CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp.

Summary

To exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 223–237 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
June 5, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2024 223 
Syllabus 
CC/DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. et al. v. ANTRIX 
CORP. LTD. et al. 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the ninth circuit 
No. 23–1201. Argued March 3, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025* 
Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. signed a satellite-leasing agreement with 
Antrix Corporation Ltd., which is owned by the Republic of India for 
use by its Department of Space. But when the Indian Government 
later determined it needed more satellite capacity for itself, Antrix ter-
minated the contract under its force majeure clause. The parties pro-
ceeded to arbitration. After unanimously concluding that Antrix had 
breached the contract, the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million 
in damages plus interest. Devas then petitioned the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington to confrm the award. 
The District Court confrmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judg-
ment against Antrix. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, fnding that personal jurisdiction was 
lacking. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) 
an immunity exception applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been 
properly served. § 1330(b). The Ninth Circuit did not question that 
Antrix is a “foreign state” under the FSIA, that an immunity exception 
applies, and that Devas effectuated proper service. Yet bound by Cir-
cuit precedent, the panel explained that the Act imposes an additional 
requirement: “personal jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a tra-
ditional minimum contacts analysis” as set forth in International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, and its progeny. Applying that stand-
ard, the court concluded it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over 
Antrix because Antrix lacked suffcient suit-related contacts with the 
United States. 
Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity ex-
ception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof 
of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required 
by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. 
Pp. 232–237. 
*Together with No. 24–17, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix 
Corp. Ltd. et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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224 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Syllabus 
(a) The FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision imposes two substan-
tive requirements. First, the district court must have subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which the FSIA grants whenever an enumerated immunity 
exception applies. Second, service must be made under the FSIA's 
specialized service-of-process rules. When both criteria are satisfed, 
the statute declares that personal jurisdiction “shall exist.” Accord-
ingly, the most natural reading of the operative text is that personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is automatic whenever an immunity 
exception applies and service of process has been accomplished. Nota-
bly absent from the provision is any reference to “minimum contacts.” 
And the Court declines to add what Congress left out, as the FSIA 
was supposed to “clarify the governing standards,” not hide the ball. 
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 488. 
Of course, the FSIA's immunity exceptions themselves require vary-
ing degrees of suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed. 
But to the extent these exceptions satisfy International Shoe , it is be-
cause the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not 
because the Act's personal-jurisdiction provision secretly incorporated 
the Court's due-process cases. 
The Act's structure reinforces this reading. The FSIA “comprehen-
sively regulat[es] the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United 
States.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134, 
141. The immunity and jurisdictional provisions form the foundation of 
that comprehensive scheme, and Congress deliberately tied them to-
gether: whenever an exception applies, the FSIA strips immunity and 
grants jurisdiction. Reading an additional minimum-contacts require-
ment into only one of the FSIA's tethered immunity and jurisdictional 
provisions would weaken the link Congress forged and create a gap in 
the Act's otherwise “comprehensive framework.” Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 699. Pp. 232–235. 
(b) The Ninth Circuit's two contrary arguments cannot override the 
plain meaning of the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision. First, the 
fact that one of the immunity exceptions contains language resembling 
the minimum-contacts test says little about whether a jurisdictional pro-
vision located elsewhere categorically imposes that test. Second, the 
legislative history cited by the Ninth Circuit shows only that Congress 
believed the contacts set forth in the Act's then-existing immunity 
exceptions satisfy due process, not that the personal-jurisdiction pro-
vision silently includes an atextual minimum-contacts requirement. 
Pp. 235–236. 
(c) Antrix's alternative arguments—that the Fifth Amendment itself 
requires a showing of minimum contacts, that the claims at issue do not 
fall within the FSIA's arbitration exception, and that the suit should be

Cite as: 605 U. S. 223 (2025) 225 
Opinion of the Court 
dismissed under forum non conveniens—were not addressed below by 
the Ninth Circuit. This Court declines to address them in the frst 
instance. Pp. 236–237. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
Aaron M. Streett argued the cause for petitioner in No. 24– 
17. With him on the briefs was Christopher E. Tutunjian. 
Matthew D. McGill argued the cause for petitioners in No. 
23–1201. With him on the briefs in both cases were Jacob 
T. Spencer, Ankita Ritwik, David W. Casazza, Brian C. Mc-
Carty, Anne Champion, and Malaika Eaton. 
Acting Solicitor General Harris argued the cause for the 
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both 
cases. On the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Dep-
uty Solicitor General Kneedler , Anthony A. Yang, Sharon 
Swingle, and Lewis S. Yelin. 
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents in 
both cases. With him on the brief were Gregory M. Wil-
liams, Kwaku A. Akowuah, and Madeleine Joseph.† 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq ., foreign states are 
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Peter B. 
Rutledge, Jennifer B. Dickey , Jonathan D. Urick, and Ryan P . Meyers; 
for the United States Council for International Business by Viren Mascar-
enhas and D. Jason File; for George A. Bermann by Alexander A. Yanos 
and Kristen K. Bromberek; for Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. by James E. 
Berger, Samantha Chaifetz, and Charlene C. Sun; and for Mark B. Feld-
man by Robert K. Kry and Mark B. Feldman, pro se. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the 
Republic of India by Andrea J. Menaker, Nicolle Kownacki, and Weiqian 
Luo; for the Republic of Zimbabwe by Rodney Q. Smith II; and for Paul 
B. Stephan by Jeffrey T. Green. 
Seth P . Waxman and Eric L. Hawkins fled a brief for Ingrid (Wuerth) 
Brunk as amicus curiae in both cases. 
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226 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Opinion of the Court 
generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the 
Act creates several exceptions. See §§ 1604, 1605–1607. 
And when an exception applies, § 1330(a) of the FSIA vests 
federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims. 
This suit concerns the FSIA's neighboring personal-
jurisdiction provision. It provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an ex-
ception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the 
foreign defendant has been properly served. § 1330(b). In 
the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third 
requirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state 
has made “minimum contacts” with the United States suff-
cient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and 
its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit's additional require-
ment goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse. 
I 
A 
Like so many disputes, this one began with two companies 
and a contract. Antrix Corporation Ltd. (Antrix) is orga-
nized under Indian law and is owned by the Republic of India 
for use by its Department of Space. In Antrix's words, it 
serves as “the commercial arm of Indian Space Research Or-
ganisation”—a division within the Department of Space— 
and is tasked with “promot[ing] and commercially market-
[ing] the products and services emanating from the Indian 
Space Programme.” No. 2:18–cv–01360 (WD Wash., Dec. 21, 
2018), ECF Doc. 24–1, p. 43. The Indian Government f-
nances most of Antrix's operations and appoints much of its 
leadership. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a. 
In January 2005, Antrix signed a satellite-leasing agree-
ment with Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (Devas), a pri-
vately owned Indian company incorporated to develop 
satellite-based telecommunications technology. Under the 
agreement, Antrix would build and launch a new satellite 
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Opinion of the Court 
network into geostationary orbit*—specifcally, at the 83°E 
orbital slot—and lease some of that network's capacity back 
to Devas. Devas, in turn, would use its leased satellite ca-
pacity to provide multimedia broadcasting services across 
India. 
The agreement proceeded as expected for several years. 
Antrix obtained project approval from the Indian Govern-
ment and clearance from the International Telecommunica-
tions Union, the arm of the United Nations responsible for 
allocating orbital satellite space among member states. For 
its part, Devas secured the requisite internet- and television-
provider licenses, brought on investors, and paid Antrix the 
contractually required fees. And as satellite construction 
neared completion, the parties performed several success-
ful trials of Devas's newly developed software and 
infrastructure. 
In February 2011, however, Antrix and Devas hit a snag. 
Just before the satellites were scheduled for launch, the In-
dian Government determined it needed greater satellite ca-
pacity for itself and could no longer lease its limited S-band 
spectrum (the type Antrix and Devas planned to use) for 
commercial use. So, at the behest of government offcials, 
Antrix terminated the agreement with Devas. Citing the 
contract's force majeure clause, Antrix explained that India's 
new satellite-allocation policy prevented it from continuing 
performance on the contract. 
But Devas thought Antrix was liable for the fnancial fall-
out. So Devas invoked the contract's arbitration provision, 
commenced proceedings, and argued the purported force 
*“Satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) fly above Earth's equator, 
moving from west to east, exactly matching Earth's rotation . . . . GEO 
is ideal for satellites that need to stay fxed above a specifc location, such 
as telecommunication satellites, allowing antennas on Earth to stay in a 
constant position, always pointing at the satellite.” European Space 
Agency, Types of Orbits (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.esa.int/Enabling_ 
Support/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits.

228 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Opinion of the Court 
majeure was self-induced. The three-member arbitral panel 
ruled unanimously for Devas on September 14, 2015. 
Applying Indian law, the panel concluded Antrix had wrong-
fully terminated the contract and awarded Devas $562.5 mil-
lion in damages plus interest. 
After successfully confrming the arbitration award in 
France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought to do the 
same in the United States. See 2 J. Grenig, Domke on Com-
mercial Arbitration § 41:1, p. 467 (3d ed. 2025) (“[C]onfrma-
tion of an arbitration award fnalizes the award and makes 
the award a judgment of the court”). In September 2018, 
Devas petitioned the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington to confrm the award, citing 
the FSIA's so-called arbitration exception as the basis for 
federal jurisdiction. See 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(6). Antrix 
moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction. 
B 
For much of American history, foreign states and their in-
strumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our 
courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 118–119 
(2025). This posture refected the venerable international 
law principle that states are independent sovereign entities, 
and it encouraged others to respect the sovereignty of the 
United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. 
170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily 
or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long under-
stood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and 
comity,” so judges historically “ `deferred to the decisions of 
the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive 
Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction' over particular ac-
tions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004) 
(quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 
480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 223 (2025) 229 
Opinion of the Court 
Department fling a case-specifc “ `suggestion of immunity' ” 
whenever a foreign sovereign was sued, and when that oc-
curred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar 
v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 
318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)). 
Beginning in the mid-20th century, the Executive Branch 
adopted a more nuanced stance toward sovereign immunity, 
but its new approach “proved troublesome.” Verlinden, 461 
U. S., at 487. Specifcally, the State Department declared in 
1952 it would no longer suggest immunity in “cases arising 
out of a foreign state's strictly commercial acts.” Ibid. 
While this shift brought the United States into parity with 
the emerging international consensus, it also provoked ten-
sion and confusion. “[F]oreign nations often placed diplo-
matic pressure on the State Department,” and, “[o]n occa-
sion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity 
in cases where immunity would not have been available.” 
Ibid. Furthermore, in instances where the State Depart-
ment simply failed to fle any suggestion, courts were forced 
to determine immunity based on standards that were “nei-
ther clear nor uniformly applied.” Id., at 488. 
Congress addressed the problem in 1976 by enacting the 
FSIA, now “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a 
foreign state in our courts.” Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 434 (1989). Instead 
of case-by-case determinations that were governed by fuzzy 
legal standards and prone to manipulation, the FSIA im-
poses a bright-line rule: foreign states and their instru-
mentalities are immune from suit unless one of the Act's 
enumerated exceptions applies. 28 U. S. C. § 1604; see 
§§ 1605–1607. Exceptions include claims based on commer-
cial activities with a specifed nexus to the United States, 
§ 1605(a)(2), claims based on torts that have caused domestic 
personal injury or property damage, § 1605(a)(5), claims 
based on certain expropriations, § 1605(a)(3), and several 
others. 
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230 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Opinion of the Court 
The Act also waives immunity for suits to confrm arbitra-
tion awards. § 1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception ap-
plies in four statutorily defned contexts, including where 
the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other 
international agreement in force for the United States call-
ing for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” 
§ 1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has acceded 
to the New York Convention, which requires it to en -
force certain awards issued abroad. See Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997; 
9 U. S. C. §§ 201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA 
is otherwise satisfed, the arbitration exception would also 
apply. 
Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdic-
tion usually follows. That is because the Act's jurisdictional 
provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1330, pegs both subject-matter and 
personal jurisdiction to the exceptions. Subsection (a) of 
that provision grants district courts “original jurisdiction” 
over “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which 
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . . under sec-
tions 1605–1607,” which are the FSIA's immunity exceptions. 
And subsection (b) provides for personal jurisdiction “as to 
every claim for relief over which the district courts have 
jurisdiction under subsection (a)”—i. e., for every claim sub-
ject to an immunity exception—and “where service has been 
made under section 1608.” See Republic of Sudan v. Har-
rison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing § 1608's spe-
cialized service-of-process rules). 
C 
Once this dispute arrived in federal court in this country, 
a dramatic series of events unfolded. Upon satisfying itself 
that jurisdiction was proper under the FSIA's arbitration ex-
ception, the District Court confrmed the award and entered 
a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix. Yet before Devas 
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could collect, an Indian corporate-law tribunal found that 
Devas—an Indian company—had procured the Devas–Antrix 
agreement by fraud; so the tribunal appointed an Indian 
Government offcial to seize control of Devas and wind down 
its affairs. Quickly thereafter, several Devas shareholders 
and an American subsidiary attempted to intervene in the 
federal proceedings below and to enforce the judgment 
themselves. Successfully so: over Devas's and Antrix's ob-
jections, they intervened, secured post-judgment discovery 
to locate Antrix's domestic assets, and registered the judg-
ment in the Eastern District of Virginia, where Antrix held 
executable assets. Then, adding one last wrinkle to an al-
ready complex dispute, the High Court of New Delhi set 
aside the arbitration award based largely on the Indian 
corporate-law tribunal's earlier fraud determination. 
Several appeals followed, and a Ninth Circuit panel found 
that personal jurisdiction was lacking and therefore reversed 
the District Court's orders confrming and registering the 
award. See No. 20–36024 etc. (Aug. 1, 2023), App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 3a–8a. The court did not question “that for pur-
poses of the FSIA, Antrix is a `foreign state,' service has 
been made, and an enumerated exception applies.” Id., at 
4a. Yet bound by Circuit precedent, the panel explained 
that the Act imposes an additional requirement: “personal 
jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a traditional min-
imum contacts analysis,” ibid., which is a reference to our 
jurisdictional due-process test frst developed in Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 
277, 283–286 (2014). Applying that standard, the court con-
cluded that Antrix lacked suffcient suit-related contacts 
with the United States and that the lawsuit must therefore 
be dismissed. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the FSIA re-
quires proof of “minimum contacts” before a court can exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state. See 603 
U. S. 949 (2024). We hold it does not.

232 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Opinion of the Court 
II 
The facts of this suit are complex, but the legal question 
we address today is straightforward. The text and struc-
ture of the FSIA demonstrate that Congress did not require 
“minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already re-
quired by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sover-
eign immunity. 
A 
We start, as always, with the relevant statutory text. 
Here, that is the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision, 28 
U. S. C. § 1330(b). It provides: 
“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist 
as to every claim for relief over which the district courts 
have [subject-matter] jurisdiction under subsection 
(a) where service has been made under section 1608 of 
this title.” 
As noted earlier, this provision imposes two substantive re-
quirements—one related to subject-matter jurisdiction, the 
other related to service of process. See supra, at 230. 
First, “district courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction 
under subsection (a)” when any of the FSIA's immunity ex-
ceptions applies. See Amerada Hess, 488 U. S., at 434–435. 
Second, “service has been made under section 1608” when 
a plaintiff complies with the FSIA's specialized service-of-
process rules. See Harrison, 587 U. S., at 4–5, 8–13. 
When both criteria are satisfed, the statute declares that 
personal jurisdiction “shall exist,” and, “as in other contexts, 
the use of the word `shall' creates an obligation impervious 
to judicial discretion.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 476 
(2024) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, the most natural reading of § 1330(b) is that personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is “automatic” when-
ever (1) “an exception to immunity applies” and (2) “service 
of process has been accomplished.” Samantar, 560 U. S., at 
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Opinion of the Court 
324, n. 20; accord, Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 485, n. 5; Restate-
ment (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 451, Comment b (2017). Or phrased in even simpler terms, 
“subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals 
personal jurisdiction.” GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port 
Auth., 680 F. 3d 805, 811 (CADC 2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Notably absent from § 1330(b) is any reference to “mini-
mum contacts.” And we decline to add in what Congress 
left out: the FSIA was supposed to “clarify the governing 
standards,” not hide the ball. Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 488; 
cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 618 
(1992) (refusing to read an “unexpressed requirement” into 
the FSIA). 
Although nothing in the text of § 1330(b) requires a 
minimum-contacts analysis, that does not mean Congress 
dispensed altogether with proof of contact between the for-
eign state and the United States. In order for subject-
matter jurisdiction to exist under the FSIA, an exception to 
immunity must apply. See § 1330(a). And the FSIA's im-
munity exceptions themselves require varying degrees of 
suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed. 
See §§ 1605–1607. Some exceptions call for considerable do-
mestic nexus, such as “rights in immovable property situated 
in the United States,” “commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state,” or “commercial activity 
of the foreign state elsewhere” that “causes a direct effect 
in the United States.” §§ 1605(a)(2)–(4); see Verlinden, 461 
U. S., at 490–491. Others, like § 1605A's terrorism excep-
tion, are satisfed by less direct or pervasive contact with the 
territory of the United States, as the parties acknowledge. 
See Brief for Petitioner Devas Multimedia Private Limited 
26, 31–32; Brief for Petitioner CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited 
et al. 48–49; Brief in Opposition 7. To the extent that some 
or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe , it is only 
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234 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Opinion of the Court 
because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that 
standard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our 
jurisdictional due-process cases. 
The Act's structure reinforces this straightforward read-
ing of § 1330(b)'s text. As we have recognized on many oc-
casions, the FSIA “ `comprehensively regulat[es] the amen-
ability of foreign nations to suit in the United States.' ” 
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134, 
141 (2014) (quoting Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 493). The Act's 
immunity and jurisdictional provisions are the foundation of 
this comprehensive scheme, and Congress deliberately tied 
them together. Namely, whenever a §§ 1605–1607 exception 
applies, § 1604's immunity falls away, and § 1330 grants juris-
diction. See supra, at 229–230; Amerada Hess, 488 U. S., at 
434–435, and n. 3 (detailing how immunity and jurisdiction 
“work in tandem”); Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 485, n. 5, 489, 
and n. 14 (same); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 294 F. 3d 82, 89 (CADC 2002) (observing that “the 
FSIA collapses subject matter jurisdiction, in personam ju-
risdiction, and sovereign immunity into a single inquiry”). 
And, in the narrow instances where Congress did not want for 
immunity and jurisdiction to be coextensive with the enu-
merated exceptions, it said so. See §§ 1330(a)–(b) (limiting 
jurisdiction to “nonjury civil action[s],” “for relief in perso-
nam,” where “service has been made under section 1608”). 
Instead of enforcing these provisions as written, the Ninth 
Circuit read an additional requirement into one—and only 
one—of the FSIA's tethered immunity and jurisdictional pro-
visions. As a practical matter, that would weaken the link 
Congress forged among foreign sovereign immunity, subject-
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and the enumer-
ated exceptions; it would also create a gap in the Act's other-
wise “comprehensive framework.” Altmann, 541 U. S., at 
699. “We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted 
from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless in-
tends to apply.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs En-
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Opinion of the Court 
forcement, 543 U. S. 335, 341 (2005). And we are all the 
more reluctant to do so where, as here, reading such a re-
quirement into the statute would upset the “carefully cali-
brated” system Congress chose. Turkiye Halk Bankasi 
A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 273 (2023). 
B 
The Ninth Circuit based its contrary interpretation on a 
strange statutory argument and on the FSIA's legislative 
history. Neither overrides § 1330(b)'s plain meaning. 
As noted by the court below, the Ninth Circuit frst read 
§ 1330(b) to “requir[e] satisfaction of the traditional minimum 
contacts standard” in an earlier precedent, Thos. P . Gonzalez 
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 
F. 2d 1247, 1255 (1980). Gonzalez offered two pieces of sup-
port for that conclusion. First, one of the enumerated im-
munity exceptions requires proof of a “direct effect” in the 
United States, § 1605(a)(2), which Gonzalez “interpreted as 
embodying the minimum contacts standard of International 
Shoe,” id., at 1255. But see Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC , 
816 F. 3d 383, 394 (CA6 2016) (“[T]he `direct effect' require-
ment does not incorporate the `minimum contacts' test”). 
Second, Gonzalez then read “[t]he legislative history of the 
Act”—particularly the House Judiciary Committee Report's 
discussion of personal jurisdiction—to “confr[m] that the 
reach of § 1330(b) does not extend beyond the limits set by 
the International Shoe line of cases.” 614 F. 2d, at 1255, 
and n. 5. But see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 
497, 523 (2018) (“[L]egislative history is not the law”). 
Even accepting Gonzalez's cited authority on its own 
terms, we do not fnd either step of the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis compelling. The fact that one of the immunity excep-
tions contains language resembling the minimum-contacts 
test says little about whether a jurisdictional provision lo-
cated elsewhere categorically imposes that test. Each im-
munity exception should be interpreted according to the text 
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236 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. 
Opinion of the Court 
Congress enacted, see, e. g., Simon, 604 U. S., at 126–128, and 
so should § 1330(b). 
To the extent it is relevant, the legislative history Gonza-
lez cites is not to the contrary. True, the House Report 
says, “[t]he requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts 
and adequate notice are embodied in the [personal -
jurisdiction] provision.” H. R. Rep. No. 94–1487, p. 13 
(1976). But then the Report explains that this “embodi-
ment” of due process comes from the Act's immunity excep-
tions and service-of-process rules, not a minimum-contacts 
requirement silently emanating from § 1330(b). “[E]ach of 
the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605–1607, re-
quires some connection between the lawsuit and the United 
States,” and, the Report notes, § 1330(b)'s plain text “incor-
porat[es] these jurisdictional contacts by reference.” Ibid. 
The Report then makes the critical point: “These immunity 
provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which 
must exist before our courts can exercise personal jurisdic-
tion. . . . [S]ection 1330(b) also satisfes the due process re-
quirement of adequate notice by prescribing that proper 
service be made under section 1608 of the bill.” Id., at 13– 
14 (emphasis added); see also Rote, 816 F. 3d, at 398 (White, 
J., concurring) (“[The House Report] shows only that Con-
gress believed that the contacts set forth in the immunity 
provisions satisfy due-process requirements. . . . It is a sepa-
rate question whether Congress was correct in its assump-
tion”). Thus, the FSIA's legislative history leads to the 
same result as § 1330(a)'s text: personal jurisdiction rises and 
falls based on whether an immunity exception applies and 
the plaintiff has effectuated proper service. 
III 
Antrix does not defend the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. See 
Brief for Respondent 1; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. Instead, it 
raises various alternative reasons why we should affrm the 
decision below notwithstanding its misreading of the FSIA.

Cite as: 605 U. S. 223 (2025) 237 
Opinion of the Court 
Namely, Antrix contends that the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause itself requires a showing of minimum con-
tacts before a federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a company owned by a foreign sovereign. Antrix also 
argues that the claims at issue in this dispute do not fall 
within the FSIA's arbitration exception, properly conceived, 
and that the suit should be dismissed under forum non 
conveniens. 
We decline to answer those questions today. The Ninth 
Circuit relied exclusively on its interpretation of the FSIA's 
personal-jurisdiction provision, so that court has not yet ad-
dressed Antrix's alternative arguments. “[A]nd, for that 
reason, neither shall we.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. 
Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175 (2004); accord, United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative , 532 U. S. 
483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate 
these contentions on remand consistent with principles of 
forfeiture and waiver. 
* * * 
Personal jurisdiction exists under § 1330(b) of the FSIA 
when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. 
Because the Ninth Circuit required more, we reverse the 
judgment below and remand the suit for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 226, line 6 from bottom: “See App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a” is inserted 
after “leadership” 
p. 228, line 4 from bottom: “foreign” is inserted before “sovereigns”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 Pages 223–237 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 5, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  ception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. Pp. 232–237. *Together with No. 24–17, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. et al., also on cert…

• #3

  (b) The Ninth Circuit's two contrary arguments cannot override the plain meaning of the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision. First, the fact that one of the immunity exceptions contains language resembling the minimum-contacts test says little about whether a jurisdictional pro- vision located elsewhere categor…

• #4

  and Kristen K. Bromberek; for Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. by James E. Berger, Samantha Chaifetz, and Charlene C. Sun; and for Mark B. Feld- man by Robert K. Kry and Mark B. Feldman, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the Republic of India by Andrea J. Menaker, Nicolle Kownac…

• #5

  satellite-based telecommunications technology. Under the agreement, Antrix would build and launch a new satellite Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 605 U. S. 223 (2025) 227 Opinion of the Court network into geostationary orbit*—specifcally, at the 83°E orbital slot—and lease…

• #6

  ruled unanimously for Devas on September 14, 2015. Applying Indian law, the panel concluded Antrix had wrong- fully terminated the contract and awarded Devas $562.5 mil- lion in damages plus interest. After successfully confrming the arbitration award in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought to do the same…

• #7

  but its new approach “proved troublesome.” Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487. Specifcally, the State Department declared in 1952 it would no longer suggest immunity in “cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly commercial acts.” Ibid. While this shift brought the United States into parity with the emerging inter…

• #8

  is otherwise satisfed, the arbitration exception would also apply. Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdic- tion usually follows. That is because the Act's jurisdictional provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1330, pegs both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to the exceptions. Subsection (a) of that prov…

• #9

  award. See No. 20–36024 etc. (Aug. 1, 2023), App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a–8a. The court did not question “that for pur- poses of the FSIA, Antrix is a `foreign state,' service has been made, and an enumerated exception applies.” Id., at 4a. Yet bound by Circuit precedent, the panel explained that the Act imposes an …

• #10

  the use of the word `shall' creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 476 (2024) (some internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the most natural reading of § 1330(b) is that personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is “automatic” when- ever (1) “an exceptio…

• #11

  or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe , it is only Page Proof Pending Publication 234 CC/ DEV AS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP. Opinion of the Court because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our jurisdictional due-process cases. …

• #12

  more reluctant to do so where, as here, reading such a re- quirement into the statute would upset the “carefully cali- brated” system Congress chose. Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 273 (2023). B The Ninth Circuit based its contrary interpretation on a strange statutory argument and on…

• #13

  (1976). But then the Report explains that this “embodi- ment” of due process comes from the Act's immunity excep- tions and service-of-process rules, not a minimum-contacts requirement silently emanating from § 1330(b). “[E]ach of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605–1607, re- quires some connection…

• #14

  States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative , 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate these contentions on remand consistent with principles of forfeiture and waiver. * * * Personal jurisdiction exists under § 1330(b) of the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is pr…