A.A.R.P. v. Trump

Summary

The Court construes the detainees’ application seeking injunctive relief against summary removal under the Alien Enemies Act, 50 U. S. C. §21, as a petition for a writ of certiorari from the decision of the Fifth Circuit. The Court grants the petition as well as the application for injunction, vacates the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and remands for further proceedings.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 91–113 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
May 16, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2024 91 
Syllabus 
A. A. R. P. et al. v. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, et al. 
on application for injunction 
No. 24A1007. Decided May 16, 2025 
The President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezue-
lan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated 
foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proclamation No. 
10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033. Applicants are two detainees identifed as 
TdA members and a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the 
Northern District of Texas. The detainees sought emergency injunc-
tive relief against summary removal under the AEA. 
On April 17, 2025, the District Court denied the detainees' motion 
for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Hours later, putative class 
members were served notices of AEA removal and told they would be 
removed imminently. The detainees fled an emergency TRO motion 
and, when the District Court did not rule, appealed to the Fifth Circuit 
and applied to this Court for temporary injunctive relief. The Govern-
ment asserted the right to remove putative class members as soon as 
the next day. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of juris-
diction. The Court now construes the application as a petition for writ 
of certiorari from the Fifth Circuit's decision. 
Held: The Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders 
that have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. 
American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84. A district court's inaction in 
the face of extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable consequences 
may constitute a constructive denial of injunctive relief. Here, the Dis-
trict Court's inaction for over 14 hours had the practical effect of refus-
ing an injunction to detainees facing imminent removal. 
The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in removal pro-
ceedings. Due process requires notice that is “reasonably calculated” 
to inform interested parties and affords “a reasonable time” to respond. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314. 
AEA detainees must receive adequate notice that they are subject to 
removal “within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow 
them to actually seek habeas relief” before removal. Trump v. J. G. G., 
604 U. S. 670, 673. Under the circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours 
before removal, without information about how to exercise due process 
rights, does not satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court re-

92 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Per Curiam 
mands for determination of what specifc notice is constitutionally 
required. 
The Court may issue temporary relief to a putative class to preserve 
its jurisdiction without deciding whether formal class certifcation is ap-
propriate. Named applicants and putative class members are entitled 
to constitutionally adequate notice prior to removal. Although putative 
class members may take different steps to protect their interests, the 
notice to which they are entitled is the same. And a class action de-
fendant may not defeat class treatment, if otherwise proper, by simply 
promising to treat named plaintiffs differently. 
Certiorari and temporary injunctive relief granted; judgment vacated 
and remanded. 
Per Curiam. 
The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), 
Rev. Stat. § 4067, 50 U. S. C. § 21, to remove Venezuelan na-
tionals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a desig-
nated foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proc-
lamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (2025). Applicants 
are two detainees identifed as members of TdA and a puta-
tive class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern 
District of Texas. All of the alleged TdA members in the 
putative class are currently being held in U. S. detention 
facilities. In the application before the Court, the detainees 
seek injunctive relief against summary removal under the 
AEA. 
I 
On April 17, 2025, the District Court denied the detainees' 
motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against 
summary removal under the AEA. No. 25−cv−59, ECF 
Doc. 27. The detainees allege that, hours later, putative 
class members were served notices of AEA removal and told 
that they would be removed “tonight or tomorrow.” ECF 
Doc. 30, p. 1. On April 18 at 12:34 a.m. central time, the 
detainees moved for an emergency TRO. See ibid. At 
12:48 p.m., the detainees moved for a ruling on that motion 
or a status conference by 1:30 p.m. ECF Doc. 34. At 3:02 
p.m., they appealed “the constructive denia[l]” of the emer-
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Per Curiam 
gency TRO to the Fifth Circuit. ECF Doc. 36, p. 1. The 
detainees also applied to this Court for a temporary 
injunction. 
We understood the Government to assert the right to re-
move the detainees as soon as midnight central time on April 
19. The Government addressed the detainees' allegations 
on April 18 only at an evening hearing before the District 
Court for the District of Columbia, where the detainees had 
separately sought relief. The Government guaranteed that 
no putative class members would be removed that day. Tr. 
of Proceedings in J. G. G. v. Trump, No. 25−cv−766, ECF 
Doc. 93, p. 9. But it further represented that, in its view, 
removal of putative class members as soon as the next day 
“would be consistent with” its due process obligations, and 
it “reserve[d] the right” to take such action. Id., at 26; see 
id., at 16 (explanation by the court that “tomorrow . . . starts 
at 12:01 a.m.”). Evidence now in the record (although not 
all before us on April 18) suggests that the Government had 
in fact taken steps on the afternoon of April 18 toward re-
moving detainees under the AEA—including transporting 
them from their detention facility to an airport and later re-
turning them to the facility. See Supp. App. to Reply 1a−5a. 
Had the detainees been removed from the United States to 
the custody of a foreign sovereign on April 19, the Govern-
ment may have argued, as it has previously argued, that no 
U. S. court had jurisdiction to order relief. See Application 
To Vacate Injunction in Noem v. Abrego Garcia, No. 24A949 
(Apr. 7, 2025), pp. 11−20. 
At 12:52 a.m. eastern time (11:52 p.m. central time), we 
ordered the Government—in light of all these circum-
stances—“not to remove any member of the putative class of 
detainees” in order to preserve our jurisdiction to consider 
the application. 604 U. S. 1251 (2025). We invited the Gov-
ernment to respond to that application after the Fifth Circuit 
ruled. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the detainees' appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for injunction

94 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Per Curiam 
pending appeal as premature, on the ground that the detain-
ees “gave the [district] court only 42 minutes to act.” No. 
25−10534, ECF Doc. 14, p. 2. We now construe the applica-
tion as a petition for writ of certiorari from the decision of 
the Fifth Circuit. See Reply 15. We grant the petition as 
well as the application for injunction pending further pro-
ceedings, vacate the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and re-
mand for further proceedings. 
II 
The Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction. Appellate courts have jurisdiction 
to review interlocutory orders that have “the practical effect 
of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. American Brands, 
Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84 (1981). A district court's inaction in the 
face of extreme urgency and a high risk of “serious, perhaps 
irreparable,” consequences may have the effect of refusing 
an injunction. 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3924.1, pp. 174, 180−181 (3d ed. 
2012) (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 
U. S. 176, 181 (1955)). Here the District Court's inaction— 
not for 42 minutes but for 14 hours and 28 minutes—had the 
practical effect of refusing an injunction to detainees facing 
an imminent threat of severe, irreparable harm. Accord-
ingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of 
law in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. 
J. G. G., 604 U. S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam ) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). “Procedural due process rules are 
meant to protect” against “the mistaken or unjustifed depri-
vation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U. S. 247, 259 (1978). We have long held that “no person 
shall be” removed from the United States “without opportu-
nity, at some time, to be heard.” The Japanese Immigrant 
Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903). Due process requires notice 
that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
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to apprise interested parties” and that “afford[s] a reasonable 
time . . . to make [an] appearance.” Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). Accord-
ingly, in J. G. G., this Court explained—with all nine Justices 
agreeing—that “AEA detainees must receive notice . . . that 
they are subject to removal under the Act . . . within a 
reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them 
to actually seek habeas relief” before removal. 604 U. S., at 
673. In order to “actually seek habeas relief,” a detainee 
must have suffcient time and information to reasonably be 
able to contact counsel, fle a petition, and pursue appro-
priate relief. 
The Government does not contest before this Court the 
applicants' description of the notice afforded to AEA detain-
ees in the Northern District of Texas, nor the assertion that 
the Government was poised to carry out removals immi-
nently. The Government has represented elsewhere that it 
is unable to provide for the return of an individual deported 
in error to a prison in El Salvador, see Abrego Garcia v. 
Noem, No. 25−cv−951 (D Md.), ECF Docs. 74, 77, where it is 
alleged that detainees face indefnite detention, see Appli-
cation for Injunction 11. The detainees' interests at stake 
are accordingly particularly weighty. Under these circum-
stances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, devoid of 
information about how to exercise due process rights to con-
test that removal, surely does not pass muster. But it is not 
optimal for this Court, far removed from the circumstances 
on the ground, to determine in the frst instance the precise 
process necessary to satisfy the Constitution in this case. 
We remand the case to the Fifth Circuit for that purpose. 
To be clear, we decide today only that the detainees are 
entitled to more notice than was given on April 18, and we 
grant temporary injunctive relief to preserve our jurisdiction 
while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated. See 
post, at 112 (Alito, J., dissenting). We did not on April 19— 
and do not now—address the underlying merits of the par-
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96 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Per Curiam 
ties' claims regarding the legality of removals under the 
AEA. We recognize the signifcance of the Government's 
national security interests as well as the necessity that such 
interests be pursued in a manner consistent with the Consti-
tution. In light of the foregoing, lower courts should ad-
dress AEA cases expeditiously. 
III 
The dissent disputes both the Court's jurisdiction and the 
availability of classwide relief. We do not fnd its reason-
ing persuasive. 
First, we reject the dissent's characterization of the events 
that transpired on April 18, which lead it to question our 
jurisdiction. District courts should approach requests for 
preliminary relief with care and consideration, see post, at 
102−103 (Alito, J., dissenting), but exigent circumstances may 
impose practical constraints. Preliminary relief is “custom-
arily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal 
and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” 
Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. 192, 200–201 (2025) (quoting Uni-
versity of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981)). The 
purpose of such relief is “merely to preserve the relative po-
sitions of the parties” pending further proceedings. Lackey, 
604 U. S., at 200 (quoting Camenisch, 451 U. S., at 395). 
In this case, the record before the District Court, although 
limited, indicated that removals of putative class members 
were likely imminent. Contra, post, at 103−105 (Alito , J., 
dissenting). The detainees attached four declarations to 
their emergency motion for a TRO. In one, for example, an 
attorney relayed a detainee's report that immigration off-
cers “had informed them that they will be deported either 
today or tomorrow.” ECF Doc. 30−1. In a second, a non-
proft director described conversations with family members 
of detainees and linked to a video of detainees holding no-
tices of removal as evidence that detainees “were being re-
moved.” ECF Doc. 30−2, p. 1. 
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Per Curiam 
Importantly, the relevant question for purposes of our ju-
risdiction is whether, at the time this Court was called upon 
to intervene, the District Court's inaction had the effect of 
refusing an injunction. In their application to this Court, 
the detainees represented that “[m]any individuals [had] al-
ready been loaded on to buses, presumably headed to the 
airport.” Application for Injunction 1. Shortly thereafter, 
the Government represented on the record in federal court 
that it reserved the right to remove detainees after mid-
night. We had the power to issue injunctive relief to pre-
vent irreparable harm to the applicants and to preserve our 
jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a). Now 
that the Fifth Circuit has ruled, our certiorari jurisdiction 
also supports review in the ordinary course. 
Finally, this Court may properly issue temporary injunc-
tive relief to the putative class in order to preserve our juris-
diction pending appeal.* Named applicants A. A. R. P. and 
W. M. M. assert that they are at imminent risk of being clas-
sifed as alien enemies and removed from the United States, 
but the record does not indicate that they have received any 
formal notice of removal under the AEA. See ECF Doc. 38, 
pp. 5−6. The named applicants, along with putative class 
members, are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice 
*We note that the District Court recently denied class certifcation as 
to the detainees' underlying habeas claims challenging the validity of re-
moval under the AEA. See ECF Doc. 67. By its own terms, the District 
Court's order is “automatically vacated” by our order granting a writ of 
certiorari. Id., at 2. And in any event, the District Court's order 
primarily addressed the detainees' ability to challenge the validity of 
AEA removal on a classwide basis. The application before this Court 
seeks only to vindicate notice rights on a classwide basis. To the extent 
the District Court's order addressed due process, see post, at 111 (Alito , 
J., dissenting) (citing ECF Doc. 67, pp. 29−31, 33, 38−39), the District 
Court's concerns as to the propriety of classwide relief focused on con-
siderations downstream of the initial notice necessary for detainees to 
raise any substantive claims against AEA removal, see id., at 29−31, 33, 
38−39.

98 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Per Curiam 
prior to any removal, in order to pursue appropriate relief. 
Although the putative class members may ultimately take 
different steps to protect their own interests in response to 
such notice, the notice to which they are entitled is the same. 
And because courts may issue temporary relief to a putative 
class, see 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class 
Actions § 4:30 (6th ed. 2022 and Supp. 2024), we need not 
decide whether a class should be certifed as to the detainees' 
due process claims in order to temporarily enjoin the Gov-
ernment from removing putative class members while the 
question of what notice is due is adjudicated. 
We recognize that the Government “has agreed to forgo 
removing the named petitioners pursuant to the AEA while 
their habeas proceedings are pending.” Opposition to 
Emergency Application 11. But we reject the proposition 
that a class-action defendant may defeat class treatment, if 
it is otherwise proper, by promising as a matter of grace to 
treat named plaintiffs differently. Cf. FBI v. Fikre, 601 
U. S. 234, 241 (2024) (explaining that voluntary cessation of 
challenged conduct does not moot a claim). And we are 
skeptical of the self-defeating notion that the right to the 
notice necessary to “actually seek habeas relief,” J. G. G., 604 
U. S., at 673, must itself be vindicated through individual 
habeas petitions, somehow by plaintiffs who have not re-
ceived notice. 
* * * 
The application for an injunction pending further proceed-
ings is granted. The motion for leave to fle a supplemental 
appendix under seal is also granted. Additionally, appli-
cants suggested this Court treat the application as a petition 
for a writ of certiorari; doing so, the petition is granted. 
The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is 
remanded to the Fifth Circuit. In resolving the detainees' 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit should address (1) all the normal 
preliminary injunction factors, including likelihood of success 
on the merits, as to the named plaintiffs' underlying habeas 
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claims that the AEA does not authorize their removal pursu-
ant to the President's March 14, 2025, Proclamation, and (2) 
the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class's due 
process claims against summary removal. The Government 
is enjoined from removing the named plaintiffs or putative 
class members in this action under the AEA pending order 
by the Fifth Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ 
of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall termi-
nate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of 
certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the 
sending down of the judgment of this Court. 
The Government may remove the named plaintiffs or puta-
tive class members under other lawful authorities. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring. 
I understand and agree with the Court's decision to grant 
a temporary injunction. The injunction simply ensures that 
the Judiciary can decide whether these Venezuelan detainees 
may be lawfully removed under the Alien Enemies Act be-
fore they are in fact removed. The underlying legal ques-
tions that the courts may need to decide before the removals 
occur include: (i) whether the Alien Enemies Act (as distinct 
from the ordinary removal process under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act) authorizes removal of these detainees 
and (ii) if so, what notice is due before removal. Several 
Federal District Courts have already issued conficting rul-
ings on the underlying legal issues. Compare A. S. R. v. 
Trump, No. 3:25–cv–113 (WD Pa., May 13, 2025), with 
G. F. F. v. Trump, No. 1:25–cv–2886 (SDNY, May 6, 2025), 
D. B. U. v. Trump, No. 1:25–cv–1163 (D Colo., May 6, 2025), 
and J. A. V. v. Trump, No. 1:25–cv–72 (SD Tex., May 1, 2025). 
The Executive Branch and the detainees agree about the 
urgency and importance of those legal questions: The Execu-
tive Branch has represented that this case is important for 
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100 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
America's national security and that it is “critical to remove 
TdA members subject to the Proclamation quickly.” Appli-
cation To Vacate Orders in Trump v. J. G. G., No. 24A931 
(Mar. 28, 2025), p. 37; see Opposition to Emergency Applica-
tion 3, 5. For their part, the detainees have explicitly re-
quested that the Court move fast and grant certiorari before 
judgment. See Reply 4. 
The circumstances call for a prompt and fnal resolution, 
which likely can be provided only by this Court. At this 
juncture, I would prefer not to remand to the lower courts 
and further put off this Court's fnal resolution of the critical 
legal issues. Rather, consistent with the Executive 
Branch's request for expedition—and as the detainees them-
selves urge—I would grant certiorari, order prompt briefng, 
hold oral argument soon thereafter, and then resolve the 
legal issues. 
Justice Alito , with whom Justice Thomas joins, 
dissenting. 
I cannot join the decision of the Court. First and most 
important, we lack jurisdiction and therefore have no author-
ity to issue any relief. Second, even if we had such author-
ity, the applicants have not satisfed the requirements for 
the issuance of injunctive relief pending appellate review. 
Third, granting certiorari before any decision on the merits 
has been made by either the District Court or the Court of 
Appeals is unwarranted. 
I 
A 
“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,” and “[w]ithout 
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all.” Ex parte Mc-
Cardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). So in order for us to do 
anything in this matter, “we must assure ourselves that we 
have jurisdiction.” Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 594 (2018). 
The Court's theory of jurisdiction, as I understand it, is as 
follows. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1254, we have jurisdiction to 
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Alito, J., dissenting 
review a “case” that is properly before one of the federal 
courts of appeals. This case was properly before the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit because the two habeas peti-
tioners, A. A. R. P. and W. M. M., took an appeal from a 
District Court order that refused to issue “an injunction.” 
§ 1292(a)(1). Although the District Court never actually is-
sued such an order or said that it would do so, the District 
Court constructively denied injunctive relief by failing to act 
under circumstances where prompt intervention was ur-
gently needed. See ante, at 94. 
This theory rests on a mischaracterization of what hap-
pened in the District Court. I do not dispute that a district 
court's failure to act expeditiously may, in some circum-
stances, have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction” 
and thus entitle a party to take an interlocutory appeal. 
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84 (1981); 
see also § 1292(a)(1). But that principle does not apply here 
where (a) the District Court had no good reason to think that 
either A. A. R. P. or W. M. M. was in imminent danger of 
removal, (b) the record at that time contained only sketchy 
evidence about any imminent threat to members of the class 
of alien detainees they sought to have certifed, (c) the court 
took the entirely reasonable position that it would wait for 
the Government to respond to the applicants' request for a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) before acting, (d) the 
court set a very short deadline for the fling of the Govern-
ment's response, and (e) the court was working diligently on 
the diffcult issues presented by the applicants' request for 
relief for themselves and the members of the putative class. 
The Court asserts that the District Court failed to act “for 
14 hours and 28 minutes,” ante, at 94, but that is misleading. 
Here is what actually happened. On the evening of April 
17, lawyers for A. A. R. P. and W. M. M. made a phone call 
in which they demanded “to talk to the Judge immediately 
. . . and have the Judge issue an order.” Order in No. 1:25– 
cv–59 (ND Tex., Apr. 21, 2025), ECF Doc. 47–1, p. 2. As the 
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102 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
District Court has since correctly noted, judges are gener-
ally not permitted to consider such ex parte communications. 
See ECF Doc. 47, at 1–2 (citing Code of Conduct for Federal 
Judges, Canon 3(A)(4)); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(b)(1). 
So the judge issued an electronic order admonishing the at-
torneys and stating that “[t]o the extent either party seeks 
emergency relief, it may fle a motion to do so. If an emer-
gency motion is fled, the opposing party shall have 24 hours 
to fle a response.” ECF Doc. 29. 
Thus, when the attorneys for A. A. R. P. and W. M. M. 
fled their renewed motion for a TRO at 12:34 a.m. on April 
18, they were fully aware that the District Court intended 
to give the Government 24 hours to fle a response. But in 
that motion, the attorneys said nothing about a plan to ap-
peal if the District Court elected to wait for that response. 
It was not until their 12:48 p.m. emergency motion for an 
immediate status conference that the attorneys suddenly in-
formed the court that they would fle an appeal if the District 
Court did not act within 42 minutes, i. e., by 1:30 p.m. No. 
1:25–cv–59 (ND Tex., Apr. 18, 2025), ECF Doc. 34, p. 2. The 
attorneys then fled their appeal at 3:02 p.m., just 133 min-
utes after they put the District Court on notice that they 
would seek appellate relief. Reply 10. Whether or not the 
actions taken by applicants' attorneys are thought to be jus-
tifed under the circumstances, delivering such an ultimatum 
to a district court judge (“Act on my motion on a complex 
matter within 42 or 133 minutes or I'll fle an appeal and 
divest you of jurisdiction”) represented a very stark depar-
ture from what is usually regarded as acceptable practice. 
Faced with applicants' extraordinary demand, the District 
Court proceeded in an entirely reasonable manner. The 
Court characterizes the District Court's behavior during the 
period in question as “inaction,” ante, at 94, but in my judg-
ment, that is unfair. Rather, as the judge has noted, he “was 
working with utmost diligence to resolve [the] important and 
complicated issues [presented by the motion] as quickly as

Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 103 
Alito, J., dissenting 
possible.” ECF Doc. 41, p. 4. The judge explained that he 
had not yet ruled because he could not “shirk [his] responsi-
bility to decide . . . complicated issues of law without at least 
some opportunity to review the pleadings and attachments 
and to get thoughtful responses from the parties.” Id., at 5. 
And the judge “was prepared to issue an order” “as soon as 
practicable after the government fled its response shortly 
after midnight, if not sooner.” Id., at 4. 
We should commend this careful approach, not criticize it. 
In the past few months alone, we have vacated or stayed 
district court orders that granted temporary injunctive relief 
without adequate consideration of the relevant issues. See 
Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. 670 (2025) (per curiam ); Depart-
ment of Education v. California, 604 U. S. 650 (2025) 
(per curiam ). But in this case, a District Court Judge is 
deemed to have constructively denied an injunction by fail-
ing to act within the space of a little over two hours on an 
application that required consideration of important and dif-
fcult questions and that was supported by factual submis-
sions that, as I will explain below, were very weak. 
Under these circumstances, I cannot agree that the Dis-
trict Court's failure to act amounted to a constructive denial 
of the applicants' request for relief. 
B 
As I mentioned, the factual support provided to the Dis-
trict Court was weak. The Court claims that the facts pre-
sented to the District Court on April 18 showed that there 
was an emergency entailing a high risk of “serious, perhaps 
irreparable, consequences.” Ante, at 94 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). But it is important not to confate the in-
formation that was in the record on April 18 with the new 
information that was presented to this Court several days 
later. 
The record that was before the District Court on April 18 
(which is the same record that was before us at midnight on 
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104 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
that date) included no concrete evidence that any removals 
were so imminent that a ruling had to be made immediately. 
The applicants' factual support consisted of six sworn decla-
rations and a photograph that the applicants asserted was an 
image of a notice of removal. See App. to Application 32– 
37, 56–65. But neither the declarations nor the photograph 
showed “extreme urgency.” Ante, at 94. 
The declarations certainly did not show that action was 
urgently needed to protect A. A. R. P. or W. M. M. The 
Government had represented in District Court that it would 
not remove either of those men—the only parties who were 
indisputably before the court—while their habeas petitions 
were pending. Order in No. 1:25–cv–59 (ND Tex., Apr. 17, 
2025), ECF Doc. 27, p. 1. And the two declarations concern-
ing those individuals included no allegations about imminent 
removal. App. to Application 32–37. Indeed, the declara-
tions concerning them were signed on April 15, prior to the 
Government's representation that they would not be re-
moved while their habeas petitions were pending. As a re-
sult, the declarations were outdated and provided no support 
for the claim that either A. A. R. P. or W. M. M. was threat-
ened with removal on April 18 or 19.
1 
The remaining evidence in the record at that time con-
cerned only the unnamed members of the as-yet uncertifed 
1 The Government “unequivocally” told the District Court that it did not 
“ `presently expect to remove A.A.R.P. or W.M.M. under the [Alien Ene-
mies Act (AEA)] until after the pending habeas petition is resolved,' ” and 
that it would “ `update' ” the District Court if that changed. ECF Doc. 27, 
at 1. And in their application for relief before this Court, the applicants 
did not assert that A. A. R. P. or W. M. M. in particular were at risk of 
being removed. To the contrary, the applicants represented that they had 
contacted the Government and were told that “the two named Applicants 
had not been given [removal] notices.” Application 5, n. 3. The Govern-
ment later confrmed in its flings before this Court that it “has agreed 
not to remove pursuant [to] the AEA those AEA detainees who do fle 
habeas claims,” including the named applicants. Opposition to Emer-
gency Application 2. 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 105 
Alito, J., dissenting 
class. And of the four declarations concerning those individ-
uals, only one said anything about when removal might hap-
pen. In that declaration, a lawyer swore that she spoke on 
the phone with an unidentifed Venezuelan man who said that 
“ICE had informed them that they will be deported either 
today or tomorrow to Venezuela.” Id., at 56. In other 
words, the most specifc piece of evidence in the record was 
a double-hearsay statement that cannot be traced back to 
any specifc government offcial. Outside of that, none of 
the remaining declarations said anything about imminent re-
moval. They merely stated that certain aliens were receiv-
ing deportation notices, but it was not claimed that these 
notices specifed when removal might occur. See id., at 57– 
58 (Brané decl.); id., at 59–60 (Collins decl.); id., at 61 (Siegel 
decl.). And the image of a document labeled “Notice and 
Warrant of Apprehension and Removal Under the Alien En-
emies Act,” which the applicants termed a removal notice, 
likewise said nothing about the time of removal. See id., at 
64–65. Other than these declarations, the court was left 
with unsupported attorney assertions in the application 
itself. 
Ignoring these defciencies in the record before the Dis-
trict Court, the Court relies on information that was not in 
the District Court record, namely, (a) statements made by a 
Government attorney in a hearing in another case that was 
held in Washington, D. C., during the evening on April 18, 
well after applicants fled their appeal and (b) evidence that 
we received several days later. See ante, at 93. But in 
evaluating whether the District Court effectively refused to 
issue injunctive relief, we must consider the facts as they 
were known to that court at the time in question.
2 
2 Moreover, it appears to me that the Court overstates what the Govern-
ment attorney actually said during the April 18 hearing. The attorney 
represented that it was “defnitive” that “there are no fights tonight,” and 
that “the people [he] spoke to were not aware of any plans for fights 
tomorrow.” Tr. of Proceedings in J. G. G. v. Trump, ECF Doc. 93, p. 15.

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106 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
For these reasons, I agree with the unanimous Court of 
Appeals panel that the District Court did not constructively 
deny an application for an injunction. As the panel stated, 
there was no reason to doubt the “diligence and ability” of 
the District Court to act appropriately under the circum-
stances. Order in No. 25–10534 (CA5, Apr. 18, 2025), ECF 
Doc. 14–1, p. 2. And his “failure to issue the requested rul-
ing” within the extraordinarily short period specifed by the 
applicants cannot reasonably be viewed as “an effective de-
nial of injunctive relief.” Id., at 4 (Ramirez, J., concurring). 
II 
Even if the District Court had denied the applicants' mo-
tion, there would be no ground for reversal because the ap-
plicants failed to satisfy the requirements for emergency in-
junctive relief, one of which is a showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits. Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 
(2009). And here, in order to obtain what the application 
sought (and what the Court now provides)—i.e ., relief for the 
members of the class that applicants asked to have certi-
fed—applicants had to show that they were likely to estab-
lish that class relief is available in a habeas proceeding and, 
if such relief is available, that the standard requirements for 
class certifcation could likely be met.
3 
Although the attorney also said that the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity “reserve[d] the right to remove people tomorrow,” he repeated nu-
merous times that no fights were planned for April 19. Id., at 26; see 
also id., at 9, 15, 29–30. The attorney's statements showed that there was 
a possibility of future injury but not that such an injury was certainly 
impending. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, USA, 568 U. S. 398, 410 (2013). 
3 The Court asserts that “courts may issue temporary relief to a putative 
class” without “decid[ing] whether a class should be certifed.” Ante, at 
98. In support of that proposition, the Court cites to no precedent of this 
Court. Instead, it cites to a treatise that provides no substantive reason-
ing in support of the proposition. See ibid. (citing 2 W. Rubenstein, New-
berg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 4:30 (6th ed. 2022 and Supp. 2024). 
Even if the Court were correct, its position would not justify its decision 
to entirely sidestep the issue of certification. A court considering

Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 107 
Alito, J., dissenting 
In my judgment, applicants were not likely to prevail on 
either of those issues. 
A 
1 
First, it is doubtful that class relief may be obtained in a 
habeas proceeding. We have never so held, and it is highly 
questionable whether it is permitted. Although habeas pro-
ceedings are classifed as civil, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply only “to the extent that the practice in [ha-
beas] proceedings . . . previously conformed to the practice 
in civil actions.” Rule 81(a)(4)(B); see also Rule 1. And in 
accordance with Rule 81, we have acknowledged that some 
Federal Rules are inapplicable in habeas. 
In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 (1969), for example, we 
held that Rule 33—concerning interrogatories—does not 
apply in habeas proceedings because it has no analogue in 
historical habeas practice and is a poor ft in a habeas pro-
ceeding. Id., at 292–298. Among other things, we noted 
that the prevalence of fact-fnding in habeas proceedings was 
a relatively recent development, and that the specifc scope 
of Rule 33 was “ill-suited to the special problems and charac-
ter of [habeas] proceedings.” Id., at 296. 
There are similar reasons to believe that Rule 23, which 
authorizes class actions, is not applicable in habeas. Neither 
courts nor commentators have found historical support 
for the practice. One commentator, writing in 1968, noted 
that “no case has been found in which anything resembling 
a class action was used in habeas corpus.” Note, Multiparty 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1493. Two 
years later, another commentator observed that “[c]lass ac-
tions for habeas corpus relief have rarely been attempted, 
whether to issue preliminary injunctive relief must consider whether the 
movant is likely to succeed on the merits. And to consider whether a 
request for classwide relief is likely to succeed on the merits, a court must 
at least consider whether class certifcation is likely. 
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108 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
perhaps because Rule 81(a)(2) [now Rule 81(a)(4)] seems to 
bar the application of the civil class action rule to habeas 
proceedings.” Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1170 (1970) (footnotes omit-
ted). Indeed, there appears to be some historical debate 
over whether even joinder was permitted in habeas practice. 
Compare Note, 81 Harv. L. Rev., at 1494 (“The issue of join-
der was not explicitly ruled upon in any of these cases, and 
no case has been found which expressly sanctions the proce-
dure”), with Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev., at 1169 (arguing that “the rules on 
joinder and consolidation apply under even the most restric-
tive interpretation of Rule 81,” but citing contrary dicta 
found in at least one case (footnotes omitted)). 
2 
Despite this lack of historical support, some lower courts 
have held that our decision in Harris sometimes permits pro-
cedures that resemble those used in a class action. As 
noted, Harris held that Rule 33, which concerns interrogato-
ries, does not apply in habeas, but the Court also observed 
that habeas courts “may fashion appropriate modes of proce-
dure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity 
with judicial usage,” when such modes of procedure are nec-
essary to “the habeas corpus jurisdiction and the duty to 
exercise it.” 394 U. S., at 299. On this ground, Harris held 
that a habeas court may use its authority under the All Writs 
Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, to fashion a procedure resembling an 
interrogatory to the extent that such an instrument is 
“needed” by the court to “perform [its] duty” to “summarily 
hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as 
law and justice require.” 394 U. S., at 299–300 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Based on this discussion in Harris, the Second Circuit held 
that while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 does not itself 
apply in habeas, “a multi-party proceeding similar to” a Rule 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 109 
Alito, J., dissenting 
23 class action is sometimes allowed. United States ex rel. 
Sero v. Preiser, 506 F. 2d 1115, 1125 (CA2 1974). And it 
concluded that this procedure was appropriate in “the un-
usual circumstances” present in the case at hand. Ibid.; see 
also Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F. 2d 965, 968 (CA7 1975). 
This reading of Harris is highly questionable. Where a 
particular rule does not apply in habeas, a court cannot cir-
cumvent that limitation by simply saying that it is importing 
the same feature under a different rubric. Harris con-
cluded that something like an interrogatory was allowed be-
cause it was needed under the circumstances to help the ha-
beas court carry out a duty clearly imposed by law, that is, 
to “ `determine the facts' ” that are material to the claim 
made by the petitioner who was before the court. 394 U. S., 
at 299 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2243). 
The situation here is different. No provision of law im-
poses on a habeas court the duty to determine facts or decide 
legal issues regarding parties who are not before the court. 
And as a general matter, the class action device is uniquely 
“ill-suited” for habeas proceedings, 394 U. S., at 296, which 
often turn on individualized and fact-specifc determinations 
regarding the confnement of a specifc prisoner. 
B 
Even if something resembling a class action could be used 
in a habeas proceeding, it is very questionable whether the 
requirements for class certifcation could be met in this case. 
Rule 23(a)(3) provides that named plaintiffs may sue as rep-
resentatives of a class “only if,” among other things, “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class.” And when a court 
certifes a class, the court is supposed to defne the precise 
“claims” that will be adjudicated on a class-wide basis. See 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B). That ensures that the only claims that 
are adjudicated in a class action are those that the class 
brings in common and those for which the named plaintiffs

110 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
are “typical” representatives of the class. See General Tele-
phone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, 330 (1980) 
(“The typicality requirement is said to limit the class claims 
to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff 's 
claims”). 
Here, however, the main interim relief sought on behalf of 
the putative class—adequate notice of plans for removal 
under the AEA and an opportunity to contest such removal 
in court, see Application 17–18; Reply 5–7—is not needed by 
either A. A. R. P. or W. M. M., who already have a pending 
habeas proceeding and a promise that they will not be re-
moved until that proceeding concludes. For this reason, 
their situation differs critically from that of many of the pu-
tative class members since they have no personal stake in 
how the court resolves the question of interim relief for the 
putative class members. 
The Court responds to this problem by suggesting that a 
class action defendant may not “defeat class treatment, if it 
is otherwise proper , by promising as a matter of grace to 
treat named plaintiffs differently.” Ante, at 98 (emphasis 
added). But the Court provides no analysis suggesting that 
class certifcation here is “otherwise proper,” and instead as-
serts that it can ignore the question of class certifcation at 
this preliminary stage. Ibid. And, in any event, the record 
does not suggest that the Government is treating the named 
plaintiffs differently “as a matter of grace.” Ibid. Rather, 
it is doing so pursuant to its general policy against removing 
AEA detainees when they have a pending habeas petition. 
See Opposition to Emergency Application 2 (“the govern-
ment has agreed not to remove pursuant [to] the AEA those 
AEA detainees who do fle habeas claims”). 
C 
We have told district courts that they may certify a class 
only after conducting a “ `rigorous analysis' ” of the question. 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 111 
Alito, J., dissenting 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 351 (2011) 
(quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 
U. S. 147, 161 (1982)). On April 18, the District Court had 
no time to engage in such analysis, and as a result, it cannot 
be said that the court abused its discretion in failing to con-
clude that applicants' were likely to prevail on their class-
action arguments. Cf. University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 
U. S. 390, 393–394 (1981). 
The District Court has since had time to conduct the “rig-
orous analysis” that our precedents require, and has con-
cluded that class certifcation would be improper here. 
Order in No. 1:25–cv–59 (ND Tex., May 9, 2025), ECF Doc. 
67. That development makes the relief issued by the Court 
today all the more extraordinary. Purporting to exercise its 
appellate jurisdiction, the Court issues “preliminary relief” 
to a putative class that the District Court has explicitly 
refused to certify, and it does so without providing any 
substantive analysis suggesting that the District Court's 
analysis of the class certifcation issue was incorrect. 
Instead of substantively engaging with the District 
Court's order, the Court asserts that the order makes no 
difference because it “primarily addressed the detainees' 
ability to challenge the validity of AEA removal on a class-
wide basis,” whereas “[t]he application before this Court 
seeks only to vindicate notice rights.” Ante, at 97, n. But 
the District Court's order did address the notice question. 
In addition to explaining why the applicants cannot pursue 
their fnal merits claims as a class action, the order explains 
at length why the applicants' claims regarding notice rights 
also cannot proceed on a class basis. ECF Doc. 67, at 29– 
31, 33, 38–39. Among other things, the District Court 
observed that “due process is by its very nature individual-
ized,” id., at 33, a proposition plainly supported by our prece-
dents. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 314 (2018) 
(“Due process is fexible, we have stressed repeatedly, and it 
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112 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP 
Alito, J., dissenting 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands” (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted)). 
In any event, the District Court also offered several gen-
eral reasons why class relief would be inappropriate here, 
and these apply equally to the applicants' claims regarding 
notice rights. See ECF Doc. 67, at 35–36, 39–45. The 
Court today issues temporary relief without engaging with 
any of that analysis. And, what's more, it asks the Fifth 
Circuit to fnally adjudicate the notice rights of members of 
the putative class without asking that court to do its own 
analysis regarding whether class certifcation as to those 
claims would be appropriate. Ante, at 99. Clearly, the 
Court would prefer to ignore the important step of class cer-
tifcation and skip directly to the adjudication of the class 
members' rights. The Federal Rules do not permit such a 
shortcut. 
III 
Instead of merely ruling on the application that is before 
us—which asks for emergency relief pending appeal—the 
Court takes the unusual step of granting certiorari before 
judgment, summarily vacating the judgment below dismiss-
ing the applicants' appeal, and remanding the case to the 
Court of Appeals with directions regarding the issues that 
court should address. From the Court's order, it is not en-
tirely clear whether the Court has silently decided issues 
that go beyond the question of interim relief. (I certainly 
hope that it has not.) But if it has done so, today's order is 
doubly extraordinary. Granting certiorari before a court of 
appeals has entered a judgment is a sharp departure from 
usual practice, but here neither the Court of Appeals nor the 
District Court has decided any merits questions. 
We have said more times than I care to remember that 
“we are a court of review, not of frst view.” Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). Even on the Court's 
reading of what happened below, all that the District Court 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 113 
Alito, J., dissenting 
and the Court of Appeals decided was that the applicants 
were not entitled to temporary injunctive relief. If the 
Court has gone beyond that question, it has blazed a new 
trail. It has plucked a case from a district court and decided 
important issues in the frst instance. To my eyes, that 
looks far too much like an expansion of our original 
jurisdiction. 
I must therefore respectfully dissent. 
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Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 112, line 3 from bottom: “of” is inserted before “frst”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 Pages 91–113 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT May 16, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify…

• #2

  ceedings. Due process requires notice that is “reasonably calculated” to inform interested parties and affords “a reasonable time” to respond. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314. AEA detainees must receive adequate notice that they are subject to removal “within a reasonable time and i…

• #3

  detainees moved for an emergency TRO. See ibid. At 12:48 p.m., the detainees moved for a ruling on that motion or a status conference by 1:30 p.m. ECF Doc. 34. At 3:02 p.m., they appealed “the constructive denia[l]” of the emer- Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 …

• #4

  pending appeal as premature, on the ground that the detain- ees “gave the [district] court only 42 minutes to act.” No. 25−10534, ECF Doc. 14, p. 2. We now construe the applica- tion as a petition for writ of certiorari from the decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Reply 15. We grant the petition as well as the app…

• #5

  reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief” before removal. 604 U. S., at 673. In order to “actually seek habeas relief,” a detainee must have suffcient time and information to reasonably be able to contact counsel, fle a petition, and pursue appro- priate relief. The …

• #6

  preliminary relief with care and consideration, see post, at 102−103 (Alito, J., dissenting), but exigent circumstances may impose practical constraints. Preliminary relief is “custom- arily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” …

• #7

  W. M. M. assert that they are at imminent risk of being clas- sifed as alien enemies and removed from the United States, but the record does not indicate that they have received any formal notice of removal under the AEA. See ECF Doc. 38, pp. 5−6. The named applicants, along with putative class members, are entit…

• #8

  challenged conduct does not moot a claim). And we are skeptical of the self-defeating notion that the right to the notice necessary to “actually seek habeas relief,” J. G. G., 604 U. S., at 673, must itself be vindicated through individual habeas petitions, somehow by plaintiffs who have not re- ceived notice. *…

• #9

  and (ii) if so, what notice is due before removal. Several Federal District Courts have already issued conficting rul- ings on the underlying legal issues. Compare A. S. R. v. Trump, No. 3:25–cv–113 (WD Pa., May 13, 2025), with G. F. F. v. Trump, No. 1:25–cv–2886 (SDNY, May 6, 2025), D. B. U. v. Trump, No. 1:25–c…

• #10

  Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 605 U. S. 91 (2025) 101 Alito, J., dissenting review a “case” that is properly before one of the federal courts of appeals. This case was properly before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit because the two habeas peti- tioners, A. A. R. P. and W. M. M., took an appe…

• #11

  See ECF Doc. 47, at 1–2 (citing Code of Conduct for Federal Judges, Canon 3(A)(4)); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(b)(1). So the judge issued an electronic order admonishing the at- torneys and stating that “[t]o the extent either party seeks emergency relief, it may fle a motion to do so. If an emer- gency mot…

• #12

  practicable after the government fled its response shortly after midnight, if not sooner.” Id., at 4. We should commend this careful approach, not criticize it. In the past few months alone, we have vacated or stayed district court orders that granted temporary injunctive relief without adequate consideration of …

• #13

  ing those individuals included no allegations about imminent removal. App. to Application 32–37. Indeed, the declara- tions concerning them were signed on April 15, prior to the Government's representation that they would not be re- moved while their habeas petitions were pending. As a re- sult, the declarations …

• #14

  Warrant of Apprehension and Removal Under the Alien En- emies Act,” which the applicants termed a removal notice, likewise said nothing about the time of removal. See id., at 64–65. Other than these declarations, the court was left with unsupported attorney assertions in the application itself. Ignoring these de…

• #15

  fed—applicants had to show that they were likely to estab- lish that class relief is available in a habeas proceeding and, if such relief is available, that the standard requirements for class certifcation could likely be met. 3 Although the attorney also said that the Department of Homeland Secu- rity “reserve[…

• #16

  There are similar reasons to believe that Rule 23, which authorizes class actions, is not applicable in habeas. Neither courts nor commentators have found historical support for the practice. One commentator, writing in 1968, noted that “no case has been found in which anything resembling a class action was used …

• #17

  interrogatory to the extent that such an instrument is “needed” by the court to “perform [its] duty” to “summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 394 U. S., at 299–300 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this discussion in Harris, the Second Circuit h…

• #18

  are adjudicated in a class action are those that the class brings in common and those for which the named plaintiffs 110 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP Alito, J., dissenting are “typical” representatives of the class. See General Tele- phone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, 330 (1980) (“The typicality requirement …

• #19

  clude that applicants' were likely to prevail on their class- action arguments. Cf. University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 393–394 (1981). The District Court has since had time to conduct the “rig- orous analysis” that our precedents require, and has con- cluded that class certifcation would be improper …

• #20

  analysis regarding whether class certifcation as to those claims would be appropriate. Ante, at 99. Clearly, the Court would prefer to ignore the important step of class cer- tifcation and skip directly to the adjudication of the class members' rights. The Federal Rules do not permit such a shortcut. III Instea…

• #21

  argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 112, line 3 from bottom: “of” is inserted before “frst”