Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n.

Summary

The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision denying petitioners a tax emption available to religious entities under Wisconsin law on the grounds that petitioners were not “operated primarily for religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor limited their charitable services to Catholics violated the First Amendment.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 238–279 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
June 5, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 
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238 OCTOBER TERM, 2024 
Syllabus 
CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC., et al. v. 
WISCONSIN LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW 
COMMISSION et al. 
certiorari to the supreme court of wisconsin 
No. 24–154. Argued March 31, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025 
Wisconsin law exempts certain religious organizations from paying unem-
ployment compensation taxes. The relevant statute exempts nonproft 
organizations “operated primarily for religious purposes” and “operated, 
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or conven-
tion or association of churches.” Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2). Petition-
ers, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of its subentities, sought 
this exemption as organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic Dio-
cese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the 
exemption, holding that petitioners were not “operated primarily for 
religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor 
limited their charitable services to Catholics. 
Held: The Wisconsin Supreme Court's application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to 
petitioners violates the First Amendment. Pp. 247–254. 
(a) The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between 
religions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational preference 
to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of 
§ 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposes a denominational preference by differentiating 
between religions based on theological lines. Petitioners' eligibility for 
the exemption ultimately turns on inherently religious choices (namely, 
whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists in the course of char-
itable work), not “ `secular criteria' ” that “happen to have a `disparate 
impact' upon different religious organizations.” Larson v. Valente, 456 
U. S. 228, 247, n. 23. Because that regime explicitly differentiates be-
tween religions based on theological practices, strict scrutiny applies. 
Pp. 247–250. 
(b) The State argues that, when it comes to religious accommodations 
afforded by the government, courts should ask whether the accommoda-
tion's eligibility criteria are the product of “invidious discrimination” to 
determine if strict scrutiny applies. In support of that rule, the State 
draws on Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437. Gillette, however, is 
inapposite. Unlike the conscientious objector status in Gillette, which 
was equally available to members of all religions, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) facially differentiates 
among religions based on inherently theological choices. The State 
next disputes the premise that petitioners were denied coverage be-

Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 239 
Syllabus 
cause they do not proselytize or serve only Catholics in the course of 
performing charitable work. The State instead claims that petitioners 
were excluded because they engaged in no “distinctively religious activ-
ity,” meaning “activities that express and inculcate religious doctrine.” 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 81. That understanding of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's ruling, even if assumed correct, cannot save the statute from 
strict scrutiny because decisions about whether to “express and incul-
cate religious doctrine” while performing charitable work are funda-
mentally theological choices driven by religious doctrine. Pp. 250–252. 
(c) Section 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied, cannot survive strict scrutiny 
because the State has not met its burden to show that the law's applica-
tion is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. 
Wisconsin contends that the exemption advances two principal inter-
ests. First, it argues that the law serves a compelling state interest in 
ensuring unemployment coverage for its citizens. The State, however, 
has failed to demonstrate that the theological lines drawn by the statute 
are narrowly tailored to advance that interest, particularly as applied 
to petitioners. Indeed, petitioners operate their own unemployment 
compensation system, which provides benefts largely equivalent to the 
state system. The distinctions drawn by Wisconsin's regime, moreover, 
are underinclusive, exempting religious entities that provide similar 
services (i.e., without proselytizing or serving only co-religionists) when 
the work is done directly by a church. Second, the State asserts an 
interest in avoiding entanglement with employment decisions based 
on religious doctrine. Resolving misconduct disputes for employees 
tasked with inculcating religious faith, the State argues, may require it 
to decide whether those employees complied with religious doctrine. 
The lines drawn by the exemption, however, are overinclusive in rela-
tion to that interest, for they operate at the organizational level, cover-
ing employees that do and do not inculcate religious doctrine in equal 
measure. This poor ft between the State's asserted interests and the 
distinctions drawn cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. Pp. 252–254. 
2024 WI 13, 411 Wis. 2d 1, 3 N. W. 3d 666, reversed and remanded. 
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, 
J., post, p. 255, and Jackson, J., post, p. 270, fled concurring opinions. 
Eric C. Rassbach argued the cause for petitioners. With 
him on the briefs were Nicholas R. Reaves, Colten L. Stan-
berry, and Kyle H. Torvinen. 
Deputy Solicitor General Gannon argued the cause for 
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With 
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240 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN 
LABOR & INDUSTRY REVIEW COMM'N 
Counsel 
him on the brief were Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
McArthur, Nicholas S. Crown, Michael S. Raab, and Lowell 
V. Sturgill, Jr. 
Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, 
argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief 
were Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General, and Charlotte Gib-
son, Assistant Attorney General.* 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ohio 
et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, T. Elliot Gaiser , Solicitor 
General, and Katie Rose Talley and Jana M. Bosch, Deputy Solicitors 
General, and by the Attorneys General and other offcials for their respec-
tive States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkan-
sas, John Guard, Acting Attorney General of Florida, Christopher M. 
Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Russell 
Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, 
Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilg-
ers of Nebraska, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, Alan Wilson of South 
Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Derek E. Brown of Utah, Jason 
Miyares of Virginia, and John B. McCuskey of West Virginia; for the Wis-
consin State Legislature by Ryan J. Walsh; for the American Center for 
Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, 
Walter M. Weber, and Laura B. Hernandez; for By The Hand by John J. 
Bursch and Cody S. Barnett; for Catholic Charities USA by Keith R. 
Styles and James H. Hulme; for the Catholic Conferences of Illinois et al. 
by James N. Law; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Steven T. Mc-
Farland, Kimberlee Wood Colby, Laura D. Nammo, and Thomas C. Berg; 
for City on a Hill Legal Ministry by Dino L. LaVerghetta; for Eleven 
Major Religious Denominations by Gene C. Schaerr , Erik S. Jaffe , H. 
Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, and R. Shawn Gunnarson; 
for the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability et al. by Stuart J. 
Lark; for the First Liberty Institute by Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. 
Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser III, David J. Hacker, Jeremiah G. Dys, and Ryan 
N. Gardner; for the International Society for Krishna Consciousness by 
Benjamin Hayes; for the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty by Yaa-
kov M. Roth and Josh Blackman; for Maranatha Baptist University 
et al. by Daniel R. Suhr and Caleb R. Gerbitz; for the National Legal 
Foundation by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, and 
James A. Davids; for the New York State Catholic Conference by Michael 
L. Costello; for Religious Liberty Scholars by Kevin T. Baine, Richard S. 
Cleary, Jr., and Ian M. Swenson; for Religiously Affliated Universities

Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 241 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Wisconsin, like many other States, exempts certain reli-
gious organizations from paying taxes into the State's unem-
ployment compensation system. One such exemption cov-
ers nonprofts “operated primarily for religious purposes” 
and controlled, supervised, or principally supported by a 
church. Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2) (2023–2024). Petition-
ers, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of the entities 
that it operates, claimed that they qualify for the exemption 
as religious organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that petitioners are not “operated 
primarily for religious purposes” because they neither en-
gage in proselytization nor serve only Catholics in their char-
itable work. 
The question here is whether § 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied 
to petitioners by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, violates the 
First Amendment. The Court holds that it does. The First 
Amendment mandates government neutrality between reli-
gions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational pref-
erence to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's 
application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposed a denominational 
preference by differentiating between religions based on 
et al. by Zachary G. Parks; for the Wisconsin Catholic Conference by 
Bradley G. Hubbard and Elizabeth A. Kiernan; for World Faith Founda-
tion by James L. Hirsen and Deborah J. Dewart; for Nathan S. Chapman 
by Jeffrey R. Johnson; and for Christopher C. Lund, pro se. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for American Athe-
ists, Inc., by Geoffrey T. Blackwell; for the Economic Policy Institute et al. 
by Laurence J. Dupuis, Brenda L. Lewison, and John Philo; for the Free-
dom From Religion Foundation by Samuel T. Grover; for Religious and 
Civil-Rights Organizations by Alex J. Luchenitser , Daniel Mach, Heather 
L. Weaver, and Cecillia D. Wang; and for Service Employees International 
Union et al. by Scott A. Kronland. 
John M. Baker fled a brief for the International Municipal Lawyers 
Association as amicus curiae . 
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242 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
theological lines. Because the law's application does not 
survive strict scrutiny, it cannot stand. 
I 
A 
Wisconsin has long operated an unemployment compensa-
tion program that seeks to mitigate and “more fairly” distrib-
ute the “economic burdens resulting from unemployment.” 
Wis. Stat. § 108.01(2); see § 108.01 et seq . To achieve that 
goal, Wisconsin law requires most employers to make regu-
lar contributions to the State's unemployment fund through 
payroll taxes. See §§ 108.17–108.18. Nonproft employers 
may choose between contributing to that fund and reimburs-
ing the State for benefts paid to their laid-off employees. 
See § 108.151. 
Wisconsin's regime contains an exemption for religious 
employers. See § 108.02(15)(h). The exemption applies to 
any “church or convention or association of churches,” with-
out further qualifcation, and to services provided “[b]y a 
duly ordained, commissioned or licensed minister of a church 
in the exercise of his or her ministry or by a member of a 
religious order in the exercise of duties required by such 
order.” §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1), (3). As relevant here, the ex-
emption also covers nonproft organizations “operated, su-
pervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches,” but only if they are “op-
erated primarily for religious purposes.” § 108.02(15)(h)(2). 
Wisconsin is not alone in exempting religious organiza-
tions from unemployment compensation taxes. The Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq ., contains 
a textually parallel religious-employer exemption. See 
§ 3309(b)(1)(B). Since Congress enacted that law in 1970, 
over 40 States have adopted similar exemptions.
1 
1 Wisconsin does not cite any decisions interpreting these federal or 
state laws to require proselytization or exclusively co-religionist service 
for charitable organizations to qualify for the exemption, as the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court did here. See infra, at 249–250. 
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Opinion of the Court 
B 
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (Bureau), is a nonproft or-
ganization that serves as the social ministry arm of the 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. 2024 WI 
13, ¶4, 411 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 3 N. W. 3d 666, 672. The Bureau's 
stated mission is to “carry on the redeeming work of our 
Lord.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 382a. In aid of that mission, 
the Bureau “provid[es] services to the poor and disadvan-
taged” and seeks to “be an effective sign of the charity of 
Christ.” Id., at 383a. It does not distinguish on the basis 
of “race, sex, or religion in reference to clients served, staff 
employed and board members appointed.” Ibid. 
The Bureau oversees several separately incorporated enti-
ties, including four that, together with the Bureau, are the 
petitioners here: Barron County Development Services, Inc., 
Black River Industries, Inc., Diversifed Services, Inc., and 
Headwaters, Inc. 411 Wis. 2d, at 14–16, 3 N. W. 3d, at 672– 
673. These entities provide a range of charitable services 
to local communities across Wisconsin. Barron County De-
velopment Services, for instance, helps individuals with disa-
bilities secure employment. See id., at 14, 3 N. W. 3d, at 
673. Black River Industries provides daily living services 
to Wisconsinites with developmental or mental health disa-
bilities, among other charitable services. Id., at 15, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 673. 
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior exercises control 
over both the Bureau and its subentities. Id., at 14, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 672. The bishop of the Diocese serves as the Bureau's 
president and appoints its membership, which in turn over-
sees the Bureau “ `to ensure' ” that it fulflls its mission “ `in 
compliance with the Principles of Catholic social teaching.' ” 
Ibid. The Bureau's executive director, who need not be a 
Catholic priest, supervises the operations of each subentity. 
Id., at 16, 3 N. W. 3d, at 673; see also 2023 WI App 12, ¶11, 
406 Wis. 2d 586, 596, 987 N. W. 2d 778, 783. 
Employees of the Bureau and its subentities are not re-
quired to adhere to any particular religious faith, and the 
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same is true for the recipients of their charitable services. 
411 Wis. 2d, at 16, 3 N. W. 3d, at 673; see also App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 383a. Participants in petitioners' charitable pro-
grams do not receive religious training or orientation, and 
neither the Bureau nor its subentities “tr[ies] to `inculcate' ” 
participants with the Catholic faith. 411 Wis. 2d, at 16, 3 
N. W. 3d, at 673. That rule, petitioners explain, refects reli-
gious doctrine prohibiting Catholic bodies from “ `misus[ing] 
works of charity for purposes of proselytism.' ” Brief for 
Petitioners 10 (quoting Directory for the Pastoral Ministry 
of Bishops “Apostolorum Successores” ¶196 (2004)). Ac-
cording to petitioners, Catholic teachings distinguish be-
tween “evangelization,” which involves “sharing one's faith,” 
and “proselytization,” which seeks to “infuence” or “co-
erc[e]” others into accepting one's religious views. Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 22–23. The former is permitted, and the latter is 
not, petitioners say. Id., at 22; see Brief for Petitioners 10. 
C 
In 2016, petitioners sought from the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Workforce Development a determination that they 
qualifed for the religious-employer exemption set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2). The department denied their 
request. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 351a. It acknowledged 
that petitioners are “supervised and controlled by the Roman 
Catholic Church,” thereby satisfying one of the two criteria 
for the exemption. Id., at 352a, 356a, 360a, 364a, 368a. The 
department determined, however, that petitioners are not 
“operated primarily for religious purposes” within the mean-
ing of the statute. Ibid. Petitioners appealed, and an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed the department's 
ruling. Id., at 291a–350a. 
In the years that followed, petitioners received a series of 
alternating wins and losses as the parties appealed up 
through the state administrative and judicial systems. The 
Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission reversed 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 245 
Opinion of the Court 
the ALJ's decision and reinstated the department's denials 
of petitioners' exemption requests. See id., at 212a–290a. 
After petitioners sought judicial review in state court, the 
state trial court overrode the commission, holding that peti-
tioners are entitled to the exemption. See id., at 190a. The 
State Court of Appeals, however, subsequently reversed. 
406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N. W. 2d 778. It reasoned that petition-
ers are not “operated primarily for religious purposes” be-
cause petitioners' “provision of charitable social services . . . 
are neither inherently or primarily religious activities.” 
Id., at 627, 629, 987 N. W. 2d, at 798, 799. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affrmed. The court began 
by recognizing, as the lower courts had, that petitioners are 
“without question `operated, supervised, controlled, or prin-
cipally supported' by the Diocese of Superior.” 411 Wis. 2d, 
at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676 (quoting § 108.02(15)(h)(2)). The 
dispositive question, then, was whether petitioners are “op-
erated primarily for religious purposes.” Id., at 22, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 676. The court interpreted that statutory phrase to 
require judicial inquiry into not only an organization's “moti-
vations” but also its “activities.” Id., at 33, 3 N. W. 3d, at 
682. To determine whether an organization's activities are 
“ `primarily' religious in nature,” the court held, courts 
should “focu[s] on whether an organization participated in 
worship services, religious outreach, ceremony, or religious 
education.” Id., at 34–35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682 (citing United 
States v. Dykema, 666 F. 2d 1096, 1100 (CA7 1981)). Accord-
ing to the court, that analysis would identify “ `[t]ypical ac-
tivities of an organization operated for religious purposes,' ” 
while avoiding “ `any subjective inquiry with respect to reli-
gious truth.' ” 411 Wis. 2d, at 32, 3 N. W. 3d, at 681 (quoting 
Dykema, 666 F. 2d, at 1100; alteration in original). 
Applying that standard, the court held that petitioners' 
activities are “secular in nature,” not religious. 411 Wis. 2d, 
at 38, 3 N. W. 3d, at 684. Petitioners “neither attempt to 
imbue program participants with the Catholic faith nor sup-
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ply any religious materials to program participants or em-
ployees,” the court observed. Id., at 35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682. 
“Both employment with the organizations and services of-
fered by the organizations are open to all participants re-
gardless of religion,” and the charitable services offered by 
the subentities could “be provided by organizations of either 
religious or secular motivations.” Id., at 35–36, 3 N. W. 3d, 
at 683. Based on that record, the court held that petitioners 
“are not operated primarily for religious purposes within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2).” Id., at 38, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 684. 
The court then addressed petitioners' argument that its 
interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) violated the First Amend-
ment's Religion Clauses. The court frst held that its inter-
pretation did not transgress church autonomy principles 
because the exemption “neither regulates internal church 
governance nor mandates any activity.” Id., at 50, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 690. The court also determined that there was no risk 
of excessive government entanglement with religion because 
Wisconsin's exemption does not ask whether petitioners' “ac-
tivities are consistent or inconsistent with Catholic doc-
trine.” Id., at 45, 3 N. W. 3d, at 687. Finally, the court 
rejected petitioners' argument that its interpretation contra-
vened First Amendment principles of “ `neutrality among re-
ligions' ” by “ `favor[ing] religious groups that require those 
they serve to adhere to the faith of that group or be subject 
to proselytization.' ” Id., at 52–53, 3 N. W. 3d, at 691. This 
argument failed, the court said, because petitioners had not 
“demonstrate[d] that the statute imposes a constitutionally 
signifcant burden on their religious practice” in the frst 
place. Id., at 55, 3 N. W. 3d, at 692.
2 
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley authored a dissent, which 
Chief Justice Ziegler joined and Justice Hagedorn joined in 
2 The Court today addresses only the denominational neutrality chal-
lenge raised by petitioners and does not reach the further two constitu-
tional arguments considered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
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Opinion of the Court 
part. Justice Bradley would have held that a nonproft is 
“operated primarily for religious purposes,” § 108.02(15) 
(h)(2), when its motivations are religious, irrespective of the 
nature of its activities. The majority's contrary approach, 
the dissent warned, “engages in religious discrimination and 
entangles the state with religion in violation of the First 
Amendment.” Id., at 92–93, 3 N. W. 3d, at 710–711. While 
Justice Bradley recognized that “the application of secular 
criteria that leads to disparate treatment of religions is not 
religious discrimination,” she reasoned that the majority's 
approach “necessarily and explicitly discriminates among 
certain religious faiths and religious practices.” Id., at 105, 
3 N. W. 3d, at 717. It did so as applied to petitioners, Justice 
Bradley explained, by declaring them ineligible for the ex-
emption based on explicitly religious criteria, including their 
adherence to Catholic teachings forbidding “proselytiz[ation] 
when conducting charitable acts.” Id., at 106, 3 N. W. 3d, at 
717. That denominational discrimination, according to Jus-
tice Bradley, triggered strict scrutiny, which the State could 
not satisfy. See id., at 108–110, 3 N. W. 3d, at 718–719. Jus-
tice Hagedorn dissented separately, noting his agreement 
with Justice Bradley's construction of the statute. Id., at 
122, 3 N. W. 3d, at 725. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied 
to petitioners, violates the First Amendment. 604 
U. S. 1064 (2024). 
II 
A 
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause” is 
that the government may not “offcially prefe[r]” one reli-
gious denomination over another. Larson v. Valente, 456 
U. S. 228, 244 (1982). This principle of denominational neu-
trality bars States from passing laws that “ `aid or oppose' ” 
particular religions, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 
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248 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN 
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(1968), or interfere in the “competition between sects,” Zor-
ach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314 (1952). The Establish-
ment Clause's “prohibition of denominational preferences is 
inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the 
Free Exercise Clause,” too. Larson, 456 U. S., at 245. 
That is because the “ `fullest realization of true religious lib-
erty requires that government' ” refrain from “ `favoritism 
among sects.' ” Id., at 246 (quoting School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring)). Government actions that favor cer-
tain religions, the Court has warned, convey to members of 
other faiths that “ `they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community.' ” Santa Fe Independent School 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290, 309 (2000). 
To guard against that serious harm, this Court in Larson 
v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, set a demanding standard for the 
government to justify differential treatment across religions 
on denominational lines. See id., at 244–246. When a state 
law establishes a denominational preference, courts must 
“treat the law as suspect” and apply “strict scrutiny in ad-
judging its constitutionality.” Id., at 246. The government 
bears the burden to show that the relevant law, or applica-
tion thereof, is “closely ftted to further a compelling govern-
mental interest.” Id., at 251 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
A law that differentiates between religions along theologi-
cal lines is textbook denominational discrimination. Take, 
for instance, a law that treats “a religious service of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses . . . differently than a religious service of 
other sects” because the former is “less ritualistic, more un-
orthodox, [and] less formal.” Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U. S. 67, 69 (1953). Or consider an exemption that applies 
only to religious organizations that perform baptisms, en-
gage in monotheistic worship, or hold services on Sunday. 
Such laws establish a preference for certain religions based 
on the content of their religious doctrine, namely, how they 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 249 
Opinion of the Court 
worship, hold services, or initiate members and whether they 
engage in those practices at all. Such offcial differentiation 
on theological lines is fundamentally foreign to our constitu-
tional order, for “[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed 
to the support of no dogma.” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 
728 (1872). 
This case involves that paradigmatic form of denomina-
tional discrimination. In determining whether petitioners 
qualifed for the tax exemption under § 108.02(15)(h)(2), the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioners are 
controlled by a church, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Supe-
rior, thereby satisfying one of the exemption's two criteria. 
411 Wis. 2d, at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676. The court's inquiry 
instead turned on whether petitioners are “operated primar-
ily for religious purposes.” Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2); see 
411 Wis. 2d, at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676. On that criterion, 
the court recognized that petitioners' charitable works are 
religiously motivated. Id., at 34, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682. The 
court nevertheless deemed petitioners ineligible for the ex-
emption under § 108.02(15)(h)(2) because they do not “at-
tempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic 
faith,” “supply any religious materials to program partici-
pants or employees,” or limit their charitable services to 
members of the Catholic Church. Id., at 35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 
682–683. Put simply, petitioners could qualify for the ex-
emption while providing their current charitable services if 
they engaged in proselytization or limited their services to 
fellow Catholics. 
Petitioners' Catholic faith, however, bars them from sat-
isfying those criteria. Catholic teaching, petitioners say, 
forbids “ `misus[ing] works of charity for purposes of prosely-
tism.' ” Brief for Petitioners 10 (quoting Directory for the 
Pastoral Ministry of Bishops “Apostolorum Successores” 
¶196). It also requires provision of charitable services 
“without making distinctions `by race, sex, or religion.' ” 
Brief for Petitioners 7 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 431a). 
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250 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN 
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Many religions apparently impose similar rules prohibiting 
proselytization or religious differentiation in the provision of 
charitable services. See Brief for Religious Liberty Schol-
ars as Amici Curiae 12–13 (discussing beliefs in Judaism, 
Islam, Sikhism, and Hinduism). Others seemingly have 
adopted a contrary approach. See id., at 12 (discussing prac-
tices of some Protestant denominations). 
Wisconsin's exemption, as interpreted by its Supreme 
Court, thus grants a denominational preference by explicitly 
differentiating between religions based on theological prac-
tices. Indeed, petitioners' eligibility for the exemption ul-
timately turns on inherently religious choices (namely, 
whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists), not 
“ `secular criteria' ” that “happen to have a `disparate impact' 
upon different religious organizations.” Larson, 456 U. S., 
at 247, n. 23. Much like a law exempting only those reli-
gious organizations that perform baptisms or worship on 
Sundays, an exemption that requires proselytization or ex-
clusive service of co-religionists establishes a preference for 
certain religions based on the commands of their religious 
doctrine. 
In short, as applied to petitioners by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposes a denomi-
national preference by differentiating between religions 
based on theological choices. 
B 
The State does not dispute that the government may not 
prefer one religion over another. See Brief for Respondents 
35. Instead, the State argues that, when it comes to “[r]eli-
gious accommodations” afforded by the government, courts 
should ask whether the accommodation's eligibility criteria 
are the product of “invidious discrimination” to determine if 
strict scrutiny applies. Id., at 35, 37; see id., at 42–43. This 
Court's decision in Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 
(1971), the State contends, lends support to this rule. See 
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Opinion of the Court 
Brief for Respondents 36. As the State would have it, Gil-
lette stands for the premise that whenever a religious “ac-
commodation's line serves `considerations of a pragmatic na-
ture' having `nothing to do with a design to foster or favor 
any sect, religion, or cluster of religions,' the Establishment 
Clause is not offended.” Brief for Respondents 36 (quoting 
Gillette, 401 U. S., at 452–453). 
The inquiry set forth in Gillette, however, is inapposite. 
There, this Court rejected an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to a provision of the Military Selective Service Act of 
1967, which afforded a “conscientious objector” status to any 
person who, “ `by reason of religious training and belief,' ” 
was “ `conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form.' ” Gillette, 401 U. S., at 441. Importantly, that ex-
emption “focused on individual conscientious belief, not on 
sectarian affliation.” Id., at 454. Conscientious objector 
status was thus “available on an equal basis” to members of 
all religions under the Military Selective Service Act, as this 
Court later explained in Larson. 456 U. S., at 247, n. 23 (dis-
cussing Gillette). “[O]n its face,” the statute “simply d[id] 
not discriminate on the basis of religious affliation.” Gil-
lette, 401 U. S., at 450. 
The same is not true here. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's interpretation of § 108.02(h)(15)(2) facially differenti-
ates among religions based on theological choices. After all, 
an exemption provided only to organizations that engage in 
proselytization or serve only co-religionists is not, on its face, 
“available on an equal basis” to all denominations. Larson, 
456 U. S., at 247, n. 23. That type of “explicit” distinction 
between religious practices is what this Court has deemed 
subject to strict scrutiny, including in the context of religious 
exemptions. Ibid.; see id., at 246–251. 
Next, the State disputes the premise that petitioners were 
denied coverage “because they do not proselytize or serve 
only Catholics” in the course of performing charitable work. 
Brief for Respondents 37. The State insists that, instead,

252 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN 
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Opinion of the Court 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court excluded petitioners because 
they had “identifed no distinctively religious activity that 
would create diffculty in resolving unemployment disputes.” 
Ibid. When pressed at argument as to what would qualify 
as such “distinctively religious activity” in the context of 
providing charitable services, however, the State clarifed 
that it meant “activities that express and inculcate religious 
doctrine: worship, proselytization, religious education.” Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 81; see also id., at 84 (“What it comes down to 
is whether the employees of the organization are expressing 
and inculcating religious doctrine”). 
That understanding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's rul-
ing, even if assumed correct, cannot save the statute from 
strict scrutiny. Decisions about whether to “express and in-
culcate religious doctrine” through worship, proselytization, 
or religious education when performing charitable work are, 
again, fundamentally theological choices driven by the con-
tent of different religious doctrines. Id., at 81. A statute 
that excludes religious organizations from an accommodation 
on such grounds facially favors some denominations over 
others. 
III 
Because § 108.02(15)(h)(2) “grants denominational prefer-
ences of the sort consistently and frmly deprecated in our 
precedents,” it “must be invalidated unless it is justifed by 
a compelling governmental interest” and is “closely ftted to 
further that interest.” Larson, 456 U. S., at 246–247. The 
State bears the burden of clearing that high bar, and it has 
failed to do so here. 
Wisconsin justifes its law by reference to two principal 
interests. First, it argues that the law serves a compelling 
state interest in “ensuring unemployment coverage for its 
citizens.” Brief for Respondents 44. Yet the State fails to 
explain how the theological lines drawn by § 108.02(15)(h)(2) 
are narrowly tailored to advance that asserted interest, par-
ticularly as applied to petitioners. Indeed, petitioners oper-
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Opinion of the Court 
ate their own unemployment compensation system for em-
ployees, which provides benefts largely “ `equivalent' ” to the 
state system. 406 Wis. 2d, at 614, 987 N. W. 2d, at 792. 
Furthermore, Wisconsin does not suggest that organizations 
like Catholic Charities, which decline to proselytize and 
choose to serve all-comers, are more likely to leave their em-
ployees without unemployment benefts. Nor could it: The 
record is devoid of such evidence. 
The distinctions drawn by Wisconsin's regime, moreover, 
are vastly underinclusive when it comes to ensuring unem-
ployment coverage for its citizens. Wisconsin exempts over 
40 forms of “employment” from its unemployment compensa-
tion program. See §§ 108.02(15)(f)–(kt). Notably, those ex-
emptions cover religious entities that provide charitable 
services in a similar manner to petitioners (that is, without 
proselytizing or denominational differentiation), but are ex-
empt because the work is done directly by the church itself 
or its ministers, rather than by a separate nonproft organiza-
tion controlled by the church. See §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1), (3). 
That underinclusiveness leaves “ `appreciable damage to [the 
State's] supposedly vital interest unprohibited' ” and there-
fore belies the State's claim of narrow tailoring. Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 172 (2015). 
Second, the State argues that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) is “narrowly tai-
lored to avoid entangling the state with employment deci-
sions touching on religious faith and doctrine.” Brief for 
Respondents 44. When an organization's employees “ex-
press an[d] inculcate religious doctrine through worship, 
proselytization, and religious education,” the State explains, 
“misconduct disputes could often force the state to decide 
whether employees complied with religious doctrine.” Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 72. Yet the State again fails to demonstrate 
that § 108.02(15)(h)(2) is “closely ftted to further” that anti-
entanglement interest. Larson, 456 U. S., at 247. To the 
extent the State seeks to avoid opining on employee compli-
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254 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN 
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ance with religious teachings, it does not explain why it de-
clined to craft an exemption limited to employees who are 
in fact tasked with inculcating religious doctrine. Instead, 
the exemption here functions at an organizational level, cov-
ering both the janitor and the priest in equal measure. See 
§ 108.02(15)(h)(2). 
That overinclusiveness pervades Wisconsin's exemption 
regime more broadly, too. Recall that Wisconsin exempts 
from its unemployment compensation system all “church[es] 
or convention[s] or association[s] of churches” without differ-
entiating between employees actually involved in religious 
works, for whom the anti-entanglement concern is relevant, 
and other staff. § 108.02(15)(h)(1). The State itself con-
cedes, as it must, that this regime contains “an element of 
over-inclusivity.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 87. At bottom, then, the 
poor ft between the State's asserted anti-entanglement con-
cern and the line it has drawn among religious organizations 
cannot be described as narrow tailoring. The State has thus 
failed to carry its burden under strict scrutiny. 
* * * 
It is fundamental to our constitutional order that the gov-
ernment maintain “neutrality between religion and reli-
gion.” Epperson, 393 U. S., at 104. There may be hard 
calls to make in policing that rule, but this is not one. When 
the government distinguishes among religions based on 
theological differences in their provision of services, it im-
poses a denominational preference that must satisfy the 
highest level of judicial scrutiny. Because Wisconsin has 
transgressed that principle without the tailoring necessary 
to survive such scrutiny, the judgment of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
Justice Thomas, concurring. 
A nonproft organization is entitled to an exemption from 
Wisconsin's unemployment-insurance tax on employers if it 
is controlled by a church and “operated primarily for reli-
gious purposes.” Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2) (2023–2024). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Catholic 
Charities Bureau (Catholic Charities) and its subentities are 
not such organizations, reasoning in two steps. First, the 
court held that the relevant “organization” is Catholic Chari-
ties and each of its subentities, not the broader Catholic Dio-
cese of Superior of which it is a part. Second, it held that 
the purposes of Catholic Charities and its subentities are pri-
marily secular, not religious. The Court concludes that the 
latter holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against Catholic Charities and its sub-
entities. I agree and join the Court's opinion in full. I 
write separately because, in my view, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's frst holding was also wrong. 
The First Amendment's guarantee of church autonomy 
gives religious institutions the right to defne their internal 
governance structures without state interference. Reli-
gious institutions may create different corporate entities to 
help manage their temporal affairs, but those entities do not 
defne the broader religious institution's internal structure. 
Here, although Catholic Charities and its subentities are sep-
arately incorporated from the Diocese of Superior, they are, 
as a matter of church law, simply an arm of the Diocese. 
I 
The First Amendment guarantees to religious institutions 
broad autonomy to conduct their internal affairs and govern 
themselves. This guarantee, which we have called the 
“church autonomy doctrine,” provides that a religious insti-
tution is not defned by the corporate entities it chooses to 
form. 
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A 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment proscribe 
laws “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.” Among other protections, these 
Clauses guarantee the “right to organize voluntary religious 
associations,” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728 (1872), and 
to allow these associations to “decide for themselves, free 
from state interference, matters of church government as 
well as those of faith and doctrine,” Kedroff v. Saint Ni-
cholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North 
America, 344 U. S. 94, 116 (1952).
1 For instance, “courts are 
bound to stay out of employment disputes involving those 
holding certain important positions with churches and other 
religious institutions.” Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. 
Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 746 (2020). And, where 
resolution of a property dispute turns on the internal law of a 
hierarchically structured church, such as who is the properly 
appointed pastor of a congregation, courts must defer to “the 
decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within [the] 
church.” Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United 
States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696, 709 (1976). 
The Religion Clauses' special protection for the autonomy 
of religious institutions derives from at least three sources. 
1 I have long questioned whether the Establishment Clause, as “a feder-
alism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state 
establishments,” applies to the States. Elk Grove Unifed School Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 49 (2004) (opinion concurring in judgment). Al-
though our decisions have grounded the church autonomy doctrine in both 
Religion Clauses, they have also made clear that the Free Exercise Clause 
is an independently suffcient basis for the doctrine. See, e.g., Our Lady 
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 746 (2020) (fram-
ing interference with church autonomy as independent violations of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses); Kedroff, 344 U. S., at 107–108, 
115–116, 120–121 (basing the doctrine on the Free Exercise Clause alone). 
My skepticism toward the incorporation of the Establishment Clause 
therefore does not lead me to doubt the correctness of our precedents in 
this area. 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
First is the right of association. This Court has “long un-
derstood as implicit in the right to engage in activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to as-
sociate with others.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U. S. 609, 622 (1984). As with other voluntary associations, 
those “who unite themselves to [a religious] body do so with 
an implied consent to” its internal system of “government, 
and are bound to submit to it.” Watson, 13 Wall., at 729. 
And, since “the text of the First Amendment . . . gives spe-
cial solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,” they 
must enjoy a greater right to control their own affairs than 
that enjoyed by other groups. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 189 
(2012). 
Second is the reality that matters of religious “faith and 
doctrine” are “closely linked to . . . matters of church govern-
ment.” Our Lady , 591 U. S., at 746 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Who serves as a church's minister, for in-
stance, determines whether the “preaching, teaching, and 
counseling” a congregation receives conforms to the faith 
that it professes. Id., at 747. And, the polity of a religious 
institution is often itself a matter of faith. In the Catholic 
Church, for instance, the leadership of the Pope over the 
Church is essential, because it is an article of faith that Jesus 
Christ personally established the offce of Pope. See First 
Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, chs. 1–2 (1870) (citing Mat-
thew 16:16–19), in 2 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils 811, 
812–813 (N. Tanner ed. 1990) (Tanner). The free exercise 
rights of individuals thus cannot be adequately protected un-
less the autonomy of religious institutions is also protected. 
Third is the understanding that church and state are “two 
rightful authorities,” each supreme in its own sphere. M. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1496–1497 
(1990) (McConnell). This concept has deep roots in the his-
tory of Western civilization. Jesus famously said to render 
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“unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God 
the things that are God's.” Matthew 22:21. From antiquity 
onward, many Christians have interpreted this statement to 
mean that church and state are distinct, and that each has a 
legitimate claim to authority within its sphere. See Hunts-
man v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, 127 F. 4th 784, 803–804 (CA9 2025) (en 
banc) (Bumatay, J., concurring); R. Renaud & L. Weinberger, 
Spheres of Sovereignty: Church Autonomy Doctrine and the 
Theological Heritage of the Separation of Church and State, 
35 N. Ky. L. Rev. 67, 68–84 (2008) (tracing the historical de-
velopment of “[t]he doctrine of separate spheres of authority 
for church and state”). Pre-founding English law accord-
ingly distinguished between temporal matters subject to 
civil courts' jurisdiction and spiritual matters subject to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. See McRaney v. North Am. 
Mission Bd. of Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 980 
F. 3d 1066, 1076–1078 (CA5 2020) (Oldham, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
The First Amendment was adopted “against this back-
ground” of distinct spheres for secular and religious authori-
ties. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U. S., at 183. In arguing for reli-
gious freedom for Baptists, for example, James Madison 
appealed to the notion of “independent” “spiritual and 
earthly authorities.” McConnell 1497. According to Madi-
son, man's “duty towards the Creator . . . is precedent, both 
in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of 
Civil Society.” Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments (1785), in 8 Papers of James Madison 295, 
299 (R. Rutland, W. Rachal, B. Ripel, & F. Teute eds. 1973). 
Thus, “Religion is wholly exempt from [Civil Society's] cogni-
zance.” Ibid. In a similar vein, early American decisions 
justifed protections for church autonomy in part based on 
the need to respect religious institutions' legitimate and dis-
tinct sphere of authority. See, e.g., Watson, 13 Wall., at 733 
(holding that “the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction” over 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
matters of “ecclesiastical government” because doing so 
“would deprive [religious] bodies of the right of construing 
their own church laws”); Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, 538 
(1871) (“ `Causes spiritual must be judged by judges of the 
spirituality, and causes temporal by temporal judges' ”); Har-
mon v. Dreher, 17 S. C. Eq. 87, 120 (1843) (“It belongs not to 
the civil power to enter into or review the proceedings of a 
Spiritual Court”); see also K. Funk, Church Corporations and 
the Confict of Laws in Antebellum America, 32 J. Law & 
Religion 263, 281 (2017) (Funk) (observing that 19th century 
decisions developing the church autonomy doctrine “essen-
tially treated these church tribunals as competent foreign 
courts”). 
B 
The church autonomy doctrine has important ramifcations 
for the incorporation of religious institutions. Establishing 
corporate entities is essential for religious institutions to 
manage their temporal affairs. But, the doctrine forbids 
treating religious institutions as nothing more than the cor-
porate entities that they form. 
1 
Religious institutions do not exist apart from the secular 
world. They need to buy and sell property. They need to 
hire and pay staff. They need to form contracts and fle 
lawsuits. They need their property arrangements to persist 
when personnel changes, and they need their property to 
remain secure when individual members of the institution 
become insolvent. These and other considerations make the 
formation of corporate entities essential for many religious 
institutions. 
At the same time, the church autonomy doctrine forbids 
treating religious institutions as nothing more than the cor-
porate entities they have formed. A corporation is a “mere 
creature of law” that generally “possesses only those proper-
ties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.” 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 
636 (1819); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, 
Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 98–99 (1991) (“Corporations . . . are crea-
tures of state law, and it is state law which is the font of 
corporate directors' powers” (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted)). And, state law has a great deal to say 
about how a corporation must be structured. See, e. g., Del. 
Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 141 (2019) (generally requiring Delaware 
corporations to be overseen by a board of directors). But, 
under the church autonomy doctrine, religious institutions 
are a parallel authority to the State, not a creature of state 
law. Supra, at 257–259. And, the State has no legitimate 
role in defning the structure of its polity. To conclude that 
a religious institution has no existence outside its corporate 
form “would be in effect to decide that our religious liberties 
[are] dependent on the will of the legislature, and not guaran-
teed by the constitution.” Burr's Ex'rs v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 
282 (1835). 
Instead, courts and commentators have long recognized 
that “while a legal entity may represent the church or other 
body of believers, the entity alone is not the church; it is only 
a part of the entire religious organization.” 1 W. Bassett, 
W. Durham, R. Smith, & M. Goldfeder, Religious Organiza-
tions and the Law § 8:2, p. 8–7 (2022). “The entity is merely 
used by the organization rather than being identical to 
the organization itself.” Ibid. A religious corporation thus 
possesses a “dual personality”: It is at once a corporation 
defned by state law and a part of a broader, “unincorpo-
rated” religious institution. Id., at 8–6 to 8–7; accord, Clas-
sis of Central Cal. v. Miraloma Community Church, 
177 Cal. App. 4th 750, 763, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 459 (2009); 
Crissman v. Board of Trustees of Cathedral of Tomorrow 
of Akron, Inc., 1990 WL 31796, *2 (Ohio Ct. App., Mar. 
21, 1990); Folwell v. Bernard, 477 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 
App. 1985); Trinity Presbyterian Church of Montgomery 
v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861, 866 (Ala. 1979); Willis v. 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
Davis, 323 S. W. 2d 847, 848 (Ky. 1959); Wheelock v. First 
Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 483, 51 P. 841, 843–844 
(1897). 
For instance, in Watson, the “nominal title-holders and 
custodians of the church property” at issue were “a body 
corporate” created by an “act of the Kentucky legislature.” 
13 Wall., at 720. That corporation, this Court recognized, 
was not itself the church, but merely an entity “under the 
control of the church session,” an ecclesiastical “governing 
body . . . composed of the ruling elders and pastor.” Ibid. 
Thus, “the constitution, usages, and laws of the Presbyterian 
[Church],” not Kentucky corporate law, controlled the out-
come of the dispute. Ibid. 
2 
We have recognized that the original “understanding” of 
the Religion Clauses' protection of church autonomy is “re-
fected” in early postratifcation practice. Hosanna-Tabor, 
565 U. S., at 184–185; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783, 787–790 (1983) (looking to early federal and state prac-
tice to determine the scope of the Establishment Clause). 
Here, that history confrms that religious institutions are 
more than the corporate entities that they form—and that 
confating the two undermines the First Amendment rights 
of religious institutions. 
Before Independence, corporate law provided the civil 
government with a mechanism to interfere in ecclesiastical 
affairs. Religious institutions had a particularly acute need 
to incorporate during that period, because “an unincorpo-
rated association could not hold property in its own right.” 
P. Kauper & S. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 
71 Mich. L. Rev. 1499, 1505 (1973). But, incorporating was 
not easy. In most Colonies, a religious group had to petition 
the government for a special charter of incorporation. Id., 
at 1507. And, the government frequently denied the re-
quests of disfavored religious denominations. Ibid.; see M. 
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 2105, 2134–2135 (2003). 
Following the Revolution, New York took a different path, 
enacting a statute to allow churches to incorporate without 
a special charter. 1784 N. Y . Laws ch. 18, p. 613 (1784 Act). 
The State grounded its new approach in respect for church 
autonomy. Invoking the free exercise clause of the State's 
1777 constitution, the preamble to the 1784 Act condemned 
the legislature's former practice of providing for “illiberal 
and partial distributions of charters of incorporation to reli-
gious societies.” Ibid. The 1784 Act liberalized the incor-
poration process “to enable every religious denomination to 
provide for the decent and honorable support of divine wor-
ship.” Id., at 614. 
The 1784 Act authorized members of a church to elect 
trustees who, upon registering with a court, would become 
a body corporate able to hold property, exist perpetually, and 
sue in court. Id., at 614–615. But, although this body 
could be “intrusted with the management, care and disposi-
tion of the temporalities of [the] church,” the Act made clear 
that the corporate body was not the church itself. Id., at 
618. The Act did not purport to name the trustees the lead-
ers of the church, but took for granted that each church 
would be headed by a “minister.” Id., at 614. And, the Act 
specifcally warranted that its provisions did not “in the least 
. . . alter or change the religious constitutions or govern-
ments” of any “churches.” Id., at 618. 
The 1784 Act soon became a model for the Nation at large. 
With a handful of exceptions, analogous statutes were 
“adopted in every American state during the antebellum 
era.” Funk 268, and n. 20 (collecting statutes). This Court 
approved this trend, holding that it neither established reli-
gion nor restrained free exercise for a legislature to “enact 
laws more effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the 
great objects of religion by giving them corporate rights for 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
the management of their property.” Terrett v. Taylor, 9 
Cranch 43, 48–49 (1815). Thus, like New York and the 
States following its approach, this Court too framed incorpo-
ration as a way to empower religious institutions, not to de-
fne them or alter their polity. 
In contrast, when Congress in 1811 attempted to use the 
corporate form to defne a church's internal form of govern-
ment, President James Madison raised a decisive constitu-
tional objection. “Congress had passed a bill incorporating 
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria 
in what was then the District of Columbia.” Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U. S., at 184. President Madison vetoed the bill, 
fnding that it violated the First Amendment because it did 
not respect “the essential distinction between civil and reli-
gious functions.” 22 Annals of Cong. 982–983 (1811). Mad-
ison further explained: 
“The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry 
rules and proceedings relative purely to the organization 
and polity of the church incorporated, and comprehend-
ing even the election and removal of the Minister of the 
same; so that no change could be made therein by the 
particular society, or by the general church of which it 
is a member, and whose authority it recognises.” Id., 
at 983. 
See also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U. S., at 184–185 (recounting 
this episode and citing it as an early invocation of the church 
autonomy doctrine). 
In short, the corporation is made for the church, not the 
church for the corporation. Both the basic principles of 
church autonomy and the history of religious corporations 
establish that religious institutions are more than the corpo-
rate entities that they form. It follows that the government 
may not use such entities as a means of regulating the inter-
nal governance of religious institutions. 
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II 
As a matter of church law, Catholic Charities and its sub-
entities are an arm of the Diocese of Superior, and thus, for 
religious purposes, are not distinct organizations. But, 
when determining whether Catholic Charities was a reli-
gious organization entitled to a tax exemption, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court nevertheless relied on Catholic Charities' 
separate corporate charter to treat it as an entity entirely 
distinct and separate from the Diocese. That holding con-
travened the church autonomy doctrine. 
A 
The Catholic Church is a single worldwide religious insti-
tution. The Church is headed by the Pope. Code of Canon 
Law, Canon 331 (Latin-English ed. 1998). Catholics believe 
that the Pope is the successor of St. Peter, the Apostle cho-
sen by Jesus to lead the Church. Ibid.; supra, at 257. The 
Church is divided into dioceses. A diocese generally con-
sists of “all the faithful living” within “a defnite territory,” 
who together constitute “a particular church” within the uni-
versal church. Code of Canon Law, Canons 369, 372, § 1. 
Each diocese is “entrusted to a bishop for him to shepherd.” 
Canon 369. The bishop exercises “legislative, executive, 
and judicial power” over his diocese. Canon 391, § 1. 
This structure of the Church is a matter of faith, not mere 
administrative convenience. Catholics believe that in nam-
ing the Apostles, Jesus personally established the offce of 
bishop and willed that “the bishops . . . should be shepherds 
in his church right to the end of the world.” Second Vatican 
Council, Lumen Gentium § 18 (1964) (citing John 20:21), in 2 
Tanner 849, 863; see Code of Canon Law, Canon 375, § 1 
(“Bishops . . . by divine institution succeed to the place of 
the Apostles through the Holy Spirit who has been given 
to them”). 
The Church understands itself to have a “three-fold” reli-
gious mission: “proclaiming the word of God,” “celebrating 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
the sacraments,” and “exercising the ministry of charity.” 
Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est ¶25(a) (2005). “These 
duties presuppose each other and are inseparable.” Ibid. 
“The Church” therefore “cannot neglect the service of char-
ity”—that is, care “for widows and orphans, prisoners, and 
the sick and needy of every kind”—“any more than she can 
neglect the Sacraments and the Word.” Id., ¶22. 
In keeping with the Church's hierarchical structure, “the 
Bishops” have “primary responsibility for carrying out . . . 
the service of charity” at the local level. Pope Benedict 
XVI, On the Service of Charity, Introduction (2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In particular, bishops are bound 
under canon law to establish within their territories organi-
zations to carry out charitable works in the name of the 
Church subject to their supervision and control. Brief for 
Catholic Charities USA as Amicus Curiae 18; see generally 
On the Service of Charity. “In the United States, these or-
ganizations are known as Catholic Charities.” Brief for 
Catholic Charities USA as Amicus Curiae 15. The works 
of these organizations are considered acts of the Church it-
self. Deus Caritas Est ¶29. 
The Diocese of Superior covers the northwest corner of 
Wisconsin. Catholic Charities is the “social ministry arm” 
of the Diocese. App. to Pet. for Cert. 371a.
2 In keeping 
with Catholic principles, the Bishop of Superior serves as 
the head of Catholic Charities and exercises plenary author-
ity over it. 
Catholic Charities is organized under state law as a non-
proft corporation governed by three members. The frst 
member is the Bishop, who serves as the organization's presi-
dent. The second member is the Diocese's vicar general, 
who is the vice president. Under canon law, the vicar gen-
eral is a priest chosen by the bishop to “assist him in the 
2 Although there are other organizations called Catholic Charities affli-
ated with other dioceses, the Catholic Charities involved in this suit is 
limited to the Diocese of Superior. 
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governance of the whole diocese.” Code of Canon Law, Can-
ons 475, § 1, 478, § 1. The third member is the organization's 
executive director, who need not be a priest. The bishop 
appoints both the vicar general and the executive director, 
who serve at his pleasure. This structure gives the Bishop 
control over both Catholic Charities and its separately incor-
porated subentities, up to and including the power to dissolve 
them at will. See App. 193. 
B 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disregarded this structure 
of Catholic Charities and its subentities in adjudicating the 
case below. The court acknowledged Catholic Charities' 
status as an “arm” of the Diocese of Superior subject to the 
bishop's “control.” 2024 WI 13, ¶¶7, 9, 411 Wis. 2d 1, 13–14, 
3 N. W. 3d 666, 672. It nonetheless viewed Catholic Chari-
ties and its subentities as distinct, nonreligious organizations 
merely because they are separately incorporated. 
Wisconsin imposes a tax on employers to cover the cost 
of state-provided unemployment benefits. Wis. Stat. 
§§ 108.17–108.18. The tax covers most employers in the 
State, but an exception applies if the employer is “a church” 
or “an organization” controlled by a church that is “operated 
primarily for religious purposes.” §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1)–(2); 
see ante, at 242. Catholic Charities and four of its subenti-
ties sought an exemption under the latter category. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the organizations were 
not operated for religious purposes, and thus that excluding 
Catholic Charities and its subentities from the exemption did 
not violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 
See ante, at 245–246. 
In construing the scope of the exemption, the court began 
with “the threshold question of whose purposes we must ex-
amine in our analysis—those of the Diocese or those of 
[Catholic Charities] and its sub-entities.” 411 Wis. 2d, at 23, 
3 N. W. 3d, at 676. The court treated this question as one 
of ordinary statutory interpretation, determining that the 
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Thomas, J., concurring 
“plain language” of the statute required looking to the indi-
vidual corporate entity's purpose, not the purpose of the 
church that operates or controls it. Ibid., 3 N. W. 3d, at 
676–677. 
Catholic Charities objected that examining “itself and its 
sub-entities as corporations separate from” the Diocese vio-
lates the First Amendment's guarantee of church autonomy 
by “ `divid[ing] up religious bodies according to secular prin-
ciples.' ” Id., at 49, 3 N. W. 3d, at 689 (alteration in original). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. It acknowledged 
that, under the First Amendment, matters of ecclesiastical 
governance “belong to the church alone.” Id., at 50, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 690. But, it insisted that the exemption simply “de-
fnes what employment is for purposes of unemployment 
insurance without reference to any religious principles or 
any attempt to control internal church operations.” Ibid.; 
see ante, at 246. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's resolution of this thresh-
old question was outcome determinative. The court recog-
nized that the Diocese's “purpose is religious by nature.” 
411 Wis. 2d, at 24, 3 N. W. 3d, at 677. In contrast, the court 
found that Catholic Charities' and its subentities' purposes 
“are primarily charitable and secular.” Id., at 35, 3 N. W. 
3d, at 683; see ante, at 245–246. As Wisconsin concedes, had 
the court resolved the threshold question of whose purpose 
controls the other way, it would have found that Catholic 
Charities and its subentities “would qualify for the church 
exemption.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 73–74. 
C 
By failing to defer to the Bishop of Superior's religious 
view that Catholic Charities and its subentities are an arm 
of the Diocese, the Wisconsin Supreme Court violated the 
church autonomy doctrine. 
Wisconsin's unemployment tax implicates the church au-
tonomy doctrine. The statute on its face treats religious in-
stitutions differently from secular institutions: If an em-
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ployer is “a church” or “an organization” controlled by a 
church that is “operated primarily for religious purposes,” it 
is exempt from the tax; if not, the tax applies. Wis. Stat. 
§§ 108.02(15)(h)(1)–(2). The statute makes this distinction 
precisely “to preserve the religious autonomy of [the ex-
empted] organizations.” Brief for Respondents 32; see ante, 
at 253. The statute thus does not simply impose neutral 
and generally applicable burdens that do not affect internal 
governance; it requires civil courts to classify employers as 
religious or not, and to treat them differently based on that 
classifcation. 
But, the church autonomy doctrine leaves it to religious 
institutions to defne their internal structure for themselves. 
Kedroff, 344 U. S., at 116. When deciding whether an em-
ployer qualifes as a religious institution, a civil court must 
accept the employer's understanding of its internal struc-
ture, just as it must accept the employer's understanding of 
its religious beliefs generally. See Milivojevich, 426 U. S., 
at 709 (“To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into 
the allocation of power within a hierarchical church so as to 
decide religious law governing church polity would violate 
the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil de-
termination of religious doctrine” (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted)). 
Here, there is no dispute that, as a matter of church gover-
nance, the Bishop of Superior—the head of both the Diocese 
of Superior and Catholic Charities—considers Catholic 
Charities and its subentities to be an “arm” of the Diocese 
rather than a distinct organization. Supra, at 265. In other 
words, Catholic Charities and its subentities are corporate 
entities that the Diocese has created to carry out its religious 
mission. It is therefore dispositive that, as the State con-
cedes, the Diocese qualifes for the religious employer ex-
emption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 73–74. As an arm of the Diocese 
from the Bishop's perspective, Catholic Charities and its sub-

Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 269 
Thomas, J., concurring 
entities must qualify as well, regardless of whether their ac-
tivities, considered in isolation, would qualify as religious. 
In holding otherwise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court en-
tirely disregarded the Bishop's religious judgment, relying 
instead on the fact that Catholic Charities and its subentities 
“are organized as separate corporations apart from the 
church itself.” 411 Wis. 2d, at 35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682. The 
court thus made the error of treating a religious institution 
as nothing more than its corporate entities. 
Wisconsin defends its Supreme Court's judgment, arguing 
that the church autonomy doctrine is inapposite because the 
State has not compelled the Diocese to alter its structure. 
In Wisconsin's view, the State has only imposed a minor tax 
to which the Diocese has no conscience objection. But, “the 
First Amendment protects against `indirect coercion or pen-
alties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohi-
bitions.' ” Carson v. Makin, 596 U. S. 767, 778 (2022). The 
exclusion of “religious observers from otherwise available 
public benefts” is a cognizable free exercise burden. Ibid. 
This principle applies with full force to the church autonomy 
doctrine. The doctrine rests on the premise that “civil 
courts” must “exercise no jurisdiction” over “subject-
matter[s] ” that are “ecclesiastical in its character.” Wat-
son, 13 Wall., at 733 (emphasis added). Regardless of 
whether the religious institution's injury is direct coercion 
or the withholding of a beneft, “essentially religious contro-
versies” are an inappropriate subject matter for civil courts 
to decide. Milivojevich, 426 U. S., at 709. 
* * * 
The Court correctly holds that Catholic Charities and its 
subentities have suffered unconstitutional religious discrimi-
nation even on the assumption that those entities should be 
considered in isolation. See ante, at 249–250. I would re-
verse for an additional reason—that the Wisconsin Supreme 
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Court violated the church autonomy doctrine. However in-
corporated, Catholic Charities and its subentities are, from a 
religious perspective, a mere arm of the Diocese of Superior. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court should have deferred to that 
understanding, and its failure to do so amounted to an unlaw-
ful attempt by the State to redefne the Diocese's internal 
governance. 
Justice Jackson, concurring. 
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) allows a 
State to exempt from its unemployment-coverage mandate 
any “organization which is operated primarily for religious 
purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or 
principally supported by a church or convention or associa-
tion of churches.” 26 U. S. C. § 3309(b)(1)(B). Like many 
States, Wisconsin enacted a religious-purposes exemption 
that tracks § 3309(b)(1)(B). As the Court explains, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court's application of that exemption has 
created a constitutional problem: The State treats church-
affliated charities that proselytize and serve co-religionists 
exclusively differently from those that do not. Ante, at 241– 
242. Because I agree that this distinction violates the neu-
trality principle of the Constitution's Religion Clauses, I join 
the Court's opinion in full. 
I write separately because, in my view, FUTA's religious-
purposes exemption does not distinguish between charitable 
organizations based on their engagement in proselytization 
or their service to religious adherents. Nor does that ex-
emption differentiate based on religious motivation, as the 
Government (as amicus) insists. Rather, both the text and 
legislative history of FUTA's religious-purposes exemption 
confrm that Congress used the phrase “operated primarily 
for religious purposes” to refer to the organization's function, 
not its inspiration. Put differently, § 3309(b)(1)(B) turns on 
what an entity does, not how or why it does it. 
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Jackson, J., concurring 
I 
America constructed its unemployment-insurance system 
during the Great Depression to mitigate the disruptive ef-
fects of sudden job loss on workers. Wisconsin led the way 
in 1932, after identifying unemployment as “an urgent public 
problem.” Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1). Congress followed suit 
later that same decade by enacting FUTA, which “called for 
a cooperative federal-state program of benefts to unem-
ployed workers.” St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. South Dakota, 451 U. S. 772, 775 (1981). 
FUTA operates by setting a federal minimum level of 
unemployment coverage that state programs must provide 
to remain eligible for certain grants and tax incentives. 
§§ 3302, 3304. To obtain federal approval, States must man-
date participation by at least those categories of employers 
that federal law requires to be covered. § 3304. FUTA 
also allows—but does not compel—States to exempt specifc 
categories of employers from mandatory participation. 
Before 1970, FUTA allowed States to exempt nearly 
all nonproft employers from unemployment coverage. See 
§ 3306(c)(8) (1964 ed.). But in 1970, Congress reversed 
course and required the opposite: that state unemployment-
insurance programs cover most nonproft workers. See Em-
ployment Security Amendments of 1970, § 104, 84 Stat. 697. 
Addressing this raising of the unemployment-coverage foor, 
the House Ways and Means Committee found that, with re-
spect to nonproft organizations, “unemployment affects a 
substantial number of their employees, particularly people 
working in nonprofessional occupations.” H. R. Rep. No. 
91–612, p. 11 (1969) (H. R. Rep.). FUTA's inclusion of non-
profts addressed Congress's concerns “about the need of 
their employees for protection against wage loss resulting 
from unemployment.” Ibid. 
The 1970 amendments further specifed certain “new and 
narrower” categories of permissible nonproft exemptions. 
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St. Martin, 451 U. S., at 777; see also § 3309(b). One was the 
religious-purposes provision at issue here. Per the statute's 
language (which Wisconsin subsequently adopted), a State 
can choose to exempt from its unemployment-insurance man-
date “an organization which is operated primarily for reli-
gious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, 
or principally supported by a church or convention or associ-
ation of churches.” § 3309(b)(1)(B).
1 
II 
This case arises out of a dispute about the meaning of the 
phrase “operated primarily for religious purposes” in Wis. 
Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2), which tracks § 3309(b)(1)(B). When 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court affrmed the denial of petition-
ers' exemption request, it concluded that this clause requires 
judicial inquiry into “both the motivations and the activities 
of the organization.” 411 Wis. 2d 1, 33 (2024). With re-
spect to activities, the court examined how Catholic Chari-
ties and its subentities provided their charitable services, 
and in particular, whether they did so while “attempt[ing] 
to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith [o]r 
supply[ing] any religious materials to program participants 
or employees.” Id., at 35. (They did not.) It also ob-
served that “[b]oth employment with the organizations and 
services offered by the organizations are open to all partici-
pants regardless of religion.” Ibid. The court further sug-
gested that a church-affliated charity would likely obtain the 
exemption if it engaged in “ `teaching, evangelism, and wor-
ship,' ” but not otherwise. Ibid. 
The Government urges us to hold that FUTA's use of the 
phrase “operated primarily for religious purposes” refers 
only to why the organization is engaging in the charitable 
1 Wisconsin extended its unemployment-insurance program to cover 
nonprofts, consistent with the 1970 FUTA amendments, in 1971. See 
1971 Wis. Laws ch. 53. It also added a religious-purposes exemption that 
mirrors § 3309(b)(1)(B). See Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2). 
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Jackson, J., concurring 
work at issue—i. e., “the motivations that drive the organiza-
tion to conduct its activities.” Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 2. It argues that, in the context of an indi-
vidual, the word “purposes” most naturally refers to “the 
mental state” accompanying their activities. Id., at 22. So, 
the Government contends, a charity's eligibility for the ex-
emption must turn on its underlying motives. Ibid. 
In my view, however, neither Wisconsin's motivations-
plus-activities reading (the how ) nor the Government's 
motivations-only interpretation (the why) accurately cap-
tures what Congress intended when it devised § 3309(b)(1)(B) 
to allow an exemption for church-affliated entities that are 
“operated primarily for religious purposes.” I think, in-
stead, that § 3309(b)(1)(B) relates solely to what the entity 
does. I reach that conclusion frst by examining the text of 
the provision and then by consulting the statute's established 
enactment history. These sources clarify that the religious-
purposes exemption is not applicable to general charitable 
organizations—e. g., soup kitchens, hospitals, or orphanages. 
Rather, Congress designed the exemption to capture a much 
narrower category of employers: church-affliated entities 
that exist to perform religious functions. 
A 
Start with the text. To fall within § 3309(b)(1)(B)'s ex-
emption, an employer must satisfy two requirements. First, 
it must be “operated primarily for religious purposes.” 
§ 3309(b)(1)(B). Second, it must be “operated, supervised, 
controlled, or principally supported by a church or conven-
tion or association of churches.” Ibid. Here, no one dis-
putes that the Catholic Church operates, supervises, con-
trols, or principally supports the charities at issue. The 
fght is over whether church-affliated charitable organiza-
tions—subentities that primarily provide job training, men-
tal health, and other services to those with developmental 
disabilities, along with the entity that oversees these and 
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other charities—satisfy the first requirement; that is, 
whether they “operat[e] primarily for religious purposes” 
within the meaning of this provision. Ibid. 
Notably, the language of the provision only goes so far, 
because § 3309(b)(1)(B) does not defne the term “religious 
purposes.” And “purposes” admits of several possible 
meanings. When used in certain contexts, such as “on pur-
pose,” the term can refer to one's “intent.” Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1847 (1971). But it can also 
mean “an end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, 
exertion, or operation.” Ibid. Another way of conceptual-
izing this second defnition is: “[T]he object which one has in 
view” or “[t]he object for which anything is done or made, or 
for which it exists.” 12 Oxford English Dictionary 878 (2d 
ed. 1989). This accords with common usage of the term. If 
something is put “to no good purpose,” then it is not per-
forming any effective function. 
The Government does not dispute that “purposes” can 
refer to ends. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15. 
But it views “ends” as relating solely to “an organization's 
fundamental motivation for its affairs,” not “the nature of 
[its] activities.” Id., at 15–16. The Government does not 
explain how it makes this logical leap—from the entity's end 
(i.e., the object it exists to achieve) to the entity's motivation 
(i. e., its inspiration for seeking that achievement). In my 
view, the only way to close the gap is to try to ascertain 
Congress's intent. That is, because “religious purposes” is 
susceptible to more than one reading in this context (it could 
mean either what an entity does or why it does it), an inter-
preter of this provision must ask: Which reading did Con-
gress intend when it inserted that phrase into this statute? 
The text of § 3309(b)(1)(B) itself provides a clue. If one 
reads “operated primarily for religious purposes” to track an 
organization's motivation, rather than its function, the provi-
sion becomes almost entirely superfuous. 
Recall that, to be exempt under § 3309(b)(1)(B), the organi-
zation must be “operated, supervised, controlled, or princi-

Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 275 
Jackson, J., concurring 
pally supported by a church or convention or association of 
churches.” And, of course, every church has religious mo-
tives for its activities. Thus, prong two of § 3309(b)(1)(B) 
already establishes religious motivation (the charitable en-
tity is, after all, run by or otherwise closely affliated with a 
church)—leaving prong one with no additional work to do if 
it, too, is interpreted as a religious-motive element. While 
not dispositive, this superfuity problem weighs in favor of a 
construction of “operated primarily for religious purposes” 
that looks to what an entity does rather than its motives. 
See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (“ `[A] stat-
ute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfu-
ous, void, or insignifcant' ” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 
U. S. 167, 174 (2001))). 
The functional understanding of “operated primarily 
for religious purposes” also makes perfect sense. So inter-
preted, it addresses a different factor than prong two be-
cause it gets at what the church-run entity actually does. 
Workforce programs train workers. Hospitals care for the 
sick. Soup kitchens feed the hungry. Shelters house the 
homeless. 
That said, I admit that § 3309(b)(1)(B)'s text alone may not 
provide a dispositive answer, and thus requires further ex-
ploration. For that reason, I look to the provision's enact-
ment history. See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 573 U. S. 431, 438–439 (2014) (turning to legislative his-
tory when text is ambiguous); cf. Delaware v. Pennsylvania, 
598 U. S. 115, 138–139 (2023) (“ `[C]lear evidence of congres-
sional intent may illuminate ambiguous text' ”). In this 
case, that history provides illuminating answers. 
B 
In the House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1970 
FUTA amendments, Congress signaled that it designed the 
§ 3309(b)(1)(B) exemption to distinguish between church-
related organizations performing ministerial functions 
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(which it wanted to allow States to exempt) and those per-
forming general charitable functions (which it wanted to re-
quire States to cover). This makes clear that what the en-
tity does matters for purposes of applying the exemption. 
To explain this, Congress included a series of examples 
distinguishing the kinds of church-run entities it thought 
were exemptible. On the exempt side of the line, the Re-
ports list (1) a “college devoted primarily to preparing stu-
dents for the ministry,” (2) “a novitiate,” and (3) “a house of 
study training candidates to become members of religious 
orders.” H. R. Rep., at 44; S. Rep. No. 91–752, pp. 48–49 
(1970) (S. Rep.). On the nonexempt side of the line, the Re-
ports state that “a church related (separately incorporated) 
charitable organization (such as, for example, an orphanage 
or a home for the aged) would not be considered under this 
paragraph to be operated primarily for religious purposes.” 
H. R. Rep., at 44; S. Rep., at 49. Nowhere does Congress 
mention how, much less why, these paradigmatic entities go 
about their work. 
These examples are instructive. The exempt category as 
the Reports defned it lists solely church-run nonprofts that 
have service to the church itself as their main objective. A 
novitiate, for instance, is an entity that trains and houses 
novices who are deciding whether to pursue a life in a reli-
gious order or priesthood. Indeed, what unites all three 
“exempt” entities is what they do: preparing people for reli-
gious life and for service to the church, i. e., they all serve 
religious functions. By contrast, the nonexempt category 
consists of general charitable organizations affliated with a 
church. A church-related “orphanage” or “home for the 
aged” is not “operated primarily for religious purposes”—at 
least within the meaning Congress intended that phrase to 
carry. H. R. Rep., at 44; S. Rep., at 49. 
Through the Reports' examples, Congress thus clarifed 
that it does not matter how or why the entity goes about its 
work. All that matters is what it does. As such, orphan-
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Jackson, J., concurring 
ages, nursing homes, and charities like them—i. e., entities 
whose “purpose” is to care for children or tend to the el-
derly—do not exhibit what Congress considered to be “reli-
gious purposes” under this exemption. And that is true re-
gardless of whether religion motivates the entity's work. 
III 
This function-based reading of “operated primarily for re-
ligious purposes” not only follows from the text and legisla-
tive history of § 3309(b)(1)(B). It also best accords with the 
anti-entanglement justifcation for the religious-purposes 
exemption. Wisconsin maintains that it adopted its state 
version of § 3309(b)(1)(B) to keep the government out of 
unemployment-eligibility adjudications that implicate ques-
tions of church doctrine. See Brief for Respondents 21–24. 
But a reading of the exemption that requires assessment of 
the entity's motivations, instead of its actual work, does little 
to further that anti-entanglement objective. 
Consider the state unemployment-insurance scheme at 
issue here. Unemployed workers are not automatically eli-
gible to receive unemployment benefts; those who have been 
terminated for “misconduct,” for example, may be ineligible. 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5). Employers can therefore object to 
any worker's unemployment claim on misconduct grounds. 
See § 108.09(1). When that happens, the State's unemploy-
ment agency must then decide whether to deny benefts by 
considering the circumstances of the unemployment-beneft 
applicant's discharge. 
For certain church-related employers— e. g., novitiates, 
houses of study, and colleges that train ministers—that as-
sessment might “entangl[e] the state in employment disputes 
that turn on religious faith and doctrine.” Brief for Re-
spondents 12. Imagine, for example, the adjudication of dis-
putes over the suffciency of a fred employee's prayers or the 
accuracy of their scriptural teaching. Indeed, it is precisely 
because of what novitiates, houses of religious study, and 
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ministerial training colleges do (prepare individuals for reli-
gious life) that potential entanglement problems occur. By 
contrast, when a church-run entity provides general charita-
ble services to the public, the same kinds of entanglement 
issues are far less likely to arise.
2 
What is more, a motive-focused exemption inquiry pre-
sents potential entanglement problems of its own. If taken 
seriously as an eligibility requirement (as opposed to a rub-
berstamp for any organization that professes religious mo-
tives), it would require assessing whether an entity is really 
motivated primarily by religion—an intrusive exploration 
into the hearts and minds of those who run it. See Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 19–21 (listing evidence 
courts might examine to assess a nonproft's “true motiva-
tions”). Requiring courts to engage in the business of eval-
uating religious motivation is a sensitive endeavor. And 
here, it is unnecessary, because the church-affliation prong 
already does that work. It actually serves no rational objec-
tive, as the sincerity of an entity's religious motives has little 
if anything to do with the problem Congress sought to 
address. 
* * * 
Church-related nonproft employers care for the sick, feed 
the hungry, and improve the world in countless ways. Most 
do this—no doubt—for religious reasons. All do this thanks 
to their employees' labor. As I read § 3309(b)(1)(B), evaluat-
2 Consider a church-related hospital that employs hundreds of workers— 
“janitors, cooks, dining assistants, housekeepers, van drivers, technicians, 
maintenance workers, secretaries, x-ray technologists, groundskeepers, 
receptionists, orderlies, nurses, anesthesia aides, sonographers, medical 
aides, occupational therapy assistants, security offcers”—the list goes on. 
Brief for Service Employees International Union et al. as Amici Curiae 
6–7 (listing jobs that amici's members perform at religiously affliated 
nonprofits). While the hospital may have a wholly sincere, Christ-
centered mission, its religious motivation has little if anything to do with 
whether adjudicating unemployment claims from this hospital's laid-off 
workers will entangle church and state. 
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Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 279 
Jackson, J., concurring 
ing whether a church-affliated nonproft “operate[s] primar-
ily for religious purposes” is not a matter of assessing the 
sincerity or primacy of its religious motives. Instead, as 
with so many other interpretive issues, determining what 
the religious-purposes exemption means involves attempting 
to discern what Congress was trying to achieve. Here, Con-
gress sought to extend to most nonproft workers the stabil-
ity that unemployment insurance offers, while exempting a 
narrow category of church-affliated entities most likely to 
cause signifcant entanglement problems for the unemploy-
ment system—precisely because their work involves prepar-
ing individuals for religious life. It is perfectly consistent 
with the opinion the Court hands down today for States to 
align their § 3309(b)(1)(B)-based religious-purposes exemp-
tions with Congress's true focus. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 243, last line: “ascribe” is changed to “adhere” 
p. 267, line 16: “church” is inserted before “operations” 
p. 275, line 8: “superfuidity” is changed to “superfuity”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 605 U. S. Part 1 Pages 238–279 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 5, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notif…

• #2

  (b) The State argues that, when it comes to religious accommodations afforded by the government, courts should ask whether the accommoda- tion's eligibility criteria are the product of “invidious discrimination” to determine if strict scrutiny applies. In support of that rule, the State draws on Gillette v. United…

• #3

  on religious doctrine. Resolving misconduct disputes for employees tasked with inculcating religious faith, the State argues, may require it to decide whether those employees complied with religious doctrine. The lines drawn by the exemption, however, are overinclusive in rela- tion to that interest, for they oper…

• #4

  Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Walter M. Weber, and Laura B. Hernandez; for By The Hand by John J. Bursch and Cody S. Barnett; for Catholic Charities USA by Keith R. Styles and James H. Hulme; for the Catholic Conferences of Illinois et al. by James N. Law; for the Christia…

• #5

  First Amendment. The Court holds that it does. The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between reli- gions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational pref- erence to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposed a denominational preference by differentiat…

• #6

  emption also covers nonproft organizations “operated, su- pervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches,” but only if they are “op- erated primarily for religious purposes.” § 108.02(15)(h)(2). Wisconsin is not alone in exempting religious organiza- tions from…

• #7

  3d, at 672. The bishop of the Diocese serves as the Bureau's president and appoints its membership, which in turn over- sees the Bureau “ `to ensure' ” that it fulflls its mission “ `in compliance with the Principles of Catholic social teaching.' ” Ibid. The Bureau's executive director, who need not be a Catholic…

• #8

  ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed the department's ruling. Id., at 291a–350a. In the years that followed, petitioners received a series of alternating wins and losses as the parties appealed up through the state administrative and judicial systems. The Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission reversed …

• #9

  at 38, 3 N. W. 3d, at 684. Petitioners “neither attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith nor sup- Page Proof Pending Publication 246 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN LABOR & INDUSTRY REVIEW COMM'N Opinion of the Court ply any religious materials to program participants or em- p…

• #10

  Opinion of the Court part. Justice Bradley would have held that a nonproft is “operated primarily for religious purposes,” § 108.02(15) (h)(2), when its motivations are religious, irrespective of the nature of its activities. The majority's contrary approach, the dissent warned, “engages in religious discriminati…

• #11

  erty requires that government' ” refrain from “ `favoritism among sects.' ” Id., at 246 (quoting School Dist. of Abing- ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Gold- berg, J., concurring)). Government actions that favor cer- tain religions, the Court has warned, convey to members of other faiths that …

• #12

  rior, thereby satisfying one of the exemption's two criteria. 411 Wis. 2d, at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676. The court's inquiry instead turned on whether petitioners are “operated primar- ily for religious purposes.” Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2); see 411 Wis. 2d, at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676. On that criterion, the court…

• #13

  upon different religious organizations.” Larson, 456 U. S., at 247, n. 23. Much like a law exempting only those reli- gious organizations that perform baptisms or worship on Sundays, an exemption that requires proselytization or ex- clusive service of co-religionists establishes a preference for certain religions…

• #14

  not discriminate on the basis of religious affliation.” Gil- lette, 401 U. S., at 450. The same is not true here. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of § 108.02(h)(15)(2) facially differenti- ates among religions based on theological choices. After all, an exemption provided only to organizations that e…

• #15

  further that interest.” Larson, 456 U. S., at 246–247. The State bears the burden of clearing that high bar, and it has failed to do so here. Wisconsin justifes its law by reference to two principal interests. First, it argues that the law serves a compelling state interest in “ensuring unemployment coverage for …

• #16

  whether employees complied with religious doctrine.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 72. Yet the State again fails to demonstrate that § 108.02(15)(h)(2) is “closely ftted to further” that anti- entanglement interest. Larson, 456 U. S., at 247. To the extent the State seeks to avoid opining on employee compli- Page Proof Pendin…

• #17

  Wisconsin's unemployment-insurance tax on employers if it is controlled by a church and “operated primarily for reli- gious purposes.” Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2) (2023–2024). The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Catholic Charities Bureau (Catholic Charities) and its subentities are not such organizations…

• #18

  America, 344 U. S. 94, 116 (1952). 1 For instance, “courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions.” Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 746 (2020). And, where resolution of a prope…

• #19

  must enjoy a greater right to control their own affairs than that enjoyed by other groups. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 189 (2012). Second is the reality that matters of religious “faith and doctrine” are “closely linked to . . . matters of church govern- ment.” Ou…

• #20

  ingly distinguished between temporal matters subject to civil courts' jurisdiction and spiritual matters subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. See McRaney v. North Am. Mission Bd. of Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 980 F. 3d 1066, 1076–1078 (CA5 2020) (Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)…

• #21

  porate entities that they form. 1 Religious institutions do not exist apart from the secular world. They need to buy and sell property. They need to hire and pay staff. They need to form contracts and fle lawsuits. They need their property arrangements to persist when personnel changes, and they need their prope…

• #22

  the organization itself.” Ibid. A religious corporation thus possesses a “dual personality”: It is at once a corporation defned by state law and a part of a broader, “unincorpo- rated” religious institution. Id., at 8–6 to 8–7; accord, Clas- sis of Central Cal. v. Miraloma Community Church, 177 Cal. App. 4th 750,…

• #23

  the government for a special charter of incorporation. Id., at 1507. And, the government frequently denied the re- quests of disfavored religious denominations. Ibid.; see M. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Page Proof Pending Publication 262 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN LABO…

• #24

  the management of their property.” Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 48–49 (1815). Thus, like New York and the States following its approach, this Court too framed incorpo- ration as a way to empower religious institutions, not to de- fne them or alter their polity. In contrast, when Congress in 1811 attempted to u…

• #25

  travened the church autonomy doctrine. A The Catholic Church is a single worldwide religious insti- tution. The Church is headed by the Pope. Code of Canon Law, Canon 331 (Latin-English ed. 1998). Catholics believe that the Pope is the successor of St. Peter, the Apostle cho- sen by Jesus to lead the Church. Ibi…

• #26

  On the Service of Charity. “In the United States, these or- ganizations are known as Catholic Charities.” Brief for Catholic Charities USA as Amicus Curiae 15. The works of these organizations are considered acts of the Church it- self. Deus Caritas Est ¶29. The Diocese of Superior covers the northwest corner of …

• #27

  primarily for religious purposes.” §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1)–(2); see ante, at 242. Catholic Charities and four of its subenti- ties sought an exemption under the latter category. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the organizations were not operated for religious purposes, and thus that excluding Catholic Charities…

• #28

  By failing to defer to the Bishop of Superior's religious view that Catholic Charities and its subentities are an arm of the Diocese, the Wisconsin Supreme Court violated the church autonomy doctrine. Wisconsin's unemployment tax implicates the church au- tonomy doctrine. The statute on its face treats religious …

• #29

  emption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 73–74. As an arm of the Diocese from the Bishop's perspective, Catholic Charities and its sub- Cite as: 605 U. S. 238 (2025) 269 Thomas, J., concurring entities must qualify as well, regardless of whether their ac- tivities, considered in isolation, would qualify as religious. In holdin…

• #30

  The Wisconsin Supreme Court should have deferred to that understanding, and its failure to do so amounted to an unlaw- ful attempt by the State to redefne the Diocese's internal governance. Justice Jackson, concurring. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) allows a State to exempt from its unemployment-coverag…

• #31

  to remain eligible for certain grants and tax incentives. §§ 3302, 3304. To obtain federal approval, States must man- date participation by at least those categories of employers that federal law requires to be covered. § 3304. FUTA also allows—but does not compel—States to exempt specifc categories of employers …

• #32

  and in particular, whether they did so while “attempt[ing] to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith [o]r supply[ing] any religious materials to program participants or employees.” Id., at 35. (They did not.) It also ob- served that “[b]oth employment with the organizations and services offered by the…

• #33

  emption, an employer must satisfy two requirements. First, it must be “operated primarily for religious purposes.” § 3309(b)(1)(B). Second, it must be “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or conven- tion or association of churches.” Ibid. Here, no one dis- putes that the Catholi…

• #34

  mean either what an entity does or why it does it), an inter- preter of this provision must ask: Which reading did Con- gress intend when it inserted that phrase into this statute? The text of § 3309(b)(1)(B) itself provides a clue. If one reads “operated primarily for religious purposes” to track an organization…

• #35

  FUTA amendments, Congress signaled that it designed the § 3309(b)(1)(B) exemption to distinguish between church- related organizations performing ministerial functions Page Proof Pending Publication 276 CA THOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN LABOR & INDUSTRY REVIEW COMM'N Jackson, J., concurring (which i…

• #36

  Jackson, J., concurring ages, nursing homes, and charities like them—i. e., entities whose “purpose” is to care for children or tend to the el- derly—do not exhibit what Congress considered to be “reli- gious purposes” under this exemption. And that is true re- gardless of whether religion motivates the entity's …

• #37

  What is more, a motive-focused exemption inquiry pre- sents potential entanglement problems of its own. If taken seriously as an eligibility requirement (as opposed to a rub- berstamp for any organization that professes religious mo- tives), it would require assessing whether an entity is really motivated primari…

• #38

  ity that unemployment insurance offers, while exempting a narrow category of church-affliated entities most likely to cause signifcant entanglement problems for the unemploy- ment system—precisely because their work involves prepar- ing individuals for religious life. It is perfectly consistent with the opinion t…