City and County of San Francisco v. EPA

Summary

The challenged end-result permitting provisions—which make the permittee responsible for the quality of the water in the body of water into which the permittee discharges pollutants—exceed the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority under the Clean Water Act.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 334–368 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
March 4, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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334 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 
Syllabus 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
CALIFORNIA v. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the ninth circuit 
No. 23–753. Argued October 16, 2024—Decided March 4, 2025 
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized state agencies issue 
permits that impose requirements on entities that wish to discharge 
“pollutants” into the waters of the United States. A critical component 
of the CWA regulatory scheme is the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), which makes it unlawful to discharge 
pollutants into covered bodies of water unless authorized by permit. 
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 
200, 205. These permits typically include “effuent limitations” on dis-
charges that restrict the “quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemi-
cal, physical, biological, and other constituents.” § 1362(11). Failure to 
comply with permit limitations exposes permittees to civil penalties and 
even criminal prosecution. §§ 1319(c) and (d). Under what is known 
as the “permit shield” provision, however, an entity that adheres to the 
terms of its permit is deemed to be compliant with the Act. § 1342(k). 
This case involves a challenge to “end-result” requirements—permit 
provisions that do not spell out what a permittee must do or refrain 
from doing but instead make a permittee responsible for the quality of 
the water in the body of water into which the permittee discharges 
pollutants. The City of San Francisco operates two combined waste-
water treatment facilities that process both wastewater and stormwa-
ter. Combined Sewer Overfow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 
18689; 75 F. 4th 1074, 1082 (CA9). During periods of heavy precipita-
tion, the combination of wastewater and stormwater may exceed the 
facility's capacity, and the result may be the discharge of untreated 
water, including raw sewage, into the Pacifc Ocean or the San Francisco 
Bay. 59 Fed. Reg. 18689; EPA, Offce of Water, Combined Sewer Over-
fows: Guidance for Permit Writers, p. 1–1; 75 F. 4th, at 1082–1083. In 
1994, the EPA adopted its CSO Control Policy, which requires munici-
palities with combined systems to take prescribed measures and to de-
velop and implement a Long-Term Control Plan, and provides for a two-
phase permitting process. 59 Fed. Reg. 18691, 18696.

Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 335 
Syllabus 
For many years, San Francisco's NPDES permit for its Oceanside 
facility was renewed without controversy, but in 2019, the EPA issued 
a renewal permit that added two end-result requirements. 75 F. 4th, 
at 1084–1085. The frst of these prohibits the facility from making any 
discharge that “contribute[s] to a violation of any applicable water qual-
ity standard” for receiving waters. Id., at 1085. The second provides 
that the City cannot perform any treatment or make any discharge that 
“create[s] pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defned by California 
Water Code section 13050.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
San Francisco argued that the end-result requirements exceed the 
EPA's statutory authority, but the Ninth Circuit denied the City's peti-
tion for review. The court held that § 1311(b)(1)(C) authorizes the EPA 
to impose “any” limitations ensuring applicable water quality standards 
are satisfed in a receiving body of water. 
Held: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end-
result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per-
mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the 
EPA's responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make 
that determination. Pp. 344–355. 
(a) Not all “limitations” under § 1311 must qualify as effuent limita-
tions. While §§ 1311(b)(1)(A) and (B) refer to “effuent limitations,” 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) refers to “any more stringent limitation.” This distinc-
tion shows that Congress intentionally authorized limitations beyond 
effuent limitations because “it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” of lan-
guage in a statute. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Other CWA provisions support this by re-
ferring to “effuent limitations and other limitations” under § 1311. See, 
e.g., §§ 1341(d), 1365(f). Moreover, San Francisco's interpretation would 
either invalidate widely accepted narrative permit provisions or require 
an improbably broad reading of “effuent limitation.” Pp. 344–345. 
(b) Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize permit requirements con-
ditioning compliance on receiving water quality. The provision's text, 
structure, and context support this interpretation. Pp. 345–355. 
(1) The terms “limitation,” “implement,” and “meet” in § 1311(b) 
(1)(C) suggest the EPA must set specifc rules permittees must follow 
to achieve water quality goals. A “limitation” is a “restriction . . . im-
posed from without,” not an end-result requirement leaving permittees 
to determine necessary steps. Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary 1312. When a provision tells a permittee that a particular end 
result must be achieved, the direct source of the restriction comes from 
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336 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Syllabus 
within, not “from without.” To “implement” standards requires “con-
crete measures,” not simply mandating achievement of results. Id., at 
1134; § 1311(b)(1)(C). A limitation that is “necessary to meet” an objec-
tive is most naturally understood to mean a provision that sets out ac-
tions that must be taken to achieve the objective. Pp. 346–348. 
(2) The pre-1972 Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) contained a 
provision that allowed direct enforcement against a polluter if the qual-
ity of the water into which the polluter discharges pollutants failed to 
meet water quality standards. See Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, ch. 758, §§ 1, 2(d)(1), 2(d)(4), 2(d)(7), 62 Stat. 1155, 1156–1157. But 
Congress deliberately omitted such provisions when overhauling the law 
in 1972. Instead, the CWA imposes “direct restrictions” on polluters 
rather than working backward from pollution to assign responsibility. 
EPA, 426 U. S., at 204. The Government's interpretation would undo 
what Congress plainly sought to achieve when it scrapped the WPCA's 
backward-looking approach. Pp. 348–349. 
(3) Two features of the broader statutory scheme further support 
this conclusion. First, end-result requirements would negate the 
CWA's “permit shield” protecting compliant permittees from liability. 
Second, EPA's interpretation provides no mechanism for fairly allocat-
ing responsibility among multiple dischargers contributing to water 
quality violations. Pp. 350–352. 
(c) The Agency has adequate tools to obtain needed information from 
permittees without resorting to end-result requirements. Its reliance 
on the Combined Sewer Overfow Policy is misplaced as that policy au-
thorizes narrative limitations but not end-result requirements. And 
concerns about disrupting general permits are unfounded given that 
narrative limitations remain available. Pp. 352–355. 
75 F. 4th 1074, reversed. 
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, in which Gorsuch, J., joined as 
to all but Part II, and in which Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jack-
son, JJ., joined as to Part II. Barrett, J., fled an opinion dissenting in 
part, in which Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined, post, p. 356. 
Tara M. Steeley argued the cause for petitioner. With her 
on the briefs were David Chiu, Yvonne R. Meré, David S. 
Louk, John S. Roddy, Estie M. Kus, Andrew C. Silton, John 
C. Cruden, and Richard S. Davis. 
Frederick Liu argued the cause for respondent. With 
him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar , Assistant 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 337 
Opinion of the Court 
Attorney General Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, 
Meghan E. Greenfeld, and Steven M. Neugeboren.* 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1251 et seq ., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and authorized state agencies 1 may issue permits that im-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Hayden Area 
Regional Sewer Board by Preston N. Carter and Morgan D. Goodin; for 
the Local Government Legal Center et al. by J. G. Andre Monette and 
Amanda Karras; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by 
John A. Sheehan, Thomas Ward, and Prianka Sharma; for the National 
Mining Association et al. by Misha Tseytlin, Michael A. Tilghman II, 
Ellen Steen, Travis Cushman, Andrew R. Varcoe, Stephanie A. Maloney, 
Michael C. Formica, and Elizabeth Milito; and for Public Wastewater and 
Stormwater Agencies et al. by David Y . Chung, Elizabeth B. Dawson, 
Amanda E. Aspatore, Hilary Meltzer, F. Paul Calamita III, and Melissa 
A. Thorme. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 
California by Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Michael J. Mon-
gan, Solicitor General, Christopher D. Hu, Deputy Solicitor General, Tracy 
L. Winsor, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Russell B. Hildreth, Super-
vising Deputy Attorney General, and Marc N. Melnick and Bryant B. 
Cannon, Deputy Attorneys General; for the State of Washington et al. by 
Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington, Kelly T. Wood, and 
Peter B. Gonick, Deputy Solicitor General, by Andrea Joy Campbell, At-
torney General of Massachusetts, and Helen Yurchenco and Emily Mitch-
ell Field, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for 
their respective jurisdictions as follows: William Tong of Connecticut, 
Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, 
Aaron Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Dana Nessel of 
Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Matthew Platkin of New Jersey, 
Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, and 
Josh Kaul of Wisconsin; for Environmental and Community Organizations 
by Kirti Datla, Benjamin Chagnon, and Linnet Davis-Stermitz; for the 
Orange County Coastkeeper by Sarah J. Spinuzzi; and for Small Business 
Owners and Operators by Keith P . Richard. 
1 See 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). The provision at issue in this case, 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C), applies equally to federal and state permits, but for con-
venience, we refer only to the EPA when referring to the scope of permit-
ting authority under that provision.

338 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
pose requirements on entities that wish to discharge “pollut-
ants” (a broadly defned term) 2 into the waters of the United 
States.3 Permits issued by these agencies include what the 
CWA calls “effuent limitations,” that is, provisions that 
specify the quantities of enumerated pollutants that may be 
discharged.
4 It is also common for permits to set out other 
steps that a discharger must take. These may include test-
ing, record-keeping, and reporting requirements, as well as 
requirements obligating a permittee to follow specifed prac-
tices designed to reduce pollution. None of these so-called 
narrative requirements is at issue here. 
Instead, this case involves provisions that do not spell out 
what a permittee must do or refrain from doing; rather, they 
make a permittee responsible for the quality of the water 
in the body of water into which the permittee discharges 
pollutants. When a permit contains such requirements, a 
permittee that punctiliously follows every specifc require-
ment in its permit may nevertheless face crushing penalties 
if the quality of the water in its receiving waters falls below 
the applicable standards. For convenience, we will call such 
provisions “end-result” requirements. 
The permittee in this case is a wastewater treatment facil-
ity owned by San Francisco. For the past fve years, the 
facility's permit has included two end-result requirements, 
and if those provisions are upheld, the City could be heavily 
penalized even though it was never put on notice that it was 
obligated to take any specifc step other than those it under-
took. San Francisco argues that the end-result provisions 
in its permit are not authorized by the CWA, and its position 
is supported by many other similarly situated cities, includ-
ing New York, the District of Columbia, Boston, and Buffalo, 
as well as national and state associations whose members 
2 § 1362(6). 
3 § 1362(7). 
4 § 1362(11). 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 339 
Opinion of the Court 
collectively “provide wastewater and stormwater services to 
the majority of [the people in this country whose homes are 
connected to sewers].” 5 
We hold that the two challenged provisions exceed the 
EPA's authority. The text and structure of the CWA, as 
well as the history of federal water pollution legislation, 
make this clear. And resorting to such requirements is not 
necessary to protect water quality. The EPA may itself de-
termine what a facility should do to protect water quality, 
and the Agency has ample tools to obtain whatever informa-
tion it needs to make that determination. If the EPA does 
its work, our holding should have no adverse effect on 
water quality. 
I 
A 
To understand the issue before us, it is helpful to take a brief 
look back at the history of federal water pollution legislation. 
For most of the Nation's history, the Federal Government 
played a secondary role in this feld. See Sackett v. EPA, 
598 U. S. 651, 659 (2023). In 1948, however, Congress passed 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA), ch. 758, 62 
Stat. 1155, which represented a cautious expansion of federal 
authority. K. Murchison, Learning From More Than Five-
and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Leg-
islation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 Boston College 
Env. Aff. L. Rev. 527, 530–531 (2005). The WPCA reaf-
frmed the long-accepted principle that “controlling water 
pollution” was primarily a state responsibility, but it also 
declared that the pollution of certain interstate waters had 
become “a public nuisance” and was “subject to abatement” 
in a suit brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the 
United States. §§ 1, 2(d)(1), 2(d)(4), 2(d)(7), 62 Stat. 1155– 
1157. 
5 Brief for Public Wastewater and Stormwater Agencies et al. as Amici 
Curiae 2. 
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340 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
Over the next 24 years, the WPCA was amended numer-
ous times,6 and the federal role gradually grew, but the basic 
structure of federal enforcement actions remained the same. 
The starting point was the identifcation of a body of water 
with substandard water quality. After that, federal author-
ities had to work backward and prove that a particular entity 
should be held responsible for the problem.
7 Both the origi-
nal version of the 1948 Act and all amendments enacted 
before 1972 proved to be ineffective due in part to this 
backward-looking model. See EPA v. California ex rel. 
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 202 (1976). 
By 1972, the WPCA's inadequacy was apparent, and Con-
gress made a fresh start. It amended the WPCA by delet-
ing all its provisions and substituting what is now generally 
known as the Clean Water Act. The CWA jettisoned the 
WPCA's retrospective approach and aimed directly at the 
sources of pollution. A critical component of the CWA 
scheme is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES), see id., at 204–205, which makes it unlawful 
to discharge pollutants into covered bodies of water unless 
authorized by permit. Permits issued under this program 
may contain several different types of provisions. 
Some are known as “effuent limitations,” see 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1311, which are defned as restrictions on the “quantities, 
rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, 
and other constituents.” § 1362(11). Section 1311(b)(1), 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), require compliance with one type 
of effuent limitations: those that are based on what can be 
achieved using specifed pollution-treatment technologies. 
6 See Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. 84–660, 
70 Stat. 498; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, 
Pub. L. 87–88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89–234, 79 
Stat. 903; Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91–224, 84 
Stat. 91. 
7 See § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1156–1157; 70 Stat. 504–505; 75 Stat. 208–209; 79 
Stat. 909. 
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See 40 CFR § 122.44(a)(1) (2023). In most cases, these 
technology-based limitations are suffcient, but when they 
are not, NPDES permits also include water quality-based 
effuent limitations (WQBELs). 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 
These WQBELs, unlike technology-based effuent limita-
tions, are “set without regard to cost or technology availabil-
ity.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 808 F. 3d 
556, 565 (CA2 2015); see Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F. 2d 156, 208 (CADC 1988) (per cu-
riam). Instead, they permit only those discharges that may 
be made without unduly impairing water quality. 
In addition to these effuent limitations, it is common for 
permits to include requirements that do not set numerical 
limitations on allowed discharges. One example, which is 
apparently common in so-called general permits, is a provi-
sion demanding that permittees follow certain “best prac-
tices” that aim to limit pollution.
8 
Under the NPDES system, permittees have a very strong 
incentive to comply with all permit terms. For one thing, 
the CWA gives the EPA a very big “stick.” Permittees that 
do not comply may be hit with enormous civil penalties and 
may face criminal prosecution for “knowing” or even “negli-
gent” violations. See §§ 1319(c) and (d); 40 CFR § 19.4 
(2023). At the same time, the CWA holds out an enticing 
“carrot.” Under what is known as the “permit shield” pro-
vision, an entity that adheres to the terms of its permit is 
deemed to be compliant with the Act. See 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1342(k). 
B 
The case now before us involves a particular type of public 
wastewater treatment, one that processes both wastewater 
(water that has been used in a home) and stormwater (rain-
water that does not sink into the ground). Many major 
8 See Brief for National Association of Home Builders et al. as Amici 
Curiae 1, 11–12.

342 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
cities have such systems, and they present special problems. 
During periods of heavy precipitation, the combination of 
wastewater and stormwater may exceed the facility's treat-
ment capacity, and the result may be the discharge of un-
treated water, including raw sewage. See Combined Sewer 
Overfow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18689 (1994); 
EPA, Offce of Water, Combined Sewer Overfows: Guidance 
for Permit Writers, p. 1–1 (1995). This problematic feature 
of combined facilities was recognized long ago; installing a 
new system that handles stormwater and wastewater sepa-
rately is enormously expensive.
9 
To address the problem of CSOs, the EPA adopted its CSO 
Control Policy, which requires municipalities with combined 
systems to take prescribed measures and to develop and im-
plement a Long-Term Control Plan. 59 Fed. Reg. 18691. 
The CSO Policy provides for a two-phase permitting process. 
Id., at 18696. During phase I, permits require municipali-
ties to implement nine minimum controls and to develop a 
long-term plan. Then, during phase II, that plan must be 
implemented. Ibid. In 2000, Congress amended the CWA 
and gave the CSO Control Policy the force of a statute. See 
33 U. S. C. § 1342(q)(1). 
C 
The City of San Francisco operates two combined treat-
ment facilities: the Bayside facility, which discharges into 
San Francisco Bay, and the Oceanside facility, which empties 
into the Pacifc Ocean. The permit at issue in this dispute 
concerns only the Oceanside facility,
10 which treats water 
from 250 miles of sewers and serves approximately 250,000 
residents. 75 F. 4th 1074, 1082 (CA9 2023). 
For many years, the Oceanside facility's NPDES permit 
was renewed without controversy, but in 2019, the two end-
9 T. Camp, The Problem of Separation in Planning Sewer Systems, 38 
J. Water Pollution Control Federation 1959 (1966). 
10 See App. to Pet. for Cert. 80–140. 
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Opinion of the Court 
result requirements that San Francisco now challenges were 
added. Id., at 1084–1085. The frst of these prohibits the 
facility from making any discharge that “contribute[s] to a 
violation of any applicable water quality standard” for re-
ceiving waters. Id., at 1085. The second provides that the 
City cannot perform any treatment or make any discharge 
that “create[s] pollution, contamination, or nuisance as de-
fned by California Water Code section 13050.” Ibid. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
The California Regional Water Quality Control Board for 
the San Francisco Bay Region approved the fnal Oceanside 
NPDES permit, and the EPA did the same.
11 Id., at 1088. 
San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals 
Board (EAB), objecting to, among other things, the two new 
provisions just noted. City and Cty. of San Francisco , 18 
E. A. D. 322, 325 (2020). The EAB rejected San Francisco's 
challenge, and the City then fled a petition for review in the 
Ninth Circuit under 33 U. S. C. § 1369(b)(1)(F). 75 F. 4th, at 
1088. A divided Ninth Circuit panel denied that petition, 
holding that § 1311(b)(1)(C) authorizes the EPA to impose 
“any” limitations that seek to ensure that applicable water 
quality standards are satisfed in a receiving body of water. 
Id., at 1089–1090. In dissent, Judge Collins argued that the 
CWA “draws an explicit distinction between the `limitations' 
that the agency must devise and impose on a particular per-
mittee's discharges” and the water quality standards them-
selves. Id., at 1102 (Collins, J., dissenting). The majority, 
he maintained, erred by making the “ `water quality stand-
ards' themselves the applicable `limitation' for an individual 
discharger.” Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the EPA can im-
pose requirements like those at issue. 602 U. S. 1002 (2024). 
11 Both the California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the 
EPA had to approve the NPDES permit because the Oceanside facility 
discharges into waters that fall under both state and federal jurisdiction. 
75 F. 4th 1074, 1082 (CA9 2023) (case below). 
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344 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
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II 
Contending that the Ninth Circuit misread § 1311(b)(1)(C), 
San Francisco leads with the argument that all “limitations” 
imposed under § 1311 must qualify as effuent limitations. 
The statutory text dooms this broad argument. “[W]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello 
v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). We have invoked this canon time and time 
again. See, e. g., Gallardo v. Marstiller, 596 U. S. 420, 429– 
430 (2022); Salinas v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 592 U. S. 
188, 196 (2021); Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. 566, 
576–577 (2019). And it is fatal to San Francisco's argument 
here. Sections 1311(b)(1)(A) and (B) refer to “effuent limi-
tations,” but the very next provision, § 1311(b)(1)(C), re-
fers instead to “any more stringent limitation.” We cannot 
believe that Congress omitted the term “effuent” from 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) simply because it wanted to save ink or as-
sumed that regulators and interested parties would under-
stand that the omission of the term was inconsequential. 
Other provisions of the CWA support this conclusion by 
describing § 1311 as authorizing the EPA to impose effuent 
or other limitations. See § 1341(d) (referring to “effuent 
limitations and other limitations, under section 1311”); 
§ 1365(f) (referring to “effuent limitation[s] or other limita-
tion[s] under section 1311”); § 1367(d) (same); see also Na-
tional Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense , 583 U. S. 
109, 122 (2018) (interpreting the phrase “effuent limitation 
or other limitation” in the CWA's judicial review provision, 
§ 1369, to encompass both “effuent” limitations and limita-
tions such as “non-numerical operational practice[s]” and 
“equipment specifcation[s]”). 
These reasons convince us that San Francisco's argument 
is wrong, but if more were needed, it is telling that the City's 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 345 
Opinion of the Court 
interpretation would lead to either drastic consequences that 
the City is unwilling to embrace or a very loose interpreta-
tion of the term “effuent limitation” that would undermine 
the City's argument. As noted earlier, it is common for per-
mits to contain “narrative” provisions requiring permittees 
to do such things as following certain “best practices.” 
These provisions do not directly restrict the “quantities, 
rates, or concentration” of pollutants that a permittee may 
discharge, and therefore they do not ft easily within the 
defnition of an “effuent limitation.” Nevertheless, the City 
acknowledges their legitimacy, see Brief for Petitioner 15, 
33, n. 22, and if that is correct, it must follow either that (1) 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) authorizes the imposition of limitations other 
than effuent limitations (which would, of course, defeat the 
City's argument) or (2) the statutory defnition of an effuent 
limitation should be read very loosely (which raises the ques-
tion why this broad interpretation would not encompass the 
provisions at issue here). Under either alternative, the City 
is on perilous ground. 
These problems overwhelm any help that the City can de-
rive from the fact that § 1311 is titled “Effuent limitations.” 
The title of a statutory provision can inform its interpreta-
tion, but it is not conclusive. See Dubin v. United States, 
599 U. S. 110, 120–121 (2023). And here, the title of § 1311 
is not enough to win the day for the City. Section 1311 is a 
lengthy provision, and most of its subsections concern effu-
ent limitations. The title “Effuent limitations” provides a 
rough description of the provision's general sweep, but it 
cannot be read as doing more than that. 
III 
In addition to the broad argument discussed above, San 
Francisco advances a narrower alternative, namely, that 
even if § 1311(b)(1)(C) is not limited to effuent limitations, it 
“does not authorize EPA to impose NPDES permit require-
ments that condition permitholders' compliance on whether 
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346 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
receiving waters meet applicable water quality standards.” 
Brief for Petitioner 19. We agree with this argument. As 
the City maintains, “[t]he text, structure, and pre- and post-
enactment context” support this interpretation. Ibid. 
A 
We begin with the text of § 1311(b)(1)(C), which, as noted, 
requires a permit to contain, in addition to “effuent limita-
tions,” “any more stringent limitation” that is “necessary to 
meet” certain “water quality standards” that are imposed 
under state law “or any other Federal law or regulation”; 
and “any more stringent limitation” that is “required to im-
plement any applicable water quality standard established 
pursuant to this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) All the itali-
cized terms in the preceding sentence suggest that the most 
natural reading of § 1311(b)(1)(C) is that it authorizes the 
EPA to set rules that a permittee must follow in order to 
achieve a desired result, namely, a certain degree of water 
quality. 
We start with the term “limitation.” As used in the rele-
vant context, a limitation is a “restriction or restraint im-
posed from without (as by law[ )].” Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1312 (1976) (emphasis added). A 
provision that tells a permittee that it must do certain spe-
cifc things plainly qualifes as a limitation. Such a provision 
imposes a restriction “from without.” But when a provision 
simply tells a permittee that a particular end result must be 
achieved and that it is up to the permittee to fgure out what 
it should do, the direct source of restriction or restraint is 
the plan that the permittee imposes on itself for the purpose 
of avoiding future liability. In other words, the direct 
source of the restriction comes from within, not “from 
without.” 
We do not dispute that the term “limitation” is sometimes 
used in a looser sense, but our task is to ascertain what the 
term means in the specifc context in question. And here, 
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Opinion of the Court 
our interpretation of the meaning of the term “limitation” in 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) must take into account the way in which the 
term is used in the two preceding statutory subsections, 
§§ 1311(b)(1)(A) and (B). In both those provisions, the “limi-
tations” are imposed directly by the EPA, and it is therefore 
natural to presume that the term has a similar meaning in 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C). See, e. g., McDonnell v. United States, 579 
U. S. 550, 568–569 (2016); Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 
528, 544 (2015) (plurality opinion); A. Scalia & B. Garner, 
Reading Law 195–198 (2012). So the use of the term “limi-
tation” in §§ 1311(b)(1)(A) and (B) provides an opening clue 
that the EPA's interpretation of § 1311(b)(1)(C) may be 
wrong. 
The terms “implement” and “meet” point in the same di-
rection. The implementation of an objective generally re-
fers to the taking of actions that are designed “to give prac-
tical effect to and ensure of actual fulfllment by concrete 
measures.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
at 1134. Section 1311(b)(1)(C) tells the EPA to impose re-
quirements to “implement” water quality standards—that is, 
to “ensure” “by concrete measures” that they are “actual[ly]” 
“fulfll[ed].” Simply telling a permittee to ensure that the 
end result is reached is not a “concrete plan” for achieving 
the desired result. Such a directive simply states the de-
sired result; it does not implement that result. 
Section 1311(b)(1)(C)'s other directive—that the EPA im-
pose limitations that are “necessary to meet” certain water 
quality standards–is similar. The verb to “meet,” in the 
sense operative here, means “to comply with; fulfll; satisfy” 
or “to come into conformity with.” Random House Un-
abridged Dictionary 1195 (2d ed. 1987). Thus, a limitation 
that is “necessary to meet” an objective is most naturally 
understood to mean a provision that sets out actions that 
must be taken to achieve the objective. 
In assessing what the directives in § 1131(b)(1)(C) mean, it 
is helpful to consider the use of the relevant terms in every-
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348 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
day speech. Suppose a State requires that all schools 
“meet” certain standards of math profciency, and suppose 
the principal of a school calls a faculty meeting and instructs 
the teachers to “implement” those standards. The princi-
pal's obvious expectation would be that the teachers would 
devise and “implement” a plan to make sure that the desired 
end is “met.” It is unlikely that the principal would be 
happy if the teachers simply told their students that a state 
math profciency test would be administered and that they 
should make sure they passed. That would not constitute 
the implementation of the desired end, i. e., meeting the 
State's standard of math profciency. 
Attempting to counter this interpretation, the EPA 
stresses § 1311(b)(1)(C)'s use of the term “any” in the phrase 
“any more stringent limitation,” arguing that “any” is a very 
broad term. That argument misconstrues the term's effect. 
The adjective “any” is indeed a broad term, but it cannot 
expand the reach of the noun it modifes. A reference to 
“any mammal” would capture all mammals, but it would not 
encompass a bird or fsh. Similarly, § 1311(b)(1)(C) encom-
passes any limitation that is necessary to meet or implement 
water quality standards, but not provisions that do not fall 
within that category. 
B 
The text of the CWA militates against the Government's 
interpretation of § 1311(b)(1)(C) for yet another reason that 
stands out when the history of federal water pollution con-
trol legislation is kept in mind. Under the Government's 
reading, a permittee may be held liable if the quality of the 
water into which it discharges pollutants fails to meet water 
quality standards. Before 1972, the WPCA contained a pro-
vision that did exactly that in no uncertain terms. But 
when Congress overhauled the WPCA in 1972, it scrapped 
that provision and did not include in the new version of the 
Act anything remotely similar. Under these circumstances, 
the absence of a comparable provision in the CWA is telling. 
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This glaring void resulted from a deliberate and prominent 
policy choice. As recounted earlier, before 1972, the basic 
structure of federal enforcement efforts was a lawsuit seek-
ing to hold a polluter accountable for contributing to what 
amounted to or was expressly termed a violation of water 
quality standards. Building on the enforcement model orig-
inally adopted in the 1948 Act, the 1965 amendments of the 
WPCA required the adoption of “water quality standards,” 
and they then provided that “violators” of these standards 
were subject to suit by the United States. 79 Stat. 907–909. 
That is where matters stood until 1972 when Congress again 
amended the WPCA by deleting its entire text and substitut-
ing what is now popularly called the CWA. 
This overhaul of the WPCA continued to require the adop-
tion of water standards, 33 U. S. C. § 1313, but the revised 
statutory text conspicuously omitted any provision authoriz-
ing either the United States or any other party to bring suit 
against an entity whose discharges were contributing to a 
violation of those standards. 
This omission cannot be viewed as accidental or inconse-
quential. The repealed enforcement provision went to the 
heart of what Congress viewed as a major defect in the old 
scheme. As we have noted, the 1972 overhaul aimed to 
facilitate enforcement by “making it unnecessary to work 
backward from an overpolluted body of water to determine 
which point sources [were] responsible” and thus subject to 
suit. EPA v. California, 426 U. S., at 204. Instead, the 
amended WPCA sought to achieve “acceptable quality stand-
ards” by means of “direct restrictions” on polluters. Ibid. 
The Government's interpretation would undo what Congress 
plainly sought to achieve when it scrapped the WPCA's 
backward-looking approach.
12 
12 The dissent suggests that the 1972 Congress was displeased with the 
prior enforcement regime because it was too burdensome for the Govern-
ment, not because it was unfair for entities against which enforce-
ment actions were brought. See post, at 363–364 (Barrett, J., dissenting 
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350 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
C 
It is a “ `fundamental canon of statutory construction that 
the words of a statute must be read in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.' ” 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 320 
(2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000)). Thus, in construing § 1311, we 
must also take into account the broader statutory scheme, 
and at least two features of that scheme point in favor of 
our interpretation. 
1 
The frst is the so-called “permit shield” provision, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342(k), under which a permittee is deemed to be 
in compliance with the CWA if it follows all the terms in its 
permit. This protection is very valuable because violations 
of the CWA, even if entirely inadvertent, are subject to hefty 
penalties. The CWA imposes a regime of strict civil liabil-
ity, see, e. g., United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp ., 366 
F. 3d 164, 174 (CA3 2004), and a party that violates a permit 
term may be fned up to $25,000 per day per violation, 
§ 1319(d). As San Francisco explains, it may take months to 
gather the information necessary to detect a drop below the 
applicable water quality standards, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, 
and after substandard water quality is detected, it may take 
some time to devise and implement appropriate corrective 
measures. Indeed, there may be occasions (such as the 
multiple-discharger situation we discuss below, see infra, 
at 351–352), when there is nothing a permittee can do to 
bring about a prompt correction. For these reasons, the po-
tential civil penalties for noncompliance can mount up and 
in part). But whether or not this assessment of Congress's intent is cor-
rect, what matters for present purposes is that Congress deliberately de-
leted a longstanding provision that expressly authorized what the dissent 
wishes to perpetuate. The idea that Congress sought to preserve the old 
enforcement mechanism by squirreling it away in § 1311(b)(1)(C)'s inapt 
language defes belief.

Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 351 
Opinion of the Court 
reach enormous sums. In a pending suit against San Fran-
cisco regarding the Bayside facility, the penalties sought are 
$10 billion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102. In addition to all this, 
a permittee who is found to have acted “knowingly” or even 
“negligently” may be criminally prosecuted. § 1319(c). 
Because of the harsh penalties for violating the terms of 
a permit, the permit shield is invaluable. Because of it, a 
discharger that complies with all permit conditions can rest 
assured that it will not be penalized. But the beneft of this 
provision would be eviscerated if the EPA could impose a 
permit provision making the permittee responsible for any 
drop in water quality below the accepted standard. A per-
mittee could do everything required by all the other permit 
terms. It could devise a careful plan for protecting water 
quality, and it could diligently implement that plan. But if, 
in the end, the quality of the water in its receiving waters 
dropped below the applicable water quality levels, it would 
face dire potential consequences. It is therefore exceed-
ingly hard to reconcile the Government's interpretation of 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) with the permit shield. And contrary to the 
Government's contention, the possibility that a court might 
ultimately exercise its “broad discretion” to mitigate penal-
ties, see Brief for Respondent 44 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), is not enough to make up for disarming the shield. 
2 
One fnal structural feature cements the case against the 
EPA's interpretation: the absence of any provision dealing 
with the problem that arises when more than one permittee 
discharges into a body of water with substandard water qual-
ity. As previously explained, it is hard to believe that the 
1972 Congress used § 1311(b)(1)(C) to perpetuate (in camou-
faged form) the backward-looking enforcement scheme in the 
prior version of the WPCA. And it is even harder to accept 
the proposition that Congress did that without setting out 
any method for dealing with the multiple-discharger prob-
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352 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
lem. “[T]here may be dozens or even hundreds of . . . per-
mitted and unpermitted discharges into the same water-
body.” Brief for National Mining Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae 9. In such situations, the pre-1972 enforce-
ment scheme made it necessary for federal authorities to 
“unscramble the polluted eggs after the fact.” Wilmington 
v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 705, 710 (2022). By 1972, it 
was recognized that this was impractical, yet the EPA main-
tains that Congress retained the backward-looking approach 
without making any attempt to address the vexing multiple-
discharger problem. 
The EPA's only response to this argument is to note that 
in this case the Oceanside facility is the only entity that 
discharges into the relevant area of the Pacifc Ocean. But 
the multiple-discharger problem goes to the meaning of 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C), and that provision cannot mean one thing in 
a single-discharger case and another when there are multi-
ple dischargers.
13 
IV 
Before concluding, we briefy address three additional 
arguments advanced by the Government. 
A 
The EPA maintains that the imposition of end-result limi-
tations is the best course of action when “the information 
13 In response to our arguments about the two structural features dis-
cussed above, the dissent contends that our interpretation of § 1311(b) 
(1)(C) is not necessary to protect permittees because even without that 
interpretation a permittee subjected to an end-result provision could chal-
lenge it as arbitrary and capricious. See post, at 364–366 (opinion of Bar-
rett, J.). Of course, that response is no answer to our argument that 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize end-result provisions in the frst place. 
And in any event, it is not clear that individual arbitrary-and-capricious 
challenges would provide adequate protection. Unless some form of judi-
cial relief could be obtained before an end-result provision took effect, a 
permittee's potential liability could reach astronomical proportions before 
the challenge was fnally resolved. 
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Opinion of the Court 
necessary to develop additional `effuent limitations' is un-
available.” Brief for Respondent 41. And it complains that 
it should not bear the burden of determining what a permit-
tee should do to protect water quality because a permittee 
is likely to have better access to necessary information and 
a superior understanding of the operation of its facility and 
the changes that could be made to provide further protection 
for water quality. 
We are not moved by this argument. For one thing, it 
appears that the EPA and state permitting authorities have 
used end-result requirements routinely, not just when a per-
mit holder has failed to provide necessary information. See 
In re Lowell, 18 E. A. D. 115, 176 (EAB 2020); App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 519. And in any event, the EPA possesses the ex-
pertise (which it regularly touts in litigation) and the re-
sources necessary to determine what a permittee should do. 
It is also armed with ample tools to deal with situations in 
which a permittee is slow to provide needed information or 
is otherwise uncooperative. The EPA can set a schedule for 
the provision of information and can refuse to issue a permit 
until the permittee complies. If necessary, it can make use 
of its emergency powers. See 33 U. S. C. § 1364.
14 
B 
The EPA contends that Congress authorized the use of 
end-result requirements when it codifed the Agency's CSO 
Policy in 1994, see 33 U. S. C. § 1342(q)(1). And in support 
of that argument, it cites language in the policy that pertains 
14 The dissent argues that end-result provisions are in the best interests 
of regulated entities because the alternative may be delay in the issuance 
of permits. Post, at 368 (opinion of Barrett, J.). If that were true, one 
would expect regulated parties to favor such provisions, but none has done 
so. On the contrary, a long list of municipalities and other permittees 
support San Francisco's position. See supra, at 338–339; infra, at 355. 
These sophisticated entities are better positioned than the dissent to judge 
what is good for them. 
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354 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Opinion of the Court 
to phase I permits. But the permit in question here is a 
phase II permit, and the EPA does not claim that its inter-
pretation is supported by any CSO Policy provision relating 
to such permits.
15 
In any event, the phase I language to which the EPA 
points does not authorize the imposition of end-result re-
quirements. The policy states that a phase I permit should 
require a permittee to “[c]omply with applicable [water 
quality standards] expressed in the form of a narrative limi-
tation.” 59 Fed. Reg. 18696 (emphasis added). Our deci-
sion does not rule out “narrative limitations.” “Limita-
tions,” as we understand the term, see supra, at 346–347, 
are permitted under § 1311(b)(1)(C), and limitations may be 
expressed in both numerical and non-numerical (i. e ., “narra-
tive”) form. 
Attempting to read more into the phase I language, the 
EPA cites guidance it issued in 1995, but Congress did not 
15 In fact, the CSO Control Policy specifes exactly what a phase II per-
mit should contain, and those requirements are inconsistent with the end-
result limitation that the EPA imposes here. Under the policy, a phase 
II should contain: (1) “[r]equirements to implement the technology-based 
controls”; (2) “[n]arrative requirements which insure [sic] that the selected 
CSO controls are implemented, operated and maintained as described in 
the long-term CSO control plan”; (3) “[w]ater quality-based effuent limita-
tions . . . requiring, at a minimum, compliance with . . . numeric perform-
ance standards for the selected CSO controls”; (4) “[a] requirement to im-
plement, with an established schedule, the approved post-construction 
water quality assessment program”; (5) “[a] requirement to reassess over-
fows to sensitive areas in those cases where elimination or relocation of 
the overfows is not physically possible and economically achievable”; (6) 
“[c]onditions establishing requirements for maximizing the treatment of 
wet weather fows”; and (7) “[a] reopener clause authorizing the NPDES 
authority to reopen and modify the permit upon determination that the 
CSO controls fail to meet [water quality standards] or protect designated 
uses.” 59 Fed. Reg. 18696. Again, although the purpose is to improve 
the quality of the relevant bodies of water, these permitting components 
all relate to the dischargers' behavior and the permitting authority's su-
pervision of that behavior. 
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Opinion of the Court 
codify that guidance, and we are not obligated to accept ad-
ministrative guidance that conficts with the statutory lan-
guage it purports to implement. See Loper Bright Enter-
prises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024). We also note that 
other guidance issued by the EPA is arguably inconsistent. 
See EPA, Combined Sewer Overfows: Guidance for Permit 
Writers, at A–1 to A–7. 
C 
Finally, the EPA contends that the rejection of its inter-
pretation of 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) would have disruptive 
consequences for businesses that rely on “general permits.” 
Brief for Respondent 38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 83. (General per-
mits cover an entire category of point sources in a given 
area. See South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Micco-
sukee Tribe , 541 U. S. 95, 108, n. (2004).) Such permits are 
important for certain businesses, such as home builders, 
other construction companies, and certain agricultural enter-
prises, see Brief for National Association of Home Builders 
et al. as Amici Curiae 1, 11, but no such company has sub-
mitted a brief supporting the EPA's interpretation. On the 
contrary, a brief fled on behalf of such companies urges us 
to reject the EPA's position. Id., at 4–7. What is impor-
tant, these companies tell us, are narrative limitations other 
than end-result requirements, and they specifcally cite pro-
visions demanding compliance with “best-management prac-
tices” and “operational requirements and prohibitions.” 
Our decision allows such requirements. 
V 
In sum, we hold that § 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the 
EPA to include “end-result” provisions in NPDES permits. 
Determining what steps a permittee must take to ensure 
that water quality standards are met is the EPA's responsi-
bility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make 
that determination. If the EPA does what the CWA de-
mands, water quality will not suffer. 
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356 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
* * * 
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Sotomayor , 
Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson join, dissenting in 
part. 
The Environmental Protection Agency issued San Fran-
cisco a permit allowing it to discharge pollutants from its 
combined sewer system into the Pacifc Ocean. The permit, 
of course, does not give the city free rein, and among its 
conditions are prohibitions on discharges that contribute to 
a violation of applicable water quality standards. San Fran-
cisco challenges these conditions on the ground that EPA 
lacks statutory authority to impose them. The city is 
wrong. The relevant provision of the Clean Water Act di-
rects EPA to impose “any more stringent limitation” that is 
“necessary to meet . . . or required to implement any applica-
ble water quality standard.” 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 
Conditions that forbid the city to violate water quality stand-
ards are plainly “limitations” on the city's license to 
discharge. 
Notwithstanding the straightforward statutory language, 
the Court sides with San Francisco. I join Part II of its 
opinion, which rightly rejects the city's primary argument. 
In Part III, however, the Court embraces an equally weak 
theory—that the permit's restrictions are not “limitations,” 
as that word is ordinarily used. The Court's analysis is con-
trary to the text, so I respectfully dissent in part. 
I 
A 
Under the Clean Water Act, “the discharge of any pollut-
ant by any person” is unlawful except as expressly author-
ized. 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a). As relevant here, authorization 
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Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
comes in the form of “National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permits,” which EPA (or, in some cir-
cumstances, a State) may issue to allow discharges. Before 
issuing a permit, however, the Agency must ensure that 
“such discharge will meet . . . all applicable requirements” 
under several different statutory provisions. § 1342(a)(1). 
Section 1311(b) is one such provision. It works in two 
steps for permits like San Francisco's. First , under 
§ 1311(b)(1)(A), EPA must set “effuent limitations” that 
“shall require the application of the best practicable control 
technology currently available.” “ `[E]ffuent limitation' ” 
refers to a restriction “on quantities, rates, and concentra-
tions of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents 
which are discharged from point sources” into waters subject 
to EPA's jurisdiction. § 1362(11). 
Second, under § 1311(b)(1)(C), EPA must impose “any 
more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet 
water quality standards, . . . or required to implement 
any applicable water quality standard.” Water quality 
standards—which are devised by the States and subject to 
federal approval—“consist of the designated uses of the navi-
gable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such 
waters based upon such uses.” § 1313(c)(2)(A). Effuent 
limitations, standing alone, are not always suffcient to pro-
tect the desired water quality, as set forth in the water qual-
ity standards. So point sources, “ `despite individual compli-
ance with effuent limitations, may be further regulated to 
prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.' ” 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U. S. 91, 101 (1992) (quoting 
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control 
Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 205, n. 12 (1976)). Importantly, the Act 
does not itself require dischargers to heed water quality 
standards; the standards are enforceable only insofar as they 
are incorporated into permit conditions under § 1311(b)(1)(C). 
Section 1311(b) therefore sets forth a coherent regime. In 
the frst instance, EPA regulates water pollution through 
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358 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
technology-based effuent limitations that restrict the “quan-
tities, rates, and concentrations” of harmful materials that 
permittees may discharge. § 1362(11). But when the 
technology-based effuent limitations are insuffcient to en-
sure that the water quality standards are met, EPA has sup-
plemental authority to impose further limitations. 
B 
As the Court explains, San Francisco operates a combined 
sewer system, which transports sewage and stormwater run-
off via the same conduits. See ante, at 341–343. Such sys-
tems occasionally overfow in wet weather—and when they 
do, they discharge both stormwater and untreated sewage 
into waters potentially regulated by the Clean Water Act. 
59 Fed. Reg. 18689 (1994). As relevant here, “combined 
sewer overfow” events from one component of San Francis-
co's sewer system result in the discharge of pollutants into 
the Pacifc Ocean via the Southwest Ocean Outfall, which is 
located within EPA's jurisdiction, 3.3 nautical miles off the 
coast of San Francisco. These discharges are presumptively 
unlawful under § 1311(a) and hence require a permit. 
The city's NPDES permit contains both the technology-
based effuent limitations required by § 1311(b)(1)(A) and ad-
ditional limitations to protect the water quality standards 
under § 1311(b)(1)(C). This latter category includes two “re-
ceiving water limitations”—requirements defning the per-
missible discharge by reference to its effect on the quality of 
the waters that receive it, rather than by reference to the 
nature of the discharge itself. (These are what the Court 
calls “ `end-result' requirements.” Ante, at 338.) The frst 
states that San Francisco “shall not cause or contribute to a 
violation of any applicable water quality standard.” App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 97. The second provides that “[n]either the 
treatment nor the discharge of pollutants shall create pollu-
tion, contamination, or nuisance” as defned by the California 
Water Code. Id., at 339. 
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Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
The city's permit thus tracks the structure of § 1311(b). It 
restrains discharges initially through technology-based ef-
fuent limitations, as required by § 1311(b)(1)(A). But be-
cause the effuent limitations may be insuffcient to ensure 
that California's water quality standards are met, the permit 
contains supplemental limitations, as required by § 1311(b) 
(1)(C). The concern that the technology-based effuent limi-
tations may fall short is on display in this case—discharges 
from components of San Francisco's sewer system have al-
legedly led to serious breaches of the water quality stand-
ards, such as “discoloration, scum, and foating material, 
including toilet paper, in Mission Creek. ” Complaint 
in United States v. City and County of San Francisco , 
No. 3:24–cv–02594 (ND Cal., May 1, 2024), ECF Doc. 1, p. 
22. The receiving water limitations imposed under § 1311(b) 
(1)(C) are included to ensure that such breaches do not occur. 
II 
A 
San Francisco dedicates almost all its briefng to the prop-
osition that the receiving water limitations are unlawful be-
cause § 1311(b)(1)(C) allows only effuent limitations. In 
other words, San Francisco reads the phrase “any more 
stringent limitation” to mean “any more stringent effuent 
limitation.” As the Court explains, this argument is fatly 
inconsistent with the text of § 1311(b). See ante, at 344–345. 
In my view, the failure of that argument should have ended 
this case. 
The Court continues, however, with a theory largely of its 
own making. Whatever “any more stringent limitation” 
may mean, the Court says, it does not authorize EPA to di-
rect permittees to comply with the water quality standards. 
This conclusion is puzzling. The entire function of 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) is to ensure that permitted discharges do not 
violate state water quality standards. And as discussed 
above, the provision gives EPA broad authority to achieve 
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360 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
that aim through conditions imposed in NPDES permits. 
Why would that broad authority not allow EPA to tell per-
mittees that they must not cause or contribute to a viola-
tion of the very standards that § 1311(b)(1)(C) serves to 
safeguard? 
The answer, according to the Court, is that a restriction 
does not count as a “limitation” if the permittee must iden-
tify the steps necessary to comply with it. Ante, at 346. 
San Francisco's permit only authorizes discharges that do not 
degrade water quality below the applicable standard. It is 
up to the city, however, to formulate a plan to achieve that 
result. The city's plan, the Court asserts, is a “limitation” 
on its discharges, but the permit condition is not. See ibid. 
As best I can tell, the Court thinks that only the “direct 
source of restriction or restraint”—apparently, the most spe-
cifc restriction—counts as a “limitation.” Ibid. 
The Court offers nothing to substantiate this proposition, 
and it is wrong as a matter of ordinary English. It is com-
monplace for “limitations” to state “that a particular end re-
sult must be achieved and that it is up to the [recipient] to 
fgure out what it should do.” Ibid. For example, a com-
pany could impose spending “limitations” by requiring each 
branch to spend no more than its allotted budget, while still 
leaving branch managers fexibility to determine how to allo-
cate those funds. A doctor could impose a “limitation” on a 
patient's diet by telling the patient that she must lose 20 
pounds over the next six months, even if the doctor does not 
prescribe a specifc diet and exercise regimen. And an air-
line could impose a “limitation” on the weight of checked 
bags, even though it does not tell passengers what items to 
pack. “Limitations” can be general as well as specifc, and 
general limitations can call for more specifc ones. 
In this context, “limitation” is simply a synonym for “[a] 
restrictive condition.” Funk & Wagnalls New Standard 
Dictionary of the English Language 1437 (1952). And condi-
tions can be stated at many levels of generality—including 
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Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
in terms of end results. A college may condition a scholar-
ship on the student's maintenance of a minimum GPA. A 
homeowner may condition payment for a new roof on the 
contractor's satisfaction of industry standards. An em-
ployer may condition job perks on the employee's perform-
ance. In each example, the condition is a limitation on a 
beneft or payment. There are strings attached. 
The Court also misconstrues § 1311(b)(1)(C)'s reference to 
limitations that are “necessary to meet” or “required to im-
plement” the water quality standards. As for the former 
phrase, “necessary to meet” does not imply anything about 
the specifcity or concreteness of the limitations adopted by 
EPA. Rather, the limitations on San Francisco's permit are 
“necessary to meet” the water quality standards because 
without them, the standards would not bind the city. The 
limitations thus ensure that San Francisco will “ `comply 
with,' ” “ `fulfll,' ” “ `satisfy,' ” or “ `come into conformity 
with' ” the water quality standards. Ante, at 347 (quoting 
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1195 (2d ed. 1987)). 
Nor does the phrase “required to implement” help the 
Court. “Implement,” the Court says, generally means “ `to 
give practical effect to and ensure of actual fulfllment by 
concrete measures.' ” Ante, at 347. That is true but incom-
plete. The full defnition reads: “to carry out: accomplish, 
fulll, . . . esp: to give practical effect to and ensure of 
actual fulfllment by concrete measures.” Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1134 (1976). So while the 
word is often used in the sense of taking “concrete meas-
ures,” such measures are not necessary to satisfy the defni-
tion of “implement.” 
Regardless, the receiving water limitations “implement” 
the water quality standards in both the broad and narrow 
senses of the word. They are required to “carry out[,] ac-
complish, [or] fulfll” the standards: When effuent limitations 
fall short, discharges from the city's combined sewer system 
will otherwise degrade water quality below the applicable 
Page Proof Pending Publication

362 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
standard. Ibid. (capitalization altered). And the limita-
tions are “concrete measures,” ibid., because they are the 
means by which EPA “implement[s] any applicable water 
quality standard,” § 1311(b)(1)(C). They give the standards 
“practical effect” by making them enforceable. Id., at 1134. 
There is no getting around it: The receiving water limita-
tions are “limitations.” If they are vague or unreasonable, 
they are vulnerable to challenge on one or both of those 
grounds. See, e. g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
EPA, 808 F. 3d 556, 578 (CA2 2015) (invalidating a receiving 
water limitation as arbitrary and capricious). But even a 
vague or unreasonable limitation is still a “limitation.” 
B 
With the text of § 1311(b)(1)(C) against it, the Court tries 
to marshal support for its approach from the Clean Water 
Act's history, as well as from what the Court describes as 
the “broader statutory scheme.” Ante, at 348–352. Nei-
ther helps. 
1 
As for the statutory history: Advancing a specifc theory 
of the congressional intent behind the Clean Water Act, the 
Court contends that EPA's interpretation would revive the 
“backward-looking” policy regime that the Act was designed 
to replace. See ante, at 348–349. Before the Act, the 
United States enforced federal water pollution laws primar-
ily through abatement actions. See 33 U. S. C. § 1160 (1970 
ed.). Though the Act abolished this cause of action, the 
Court claims that receiving water limitations function in es-
sentially the same way. Just as the United States did when it 
brought abatement suits, EPA would have to “ `work back-
ward from an overpolluted body of water' ” to combat water 
pollution. Ante, at 349 (quoting State Water Resources Con-
trol Bd., 426 U. S., at 204). Thus, the Court insists, the use 
of receiving water limitations would “undo” the Act's shift 
from abatement suits to “ `direct restrictions' on polluters.” 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 363 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
Ante, at 349 (quoting State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 
U. S., at 204). 
Of course, no theory of “what Congress plainly sought to 
achieve,” ante, at 349, could justify an implausible interpre-
tation of § 1311(b)(1)(C). Here, however, the Court does not 
even deliver on the claim that its account “plainly” tracks 
Congress's goal. Ante, at 349. Because receiving water 
limitations do not actually replicate the old abatement re-
gime, the Court's rendition is not the only (much less the 
most obvious) explanation for the statutory before and after. 
There is another explanation, and it is one in which receiving 
water limitations ft right in. 
Under the old system, the United States could bring 
abatement actions only after the pollution had already oc-
curred. See 33 U. S. C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970 ed.). A glaring 
problem with this approach is that an ex post enforcement 
regime does not adequately deter polluters or prevent pollu-
tion. Making matters worse, this regime involved “cum-
brous enforcement procedures” that made it next to impossi-
ble to bring abatement actions. State Water Resources 
Control Bd., 426 U. S., at 202; see also 33 U. S. C. § 1160 (1970 
ed.) (requiring, prior to an abatement action, that the United 
States hold a conference of the relevant state agencies, then 
provide the state agency six months to take remedial action, 
then call a public hearing with the state agency and 
the discharger); K. Murchison, Learning From More Than 
Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control 
Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 Boston Col-
lege Env. Aff. L. Rev. 527, 534 (2005) (“According to a report 
prepared by the Senate Committee on Public Works, the fed-
eral government initiated only one enforcement action under 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act prior to 1970”). 
Congress chose a different regulatory model when it 
adopted the Act in 1972. The Act renders all discharges 
presumptively unlawful. Then, under the current ex ante 
permitting regime, EPA authorizes only those discharges 
Page Proof Pending Publication

364 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
that comply with the Act. Should a permittee fail to comply 
with the terms of its permit, EPA has broad authority to 
sue. See 33 U. S. C. §§ 1319(b)–(d) (authorizing civil actions 
for injunctive relief, civil penalties for violations, and in some 
instances criminal sanctions). 
The receiving water limitations imposed under § 1311(b) 
(1)(C) are entirely consistent with this scheme. Again, the 
technology-based effluent limitations imposed under 
§ 1311(b)(1)(A) do the primary work of gating discharges at 
the front end to minimize pollution. The § 1311(b)(1)(C) lim-
itations guard against any residual risk that discharges will 
violate the water quality standards. Because these limita-
tions supplement rather than replace the technology-based 
effuent limitations, there is no risk that broadly worded re-
ceiving water limitations will recreate the ineffective abate-
ment regime that prevailed prior to 1972. 
Furthermore, the receiving water limitations operate 
within the broader context of the Act's permitting regime. 
These permits impose a prospective requirement on permit-
tees to comply with permit conditions. Under the old re-
gime, a discharger could take an approach of “pollute frst 
and apologize later,” secure in the knowledge that an abate-
ment suit was unlikely and that such a suit would at most 
allow judgment to “secur[e] abatement of any pollution 
proved.” 33 U. S. C. § 1160(h) (1970 ed.). A permittee who 
violates a permit condition, by contrast, necessarily exposes 
itself to enforcement actions by EPA, as well as potential 
penalties. See 33 U. S. C. §§ 1319(b)–(d). Receiving water 
limitations, like any other permit condition, thus operate as 
“ `direct restrictions' on polluters.” Ante, at 349 (quoting 
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S., at 204). 
2 
The Court also claims that the receiving water limitations 
are inconsistent with two features of the “broader statutory 
scheme.” Ante, at 350–352. First, it contends that the re-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 365 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
ceiving water limitations are at odds with the permit shield 
provision because violations of the permit condition (and the 
attendant liability) are hard to predict. Ante, at 350–351. 
Second, it argues that the Clean Water Act is silent about 
the problem of multiple dischargers into the same body of 
water—and if the Act allowed EPA to condition a permit on 
maintaining water quality standards, the Court says, it 
surely would have spelled out how to deal with such an obvi-
ous complication. Ante, at 351–352. Both of these argu-
ments boil down to the Court's concern that receiving water 
limitations might be unfair to permittees. In some circum-
stances, they might be. But any unfairness should be ad-
dressed through arbitrary-and-capricious challenges—not a 
statutory rewrite. 
Start with the permit shield provision. Under § 1342(k), 
compliance with the terms of a permit “shall be deemed com-
pliance” with various substantive provisions of the Act, 
thereby shielding permit holders from liability. The Court 
insists that receiving water limitations like those in the city's 
permit would “eviscerat[e]” that beneft by failing to provide 
fair notice. Ante, at 350–351. 
The permit shield provision, however, serves the specifc 
role of immunizing permittees that comply with a permit. 
See § 1342(k). For instance, it “insulate[s] permit holders 
from changes in various regulations during the period of a 
permit” and “relieve[s] them of having to litigate in an en-
forcement action the question whether their permits are suf-
fciently strict.” E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 
430 U. S. 112, 138, n. 28 (1977). The receiving water limita-
tions do not eliminate that beneft. It remains true that San 
Francisco cannot be sued under the theory that the city's 
permit is insuffcient to ensure compliance with the Act. 
Really, the Court's argument reduces to the broader policy 
concern that it may be diffcult for regulated entities to com-
ply with receiving water limitations and that they may lack 
adequate notice of a violation. But again, that concern goes

366 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
to the question whether a particular receiving water limita-
tion is rational. If a permittee cannot reasonably determine 
how to comply with a receiving water limitation, then the 
permit condition may be invalidated as arbitrary and capri-
cious. (In fact, San Francisco made arbitrary-and -
capricious arguments below, but the Ninth Circuit rejected 
them; the city did not seek this Court's review of that issue. 
See 75 F. 4th 1074, 1092–1093 (2023).) And as EPA acknowl-
edged at oral argument, the Agency “may not impose limita-
tions of any kind that are unconstitutionally vague.” Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 51. These concerns do not speak to the relevant 
question here, which is whether receiving water limitations 
comport with the Act. 
The Court is also wrong to suggest that receiving water 
limitations are categorically impermissible because there 
may be multiple dischargers into one body of water in some 
circumstances. See ante, at 351–352. It makes little sense 
to say that an agency always lacks authority to take a cer-
tain action just because the action would be unreasonable in 
some scenarios. And as the Court itself recognizes, there is 
no multiple-discharger problem here: San Francisco is the 
only signifcant discharger at the Southwest Ocean Outfall. 
Ante, at 352. If EPA does start imposing receiving water 
limitations in contexts where permittees cannot control the 
quality of the receiving waters—such as where there are 
multiple dischargers—then, again, the permittee can bring 
an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge. 
3 
Finally, the Court downplays the valuable uses of receiv-
ing water limitations. To begin, EPA imposes such limita-
tions when the Agency “lacks the information necessary to 
develop more tailored limitations.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. 
That is the case here: San Francisco has consistently failed 
to update its Long-Term Control Plan for managing com-
bined sewer overfows. See 75 F. 4th, at 1095 (observing 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 367 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
that San Francisco has not updated its plan since 1991). By 
imposing receiving water limitations, EPA was nevertheless 
able to issue a permit to San Francisco while complying with 
the Clean Water Act. 
The Court does not explain what other course of action 
EPA could take. Instead, it states, without citation, that 
“EPA possesses the expertise . . . and the resources neces-
sary to determine what a permittee should do.” Ante, 
at 353. This bare assertion simply ignores the obvious 
problem—how is EPA expected to deploy its expertise when 
it lacks the basic information necessary to make a decision? 
The Court also suggests that the Agency could refuse to 
issue a permit until the applicant provides the necessary in-
formation. Ibid. But this gives the game away: The entire 
point of EPA's argument is that it is preferable for EPA to 
impose broadly worded conditions in its permits than to deny 
permits altogether and potentially shut down San Francisco's 
sewer system. Nor can EPA simply “make use of its emer-
gency powers” when permittees fail to provide necessary in-
formation. Ibid. Such powers are available only when 
there is “imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
health of persons or to . . . the livelihood of . . . persons.” 
§ 1364(a). As the name “emergency” suggests, these powers 
provide a limited avenue for the Agency to sue in response 
to a crisis. They do not provide a solution to the problem 
of noncompliant permittees. 
Receiving water limitations are also useful when EPA is-
sues general permits to broad categories of dischargers (such 
as for construction projects). See South Fla. Water Man-
agement Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U. S. 95, 108, n. (2004) 
(observing that such “permits greatly reduce . . . administra-
tive burden by authorizing discharges from a category of 
point sources within a specifed geographic area”). In lieu 
of individualized and prescriptive permitting conditions— 
which would take time to craft and with which small busi-
nesses might have diffculty complying—EPA instead allows

368 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA 
Barrett, J., dissenting in part 
the permittee to proceed under more general language. 
EPA can therefore issue the permit quickly and give respon-
sible permittees fexibility to choose how to comply with 
the permit. 
After today, the alternative for entities seeking a general 
permit is not for EPA to issue the permit without the 
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) limitation. Instead, the alternative is for the 
permit to be delayed or even denied. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 
83 (If the Court “take[s] away [EPA's] ability to rely on these 
sorts of prohibitions,” then the Agency is “going to need to 
ask for more information because it's only with that informa-
tion” that the Agency can “develop more tailored limita-
tions”). Section 1311(b)(1)(C) is not optional; EPA is re-
quired to issue the limitations necessary to ensure that the 
water quality standards are met. So taking a tool away 
from EPA may make it harder for the Agency to issue the 
permits that municipalities and businesses need in order for 
their discharges to be lawful. 
The Court dismisses this concern, noting that “no . . . com-
pany has submitted a brief supporting . . . EPA's interpreta-
tion.” Ante, at 355. But there is no reason to think that 
the sampling of trade associations from which this Court 
happens to hear refects the views of all potentially affected 
parties. And in any event, neither the cited amicus brief 
nor the Court itself has any response to EPA's straightfor-
ward point: If the Agency must impose individualized condi-
tions for each permittee under § 1311(b)(1)(C), then it will be 
more diffcult and more time consuming for the Agency to 
issue permits. 
* * * 
Receiving water limitations are not categorically incon-
sistent with the Clean Water Act. Because the Court holds 
otherwise, I respectfully dissent in part. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 334, line 1: “1151” is changed to “1251” 
p. 335, line 10: “the” is inserted before “EPA” 
p. 335, line 12: “the” is inserted before “EPA” 
p. 335, line 6 from bottom: “the” is inserted before “EPA” 
p. 336, line 29: “and remanded” is deleted 
p. 339, line 8: “Boston College” is inserted before “Env.” 
p. 350, n. 12, line 5: “§ 1311(b)(1)(B)” is replaced with “§ 1311(b)(1)(C)” 
p. 363, line 9 from bottom: “Boston College” is inserted before “Env.” 
p. 363, line 9 from bottom: “L. Rev.” is inserted after “Aff.”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 604 U. S. Part 1 Pages 334–368 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT March 4, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  facility's capacity, and the result may be the discharge of untreated water, including raw sewage, into the Pacifc Ocean or the San Francisco Bay. 59 Fed. Reg. 18689; EPA, Offce of Water, Combined Sewer Over- fows: Guidance for Permit Writers, p. 1–1; 75 F. 4th, at 1082–1083. In 1994, the EPA adopted its CSO Contr…

• #3

  ferring to “effuent limitations and other limitations” under § 1311. See, e.g., §§ 1341(d), 1365(f). Moreover, San Francisco's interpretation would either invalidate widely accepted narrative permit provisions or require an improbably broad reading of “effuent limitation.” Pp. 344–345. (b) Section 1311(b)(1)(C) do…

• #4

  ing responsibility among multiple dischargers contributing to water quality violations. Pp. 350–352. (c) The Agency has adequate tools to obtain needed information from permittees without resorting to end-result requirements. Its reliance on the Combined Sewer Overfow Policy is misplaced as that policy au- thoriz…

• #5

  California by Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Michael J. Mon- gan, Solicitor General, Christopher D. Hu, Deputy Solicitor General, Tracy L. Winsor, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Russell B. Hildreth, Super- vising Deputy Attorney General, and Marc N. Melnick and Bryant B. Cannon, Deputy Attorneys Ge…

• #6

  pollutants. When a permit contains such requirements, a permittee that punctiliously follows every specifc require- ment in its permit may nevertheless face crushing penalties if the quality of the water in its receiving waters falls below the applicable standards. For convenience, we will call such provisions “e…

• #7

  Env. Aff. L. Rev. 527, 530–531 (2005). The WPCA reaf- frmed the long-accepted principle that “controlling water pollution” was primarily a state responsibility, but it also declared that the pollution of certain interstate waters had become “a public nuisance” and was “subject to abatement” in a suit brought by t…

• #8

  Pub. L. 87–88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89–234, 79 Stat. 903; Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91–224, 84 Stat. 91. 7 See § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1156–1157; 70 Stat. 504–505; 75 Stat. 208–209; 79 Stat. 909. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 604…

• #9

  wastewater and stormwater may exceed the facility's treat- ment capacity, and the result may be the discharge of un- treated water, including raw sewage. See Combined Sewer Overfow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18689 (1994); EPA, Offce of Water, Combined Sewer Overfows: Guidance for Permit Writers, p. 1–1 (1…

• #10

  the San Francisco Bay Region approved the fnal Oceanside NPDES permit, and the EPA did the same. 11 Id., at 1088. San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), objecting to, among other things, the two new provisions just noted. City and Cty. of San Francisco , 18 E. A. D. 322, 325 (2020…

• #11

  576–577 (2019). And it is fatal to San Francisco's argument here. Sections 1311(b)(1)(A) and (B) refer to “effuent limi- tations,” but the very next provision, § 1311(b)(1)(C), re- fers instead to “any more stringent limitation.” We cannot believe that Congress omitted the term “effuent” from § 1311(b)(1)(C) simp…

• #12

  is on perilous ground. These problems overwhelm any help that the City can de- rive from the fact that § 1311 is titled “Effuent limitations.” The title of a statutory provision can inform its interpreta- tion, but it is not conclusive. See Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110, 120–121 (2023). And here, the titl…

• #13

  achieved and that it is up to the permittee to fgure out what it should do, the direct source of restriction or restraint is the plan that the permittee imposes on itself for the purpose of avoiding future liability. In other words, the direct source of the restriction comes from within, not “from without.” We d…

• #14

  understood to mean a provision that sets out actions that must be taken to achieve the objective. In assessing what the directives in § 1131(b)(1)(C) mean, it is helpful to consider the use of the relevant terms in every- Page Proof Pending Publication 348 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. EPA Opinion of the C…

• #15

  This glaring void resulted from a deliberate and prominent policy choice. As recounted earlier, before 1972, the basic structure of federal enforcement efforts was a lawsuit seek- ing to hold a polluter accountable for contributing to what amounted to or was expressly termed a violation of water quality standards…

• #16

  (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000)). Thus, in construing § 1311, we must also take into account the broader statutory scheme, and at least two features of that scheme point in favor of our interpretation. 1 The frst is the so-called “permit shield” provision, 33 U…

• #17

  permit provision making the permittee responsible for any drop in water quality below the accepted standard. A per- mittee could do everything required by all the other permit terms. It could devise a careful plan for protecting water quality, and it could diligently implement that plan. But if, in the end, the q…

• #18

  a single-discharger case and another when there are multi- ple dischargers. 13 IV Before concluding, we briefy address three additional arguments advanced by the Government. A The EPA maintains that the imposition of end-result limi- tations is the best course of action when “the information 13 In response to…

• #19

  of its emergency powers. See 33 U. S. C. § 1364. 14 B The EPA contends that Congress authorized the use of end-result requirements when it codifed the Agency's CSO Policy in 1994, see 33 U. S. C. § 1342(q)(1). And in support of that argument, it cites language in the policy that pertains 14 The dissent argues t…

• #20

  ance standards for the selected CSO controls”; (4) “[a] requirement to im- plement, with an established schedule, the approved post-construction water quality assessment program”; (5) “[a] requirement to reassess over- fows to sensitive areas in those cases where elimination or relocation of the overfows is not ph…

• #21

  Our decision allows such requirements. V In sum, we hold that § 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end-result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a permittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA's responsi- bility, and Congress has given it the to…

• #22

  issuing a permit, however, the Agency must ensure that “such discharge will meet . . . all applicable requirements” under several different statutory provisions. § 1342(a)(1). Section 1311(b) is one such provision. It works in two steps for permits like San Francisco's. First , under § 1311(b)(1)(A), EPA must set…

• #23

  sewer system, which transports sewage and stormwater run- off via the same conduits. See ante, at 341–343. Such sys- tems occasionally overfow in wet weather—and when they do, they discharge both stormwater and untreated sewage into waters potentially regulated by the Clean Water Act. 59 Fed. Reg. 18689 (1994). A…

• #24

  No. 3:24–cv–02594 (ND Cal., May 1, 2024), ECF Doc. 1, p. 22. The receiving water limitations imposed under § 1311(b) (1)(C) are included to ensure that such breaches do not occur. II A San Francisco dedicates almost all its briefng to the prop- osition that the receiving water limitations are unlawful be- cause…

• #25

  pany could impose spending “limitations” by requiring each branch to spend no more than its allotted budget, while still leaving branch managers fexibility to determine how to allo- cate those funds. A doctor could impose a “limitation” on a patient's diet by telling the patient that she must lose 20 pounds over …

• #26

  actual fulfllment by concrete measures.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1134 (1976). So while the word is often used in the sense of taking “concrete meas- ures,” such measures are not necessary to satisfy the defni- tion of “implement.” Regardless, the receiving water limitations “implement” the w…

• #27

  trol Bd., 426 U. S., at 204). Thus, the Court insists, the use of receiving water limitations would “undo” the Act's shift from abatement suits to “ `direct restrictions' on polluters.” Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 604 U. S. 334 (2025) 363 Barrett, J., dissenting in part Ante, at 349 (quoting State Wa…

• #28

  that comply with the Act. Should a permittee fail to comply with the terms of its permit, EPA has broad authority to sue. See 33 U. S. C. §§ 1319(b)–(d) (authorizing civil actions for injunctive relief, civil penalties for violations, and in some instances criminal sanctions). The receiving water limitations impo…

• #29

  water—and if the Act allowed EPA to condition a permit on maintaining water quality standards, the Court says, it surely would have spelled out how to deal with such an obvi- ous complication. Ante, at 351–352. Both of these argu- ments boil down to the Court's concern that receiving water limitations might be un…

• #30

  Oral Arg. 51. These concerns do not speak to the relevant question here, which is whether receiving water limitations comport with the Act. The Court is also wrong to suggest that receiving water limitations are categorically impermissible because there may be multiple dischargers into one body of water in some …

• #31

  sewer system. Nor can EPA simply “make use of its emer- gency powers” when permittees fail to provide necessary in- formation. Ibid. Such powers are available only when there is “imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to . . . the livelihood of . . . persons.” § 1364(a). As the name “em…

• #32

  parties. And in any event, neither the cited amicus brief nor the Court itself has any response to EPA's straightfor- ward point: If the Agency must impose individualized condi- tions for each permittee under § 1311(b)(1)(C), then it will be more diffcult and more time consuming for the Agency to issue permits. …