BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman

Summary

Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint; a party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 204–222 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
June 5, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
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204 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 
Syllabus 
BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the second circuit 
No. 23–1259. Argued March 3, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025 
Plaintiffs, who are victims and families of victims of terrorist attacks car-
ried out by Hamas between 2001 and 2003, sued BLOM Bank SAL under 
the Anti-Terrorism Act for allegedly aiding and abetting the attacks 
by providing fnancial services to Hamas-affliated customers. BLOM 
argued that the complaint failed to state a claim, and plaintiffs repeat-
edly affrmed they would not seek to amend their complaint if it were 
dismissed. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, 
fnding that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that BLOM had the 
requisite general awareness for aiding-and-abetting liability. The court 
denied leave to amend because plaintiffs had declined several opportuni-
ties to amend and failed to identify additional facts they could allege. 
The Second Circuit affrmed the dismissal, fnding that even though the 
District Court had applied too stringent a standard for the general 
awareness element, plaintiffs' claims still failed under the correct stand-
ard. Following the affrmance, plaintiffs returned to the District Court 
and moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the 
fnal judgment so that they could fle an amended complaint to meet 
the Second Circuit's clarifed standard. The District Court denied the 
motion, ruling that the Second Circuit's clarifcation did not constitute 
the “extraordinary circumstances” required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and 
that plaintiffs' prior deliberate choices not to amend counseled against 
relief. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that when a 
party seeks Rule 60(b) relief to fle an amended complaint, district 
courts must not apply Rule 60(b)(6)'s extraordinary circumstances 
standard in isolation but must instead balance Rule 60(b)'s fnality prin-
ciples with Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy. 
Held: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, 
and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant 
seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must frst satisfy 
Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard can apply. 
Pp. 210–217. 
(a) Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that provides relief from fnal 
judgment for “any other reason that justifes relief” beyond the specifc 
grounds in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). The text and structure of Rule 60(b) 
make clear that this catchall provision is available only in narrow cir-

Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 205 
Syllabus 
cumstances. It covers grounds not already covered by the preceding 
fve paragraphs, and a broad interpretation would improperly circum-
vent the time limitations of those paragraphs. The Court has consist-
ently held that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary cir-
cumstances,” as frst established in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 
601, and reaffrmed in numerous subsequent decisions. This strict in-
terpretation is essential to preserve the fnality of judgments. See 
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 535. Pp. 210–213. 
(b) The Rule 60(b)(6) standard does not change when a party seeks 
to reopen a case to amend a complaint. In that circumstance, satisfac-
tion of Rule 60(b)(6) necessarily precedes any application of Rule 15(a). 
Cf. Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 311. 
Rules 60(b) and 15(a) apply at different stages of litigation and require 
separate inquiries. Rule 15(a)(2)'s direction that courts “should freely 
give leave when justice so requires” governs pretrial amendments, but 
does not apply when a case is closed following fnal judgment. A party 
seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief must demonstrate extraordinary circum-
stances regardless of what they intend to do if the case is reopened. 
The Second Circuit's “balancing” approach is not consonant with Rule 
60(b)(6) and this Court's precedents because it improperly dilutes Rule 
60(b)(6)'s stringent standard. Pp. 213–214. 
(c) Plaintiffs' arguments that the Second Circuit's approach is conso-
nant both with Rule 60(b)(6) and with this Court's precedents are unper-
suasive. Balancing the strict standards of Rule 60(b)(6) against the 
more relaxed standards of Rule 15 necessarily weakens the former, and 
is thus incompatible with this Court's long line of precedents holding 
that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary circum-
stances.' ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 
847, 864. Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, does not suggest otherwise. 
Foman dealt with Rule 59(e), which does not threaten the fnality of 
judgments to the same degree that Rule 60(b)(6) does. Thus, a Rule 
59(e) movant is not required to show the same “extraordinary circum-
stances” to receive relief. See id., at 181–182. Pp. 215–216. 
(d) The Second Circuit's disposition of this case was incorrect. District 
courts' Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed “only for abuse of discretion.” 
Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7. 
The District Court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 
both applied the correct legal standard and provided “substantial justi-
fcation” for its conclusion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 
384, 405. The District Court's justifcations for its decision align with 
established Rule 60(b) doctrine that intervening legal develop-
ments rarely constitute extraordinary circumstances and that ex-
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206 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of the Court 
traordinary circumstances must suggest the movant is faultless in the 
delay. Pp. 216–217. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, 
JJ., joined, and in which Jackson, J., joined as to all but Part III. Jack-
son, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
post, p. 217. 
Michael H. McGinley argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the briefs were Steven A. Engel, Tamer Mallat, 
Brian A. Kulp, and Christopher J. Merken. 
Michael Radine argued the cause for respondents. With 
him on the brief were Gary M. Osen, Ari Ungar, and Dina 
Gielchinsky. 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a district 
court to grant relief from a fnal judgment in limited circum-
stances. The Rule includes fve provisions setting out spe-
cifc grounds upon which parties may seek such relief. See 
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1)–(5). It also includes a catchall 
provision that allows a district court to relieve a party from 
a fnal judgment for “any other reason that justifes relief.” 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6). We have consistently held 
that only “extraordinary circumstances” can justify relief 
under the Rule 60(b)(6) catchall. The question presented is 
whether this rigorous standard applies when a Rule 60(b)(6) 
movant seeks to reopen a case for the purpose of fling an 
amended complaint. We hold that it does. 
I 
A 
Plaintiffs (respondents here) are victims and the families 
of victims of terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas between 
December 2001 and August 2003. On January 1, 2019, plain-
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 207 
Opinion of the Court 
tiffs sued petitioner BLOM Bank SAL (BLOM), an interna-
tional bank, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by 
the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), 18 
U. S. C. § 2333(d). They alleged that BLOM aided and abet-
ted Hamas's commission of the terrorist attacks by providing 
fnancial services to customers who were allegedly affliated 
with Hamas and who had helped further Hamas's goals. 
In the District Court, BLOM repeatedly argued that the 
facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint were insuffcient to state 
a claim of aiding and abetting under JASTA. Before moving 
to dismiss the complaint, BLOM made this argument to the 
District Court in a required premotion letter. See 1 App. 
142–147. Plaintiffs responded that they would stand on 
their allegations as pleaded. See id., at 148–155. At a sub-
sequent, premotion conference, plaintiffs' counsel reaffrmed 
their clients' position, telling the District Court that they 
were “prepared to brief [their opposition to a motion to dis-
miss] based on the arguments presented in the pre-motion 
letter,” and that they “would not seek leave to amend” if 
the court dismissed their complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
93–94. 
BLOM moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6). At a hearing on the motion, the District 
Court reminded plaintiffs' counsel that they had not re-
quested an opportunity to replead and specifcally asked 
whether this meant that the complaint contained everything 
the court would “need to consider in terms of suffciency of 
[plaintiffs'] pleading.” Id., at 124. Plaintiffs' counsel con-
frmed that they did not intend to add any additional facts. 
Id., at 125. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice 
and so denied leave to amend. The court held, as relevant 
here, that plaintiffs had not “plausibly allege[d] the general 
awareness . . . elemen[t] necessary to plead JASTA aiding-
and-abetting liability.” 432 F. Supp. 3d 253, 257 (EDNY 
2020). In the District Court's view, “it [was] not enough for 
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208 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of the Court 
Plaintiffs to plausibl[y] allege that BLOM was generally 
aware of [its] role in terrorist activities, from which terrorist 
attacks were a natural and foreseeable consequence.” Id., 
at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, plain-
tiffs needed to “plausibly alleg[e] that, by providing fnancial 
services to [specifc customers], BLOM generally assumed a 
role in Hamas' violent or life-endangering activities,” and 
plaintiffs had failed to do so. Id., at 265. And, the court 
explained, leave to amend was unwarranted because “Plain-
tiffs . . . d[id] not request leave to amend”; “specifcally de-
clined the Court's offer to do so at the pre-motion confer-
ence”; and further failed to “identif[y] any additional facts 
they could allege which would address the defciencies in 
their complaint.” Id., at 270–271. The District Court thus 
made an exception to its usual practice of “grant[ing] plain-
tiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints following dis-
missal.” Id., at 270. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that 
they had pleaded facts suffcient to support their aiding-and-
abetting claim.* The Second Circuit concluded that the Dis-
trict Court had misinterpreted the general-awareness ele-
ment to impose an unduly high foreseeability requirement. 
6 F. 4th 487, 497–498 (2021). But, even applying its less ex-
acting standard, the Second Circuit determined that the 
facts alleged in the complaint “d[id] not plausibly support an 
inference that [BLOM] had the requisite general awareness 
at the time that it provided banking services” to the custom-
ers allegedly affliated with Hamas. Id., at 501. The court 
thus affrmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal. 
Id., at 503. 
B 
Plaintiffs returned to the District Court, and moved under 
Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the court's then-affrmed fnal judg-
*Plaintiffs did not appeal the “with prejudice” aspect of the District 
Court's dismissal. 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 209 
Opinion of the Court 
ment so that they could fle an amended complaint. They 
argued that the District Court should give them an opportu-
nity to meet the standard outlined by the Second Circuit. 
2022 WL 1062315, *3 (EDNY, Apr. 8, 2022). 
The District Court denied their request. Specifcally, it 
rejected plaintiffs' contention that “the Second Circuit's clar-
ifcation of the aiding-and-abetting standard” constituted 
“ `extraordinary circumstances' ” suffcient to justify relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid. That argument, according to 
the District Court, ignores the principle that “ `a mere 
change in decisional law does not constitute an “extraordi-
nary circumstance.” ' ” Ibid. In any event, the District 
Court continued, any amendment would likely be futile be-
cause it was “not clear” that plaintiffs could succeed “[e]ven 
under the clarifed standard” laid out by the Second Circuit. 
Ibid., n. 3. 
The District Court added that plaintiffs' litigation choices 
further counseled against relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The 
court explained that plaintiffs “had ample opportunity to 
pursue all legal avenues available to them for relief,” and 
sought postjudgment amendment despite having “declin[ed] 
two prior opportunities” to amend their complaint in the 
ordinary course, and “after unsuccessfully appealing the 
dismissal of that complaint with prejudice.” Id., at *3. The 
District Court declined to overlook “Plaintiffs' documented 
series of deliberate choices not to cure the defciencies identi-
fed in their pleading.” Id., at *4. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit again disagreed with the 
District Court. It acknowledged that “[a] plaintiff is ordi-
narily entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief” only under “ `extraor-
dinary circumstances.' ” 2024 WL 852265, *2 (Feb. 29, 2024). 
But, it asserted, when a party seeks vacatur under Rule 
60(b) “ `to obtain leave to fle an amended complaint, special 
considerations come into play.' ” Ibid. In that circum-
stance, the court held, “the district court must give `due re-
gard' to ` both [Rule 60(b)'s] philosophy favoring fnality of 
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210 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of the Court 
judgments . . . and the liberal amendment policy of Rule 
15(a),' ” ibid., which requires courts to “freely give leave” to 
amend pleadings before trial “when justice so requires,” Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2). In other words, courts must “bal-
ance” the competing standards by “consider[ing] Rule 60(b) 
fnality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tandem.” 2024 WL 
852265, *2. The Second Circuit held that the District Court 
had abused its discretion by “incorrectly treat[ing] Plaintiffs' 
motion to vacate and amend as calling for two distinct analy-
ses, requiring Plaintiffs to successfully navigate Rule 60(b)'s 
fnality gauntlet before they could invoke Rule 15(a)'s lib-
eral repleading policy.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 603 
U. S. 949 (2024). 
II 
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circum-
stances. That standard does not become less demanding 
when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant also hopes to amend his com-
plaint. Rather, a party seeking to reopen his case and re-
plead must frst satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms and ob-
tain Rule 60(b) relief before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment 
standard can apply. Because the Second Circuit's balancing 
approach confates this order of operations and dilutes Rule 
60(b)(6)'s well-established standard, we must reject it. 
A 
Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from fnal judgment 
and reopen a case based on mistake or excusable neglect, 
newly discovered evidence, fraud, or the void or prospec-
tively inequitable status of a judgment. See Rules 60(b)(1)– 
(5). Rule 60(b) also includes a “catchall” provision—Rule 
60(b)(6)—that allows a district court to reopen a case for 
“ `any other reason that justifes relief.' ” Kemp v. United 
States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022). A party seeking relief 
based on the grounds covered by paragraphs (1) through 
(3)—i. e., mistake or excusable neglect, new evidence, or 
fraud—faces a 1-year limitations period. See Fed. Rule Civ. 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 211 
Opinion of the Court 
Proc. 60(c)(1). That time bar, however, does not apply to 
motions for relief fled under Rule 60(b)'s other paragraphs, 
including Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid. 
The text and structure of Rule 60 make clear that relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow circum-
stances. Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall that follows paragraphs 
(1) through (5). It covers “any other reason” that justifes 
relief; that is, Rule 60(b)(6) provides only grounds for relief 
not already covered by the preceding fve paragraphs. 
Were it otherwise, the catchall provision could swallow the 
preceding paragraphs and “b[e] used to circumvent” their 
time bars. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 
486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988). Such a broad interpretation 
of Rule 60(b)(6) would thus violate a “cardinal principle of 
statutory construction” by making the preceding paragraphs 
and their limitations periods “superfuous.” Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480, 493 
(2024) (avoiding an “unbounded interpretation” of catchall 
provision that would “render superfuous” a “reticulated list” 
of provisions). Thus, we have repeatedly held that relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6) is available “only when Rules 60(b)(1) 
through (b)(5) are inapplicable.” Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533 
(citing Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 863, n. 11). 
But, “[e]ven then, ` “extraordinary circumstances” ' must 
justify reopening.” Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533. The Court 
identifed such circumstances for the frst time in Klapprott 
v. United States, 335 U. S. 601 (1949), decided shortly after 
Rule 60(b)(6)'s adoption. There, the petitioner sought to set 
aside a default judgment entered in denaturalization pro-
ceedings. See id., at 603 (opinion of Black, J.). His “allega-
tions set up an extraordinary situation”: The petitioner was 
“in jail . . . , weakened from illness, without a lawyer in the 
denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire one,” and “dis-
turbed and fully occupied in efforts to protect himself against 
the gravest criminal charges” in separate proceedings. Id., 
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212 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of the Court 
at 613–614. He was therefore “no more able to defend him-
self” in the denaturalization proceedings “than he would 
have been had he never received notice of the charges.” Id., 
at 614. On these facts, the Court found that relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6) was justifed. Id., at 614–616. 
The Court underscored the stringency of the “extraordi-
nary circumstances” test a year later in Ackermann v. 
United States, 340 U. S. 193 (1950). The petitioner there 
had suffered an adverse denaturalization judgment and de-
clined to appeal. Id., at 195. Four years later, he sought 
to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), alleging that it 
was erroneous, and that he had declined to appeal due to 
expense and the advice of a third party. Id., at 195–197. 
The Court held these circumstances insuffcient to satisfy 
Rule 60(b)(6)'s strict standard. Id., at 197. Compared to 
the situation in Klapprott, the Ackermann petitioner's alle-
gations highlighted “the difference between no choice and 
choice; imprisonment and freedom of action; no trial and 
trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and 
inexcusable negligence.” 340 U. S., at 202. The Court em-
phasized the importance of a Rule 60(b)(6) movant's fault-
lessness, explaining that “[t]here must be an end to litigation 
someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to 
be relieved from.” Id., at 198; see also, e. g., 12 J. Moore, D. 
Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Federal 
Practice § 60.48[3][b], p. 60–188 (3d ed. 2024) (“In a vast ma-
jority of the cases fnding that extraordinary circumstances 
do exist . . . , the movant is completely without fault for his 
or her predicament”). 
Our more recent cases have consistently reaffrmed that 
Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary cir-
cumstances.' ” Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; see Kemp, 596 
U. S., at 533; Tharpe v. Sellers, 583 U. S. 33, 35 (2018) (per 
curiam); Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 123 (2017); Christeson 
v. Roper, 574 U. S. 373, 380 (2015) (per curiam ); Pioneer In-
vestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates L. P ., 507 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 213 
Opinion of the Court 
U. S. 380, 393 (1993). “ `This very strict interpretation of 
Rule 60(b) is essential if the fnality of judgments is to 
be preserved.' ” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 535 
(2005) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 873 (Rehnquist, C. J., 
dissenting)). 
B 
The Rule 60(b)(6) standard does not change when a party 
seeks to reopen his case to amend his complaint. In that 
circumstance, satisfaction of Rule 60(b)(6) necessarily pre-
cedes any application of Rule 15(a). Cf. Waetzig v. Hallibur-
ton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 311 (2025) (explain-
ing that motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) “must be 
addressed before any subsequent jurisdictional questions 
[are] considered”). Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy 
therefore cannot weaken Rule 60(b)(6)'s “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” standard. 
Rules 60(b) and 15(a) apply at different stages of litigation 
and demand separate inquiries. Rule 15(a) governs pre-
trial amendments, and sets forth a standard under which 
courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 
Rule 15(a)(2). The Rule's “purpose is to provide maxi-
mum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits 
rather than on procedural technicalities.” 6 C. Wright, A. 
Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1471, 
p. 587 (3d ed. 2010) (Wright & Miller). That standard, how-
ever, does not govern when, following a fnal judgment, the 
case is closed and there is no pending pleading to amend. 
Accord, e. g., Boyd v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 114 
F. 4th 1232, 1237 (CA11 2024) (“[O]nce the court has entered 
fnal judgment, Rule 15(a) no longer applies and no amend-
ment is possible unless the judgment is frst set aside”). A 
contrary approach “would enable the liberal amendment pol-
icy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to 
the philosophy favoring fnality of judgments and the expedi-
tious termination of litigation.” 6 Wright & Miller § 1489, 
at 816. 
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214 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of the Court 
Thus, we disagree with the Second Circuit's holding that 
the District Court should have used a hybrid standard to 
“consider Rule 60(b) fnality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tan-
dem.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. It is Rule 60(b)'s standard— 
and only Rule 60(b)'s standard—that applies when a party 
seeks relief from fnal judgment. A party seeking Rule 
60(b)(6) relief must always demonstrate “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” justifying relief, see Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); what he intends to do if his 
case is reopened does not alter that standard, see supra, at 
211, 213; cf., e. g., In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litigation, 
511 F. 3d 611, 624 (CA6 2008) (“Plaintiffs must frst meet the 
threshold requirement of 60(b)(6)'s extraordinary or excep-
tional circumstances to vacate the judgment before seeking 
to conduct discovery”). In other words, the District Court 
was correct to “trea[t] Plaintiffs' motion to vacate and amend 
as calling for two distinct analyses,” with the question of 
vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6) preceding that of repleading 
under Rule 15(a). 2024 WL 852265, *2; accord, e. g., Daulat-
zai v. Maryland, 97 F. 4th 166, 179 (CA4 2024) (“[W]hen the 
motion to vacate is fled under Rule 60(b), the more restric-
tive standard for granting that motion must be satisfed be-
fore consideration can be given to the motion to amend”). 
None of our analysis, however, should be taken to suggest 
that a district court contravenes Rule 60(b) merely by con-
sidering a movant's desire to amend his complaint. For ex-
ample, where a party seeks vacatur in order to amend its 
pleadings, a district court is free to cite Rule 15 and acknowl-
edge amendment-related considerations, such as whether a 
movant has had the opportunity to amend, and the amend-
ment standard that the party will eventually have to meet if 
the Rule 60(b) motion is granted. What a district court may 
not do is what the Second Circuit demanded here: dilute Rule 
60(b)(6)'s stringent standard by “balanc[ing]” it with “Rule 
15(a)'s liberal pleading principles.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 215 
Opinion of the Court 
C 
Plaintiffs insist that the Second Circuit's approach is conso-
nant with Rule 60(b)(6) and our precedents interpreting that 
provision, but their arguments are unpersuasive. 
Balancing the strict standards of Rule 60(b)(6) against the 
more relaxed standards of Rule 15 necessarily weakens the 
former, and is thus incompatible with our long line of prece-
dents holding that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in 
`extraordinary circumstances.' ” Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; 
accord, 6 Wright & Miller § 1489, at 816. Even the Second 
Circuit appeared to acknowledge that its test departed from 
the “ordinar[y]” approach to Rule 60(b)(6) under which a 
plaintiff may receive relief only by demonstrating “ `extraor-
dinary circumstances' ” and showing that “ `the asserted 
grounds for relief are not recognized in clauses (1)–(5) of the 
Rule.' ” 2024 WL 852265, *2. 
Nor does this Court's decision in Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 
178 (1962), help plaintiffs. The Foman Court held that the 
District Court's denial of the petitioner's motions to vacate 
the court's judgment and amend her complaint rested on 
“technicalities” that ran contrary to “the spirit of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 181–182. But, 
Foman dealt with Rule 59(e), not Rule 60(b), id., at 181, and 
“Rule 60(b) differs from Rule 59(e) in just about every way 
that matters to the inquiry here,” Banister v. Davis, 590 
U. S. 504, 518 (2020). Most relevant, a Rule 60(b) motion 
“threaten[s] an already fnal judgment with successive litiga-
tion,” id., at 519, and a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) in particu-
lar may threaten fnal judgments years after they are en-
tered. See Rule 60(c)(1). In contrast, “[t]he fling of a Rule 
59(e) motion within the 28-day period `suspends the fnality 
of the original judgment,' ” and “[o]nly the disposition of that 
motion `restores th[e] fnality' of the original judgment.” 
Banister, 590 U. S., at 508. Because Rule 59(e) does not 
threaten the fnality of judgments to the same degree that 
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216 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of the Court 
Rule 60(b)(6) does, we do not require a movant to show the 
same “extraordinary circumstances” to receive relief. See 
Foman, 371 U. S., at 181–182. 
III 
We also disagree with the Second Circuit's disposition of 
this case. District courts' Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed 
“only for abuse of discretion.” Browder v. Director, Dept. 
of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). That 
standard is “limited and deferential.” Gonzalez, 545 U. S., 
at 535. To be upheld, a district court's decision need only 
“ `appl[y] the correct legal standard and offe[r] substantial 
justifcation' ” for its conclusion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990). The District Court's deter-
mination that plaintiffs failed to “demonstrat[e] any extraor-
dinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6),” 
2022 WL 1062315, *3, easily clears that bar. 
For the reasons we have explained, the District Court was 
correct to “evaluat[e] Plaintiffs' motion under only Rule 
60(b)'s standard.” 2024 WL 852265, *2; see supra, at 211– 
214. And, the District Court offered persuasive justifca-
tions for fnding that standard unsatisfed—that the Second 
Circuit's clarifcation of the test for aiding-and-abetting lia-
bility did not “constitute extraordinary circumstances,” par-
ticularly when plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed under that 
standard, and that plaintiffs' “series of deliberate choices not 
to cure the defciencies identifed in their pleading” also cut 
against them. 2022 WL 1062315, *3–*4, and n. 3; see supra, 
at 209. Those justifcations follow from core tenets of Rule 
60(b) doctrine. See, e. g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 
239 (1997) (“Intervening developments in the law by them-
selves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances re-
quired for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)”); Pioneer Investment 
Services, 507 U. S., at 393 (“ `extraordinary circumstances' ” 
must suggest that the movant is “faultless in the delay”). 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 217 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
The District Court's decision therefore fell within the 
“ `wide range of choice' ” afforded under the abuse-of -
discretion standard. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U. S. 72, 83 
(2017). The Second Circuit erred in holding otherwise. 
* * * 
The judgment of the Second Circuit is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
I join all but Part III of the Court's opinion. I agree with 
the Court's conclusion that, when a district court considers 
“a movant's desire to amend his complaint” in the context of 
a motion to reopen a case under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b)(6), the Rule 60(b)(6) standard, rather than the 
Rule 15(a) standard, applies. Ante, at 214. Given the def-
erence owed to lower courts with respect to Rule 60(b)(6) 
determinations, I also agree that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying reopening here. Ante, at 
216–217. 
I write separately to emphasize that our affrmance of the 
District Court's denial of reopening in this case does not re-
quire accepting all aspects of the District Court's reasoning. 
In particular, I think the District Court was wrong to fault 
plaintiffs for making a “deliberate choic[e]” to appeal the dis-
missal of their complaint in lieu of accepting various pre-
dismissal opportunities to cure purported pleading def-
ciencies. 2022 WL 1062315, *4 (EDNY, Apr. 8, 2022). The 
District Court based that aspect of its reopening determina-
tion on our opinion in Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 
193 (1950). But, as I explain below, the “choice” that plain-
tiffs made—declining to amend—does not categorically pre-
clude Rule 60(b)(6) relief under that precedent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

218 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
I 
Rule 60(b) permits district courts to reopen cases after the 
entry of a fnal judgment “under a limited set of circum-
stances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evi-
dence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 528 (2005). This 
Rule “ `attempts to strike a proper balance between the con-
ficting principles that litigation must be brought to an end 
and that justice should be done.' ” Waetzig v. Halliburton 
Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 309 (2025) (quoting 11 
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2851, p. 286 (3d ed. 2012)). 
The sixth paragraph of Rule 60(b) is the provision at issue 
here; it is a “catchall” that permits reopening for reasons not 
covered in the Rule's preceding fve paragraphs. Kemp v. 
United States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022). The opening para-
graphs of subsection (b) specifcally enumerate various bases 
for relief: mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and the 
voiding or satisfaction of a judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
60(b)(1)–(5). Then, under paragraph (6), a court may, “[o]n 
motion and just terms,” reopen a judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding for “any other reason that justifes relief,” Rule 
60(b)(6), provided that the motion is fled “within a reason-
able time,” Rule 60(c)(1). 
Because of the “mutually exclusive” nature of Rule 60(b)'s 
provisions, Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick 
Associates L. P ., 507 U. S. 380, 393 (1993), this Court has long 
held that “relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow 
circumstances,” ante, at 211. We have thus required Rule 
60(b)(6) movants to demonstrate that “ ` “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” ' ” justify reopening the case. Kemp, 596 U. S., 
at 533. In this Court's frst case applying Rule 60(b)(6), we 
concluded that reopening was warranted where a movant al-
leged “an extraordinary situation”—namely, that he had been 
stripped of his citizenship by default judgment while he was, 
among other things, incarcerated and in ill health. Klap-
prott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613–614 (1949) (opinion 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 219 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
of Black, J.). The Court considered a similar Rule 60(b)(6) 
request for reopening in the context of a denaturalization 
proceeding one year later in Ackermann—and reached a dif-
ferent outcome: We upheld the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion, expressly distinguishing Klapprott. 340 U. S., at 
199–200. Critically, the movant in Ackermann had sought 
reopening only after “ma[king] a considered choice not to 
appeal” the adverse judgment. Id., at 198. Given the need 
for “an end to litigation someday,” we explained that a mov-
ant “cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight 
seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was 
probably wrong.” Ibid. 
Under this line of precedent, the Court has concluded that 
“due diligence” by the movant is a prerequisite to obtaining 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi-
tion Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988). For that reason, 
we have consistently found reopening inappropriate where, 
as in Ackermann, a movant deliberately terminated the un-
derlying litigation. A decade after Ackermann, for exam-
ple, we held that a Rule 60(b)(6) movant who had “aban-
doned” his appeal from a denaturalization judgment due to 
its perceived “small likelihood of . . . success” was not enti-
tled to reopening under Rule 60(b)(6) where he could not 
otherwise demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Po-
lites v. United States, 364 U. S. 426, 432–433 (1960). More 
recently, we found reopening inappropriate when a movant 
had “abandoned any attempt to seek review of” the decision 
in question. Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 537; cf. Pioneer Invest-
ment Services, 507 U. S., at 393 (explaining that, to obtain 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief more than one year after the entry of a 
fnal judgment, a party must be “faultless in the delay”). 
II 
A 
Relying on Ackermann, the District Court below sug-
gested that plaintiffs could not demonstrate extraordinary 
Page Proof Pending Publication

220 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
circumstances because they had made a “documented series 
of deliberate choices not to cure the defciencies identifed in 
their pleading.” 2022 WL 1062315, *4 (citing Ackermann, 
340 U. S., at 198). The District Court thus faulted plaintiffs 
for believing that their complaint alleged suffcient facts and 
declining to amend it; they opted instead to seek clarifcation 
from the appeals court regarding the suffciency of their 
pleading. See 2022 WL 1062315, *3 (“Fundamentally, Plain-
tiffs seek to amend their complaint after declining two prior 
opportunities to do so, and after unsuccessfully appealing the 
dismissal of that complaint with prejudice”). 
In my view, the District Court should not have assumed 
that Ackermann 's lack-of-due-diligence principle applies 
under these circumstances. Plaintiffs did not “abando[n]” 
this litigation. Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 537; Polites, 364 U. S., 
at 433. Instead, they diligently pursued their “ `statutory 
right' ” to appeal on the grounds that, in their view, the Dis-
trict Court had mistakenly concluded their complaint was 
insuffcient. Waetzig, 604 U. S., at 314. 
To be sure, the courts below did ultimately fnd that the 
factual allegations in plaintiffs' complaint were defcient. 
But that just means that plaintiffs were overconfdent about 
the strength of their pleading and their prospect of success 
on appeal. A misstep of this nature is not abandonment— 
far from it—and the fact that a plaintiff opts to appeal does 
not alone preclude Rule 60(b)(6) relief, provided that he can 
otherwise demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and has 
not exhibited “neglect or lack of due diligence.” Liljeberg, 
486 U. S., at 863, n. 11; cf. Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 123– 
126 (2017) (holding that the use of race-based considerations 
at sentencing in a capital case was an extraordinary circum-
stance warranting reopening even though the movant's coun-
sel had introduced the evidence in question). 
The bottom line, jurisprudentially, is that courts should 
refrain from refexively denying reopening for amendment 
purposes when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant's only purported 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025) 221 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
“fault” was a prior decision not to amend the complaint. 
See S. Dodson, Rethinking Extraordinary Circumstances, 
106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 377, 386 (2012) (arguing that Ackermann 
should preclude reopening only with respect to “those mov-
ants who deliberately stop pursuing their claims”). 
B 
A plaintiff may have good reasons for seeking clarifcation 
from the appeals court before taking the signifcant step of 
amending his pleading. In this case, for example, plaintiffs 
allege that BLOM Bank SAL “aided and abetted Hamas's 
commission of” certain “terrorist attacks by providing f-
nancial services to customers who were allegedly affliated 
with Hamas and who had helped further Hamas's goals.” 
Ante, at 207. These are serious allegations. One would 
reasonably expect plaintiffs to exercise great caution before 
making additional factual assertions that further link BLOM 
to alleged terrorist activities. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
11(b)–(c). 
Moreover, and importantly, denying reopening after ap-
peal merely because the plaintiff previously declined to 
amend the complaint risks undermining the “ `statutory 
right' to take an appeal from any `fnal decision' ” of a district 
court. Waetzig, 604 U. S., at 314. If a plaintiff is necessar-
ily at fault for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes just because he exer-
cised his right to appeal, then plaintiffs will be disincentiv-
ized to go to the courts of appeals even when they reasonably 
believe the allegations in their pleadings are suffcient. 
That outcome not only divests them of their right to appel-
late review, but could also leave important legal questions 
regarding pleading suffciency unanswered. 
It is particularly inappropriate to deny Rule 60(b)(6) re-
opening based on a prior refusal to amend where a clear, 
intervening change in the law supplies the necessary “ex-
traordinary circumstances.” Cf. Kemp, 596 U. S., at 540 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (detailing this Court's “settled 
Page Proof Pending Publication

222 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
precedents” recognizing “the availability of Rule 60(b)(6) to 
reopen a judgment in extraordinary circumstances, including 
a change in controlling law”). To treat the plaintiff's prior 
refusals to amend as dispositive in such a situation would be 
manifestly inconsistent with “the preference expressed in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general . . . for re-
solving disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Cro-
ciere S. p. A., 560 U. S. 538, 550 (2010). 
* * * 
This Court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion only 
for an abuse of discretion, and does not opine here, in the 
frst instance, as to whether these plaintiffs have demon-
strated extraordinary circumstances. Ante, at 216. The 
District Court's primary justifcation for denying plaintiffs' 
motion to reopen was that the Second Circuit's “clarifcation” 
of the applicable legal standard did not qualify as an extraor-
dinary circumstance, particularly when plaintiffs were un-
likely to prevail “[e]ven under the clarifed standard.” 2022 
WL 1062315, *3, and n. 3. I concur in today's judgment be-
cause I agree that the District Court did not abuse its discre-
tion with respect to denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief on that 
basis. But I fnd the District Court's alternative ground for 
denying reopening—that plaintiffs were at fault because 
they declined prior opportunities to amend their complaint— 
neither “persuasive” nor consistent with “core tenets of Rule 
60(b) doctrine.” Ante, at 216. Assuming extraordinary cir-
cumstances otherwise exist, a plaintiff should not be faulted 
under Rule 60(b)(6) for reasonably having chosen to appeal 
rather than amend his complaint. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
None

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 Pages 204–222 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 5, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  ciples with Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy. Held: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must frst satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard…

• #3

  that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary circum- stances.' ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 864. Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, does not suggest otherwise. Foman dealt with Rule 59(e), which does not threaten the fnality of judgments to the same degree that Rule …

• #4

  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6). We have consistently held that only “extraordinary circumstances” can justify relief under the Rule 60(b)(6) catchall. The question presented is whether this rigorous standard applies when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant seeks to reopen a case for the purpose of fling an amended complaint. W…

• #5

  awareness . . . elemen[t] necessary to plead JASTA aiding- and-abetting liability.” 432 F. Supp. 3d 253, 257 (EDNY 2020). In the District Court's view, “it [was] not enough for Page Proof Pending Publication 208 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN Opinion of the Court Plaintiffs to plausibl[y] allege that BLOM was genera…

• #6

  2022 WL 1062315, *3 (EDNY, Apr. 8, 2022). The District Court denied their request. Specifcally, it rejected plaintiffs' contention that “the Second Circuit's clar- ifcation of the aiding-and-abetting standard” constituted “ `extraordinary circumstances' ” suffcient to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid. Tha…

• #7

  motion to vacate and amend as calling for two distinct analy- ses, requiring Plaintiffs to successfully navigate Rule 60(b)'s fnality gauntlet before they could invoke Rule 15(a)'s lib- eral repleading policy.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 603 U. S. 949 (2024). II Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinar…

• #8

  Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480, 493 (2024) (avoiding an “unbounded interpretation” of catchall provision that would “render superfuous” a “reticulated list” of provisions). Thus, we have repeatedly held that relief under Rule …

• #9

  phasized the importance of a Rule 60(b)(6) movant's fault- lessness, explaining that “[t]here must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from.” Id., at 198; see also, e. g., 12 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Federal Pr…

• #10

  case is closed and there is no pending pleading to amend. Accord, e. g., Boyd v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 114 F. 4th 1232, 1237 (CA11 2024) (“[O]nce the court has entered fnal judgment, Rule 15(a) no longer applies and no amend- ment is possible unless the judgment is frst set aside”). A contrary approach…

• #11

  ment standard that the party will eventually have to meet if the Rule 60(b) motion is granted. What a district court may not do is what the Second Circuit demanded here: dilute Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard by “balanc[ing]” it with “Rule 15(a)'s liberal pleading principles.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. Page Proof Pe…

• #12

  Opinion of the Court Rule 60(b)(6) does, we do not require a movant to show the same “extraordinary circumstances” to receive relief. See Foman, 371 U. S., at 181–182. III We also disagree with the Second Circuit's disposition of this case. District courts' Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed “only for abuse of dis…

• #13

  Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join all but Part III of the Court's opinion. I agree with the Court's conclusion that, when a district court considers “a movant's desire to amend his complaint” in the context of a motion to reopen a case under Federal Rule of Civil Proce- d…

• #14

  voiding or satisfaction of a judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1)–(5). Then, under paragraph (6), a court may, “[o]n motion and just terms,” reopen a judgment, order, or pro- ceeding for “any other reason that justifes relief,” Rule 60(b)(6), provided that the motion is fled “within a reason- able time,” Rule…

• #15

  its perceived “small likelihood of . . . success” was not enti- tled to reopening under Rule 60(b)(6) where he could not otherwise demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Po- lites v. United States, 364 U. S. 426, 432–433 (1960). More recently, we found reopening inappropriate when a movant had “abandoned any at…

• #16

  486 U. S., at 863, n. 11; cf. Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 123– 126 (2017) (holding that the use of race-based considerations at sentencing in a capital case was an extraordinary circum- stance warranting reopening even though the movant's coun- sel had introduced the evidence in question). The bottom line, juri…

• #17

  (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (detailing this Court's “settled Page Proof Pending Publication 222 BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN Opinion of Jackson, J. precedents” recognizing “the availability of Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen a judgment in extraordinary circumstances, including a change in controlling law”). To treat the p…

• #18

  include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None