. An inter-
vening decision like Lynch, which undisputedly did not 
change any legal doctrine, has no analog in Arizona's Rule 
32.1(g) jurisprudence. See ante, at 24 (Lynch “reaffrm[ed] 
that Simmons applies in Arizona” (emphasis added)). So 
the Arizona Supreme Court devised a rule: “Rule 32.1(g) re-
quires a signifcant change in the law, whether state or fed-
eral—not a signifcant change in the application of the law.” 
251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). By that stand-
ard, Lynch did not satisfy Rule 32.1(g). 251 Ariz., at 207, 
487 P. 3d, at 995. 
The Court criticizes the “novelty” of the Arizona Supreme 
Court's law versus application-of-law distinction, as it does 
not appear in any other Arizona precedent. Ante, at 27–28. 
A point that deserves emphasis at the outset: Novelty does 
not mean that a rule is inadequate merely because a state 
court announced it for the frst time in the decision under 
review, and I do not understand the Court to suggest other-
wise. Legal systems based on precedent depend on cases to 
present novel fact patterns, which enable courts to articulate 
new principles of law or to clarify old ones with greater pre-
cision. Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 65 (2009) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). We do a disservice to that mode of legal 
development when we “disregard a state procedural ground 
that was not in all respects explicit before the case when it 
was frst announced”—unless, of course, the decision demon-

Page Proof Pending Publication
36 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
strates “a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guaran-
tees.” Ibid. That is why we have been careful to explain 
that, in the inadequacy context, a decision is “ `novel' ” only 
when it was wholly “ `unforeseeable' ” and lacked any “ `fair 
or substantial support in prior state law.' ” Walker, 562 
U. S., at 320 (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996)). 
The Court's real objection is that it thinks the Arizona 
Supreme Court violated its own Rule 32.1(g) precedent by 
holding that Lynch is not a signifcant change in law. For 
one, the Court says, the Arizona Supreme Court has pre-
viously explained that “ `[t]he archetype' ” of a signifcant 
change occurs “ `when an appellate court overrules pre-
viously binding case law,' ” and Lynch overruled binding Ari-
zona case law. Ante, at 27 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 
203 P. 3d, at 1178). In isolation, that language does suggest 
that Lynch is a “signifcant change” for purposes of Rule 
32.1(g). Context, however, shows there is more to the story: 
Shrum illustrated its point with the example of Ring v. Ari-
zona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), which was a signifcant change 
because it overruled our contrary decision in Walton v. Ari-
zona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990). 220 Ariz., at 118–119, 203 P. 3d, 
at 1178–1179 (citing State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 390, 64 
P. 3d 828, 832 (2003)). Unlike Lynch, Ring changed the 
governing legal doctrine, not a mistaken application of that 
doctrine. So Shrum's reasoning is not inconsistent with the 
result below. 
The Court also asserts that Arizona courts typically ana-
lyze how an intervening decision affects the law in Arizona, 
so by that logic, decisions like Lynch that change the law's 
on-the-ground application in Arizona constitute grounds for 
relief under Rule 32.1(g). Ante, at 28. I do not read the 
Arizona Supreme Court's “past unambiguous holdings” to 
say as much. Patterson, 357 U. S., at 456. The closest ex-
ample the Court offers is State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206, 
386 P. 3d 392 (2016), in which the Arizona Supreme Court

Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 37 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
considered whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460 (2012), 
constituted a signifcant change in law. 241 Ariz., at 208, 
386 P. 3d, at 394. The court observed that pre-Miller , “Ari-
zona law” allowed trial courts to impose life sentences on 
juveniles “without distinguishing crimes that refected `ir-
reparable corruption' rather than the `transient immaturity 
of youth.' ” Valencia, 241 Ariz., at 209, 386 P. 3d, at 395. 
Miller, in holding that trial courts must weigh such consider-
ations before imposing a life sentence on juveniles, changed 
Eighth Amendment doctrine and therefore changed the law 
in Arizona. 241 Ariz., at 209, 386 P. 3d, at 395; see also 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. 190, 208, 212 (2016). 
Lynch, by contrast, did not change the content of federal law 
and therefore did not change the law in Arizona. 
If the Arizona Supreme Court's distinction between a 
change in law and a change in the application of law seems 
familiar, it should—federal habeas law draws the same line. 
Take everything about this case and transplant it to federal 
court: A federal defendant is wrongfully denied a Simmons 
instruction, the Court of Appeals's understanding of Sim-
mons is later summarily reversed in Lynch, and the defend-
ant (now a prisoner) then tries to obtain the beneft of Lynch 
through a successive or delayed motion for postconviction 
relief.* In this scenario, the federal prisoner faces the same 
dilemma that Cruz faces in Arizona. Pre-Lynch, the Court 
of Appeals was unreceptive to the Simmons claim. Post-
Lynch, the prisoner's claim is procedurally barred: Lynch is 
not “a new rule of constitutional law” or a “newly recog-
nized” right because it merely applies an old rule, Simmons. 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2255(f)(3), (h)(2). If federal law limits a prison-
er's Simmons claim to an initial, timely motion, we should 
not be surprised that Arizona has made a similar choice. 
*This hypothetical is inapposite to Cruz's pending federal habeas action, 
which appears to be a timely, initial federal fling. See Cruz v. Ryan, 2018 
WL 1524026, *3 (D Ariz., Mar. 28, 2018), appeal docketed sub nom. Cruz 
v. Credio, No. 21–99005 (CA9, Apr. 22, 2021). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

38 CRUZ v. ARIZONA 
Barrett, J., dissenting 
And we have cautioned before that “[f]ederal habeas courts 
must not lightly `disregard state procedural rules that are 
substantially similar to those to which we give full force in 
our own courts.' ” Johnson v. Lee, 578 U. S. 605, 609 (2016) 
(per curiam ) (quoting Kindler, 558 U. S., at 62). 
The Court makes a case for why the Arizona Supreme 
Court's interpretation of its own precedent is wrong. If I 
were on the Arizona Supreme Court, I might agree. But 
that call is not within our bailiwick. Our job is to determine 
whether the Arizona Supreme Court's decision is defensible, 
and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in mak-
ing that judgment. Cases of inadequacy are extremely rare, 
and this is not one. I respectfully dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
None

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 Pages 17–38 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT February 22, 2023 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to no…

• #2

  ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law,” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 60. A state procedural ruling that is “ `frmly established and regularly followed' ” will ordinarily “be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 376. This case is an exception, however, i…

• #3

  elty. To obtain relief under Rule 32.1(g), a defendant must establish not just a signifcant change in the law but also that the law in question applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288. Prior to the Arizona Supreme Court's decision below, it was possible to show that Lynch both was a “signifcant c…

• #4

  C. J., and Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined, post, p. 32. Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Katherine B. Wellington, Wil- liam E. Havemann, Jon M. Sands, and Cary Sandma…

• #5

  Relying on Lynch, Cruz fled a motion for state postconvic- tion relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). That Rule permits a defendant to bring a successive petition if “there has been a signifcant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant's case, would probably overturn the defendant…

• #6

  the possibility of “release” after at least 25 years. § 13– 751(A). Because of the elimination of parole, however, the only “release” available to capital defendants convicted after 1993 was, and remains, executive clemency. Despite the elimination of parole for capital defendants, the Arizona Supreme Court held,…

• #7

  225 Ariz. 229, 240, 236 P. 3d 1176, 1187 (2010); State v. Hargrave, 225 Ariz. 1, 14–15, 234 P. 3d 569, 582–583 (2010); State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 18, 226 P. 3d 370, 387 (2010). Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 23 Opinion of the Court tive Clemency to …

• #8

  voted for a life sentence without parole, I would have voted for that option.” Id., at 269. Cruz thereafter moved for a new trial, arguing that the instructions did not give the jury “an accurate and complete understanding of the consequences of a non-death verdict.” Id., at 137. The trial judge denied the motion…

• #9

  at the time of Cruz's trial . . . despite the misapplication of that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at 206, 203 P. 3d, at 994. In so holding, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Cruz's argument that Lynch should qualify as a signifcant change in the law under Rule 32.1(g) “because it signifcantly changed …

• #10

  ance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958). This Court has applied this principle for over a century. See, e. g., Enter- prise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 165 …

• #11

  change in the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. It reasoned that Lynch could not be a signifcant change be- cause Lynch relied on Simmons, and Simmons “was clearly established at the time of Cruz's trial . . . despite the misap- plication of that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at 206, 487 P. 3d,…

• #12

  The consequences of the interpretation below compound its novelty. Arizona requires a petitioner seeking Rule 32.1(g) relief to establish not just a “signifcant change in the law,” but also that the law in question applies retroactively under this Court's analysis in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). See, e. …

• #13

  2 The Court also does not need to reach Cruz's additional arguments that the decision below refects an attitude of hostility toward Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion), and Lynch v. Ari- zona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam ), and impermissibly discriminates against federal law by…

• #14

  the State conceded Lynch was a “clear break” from the past in Arizona courts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Cite as: 598 U. S. 17 (2023) 31 Opinion of the Court ing a “ `novel and unforeseeable' ” approach to Rule 32.1(g) that lacks “ `fair or substantial support in prior state law.' ” Walker, 562 U. S., at 320 (quoting …

• #15

  Arizona Supreme Court's ordinary approach, then, there was a “signifcant change in the law.” Page Proof Pending Publication 32 CRUZ v. ARIZONA Barrett, J., dissenting prisoners seeking to fle delayed or successive § 2255 mo- tions. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2255(f), (h). The parallel breaks down, however, because the …

• #16

  quate to sustain the judgment, we lack jurisdiction over the entire dispute. Anything we said about alternative federal grounds would not affect the ultimate resolution of the case and would therefore be advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 126 (1945). The Court holds that the Arizona Supreme Court's appli-…

• #17

  26, concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Rule 32.1(g) falls in the same category as Patterson. I respectfully disagree. Unlike the state courts in cases like Patterson, the Arizona Supreme Court did not contradict its own settled law. Instead, it confronted a new question and gave an answer r…

• #18

  that Simmons applies in Arizona” (emphasis added)). So the Arizona Supreme Court devised a rule: “Rule 32.1(g) re- quires a signifcant change in the law, whether state or fed- eral—not a signifcant change in the application of the law.” 251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). By that stand- ard, Lynch did …

• #19

  Shrum illustrated its point with the example of Ring v. Ari- zona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), which was a signifcant change because it overruled our contrary decision in Walton v. Ari- zona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990). 220 Ariz., at 118–119, 203 P. 3d, at 1178–1179 (citing State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 390, 64 P. 3d 828, …

• #20

  relief.* In this scenario, the federal prisoner faces the same dilemma that Cruz faces in Arizona. Pre-Lynch, the Court of Appeals was unreceptive to the Simmons claim. Post- Lynch, the prisoner's claim is procedurally barred: Lynch is not “a new rule of constitutional law” or a “newly recog- nized” right because…