Barnes v. Felix

Summary

The Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat rule—a framework for evaluating police shootings which requires a court to look only to the circumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived the threat inducing him to shoot—improperly narrows the Fourth Amendment analysis of police use of force.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 73–90 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 15, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2024 73 
Syllabus 
BARNES, individually and as representative of the 
ESTATE OF BARNES, DECEASED v. FELIX et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the fth circuit 
No. 23–1239. Argued January 22, 2025—Decided May 15, 2025 
Respondent Roberto Felix, Jr., a law enforcement offcer, pulled over Ash-
tian Barnes for suspected toll violations. Felix ordered Barnes to exit 
the vehicle, but Barnes began to drive away. As the car began to move 
forward, Felix jumped onto its doorsill and fred two shots inside. 
Barnes was fatally hit but managed to stop the car. About fve seconds 
elapsed between when the car started moving and when it stopped. 
Two seconds passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill 
and the moment he fred his frst shot. 
Barnes's mother sued Felix on Barnes's behalf, alleging that Felix 
violated Barnes's Fourth Amendment right against excessive force. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix, applying the 
Fifth Circuit's “moment-of-threat” rule. The Court of Appeals af-
frmed, explaining that the moment-of-threat rule requires asking only 
whether an offcer was “in danger at the moment of the threat that 
resulted in [his] use of deadly force.” 91 F. 4th 393, 397. Under the 
rule, events “leading up to the shooting” are “not relevant.” Ibid. 
Here, the “precise moment of the threat” was the “two seconds” when 
Felix was clinging to a moving car. Id., at 397–398. Because Felix 
could then have reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel held, 
the shooting was lawful. Id., at 398. 
Held: A claim that a law enforcement offcer used excessive force during 
a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re-
quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from “the per-
spective of a reasonable offcer on the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490 
U. S. 386, 396. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re-
quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” County of Los 
Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 427–428; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 
1, 9. That analysis demands “careful attention to the facts and circum-
stances” relating to the incident. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. 
Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry has no 
time limit. While the situation at the precise time of the shooting will 
often matter most, earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a 
reasonable offcer would have understood and responded to later ones. 
Prior events may show why a reasonable offcer would perceive other-

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74 BARNES v. FELIX 
Syllabus 
wise ambiguous conduct as threatening, or instead as innocuous. 
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. 765, well illustrates this point. There, 
an offcer's use of deadly force was justifed “at the moment” partly 
because of what had transpired in the preceding period. Id., at 777. 
The moment-of-threat rule applied below prevents that sort of atten-
tion to context, and thus conficts with this Court's instruction to ana-
lyze the totality of the circumstances. By limiting their view to the 
two seconds before the shooting, the lower courts could not take into 
account anything preceding that fnal moment. So, for example, they 
could not consider the reasons for the stop or the earlier interactions 
between the suspect and offcer. And because of that limit, they could 
not address whether the fnal two seconds of the encounter would look 
different if set within a longer timeframe. A rule like that, which pre-
cludes consideration of prior events in assessing a police shooting, is not 
reconcilable with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive approach this 
Court has prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-force case cannot re-
view the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological 
blinders. 
The Court does not address a separate question about whether or 
how an offcer's own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the 
reasonableness analysis. The courts below never confronted that issue, 
and it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. Pp. 79–84. 
91 F. 4th 393, vacated and remanded. 
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kavanaugh, 
J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., 
joined, post, p. 84. 
Nathaniel A. G. Zelinsky argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the briefs were Katherine B. Wellington, Neal 
Kumar Katyal, and Adam W. Fomby. 
Zoe A. Jacoby argued the cause for the United States as 
amicus curiae supporting vacatur and remand. With her 
on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant At-
torney General Clarke, Principal Deputy Assistant Attor-
neys General Argentieri and Boynton, Deputy Solicitor 
General Feigin, Thomas Booth, and Teresa Kwong. 
Charles L. McCloud argued the cause for respondents. 
With him on the brief were Lisa S. Blatt, Peter S. Jorgensen,

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Counsel 
Erin M. Sielaff, and Judith Ramsey Saldana. Lanora C. 
Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General of Texas, argued 
the cause for Texas et al. as amici curiae supporting re-
spondent Felix.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Cato Institute 
et al. by Clark M. Neily III, Matthew P . Cavedon, and Michael Z. Fox; 
for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Bri-
anne J. Gorod, David H. Gans, and Brian R. Frazelle; for Current and 
Former Law Enforcement Officials by Elizabeth C. Rinehart, Barry 
Friedman, Aaron Scherzer, and Josh Parker; for the Due Process Insti-
tute et al. by Douglas E. Litvack and Shana-Tara O'Toole; for the Giffords 
Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. by Maureen P . Alger, Emily 
J. Born, Douglas N. Letter, Shira Lauren Feldman, Kristen A. Johnson, 
Amanda Liverzani, Esther Sanchez-Gomez, and Leigh Rome; for the In-
stitute for American Policing Reform by Chantale Fiebig, Joshua M. 
Wesneski, Stephanie Adamakos, and Steven Reiss; for the National Police 
Accountability Project by Dana E. Foster; for the National Urban League 
et al. by Rachel A. Chung, Janai S. Nelson, Kevin E. Jason, Jin Hee Lee, 
and Melissa C. Cassel; for The Rutherford Institute by Angela M. Liu, 
John W. Whitehead, and Christopher J. Merken; for the Southern Border 
Communities Coalition by Delia Addo-Yobo and Roxanna Altholz; for the 
Southern Poverty Law Center by Arthur Ago and Krista A. Dolan; and 
for the Texas Civil Rights Project by Daniel N. Guisbond. Raff Melkon-
ian fled a brief for the Color of Change as amicus curiae urging vacatur. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 
Texas et al. by Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Brent Webster, 
First Assistant Attorney General, Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, 
Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Kateland R. Jack-
son, Assistant Solicitor General, and Brendan A. Fugere, Assistant Attor-
ney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as 
follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Chris Carr 
of Georgia, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Liz Mur-
rill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, 
Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrigley of North Dakota, Alan 
Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skr-
metti of Tennessee, and Jason Miyares of Virginia; for the Los Angeles 
County Police Chiefs' Association by J. Scott Tiedemann and David A. 
Urban; for the National Fraternal Order of Police by Larry H. James; for 
the National Police Association et al. by Jeffrey C. Hendrickson and Rob-
ert S. Lafferrandre; for the Peace Offcers Research Association of Califor-

76 BARNES v. FELIX 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A police offcer's use of deadly force violates the Fourth 
Amendment when it is not “objectively reasonable.” Gra-
ham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989). And that inquiry 
into reasonableness, we have held, requires assessing the 
“totality of the circumstances.” Id., at 396 (quoting Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 9 (1985)). 
The question here is whether that framework permits 
courts, in evaluating a police shooting (or other use of force), 
to apply the so-called moment-of-threat rule used in the 
courts below. Under that rule, a court looks only to the cir-
cumstances existing at the precise time an offcer perceived 
the threat inducing him to shoot. Today, we reject that 
approach as improperly narrowing the requisite Fourth 
Amendment analysis. To assess whether an offcer acted 
reasonably in using force, a court must consider all the rele-
vant circumstances, including facts and events leading up to 
the climactic moment. 
I 
On the afternoon of April 28, 2016, Roberto Felix, Jr., a 
law enforcement offcer patrolling a highway outside Hous-
ton, received a radio alert about an automobile on the road 
with outstanding toll violations. Felix soon spotted the car, 
a Toyota Corolla, and turned on his emergency lights to initi-
ate a traffc stop. The driver, Ashtian Barnes, pulled over 
to the highway's shoulder. 
nia et al. by Timothy K. Talbot, Michael A. Morguess, and David E. Mas-
tagni; and for the Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool 
et al. by Laura O'Leary and Francisco J. Valenzuela. 
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the California State Sheriffs' Asso-
ciation et al. by James R. Touchstone and Scott Wm. Davenport; for the 
National Sheriffs' Association by Gregory C. Champagne and Maurice E. 
Bostick; for Restore the Fourth, Inc., by Mahesha P . Subbaraman; for the 
Wisconsin Coalition of Law Enforcement et al. by Remzy D. Bitar; and 
for Seth W. Stoughton by J. Carl Cecere. 
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Parking his own car just behind, Felix walked to the Co-
rolla's driver-side door and asked Barnes for his license and 
proof of insurance. Barnes replied that he did not have his 
license with him, and that the car was a rental in his girl-
friend's name. As he spoke, Barnes rummaged through 
some papers inside the car, causing Felix to tell him several 
times to stop “digging around.” Felix also commented that 
he smelled marijuana, and asked if there was anything in the 
car he should know about. Barnes responded that he might 
have some identifcation in the trunk. So Felix told him to 
open the trunk from his seat. Barnes did so, while also 
turning off the ignition. All that happened (as a dashcam 
recording of the incident shows) in less than two minutes. 
Then things began moving even faster. With his right 
hand resting on his holster, Felix told Barnes to get out of 
the car. Barnes opened the door but did not exit; instead, 
he turned the ignition back on. Felix unholstered his gun 
and, as the car began to move forward, jumped onto its door-
sill. He twice shouted, “Don't fucking move.” And with no 
visibility into the car (because his head was above the roof), 
he fred two quick shots inside. Barnes was hit, but man-
aged to stop the car. Felix then radioed for back-up. By 
the time it arrived, Barnes was dead. All told, about fve 
seconds elapsed between when the car started moving and 
when it stopped. And within that period, two seconds 
passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill 
and the moment he fred his frst shot. 
Barnes's mother, Janice Barnes, sued Felix on her son's 
behalf. The suit, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleged 
that Felix had violated Ashtian Barnes's Fourth Amendment 
rights by using excessive force against him. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix. 
The court explained that to prevail on her claim, Mrs. Barnes 
needed to show that Felix's use of force was “objectively un-
reasonable.” 532 F. Supp. 3d 463, 468 (SD Tex. 2021). In

78 BARNES v. FELIX 
Opinion of the Court 
the usual excessive-force case, the court noted, the inquiry 
into reasonableness would involve considering a variety of 
circumstances. See id., at 468–469. But when an offcer 
has used deadly force, the court continued, “the Fifth Circuit 
has developed a much narrower approach.” Id., at 469. 
Then, a court could ask only about the situation existing “ at 
the moment of the threat” that sparked the fatal shooting. 
Ibid. (quoting Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F. 3d 985, 991 (CA5 
2011); emphasis in original). The District Court identifed 
that moment as “the two seconds before Felix fred his frst 
shot,” when he was standing on the doorsill of a moving vehi-
cle. 532 F. Supp. 3d, at 471. At that moment, the court 
found, an offcer could reasonably think himself “at risk of 
serious harm.” Id., at 472. And under the Fifth Circuit's 
rule, that fact alone concluded the analysis. The court ex-
plained that it could not consider “what had transpired up 
until” those last two seconds, including Felix's decision to 
jump onto the sill. Id., at 471. Although a “more robust 
examination” might have aided in assessing the reasonable-
ness of the shooting, the court was “duty bound” by “Circuit 
precedent” to “limit[ its] focus” to the “exact moment Felix 
was hanging onto Barnes's” moving car. Id., at 472. 
The Court of Appeals affrmed, explaining that it too was 
“[b]ound” by “this Circuit's moment of threat doctrine.” 91 
F. 4th 393, 394, 397 (2024). Under that rule, the panel 
agreed, the “inquiry is confned to whether the offcer[ ]” was 
“in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in [his] 
use of deadly force.” Id., at 397. Any prior events “leading 
up to the shooting,” including actions the offcer took, were 
simply “not relevant.” Ibid. (quoting Harris v. Serpas, 745 
F. 3d 767, 772 (CA5 2014)). And here, as the District Court 
found, the “precise moment of the threat” was the “two sec-
onds” when Felix was clinging to a moving car. 91 F. 4th, 
at 397–398. Because Felix could then have reasonably be-
lieved his life in danger, the panel concluded, his decision to 
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Opinion of the Court 
shoot “did not violate Barnes's constitutional rights.” Id., 
at 398. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Higginbotham (who also 
authored the panel opinion) expressed “concern” with the 
Fifth Circuit's moment-of-threat doctrine. Ibid. He 
thought that rule inconsistent with this Court's directive to 
assess the reasonableness of an offcer's use of force, includ-
ing deadly force, by “look[ing] to the totality of circum-
stances.” Id., at 399. Under the totality approach, Judge 
Higginbotham wrote, a court could consider not just the 
“precise millisecond” when an offcer deploys force, but ev-
erything that “ha[d] transpired up until” that time. Ibid. 
And with that wider focus, Judge Higginbotham would have 
found that Felix's shooting of Barnes was unreasonable. 
See id., at 401. 
We granted certiorari to address whether, in resolving 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, courts may apply 
the moment-of-threat rule just described. See 603 U. S. 949 
(2024). We hold they may not because that rule con-
stricts the proper inquiry into the “ totality of the 
circumstances.” 
II 
A claim that a law enforcement offcer used excessive force 
during a stop or arrest is “analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 395; see Amdt. 4 
(applying to “seizures” of “persons”). The “touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is `reasonableness,' ” as measured in 
objective terms. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 
(2006). So the question in a case like this one, as this Court 
has often held, is whether the force deployed was justifed 
from “the perspective of a reasonable offcer on the scene,” 
taking due account of both the individual interests and the 
governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396; 
County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 428 (2017). 
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80 BARNES v. FELIX 
Opinion of the Court 
That inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re-
quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” Id., at 
427–428; Garner, 471 U. S., at 9. There is no “easy-to-apply 
legal test” or “on/off switch” in this context. Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 382–383 (2007). Rather, the Fourth 
Amendment requires, as we once put it, that a court “slosh 
[its] way through” a “factbound morass.” Id., at 383. Or 
said more prosaically, deciding whether a use of force was 
objectively reasonable demands “careful attention to the 
facts and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then 
known to the offcer. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. For exam-
ple, the “severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry 
weight in the analysis. See ibid.; Garner, 471 U. S., at 11. 
So too can actions the offcer took during the stop, such as 
giving warnings or otherwise trying to control the encoun-
ter. See id., at 12; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S. 389, 
397 (2015). And the stopped person's conduct is always rele-
vant because it indicates the nature and level of the threat 
he poses, either to the offcer or to others. See ibid.; Gra-
ham, 490 U. S., at 396. 
Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” in-
quiry into a use of force has no time limit. Of course, the 
situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be 
what matters most; it is, after all, the offcer's choice in that 
moment that is under review. But earlier facts and circum-
stances may bear on how a reasonable offcer would have 
understood and responded to later ones. Or as the Federal 
Government puts the point, those later, “in-the-moment” 
facts “cannot be hermetically sealed off from the context in 
which they arose.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 14. Taking account of that context may beneft either 
party in an excessive-force case. Prior events may show, 
for example, why a reasonable offcer would have perceived 
otherwise ambiguous conduct of a suspect as threatening. 
Or instead they may show why such an offcer would have 
perceived the same conduct as innocuous. The history of

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Opinion of the Court 
the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known 
to the offcer, thus may inform the reasonableness of the use 
of force. 
The Court's decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. 765 
(2014), well illustrates the point. The excessive-force claim 
there concerned the fatal shooting of a driver at the end of 
a “dangerous car chase” lasting more than fve minutes. Id., 
at 768. The driver had sped away from a traffc stop on a 
well-used road, and tried to outrun as many as six police 
cruisers at speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour. 
Eventually, the feeing car ran into one of the cruisers and 
came “to a near standstill.” Id., at 776. The driver, 
though, still tried to escape, pumping the gas in a way that 
sent his wheels “spinning” and then putting the car into re-
verse. Ibid. At that point, one of the offcers fred several 
shots into the car. In a suit brought against the offcer, the 
driver's daughter contended that those shots were taken 
when the chase was “already over.” Id., at 777. But this 
Court rejected that claim based on everything that had hap-
pened during the incident—the driver's “outrageously reck-
less” behavior over the prior “fve minutes,” as well as his 
last-second efforts to again take fight. Id., at 776. Given 
all of those events, the Court explained, a reasonable offcer 
would have concluded that the driver was “intent on resum-
ing” his getaway and, if allowed to do so, would “again pose 
a deadly threat for others.” Id., at 777. In short, the 
shooting was justifed “at the moment” it occurred partly 
because of what had transpired in the preceding period. 
Ibid. 
The moment-of-threat rule applied in the courts below pre-
vents that sort of attention to context, and thus conficts with 
this Court's instruction to analyze the totality of the circum-
stances. Recall that the District Court and Fifth Circuit 
limited their view to the two seconds before the shooting, 
after Felix had stepped onto the doorsill of Barnes's car. See 
supra, at 78–79. Those courts believed that, under Fifth

82 BARNES v. FELIX 
Opinion of the Court 
Circuit precedent, they could not take into account anything 
preceding that fnal moment. See 532 F. Supp. 3d, at 471 
(excluding analysis of “what had transpired up until the 
shooting itself”); 91 F. 4th, at 397 (agreeing that “actions 
leading up to the shooting are not relevant”). So, for exam-
ple, they could not consider the reasons for the stop or the 
earlier conduct of, and interactions between, the suspect and 
offcer. And because of that limit, they could not address 
whether the fnal two seconds of the encounter would look 
different if set within a longer timeframe. It is as though 
the Court in Plumhoff could consider only the instant when 
the chased car was at a “near standstill,” and not the earlier 
time when it zigzagged down a busy roadway at speed. 572 
U. S., at 776. To be sure, historical facts will not often mat-
ter as much as they did there to the reasonableness analysis. 
See supra, at 81. And some of those facts may not be rele-
vant at all. But no rule that precludes consideration of 
prior events in assessing a police shooting is reconcilable 
with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive approach we 
have prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-force case can-
not review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on 
chronological blinders. 
That point is so evident that not even Felix quarrels with 
it; his defense of the decisions below instead relies on taking 
a different view of their meaning and of the question they 
raise. First, the agreement with what we have said: Yes, 
Felix acknowledges, prior events are not “off limits” in the 
reasonableness inquiry, for they may “inform the perspective 
of the reasonable offcer.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 79; Brief for Re-
spondent 2. Just so. But now the divergence: According to 
Felix, the courts below acted consistently with that all-times-
considered principle. The Fifth Circuit's moment-of-threat 
doctrine, Felix argues, in fact allows courts to assess many 
pre-shooting facts and circumstances—and courts applying it 
often do so. See id., at 20 (citing other Fifth Circuit deci-
sions). All that the doctrine bars is a single kind of in-
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quiry—into whether an offcer's earlier error itself “created 
the need for deadly force.” Id., at 21; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 
53. And on that issue, Felix submits, the Fifth Circuit is 
right: “[A]n offcer doesn't lose his right to defend himself 
just because” he previously “made a mistake.” Ibid. 
But whatever might be said of Fifth Circuit law generally, 
the decisions below applied a rule about timing. As shown 
above, both lower courts took pains to explain that, in evalu-
ating the shooting's reasonableness, they could look only to 
a two-second snippet of the encounter. See supra, at 78–79. 
And because that was the reasoning in the case before us, 
that is the reasoning we must address. It could make no 
difference to our decision here if the Fifth Circuit in other 
cases eschewed a strict time limit, as Felix claims. And 
anyway, we are not sure Felix correctly describes the overall 
state of Fifth Circuit law. Consider Harris v. Serpas—a 
Fifth Circuit decision relied on below. See 91 F. 4th, at 397. 
The court there noted the plaintiffs' recital of several histori-
cal facts—actions of both the suspect and the offcer in the 
period prior to the shooting. See 745 F. 3d, at 772. And 
the court recognized that this Court's decisions directed an 
inquiry into the “the `totality of the circumstances.' ” Ibid. 
(quoting Graham, 490 U. S., at 396). But then came the fol-
lowing: “This [Circuit], however, has narrowed that test” in 
deadly force cases, holding that the inquiry there is “confned 
to whether the [offcer] was in danger at the moment of the 
threat that resulted in the [offcer's] shooting.” Ibid. (alter-
ations in original). The problem with the statement is ap-
parent. As we have explained, a court cannot thus “narrow” 
the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, to focus on only a 
single moment. It must look too, in this and all excessive-
force cases, at any relevant events coming before. 
We do not address here the different question Felix raises 
about use-of-force cases: whether or how an offcer's own “cre-
ation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reasonableness 
analysis. Brief for Respondent 22; see supra, at 82–83.

84 BARNES v. FELIX 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
As in another of our recent Fourth Amendment cases, that 
issue is not properly before us. See Mendez, 581 U. S., at 
429, n. The courts below never confronted the issue, pre-
cisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking 
at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from 
view any actions of the offcer that allegedly created the dan-
ger necessitating deadly force. See supra, at 78–79. So, to 
use the obvious example, the courts below did not address 
the relevance, if any, of Felix stepping onto the doorsill of 
Barnes's car. And because they never considered that issue, 
it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The 
question presented to us was one of timing alone: whether 
to look only at the encounter's fnal two seconds, or also to 
consider earlier events serving to put those seconds in 
context. 
With that matter resolved, we return everything else to 
the courts below. It is for them now to consider the reason-
ableness of the shooting, using the lengthier timeframe we 
have prescribed. 
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Thomas, Jus-
tice Alito, and Justice Barrett join, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion. I agree that the offcer's ac-
tions during the traffc stop in this case should be assessed 
based on the totality of the circumstances. I write sepa-
rately to add a few points about the dangers of traffc stops 
for police offcers, particularly when as here the driver pulls 
away in the midst of the stop. 
Even for routine traffic violations, traffic stops are 
“fraught with danger to police offcers.” Michigan v. Long, 
463 U. S. 1032, 1047 (1983). An “inordinate risk confront[s] 
an offcer as he approaches a person seated in an automo-
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
bile.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110 (1977) 
(per curiam ). That is in part because offcers operate at a 
“tactical disadvantage” when “approaching an unknown ve-
hicle, with limited visibility and unpredictable threats.” 
Brief for National Fraternal Order of Police as Amicus Cu-
riae 4. As this Court noted nearly 50 years ago, “a signif-
cant percentage of murders of police offcers occurs when the 
offcers are making traffc stops.” Mimms, 434 U. S., at 110 
(quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 234, n. 5 
(1973)). Traffc stops remain highly dangerous today. See 
Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law En-
forcement Offcers Killed and Assaulted, 2023 (2024) (Table 
27). On April 8, 2023, two offcers were shot and killed at 
an intersection in Cameron, Wisconsin, after stopping a car 
for a warrant and welfare check on the driver.
1 On Decem-
ber 8, 2024, an offcer was shot and killed after he pulled 
over a pickup truck with expired license plates in a Super 8 
motel parking lot in Terrell, Texas. See Brief for State of 
Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 1, and n. 4. The list goes on 
and on.
2 
Offcers cannot let their guard down and assume that any 
particular traffc stop will be safe—even if a driver is pulled 
over for nothing more than a speeding violation, a broken 
taillight, or the like. The driver may be drunk, on drugs, 
armed, or some combination thereof. Or the driver may 
have committed (or may be about to commit) a serious crime. 
“People detained for minor offenses” such as ordinary traffc 
violations “can turn out to be the most devious and danger-
1 See Offcer Down Memorial Page, Police Offcer Emily Ann Breidenbach, 
https://www.odmp.org/officer/26693-police-officer-emily-ann-breidenbach; 
Offcer Down Memorial Page, Police Offcer Hunter Timothy Scheel, https:// 
www.odmp.org/offcer/26694-police-offcer-hunter-timothy-scheel. 
2 To be sure, offcers sometimes use excessive force during traffc stops. 
When that happens, offcers of course should be held to account for their 
actions. See Brief for Current and Former Law Enforcement Offcials as 
Amici Curiae 22; Brief for California State Sheriffs' Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae 10.

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86 BARNES v. FELIX 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
ous criminals.” Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of 
County of Burlington, 566 U. S. 318, 334 (2012). Timothy 
McVeigh, the man responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing, was stopped for a missing license plate, which ulti-
mately led to his apprehension for the bombing. See ibid. 
Likewise, serial killer Ted Bundy was pulled over based on 
a stolen-vehicle alert in Pensacola, Florida. When informed 
that he was under arrest, Bundy kicked the offcer's legs out 
from under him, and the two struggled over the offcer's gun 
before the offcer was able to subdue and arrest Bundy. See 
Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F. 2d 1402, 1422 (CA11 1988); see 
also Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12, 
and n. 12. 
So even though most traffc stops end without incident, 
traffc stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police off-
cers. And when, as in this case, the driver suddenly pulls 
away in the midst of a stop, the risks multiply. A driver 
speeding away from a traffc stop could easily endanger by-
standers and other drivers—especially if the feeing driver 
is under the infuence of alcohol or drugs, as might well be 
the case when a driver fees. Moreover, the very “fact that 
a suspect fees when suspected of a minor offense,” such as 
speeding or a failure to pay tolls, “could well be indicative of 
a larger danger.” Lange v. California, 594 U. S. 295, 331 
(2021) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment). Fleeing 
from the traffc stop could suggest that the driver is prepar-
ing to commit or has committed a more serious crime—and 
is attempting to evade detection or arrest. The driver may 
have illegal drugs or an illegal gun in the car. Or the driver 
may be unlawfully in the country and fear removal if appre-
hended. He might have a warrant out for his arrest. He 
could have an abducted child in the car. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 
18. Or as the tragic 2025 New Year's terrorist attack in 
New Orleans illustrates, the driver might intend to use the 
car as a weapon. See id., at 24.

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Cite as: 605 U. S. 73 (2025) 87 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
The possibilities are many. But the key point is a com-
monsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffc stop 
can pose signifcant dangers to both the offcer and the sur-
rounding community. 
The question when a driver fees, therefore, is not merely 
whether the underlying traffc violation “presents risks to 
public safety”—it is also “whether fight,” and what that 
fight might indicate or enable, “does so.” Lange, 594 U. S., 
at 331 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment). In those 
circumstances, in other words, it is not only the “severity of 
the crime” that prompted the stop that is relevant to the 
“totality of the circumstances” inquiry. Graham v. Connor, 
490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). The 
Fourth Amendment analysis must also take account of the 
suspect's attempt “to evade” the offcer “by fight.” Ibid. 
What should the offcer do when a driver fees from a traf-
fc stop? There are no easy or risk-free answers. Every 
feasible option poses some potential danger to the offcer, the 
driver, or the public at large—and often to all three. And 
an offcer in that situation must make a split-second choice 
among those various dangerous options. 
First, the offcer could simply let the driver go. But be-
cause the feeing driver might be a threat to the community, 
letting the driver go may exacerbate the dangers, rather 
than mitigate them. Encouraging offcers to stand back and 
allow drivers to take off would also create “perverse incen-
tives” for those who are stopped by the police. Scott v. Har-
ris, 550 U. S. 372, 385 (2007). If doing nothing in response 
to a feeing driver became a known and regular practice 
among police offcers, that would presumably embolden some 
drivers who otherwise might have thought twice about tak-
ing off. 
Of course, the offcer could let the driver go in the moment 
but then attempt to catch the driver by, for example, track-
ing the car's license plate or reviewing surveillance footage. 
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. But after letting the driver go, the

88 BARNES v. FELIX 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
police may not be able to later track down the car or the 
driver of the car. Even if the police are able to do so, the 
escaped driver may pose a serious risk to the public in the 
interim. And given that the driver has already shown a 
propensity to evade law enforcement by feeing a traffc stop, 
attempting to execute an arrest upon fnding the driver could 
itself be dangerous for the police and others. 
Second, the offcer could get back in his police car and give 
chase, or could radio other offcers to pursue the driver. But 
a high-speed chase likewise can be exceptionally dangerous 
to the offcer, the driver, and others on the road. “Vehicular 
pursuits” are “often catastrophic.” Lange, 594 U. S., at 324 
(Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment). Many real-world 
examples demonstrate as much. Plumhoff v. Rickard in-
volved a “ `dangerous car chase' ” in which the driver “tried 
to outrun as many as six police cruisers at speeds sometimes 
exceeding 100 miles per hour,” ending in the “fatal shooting” 
of the driver. Ante, at 81 (quoting 572 U. S. 765, 768 (2014)). 
In Scott v. Harris, multiple police cars “with blue lights 
fashing and sirens blaring” chased the driver “for nearly 10 
miles” while “he ignored their warning to stop,” culminating 
in an offcer ramming the driver off the road. 550 U. S., at 
384. Moreover, a recent study concluded that a signifcant 
percentage of those killed in police chases are not the feeing 
drivers but rather are passengers or bystanders. From 
2017 through 2022, more than 500 bystanders were report-
edly killed as a result of police chases.
3 
Third, the offcer might try to shoot out the tires of the 
feeing car, or otherwise try to hinder the car's movement, 
in order to bring it to a stop. But shooting at a car, espe-
cially its tires, can be “dangerous” and is often “ineffective.” 
4 
3 See S. Neilson, J. Gollan, & J. Haseman, First-of-Its-Kind Database: 
Majority of People Killed in Police Chases Aren't the Fleeing Drivers, San 
Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 2024). 
4 Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., Field Operations Support Services 
Newsletter: 15–14 – Shooting at Vehicle Tires (2025). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 605 U. S. 73 (2025) 89 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
Even if the offcer manages to hit the tires, the driver could 
lose control and crash into others on the road. That course 
of action also poses the risk of the offcer accidentally shoot-
ing the driver or innocent passengers. 
Fourth, as happened here, the offcer could attempt to stop 
the feeing driver at the outset by jumping on or reaching 
into the car. The dangerousness of that option is readily 
apparent. Perhaps the driver will hit the brakes once he 
realizes an offcer is clinging to the car or attempting to 
reach through the window. But if the driver does not slow 
down, then the offcer may suffer serious and perhaps fatal 
injuries. The offcer could try to fre his weapon to incapaci-
tate the driver and bring the car safely to a stop. But the 
car may be just as likely to go careening into traffc, thereby 
threatening the safety of the offcer, other drivers, passen-
gers, pedestrians, and more. 
I could go on. The point here is that when a driver 
abruptly pulls away during a traffc stop, an offcer has no 
particularly good or safe options. None of the options avail-
able to the offcer avoids danger to the community, and all 
of them require life-or-death decisions that must be made 
in a few seconds in highly stressful and unpredictable 
circumstances. 
Of course, when an offcer uses force against a feeing 
driver, the judiciary still must assess any resulting Fourth 
Amendment claim under the standard of objective reason-
ableness. Under this Court's precedents, that inquiry in-
volves “a careful balancing of `the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' 
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 
Graham, 490 U. S., at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U. S. 1, 8 (1985)). In conducting that analysis, judges should 
keep in mind that it is one thing to dissect and scrutinize an 
offcer's actions with the “20/20 vision of hindsight,” “in the 
peace of a judge's chambers.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 396 
(quotation marks omitted). It is quite another to make 
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90 BARNES v. FELIX 
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
“split-second judgments” on the ground, “in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Id., at 397. 
In analyzing the reasonableness of an offcer's conduct at a 
traffc stop, particularly traffc stops where the driver has 
suddenly pulled away, courts must appreciate the extraordi-
nary dangers and risks facing police offcers and the commu-
nity at large. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 73, line 18 from bottom: “the” is inserted before “threat” 
p. 73, line 11 from bottom: “at” is changed to “on”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 Pages 73–90 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 15, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify …

• #2

  quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 427–428; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 9. That analysis demands “careful attention to the facts and circum- stances” relating to the incident. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. Most notable here, the “totality of the…

• #3

  With him on the briefs were Katherine B. Wellington, Neal Kumar Katyal, and Adam W. Fomby. Zoe A. Jacoby argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae supporting vacatur and remand. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant At- torney General Clarke, Principal Deputy Assistant Att…

• #4

  Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Kateland R. Jack- son, Assistant Solicitor General, and Brendan A. Fugere, Assistant Attor- ney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Chris Carr of Georgia, Theodore E. R…

• #5

  tagni; and for the Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool et al. by Laura O'Leary and Francisco J. Valenzuela. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the California State Sheriffs' Asso- ciation et al. by James R. Touchstone and Scott Wm. Davenport; for the National Sheriffs' Association by Gregory C. Ch…

• #6

  The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix. The court explained that to prevail on her claim, Mrs. Barnes needed to show that Felix's use of force was “objectively un- reasonable.” 532 F. Supp. 3d 463, 468 (SD Tex. 2021). In 78 BARNES v. FELIX Opinion of the Court the usual excessive-force case, the co…

• #7

  shoot “did not violate Barnes's constitutional rights.” Id., at 398. In a concurring opinion, Judge Higginbotham (who also authored the panel opinion) expressed “concern” with the Fifth Circuit's moment-of-threat doctrine. Ibid. He thought that rule inconsistent with this Court's directive to assess the reasonab…

• #8

  facts and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then known to the offcer. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. For exam- ple, the “severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry weight in the analysis. See ibid.; Garner, 471 U. S., at 11. So too can actions the offcer took during the stop, such as giving warning…

• #9

  verse. Ibid. At that point, one of the offcers fred several shots into the car. In a suit brought against the offcer, the driver's daughter contended that those shots were taken when the chase was “already over.” Id., at 777. But this Court rejected that claim based on everything that had hap- pened during the in…

• #10

  have prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-force case can- not review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological blinders. That point is so evident that not even Felix quarrels with it; his defense of the decisions below instead relies on taking a different view of their meaning and of the q…

• #11

  (quoting Graham, 490 U. S., at 396). But then came the fol- lowing: “This [Circuit], however, has narrowed that test” in deadly force cases, holding that the inquiry there is “confned to whether the [offcer] was in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the [offcer's] shooting.” Ibid. (alter- ations …

• #12

  for police offcers, particularly when as here the driver pulls away in the midst of the stop. Even for routine traffic violations, traffic stops are “fraught with danger to police offcers.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1047 (1983). An “inordinate risk confront[s] an offcer as he approaches a person seated in…

• #13

  When that happens, offcers of course should be held to account for their actions. See Brief for Current and Former Law Enforcement Offcials as Amici Curiae 22; Brief for California State Sheriffs' Association et al. as Amici Curiae 10. Page Proof Pending Publication 86 BARNES v. FELIX Kavanaugh, J., concurring …

• #14

  monsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffc stop can pose signifcant dangers to both the offcer and the sur- rounding community. The question when a driver fees, therefore, is not merely whether the underlying traffc violation “presents risks to public safety”—it is also “whether fight,” and what that f…

• #15

  Second, the offcer could get back in his police car and give chase, or could radio other offcers to pursue the driver. But a high-speed chase likewise can be exceptionally dangerous to the offcer, the driver, and others on the road. “Vehicular pursuits” are “often catastrophic.” Lange, 594 U. S., at 324 (Roberts,…

• #16

  injuries. The offcer could try to fre his weapon to incapaci- tate the driver and bring the car safely to a stop. But the car may be just as likely to go careening into traffc, thereby threatening the safety of the offcer, other drivers, passen- gers, pedestrians, and more. I could go on. The point here is that w…

• #17

  argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 73, line 18 from bottom: “the” is inserted before “threat” p. 73, line 11 from bottom: “at” is changed to “on”