Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.

Summary

Nothing in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act—including its jurisdictional provision, 48 U. S. C. §2126(a)—categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico enjoys from legal claims.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 598 U. S. Part 2 
Pages 339–355 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 11, 2023 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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339 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022 
Syllabus 
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT 
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO v. CENTRO DE 
PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the rst circuit 
No. 22–96. Argued January 11, 2023—Decided May 11, 2023 
In 2016, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and 
Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U. S. C. § 2101 et seq., to deal 
with a fscal crisis in Puerto Rico brought about by soaring public debt. 
PROMESA establishes a system for overseeing Puerto Rico's fnances, 
while also enabling the Commonwealth to gain bankruptcy protections 
similar to those available under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. See Fi-
nancial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius 
Investment, LLC, 590 U. S. –––, –––. The statute creates the Financial 
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico—petitioner in this 
case—as an “entity within the territorial government” of Puerto Rico. 
§ 2121(c)(1). Under PROMESA, the Board approves the Common-
wealth's fscal plans and budgets, supervises its borrowing, and rep-
resents Puerto Rico in so-called Title III cases—judicial debt-
restructuring proceedings modeled on federal bankruptcy proceedings. 
Beginning in 2016, respondent Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. 
(CPI)—a nonproft media organization that has reported on Puerto 
Rico's fscal crisis—asked the Board to release various documents relat-
ing to its work. When CPI's requests went unfulflled, it sued the 
Board in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico, citing a pro-
vision of the Puerto Rican Constitution interpreted to guarantee a right 
of access to public records. The Board moved to dismiss on sovereign 
immunity grounds, but the District Court rejected that defense. The 
First Circuit affrmed. The court began by citing Circuit precedent 
that Puerto Rico enjoys sovereign immunity, and it assumed without 
deciding that the Board shares in that immunity. But it then held that 
PROMESA—particularly its jurisdictional provision, Section 2126(a)— 
clearly abrogates the Board's immunity. 
Held: Nothing in PROMESA—including its jurisdictional provision, Sec-
tion 2126(a)—categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Board 
enjoys from legal claims. This Court assumes without deciding that 
Puerto Rico is immune from suit in United States district court, and 
that the Board partakes of that immunity. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7.

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340 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Syllabus 
This Court has often held that Congress must make its intent to abro-
gate sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73. The Court 
has applied that clear-statement rule in cases naming the federal gov-
ernment, States, and Indian tribes as defendants. And it has found 
that standard met in only two situations: when a statute says, in so 
many words, that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity, e. g., 
35 U. S. C. § 296(a), and when a statute creates a cause of action and 
authorizes suit against a government on that claim, see, e. g., Kimel, 
528 U. S., at 73–74. PROMESA fts neither of these molds. Except 
by reference to the Bankruptcy Code in Title III debt-restructuring 
proceedings, see 11 U. S. C. § 106(a); 48 U. S. C. § 2161(a), PROMESA 
does not provide that the Board or Puerto Rico is subject to suit. Nor 
does PROMESA create any cause of action for use against the Board or 
Puerto Rico. Thus, Congress has not, through a means this Court has 
recognized, “ma[de] its intention” to abrogate immunity “unmistakably 
clear.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73. 
CPI claims to identify the required clear statement in PROMESA's 
establishment of a judicial review scheme. Section 2126(a) provides 
that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise 
arising out of” PROMESA, “shall be brought” in the Federal District 
Court for Puerto Rico. In CPI's view, that provision—especially when 
combined with Section 2126(c)'s allusion to “declaratory or injunctive 
relief against the Oversight Board”—contemplates that the Board would 
be subject to suit in federal court. But those provisions serve a func-
tion even absent a categorical abrogation of immunity, in cases where 
the Board's immunity has been waived or abrogated by other statutes. 
For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act abrogates the immunity 
of “governments” and “governmental agencies” from all actions it au-
thorizes. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(a)–(b). If a Board employee were fred 
because of race, Section 2126(a) would tell the employee where to bring 
the suit and Section 2126(c) would govern the timing of injunctive and 
declaratory relief. Nor do protections that PROMESA provides the 
Board from litigation fll the gap. Again, CPI is wrong to think those 
provisions “superfuous” unless PROMESA generally abrogates the 
Board's immunity. Section 2125's protection of Board members from 
monetary liability would do work whenever some other law abrogated 
or waived the Board's immunity from specifc claims. In such a case, 
the claim could go forward, but Section 2125 would stop the award 
of money damages. And Section 2126(e)'s bar on challenges to the 
Board's fscal and budgetary decisions would do work whenever a plain-
tiff sought to get around the Board's sovereign immunity via an 
Ex parte Young action against an individual Board member. See Vir-

341 
Cite as: 598 U. S. 339 (2023) 
Syllabus 
ginia Offce for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 
254–255. 
In short, nothing in PROMESA makes Congress's intent to abrogate 
the Board's sovereign immunity unmistakably clear. The statute does 
not explicitly strip the Board of immunity or expressly authorize the 
bringing of claims against the Board. And its judicial review provi-
sions and liability protections are compatible with the Board's generally 
retaining sovereign immunity. Pp. 345–351. 
35 F. 4th 1, reversed and remanded. 
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, 
JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 351. 
Mark D. Harris argued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the briefs were Martin J. Bienenstock, Shiloh A. 
Rainwater, Timothy W. Mungovan, John E. Roberts, Wil-
liam D. Dalsen, and Lucas Kowalczyk. 
Aimee W. Brown argued the cause for the United States 
as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With her on the brief 
were Solicitor General Prelogar, Deputy Solicitor General 
Kneedler, and Michael S. Raab. 
Sarah M. Harris argued the cause for respondent. With 
her on the brief were Lisa S. Blatt, Judith Berkan, Rafael 
E. Rodríguez Rivera, Steven P . Lausell Recurt, Luis J. Tor-
res Asencio, and Carlos F. Ramos-Hernández.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Asociación de 
Periodistas de Puerto Rico by Ariadna Michelle Godreau Aubert and Ve-
rónica González Rodríguez; for Clemente Properties, Inc., et al. by Ta-
naira Padilla-Rodríguez; for Espacios Abiertos by Brendan Benedict; for 
GFR Media, LLC, by Rafael Cox Alomar and Pedro Busó-García; for 
LatinoJustice PRLDEF et al. by Steven A. Zalesin; for Public Citizen by 
Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve; for Puerto Rican Legal Scholars by 
Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe; for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press et al. by Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. 
Tayrani, Katherine Moran Meeks, David W. Casazza, and Bruce D. 
Brown; and for the Speaker of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives 
by Emil Rodríguez-Escudero and Jorge Martínez-Luciano. 
A brief of amici curiae was fled for the Institute for Energy Economics 
and Financial Analysis et al. by Jessica E. Méndez-Colberg and Rolando 
Emmanuelli-Jiménez. 
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342 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A recently enacted federal statute establishes a fnancial 
oversight board within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's 
government. The question presented is whether the statute 
categorically abrogates (legalspeak for eliminates) any sov-
ereign immunity the board enjoys from legal claims. We 
hold it does not. Under long-settled law, Congress must use 
unmistakable language to abrogate sovereign immunity. 
Nothing in the statute creating the board meets that high 
bar. 
I 
Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, 
and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), 48 U. S. C. 
§ 2101 et seq., to deal with a fscal emergency. Puerto Rico's 
public debt had soared, to more than the annual output of 
the island's economy. The Commonwealth could not service 
that level of debt through the bond markets. And it was 
not eligible to restructure debt under the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Code. PROMESA offered a path out of the crisis, 
helping Puerto Rico “to achieve fscal responsibility and ac-
cess to the capital markets.” § 2121(a). The idea was to set 
up a system for overseeing Puerto Rico's fnances, while also 
enabling the Commonwealth to gain bankruptcy protections 
similar to those available under the Code. See Financial 
Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius 
Investment, LLC , 590 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020). 
PROMESA creates, as its centerpiece, the Financial Over-
sight and Management Board for Puerto Rico—the peti-
tioner here. The statute describes the seven-member Board 
as an “entity within the territorial government” of Puerto 
Rico. § 2121(c)(1). And this Court has affrmed that the 
Board's structure, duties, and powers make it “part of the 
local Puerto Rican government. ” Id. , at –––. Under 
PROMESA, the Board approves and enforces the Common-
wealth's fscal plans and budgets, and supervises the Com-
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Opinion of the Court 
monwealth's borrowing. See §§ 2141–2144, 2147. The 
Board also represents Puerto Rico in so-called Title III 
cases—judicial proceedings, modeled on federal bankruptcy 
proceedings, for restructuring the Commonwealth's (and its 
instrumentalities') debt. See §§ 2161–2177. 
With one exception, PROMESA says nothing explicit 
about abrogating sovereign immunity. The exception is for 
Title III cases, and comes via the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 
PROMESA incorporates, as part of its mechanism for re-
structuring debt, the Code's express abrogation of sovereign 
immunity. See § 2161(a) (incorporating 11 U. S. C. § 106 for 
“case[s] under [Title III]”). But as to all other matters 
PROMESA addresses, Congress did not mention sovereign 
immunity. In particular, no provision states that it is 
abrogating any immunity the Board possesses from legal 
claims. 
At the same time, several provisions of PROMESA con-
template that, even outside the Title III context, the Board 
may confront legal claims against it. Most fundamentally, 
Section 2126(a), entitled “Jurisdiction,” states that “any ac-
tion against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise 
arising out of” PROMESA, “shall be brought” in the Federal 
District Court sitting in Puerto Rico.
1 And Section 2126(c) 
anticipates that those actions may lead to orders “granting 
declaratory or injunctive relief against the Oversight Board”; 
under the provision, such orders cannot take effect until the 
litigation is over. 
On the fipside, PROMESA sets certain limits on litigation 
targeting the Board. Section 2125 forecloses monetary lia-
bility against the Board, its members, and its employees 
for “actions taken to carry out” the statute. And Section 
2126(e) provides that no district court will have jurisdic-
1 The section contains two exceptions not relevant here—one for applica-
tions to enforce subpoenas, the other for certain actions related to Title 
III cases. See 48 U. S. C. §§ 2124(f)(2), 2166(a)(2).

344 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
tion over challenges to the Board's “certifcation determina-
tions”—mainly, decisions approving Puerto Rico's fscal plans 
and budgets. See §§ 2141(e), 2142(e) (describing those 
determinations). 
The suit before us demands that the Board release various 
documents relating to its work. Respondent Centro de Pe-
riodismo Investigativo, Inc. (CPI) is a nonproft media orga-
nization that has published many reports on Puerto Rico's 
fscal crisis and the debt-restructuring process. In 2016, 
CPI asked the Board to turn over a broad array of materials, 
including communications between the Board's members and 
Puerto Rican and U. S. offcials. When the request went 
unanswered, CPI sued the Board in the Federal District 
Court in Puerto Rico. CPI cited a provision of the Puerto 
Rican Constitution interpreted to guarantee a right of access 
to public records. And it requested an injunction ordering 
the records' release. 
The Board moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that, as 
an arm of the Puerto Rican government, it enjoys sovereign 
immunity. The District Court denied the motion, reason-
ing that Congress had abrogated the Board's immunity in 
PROMESA—particularly, in Section 2126(a)'s jurisdictional 
provision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a–76a. While the 
parties fought over unresolved privilege issues, CPI brought 
a second suit seeking another set of documents. The Board 
again invoked sovereign immunity, and the court again de-
nied the defense. See id., at 56a–57a. Orders in both suits 
were consolidated for appeal. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affrmed the 
denial of immunity, over a dissent. See 35 F. 4th 1 (2022). 
The court began by citing Circuit precedent that Puerto Rico 
(like a State or Indian tribe) enjoys sovereign immunity. It 
then “assume[d] without deciding” that the Board shares in 
Puerto Rico's immunity, noting that CPI had not contested 
that issue. Id., at 15. That was the Board's fnal piece of 
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good news—for the court next held that PROMESA abro-
gates the Board's (assumed) immunity. Congress may abro-
gate sovereign immunity, the court noted, “by making its 
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” 
Ibid. (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 
73 (2000)). And Congress had done so, the court held, in 
Section 2126(a): The “grant of jurisdiction” there “unequivo-
cally stated [Congress's] intention that the Board could be 
sued” in federal district court. 35 F. 4th, at 17. The court 
found additional support for its holding in Sections 2126(c) 
and (e). The former, the court reasoned, “contemplates” or-
ders of “declaratory and injunctive relief” against the Board. 
Ibid. And the latter, in making certifcation challenges un-
reviewable, “implies” that all other claims against the Board 
fall within Section 2126(a)'s scope. Ibid. Judge Lynch dis-
agreed. She would have held that Congress had not ade-
quately “set[ ] forth an intent to abrogate” the Board's immu-
nity, whether in Section 2126(a)'s jurisdictional grant or in 
any other provision. Id., at 21. 
We granted certiorari, 598 U. S. ––– (2022), and now 
reverse. 
II 
The question on which we granted certiorari is whether 
PROMESA—and particularly its jurisdictional provision— 
abrogates the Board's immunity. See Brief for Oversight 
Board i. As thus framed, the question asks only about abro-
gation, while taking the Board's underlying immunity as a 
given. That framing accords with how this case played out 
in the courts below. Because Circuit precedent had settled 
Puerto Rico's own immunity, the lower courts barely ad-
dressed the question. See, e. g., 35 F. 4th, at 13–14. Simi-
larly for the Board's immunity. CPI never argued that the 
Commonwealth's immunity did not extend to the Board; and 
for that reason, the courts below simply assumed the Board's 
immunity before turning to the abrogation issue. See, e. g., 
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346 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
id., at 14–15. We took the case on those terms, and we re-
solve it on those terms. See, e. g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of 
frst view”). That means we assume without deciding that 
Puerto Rico is immune from suit in federal district court, 
and that the Board partakes of that immunity. We address 
only whether, accepting those premises, PROMESA effects 
an abrogation.
2 
The standard for fnding a congressional abrogation is 
stringent. Congress, this Court has often held, must make 
its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity “unmistakably 
clear in the language of the statute.” E. g., Kimel, 528 U. S., 
at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sossamon 
v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 287 (2011) (“[W]here a statute is sus-
ceptible of multiple plausible interpretations,” we will not 
read it to strip immunity). We have invoked that clear-
statement rule, and applied it equivalently, in cases naming 
the federal government, States, and Indian tribes as defend-
ants. See, e. g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290–291 
(2012); Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73; Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
2 CPI now asks us to extend our review to the underlying immunity 
issue. CPI still does not contest that the Board shares in whatever immu-
nity Puerto Rico possesses. But it argues here that Puerto Rico's immu-
nity applies only in its own courts—not in federal courts. See Brief for 
CPI 29–32. The Government also urges us to address Puerto Rico's im-
munity, though to come out the other way: It reads our precedents as 
supporting immunity in both territorial and federal courts. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 16–19 (citing, e. g., Porto Rico v. Rosaly 
y Castillo, 227 U. S. 270, 273–277 (1913)). We decline the two invitations 
for the reasons just stated: The proceedings below did not examine those 
matters, and we agreed to tackle only the abrogation question. Cf. 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 
U. S. 139, 141, n. 1 (1993) (similarly declining to address whether Puerto 
Rico has sovereign immunity when holding that an order denying immu-
nity for one of its instrumentalities is immediately appealable). We also 
note that this suit—in which Puerto Rico itself plays no role—would be a 
singularly inapt vehicle to resolve Puerto Rico's immunity. 
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Opinion of the Court 
Community, 572 U. S. 782, 790 (2014). 3 CPI argues that the 
rule should not likewise apply to Puerto Rico, citing Con-
gress's plenary power over Territories. See Brief for CPI 
25–26 (“The concept of plenary power” is “incompatible with 
forcing Congress to express its intent unequivocally”). But 
we have similarly described Congress's power over the 
tribes, and still demand that Congress “unequivocally ex-
press” an intent to abrogate their immunity. Bay Mills, 572 
U. S., at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted); see ibid. 
(“Although Congress has plenary authority over tribes, 
courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends” 
to abrogate their immunity). Our precedent thus conveys a 
consistent message: If a defendant enjoys sovereign immu-
nity (which we are assuming the Board does), abrogation 
requires an “unequivocal declaration” from Congress. Dell-
muth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 232 (1989). 
The Court has found that standard met in only two situa-
tions. The frst is when a statute says in so many words 
that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity. Con-
gress, for example, has provided that States “shall not be 
immune,” under any “doctrine of sovereign immunity, from 
suit in Federal court” for patent or copyright infringement. 
35 U. S. C. § 296(a); 17 U. S. C. § 511(a). Those provisions, we 
have noted, “could not have made any clearer Congress's in-
tent” to abrogate immunity. Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2020) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted). The second is when a statute creates a cause of 
action and authorizes suit against a government on that 
claim. Take the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) or the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). We 
held that each abrogated sovereign immunity by authoriz-
ing suits against employers—specifcally including govern-
3 Of course, when the federal government is the defendant, the clear-
statement rule operates to identify a waiver of its own immunity, rather 
than an abrogation of another government's. 
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348 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
ments—for violating the statute's provisions (i. e., for dis-
criminating or denying leave). See Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73– 
74; Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 
721, 726 (2003). Or consider the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (IGRA). We likewise saw an abrogation in its authori-
zation of tribal suits against States for violating their statu-
tory duty to negotiate about gaming compacts. See Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 56–57 (1996). 
True enough, none of those Acts expressly declared sover-
eigns non-immune (as the patent and copyright laws did). 
But all expressly authorized suits against sovereigns in serv-
ice of enforcing statutory requirements. And recognizing 
immunity would have negated those authorizations: The very 
suits allowed against governments would automatically have 
been dismissed. 
PROMESA fts neither of those two molds. Except in 
Title III debt-restructuring proceedings (not at issue here), 
the statute does not provide that the Board or Puerto Rico 
is subject to suit. See supra, at 343. And indeed, the excep-
tion implies the opposite as a general rule. The immunity 
provision that PROMESA borrows from the Bankruptcy 
Code for Title III cases states: “[S]overeign immunity is ab-
rogated as to a governmental unit,” including a “Territory.” 
11 U. S. C. § 106(a), incorporated by 48 U. S. C. § 2161(a); 11 
U. S. C. § 101(27). Congress chose not to adopt similar lan-
guage to govern other kinds of litigation involving the 
Board. See, e. g., Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. –––, ––– 
(2022) (“When Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, we generally take the choice to be deliberate”). 
Too, PROMESA does not create any cause of action (or oth-
erwise approve any claim) for use against the Board or 
Puerto Rico. So recognizing immunity under PROMESA 
would not—as in the ADEA, FMLA, and IGRA cases—au-
thorize a suit against a sovereign with one hand, only to bar 
it with the other. Instead, immunity would operate in the

349 
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Opinion of the Court 
ordinary way—to protect a sovereign from a host of claims 
Congress has not otherwise said may proceed. The upshot 
is evident: Congress has not, through a means we have recog-
nized, “ma[de] its intention” to abrogate immunity “unmis-
takably clear.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
CPI contends we can still find a clear statement in 
PROMESA, based on the statute's establishment of a judicial 
review scheme. The primary provision in CPI's argument 
(as in the First Circuit's, see supra, at 345) is Section 2126(a): 
“[A]ny action against the Oversight Board, and any action 
otherwise arising out of” PROMESA, “shall be brought” in 
the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico. In CPI's view, 
that provision—especially when combined with Section 
2126(c)'s allusion to “declaratory or injunctive relief against 
the Oversight Board”—expresses Congress's “clear intent to 
subject the Board to suit in federal court.” Brief for CPI 
16. CPI backs up that argument by pointing to provisions 
insulating the Board (and its members and employees) from 
monetary liability and barring suits challenging the Board's 
budgetary decisions. See id., at 15–16, 38–40; see supra, 
at 343–344. Those protections, CPI maintains, would have 
no point “if the Board were immune generally.” Brief for 
CPI 16. So taken together (says CPI), PROMESA's judicial 
review provisions are “incompatible with sovereign immu-
nity.” Id., at 35. 
But all those provisions serve a function without our read-
ing an abrogation of immunity into PROMESA. In Sections 
2126(a) and (c), Congress indeed contemplated the possibility 
of suits—and of relief—against the Board. And wisely so— 
because litigation against the Board can arise even though 
the Board enjoys sovereign immunity generally. For one 
thing, statutes other than PROMESA abrogate the Board's 
immunity from particular claims. See generally supra, at 
347–348. Consider Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohib-
iting various kinds of employment discrimination. That law, 
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350 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
this Court has held, validly abrogates the immunity of “gov-
ernments” and “governmental agencies” from all actions it 
authorizes. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(a)–(b); see Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 447–448 (1976). So if a Board employee 
were fred because of race, Section 2126(a) would tell him 
where to bring his suit and Section 2126(c) would govern the 
timing of injunctive and declaratory relief. And for another 
thing, the Board could decide to waive its immunity from 
particular suits or claims. Were it to do so, Sections 2126(a) 
and (c) would again kick in. So PROMESA's judicial review 
scheme—absent a categorical abrogation of immunity—still 
has plenty of work to do. For similar reasons, this Court 
has held that other jurisdictional and judicial review pro-
visions were insuffcient to establish an abrogation. See 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 786, 
and n. 4 (1991); Dellmuth, 491 U. S., at 231. Here, as there, 
providing for a judicial forum does not make the requisite 
clear statement. 
Nor do the litigation protections in PROMESA fll the gap. 
At the most basic level, it would be peculiar to read shields 
from lawsuits as unmistakably subjecting the Board to law-
suits (by abrogating immunity). But aside from that, CPI 
is wrong to think that those shields would be “pointless” or 
“superfuous” unless PROMESA generally abrogates the 
Board's immunity. Brief for CPI 38. Consider frst Section 
2125's protection of the Board, its employees, and its mem-
bers from monetary liability for carrying out PROMESA. 
That provision would do work whenever, as discussed above, 
some other law abrogated or waived the Board's immunity 
from specifc claims. In such a case, the claim could go for-
ward, but Section 2125 would stop the award of money dam-
ages. Of particular note, that section would limit the 
Board's liability in Title III cases, in which PROMESA has 
indeed abrogated immunity. See supra, at 343. And last, 
Section 2125 protects individuals—the Board's members 
and employees—not covered by the Board's sovereign immu-
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351 
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Thomas, J., dissenting 
nity. All in all, that seems like more than enough to explain 
the provision's existence. Similarly for Section 2126(e), 
which prevents challenges to the Board's fscal and budget-
ary decisions. Yes, sovereign immunity insulates the Board 
itself from those attacks. But without Section 2126(e), a 
plaintiff might get around that immunity via an Ex parte 
Young action—a suit against an individual Board member 
for injunctive relief. See Virginia Offce for Protection and 
Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 254–255 (2011) (describ-
ing the Ex parte Young “limit on the sovereign-immunity 
principle”). Section 2126(e) precludes that possibility. So 
it too has a role to play in a scheme with sovereign immunity. 
In short, nothing in PROMESA makes Congress's intent 
to abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity “unmistakably 
clear.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73. The statute does not explic-
itly strip the Board of immunity. It does not expressly au-
thorize the bringing of claims against the Board. And its 
judicial review provisions and liability protections are com-
patible with the Board's generally retaining sovereign immu-
nity. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Thomas, dissenting. 
At every stage of these proceedings, respondent has ar-
gued that petitioner lacks state sovereign immunity. Peti-
tioner has consistently replied that it has that immunity and 
that nothing abrogates it. The courts below, bound by Cir-
cuit precedent, held that petitioner does have state sovereign 
immunity—but they also held that the immunity has been 
abrogated. The Court today disagrees with only that latter 
conclusion, holding that nothing abrogates petitioner's immu-
nity, but it “assume[s] without deciding” the logically ante-
cedent question whether petitioner enjoys that immunity in 
the frst place. Ante, at 346. In doing so, the majority ef-
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352 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Thomas, J., dissenting 
fectively decides the outcome of this case. Because I would 
reach the antecedent question and hold that petitioner lacks 
the only immunity it has ever asserted, I respectfully dissent. 
Respondent, Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. 
(CPI), sued petitioner, the Financial Oversight and Manage-
ment Board for Puerto Rico, over a document-disclosure dis-
pute. The Board moved to dismiss the lawsuit by invoking 
state sovereign immunity, which the Board claimed to pos-
sess as an arm of the Puerto Rican territorial government. 
CPI responded (both in the District Court and on appeal) 
that Puerto Rico has no such immunity and that, even if 
it did, that immunity would be abrogated by the Puerto 
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA), 48 U. S. C. § 2101 et seq. Bound by Circuit 
precedent holding that Puerto Rico enjoys state sovereign 
immunity, each court below rejected CPI's frst argument. 
See 35 F. 4th 1, 14 (CA1 2022). But the courts below also 
agreed with CPI's second argument that the Board's immu-
nity was abrogated. 
When the Board asked us to review that holding, CPI once 
again raised its lead argument, pointing out that we logically 
could not reverse the First Circuit's judgment without frst 
addressing whether the Board actually has the immunity 
that the Board claims has not been abrogated. And, in its 
merits brief, CPI made Puerto Rico's lack of state sovereign 
immunity its lead argument. There is nothing more that 
CPI could have done to preserve this antecedent, disposi-
tive argument. 
Yet the majority skips it entirely, “assum[ing] without de-
ciding that Puerto Rico is immune from suit in federal dis-
trict court”—while also deciding that PROMESA does not 
abrogate that assumed immunity. Ante, at 346. In doing 
so, it effectively consigns CPI's case to the dustbin, remand-
ing back to a Circuit where Circuit precedent will dictate the 
outcome. CPI might be forgiven for wondering whether we 
granted certiorari only insofar as our review would favor 
the Board. 
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Page Proof Pending Publication
353 
Cite as: 598 U. S. 339 (2023) 
Thomas, J., dissenting 
The majority asserts that it need not address CPI's argu-
ment because “[t]he proceedings below did not examine those 
matters, and we agreed to tackle only the abrogation ques-
tion.” Ibid., n. 2. But it is unclear why the court below 
would have examined the matter any further, given its prec-
edent.
1 And, “[t]his issue is predicate to an intelligent reso-
lution of the question presented,” as it makes no sense to 
analyze whether PROMESA abrogates state sovereign im-
munity without frst determining whether that immunity is 
implicated at all. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U. S. 90, 94, 
n. 1 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Because I 
think the Court has a duty to pass upon issues that are fairly 
presented, preserved by the parties, and necessary to sup-
port its judgment, I would consider whether the Board has 
the immunity it asserts. 
From the start, the Board has asserted only that it pos-
sesses what it has called “Eleventh Amendment immunity.” 
The First Circuit agreed, explaining that it “has long treated 
Puerto Rico like a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” 
35 F. 4th, at 14. However, the plain text of the Eleventh 
Amendment applies only to lawsuits brought against a State 
by citizens of another State. And, because CPI is a resident 
of Puerto Rico, I can only assume that the Board and the 
1 The fact that the First Circuit barely addressed the issue below, simply 
noting Circuit precedent, is surely irrelevant; we have often granted cer-
tiorari on questions that were resolved below with drive-by citations to 
binding precedent, sometimes in footnotes. See, e. g., App. to Pet. for 
Cert. in Lora v. United States, O. T. 2022, No. 22–49, p. 11a, n. 3; App. to 
Pet. for Cert. in Smith v. United States, O. T. 2022, No. 21–1576, p. 15a. 
2 We have often recognized the need to address such logically antecedent 
questions. See, e. g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 75, n. 13 
(1996); see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258–259, n. 5 (1980) 
(collecting cases). For example, we explained in Grubbs that it would 
“mak[e] little sense to address what the Fourth Amendment requires of 
anticipatory search warrants if it does not allow them at all.” 547 U. S., 
at 94, n. 1. And, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47 (2006), we explained that “granting certiorari to 
determine whether a statute is constitutional fairly includes the question 
of what that statute says.” Id., at 56.

Page Proof Pending Publication
354 FIN ANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
P. R. v. CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO, INC. 
Thomas, J., dissenting 
First Circuit meant to refer to the sovereign immunity that 
is inherent in the 50 States. See Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. 
–––, ––– (2020). 
As we have explained, inherent state sovereign immunity 
refects the original design of the Constitution. See Fran-
chise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019). 
At the Founding, the “States considered themselves fully 
sovereign nations,” and part of that sovereignty “was their 
immunity from private suits.” Id., at ––– (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). When advocating for the Constitu-
tion's ratifcation, leading Federalists then assured their op-
ponents that the Constitution would not allow private 
citizens to hale States into federal court without their con-
sent. See ibid. Though this Court held otherwise soon 
thereafter in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the 
Eleventh Amendment's swift ratifcation confrmed that 
Chisholm was wrong. See Hyatt, 587 U. S., at ––– – –––. 
Thus, in general, the Constitution does not allow federal or 
state courts to hear cases against States without their con-
sent. See id., at ––– – –––; Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 
730–731 (1999). This deeply rooted rule “inheres in the sys-
tem of federalism” that the Constitution establishes. See 
id., at 730.
3 
Here, however, all sides agree that Puerto Rico is a Terri-
tory, not a State. See Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle , 579 
U. S. 59, 75–77 (2016). Accordingly, it is diffcult to see how 
the same inherent sovereign immunity that the States enjoy 
in federal court would apply to Puerto Rico. To be sure, the 
3 The Court has described this unique form of sovereign immunity as 
belonging to the 13 original States by dint of their post-Independence and 
pre-Ratifcation independent sovereignty and to the subsequently ad-
mitted States as a result of their admission to the Union on an equal 
footing with the original States. Alden, 527 U. S., at 713; see also Michi-
gan v. Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U. S. 782, 816, n. 1 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); accord, Hyatt, 587 U. S., at ––– – ––– (noting 
unique nature of state sovereign immunity).

355 
Cite as: 598 U. S. 339 (2023) 
Thomas, J., dissenting 
United States has urged us to hold that Puerto Rico enjoys 
a form of common-law immunity that, it claims, territorial 
governments can invoke in federal court. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 16–19. But the Board has, 
at every stage, argued only that it possesses the same immu-
nity as States. That argument appears untenable. And, as 
the party asserting an immunity, the Board should have the 
burden of establishing its immunity. Because the Board has 
failed to do so, I would rule in CPI's favor and affrm the 
judgment below. 
I respectfully dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 353, line 2, “these” is replaced with “those”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 598 U. S. Part 2 Pages 339–355 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 11, 2023 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  deciding that the Board shares in that immunity. But it then held that PROMESA—particularly its jurisdictional provision, Section 2126(a)— clearly abrogates the Board's immunity. Held: Nothing in PROMESA—including its jurisdictional provision, Sec- tion 2126(a)—categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Bo…

• #3

  the Board's immunity has been waived or abrogated by other statutes. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act abrogates the immunity of “governments” and “governmental agencies” from all actions it au- thorizes. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(a)–(b). If a Board employee were fred because of race, Section 2126(a) would…

• #4

  E. Rodríguez Rivera, Steven P . Lausell Recurt, Luis J. Tor- res Asencio, and Carlos F. Ramos-Hernández.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Asociación de Periodistas de Puerto Rico by Ariadna Michelle Godreau Aubert and Ve- rónica González Rodríguez; for Clemente Properties, Inc., et al. by Ta…

• #5

  similar to those available under the Code. See Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC , 590 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020). PROMESA creates, as its centerpiece, the Financial Over- sight and Management Board for Puerto Rico—the peti- tioner here. The statute describes the …

• #6

  for “actions taken to carry out” the statute. And Section 2126(e) provides that no district court will have jurisdic- 1 The section contains two exceptions not relevant here—one for applica- tions to enforce subpoenas, the other for certain actions related to Title III cases. See 48 U. S. C. §§ 2124(f)(2), 2166(a)…

• #7

  Opinion of the Court good news—for the court next held that PROMESA abro- gates the Board's (assumed) immunity. Congress may abro- gate sovereign immunity, the court noted, “by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Ibid. (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 7…

• #8

  and that the Board partakes of that immunity. We address only whether, accepting those premises, PROMESA effects an abrogation. 2 The standard for fnding a congressional abrogation is stringent. Congress, this Court has often held, must make its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear in the l…

• #9

  we have similarly described Congress's power over the tribes, and still demand that Congress “unequivocally ex- press” an intent to abrogate their immunity. Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted); see ibid. (“Although Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly ass…

• #10

  eigns non-immune (as the patent and copyright laws did). But all expressly authorized suits against sovereigns in serv- ice of enforcing statutory requirements. And recognizing immunity would have negated those authorizations: The very suits allowed against governments would automatically have been dismissed. PR…

• #11

  the Oversight Board”—expresses Congress's “clear intent to subject the Board to suit in federal court.” Brief for CPI 16. CPI backs up that argument by pointing to provisions insulating the Board (and its members and employees) from monetary liability and barring suits challenging the Board's budgetary decisions.…

• #12

  At the most basic level, it would be peculiar to read shields from lawsuits as unmistakably subjecting the Board to law- suits (by abrogating immunity). But aside from that, CPI is wrong to think that those shields would be “pointless” or “superfuous” unless PROMESA generally abrogates the Board's immunity. Brief…

• #13

  gued that petitioner lacks state sovereign immunity. Peti- tioner has consistently replied that it has that immunity and that nothing abrogates it. The courts below, bound by Cir- cuit precedent, held that petitioner does have state sovereign immunity—but they also held that the immunity has been abrogated. The C…

• #14

  trict court”—while also deciding that PROMESA does not abrogate that assumed immunity. Ante, at 346. In doing so, it effectively consigns CPI's case to the dustbin, remand- ing back to a Circuit where Circuit precedent will dictate the outcome. CPI might be forgiven for wondering whether we granted certiorari onl…

• #15

  (1996); see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258–259, n. 5 (1980) (collecting cases). For example, we explained in Grubbs that it would “mak[e] little sense to address what the Fourth Amendment requires of anticipatory search warrants if it does not allow them at all.” 547 U. S., at 94, n. 1. And, in Rumsfel…

• #16

  pre-Ratifcation independent sovereignty and to the subsequently ad- mitted States as a result of their admission to the Union on an equal footing with the original States. Alden, 527 U. S., at 713; see also Michi- gan v. Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U. S. 782, 816, n. 1 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord,…