Department of Education v. Louisiana

Summary

The Government's applications for a partial stay of the preliminary injunctions issued by District Courts in Louisiana and Kentucky against the enforcement of the Department of Education's new rule implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 are denied, as the Government has not provided the Court a sufficient basis to disturb the lower courts' interim conclusions.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 603 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 866–876 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
August 16, 2024 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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866 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al. v. LOUISIANA 
et al. 
on application for stay 
No. 24A78. Decided August 16, 2024 1 
Several States and other parties obtained preliminary injunctions against 
the enforcement of the Department of Education's new rule implement-
ing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits declined to stay the injunctions at the Government's re-
quest. The Government then fled emergency applications in this Court 
seeking partial stays of the preliminary injunctions pending appellate 
proceedings. The Government argues that three provisions in the new 
rule on which the courts below based plaintiffs' entitlement to prelimi-
nary injunctive relief should be severed and that the other provisions 
of the new rule should be permitted to take effect. 
Held: All Members of the Court accept that plaintiffs were entitled to 
preliminary injunctive relief as to three provisions of the new rule, in-
cluding the central provision that newly defnes sex discrimination to 
include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. The Government has neither provided a suffcient basis to dis-
turb the lower courts' interim conclusions that the three provisions 
found likely to be unlawful are intertwined with other provisions of the 
rule, nor has it adequately identifed which particular provisions, if any, 
might be able to remain in effect. 
Applications for stays denied. 
Per Curiam. 
The application for a partial stay presented to Justice 
Alito in No. 24A78 and by him referred to the Court is de-
nied. The application for a partial stay presented to Jus-
tice Kavanaugh in No. 24A79 and by him referred to the 
Court is denied. 
The Department of Education recently issued a new rule 
implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1 Together with No. 24A79, Cardona, Secretary of Education, et al. v. 
Tennessee et al., also on application for stay.

Cite as: 603 U. S. 866 (2024) 867 
Per Curiam 
1972. The rule newly defned sex discrimination to “in-
clud[e] discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, 
sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33886 
(2024). 
Several States and other parties sought preliminary in-
junctions against the new rule, arguing among other things 
that the rule exceeded the bounds of the statutory text 
enacted by Congress. District Courts in Louisiana and 
Kentucky agreed with the plaintiffs and preliminarily en-
joined enforcement of the rule in the plaintiff States. The 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits then de-
clined to stay the injunctions in the interim period while 
those courts consider the Government's appeals of the pre-
liminary injunctions. 
The Government has now fled emergency applications in 
this Court seeking partial stays of the preliminary injunc-
tions pending resolution of the appeals in the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits. The Court denies the Government's applications. 
Importantly, all Members of the Court today accept that 
the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief 
as to three provisions of the rule, including the central provi-
sion that newly defnes sex discrimination to include discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
But the Government argues (and the dissent agrees) that 
those provisions should be severed and that the other provi-
sions of the new rule should still be permitted to take effect 
in the interim period while the Government's appeals of the 
preliminary injunctions are pending in the Courts of Ap-
peals. The lower courts concluded otherwise because the 
new defnition of sex discrimination is intertwined with and 
affects many other provisions of the new rule. Those courts 
therefore concluded, at least at this preliminary stage, that 
the allegedly unlawful provisions are not readily severable 
from the remaining provisions. The lower courts also 
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868 DEP ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
pointed out the diffculty that schools would face in deter-
mining how to apply the rule for a temporary period with 
some provisions in effect and some enjoined. 
In this emergency posture in this Court, the burden is on 
the Government as applicant to show, among other things, a 
likelihood of success on its severability argument and that 
the equities favor a stay. On this limited record and in its 
emergency applications, the Government has not provided 
this Court a suffcient basis to disturb the lower courts' in-
terim conclusions that the three provisions found likely to be 
unlawful are intertwined with and affect other provisions of 
the rule. Nor has the Government adequately identifed 
which particular provisions, if any, are suffciently independ-
ent of the enjoined defnitional provision and thus might be 
able to remain in effect. Moreover, related to the equities, 
the Sixth Circuit has already expedited its consideration of 
the case and scheduled oral argument for October. The 
Court expects that the Courts of Appeals will render their 
decisions with appropriate dispatch. In light of all of the 
circumstances, the Court denies the Government's applica-
tions for partial stays. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Sotomayor , with whom Justice Kagan, Jus-
tice Gorsuch, and Justice Jackson join, dissenting in 
part. 
Respondents challenged a Department of Education rule 
implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 
Respondents contend that the rule unlawfully redefnes sex 
discrimination; that it violates students' and employees' rights 
to bodily privacy and safety; and that its defnition of hostile 
environment harassment is inconsistent with the statute and 
violates the First Amendment. Every Member of the Court 
agrees respondents are entitled to interim relief as to three 
provisions of that Rule: 34 CFR § 106.10 (2024) (defning sex 
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Cite as: 603 U. S. 866 (2024) 869 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
discrimination), § 106.31(a)(2) (prohibiting schools from pre-
venting individuals from accessing certain sex-separated 
spaces consistent with their gender identity), and § 106.2's 
defnition of hostile environment harassment. Respondents' 
alleged injuries fow from those three provisions. 
Today, however, a majority of this Court leaves in place 
preliminary injunctions that bar the Government from en-
forcing the entire rule—including provisions that bear no ap-
parent relationship to respondents' alleged injuries. Those 
injunctions are overbroad. To be sure, this litigation is still 
unfolding, and respondents might eventually show injuries 
from the other portions of the rule. If so, those injuries 
might merit further relief. For now, on the briefng and rec-
ord currently before us, I would stay the preliminary injunc-
tions except as to the three provisions above, in keeping with 
the traditional principle of equitable remedies that “relief af-
forded [to] the plaintiffs” must not “be more burdensome 
than necessary to redress the complaining parties.” Cali-
fano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979); see Madsen v. 
Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994) (“[An] 
injunction [should be] no broader than necessary to achieve 
its desired goals”). 
I 
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefts of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
fnancial assistance.” 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). 
Congress charged the Department of Education with “issu-
ing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability” to 
“effectuate” Title IX's antidiscrimination mandate. § 1682. 
Pursuant to that authority, in April 2024, the Department 
issued an omnibus rule amending Title IX's regulations, set 
to take effect nationwide on August 1, 2024. See 89 Fed. 
Reg. 33474 (2024) (Rule). The amended provisions of the 
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870 DEP ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
Rule cover a range of matters, most of which do not refer-
ence gender identity discrimination and went unmentioned 
by respondents.1 
Respondents claim they are harmed by three provisions of 
the Rule. First, at 34 CFR § 106.10, the Rule defnes “[d]is-
crimination on the basis of sex” to “includ[e] discrimination 
on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, preg-
nancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender 
identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33886. Second, at § 106.31(a)(2), 
the Rule addresses Title IX's application in sex-separated 
spaces. 89 Fed. Reg. 33887. The Rule leaves untouched 
Title IX's explicit recognition that schools may differentiate 
between students on the basis of sex in some contexts, such 
as in assigning dormitories and creating athletic teams.
2 
1 Those provisions include: a provision requiring access to lactation 
spaces and “reasonable modifcations” for pregnant students, such as rest-
room breaks, 89 Fed. Reg. 33888, 33895–33896 (to be codifed in 34 CFR 
§§ 106.40(b)(3)(v), 106.57); a provision affrming the legal rights of parents 
and guardians to act on behalf of complainants and respondents, 89 Fed. 
Reg. 33885 (to be codifed in 34 CFR § 106.6(g)); three provisions address-
ing schools' obligations in responding to claims implicating Title IX, in-
cluding measures to assist impacted parties, employee-notifcation require-
ments, Title IX coordinator duties, applicable grievance procedures, and 
protection of personally identifable information, 89 Fed. Reg. 33888–33895 
(to be codifed in 34 CFR §§ 106.44, 106.45, 106.46); a provision addressing 
schools' obligations to designate Title IX coordinators, and adopt and im-
plement a nondiscrimination policy and grievance procedures, 89 Fed. Reg. 
33885–33886 (to be codifed in 34 CFR § 106.8); a provision clarifying 
schools' obligations with respect to retaliation, 89 Fed. Reg. 33896 (to be 
codifed in 34 CFR § 106.71); a provision clarifying that the Department of 
Education's Assistant Secretary of Civil Rights will not deem a recipient 
to have violated the Title IX regulations solely because the Assistant Sec-
retary would have reached a different decision in a particular complaint 
alleging sex-based harassment, 89 Fed. Reg. 33895 (to be codifed in 34 
CFR § 106.47); and a provision addressing what preemployment inquiries 
a school may make regarding an individual's marital status and sex, 89 
Fed. Reg. 33896 (to be codifed in 34 CFR § 106.60). 
2 Specifcally, those contexts include membership in fraternities or soror-
ities, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a)(6), separate living facilities, § 1686, and athletic 
teams, Education Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 612. The Department

Cite as: 603 U. S. 866 (2024) 871 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
Outside those statutory exceptions, however, § 106.31(a)(2) 
states that Title IX generally permits “different treatment 
or separation on the basis of sex” only to the extent that 
such differential treatment or separation does not “discrimi-
nat[e]. . . by subjecting a person to more than de minimis 
harm.” Section 106.31(a)(2) further provides that a policy 
or practice that “prevents a person from participating in an 
education program or activity consistent with the person's 
gender identity subjects a person to more than de minimis 
harm on the basis of sex.” (Emphasis added.) Sections 
106.10 and 106.31(a)(2) are the only provisions in the entire 
Rule that reference “gender identity.” 
Third, at 34 CFR § 106.2, the Rule defnes several terms, 
including “hostile environment harassment.” 89 Fed. Reg. 
33884. “Hostile environment harassment” is a prohibited 
form of sex discrimination that, as defned by the Rule, in-
volves “[u]nwelcome sex-based conduct that, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, is subjectively and objectively 
offensive and is so severe or pervasive that it limits or denies 
a person's ability to participate in or beneft from the recipi-
ent's education program or activity (i.e ., creates a hostile en-
vironment).” Ibid. Respondents do not object to § 106.2's 
defnitions of other terms within the Rule, such as “com-
plaint,” “disciplinary sanctions,” “elementary school,” and 
“student.” 
Two groups of States fled suits in two District Courts 
challenging the new Rule as unlawful.
3 They contend that 
explained in the Rule that neither § 106.31(a)(2) nor anything else in the 
Rule addresses or alters existing requirements governing sex separation 
in athletics, which is the subject of a separate rulemaking. 89 Fed. Reg. 
33816–33817. 
3 One suit was brought by the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, 
and Idaho, joined by the Louisiana Department of Education and 18 Louisi-
ana school boards. Another suit was brought by the states of Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia, joined by an associa-
tion of Christian teachers and a 15-year-old girl from West Virginia. Sev-
eral other States and parties have fled similar suits challenging the Rule 
and requesting preliminary injunctions within the plaintiff States. See 
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872 DEP ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
the Rule unlawfully rewrites Title IX's prohibition on sex 
discrimination to include discrimination based on students' 
gender identity. Respondents further argue that § 106.2's 
defnition of “hostile environment harassment” is unlawful 
under Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629 
(1999), because it waters down the standard for what consti-
tutes actionable sex-based harassment: Title IX complain-
ants can prevail under the Rule by showing the alleged har-
assment was severe or pervasive (as opposed to both) and do 
not need to prove that the offending conduct denied them 
access to educational benefts. Respondents separately as-
sert that § 106.2's defnition of “hostile environment harass-
ment” violates the First Amendment by chilling or compel-
ling speech, including on issues of gender identity. 
Accordingly, when respondents asked the District Courts 
to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the Rule, they focused 
on the two provisions concerning gender identity—§§ 106.10 
and 106.31(a)(2)—and § 106.2's defnition of “hostile environ-
ment harassment.” Respondents alleged that those three 
provisions would cause them irreparable harm if the Rule 
went into effect. Specifcally, they asserted that they would 
incur unrecoverable costs in complying with those provisions 
(and a loss of Title IX funding if they failed to do so), that 
they would lose the right to speak freely on issues such as 
gender identity, and that they would be unable to enforce 
existing state laws that confict with the Rule's prohibition 
of gender identity discrimination. Although respondents' 
alleged irreparable harm apparently traces back to just three 
of the Rule's provisions, the District Courts preliminarily 
Kansas v. United States Dept. of Ed., ––– F. Supp. 3d –––, 2024 WL 
3273285 (D Kan., July 2, 2024); Texas v. United States, ––– F. Supp. 3d –––, 
2024 WL 3405342 (ND Tex., July 11, 2024); Carroll Independent School 
Dist. v. United States Dept. of Ed., ––– F. Supp. 3d –––, 2024 WL 3381901 
(ND Tex., July 11, 2024); Arkansas v. United States Dept. of Ed., No. 4:24– 
CV–636 (ED Mo., July 24, 2024), ECF Doc. 54; Alabama v. Cardona, 2024 
WL 3607492 (ND Ala., July 30, 2024). 
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Cite as: 603 U. S. 866 (2024) 873 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
enjoined the Government from enforcing the entire Rule in 
all the respondent States. 
After unsuccessful efforts to seek relief from these over-
broad injunctions in the lower courts, the Government asks 
this Court to stay the injunctions in part. The Government 
does not contest the continued injunction as to § 106.31(a)(2) 
(regulating access to sex-separated spaces) or § 106.2's def-
nition of hostile environment harassment as applied to gen-
der identity discrimination. Instead, it asks this Court to 
stay the injunction as to § 106.2's defnition of hostile environ-
ment harassment as applied to other forms of sex discrimina-
tion, § 106.2's other defnitions, § 106.10, and the remainder of 
the Rule's unchallenged provisions. 
II 
I would grant most of the Government's stay requests and 
leave enjoined only its enforcement of the three challenged 
provisions.
4 A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary” 
exercise of equitable authority, appropriate only “upon a 
clear showing” that a party is “entitled to such relief.” 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 
7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party 
must establish, among other things, that it would likely suf-
fer irreparable harm without equitable relief. Ibid. Even 
when a party makes that showing, though, a court must tai-
lor equitable relief to redress the party's alleged injuries 
without burdening the defendant more than necessary. See 
Madsen, 512 U. S., at 765 (“[An] injunction [should be] no 
broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals”); Yama-
saki, 442 U. S., at 702 (explaining that “relief afforded [to] the 
plaintiffs” must not “be more burdensome than necessary to 
redress the complaining parties”). 
Here, respondents' alleged injuries fow from the chal-
lenged provisions. Even assuming respondents established 
4 For § 106.2, I would leave enjoined only its defnition of “hostile envi-
ronment harassment.” 
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874 DEP ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
that those provisions subject them to a threat of irreparable 
harm, enjoining enforcement of the entire Rule appears to 
go beyond what was necessary to redress those injuries. 
Consider some of the unchallenged provisions. The Rule 
requires schools to provide “reasonable modifcations” to 
pregnant students, including but not limited to “breaks dur-
ing class to express breast milk, breastfeed, or attend to 
health needs associated with pregnancy or related condi-
tions.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33887. A separate provision prohibits 
schools from making a preemployment inquiry as to an appli-
cant's marital status and limits the circumstances under 
which a school may make a preemployment inquiry as to an 
applicant's sex. Id., at 33896. The Rule also mandates that 
schools prohibit staff and students from retaliating against 
students who fle Title IX complaints, and provides the pro-
cedure a school must follow upon receiving a complaint of 
retaliation. Ibid. Those provisions (like many others in 
the Rule) do not reference gender identity discrimination or 
hostile environment harassment and bear no apparent rela-
tionship to respondents' alleged injuries. As litigation over 
the Rule proceeds, respondents might be able to show those 
other portions of the Rule will irreparably harm them in a 
manner justifying further equitable relief. At this juncture, 
however, enjoining the application of any other part of the 
Rule needlessly impairs the Government from enforcing 
Title IX and deprives potential claimants of protections 
against forms of sex discrimination not at issue in respond-
ents' suit. 
Respondents maintain that the Government must remain 
enjoined from enforcing the entire Rule because the chal-
lenged provisions “permeate” it. Respondents fail to ex-
plain, however, why enjoining enforcement of the entire Rule 
at this stage is necessary to redress their alleged injuries. 
As an initial matter, many unchallenged provisions (such as 
those governing preemployment inquiries about an appli-
cant's marital status or sex and prohibiting pregnancy dis-
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Cite as: 603 U. S. 866 (2024) 875 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
crimination) include no reference to gender identity discrimi-
nation or hostile environment harassment. Respondents 
offer nothing to justify preventing the Government from en-
forcing those parts of the Rule. As for the provisions that 
do incorporate the Department's allegedly unlawful defni-
tions of sex-based discrimination and harassment, respond-
ents do not explain how those provisions would injure them 
while the Government is enjoined from enforcing the dis-
puted defnitions. Take the Rule's requirement that em-
ployees be trained on “[t]he scope of conduct that constitutes 
sex discrimination under Title IX and this part, includ-
ing the defnition of sex-based harassment.” 89 Fed. Reg. 
33886. Even respondents do not argue that the training re-
quirement is itself unlawful. With the challenged provisions 
out of the picture, the “scope of conduct” under that training 
provision would exclude gender identity discrimination and 
hostile environment harassment, the sources of respondents' 
alleged injuries. If there were any doubt on this score, 
moreover, the Court could simply have excluded the provi-
sion from its stay order. 
Respondents further assert that the Rule would be un-
workable with the Government enjoined from applying its 
defnition of sex discrimination. For 50 years, however, 
Title IX regulations have not defned sex discrimination, and 
respondents offer no evidence that schools cannot comply 
with their Title IX obligations without such a defnition. 
* * * 
By blocking the Government from enforcing scores of reg-
ulations that respondents never challenged and that bear no 
apparent relationship to respondents' alleged injuries, the 
lower courts went beyond their authority to remedy the dis-
crete harms alleged here. The injunctions this Court leaves 
in place will burden the Government more than necessary. 
The injunctions will also affect the public. Individuals in 
the respondent States will be deprived of guidance related

876 DEP ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA 
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part 
to their rights under Title IX, of updates to the processes 
schools must follow in investigating their complaints of sex 
discrimination, of protections from retaliation should they 
fle a complaint, and of much more. On the present record, 
more tailored relief focused on the three challenged provi-
sions would have redressed respondents' alleged injuries 
without depriving the public of the Rule's other provisions. 
Because the majority of this Court nonetheless leaves the 
overly broad injunctions in place, I respectfully dissent in 
part. 
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Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
None

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 603 U. S. Part 1 Pages 866–876 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT August 16, 2024 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to no…

• #2

  Cite as: 603 U. S. 866 (2024) 867 Per Curiam 1972. The rule newly defned sex discrimination to “in- clud[e] discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33886 (2024). Several States and other parties …

• #3

  likelihood of success on its severability argument and that the equities favor a stay. On this limited record and in its emergency applications, the Government has not provided this Court a suffcient basis to disturb the lower courts' in- terim conclusions that the three provisions found likely to be unlawful are…

• #4

  ord currently before us, I would stay the preliminary injunc- tions except as to the three provisions above, in keeping with the traditional principle of equitable remedies that “relief af- forded [to] the plaintiffs” must not “be more burdensome than necessary to redress the complaining parties.” Cali- fano v. Y…

• #5

  and guardians to act on behalf of complainants and respondents, 89 Fed. Reg. 33885 (to be codifed in 34 CFR § 106.6(g)); three provisions address- ing schools' obligations in responding to claims implicating Title IX, in- cluding measures to assist impacted parties, employee-notifcation require- ments, Title IX co…

• #6

  including “hostile environment harassment.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33884. “Hostile environment harassment” is a prohibited form of sex discrimination that, as defned by the Rule, in- volves “[u]nwelcome sex-based conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, is subjectively and objectively offensive and is so s…

• #7

  ling speech, including on issues of gender identity. Accordingly, when respondents asked the District Courts to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the Rule, they focused on the two provisions concerning gender identity—§§ 106.10 and 106.31(a)(2)—and § 106.2's defnition of “hostile environ- ment harassment.” Resp…

• #8

  exercise of equitable authority, appropriate only “upon a clear showing” that a party is “entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must establish, among other things, that it would likely suf- fer irreparable h…

• #9

  manner justifying further equitable relief. At this juncture, however, enjoining the application of any other part of the Rule needlessly impairs the Government from enforcing Title IX and deprives potential claimants of protections against forms of sex discrimination not at issue in respond- ents' suit. Respond…

• #10

  ulations that respondents never challenged and that bear no apparent relationship to respondents' alleged injuries, the lower courts went beyond their authority to remedy the dis- crete harms alleged here. The injunctions this Court leaves in place will burden the Government more than necessary. The injunctions w…