Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz

Summary

A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U. S. C. §§1681n and 1681o for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 601 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 42–64 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
February 8, 2024 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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42 OCTOBER TERM, 2023 
Syllabus 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOP-
MENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE v. KIRTZ 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the third circuit 
No. 22–846. Argued November 6, 2023—Decided February 8, 2024 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, as amended by the Consumer 
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, allows consumers to sue lenders 
who willfully or negligently supply false information about them to enti-
ties that generate credit reports. Respondent Reginald Kirtz secured 
a loan from a division of the United States Department of Agriculture 
and later sued the agency for money damages under the FCRA. Kirtz 
alleged that the USDA falsely told TransUnion—a credit reporting 
agency—that his account was past due, thus damaging his credit score 
and his ability to secure loans at affordable rates. The USDA moved 
to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity. The District Court sided 
with the USDA. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 1681n and 1681o authorize suits for damages against “any person” 
who violates the FCRA, and § 1681a expressly defnes “person” to in-
clude “any” government agency. 46 F. 4th 159, 164–166. 
Held: A consumer may sue a federal agency for defying the FCRA's terms. 
Pp. 48–64. 
(a) As a sovereign, the United States is generally immune from suits 
seeking money damages unless Congress chooses to waive that immu-
nity. See, e. g., United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399. To deter-
mine whether Congress has chosen to do so, this Court applies a “clear 
statement” rule, permitting suit against the government only when “the 
language of the statute” is “unmistakably clear” in allowing it. Kimel 
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73. 
Guided by these principles, this Court has found a clear waiver of 
sovereign immunity “in only two situations.” Financial Oversight and 
Management Bd. for P . R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 
598 U. S. 339, 347. “The frst is when a statute says . . . that it is 
stripping immunity from a sovereign entity.” Ibid. The second “is 
when a statute creates a cause of action” and explicitly “authorizes suit 
against a government on that claim.” Ibid. Statutes in the second 
category may not directly address sovereign immunity, but dismissing 
a claim against the government would negate a claim specifcally author-
ized by Congress. Id., at 348; see Kimel, 528 U. S. 62. 
Applying these principles leads to the conclusion that the FCRA 
clearly waives sovereign immunity in cases like this one. The FCRA's

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Syllabus 
requirements apply to “person[s]” who, like the federal government 
here, furnish information to consumer reporting agencies. § 1681s–2(b). 
Sections 1681n and 1681o create a cause of action for money damages to 
consumers injured by “[a]ny person” who willfully or negligently fails 
to comply with the statute's directive. Section 1681a provides a defni-
tion of “person” that includes “any . . . governmental . . . agency,” 
§ 1681a(b), and that applies to the entire Act. That other statutory pro-
visions in the FCRA and elsewhere address the question of sovereign 
immunity in arguably more obvious terms, see, e. g., § 1681u, does not 
make the waiver of sovereign immunity in the provisions at issue here 
any less clear. Pp. 48–52. 
(b) The government implies that a cause of action against the govern-
ment is insuffcient to effect a waiver unless accompanied by a separate 
provision addressing sovereign immunity, but the Court has held that 
sovereign immunity may be waived even without a separate waiver pro-
vision. Financial Oversight and Management Bd., 598 U. S., at 347. 
Next, the government turns to the canon of superfuity to extrapolate a 
new rule: A statute should not be read to waive sovereign immunity 
unless doing so would leave it without any work to perform. Applying 
its new rule should foreclose suit here, the government submits, because 
allowing federal agencies a sovereign-immunity defense would not fore-
close every suit under §§ 1681n and 1681o . But this Court has never 
endorsed the notion that a statute may effect a waiver of sovereign 
immunity only if that is the sole work it performs. The government 
theorizes that this Court may not fnd a waiver of sovereign immunity 
where substantive provisions like §§ 1681n and 1681o merely cross-
reference a general defnition—such as “persons”—that includes both 
sovereign and non-sovereign entities. Under this Court's precedents, 
however, Congress need not “make its clear statement in a single sec-
tion.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 76. What matters is whether Congress has 
authorized a waiver of sovereign immunity that is “clearly discernible” 
from the sum total of its work. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Supe-
rior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin, 599 U. S. 382, 388. Alternatively 
still, the government points to Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 
473 U. S. 234, and Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of 
Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U. S. 279, 
as imposing more demanding rules a court must follow before fnding a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. But these cases arise from a period in 
which this Court's approach to sovereign immunity was very different 
than it is today. Understood in this context, Atascadero stands only for 
the proposition that Congress must, at a minimum, mention the govern-
ment when it wishes to scrap sovereign immunity and permit damages 
claims. The FCRA meets that requirement. Employees is factually 
distinguishable. Further, the Employees Court considered legislative

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44 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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Syllabus 
history all but dispositive despite the statutory text, 411 U. S., at 283, 
285, a methodological approach the Court has since repeatedly disa-
vowed. Pp. 52–59. 
(c) The government requests this Court to hold that §§ 1681n and 
1681o do not clearly waive sovereign immunity because they do not “un-
ambiguously incorporate” § 1681a's defnition of “person.” But a court 
must respect defnitions given by Congress as “virtually conclusive,” 
Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. 28, 56, deviating only when applying it 
would be “incompatible with Congress'[s] regulatory scheme” or would 
“destro[y] one of the statute's major purposes.” Digital Realty Trust, 
Inc. v. Somers, 583 U. S. 149, 163–164. The government cannot meet 
that standard given that applying the Act's defnitional and civil liability 
provisions as written to allow suits against federal agencies to proceed 
seems consistent with the Act's goal of “ensur[ing] fair and accurate 
credit reporting.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 52. 
The government notes that giving § 1681a's defnition of “person” effect 
in §§ 1681n and 1681o would render “not just the federal government, 
but also individual States” susceptible to consumer suits for money dam-
ages. Brief for Petitioner 33. The government fnds that result un-
thinkable because Congress enacted the FCRA pursuant to the Consti-
tution's Commerce Clause—a provision this Court has held does not 
endow Congress with the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
But none of that means the Court may disregard the statute's clear 
terms, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 57, n. 9, even 
if state defendants might have a valid constitutional defense to a suit 
that the federal government does not. 
The government next points to § 1681q, a criminal-enforcement provi-
sion, to argue that because the federal government cannot be subjected 
to criminal prosecution, it would be absurd to apply § 1681a's defnition 
of “person” to that provision. Even if the government is right, the 
power to correct for an absurdity “in one portion of a statute” does not 
imply a “license to distort other provisions of the statute.” NLRB v. 
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U. S. 571, 579. And 
the government provides no basis here to suggest that applying 
§ 1681a's defnition in §§ 1681n and 1681o would lead to absurd results. 
Finally, the argument that the Privacy Act of 1974 covers some of the 
same ground as the FCRA, and Congress had no reason to supplement 
its remedies also fails. The government acknowledges that at least 
some provisions of the FCRA apply to it, and the Court's duty when 
two laws are complementary—as is the case here—is to give effect to 
both. Pp. 59–64. 
46 F. 4th 159, affrmed. 
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 601 U. S. 42 (2024) 45 
Opinion of the Court 
Benjamin W. Snyder argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Prelogar , 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, 
Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, Mark B. Stern, Sarah Car-
roll, and David L. Peters. 
Nandan M. Joshi argued the cause for respondent. With 
him on the brief were Matthew B. Weisberg, Allison M. 
Zieve, and Scott L. Nelson.* 
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A credit report can determine everything from whether a 
person can secure a credit card, purchase a home, win a new 
job, or start a small business. Recognizing the importance 
of accuracy in credit reporting, Congress adopted the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act in 1970 (FCRA). In its present form, 
the Act allows consumers to sue private lenders who will-
fully or negligently supply false information about them to 
agencies that generate credit reports. The question we face 
is whether one of the Nation's largest lenders—the federal 
government—is also susceptible to suit when it supplies false 
information, or whether it may invoke sovereign immunity 
to avoid liability. 
I 
This case arises from a loan Reginald Kirtz secured from 
the Rural Housing Service. The Service, a division of the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), “issues 
loans to promote the development of safe and affordable 
housing in rural communities.” Kirtz v. Trans Union LLC , 
46 F. 4th 159, 163 (CA3 2022). According to Mr. Kirtz, he 
repaid his loan in full by mid-2018. See Amended Complaint 
in No. 2:20–cv–05231 (ED Pa.), ECF Doc. 20, p. 3, ¶11. De-
spite this, the USDA repeatedly told TransUnion, a company 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Constitu-
tional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; 
and for the National Consumer Law Center et al. by Seth E. Mermin, 
Jeffrey Gentes, Hannah Kieschnick, Ellen Noble, Chi Chi Wu, and Stu-
art Rossman. 
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46 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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engaged in the business of preparing consumer credit re-
ports, that his account was past due. Ibid., ¶12. These 
misrepresentations damaged his credit score and threatened 
his ability to secure future loans at affordable rates. See 
id., at 3–4, ¶¶12–14. In an effort to resolve the problem, 
Mr. Kirtz alerted TransUnion to the error, and the company, 
in turn, notifed the USDA. Id., at 5, ¶¶16, 20. But, 
Mr. Kirtz says, the USDA failed to take “any action to inves-
tigate or correct” its records. 46 F. 4th, at 163. So he even-
tually decided to sue the agency under the FCRA. Ibid. 
As originally enacted in 1970, the FCRA focused largely 
on two groups. First, it addressed “consumer reporting 
agenc[ies]” like TransUnion, charging them with various new 
duties designed to ensure the accuracy and confdentiality of 
their work. See, e.g., 84 Stat. 1129, 1132; 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 1681b, 1681i. Second, it imposed new regulations on “per-
son[s]” who procure credit information from consumer re-
porting agencies. So, for example, the Act provided that a 
“person” who requests “an investigative consumer report on 
any consumer” must inform the consumer in writing “not 
later than three days after the date on which the report was 
frst requested.” 84 Stat. 1130; see § 1681d(a). The FCRA 
proceeded to defne the term “person” broadly to “mea[n] any 
individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, coopera-
tive, association, government or governmental subdivision or 
agency, or other entity.” 84 Stat. 1128; see § 1681a(b). The 
Act further authorized consumers to seek damages for viola-
tions of its terms, but only against consumer reporting agen-
cies and those who use the information they produce. 84 
Stat. 1134; see §§ 1681n, 1681o (1970 ed.). 
In the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, 
Congress amended the FCRA to broaden its reach. As rele-
vant here, Congress added provisions addressing those who 
furnish information to consumer reporting agencies. Refer-
encing the defnition of “person” it had adopted in 1970, Con-
gress instructed that, if a consumer disputes “the complete-
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Opinion of the Court 
ness or accuracy” of his credit information, the “person” who 
furnished it must investigate the matter and take steps to 
correct any mistake. 110 Stat. 3009–448; see § 1681s–2(b). 
To enforce these new duties, Congress revised the 1970 Act's 
remedial provisions. Where it had once authorized con-
sumer suits against only consumer reporting agencies and 
users of their information, Congress now authorized con-
sumer suits against “[a]ny person” who willfully or negli-
gently fails to comply with “any” of the law's “require-
ment[s].” 110 Stat. 3009–446; see §§ 1681n(a), 1681o(a). 
Mr. Kirtz sought relief under these new provisions. 
According to his complaint, the USDA furnished information 
to TransUnion. The agency had notice that the information 
it supplied was false. That false information impaired 
Mr. Kirtz's ability to access affordable credit. Yet the 
agency failed to take any steps to correct its mistake—either 
willfully (in violation of § 1681n) or negligently (in violation 
of § 1681o). By way of remedy, Mr. Kirtz sought money 
damages consistent with what the FCRA allows. See 
Amended Complaint 12. 
In response, the USDA moved to dismiss the complaint. 
The agency did not dispute that allegations like Mr. Kirtz's 
state a viable claim for relief. Instead, it pointed to this 
Court's precedents holding that, as sovereign, the federal 
government enjoys immunity from suits for money damages 
unless Congress waives that immunity. And, the agency 
contended, nothing in the FCRA purports to render the fed-
eral government amenable to suit. The district court sided 
with the USDA, but the Third Circuit reversed. Speaking 
for a unanimous panel, Judge Krause observed that §§ 1681n 
and 1681o authorize suits for damages against “any person” 
who violates the Act, and § 1681a expressly defnes “person” 
to include “any” government agency. 46 F. 4th, at 164–166. 
The question whether Mr. Kirtz may sue the federal gov-
ernment holds signifcance for many. A 2021 study cited by 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau “found that over 
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48 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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34% of consumers surveyed were able to identify at least 
one error in their credit reports.” 87 Fed. Reg. 64689–64690 
(2022). Mistakes like these can lead lenders to insist on 
higher interest rates or other terms that make it “diffcult 
or impossible” for consumers “to obtain a mortgage, auto 
loan, student loan, or other credit.” Id., at 64689. These 
days, too, federal agencies are among “ `the largest furnish-
ers of credit information' ” to consumer reporting agencies. 
Brief for Petitioner 38 (quoting Robinson v. Department of 
Education, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari)). Yet the lower courts have 
reached different views on the question whether federal 
agencies are answerable under the FCRA for their mistakes. 
Like the Third Circuit, the Seventh and D. C. Circuits have 
held that the FCRA authorizes suits against government 
agencies no less than it does private lenders. The Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits, by contrast, have held that sovereign 
immunity bars consumer suits against federal agencies. We 
agreed to hear this case to resolve that conflict. 599 
U. S. ––– (2023). 
II 
The parties agree on the principles that guide our analysis 
even as they disagree on the answer those principles yield. 
Under this Court's precedents, both sides acknowledge, the 
United States, as sovereign, is generally immune from suits 
seeking money damages. See, e. g., United States v. Testan, 
424 U. S. 392, 399 (1976). At the same time, Congress may 
choose to waive that immunity. Ibid. But because the 
power to waive the federal government's immunity is Con-
gress's prerogative, not ours, this Court applies a “clear 
statement” rule. Under the rule's terms, we will permit a 
suit against the government only when a statute “unmistak-
abl[y]” allows it. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 291 (2012). 
“Congress need not state its intent in any particular way.” 
Ibid. It need not “use magic words.” Ibid. Nor must it 
“make its clear statement in a single section or in statutory 
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provisions enacted at the same time.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 76 (2000). But, one way or another, 
a waiver of sovereign immunity must be “unmistakably clear 
in the language of the statute.” Id., at 73 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
Necessarily, this inquiry trains on statutory text rather 
than legislative history. Because “[a]ny ambiguities in the 
statutory language are to be construed in favor of immu-
nity,” no amount of legislative history can “supply a waiver 
that is not clearly evident from the language of the statute.” 
Cooper, 566 U. S., at 290; accord, Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 
192 (1996). Conversely, when an “ `unmistakably clear' ” 
waiver of sovereign immunity appears in a statute, no 
amount of legislative history can dislodge it. Dellmuth v. 
Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 230 (1989); see Food Marketing Institute 
v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U. S. 427, 436 (2019) (“Even 
those of us who sometimes consult legislative history will 
never allow it to be used to muddy the meaning of clear 
statutory language” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Either way, then, a court charged with asking whether Con-
gress has spoken clearly has its answer long before it might 
have reason to consult the Congressional Record. 
To date, this Court has found a clear waiver of sovereign 
immunity “in only two situations.” Financial Oversight 
and Management Bd. for P . R. v. Centro De Periodismo In-
vestigativo, Inc., 598 U. S. 339, 347 (2023). “The frst is 
when a statute says in so many words that it is stripping 
immunity from a sovereign entity.” Ibid. Congress has 
employed this approach in the Bankruptcy Code, for exam-
ple, where it has stated that, “[n]otwithstanding an assertion 
of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as 
to a governmental unit . . . with respect to” enumerated pro-
visions of the Code. 11 U. S. C. § 106(a). The second situa-
tion “is when a statute creates a cause of action” and explic-
itly “authorizes suit against a government on that claim.” 
Financial Oversight and Management Bd., 598 U. S., at 347. 
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Statutes like these may not discuss sovereign immunity in 
so many words. But dismissing a claim against the govern-
ment in these circumstances would effectively “negat[e]” a 
claim Congress has clearly authorized. Id., at 348. 
The Court encountered a statute falling into this second 
category in Kimel, 528 U. S. 62. That case involved the 
question whether the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (ADEA) abrogated state sovereign immunity. 
As originally enacted, the ADEA authorized employees to 
bring claims against employers who discriminate based on 
age. 29 U. S. C. §§ 623(a), 626(c)(1). A later amendment in-
corporated into the ADEA a provision of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) that extended the right to 
bring claims for age-based discrimination “against any em-
ployer (including a public agency).” § 216(b) (emphasis 
added); see § 626(b). And, elsewhere, the FLSA defned 
“ `[p]ublic agency' ” to include “the government of a State or 
political subdivision thereof” and “any agency of . . . a State, 
or a political subdivision of a State.” § 203(x). In light of 
these amendments and their cross-references, Kimel held, 
the statute's “plain language . . . clearly demonstrate[d] Con-
gress['s] intent to subject the States to suit for money dam-
ages at the hands of individual employees.” 528 U. S., at 74. 
Guided by these principles, we think the Third Circuit 
reached the right decision in this case: The FCRA effects 
a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. In § 1681s–2, the Act 
requires “person[s]” who furnish information to consumer re-
porting agencies to investigate consumer complaints and 
make any necessary corrections. 15 U. S. C. § 1681s–2(b). 
In §§ 1681n and 1681o, the Act authorizes consumer suits for 
money damages against “[a]ny person” who willfully or negli-
gently fails to comply with this directive. §§ 1681n(a), 
1681o(a). In § 1681a, the Act defnes the term “ `person' ” to 
include “any . . . governmental . . . agency.” § 1681a(b). 
And the same provision instructs us to apply this defnition 
throughout the entire “subchapter” where §§ 1681n and 
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1681o appear. § 1681a(a). Through this series of statutory 
directions, no less than those we encountered in Kimel, Con-
gress has explicitly permitted consumer claims for damages 
against the government. Dismissing suits like Mr. Kirtz's 
would effectively “negat[e]” suits Congress has clearly au-
thorized. Financial Oversight and Management Bd., 598 
U. S., at 348. 
We need look no further to resolve this case. But if we 
do, other portions of the FCRA point to the same conclusion. 
Section 1681a(y) excludes from the defnition of “consumer 
report” certain communications that are “not provided to 
any person except . . . any Federal or State offcer, agency, 
or department, or any offcer, agency, or department of a unit 
of general local government.” (Emphasis added.) Section 
1681b requires a “person” who intends to take an “adverse 
[employment] action” based on a consumer credit report to 
provide the affected individual with a copy of the report un-
less “an agency or department of the United States Govern-
ment” seeks to use the report as part of a national security 
investigation. §§ 1681b(b)(3)(A), (4)(A). Both provisions 
thus exempt government agencies from the Act's otherwise-
broad defnition of “person” for particular reasons in particu-
lar contexts. All of which tends to confrm what the Act 
tells us explicitly: Throughout the Act, the term “person” 
includes the government unless otherwise noted. See 
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 457–458 
(2022) (recounting the traditional canon of construction that 
material variations in usage can illuminate a statute's 
meaning). 
To be sure, there are other provisions in the FCRA—just 
as there are elsewhere in the U. S. Code—that address the 
question of sovereign immunity in different and arguably 
even more obvious terms. For example, Congress added 
§ 1681u to the FCRA as part of the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1996. See 109 Stat. 974. That pro-
vision allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation to access 
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52 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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consumer information, subject to a number of constraints. 
See §§ 1681u(a)–(d). At the same time, the statute indicates 
that the failure to respect those constraints can expose “[a]ny 
agency or department of the United States” to “liab[ility] to 
the consumer” for money damages. § 1681u(j). While no-
thing in § 1681u discusses sovereign immunity as such, every-
one agrees its language clearly waives sovereign immunity. 
None of that, however, makes the waiver of sovereign im-
munity refected in the provisions now before us any less 
clear. “If no magic words are required” to waive sovereign 
immunity, then the clarity of “each statute must be evaluated 
on its own terms.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U. S. 1, 13, n. 4 (1989). And the fact that Congress chose to 
use certain language to waive sovereign immunity in one 
amendment to the FCRA hardly means it was “foreclose[d] 
. . . from using different language to accomplish th[e] same 
goal” in a different set of amendments to the same law. Lac 
du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. 
Coughlin, 599 U. S. 382, 395 (2023). The question we must 
answer is not whether §§ 1681a, 1681n, and 1681o speak in 
the same terms as § 1681u. The only question we face is 
whether those provisions speak clearly to the government's 
liability. Because they do, that is the end of the matter.
1 
III 
A 
While the government largely accepts our understanding 
of this Court's sovereign-immunity jurisprudence, it disputes 
1 The differences between § 1681u (on the one hand) and §§ 1681n and 
1681o (on the other) are in any event unremarkable. Section 1681u princi-
pally concerns the liability of the United States. Understandably, then, 
Congress singled out the United States by name in that section. Sections 
1681n and 1681o , by contrast, address the liability of a broad array of 
government agencies, corporations, and natural persons. Understandably 
then, too, Congress chose a parsimonious approach in these sections by 
employing the term “person[s]”—one § 1681a defnes capaciously enough 
to capture them all. 
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some of the fner points. As an initial matter, the govern-
ment asserts that, “to impose liability on a sovereign, a plain-
tiff must identify both a `source of substantive law' that `pro-
vides an avenue for relief' and `a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.' ” Brief for Petitioner 14 (quoting FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 484 (1994)). The implication is that a 
cause of action explicitly against the government is insuff-
cient unless accompanied by a separate provision addressing 
sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioner 14. 
That implication is incorrect. At the risk of repeating 
ourselves, a cause of action authorizing suit against the gov-
ernment may waive sovereign immunity even without a sep-
arate waiver provision. Financial Oversight and Manage-
ment Bd., 598 U. S., at 347; see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 56–57 (1996) (Congress abrogated 
state sovereign immunity when it explicitly authorized a 
cause of action against “Stat[es],” despite the absence of a 
separate waiver provision). Nor does FDIC v. Meyer, 
where this Court refused to recognize an implied cause of 
action, say anything to the contrary. See 510 U. S., at 484. 
The government must know as much. Why else would it 
hold out § 1681u—a section that contains an express cause of 
action against the government but no separate waiver provi-
sion—as “a model for authorizing suits against the United 
States”? Brief for Petitioner 34. 
Changing tack but pursuing the same end, the government 
points to the canon against superfuity. Proper respect for 
Congress cautions courts against lightly assuming that any 
of the statutory terms it has chosen to employ are “superfu-
ous” or “void” of signifcance. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 
U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
From this familiar teaching, the government seeks to extrap-
olate a new rule: A provision can waive sovereign immunity 
only if that provision would have no other role to play in the 
statutory scheme. Brief for Petitioner 20–21. That rule 
should foreclose suit here, the government submits, because 
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54 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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allowing federal agencies a sovereign-immunity defense 
would not foreclose every suit under §§ 1681n and 1681o . 
See id., at 24. After all, even if consumers injured by gov-
ernment agencies could not seek relief under these provi-
sions, other consumers harmed by private creditors still 
could. See ibid. 
We cannot agree with this suggestion any more than the 
last. The canon against rendering statutory terms a nullity 
has a long lineage. But this Court has never endorsed the 
notion that a statute may effect a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity only if that is the sole work it performs. Doing so 
would (again) effectively force Congress to address sover-
eign immunity in so many words in a discrete statutory pro-
vision. It would come perilously close, as well, to imposing 
a “magic-words” requirement. For good reason, then, the 
government's supposed rule appears in none of the decisions 
it directs us to—not in Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U. S. 44, 
not in Kimel, 528 U. S. 62, and not in Nevada Dept. of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721 (2003). See Brief 
for Petitioner 18–19. 
The government has another theory to offer. We may not 
fnd a waiver of sovereign immunity, it suggests, “when a 
cause of action merely cross-references a general defnition 
that includes sovereigns along with non-sovereigns.” Id., at 
22. Running with this idea, the government concedes that 
Congress would have clearly waived sovereign immunity if it 
had “plug[ged]” the full defnition of “persons” from § 1681a 
directly into §§ 1681n and 1681o . Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; accord, 
Brief for Petitioner 22. But, the government argues, a 
waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be effected by reading 
these provisions in combination. 
This theory encounters its own diffculties. Under this 
Court's precedents, Congress need not “make its clear state-
ment in a single section” adopted at a single moment in time. 
Kimel, 528 U. S., at 76. Instead, what matters is whether 
Congress has authorized a waiver of sovereign immunity 
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Opinion of the Court 
that is “clearly discernible” from the sum total of its work. 
Lac du Flambeau, 599 U. S., at 388 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Were the rule otherwise, large swathes of our 
modern sovereign-immunity case law would be cast into 
doubt. After all, in Kimel this Court relied on the ADEA's 
incorporation of the FLSA's enforcement provision, and the 
latter provision's incorporation, in turn, of a separate defni-
tional provision. See 528 U. S., at 73–75. In Union Gas, 
the Court relied on the defnition of “person” in the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 along with other clues from surrounding stat-
utory provisions. 491 U. S., at 7–10. And in Seminole 
Tribe we “confrm[ed]” the “clear statement in one statutory 
subsection by looking to provisions in [an]other subsection.” 
Kimel, 528 U. S., at 104–105 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing Seminole Tribe , 517 U. S., at 
56–57). 
Alternatively still, the government points to Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985), and Employ-
ees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Depart-
ment of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U. S. 279 
(1973). These cases, the government insists, impose still 
other and more demanding rules a court must follow before 
fnding a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Brief for Peti-
tioner 21, 25. 
To appreciate the problem with this line of thinking, some 
background helps. For a period in the mid-20th century, 
this Court's approach to sovereign immunity looked consid-
erably different than it does today (or did before). Back 
then, in cases like Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala. Docks 
Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), this Court was content to do away 
with state sovereign immunity without clear authorization 
from Congress. Instead, the Court would infer a congres-
sional intention to abrogate immunity from statutory text 
that made no mention of the government, id., at 187, 199 
(White, J., dissenting), sometimes resting on clues found in 
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56 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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Opinion of the Court 
legislative history, see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
694 (1978). In time, the Court began to break from this ap-
proach. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 677–678 (1999). 
But decades passed before the Court defnitively repudiated 
Parden. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and 
Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 478 (1987) (indicating that 
later decisions had implicitly overruled Parden, but explic-
itly overruling Parden for good measure); Dellmuth, 491 
U. S., at 230 (rejecting the use of legislative history when 
assessing whether Congress abrogated sovereign immunity); 
College Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 680 (overruling “[w]hat-
ever may remain of our decision in Parden”). 
Atascadero was one of the decisions issued during the 
course of this journey—and it does nothing to help the gov-
ernment's cause. In Parden, the Court had held that a pri-
vate individual could sue “a railroad owned and operated by 
Alabama . . . under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.” 
College Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 676. This was so “[d]e-
spite the absence of any provision in the statute specifcally 
referring to the States.” Ibid. Why? Because the Act 
applied “to `every' common carrier by railroad in interstate 
commerce,” and Alabama's railroad met that description. 
Parden, 377 U. S., at 187. When later faced with a similar 
statute—one that permitted suit against “ `any recipient of 
Federal assistance' ”—the Atascadero Court rejected Par-
den's reasoning, holding that this sort of “general authoriza-
tion for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal 
statutory language suffcient to abrogate” state sovereign 
immunity. 473 U. S., at 245–246. “When Congress chooses 
to subject the States to federal jurisdiction,” the Court con-
tinued, “it must do so specifcally.” Id., at 246. Understood 
in context, then, Atascadero stands only for the now-familiar 
proposition that Congress must, at a minimum, mention the 
government when it wishes to scrap sovereign immunity 
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Opinion of the Court 
and permit claims for damages. The decision does not— 
contrary to the government's submission—counsel against 
recognizing a waiver of sovereign immunity when Congress 
authorizes suit against “any person” and takes the further 
step of expressly defning that term to include “any . . . gov-
ernment . . . agency.” 
Employees was another case decided during the long re-
treat from Parden. And, on frst encounter, it might seem 
more promising for the government. That case concerned 
the FLSA, which authorizes actions against “employer[s]” 
for unpaid overtime, and the question whether that law 
clearly permitted suit against state agencies. See Employ-
ees, 411 U. S., at 282. As originally drafted, the Act defned 
the term “employer” to exclude state agencies. Ibid. But 
a later amendment to the statute's defnitional section 
brought some state agencies within its reach. Id., at 282– 
283. Recognizing that “the literal language” of the Act as 
amended covered some state agencies, the Court neverthe-
less concluded that Congress had not spoken clearly enough 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See id., at 283, 285. 
As the government sees it, the same logic applies with equal 
force here. Brief for Petitioner 25–28. 
By its own terms, however, Employees is distinguishable. 
The Employees Court stressed that, while Congress 
amended the defnitional section of the FLSA to include 
States, it had not made any changes to the underlying liabil-
ity provision. And, the Court reasoned, “it would be sur-
prising” to think Congress meant to deprive a State of im-
munity on the basis of a change to a defnitional section 
alone, without any accompanying change to the pertinent lia-
bility provision. 411 U. S., at 285 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But what the FLSA lacked, the FCRA supplies. 
As we have seen, Congress did amend the FCRA's liability 
provisions in 1996. In doing so, Congress replaced the nar-
row class of defendants originally subject to suit for money

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58 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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Opinion of the Court 
damages—consumer reporting agencies and users of the in-
formation they supply. See Part I, supra; 84 Stat. 1134; 
§§ 1681n, 1681o (1970 ed.). In its stead, Congress provided 
that a different and much larger class of defendants—“[a]ny 
person,” 110 Stat. 3009–446—may be sued for violating “any 
requirement” of the FCRA. §§ 1681n(a), 1681o(a). And 
from the statute's start, Congress has defned the term “per-
son” to include “any” government agency. 84 Stat. 1128; 
see § 1681a(b). 
There is another problem with the government's invoca-
tion of Employees. Despite recognizing that “the literal 
language of the” FLSA permitted suits against States, the 
Employees Court considered it all but dispositive that it 
could not fnd “a word” in the Act's legislative history indi-
cating that Congress wanted “to make it possible for a citizen 
of that State or another State to sue the State in the federal 
courts.” 411 U. S., at 283, 285. As should be clear by now, 
that is not how this Court's contemporary sovereign-immunity 
doctrine works. With time, this Court has resolved that our 
task is to look for “a clear statement in the text of the stat-
ute.” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 290 (2011). And 
just as it is error to displace sovereign immunity based on 
inferences from legislative history without clear statutory 
direction (Parden), so it is error to grant sovereign immunity 
based on inferences from legislative history in the face of 
clear statutory direction waiving that immunity (Employ-
ees). The government itself has elsewhere recognized that 
such notions are “relic[s] from a `bygone era of statutory con-
struction.' ” Food Marketing Institute , 588 U. S., at 437 
(quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Food 
Marketing Institute , O. T. 2018, No. 18–481, p. 19). 
In saying this much, we do not wash our hands of Employ-
ees. No one before us questions that the decision is entitled 
to stare decisis effect with respect to the portions of the 
FLSA it addressed. We recognize only that the Court has 
since repeatedly disavowed the decision's methodological ap-

Cite as: 601 U. S. 42 (2024) 59 
Opinion of the Court 
proach and cautioned against its use when considering claims 
of sovereign immunity in other contexts. 2 
B 
In a fnal set of arguments, the government pursues a dif-
ferent theme. Now accepting the contemporary sovereign-
immunity principles we have outlined, the government 
contends the provisions of the FCRA before us are still in-
suffcient to abrogate immunity. Here, the government ac-
knowledges that §§ 1681n and 1681o expressly authorize suits 
against “any person.” It acknowledges that § 1681a ex-
pressly defnes “person” to include “any” federal agency. 
But the government asks us to hold that §§ 1681n and 1681o 
do not clearly waive sovereign immunity because they do not 
“unambiguously incorporate” § 1681a's defnition. Brief for 
Petitioner 28. 
That is no small ask. When Congress takes the trouble 
to defne the terms it uses, a court must respect its defni-
tions as “virtually conclusive.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. 
28, 56 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 
Court will not deviate from an express statutory defnition 
merely because it “varies from [the] term's ordinary mean-
ing.” Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U. S. 149, 
160 (2018). Nor will we disregard a statutory defnition sim-
ply because the question before us happens to involve sover-
eign immunity. See Seminole Tribe , 517 U. S., at 57, n. 9. 
2 Employees also appears to have rested in part on the Court's views 
about the constraints Congress faces when seeking to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity, given the Constitution's federal structure and the 
Eleventh Amendment. 411 U. S., at 284; see id., at 288 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in result) (noting “[p]ortions of the Court's opinion convey th[at] 
impression”). It is yet another point of distinction between our case and 
that one. We do not face today any question about Congress's power 
under the Constitution to abrogate state sovereign immunity, only a claim 
against the USDA, a federal agency whose immunity Congress is free to 
waive as it wishes. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 
30, 33 (1992). 
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60 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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Rather, this Court has said it will deviate from a statutory 
defnition only when applying the defnition would be “in-
compatible with Congress['s] regulatory scheme” or would 
“destro[y] one of the statute's major purposes.” Digital 
Realty Trust, 583 U. S., at 163–164 (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted). 
The government does not even try to meet that standard 
in this case. How could it? The government acknowledges 
that federal agencies are among “ `the largest furnishers of 
credit information in the country.' ” Brief for Petitioner 38 
(quoting Robinson, 590 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Thomas, J.)). 
So applying the Act's defnitional and civil liability provisions 
as written and allowing suits against federal agencies to pro-
ceed would, if anything, seem consistent with the Act's goal 
of “ensur[ing] fair and accurate credit reporting.” Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 52 (2007). 
Recognizing this problem, the government suggests a dif-
ferent kind of “[i]ncongruit[y]” would arise if §§ 1681n and 
1681o incorporated § 1681a's defnition of “person.” Brief 
for Petitioner 33. The government focuses on the fact that 
§ 1681a's defnition of “person” includes not just federal agen-
cies but state entities as well. So giving that defnition ef-
fect in §§ 1681n and 1681o would render “not just the federal 
government, but also individual States” susceptible to con-
sumer suits for money damages. Ibid. And that result, the 
government contends, is unthinkable. Unthinkable because 
Congress enacted the FCRA pursuant to the Constitution's 
Commerce Clause—a provision this Court has held does not 
endow Congress with the power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. Id., at 34; see Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 636 
(1999) (“Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity” through “the Commerce Clause”). 
While the premise of the government's argument is cor-
rect, its conclusion is not. If the FCRA is a piece of Com-
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Opinion of the Court 
merce Clause legislation, the waiver of sovereign immunity 
effected by §§ 1681n and 1681o might be constitutionally in-
valid as applied against individual States. But none of that 
means we may disregard the statute's clear terms. See 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 57, n. 9 (“We already have found 
the clear statement rule satisfed, and that fnding renders 
the preference for avoiding a constitutional question inappli-
cable”); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooper-
ative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001) (“[T]he canon of constitutional 
avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory am-
biguity”). Instead, we ask two distinct questions in cases 
involving claims of state sovereign immunity: “frst, whether 
Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that 
immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pur-
suant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Kimel, 
528 U. S., at 73. Often, this Court has found, a federal stat-
ute does clearly seek to abrogate a State's immunity but 
lacks constitutional authority to accomplish that objective. 
See, e.g., id., at 67; Seminole Tribe , 517 U. S., at 47; Allen v. 
Cooper, 589 U. S. 248, 255–256 (2020). Analytically, today's 
case is no different. “[P]erson” means what the FCRA says 
it means, even if state defendants might be able to raise a 
valid constitutional defense to a consumer suit that the fed-
eral government cannot. 
Perhaps recognizing as much, the government pivots to a 
discussion of the Act's other enforcement mechanisms. 
Most notably, the government points to § 1681q, which makes 
it a crime—punishable by a fne, imprisonment, or both—for 
“[a]ny person” to “knowingly and willfully obtai[n]” con-
sumer information “under false pretenses.” As the govern-
ment sees it, the term “person” in this provision cannot pos-
sibly bear its statutory defnition because it is “absur[d]” to 
think Congress might have authorized criminal enforcement 
against federal agencies. Brief for Petitioner 31 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). What's more, the government 
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62 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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Opinion of the Court 
submits, because the term “person” cannot include “govern-
ment” in § 1681q, it cannot include “government” in §§ 1681n 
and 1681o either. Id., at 30–31. 
Again, however, that much does not follow. Suppose, as 
the Third Circuit did when analyzing Mr. Kirtz's claim, that 
“[i]t would be absurd . . . to subject the federal government 
to criminal prosecution.” 46 F. 4th, at 171–172. Suppose, 
too, that this absurdity supplies the exceptional reason nec-
essary to deviate from § 1681a's defnition of “person” in 
§ 1681q's criminal-enforcement provision. Even spotting the 
government that much for argument's sake, absurdity is not 
contagious: The power to correct for an absurdity “in one 
portion of a statute” does not imply a “license to distort 
other provisions of the statute.” NLRB v. Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U. S. 571, 579 (1994). 
And the government offers no basis for us to think that 
applying § 1681a's defnition to the Act's consumer-suit provi-
sions in §§ 1681n and 1681o—as opposed to its criminal provi-
sions in § 1681q—would lead to absurd results. Our obliga-
tion therefore remains “to enforce” the statutes presently 
before us, each “according to its terms.” Hartford Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 
6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Consider the alternative. If we could ignore § 1681a's 
defnition of “person” when it comes to §§ 1681n and 1681o 
simply because applying that defnition to other statutory 
provisions could lead to absurd results, where would 
§ 1681a's defnition apply? Before the Seventh Circuit, the 
government proposed this solution: treating federal agencies 
as “person[s]” subject to all the Act's “substantive require-
ments” but exempt from any of its liability provisions. 
Bormes v. United States, 759 F. 3d 793, 795 (2014). That 
kind of “wholly artifcial,” if surely convenient, distinction 
lacks any grounding in the statutory text, 46 F. 4th, at 166, 
and has no proper place in our jurisprudence, cf. Niz-Chavez 
v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155, 172 (2021) (“[W]ords are how the 
law constrains power”). 
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Opinion of the Court 
Venturing even further from the relevant statutory text, 
the government offers one last argument. It observes that 
the Privacy Act of 1974 covers some of the same ground we 
attribute to the FCRA. Passed “to protect the privacy of 
individuals identifed in [federal] information systems,” 88 
Stat. 1896, the Privacy Act addresses the government's re-
tention and disclosure of personal information, see 5 U. S. C. 
§ 552a, including the disclosure of that information to con-
sumer reporting agencies, see 31 U. S. C. § 3711(e). If a fed-
eral agency supplies inaccurate information, the Privacy Act 
allows individuals to seek a court order requiring it to cor-
rect its records. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 552a(g)(1)–(2). Money 
damages are also sometimes available. § 552a(g)(4). Be-
cause these remedies have long been available to address 
agency misconduct under the Privacy Act, the government 
reasons, there was no reason for Congress to supplement 
them with additional remedies under the FCRA. 
That's an unusual argument. Even the government con-
cedes that, the Privacy Act notwithstanding, it is subject to 
and liable under at least some provisions of the FCRA. 
E. g., Brief for Petitioner 34–35 (conceding the government 
may be held liable under § 1681u); id., at 28 (“Sometimes,” 
the Act's “use of the word `person' . . . refers to the default 
statutory defnition in [§ ]1681a(b)”). Nor is the need to jug-
gle multiple and sometimes overlapping legal obligations an 
unusual feature of contemporary American life for the gov-
ernment any more than it is for the governed. Recognizing 
this fact—and mindful our role is to apply the law, not re-
write it—we approach federal statutes touching on the same 
topic with a “strong presumption” they can coexist harmoni-
ously. See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 510 
(2018) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
Only by carrying a “heavy burden” can a party convince us 
that one statute “displaces” a second. Ibid. Where two 
laws are merely complementary—as is undisputedly the case 
here—our duty lies not in preferring one over another but 
in giving effect to both. Gallardo v. Marstiller, 596 U. S. 
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64 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
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Opinion of the Court 
420, 432 (2022); see 46 F. 4th, at 176 (“USDA has not identi-
fed any actual inconsistency between the Privacy Act and 
the [FCRA]”). 
* 
The Executive Branch may question the wisdom of holding 
federal agencies accountable for their violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act; certainly the many and resourceful 
arguments it advances today suggest as much. But Con-
gress's judgment commands our respect and the law it has 
adopted speaks clearly: A consumer may sue “any” federal 
agency for defying the law's terms. Because it faithfully fol-
lowed this legislative direction, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit is 
Affrmed. 
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Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 43, line 6: “government” is replaced with “governmental”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 601 U. S. Part 1 Pages 42–64 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT February 8, 2024 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to not…

• #2

  598 U. S. 339, 347. “The frst is when a statute says . . . that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity.” Ibid. The second “is when a statute creates a cause of action” and explicitly “authorizes suit against a government on that claim.” Ibid. Statutes in the second category may not directly address sover…

• #3

  reference a general defnition—such as “persons”—that includes both sovereign and non-sovereign entities. Under this Court's precedents, however, Congress need not “make its clear statement in a single sec- tion.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 76. What matters is whether Congress has authorized a waiver of sovereign immunit…

• #4

  in §§ 1681n and 1681o would render “not just the federal government, but also individual States” susceptible to consumer suits for money dam- ages. Brief for Petitioner 33. The government fnds that result un- thinkable because Congress enacted the FCRA pursuant to the Consti- tution's Commerce Clause—a provision t…

• #5

  Credit Reporting Act in 1970 (FCRA). In its present form, the Act allows consumers to sue private lenders who will- fully or negligently supply false information about them to agencies that generate credit reports. The question we face is whether one of the Nation's largest lenders—the federal government—is also …

• #6

  “person” who requests “an investigative consumer report on any consumer” must inform the consumer in writing “not later than three days after the date on which the report was frst requested.” 84 Stat. 1130; see § 1681d(a). The FCRA proceeded to defne the term “person” broadly to “mea[n] any individual, partnershi…

• #7

  Court's precedents holding that, as sovereign, the federal government enjoys immunity from suits for money damages unless Congress waives that immunity. And, the agency contended, nothing in the FCRA purports to render the fed- eral government amenable to suit. The district court sided with the USDA, but the Thir…

• #8

  power to waive the federal government's immunity is Con- gress's prerogative, not ours, this Court applies a “clear statement” rule. Under the rule's terms, we will permit a suit against the government only when a statute “unmistak- abl[y]” allows it. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 291 (2012). “Congress need not s…

• #9

  tion “is when a statute creates a cause of action” and explic- itly “authorizes suit against a government on that claim.” Financial Oversight and Management Bd., 598 U. S., at 347. Page Proof Pending Publication 50 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERV . v. KIRTZ Opinion of the Court St…

• #10

  Cite as: 601 U. S. 42 (2024) 51 Opinion of the Court 1681o appear. § 1681a(a). Through this series of statutory directions, no less than those we encountered in Kimel, Con- gress has explicitly permitted consumer claims for damages against the government. Dismissing suits like Mr. Kirtz's would effectively “nega…

• #11

  the consumer” for money damages. § 1681u(j). While no- thing in § 1681u discusses sovereign immunity as such, every- one agrees its language clearly waives sovereign immunity. None of that, however, makes the waiver of sovereign im- munity refected in the provisions now before us any less clear. “If no magic word…

• #12

  That implication is incorrect. At the risk of repeating ourselves, a cause of action authorizing suit against the gov- ernment may waive sovereign immunity even without a sep- arate waiver provision. Financial Oversight and Manage- ment Bd., 598 U. S., at 347; see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. …

• #13

  vision. It would come perilously close, as well, to imposing a “magic-words” requirement. For good reason, then, the government's supposed rule appears in none of the decisions it directs us to—not in Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U. S. 44, not in Kimel, 528 U. S. 62, and not in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. H…

• #14

  ees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Depart- ment of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). These cases, the government insists, impose still other and more demanding rules a court must follow before fnding a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Brief for Peti- tioner 21, 25. To appr…

• #15

  Parden, 377 U. S., at 187. When later faced with a similar statute—one that permitted suit against “ `any recipient of Federal assistance' ”—the Atascadero Court rejected Par- den's reasoning, holding that this sort of “general authoriza- tion for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory lan…

• #16

  alone, without any accompanying change to the pertinent lia- bility provision. 411 U. S., at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted). But what the FLSA lacked, the FCRA supplies. As we have seen, Congress did amend the FCRA's liability provisions in 1996. In doing so, Congress replaced the nar- row class of defend…

• #17

  FLSA it addressed. We recognize only that the Court has since repeatedly disavowed the decision's methodological ap- Cite as: 601 U. S. 42 (2024) 59 Opinion of the Court proach and cautioned against its use when considering claims of sovereign immunity in other contexts. 2 B In a fnal set of arguments, the gove…

• #18

  defnition only when applying the defnition would be “in- compatible with Congress['s] regulatory scheme” or would “destro[y] one of the statute's major purposes.” Digital Realty Trust, 583 U. S., at 163–164 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The government does not even try to meet that standard …

• #19

  cable”); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooper- ative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001) (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory am- biguity”). Instead, we ask two distinct questions in cases involving claims of state sovereign immunity: “frst, whether Congress …

• #20

  portion of a statute” does not imply a “license to distort other provisions of the statute.” NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U. S. 571, 579 (1994). And the government offers no basis for us to think that applying § 1681a's defnition to the Act's consumer-suit provi- sions in §§ 1681n and 16…

• #21

  them with additional remedies under the FCRA. That's an unusual argument. Even the government con- cedes that, the Privacy Act notwithstanding, it is subject to and liable under at least some provisions of the FCRA. E. g., Brief for Petitioner 34–35 (conceding the government may be held liable under § 1681u); id.…

• #22

  the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following ad…