Bufkin v. Collins

Summary

The Department of Veterans Affairs’ determination that the evidence regarding a service-related disability claim is in “approximate balance” pursuant to the “benefit-of-the-doubt rule,” 38 U. S. C. §5107(b), is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 369–407 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
March 5, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
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[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2024 369 
Syllabus 
BUFKIN v. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the federal circuit 
No. 23–713. Argued October 16, 2024—Decided March 5, 2025* 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (V A) applies a “beneft-of-the-doubt 
rule” that tips the scales in a veteran's favor when evidence regarding 
any issue material to a service-related disability claim is in “approxi-
mate balance.” 38 U. S. C. § 5107(b). Petitioners are veterans who ap-
plied for service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) dis-
ability benefts and were dissatisfed with the V A's resolution of their 
claims. Petitioner Joshua Bufkin claimed that his PTSD stemmed from 
his military service, but the V A found no clear link. Petitioner Norman 
Thornton obtained service-connected PTSD disability benefts, but the 
V A denied his most recent request to increase his disability rating. 
These adverse determinations were reviewed de novo by the Board of 
Veterans' Appeals, which rendered fnal decisions on behalf of the V A 
denying the claims. Petitioners then challenged the adverse determi-
nations before the U. S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 
Court). Under § 7261(a), the Veterans Court reviews legal issues de 
novo and factual issues for clear error. And under § 7261(b)(1), the Vet-
erans Court must “take due account” of the V A's application of the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule. Applying those standards, the Veterans 
Court affrmed the V A's adverse beneft determinations, fnding that the 
Board's approximate-balance determinations were not clearly errone-
ous. Petitioners then appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the 
Veterans Court's legal interpretation of § 7261(b)(1), and arguing that 
the statutory command to “take due account” of the V A's application of 
the beneft-of-the-doubt rule requires the Veterans Court to review the 
entire record de novo and decide for itself whether the evidence is in 
approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and 
affrmed. 
Held: The V A's determination that the evidence regarding a service-
related disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly 
factual determination reviewed only for clear error. Pp. 379–388. 
*Together with Thornton v. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs (see 
this Court's Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court.

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370 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Syllabus 
(a) Under § 7261(b)(1)'s plain text, the Veterans Court must “take due 
account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. This 
requirement directs the Veterans Court to give appropriate attention 
to the V A's work. The Veterans Court must review the V A's application 
of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule “[i]n making the determinations under 
subsection (a).” § 7261(b)(1). Accordingly, the standards of review 
provided in subsection (a) also govern the Veterans Court's review of 
beneft-of-the-doubt issues. Section 7261(b)(1) makes explicit the Vet-
erans Court's previously implicit duty to review the V A's application 
of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule, pursuant to the standards set forth in 
subsection (a). Pp. 379–380. 
(b) The appropriate standard of review for any given challenge de-
pends on whether the challenge is factual or legal in nature. The par-
ties contest whether a veteran's challenge to the V A's determination 
that the evidence on a particular material issue is not in approximate 
balance involves a legal inquiry subject to de novo review, or a factual 
fnding, or at least a predominantly factual, mixed question of law and 
fact, subject to clear-error review. 
The approximate-balance determination involves two steps. First, 
the V A reviews each item of evidence and assigns weight to it—a fact-
fnding inquiry reviewed only for clear error. Second, the V A deter-
mines whether the evidence is in approximate balance. See § 5107(b). 
This second step includes both legal and factual components: factual 
because it involves marshaling and weighing evidence, and legal because 
the “approximate balance” determination involves whether the evidence 
satisfes a legal standard. The V A's approximate-balance determination 
is thus at most a mixed question. And the appropriate standard of 
review for a mixed question depends “on whether answering it entails 
primarily legal or factual work.” U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lake-
ridge, LLC , 583 U. S. 387, 396. 
Reviewing a determination whether record evidence is approximately 
balanced is “about as factual sounding” as any question gets. Id., at 
397. In Bufkin's case, the Board weighed medical opinions and family 
testimony to assess his PTSD claims. Similarly, the Board in Thorn-
ton's case analyzed symptom severity and medical evidence to assess 
his disability rating. Both cases demonstrate that approximate-balance 
determinations require case-specifc factual review warranting clear-
error review. Pp. 380–383. 
(c) Petitioners' counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, peti-
tioners urge that by amending § 7261(b)(1) to include the modest phrase, 
“take due account,” Congress imposed a new standard of review for 
challenges to the V A's application of the beneft-of the-doubt rule. But 
had Congress intended to do so, it would have identifed a standard, just 
as it did in § 7261(a). Petitioners next argue that, even if § 7261(b)(1)

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Syllabus 
incorporates § 7261(a)'s standards of review, the V A's approximate-
balance determination is much like a court's probable-cause determina-
tion, which involves a mixed-question inquiry that appellate courts re-
view de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 699. 
Two features distinguish the probable-cause determination from the 
V A's determination here. First, probable cause is a constitutional 
standard, creating a strong presumption that determinations under that 
standard are subject to de novo review. By contrast, the approximate-
balance determination is a creature of statute, not the Constitution. 
Second, probable cause poses a question that requires substantial “legal 
work,” U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 398, but the V A's approximate-balance 
determination lacks a comparable legal component. 
Petitioners contend that the Federal Circuit's reading of § 7261(b)(1) 
renders the provision superfuous. While this Court's reading of 
§ 7261(b)(1) might involve some redundancy, the canon against surplus-
age does not apply here because petitioners have not identifed a com-
peting interpretation that would avoid redundancy. See Marx v. Gen-
eral Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385. Pp. 383–387. 
75 F. 4th 1368, affrmed. 
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. 
Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, 
p. 388. 
Melanie L. Bostwick argued the cause for petitioners. 
With her on the briefs were Thomas M. Bondy, Jonas Q. 
Wang, Melanie R. Hallums, Katherine M. Kopp, Kenneth 
M. Carpenter, and Geoffrey C. Shaw. 
Sopan Joshi argued the cause for respondent. With him 
on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solic-
itor General Stewart, Evan Wisser, Meredyth Cohen Ha-
vasy, and Christopher O. Adeloye.† 
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Disabled Ameri-
can Veterans by Amy F. Odom, Robert V. Chisholm, and Zachary Stolz; 
for the Federal Circuit Bar Association by Brian T. Burgess; for Military-
Veterans Advocacy, Inc., by Michael E. Joffre, Anna G. Phillips, and John 
B. Wells; for the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium by 
Katie M. Becker and Amy B. Kretkowski; and for the National Veterans 
Legal Services Program et al. by D. Shayon Ghosh, Liam J. Montgomery, 
Barton F. Stichman, and Diane Boyd Rauber.

372 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. 
When evaluating a veteran's claim for service-related dis-
ability benefts, the Department of Veterans Affairs (V A) 
applies a unique standard of proof known as the “beneft-of-
the-doubt rule.” This rule requires the V A to “give the ben-
eft of the doubt to the claimant” whenever “there is an ap-
proximate balance of positive and negative evidence” on any 
issue material to the claim. 38 U. S. C. § 5107(b). When re-
viewing the V A's benefts decisions, the United States Court 
of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) must “take 
due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-
doubt rule. § 7261(b)(1). The question before us is what 
the Veterans Court must do to comply with that statutory 
command. We hold that the Veterans Court must review 
the V A's application of the rule the same way it would any 
other determination—by reviewing legal issues de novo and 
factual issues for clear error. See § 7261(a). And, we hold 
that the V A's determination that the evidence is in approxi-
mate balance is a predominantly factual determination 
reviewed only for clear error. 
I 
A 
Congress provides veterans a wide range of benefts, in-
cluding compensation for disabilities caused or aggravated 
by active-duty military service. §§ 1110, 1131. The V A, led 
by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, administers the laws 
that provide for those benefts. §§ 301, 303. 
Veterans who suffer from service-connected post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are among those entitled 
to disability benefts. To establish service-connected PTSD, 
the V A requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition 
and linking the veteran's symptoms with an “in-service 
stressor,” as well as credible evidence that the in-service 
stressor occurred. 38 CFR § 3.304(f) (2023). When the V A 
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fnds those conditions satisfed, it assigns a disability rating 
that refects reductions in earning capacity. 38 U. S. C. 
§ 1155; 38 CFR § 4.130. This rating determines the amount 
of compensation a veteran receives. 
A veteran begins the claims process by submitting a re-
quest for benefts to the V A. A V A regional offce then ad-
judicates the claim. If the regional offce issues an adverse 
decision, the veteran may seek de novo review from the 
Board of Veterans' Appeals. The Board is an administrative 
body within the V A that renders fnal decisions for the 
agency. 38 U. S. C. §§ 7101, 7104(a). 
Congress designed the V A's adjudicatory process to func-
tion “ `with a high degree of informality and solicitude for 
the claimant.' ” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 431 
(2011) (quoting Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Sur-
vivors, 473 U. S. 305, 311 (1985)). For example, Congress 
imposes no statute of limitations on a veteran's claim for 
benefts. The process at both the regional offces and the 
Board is ex parte and nonadversarial. 38 CFR §§ 3.103(a), 
20.700(c). And, the V A must assist veterans in developing 
the evidence necessary to substantiate their claims. 38 
U. S. C. § 5103A(a)(1). 
Congress also requires the regional offces and the Board 
to give veterans the beneft of the doubt on close issues. 
Specifcally, the V A must “consider all information and lay 
and medical evidence of record,” and, “[w]hen there is an 
approximate balance of positive and negative evidence re-
garding any issue material to the determination of a matter, 
the [V A] shall give the beneft of the doubt to the claimant.” 
§ 5107(b). This rule refects a pro-veteran policy choice that 
dates back to the post-Civil War era. See 50 Fed. Reg. 
34454 (1985). 
A veteran who receives an adverse decision from the 
Board may appeal to the Veterans Court, an Article I tribu-
nal. The Veterans Court has exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view fnal decisions of the Board. § 7252(a). 
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374 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
Section 7261 defnes the scope of the Veterans Court's re-
view. Subsection (a), which sets forth the court's adjudica-
tory powers, is modeled after the scope-of-review provision 
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U. S. C. 
§ 706. It empowers the Veterans Court to decide relevant 
questions of law; to compel action unlawfully withheld or un-
reasonably delayed; and to hold unlawful and set aside V A 
fndings, conclusions, rules, and regulations that are arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. 38 U. S. C. §§ 7261(a)(1)–(3). Unlike 
the APA, however, § 7261(a) imposes a slightly different 
standard of review for factual fndings. The Veterans Court 
may set aside or reverse a factual fnding only if “the fnding 
is clearly erroneous,” in contrast to the APA's “substantial 
evidence” standard. § 7261(a)(4); see Dickinson v. Zurko, 
527 U. S. 150, 153, 162–163 (1999) (examining the “subtle” 
difference between the two standards). 
Subsection (b) sets forth additional requirements that the 
Veterans Court must follow “[i]n making the determinations 
under subsection (a).” § 7261(b). As originally enacted, 
the provision required only that the Veterans Court “ `take 
due account of the rule of prejudicial error.' ” Veterans' Ju-
dicial Review Act, § 301(a), 102 Stat. 4115 (now codifed at 
38 U. S. C. § 7261(b)(2)). We have held that this statutory 
command requires the Veterans Court to apply the same 
kind of harmless-error rule that courts ordinarily apply in 
civil cases. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U. S. 396, 406 (2009). 
In 2002, Congress amended subsection (b) to add the provi-
sion at issue here. Veterans Benefts Act, § 401(b), 116 Stat. 
2832. Codifed at § 7261(b)(1), it directs the Veterans Court 
to “ `take due account of the [V A]'s application of section 
5107(b) of this title.' ” In other words, when conducting ju-
dicial review under subsection (a), the Veterans Court must 
“take due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-
the-doubt rule. 
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In most cases, an appeal to the Veterans Court is a veter-
an's fnal opportunity for judicial review of a benefts deci-
sion. Although veterans may appeal certain legal issues to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
see § 7292, that court has held that it lacks jurisdiction to 
review most factual determinations, including whether the 
V A properly applied the beneft-of-the-doubt rule in individ-
ual cases, see Ferguson v. Principi, 273 F. 3d 1072, 1076 
(2001). 
B 
Petitioners are veterans who applied for service-connected 
PTSD disability benefts and were dissatisfed with the V A's 
resolution of their claims. 
1 
Petitioner Joshua Bufkin served in the Air Force from late 
2005 to early 2006. Although Bufkin intended to join the 
military police, he never received a job assignment because 
he could not pass the required training classes. Bufkin 
blamed his poor performance on marital stress. He re-
ported that his wife opposed his service and had threatened 
to commit suicide if he stayed in the military. Bufkin ulti-
mately requested and obtained a nonprejudicial hardship 
discharge. 
Seven years later, Bufkin sought disability benefts from 
the V A. He claimed that his military service caused several 
psychiatric conditions, including PTSD. To support his 
PTSD claim, Bufkin submitted a letter from a V A physician 
who had recently treated him. The physician explained that 
Bufkin's wife suffered from depression, and that Bufkin felt 
forced to make a choice between divorcing his wife or leaving 
the military. The physician diagnosed Bufkin with PTSD 
and opined that the primary stressor was the perceived 
threat to his wife's life. 
The V A regional offce denied Bufkin's claim on the ground 
that the medical evidence was insuffcient to establish a link 
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376 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
between his symptoms and his military service. Bufkin 
sought reconsideration, and the V A ordered a second exami-
nation by a second V A physician. The new physician deter-
mined that Bufkin did not meet the criteria for PTSD. He 
explained that the frst physician was unable to review Buf-
kin's military or medical records, a limitation that may have 
had a “signifcant impact” on Bufkin's initial diagnosis. 
App. in No. 2022–1089 (CA Fed.), pp. 26–27. Bufkin also 
submitted letters from his wife and mother describing 
changes they observed in his personality after his military 
service. 
The V A regional offce reviewed the new information and 
reaffrmed its denial of Bufkin's claim. Bufkin fled a notice 
of disagreement. He argued that the evidence for and 
against his claim was roughly equal and that he was there-
fore entitled to “the beneft of the doubt.” § 5107(b). Buf-
kin then underwent a third V A examination by yet another 
physician. Like the second physician, this physician con-
cluded that Bufkin's symptoms did not meet the criteria for 
PTSD. She also noted that Bufkin's symptoms started one 
year after his discharge, and that no evidence indicated that 
his military service caused a disability. The V A regional of-
fce again reaffrmed its decision to deny benefts. 
Bufkin appealed to the Board. While the appeal was 
pending, he submitted a short statement from a fourth physi-
cian. This physician stated that, in his opinion, Bufkin suf-
fered from PTSD, but he noted other doctors might disagree 
with that diagnosis. He suggested that, at a minimum, Buf-
kin suffered from severe anxiety disorder. 
The Board concluded that Bufkin did not suffer from 
PTSD and denied his claim. In a detailed opinion, the Board 
recounted each physician's fndings and medical conclusions. 
The Board observed that one physician diagnosed Bufkin 
with PTSD, two physicians determined he did not have 
PTSD, and one physician thought the issue was debatable.

Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 377 
Opinion of the Court 
After carefully reviewing each medical opinion, the Board 
explained that it found the second physician's report “espe-
cially persuasive.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. The Board 
noted that the one physician to diagnose Bufkin with PTSD 
had not reviewed his military or medical records. The 
Board also reviewed the letters from Bufkin's wife and 
mother but found that they lacked probative value because 
neither individual had relevant medical expertise. When 
taken as a whole, the Board explained, the evidence was not 
in approximate balance. Accordingly, the Board determined 
that Bufkin was not entitled to the beneft of the doubt. 
2 
Petitioner Norman Thornton served in the Army from 
1988 to 1991. After being honorably discharged, Thornton 
applied for and received benefts for an “ `undiagnosed ill-
ness.' ” Id., at 32a. Years later, he sought additional bene-
fts for service-connected PTSD. The V A granted benefts 
for the PTSD claim, initially rating his condition as 10% disa-
bling and later increasing the rating to 30%. 
In 2015, Thornton applied for another increase to his 
PTSD disability rating and underwent a new V A medical ex-
amination. The physician concluded that Thornton suffered 
some common PTSD symptoms, including depressed mood, 
anxiety, memory loss, and sleep impairment, but questioned 
whether PTSD was the cause of those symptoms. The phy-
sician did not fnd several of the more severe symptoms that 
earlier medical examinations had revealed, such as suicidal 
ideation, impaired impulse control, and panic attacks. Nev-
ertheless, the regional offce increased Thornton's PTSD dis-
ability rating to 50%. Thornton then sought an additional 
increase to 70% and underwent another medical evaluation, 
but the regional offce maintained the 50% rating. 
Thornton appealed to the Board, which reviewed the evi-
dence de novo. As in Bufkin's case, the Board thoroughly 
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378 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
recounted each medical report and assessed the credibility 
of each physician's fndings. The Board ultimately declined 
to increase Thornton's 50% disability rating. 1 
3 
Both petitioners appealed the Board's resolution of their 
PTSD claims to the Veterans Court. They argued that the 
evidence concerning their diagnoses was in “approximate 
balance,” so they were entitled to the beneft of the doubt. 
See § 5107(b). In both cases, the Veterans Court upheld the 
Board's decisions on the ground that the Board's approximate-
balance determinations were not clearly erroneous. 
Petitioners then appealed to the Federal Circuit, chal-
lenging the Veterans Court's legal interpretation of 
§ 7261(b)(1). They argued that the statutory command to 
“take due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-
the-doubt rule requires the Veterans Court to review the 
entire record de novo and decide for itself whether the evi-
dence is in approximate balance. 
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affrmed 
the Veterans Court in both cases. Bufkin v. McDonough, 
75 F. 4th 1368 (2023); Thornton v. McDonough, 2023 WL 
5091653 (Aug. 9, 2023). The court held that “the statutory 
command that the Veterans Court `take due account' of the 
beneft of the doubt rule does not require the Veterans Court 
to conduct any review of the beneft of the doubt issue be-
yond the clear error review required by” § 7261(a). Id., at *2. 
We granted certiorari to decide what it means to “take 
due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-
doubt rule. 601 U. S. 1167 (2024). 
1 At the same time, the Board granted Thornton a “total disability” rat-
ing for his separate claim of unemployability, based on the combined effect 
of his service-connected PTSD and the undiagnosed illness. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 86a–89a. Thornton currently receives full benefts, but those 
benefts are subject to continual review. He appeals only the denial of 
the increase to his PTSD disability rating. 
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II 
A 
We start, as always, with the text. Section 7261(b)(1) 
provides that “[i]n making the determinations under subsec-
tion (a),” the Veterans Court “shall” “take due account of the 
[V A]'s application of [the beneft-of-the-doubt rule].” 
The plain meaning of the text reveals the scope of the Vet-
erans Court's task. It is undisputed that the word “shall” 
imposes a mandatory command. Shapiro v. McManus, 577 
U. S. 39, 43 (2015). “Shall” means “must.” Kingdomware 
Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 171–172 
(2016). It is likewise undisputed that to “take account of” 
something means to give it attention or consideration. See 
American Heritage Dictionary 1763 (4th ed. 2000) (defning 
“take account of” as “[t]o take into consideration”). The 
word “due” qualifes the attention that the V A must give. 
“Due” means “appropriate” or “proper.” See 4 Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary 1105 (2d ed. 1989) (“Merited, appropriate: 
proper, right”); Black's Law Dictionary 515 (7th ed. 1999) 
(“Just, proper, regular, and reasonable”). 
Taken together, the statutory command to “take due ac-
count” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule 
requires the Veterans Court to give appropriate attention to 
the V A's work, at least when the issue is properly presented. 
See id., at 516 (defning “due consideration” as “[t]he degree 
of attention properly paid to something, as the circum-
stances merit”).
2 
The text makes clear that the appropriate attention due 
is that which is required under subsection (a). Sec -
tion 7261(b)(1) states that the Veterans Court must “take 
2 Petitioners invite us to decide whether the Veterans Court must ad-
dress the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule when a veteran 
does not raise the issue as a ground for reversal. Because both petition-
ers adequately preserved and raised their challenges below, we leave that 
question for another day. 
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380 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-
doubt rule only “[i]n making the determinations under 
subsection (a).” This language highlights that taking due 
account is not a freestanding task but rather an aspect of 
judicial review under subsection (a). 
The upshot is straightforward. Review of the V A's 
beneft-of-the-doubt decision is just another determination 
made “under subsection (a).” § 7261(b)(1). Accordingly, 
the standards of review provided in subsection (a) also gov-
ern the Veterans Court's review of beneft-of-the-doubt is-
sues. In particular, subsection (a) requires the Veterans 
Court to review the V A's conclusions of law de novo and its 
fndings of fact for clear error. See §§ 7261(a)(1) and (4). 
Which standard applies will depend on whether a veteran 
raises a legal or factual objection. 
Section 7261(b)(1) makes explicit the Veterans Court's pre-
viously implicit duty to review the V A's application of the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule, pursuant to the standards set forth 
in subsection (a). Of course, this duty predated Congress's 
enactment of § 7261(b)(1); subsection (a) always required the 
Veterans Court to review all relevant fndings of fact and 
conclusions of law. See §§ 7261(a)(1) and (4). But, Con-
gress's enactment underscores the beneft-of-the-doubt rule's 
status as a paramount consideration. 
B 
The next question, then, is the appropriate standard of re-
view for challenges to the V A's application of the beneft-of-
the-doubt rule. The applicable standard will vary with the 
challenge, as the application of the rule has both factual and 
legal components. A veteran may challenge any aspect of 
the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule on 
appeal. 
No one disputes that challenges to the V A's legal conclu-
sions are subject to de novo review. For example, if the 
veteran argues that the V A misunderstood the defnition of 
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Opinion of the Court 
“approximate balance,” the Veterans Court would construe 
the challenge as a legal one and review it de novo. So too 
if the veteran argues that the V A gave the beneft of the 
doubt to the wrong party. 
These arguments, however, are not the typical arguments 
a veteran raises on appeal. In mine-run cases, including the 
two before us, a veteran challenges the V A's determination 
that the evidence on a particular material issue is not in ap-
proximate balance. 
Petitioners assert that the approximate-balance determi-
nation is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. The Gov-
ernment counters that the determination is a factual fnding, 
or at least a mixed question that is predominantly factual 
and reviewed for clear error. After closely examining the 
way in which the V A conducts the approximate-balance in-
quiry, we conclude it is a predominantly factual question and 
thus subject to clear-error review. 
The approximate-balance determination involves two 
steps. First, the V A reviews each item of evidence in the 
record and assigns weight to it. Both sides agree that this 
aspect of the V A's analysis is factfnding reviewed only for 
clear error. Second, the V A assesses the weight of the evi-
dence as a whole, deciding whether “there is an approximate 
balance of positive and negative evidence” on any material 
issue. § 5107(b). The V A gives the beneft of the doubt to 
the veteran only after determining that the positive evidence 
and negative evidence on a material issue are in approximate 
balance. Otherwise, the V A simply resolves the issue in 
favor of the party with the more persuasive evidence. 
The second step—deciding whether the evidence as a 
whole is approximately balanced—has both legal and factual 
components. The task is partly factual because it involves 
marshaling and weighing evidence. See U. S. Bank N. A. v. 
Village at Lakeridge, LLC , 583 U. S. 387, 396 (2018). The 
V A must categorize the evidence based on whether it sup-
ports or undermines the veteran's claim. After doing so, 
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382 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
the V A compares the relative strength and persuasiveness of 
the evidence on each side. Assigning weight to evidence— 
whether individual pieces of evidence or collections of it—is 
an inherently factual task. See ibid. But, the V A's decision 
also involves a legal determination. After assessing the 
weight of the assorted evidence, the V A must decide whether 
the evidence is in “approximate balance.” See § 5107(b). 
In other words, the V A must determine whether the evi-
dence satisfies a legal standard. Because the VA's 
approximate-balance determination involves both legal and 
factual work, it is at most a mixed question, not a purely 
legal one.
3 
The appropriate standard of review for a mixed question 
depends “on whether answering it entails primarily legal or 
factual work.” U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 396. Some mixed 
questions require a court to “expound on the law” by “ampli-
fying or elaborating on a broad legal standard.” Ibid. 
When applying the law involves developing legal principles 
for use in future cases, appellate courts typically review the 
decision de novo . Ibid. Other mixed questions require 
courts to resolve “case-specific factual issues. ” Ibid. 
When the tribunal below is “immerse[d]” in facts and com-
pelled to “marshal and weigh evidence” and “make credibil-
ity judgments,” the appellate court “should usually review a 
decision with deference.” Ibid. 
Reviewing a determination whether record evidence is ap-
proximately balanced is “about as factual sounding” as any 
question gets. Id., at 397. Consider Bufkin's case. To de-
3 We need not decide whether the V A's approximate-balance determina-
tion is best characterized as a mixed question or a factual one. See Alex-
ander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP , 602 U. S. 1, 18– 
19 (2024) (observing that “a fnding of fact” may involve application of a 
“standard of proof” with a “substantial legal component”). Whether the 
determination is mixed or factual, clear-error review is appropriate be-
cause it is at least predominantly factual.

Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 383 
Opinion of the Court 
cide whether Bufkin was entitled to the beneft of the doubt, 
the Board reviewed four medical opinions and two letters 
from Bufkin's family members. After assigning weight to 
each item, the Board assessed whether the evidence was 
roughly equal. To make that determination, the Board had 
to consider evidence of Bufkin's symptoms and their causes, 
while assessing the credibility of the physicians who treated 
him. Thornton's case is no different. The Board assessed 
the weight of his symptoms, the degree to which they af-
fected his day-to-day life, and the credibility of each physi-
cian. These cases illustrate that the approximate-balance 
determination necessarily immerses the Board “in case-
specifc factual issues.” Id., at 396. When that is so—that 
is, when the initial decisionmaker is “marshal[ing] and 
weigh[ing] evidence” and “mak[ing] credibility judgments”— 
its work is fact intensive, and its determinations should be 
reviewed with deference. Ibid. 
C 
Petitioners and the dissent offer various paths to a differ-
ent result. But, their arguments are not persuasive. 
First, petitioners urge us to hold that with one modest 
phrase, “take due account,” Congress imposed a new stand-
ard of review for challenges to the V A's application of the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule. Before the Federal Circuit, peti-
tioners argued that § 7261(b)(1) established a de novo stand-
ard of review. They hesitate to call the standard “de novo 
review” before this Court, instead describing it as “APA-
plus.” Brief for Petitioners 25, 41–42. 
However labeled, the directive to “take due account” does 
not do the work that petitioners envision. Had Congress 
intended to impose a new standard of review for challenges 
to the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule, it 
would have clearly named a standard—just as it did in 
§ 7261(a). But, as we have explained, Congress chose not to 
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384 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
announce any new standard in § 7261(b)(1). It instead incor-
porated the pre-existing standards of review set forth in sub-
section (a). 
Petitioners contend, in the alternative, that even if 
§ 7261(b)(1) incorporates the standards of review in § 7261(a), 
the V A's approximate-balance determination is a legal ques-
tion subject to de novo review under § 7261(a). The dissent 
adopts a similar view, arguing that the approximate-balance 
determination is a predominantly legal mixed question. 
Post, at 398–402 (opinion of J ackson, J.). 
The de novo standard applies, they say, because the 
approximate-balance determination resembles other legal or 
predominantly legal questions that courts review de novo . 
They point to judicial review of a court's probable-cause de-
termination as one such analogue. Post, at 401. Probable 
cause is the standard by which a court assesses whether a 
police offcer's search or seizure was permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. For example, “probable cause to 
search . . . exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances 
are suffcient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the 
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996). We have 
held that this inquiry is a mixed question that courts review 
de novo. See id., at 699. 
Two features of the probable-cause determination distin-
guish it from the approximate-balance determination, how-
ever, and underscore why courts review it de novo . First, 
because probable cause is a constitutional standard, we start 
with a strong presumption that determinations under that 
standard are subject to de novo review, even if they require 
courts to “plung[e] into a factual record.” U. S. Bank, 583 
U. S., at 396, n. 4. Second, probable cause at bottom poses 
a question that requires substantial “legal work.” Id., at 
398. Because probable cause asks whether the “offcer's un-
derstanding of the facts and his understanding of the rele-
vant law” was “reasonable,” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 
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Opinion of the Court 
U. S. 54, 61–64 (2014), it requires an objective, legally 
grounded inquiry as to what a hypothetical person could 
have found, see Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 464 (2011). 
The answer to how a hypothetical person would act is, by its 
nature, one that courts refne over time, building out princi-
ples that “acquire content only through application.” Or-
nelas, 517 U. S., at 697. De novo review is therefore essen-
tial so that courts can ensure “unif[orm] precedent” that will 
“provid[e] law enforcement offcers with a defned set of rules 
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct 
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of pri-
vacy is justifed.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The V A's approximate-balance determination differs on 
both counts. First, the standard is a creature of statute. 
Because it does not dwell “[i]n the constitutional realm,” it 
is not entitled to the presumption of de novo review that 
applies to probable cause. U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 396, n. 4. 
Second, the approximate-balance inquiry does not have a 
comparable legal component. Instead, as these cases exem-
plify, that inquiry tends to be case specifc and fact intensive, 
with courts evaluating the weight of the evidence for and 
against a particular veteran's claim. To decide Bufkin's 
claim, for example, the V A reviewed a panoply of medical 
and lay evidence, and Bufkin's central argument before the 
Veterans Court was that the overall balance of this evidence 
was closer than the V A thought. Thornton's claim similarly 
presented case-specifc, fact-bound issues about the existence 
and severity of symptoms. Resolution of these claims is un-
likely to generate guidance for the V A or future courts in 
the way that probable-cause precedents do for police and 
the courts. 
The V A's approximate-balance determination is likewise 
distinct from a court's conclusion that evidence is suffcient to 
support a criminal conviction, a conclusion that courts review 
de novo . See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318–319 
(1979). While the suffciency-of-the-evidence inquiry neces-
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386 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Opinion of the Court 
sarily turns on facts, the reviewing court does not decide 
for itself whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Instead, it construes all evidence and 
makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, 
and asks whether “any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Id., at 319. Courts therefore conduct their review 
through a legal lens, applying a hypothetical, objective 
standard and putting a thumb on the scale in favor of the 
prevailing party—the prosecution. No one—petitioners and 
the dissent included—wants the Veterans Court to do that. 
Instead, petitioners and the dissent would have the Veterans 
Court “weigh the evidence” in the frst instance and then 
make “inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts”— 
precisely what a court may not do on suffciency review. 
Ibid. 
Petitioners and the dissent also rely heavily on the asser-
tion that our reading of § 7261(b)(1) renders the provision 
superfuous. Post, at 395–397. That objection is a serious 
one. “We are reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplus-
age in any setting.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our reluctance 
increases when Congress amends a statute, as we ordinarily 
presume that when Congress does so, “ `it intends its amend-
ment to have real and substantial effect.' ” Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U. S. 241, 258–259 (2004). 
But, our reading of § 7261(b)(1) gives that provision a func-
tion, even if it might involve some redundancy. As we have 
explained, Congress's amendment makes express the Veter-
ans Court's obligation to review challenges to the V A's appli-
cation of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule according to the stand-
ards set forth in § 7261(a). Moreover, as the dissent notes, 
we have left open the possibility that Congress's enactment 
requires the Veterans Court to review the V A's application 
of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule even if the veteran fails to 
present that issue on appeal. See n. 2, supra; post, at 396. 
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Opinion of the Court 
If the Court were to decide that Congress's enactment 
changed the party-presentation requirement, then the enact-
ment of § 7261(b)(1) would serve an additional independent 
function. 
Notably, the dissent fails to offer a reading of the text that 
avoids redundancy. According to the dissent, the V A's 
approximate-balance determination is a predominantly legal 
question subject to de novo review. Post, at 399–402. But, 
if the dissent were correct, then the approximate-balance 
determination would have been subject to de novo review 
even before the enactment of § 7261(b)(1). All agree that 
under § 7261(a), which predated Congress's enactment of 
§ 7261(b)(1), the Veterans Court is required to review ques-
tions of law de novo . Thus, under the dissent's interpre-
tation—no less than ours—the enactment of § 7261(b)(1) 
merely underscores a pre-existing duty. The canon against 
surplusage can be meaningful when a competing interpreta-
tion would avoid superfuity. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P ., 
564 U. S. 91, 106 (2011). But, when both interpretations in-
volve the same redundancy, the canon against surplusage 
simply does not apply. See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 
568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013) (declining to apply the canon against 
surplusage when no interpretation would give effect to 
every word). 
In any event, “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of 
the statute contains some redundancy.” Rimini Street, Inc. 
v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U. S. 334, 346 (2019). Here, the 
text leaves no doubt that the Federal Circuit's reading of the 
statute is the better one. 
* * * 
Section 7261(b)(1) does not establish a new standard of re-
view for challenges to the V A's application of the beneft-of-
the-doubt rule. Instead, it requires the Veterans Court to 
apply the appropriate standard of review under § 7261(a). 
Because the V A's approximate-balance determination is a

388 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
predominantly factual question, the Veterans Court reviews 
it for clear error. § 7261(a)(4). 
III 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affrmed. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, 
dissenting. 
The Court draws two conclusions from today's evaluation 
of Congress's “take due account” admonition. See 38 
U. S. C. § 7261(b)(1). First, it holds that when the United 
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 
Court) reviews the Department of Veterans Affairs' (V A's) 
application of the “beneft-of-the-doubt” rule, that appellate 
tribunal must use the “same” standards of review that apply 
to its assessment of any other V A claims determination. 
Ante, at 372. Second, the Court concludes that whether evi-
dence is in “approximate balance” for purposes of the beneft-
of-the-doubt rule is a “predominantly factual determination” 
to be reviewed only for clear error. Ibid. 
The majority is wrong in both respects. Nothing about 
the text, context, or drafting history of subsection (b)(1) 
demonstrates that “take due account” actually means “pro-
ceed as normal.” Reading the provision in that fashion, as 
the majority does, makes little sense. That interpretation 
is also inconsistent with how we have treated identical 
language elsewhere in this same statute and renders 
meaningless the “take due account” command that Congress 
specifcally amended § 7261(b) to insert. 
The majority's clear-error conclusion fares no better, inso-
far as its reasoning ignores what appellate courts do and 
what we have consistently said about substantially similar 
circumstances. That is, even if the majority were correct 
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Jackson, J., dissenting 
that subsection (b)(1) instructs the Veterans Court to carry 
on applying the usual standards, clear-error review would 
not be appropriate because whether the V A properly applied 
the beneft-of-the-doubt rule does not present a question of 
fact. The V A's beneft-of-the-doubt determination poses, at 
most, a mixed question of law and fact—and one that is sub-
stantively indistinguishable from the kinds of mixed ques-
tions that this Court has long said are subject to de novo 
review on appeal. 
In short, the Court today concludes that Congress meant 
nothing when it inserted subsection (b)(1) in response to con-
cerns that the Veterans Court was improperly rubberstamp-
ing the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt determinations, and also 
that the Veterans Court is not obliged to do anything more 
than defer to those agency decisions notwithstanding Con-
gress's “take due account” direction. I respectfully dissent. 
I 
Under the time-honored beneft-of-the-doubt rule, veter-
ans asserting claims for service-connected disabilities are 
entitled to have any reasonable doubt on a material issue 
resolved in their favor. Congress codifed this rule in 1988: 
Section 5107(b) of Title 38 states unequivocally that the V A 
must “give the beneft of the doubt to the claimant” when-
ever “there is an approximate balance of positive and nega-
tive evidence regarding any issue material to the” veteran's 
benefts claim. This generous standard of proof honors the 
sacrifces of those who have served in the Armed Forces. 
Recognizing the weighty interests at stake in cases that 
involve benefts for veterans, Congress's 1988 legislation also 
established judicial review of the V A's benefts decisions by 
the Veterans Court, a specialized Article I tribunal. Section 
7261(a) lays out in detail the authority that the Veterans 
Court has been given. As relevant here, the Veterans 
Court is authorized to (1) “decide all relevant questions of 
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390 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
law”; (2) “compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed”; and (3) “hold unlawful and set 
aside” certain V A decisions. §§ 7261(a)(1)–(3). Notably, 
clause (4) of § 7261(a) states that “in the case of a fnding 
of material fact adverse to the claimant made in reaching a 
decision in a case before the [V A] with respect to benefts,” 
the Veterans Court shall “hold unlawful and set aside or 
reverse such fnding if the fnding is clearly erroneous.” 
§ 7261(a)(4). 
For present purposes, all parties agree that § 7261(a) has 
always authorized the Veterans Court to review the V A's 
application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. But judicial re-
view of that issue proved illusory from the start, because the 
Veterans Court historically applied a deferential standard of 
review for assessing the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt determi-
nations. See, e. g., Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57– 
58 (1990); Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (Ct. App. 
Vet. Cl. 2001). As a result, veterans groups routinely com-
plained to Congress that judicial review by the Veterans 
Court was inappropriately deferential. See, e. g., Hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, 107th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 47 (2002) (statement of the legislative direc-
tor of a veterans group); see also Brief for Federal Circuit 
Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 11–14. 
Congress responded in 2002, when it amended § 7261(b) to 
specifcally require the Veterans Court to “take due account 
of” the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. 
§ 7261(b)(1). In its entirety, the amended subsection (b) 
states: 
“(b) In making the determinations under subsection 
(a), the [Veterans] Court shall review the record of pro-
ceedings before the Secretary and the Board of Veter-
ans' Appeals . . . and shall— 
“(1) take due account of the Secretary's application of 
section 5107(b) of this title; and 
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Jackson, J., dissenting 
“(2) take due account of the rule of pre judicial 
error.” § 7261(b). 1 
The plain text of § 7261(b)(1) thus requires the Veterans 
Court to “take due account” of the V A's obligations under 
the beneft-of-the-doubt rule when it reviews V A benefts de-
terminations under § 7261(a). 
II 
The dispute before us concerns the meaning of subsection 
(b)(1)'s “take due account” clause. The majority and I agree 
that subsection (b)(1) imposes a “statutory command” that 
the Veterans Court “give appropriate attention to the V A's 
work” related to its application of the beneft-of-the-doubt 
rule. Ante, at 379. But the majority concludes that the 
“appropriate attention due is that which is required under 
subsection (a).” Ibid. In my view, that holding is un-
moored from subsection (b)(1)'s text, ignores § 7261's overall 
structure and drafting history, and renders entirely super-
fuous Congress's requirement that the Veterans Court “take 
due account” of the application of the beneft-of-the-doubt 
rule. The better reading of the statute recognizes that sub-
section (b)(1) requires the Veterans Court to determine, 
without deference, whether the V A properly applied the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule. 
A 
The primary textual pillar of the majority's conclusion that 
“[r]eview of the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt decision is just an-
1 Subsection (b)(1) cross references § 5107(b), which (as explained above 
and bears repeating) codifes the beneft-of-the-doubt rule: “When there is 
an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any 
issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give 
the beneft of the doubt to the claimant.” § 5107(b). The reference to 
“the Secretary” in § 5107(b) and § 7261(b)(1) includes the V A's regional 
offces and the Board of Veterans' Appeals. See ante, at 373. 
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392 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
other determination made `under subsection (a)' ” is its ob-
servation that subsection (b)(1)'s review applies only “ `[i]n 
making the determinations under subsection (a).' ” Ante, at 
380 (quoting § 7261(b)(1)). Based on that prefatory lan-
guage, the majority reasons that subsection (b)(1) is merely 
an “ aspect of” the review that the Veterans Court performs 
under subsection (a), such that the “standards of review pro-
vided in subsection (a) also govern the Veterans Court's re-
view of beneft-of-the-doubt issues.” Ante, at 380. 
But the fact that the Veterans Court must apply subsec-
tion (b)(1) “[i]n making the determinations under subsection 
(a)” does not justify collapsing these two provisions. The 
word “in,” when paired with a gerund—here, “making”—is 
generally “equivalent in sense to a temporal clause intro-
duced by when, while, if, [or] in the event of .” 7 Oxford 
English Dictionary 760 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis in original). 
The “in making” clause in subsection (b) thus merely pro-
vides that when the Veterans Court makes one of the deter-
minations authorized by subsection (a), it must also satisfy 
its duty to “take due account of” the V A's application of the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule. In other words, the “in making” 
clause the majority seizes upon to justify its same-standards 
holding simply establishes that review under subsection 
(b)(1) occurs alongside review under subsection (a), not that 
they are the same thing. 
Interpreting subsection (b)(1) to require a separate, con-
current review of the V A's compliance with the beneft-
of-the-doubt rule is consistent with how this Court has in-
terpreted subsection (b)(1)'s parallel provision—subsection 
(b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) directs that, “[i]n making the deter-
minations under subsection (a),” the Veterans Court shall 
“ take due account of the rule of pre judicial error.” 
§ 7261(b)(2). In Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U. S. 396 (2009), 
we held that subsection (b)(2) “requires the Veterans Court 
to apply the same kind of `harmless-error' rule that courts 
ordinarily apply in civil cases,” id., at 406. We did not

Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 393 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
suggest—much less hold—that subsection (a)'s standards 
of review governed subsection (b)(2)'s “take due account” 
clause. To the contrary, we explained that the Veterans 
Court is not prevented from “directly asking the harmless-
error question” and “resting its conclusion on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.” Id., at 408. 
Thus, there is no dispute that, under subsection (b)(2), the 
Veterans Court analyzes whether any error was harmless 
de novo, without applying the standards of review prescribed 
by subsection (a). And because subsection (a)'s standards 
do not apply when the Veterans Court “take[s] due account 
of the rule of prejudicial error” under subsection (b)(2), it 
is oddly discordant for the majority to conclude that those 
standards do apply when the Veterans Court “take[s] due 
account of the Secretary's application of” the beneft-of-the-
doubt rule. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 408 (2011) 
(“ `[I]dentical words and phrases within the same statute 
should normally be given the same meaning' ”). 
An understanding of how subsection (b)(2)'s “take due ac-
count” language functions in practice further clarifes subsec-
tion (b)(1), as subsection (b)(2) existed prior to subsection 
(b)(1) and plainly served as its model. The majority does not 
dispute that the V A's appellate tribunal, the Board of Veterans' 
Appeals, sometimes applies the rule of prejudicial error in the 
frst instance. See, e. g., Medrano v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 
165, 170 (Ct. App. Vet. Cl. 2007).
2 If the Board determines 
that an error was harmless and denies a veteran's claim, then 
2 This happens often in the context of notice errors. Consistent with 
the pro-claimant nature of the veterans-disability system, the V A has a 
statutory obligation to notify veterans of certain information. Shinseki 
v. Sanders, 556 U. S. 396, 400 (2009) (citing 38 U. S. C. § 5103(a)). If the 
V A breaches that duty, the Board may nonetheless deny a veteran's claim 
if it determines that the notice error was harmless. The Veterans Court 
reviews any such harmlessness determination de novo . See, e. g., Me-
drano, 21 Vet. App., at 170, 173; Lowery v. McDonough, 2024 WL 3949253, 
*4, *5–*6 (Ct. App. Vet. Cl., Aug. 27, 2024) (unpublished); Weaver v. Shinseki, 
2011 WL 2745773, *1 (Ct. App. Vet. Cl., July 13, 2011) (unpublished). 
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394 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
per subsection (b)(2), the Veterans Court reviews the record 
for prejudicial error and does so “de novo, in other words, 
without any deference to the Board,” before affrming. Id., 
at 171. Subsection (b)(1) works in precisely the same way: 
If the Veterans Court is inclined to affrm the V A's denial of 
benefts, subsection (b)(1) requires it to frst confrm de novo 
that the beneft-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied. 
B 
Nor does the drafting history of the relevant provisions 
support the majority's contention that subsection (b)(1) is an 
“aspect” of subsection (a), or that subsection (a)(4) substan-
tively limits the review that subsection (b)(1) requires. In 
fact, the historical account suggests the opposite. The ini-
tial Senate bill amended subsection (a)(4)—rather than sub-
section (b)—to command that the Veterans Court “tak[e] into 
account” the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. 
S. Rep. No. 107–234, p. 40 (2002) (italics deleted). That bill 
also proposed two other relevant changes: It authorized the 
Veterans Court to “reverse” the V A's factual fndings rather 
than remand them, and it eliminated the “clearly erroneous” 
standard of review. Ibid. (italics deleted). Accordingly, 
under the Senate's bill, subsection (a)(4) would have author-
ized the Veterans Court to “set aside or reverse” any factual 
fnding of the V A that was “unsupported by substantial evi-
dence of record, taking into account the Secretary's applica-
tion of” the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. Ibid. (italics deleted). 
Had Congress adopted this proposal, the majority's con-
fation of subsections (a) and (b)(1) might stand on frmer 
ground. But Congress plainly rejected that approach. It 
instead amended subsection (a)(4) only to empower the Vet-
erans Court to reverse certain factual fndings (i. e., those 
that are material and adverse to the claimant), and neither 
modifed subsection (a)(4)'s clear-error standard nor inserted 
a requirement that the Veterans Court review the V A's ap-
plication of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule into that provision. 
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Jackson, J., dissenting 
§ 401, 116 Stat. 2832. At the end of the day, then, instead of 
incorporating a beneft-of-the-doubt-rule reminder into sub-
section (a)(4), Congress crafted an entirely new statutory 
provision—subsection (b)(1)—to address judicial review of 
the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. Ibid. 
Recognizing that review under subsection (b)(1) is distinct 
from review under subsection (a)(4) respects Congress's 
choice to separate those two provisions. It also comports 
with subsection (b)(1)'s language and the statute's overall 
design. No one disputes that Congress sought to subject 
the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt decisions to increased judicial 
scrutiny while otherwise preserving the V A's not-clearly-
erroneous factual fndings. Reading subsection (b)(1) to be 
such a congressional mandate furthers that objective, while 
the majority's conclusion that subsection (b)(1) implicitly in-
corporates subsection (a)(4)'s limited clear-error standard 
undermines it. 
C 
The usual indicators of statutory meaning thus confrm 
that subsection (b)(1) was meant to have bite. But the ma-
jority's reading renders it toothless. According to the ma-
jority, subsection (b)(1) does not impose any new obligation 
on the Veterans Court; instead, that provision merely “un-
derscores” the importance of § 5107(b)'s beneft-of-the-doubt 
rule. Ante, at 380. At oral argument, the Government put 
the matter even more bluntly, arguing that subsection (b)(1) 
is an “exclamation point” that does “duplicate work” and 
is ultimately “redundant.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42, 44. This 
interpretation, which the majority adopts, violates the 
“cardinal principle of statutory construction” that courts or-
dinarily “ ` “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 
of a statute.” ' ” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 
(2000) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 
538–539 (1955)). 
The majority acknowledges that the surplusage argument 
is “a serious one” and that its interpretation “might involve 
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396 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
some redundancy.” Ante, at 386. Still, the majority main-
tains that subsection (b)(1) has a “function” even if it per-
forms zero independent work. Ibid. That is because, as 
the majority sees it, subsection (b)(1) makes “express” the 
Veterans Court's duty to hear challenges to the V A's applica-
tion of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule under subsection (a), and 
may even require the Veterans Court to do so sua sponte . 
Ibid. But the majority cannot overcome the surplusage 
problem simply by asserting that subsection (b)(1) empha-
sizes or clarifes a pre-existing duty. To state the obvious, 
“most superfuous language” can be justifed as providing 
“clarity.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 304 
(2017). Perhaps for this reason, the majority does not iden-
tify any other case in which this Court held that Congress 
passed an amendment with no substantive effect. 
Moreover, the majority does not and cannot explain why 
any such expression of the Veterans Court's duties was 
needed—much less why Congress would go out of its way 
to amend the statute to underscore an existing obligation. 
Subsection (a) covers the waterfront of possible exercises 
of judicial authority and has always required the Veter-
ans Court to consider any argument “presented” by a vet-
eran. Subsection (a) cannot be reasonably read to exclude 
consideration of a veteran's claim that the V A misapplied the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule. And no one actually thought this; 
indeed, prior to Congress's enactment of subsection (b)(1), 
the Veterans Court regularly considered challenges to the 
V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule—it just did 
so deferentially. See supra, at 390. 
Thus, the problem that Congress enacted subsection (b)(1) 
to address was not that the Veterans Court seemed to have 
limited authority under subsection (a). Nor was it that the 
Veterans Court was somehow unaware of its duty to review 
the V A's application of the beneft-of-the doubt rule upon re-
quest. Rather, as I have explained, Congress enacted sub-
section (b)(1) after veterans service organizations brought to 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 397 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
its attention how the Veterans Court was performing that 
review—i. e., it was giving too much deference to the V A's 
beneft-of-the-doubt determinations. Ibid. Congress's in-
disputable focus was on the improper degree of deference the 
Veterans Court was affording to the V A's determinations, a 
target that the majority's reading misses completely. Nor 
is the majority's surplusage problem solved by the “possibil-
ity” that subsection (b)(1) requires sua sponte review of 
the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt determinations. Ante, at 386. 
Even assuming that subsection (b)(1) seeks to effect that 
change, sua sponte review would make no difference unless 
the Veterans Court proceeds nondeferentially. A rubber-
stamp applied to every case remains a rubberstamp. 
Finally, the majority maintains that if Congress had in-
tended for subsection (b)(1) to do anything other than under-
score the pre-existing duty to consider challenges to the V A's 
beneft-of-the-doubt determinations, it would have more 
clearly said so. Ante, at 383–384. That gets things exactly 
backwards. Ordinarily, when Congress amends a statute, 
“ ` “we presume it intends its amendment to have real and 
substantial effect.” ' ” Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, 
578 U. S. 355, 359 (2016) (quoting United States v. Quality 
Stores, Inc., 572 U. S. 141, 148 (2014)). The majority instead 
presumes that Congress intended to enact a do-nothing 
amendment. But if Congress had wanted to maintain the 
status quo, why enact subsection (b)(1) at all? The pre-
sumption is, and should be, that Congress expects a change 
when it goes through the trouble of amending a statute. 
And, here, the majority's reasoning has plainly failed to over-
come that presumption. 
D 
The veterans canon resolves whatever lingering doubt 
might remain about the proper interpretation of subsection 
(b)(1). We have “long applied `the canon that provisions for 
benefts to members of the Armed Services are to be con-
strued in the benefciaries' favor.' ” Henderson v. Shinseki, 
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398 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
562 U. S. 428, 441 (2011) (quoting King v. St. Vincent's Hospi-
tal, 502 U. S. 215, 220–221, n. 9 (1991)). Likewise, under the 
veterans canon, “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the 
veteran's favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 
(1994). 
The veterans canon strongly supports interpreting subsec-
tion (b)(1) to represent more than Congress's grandiloquence. 
Requiring subsection (b)(1) to affect the judicial review the 
Veterans Court provides aligns with the signifcance of the 
beneft-of-the-doubt rule and mitigates the unique problems 
that arise in veterans' cases, including that veterans are 
“often unrepresented” before the V A. Sanders, 556 U. S., at 
412. Veterans' claims also often involve a considerable time 
lag that produces problems of proof, since no statute of limi-
tations applies to such claims. D. Nagin, The Credibility 
Trap: Notes on a V A Evidentiary Standard, 45 U. Memphis 
L. Rev. 887, 894, 898 (2015). An appeal to the Veterans 
Court is generally a veteran's “fnal opportunity” to correct 
the V A's mistakes. Ante, at 375. Nondeferential review of 
the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt determinations plainly mini-
mizes the risk that veterans with borderline claims will be 
denied benefts to which they are entitled. 
Therefore, the veterans canon “garnish[es] an already 
solid argument” based on the statute's text and structure. 
Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U. S. 1, 14 (2023). Reading 
subsection (b)(1) as a standalone command that requires the 
Veterans Court to review the V A's application of the beneft-
of-the-doubt rule nondeferentially obviously favors veterans 
more than an interpretation that reduces the provision to an 
exclamation point. 
III 
The majority does not stop at the mistaken conclusion that 
Congress enacted subsection (b)(1) for no reason other than 
to reiterate the Veterans Court's pre-existing statutory du-
ties. It also proceeds to analyze how a challenge to the V A's 
application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule fares when fl-
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 399 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
tered through the authority conferred to the Veterans Court 
in subsection (a). In this regard, the majority reasons that 
part—but not all—of the V A's application of the beneft-of-
the-doubt rule must be reviewed for clear error. Ante, at 
380. But in my view, the Court mischaracterizes the “ap-
proximate balance” assessment under § 5107(b), which is the 
part of the analysis that is at issue here. The majority 
maintains that that aspect of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule 
involves the type of predominately factual fnding that appel-
late courts ordinarily review with deference. Ante, at 382– 
383. Stated simply, such is not the case. 
A 
To understand the majority's mistake, one must frst be 
clear eyed about the two steps that are necessary for the 
Veterans Court to review the V A's application of the beneft-
of-the-doubt rule. First, the Veterans Court identifes and 
reviews the V A's relevant factual fndings concerning the evi-
dence presented. Then, the Veterans Court determines 
whether, based on the V A's plausible factual fndings, the 
“positive and negative evidence” is in “approximate balance” 
(what I call the approximate-balance standard). 
All agree that the clear-error standard applies to the V A's 
factual fndings regarding the evidence that the Veterans 
Court examines at step one. So, for example, the Veterans 
Court must accept the V A's determination that a particular 
piece of evidence is reliable or that an individual medical 
examiner is qualifed, unless those fndings are clearly er-
roneous. It is at the second step—when the Veterans 
Court determines whether the evidence is in approximate 
balance—that questions of law come in. 
At step two, the Veterans Court is essentially being asked 
to decide whether a legal standard (“approximate balance”) 
has been satisfed on the established facts. As a general 
matter, this Court has long treated the application of a legal 
standard to a given set of facts as an exercise that poses a 
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400 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
legal question. See, e. g., Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 
U. S. 221, 227–228 (2020). What the majority misses in its 
effort to shoehorn § 5107(b)'s approximate-balance inquiry 
into the question-of-fact category is the true nature of that 
assessment, as well as the fact that making the approximate-
balance determination is more nuanced than simply weighing 
the evidence on hand. 
For one thing, the court must have a standard for deciding 
when the evidence before it is in “approximate balance” as a 
matter of law. In our common-law legal system, devising 
that standard happens over time, on a case-by-case basis. 
Therefore, applying it might well involve examining Veter-
ans Court precedents concerning the meaning of “approxi-
mate balance,” as well as past cases that establish when and 
under what circumstances certain kinds of evidence will be 
found to qualify. One can easily imagine a body of case law 
developing to illuminate the substantive and procedural con-
tours of the approximate-balance inquiry and the factors that 
are to be considered. Thus, applying § 5107(b)'s “approxi-
mate balance” test is in no way akin to “fnding” a “material 
fact” that is ultimately subject to subsection (a)(4)'s clear-
error review, as even the Government appeared to concede 
at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 59. Rather, applica-
tion of the “approximate balance” test presents a “classic 
mixed question of law” that requires applying a “legal stand-
ard” to “historical facts.” Ibid. 
Where Congress has not prescribed a standard of review 
for evaluating a mixed question, the appropriate degree of 
deference refects “the nature of the mixed question” and 
“which kind of court . . . is better suited to resolve it.” U. S. 
Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC , 583 U. S. 387, 395 
(2018) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114 (1985)). In 
general, trial courts' “expertise” as factfnders justifes def-
erence to their factual determinations. Anderson v. Besse-
mer City , 470 U. S. 564, 574–575 (1985). For this reason, 
appellate courts “usually” review with deference mixed 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 401 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
questions that require resolving “case-specifc factual is-
sues.” U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 396. But, as I have already 
explained, that is not what is happening here. 
Even if the majority is correct to assume that § 5107(b)'s 
“approximate balance” standard calls for a mere head-to-
head weighing of the positive and negative evidence, that is 
still an insuffcient basis upon which to rest the majority's 
clear-error conclusion, because deference is “not always” 
given regarding such fact-specifc inquiries. Ibid., n. 4. 
There are circumstances where de novo review is appro-
priate “even when answering a mixed question primarily in-
volves plunging into a factual record.” Ibid. 
Consider one common example. Whether probable cause 
existed to support a search or seizure in the Fourth Amend-
ment context is a mixed question of law and fact that appel-
late courts review de novo . Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U. S. 690, 696–699 (1996). And review of probable-cause de-
terminations proceeds in two steps, just like the 
approximate-balance inquiry. At step one, the appellate 
court identifes the relevant historical facts and reviews 
them for clear error. Id., at 696–697, 699. At step two, the 
court decides whether an objectively reasonable police offcer 
would believe that those facts establish probable cause to 
search. Id., at 696–697. The second step is a legal question 
that asks whether the facts satisfy a legal standard. Ibid. 
Another highly fact-sensitive inquiry is whether evidence 
presented at trial is suffcient to support a verdict—and ap-
pellate courts review that determination de novo as well. In 
a civil case, the trial court may grant judgment to a moving 
party as a matter of law after the nonmoving “party has 
been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial,” if it “fnds 
that a reasonable jury would not have a legally suffcient 
evidentiary basis to fnd for the party on that issue.” Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a)(1). When making this decision, the 
trial judge determines whether, reviewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmovant, the evidence is suff-
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402 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
cient to meet the applicable evidentiary standard. Reeves 
v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150 
(2000); see also 9B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2524 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that the 
suffciency-of-the-evidence inquiry is a legal question deter-
mined by the court). And, on appeal, the reviewing court 
undertakes the same suffciency analysis by evaluating the 
evidence without any deference to the trial court's determi-
nation. Ibid.; see also Reeves, 530 U. S., at 150.
3 
These examples demonstrate that nondeferential appellate 
review of factbound legal issues is not unprecedented. And 
under § 7261(b)(1), the Veterans Court must follow suit. 
Section 7261(b)(1) directs the Veterans Court to evaluate the 
V A's approximate-balance decisions by frst accepting the 
agency's not-clearly-erroneous factual fndings about the evi-
dence presented and then determining whether that evi-
dence satisfes the approximate-balance standard, without 
deference to the V A's own conclusions. This analysis— 
which “has both legal and factual components,” ante, at 
381—is plainly analogous to the suffciency-of-evidence and 
probable-cause questions that appellate courts regularly re-
view de novo. 
B 
The majority dismisses these compelling parallels on the 
grounds that assessing the suffciency of the evidence or deter-
mining the existence of probable cause are more “legal” than 
the approximate-balance inquiry. Ante, at 384–385. The 
majority further emphasizes that evaluating whether the ev-
idence is approximately balanced for § 5107(b) purposes is a 
“fact intensive” inquiry that is better left to the “tribunal 
below” than the appeals court. Ante, at 382–383. It also 
unfurls a surplusage argument of its own: If de novo review 
3 In criminal cases, too, whether evidence is legally suffcient to support 
a conviction is reviewed de novo , considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 
318–319 (1979). 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 403 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
applies to the V A's approximate-balance determination, the 
majority says, then subsection (b)(1) is superfuous under 
petitioners' interpretation because that determination 
“would have been subject to de novo review even before the 
enactment of § 7261(b)(1).” Ante, at 387. 
None of this reasoning is persuasive. To start, the major-
ity's efforts to distinguish suffciency and probable-cause re-
view from the approximate-balance inquiry fall fat. For ex-
ample, according to the majority, the probable-cause inquiry 
is distinguishable because reviewing courts assess probable 
cause from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable off-
cer, and courts are required to consider and “refne over 
time” what a “hypothetical person” would deem reasonable 
as a matter of law. Ante, at 384–385. The majority says 
that suffciency challenges likewise require courts to use a 
“legal lens, applying a hypothetical, objective standard”— 
i. e., what a reasonable jury could fnd. Ante, at 386. 
But the approximate-balance inquiry is not meaningfully 
different. Before the Veterans Court can determine 
whether the V A erred in deciding that the positive and nega-
tive evidence is not in “approximate balance,” it must frst 
have an understanding of what “balanced” evidence looks 
like in this context. Identifying “balance” might involve a 
hypothetical and objective examination of the evidence—just 
like a review of the suffciency of the evidence or probable 
cause. Imagine two doctors testify in favor of a claimant's 
diagnosis and two doctors testify against it. Does the mere 
fact that the same number of witnesses are presented on 
both sides mean that the evidence is “balanced,” as a legal 
matter? The Veterans Court would need to develop a legal 
rule to decide. It would also need to decide how the quality 
of the evidence factors in: What if one of the doctors is the 
Nobel laureate who discovered the condition at issue while 
others are recent medical-school graduates? Does the testi-
mony of a doctor who has examined the claimant balance 
evenly against one who has not? 
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404 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
It is thus quite likely that legal standards will need to 
be developed to govern the assessment of “approximate 
balance”—which is why the majority is wrong to contend 
that resolving approximate-balance challenges will rarely 
produce generally applicable precedents. Ante, at 385–386. 
Regardless, the mere fact that the assignment here involves 
a fact-intensive and “multi-faceted” decision—such that 
“ `one determination will seldom be a useful “precedent” for 
another' ”—should not impede our recognition of the signif-
cant questions of law that are embedded in the application 
of the approximate-balance standard. Ornelas, 517 U. S., at 
698; see also Dupree v. Younger, 598 U. S. 729, 734 (2023) 
(observing that suffciency challenges “depend on . . . the 
facts”). 
The majority's attempt to distinguish probable cause from 
the approximate-balance standard because the latter is “a 
creature of statute,” ante, at 385, is similarly off base. To 
be sure, application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule is not 
constitutional in nature. But this principle is not a mere 
statutory creation, either—it predates § 5107(b) and in fact 
“dates back to the post-Civil War era.” Ante, at 373 (citing 
50 Fed. Reg. 34454 (1985)); see also, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 
387, 46th Cong., 3d Sess., 132–133 (1881) (testimony of a 
Bureau of Pensions physician explaining that when the evi-
dence left “room for doubt” regarding the extent of a veter-
an's disability, the practice was to “give him the beneft of 
the doubt” if “he appear[ed] like an honest man”). In any 
event, the majority does not explain why the statutory-
versus-constitutional distinction has any rational bearing on 
the amount of deference the Veterans Court owes to the V A's 
beneft-of-the-doubt determinations. 
Speaking of statutes, it is also signifcant that, under the 
judicial review scheme Congress has crafted for veterans' 
benefts claims, the Veterans Court is no ordinary appellate 
tribunal. The thrust of the majority's reasoning seems to 
be that, as an “appellate court,” the Veterans Court should 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 405 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
do what appeals courts typically do: defer to the lower tribu-
nal's assessment of these “ `case-specifc factual issues.' ” 
Ante, at 383. But the “contrast between ordinary civil liti-
gation” and the statutory requirements for adjudicating 
veterans' benefts claims “could hardly be more dramatic.” 
Henderson, 562 U. S., at 440. 
To begin, the institutional advantages that generally war-
rant deference to trial courts on factual issues do not exist 
in this context, because the fnal decisionmaker for the V A— 
the Board of Veterans' Appeals—is itself an appellate body. 
See id., at 431 (citing §§ 7101, 7104(a)). What is more, the 
Veterans Court is “an Article I tribunal” that Congress 
placed within “a unique administrative scheme.” Id., at 
437–438. Such tribunals often develop “special `expertise' ” 
that guides them “ `in making complex determinations in a 
specialized area of the law.' ” Sanders, 556 U. S., at 412. 
And that is particularly true of the Veterans Court, which 
regularly reviews “case-specifc raw material” in veterans' 
cases. Ibid. This feature distinguishes the Veterans Court 
from Article III appellate courts because it gives that court 
the “experience” and “expertise,” Anderson, 470 U. S., at 
574, that “enable it to make empirically based” judgments on 
fact-specifc issues, Sanders, 556 U. S., at 412—such as 
whether the beneft-of-the-doubt rule applies. 
Considering these unique features of the Veterans Court 
and the legal landscape in which it operates, there is good 
reason to believe that the Veterans Court is actually “better 
suited to resolve” the approximate-balance inquiry than the 
V A itself. U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 395. This is especially 
so given the need for fairness and consistency in the applica-
tion of the “approximate balance” standard. 
Thus, even though review of the V A's approximate-balance 
determination requires applying a legal standard to a set of 
facts, the Veterans Court is well equipped to do so, and 
de novo review of the V A's determination best promotes the 
“sound administration of justice.” Miller, 474 U. S., at 114. 
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406 BUFKIN v. COLLINS 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
In concluding otherwise, the majority minimizes the “singu-
lar characteristics” of the review scheme at issue, Hender-
son, 562 U. S., at 440, and disregards Congress's choice to 
task the Veterans Court with ensuring that the V A complies 
with the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. 
Finally, because § 7261(a) unquestionably authorizes 
de novo review of questions of law, the majority contends 
that applying de novo review to the V A's approximate-balance 
determinations would render subsection (b)(1) superfuous. 
Ante, at 386. But that reasoning assumes that it was always 
clear that an approximate-balance challenge raises a legal 
question (an assumption belied by the very holding that the 
majority announces today). Quite to the contrary, before 
Congress enacted subsection (b)(1) to require that the Veter-
ans Court “take due account” of the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt 
determinations, that court—erroneously, in my view—re-
viewed beneft-of-the-doubt challenges with deference. See 
supra, at 390–391, 396–397. Properly understood, subsection 
(b)(1) accomplishes the clear and important mission of abro-
gating the Federal Circuit and Veterans Court cases requir-
ing such deference. The majority simply ignores this point. 
See ante, at 387. 
* * * 
In response to complaints that the Veterans Court was not 
doing enough to ensure that the V A was, in fact, giving 
the beneft of the doubt to veterans, Congress inserted 
into a demonstrably pro-claimant administrative scheme the 
requirement that the Veterans Court “take due account” 
of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. 
§ 7261(b)(1). The reading that the majority adopts today re-
duces that provision to a rhetorical fourish and all but en-
sures that the Veterans Court will continue rubberstamping 
the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. 
If the majority's holding is correct, then “Congress went 
through an awful lot to achieve relatively little.” Wilkinson 
v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209, 227 (2024) (Jackson, J., concurring 
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Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 407 
Jackson, J., dissenting 
in judgment). The far better reading of this statute—one 
that fully comports with the text, structure, context, history, 
and purpose of the provision Congress wrote—is that the 
Veterans Court must review without deference the V A's 
approximate-balance determination, and thereby fully assess 
that agency's compliance with Congress's commands. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 369: “Together with Thornton v. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
(see this Court's Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court” is 
inserted as a footnote to “Decided March 5, 2025” 
p. 378, line 10 from bottom: “Bufkin v. McDonough” is inserted before 75 
F. 4th 1368” 
p. 378, line 9 from bottom: “Thornton v. McDonough” is inserted before 
2023 WL 5091653” 
p. 395, line 7 from bottom: “interpretation” is changed to “construction”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 604 U. S. Part 1 Pages 369–407 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT March 5, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  entire record de novo and decide for itself whether the evidence is in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affrmed. Held: The V A's determination that the evidence regarding a service- related disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination rev…

• #3

  primarily legal or factual work.” U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lake- ridge, LLC , 583 U. S. 387, 396. Reviewing a determination whether record evidence is approximately balanced is “about as factual sounding” as any question gets. Id., at 397. In Bufkin's case, the Board weighed medical opinions and family test…

• #4

  and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 388. Melanie L. Bostwick argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Thomas M. Bondy, Jonas Q. Wang, Melanie R. Hallums, Katherine M. Kopp, Kenneth M.…

• #5

  by active-duty military service. §§ 1110, 1131. The V A, led by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, administers the laws that provide for those benefts. §§ 301, 303. Veterans who suffer from service-connected post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are among those entitled to disability benefts. To establish servic…

• #6

  Board may appeal to the Veterans Court, an Article I tribu- nal. The Veterans Court has exclusive jurisdiction to re- view fnal decisions of the Board. § 7252(a). Page Proof Pending Publication 374 BUFKIN v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court Section 7261 defnes the scope of the Veterans Court's re- view. Subsection …

• #7

  an's fnal opportunity for judicial review of a benefts deci- sion. Although veterans may appeal certain legal issues to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see § 7292, that court has held that it lacks jurisdiction to review most factual determinations, including whether the V A properly a…

• #8

  The V A regional offce reviewed the new information and reaffrmed its denial of Bufkin's claim. Bufkin fled a notice of disagreement. He argued that the evidence for and against his claim was roughly equal and that he was there- fore entitled to “the beneft of the doubt.” § 5107(b). Buf- kin then underwent a thir…

• #9

  In 2015, Thornton applied for another increase to his PTSD disability rating and underwent a new V A medical ex- amination. The physician concluded that Thornton suffered some common PTSD symptoms, including depressed mood, anxiety, memory loss, and sleep impairment, but questioned whether PTSD was the cause of t…

• #10

  due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the- doubt rule. 601 U. S. 1167 (2024). 1 At the same time, the Board granted Thornton a “total disability” rat- ing for his separate claim of unemployability, based on the combined effect of his service-connected PTSD and the undiagnosed illness. App. to Pet.…

• #11

  ers adequately preserved and raised their challenges below, we leave that question for another day. Page Proof Pending Publication 380 BUFKIN v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the- doubt rule only “[i]n making the determinations under subsection (a).” This la…

• #12

  a veteran raises on appeal. In mine-run cases, including the two before us, a veteran challenges the V A's determination that the evidence on a particular material issue is not in ap- proximate balance. Petitioners assert that the approximate-balance determi- nation is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. T…

• #13

  factual work, it is at most a mixed question, not a purely legal one. 3 The appropriate standard of review for a mixed question depends “on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 396. Some mixed questions require a court to “expound on the law” by “ampli- fying …

• #14

  reviewed with deference. Ibid. C Petitioners and the dissent offer various paths to a differ- ent result. But, their arguments are not persuasive. First, petitioners urge us to hold that with one modest phrase, “take due account,” Congress imposed a new stand- ard of review for challenges to the V A's applicatio…

• #15

  guish it from the approximate-balance determination, how- ever, and underscore why courts review it de novo . First, because probable cause is a constitutional standard, we start with a strong presumption that determinations under that standard are subject to de novo review, even if they require courts to “plung[…

• #16

  likely to generate guidance for the V A or future courts in the way that probable-cause precedents do for police and the courts. The V A's approximate-balance determination is likewise distinct from a court's conclusion that evidence is suffcient to support a criminal conviction, a conclusion that courts review …

• #17

  requires the Veterans Court to review the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule even if the veteran fails to present that issue on appeal. See n. 2, supra; post, at 396. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 604 U. S. 369 (2025) 387 Opinion of the Court If the Court …

• #18

  The Court draws two conclusions from today's evaluation of Congress's “take due account” admonition. See 38 U. S. C. § 7261(b)(1). First, it holds that when the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) reviews the Department of Veterans Affairs' (V A's) application of the “beneft-of-the…

• #19

  Under the time-honored beneft-of-the-doubt rule, veter- ans asserting claims for service-connected disabilities are entitled to have any reasonable doubt on a material issue resolved in their favor. Congress codifed this rule in 1988: Section 5107(b) of Title 38 states unequivocally that the V A must “give the be…

• #20

  Congress responded in 2002, when it amended § 7261(b) to specifcally require the Veterans Court to “take due account of” the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. § 7261(b)(1). In its entirety, the amended subsection (b) states: “(b) In making the determinations under subsection (a), the [Veterans] …

• #21

  Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication 392 BUFKIN v. COLLINS Jackson, J., dissenting other determination made `under subsection (a)' ” is its ob- servation that subsection (b)(1)'s review applies only “ `[i]n making the determinations under subsection (a).' ” Ante, at 380 (quoting § 7261(…

• #22

  Court is not prevented from “directly asking the harmless- error question” and “resting its conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id., at 408. Thus, there is no dispute that, under subsection (b)(2), the Veterans Court analyzes whether any error was harmless de novo, without applying …

• #23

  at 171. Subsection (b)(1) works in precisely the same way: If the Veterans Court is inclined to affrm the V A's denial of benefts, subsection (b)(1) requires it to frst confrm de novo that the beneft-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied. B Nor does the drafting history of the relevant provisions support the ma…

• #24

  with subsection (b)(1)'s language and the statute's overall design. No one disputes that Congress sought to subject the V A's beneft-of-the-doubt decisions to increased judicial scrutiny while otherwise preserving the V A's not-clearly- erroneous factual fndings. Reading subsection (b)(1) to be such a congression…

• #25

  passed an amendment with no substantive effect. Moreover, the majority does not and cannot explain why any such expression of the Veterans Court's duties was needed—much less why Congress would go out of its way to amend the statute to underscore an existing obligation. Subsection (a) covers the waterfront of pos…

• #26

  “ ` “we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” ' ” Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U. S. 355, 359 (2016) (quoting United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U. S. 141, 148 (2014)). The majority instead presumes that Congress intended to enact a do-nothing amendment. But …

• #27

  subsection (b)(1) as a standalone command that requires the Veterans Court to review the V A's application of the beneft- of-the-doubt rule nondeferentially obviously favors veterans more than an interpretation that reduces the provision to an exclamation point. III The majority does not stop at the mistaken con…

• #28

  has been satisfed on the established facts. As a general matter, this Court has long treated the application of a legal standard to a given set of facts as an exercise that poses a Page Proof Pending Publication 400 BUFKIN v. COLLINS Jackson, J., dissenting legal question. See, e. g., Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,…

• #29

  questions that require resolving “case-specifc factual is- sues.” U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 396. But, as I have already explained, that is not what is happening here. Even if the majority is correct to assume that § 5107(b)'s “approximate balance” standard calls for a mere head-to- head weighing of the positive a…

• #30

  suffciency-of-the-evidence inquiry is a legal question deter- mined by the court). And, on appeal, the reviewing court undertakes the same suffciency analysis by evaluating the evidence without any deference to the trial court's determi- nation. Ibid.; see also Reeves, 530 U. S., at 150. 3 These examples demonst…

• #31

  cause from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable off- cer, and courts are required to consider and “refne over time” what a “hypothetical person” would deem reasonable as a matter of law. Ante, at 384–385. The majority says that suffciency challenges likewise require courts to use a “legal lens, applying a …

• #32

  creature of statute,” ante, at 385, is similarly off base. To be sure, application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule is not constitutional in nature. But this principle is not a mere statutory creation, either—it predates § 5107(b) and in fact “dates back to the post-Civil War era.” Ante, at 373 (citing 50 Fed. Reg…

• #33

  the “experience” and “expertise,” Anderson, 470 U. S., at 574, that “enable it to make empirically based” judgments on fact-specifc issues, Sanders, 556 U. S., at 412—such as whether the beneft-of-the-doubt rule applies. Considering these unique features of the Veterans Court and the legal landscape in which it o…

• #34

  into a demonstrably pro-claimant administrative scheme the requirement that the Veterans Court “take due account” of the V A's application of the beneft-of-the-doubt rule. § 7261(b)(1). The reading that the majority adopts today re- duces that provision to a rhetorical fourish and all but en- sures that the Veter…