Esteras v. United States

Summary

A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release may not consider 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à-vis the defendant’s underlying criminal offense.

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 185–225 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
June 20, 2025 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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OCTOBER TERM, 2024 185 
Syllabus 
ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the sixth circuit 
No. 23–7483. Argued February 25, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025* 
Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin, and the 
District Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison followed by a 6-
year term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Esteras 
was arrested and charged with domestic violence and other crimes. 
The District Court revoked Esteras's supervised release and ordered 24 
months of reimprisonment, explaining that Esteras's earlier sentence 
had been “rather lenient” and that his revocation sentence must “pro-
mote respect for the law,” a consideration enumerated in 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit affrmed, holding that a district court 
may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. 
Held: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant's term 
of supervised release may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers 
retribution vis-à-vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense. 
Pp. 191–204. 
(a) In determining the appropriate sentence for a federal defendant, 
a district court must consider 10 factors set forth in § 3553(a). Among 
those factors is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which references “the need for the sen-
tence imposed” “to refect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” 
This provision speaks to the retributive purpose of punishment. 
A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may also impose a post-
imprisonment term of supervised release. Section 3583(c) enumerates 
the factors that a court must consider when deciding to impose super-
vised release. Eight of the ten § 3553(a) factors are listed. Signifcant 
here, § 3583(c) excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à-
vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense. When a court decides 
whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release, § 3583(e) 
provides that the same eight factors apply. So the question is this: In 
determining whether to revoke supervised release, may a district court 
account for these omitted factors—and specifcally § 3553(a)(2)(A)? Es-
teras says no; the Government says yes. Pp. 191–195. 
*Together with Jaimez, fka Watters v. United States and Leaks v. United 
States, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court's Rule 12.4). 
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186 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
(b) The Court agrees with Esteras. District courts cannot consider 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. That conclusion fol-
lows from the well-established canon of statutory interpretation—“ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius”—which means that expressing one 
item of an associated group excludes another item not mentioned. See 
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S. 73, 80. While Congress 
elsewhere set forth 10 factors that must generally inform a district 
court's sentencing decisions, it provided in § 3583(e)—the provision gov-
erning the revocation of supervised release—that courts must consider 
only 8 of those 10 factors. The natural implication is that Congress did 
not intend courts to consider the other two factors, including 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). 
The statutory structure confrms this negative inference. Neighbor-
ing provisions governing the imposition and revocation of other kinds 
of sentences instruct courts to consider all the § 3553(a) factors. But 
for supervised release—and supervised release only—Congress omitted 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). This is a distinction with a difference. And Congress's 
decision to exclude retribution from the calculus also comports with su-
pervised release's role in the criminal justice scheme. Supervised re-
lease “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. 
Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 50. Rather, it “fulflls rehabilitative ends” 
and “provides individuals with postconfnement assistance.” United 
States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60. So when a defendant violates 
a condition of supervised release, courts must consider the forward-
looking sentencing ends, but may not consider the backward-looking 
purpose of retribution. 
The Court has twice interpreted the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from 
the provision governing the imposition of supervised release to mean 
that district courts may not consider that factor. See Tapia v. United 
States, 564 U. S. 319; Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481. Al-
though Tapia and Concepcion both deal with the imposition of super-
vised release under § 3583(c), the same reasoning applies to revocation 
under § 3583(e): the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) means that courts may 
not consider it. Pp. 195–197. 
(c) The Government's counterarguments are unpersuasive. The Gov-
ernment reads the exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e) to mean 
that district courts must consider enumerated factors and need not (but 
may) consider unenumerated ones. Given sentencing judges' discre-
tion, the Government argues, Congress would have been more explicit 
had it intended to foreclose the consideration of retributive aims when 
revoking supervised release. But what Congress said is clear: The 
itemized list in § 3583(e) is exhaustive and supplies the entire universe 
of factors courts may consider. And the Government's reading trivial-
izes the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A): As the Government recognizes, a 
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Syllabus 
court may “consider” an enumerated factor but give it no weight. Yet 
there is negligible difference between saying that a court must consider 
a given factor (but may give it no weight) and saying that a court may 
consider a given factor (if the court so chooses). 
Next, the Government argues that Esteras's reading is unworkable 
because considering other enumerated factors—such as “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense” under § 3553(a)(1)—will necessarily imply 
consideration of the retributive principles captured by § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
While the Government asks how a court may consider the nature and 
circumstances of the offense without also considering the retributive 
principles captured by § 3553(a)(2)(A), the answer is straightforward. 
Courts may consider the offense's nature and circumstances to inform 
the considerations set forth in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)—deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But courts cannot consider them as 
relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s retributive focus. 
Finally, the Government interprets § 3583(g), which mandates revoca-
tion in certain circumstances, as subject to the full list of § 3553(a) fac-
tors. And it would be anomalous, the Government says, if courts could 
consider retribution in mandatory revocations under § 3583(g) but not 
in discretionary revocations under § 3583(e)(3). The correct reading of 
§ 3583(g) does not affect the Court's analysis. That § 3583(e) might op-
erate differently from § 3583(g) is no reason to disregard § 3583(e)'s plain 
meaning. Pp. 197–202. 
(d) When appellate courts review a claim that the district court has 
impermissibly relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A), much will turn on whether the 
defendant has properly objected to the district court's impermissible 
reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A). If not, the defendant's appeal will be gov-
erned by plain-error review. But if a court considers retribution for 
the original offense over the defendant's objection, and the error was not 
harmless, then the court of appeals should vacate the order and remand 
for the court to apply the correct standard. None of this turns the 
Court's reading of § 3583(e) into a “substance-free reverse magic-words 
requirement,” as the Government suggests. Brief for United States 37. 
The Government confates the proper interpretation of § 3583(e) with an 
appellate court's ability to enforce that interpretation. Pp. 202–204. 
88 F. 4th 1163, 95 F. 4th 1004, vacated and remanded. 
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 
C. J., and Thomas, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, and in which 
Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–B. Sotomayor, 
J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in 
which Jackson, J., joined, post, p. 204. Jackson, J., fled an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 206. Alito, J., 
fled a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 208.

188 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
Christian J. Grostic argued the cause for petitioners. 
With him on the briefs were Stephen C. Newman, Lori B. 
Riga, Jeffrey B. Lazarus, Catherine Adinaro Shusky , and 
Kevin M. Schad. 
Masha G. Hansford argued the cause for the United 
States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Pre-
logar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Wible, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, and Mahogane D. 
Reed.† 
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and 
a term of supervised release. 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a). Super-
vised release comes with conditions—for instance, the de-
fendant must refrain from committing another crime. 
§ 3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions, 
then the district court may revoke the term of supervised 
release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do 
so only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing 
factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” § 3583(e). 
Conspicuously missing from this list is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which 
directs a district court to consider “the need for the sentence 
imposed” “to refect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 
the offense.” The Sixth Circuit held that a district court 
may consider that factor nonetheless. 
We disagree. Congress's decision to enumerate most of 
the sentencing factors while omitting § 3553(a)(2)(A) raises a 
strong inference that courts may not consider that factor 
when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised re-
lease. This inference is consistent with both the statutory 
structure and the role that supervised release plays in the 
sentencing process. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments 
of the Sixth Circuit and remand for further proceedings. 
†Jacob Schuman, pro se, and Ed Spreha fled a brief for Criminal Law 
Scholars as amici curiae urging reversal. 
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Opinion of the Court 
I 
In 2018, Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to 
distribute heroin. Varying downward from the 15-to-21-
month sentencing range, the District Court sentenced him 
to 12 months in prison, to be followed by a 6-year term of 
supervised release. 
When Esteras completed his term of imprisonment, his 
period of supervised release began. Three years in, the pro-
bation offce notifed the District Court that Esteras had 
been arrested. According to the mother of his children, Es-
teras had threatened to kill her and had fred three rounds 
into her vehicle. Esteras was charged in municipal court 
with domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and criminal 
damaging, although the charges were ultimately dismissed 
at the request of the victim. 
The District Court held a revocation hearing, at which it 
found that Esteras had violated the conditions of his super-
vised release. The District Court remarked that Esteras 
was “no stranger to law violations and no stranger to federal 
court” and that his previous drug sentences had been “rather 
lenient.” App. 96a. The District Court revoked his super-
vised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, an 
upward variation from the advisory 6-to-12-month range, 
with three more years of supervised release to follow. 
At this point, Esteras's counsel objected, arguing that the 
District Court had impermissibly considered “the factor in 
Section 3553(a)(2)(A).” Id., at 105a. While Esteras's coun-
sel lodged his objection for the record, he recognized that 
Sixth Circuit precedent allows district courts to consider 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised release. 
See United States v. Lewis, 498 F. 3d 393, 399–400 (2007). 
The District Court in turn acknowledged that part of its de-
cision “certainly [was] the need for the sentence imposed, to 
promote respect for the law.” App. 105a. In a subsequent 
written order, the District Court explained that it had “con-
sidered the factors and conditions for sentencing listed in 18 
U. S. C. § 3553(a)” and had imposed the term of reimprison-
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190 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
ment in part to “promote respect for the law.” Id., at 
115a–116a. 
The Sixth Circuit affrmed, providing two justifcations for 
its view that district courts may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
when revoking a term of supervised release. See 88 F. 4th 
1163 (2023). First, § 3583(e) does not say “that the court 
may consider `only' those factors” specifcally enumerated, 
so there was no indication that Congress meant to displace 
the “considerable discretion” that district courts typically 
enjoy “over supervised-release decisions.” Id., at 1167. 
Second, a rule prohibiting district courts from considering 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) would be unworkable. As the panel saw it, 
“the purportedly forbidden considerations mentioned in 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) tend to be `essentially redundant' with the 
permitted ones,” so “[t]o think about the one requires the 
judge to think about the other.” Ibid. (quoting Lewis, 498 
F. 3d, at 400). 
The circuits are divided as to whether district courts may 
consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised 
release.
1 We granted certiorari to resolve this split. 604 
U. S. 997 (2024).2 
1 In addition to the Sixth Circuit, the First, Second, and Third Circuits 
have held that district courts may consider § 3553(a)(2)(A). See United 
States v. Vargas-Dávila, 649 F. 3d 129, 131–132 (CA1 2011); United States 
v. Williams, 443 F. 3d 35, 47–48 (CA2 2006); United States v. Young, 634 
F. 3d 233, 238–242 (CA3 2011). By contrast, the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have held that a court may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A). See 
United States v. Crudup, 461 F. 3d 433, 439 (CA4 2006); United States v. 
Miqbel, 444 F. 3d 1173, 1182 (CA9 2006); United States v. Booker, 63 F. 4th 
1254, 1259–1260 (CA10 2023). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have taken 
intermediate positions. See United States v. Sanchez, 900 F. 3d 678, 684, 
and n. 5 (CA5 2018) (while § 3553(a)(2)(A) is an impermissible factor for a 
district court to consider, “the forbidden factor must be `dominant' ” to 
constitute reversible error); United States v. Clay, 752 F. 3d 1106, 1108– 
1109 (CA7 2014) (allowing consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) if the district 
court “relies primarily” on the enumerated factors). 
2 Timothy Jaimez and Toriano Leaks joined Esteras's petition for certio-
rari. Jaimez and Leaks, like Esteras, argued that the District Courts 
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Opinion of the Court 
II 
A 
When a district court sentences a federal defendant, the 
judge may impose a term of imprisonment, a term of proba-
tion, or a fne. See § 3551(b). In determining the appro-
priate sentence, the court must consider certain factors set 
forth in § 3553(a). Some are obvious: The court must con-
sider “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the his-
tory and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the kinds 
of sentences available.” §§ 3553(a)(1), (3). Others require 
courts to consider guidelines or policies issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5). And still others re-
fect discrete policy aims, such as “the need to avoid un-
warranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated 
defendants and “the need to provide restitution to any vic-
tims of the offense.” §§ 3553(a)(6)–(7). 
While all these factors are important, § 3553(a)(2) captures 
the traditional heartland of criminal sentencing. It requires 
courts to consider: 
“the need for the sentence imposed— 
“(A) to refect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense; 
“(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; 
“(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and 
“(D) to provide the defendant with needed educa-
tional or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 
“These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, inca-
pacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of sen-
in their revocation proceedings had improperly considered § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
The Sixth Circuit held that these arguments were foreclosed by Esteras 
and Lewis. See United States v. Jaimez, 95 F. 4th 1004, 1007 (2024); 
United States v. Leaks, 2024 WL 2196795, *1 (Mar. 6, 2024). 
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192 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
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tencing generally.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 
325 (2011). They speak to the questions at the core of any 
system of criminal justice: What sentence does the defendant 
deserve? What sentence will deter criminal conduct in the 
future? What sentence will protect the public? And what 
sentence is most likely to help the defendant rehabilitate for 
transition back into society? 
A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may—and 
sometimes must—impose a postimprisonment term of super-
vised release. § 3583(a). “Supervised release is `a form of 
postconfnement monitoring' that permits a defendant a kind 
of conditional liberty by allowing him to serve part of his 
sentence outside of prison,” subject to conditions on his be-
havior. Mont v. United States, 587 U. S. 514, 523 (2019) 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 697 (2000)). 
Some conditions are mandatory, such as requiring that the 
defendant not commit additional crimes and, in most cases, 
that the defendant submit to drug testing. § 3583(d). Oth-
ers are up to the discretion of the court. Ibid. 
When a court “determin[es] whether to include a term of su-
pervised release,” as well as the length and conditions of such 
a term, it must “consider the factors set forth in section 
3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and 
(a)(7).” § 3583(c). Only two of the § 3553(a) factors are ab-
sent from this list. The frst is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which requires 
the court to consider the need for the sentence imposed to 
“refect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” i. e., 
the retributive purposes of sentencing. The second is 
§ 3553(a)(3), which requires the court to consider “the kinds of 
sentences available.” When a court decides whether to re-
voke a defendant's supervised release, the very same subset of 
§ 3553(a) factors—that is, all but two—applies. § 3583(e)(3).
3 
3 The same list of factors also applies when a district court modifes the 
terms of supervised release, such as by terminating supervised release 
early, by extending the term of supervised release, or by altering the 
conditions of supervised release. §§ 3583(e)(1)–(2), (4). 
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Opinion of the Court 
The reason for excluding § 3553(a)(3) from the list is self-
evident: When a district court decides whether to revoke a 
term of supervised release, there is no need to consider “the 
kinds of sentences available,” because supervised release is 
the only matter at issue.
4 The exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) is 
more signifcant—and here, controversial. Esteras argues 
that district courts cannot consider the retributive purpose 
articulated in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised re-
lease. The Government insists that courts can consider it, 
although they are not required to do so. 
B 
To see what is at stake, keep in mind that § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
does not speak of retribution generally—it references the 
need for the sentence “to refect the seriousness of the of-
fense” and to “provide just punishment for the offense.” 
(Emphasis added.) In the context of a revocation hearing, 
4 The dissent offers a different view of § 3553(a)(3). In its view, the 
termination, extension, modifcation, and revocation of supervised release 
are all different “kinds of” sentences. Post, at 214 (opinion of Alito, J.). 
The Government never makes this argument—and for good reason. To 
begin, it is textually implausible. As the statute articulates, there are 
three “kinds of sentences available” for an individual “found guilty of an 
offense”: “a term of probation,” “a fne,” and “a term of imprisonment.” 
§§ 3551(b)(1)–(3); § 3553(a)(3). In fact, a term of supervised release is not 
itself a “sentence” at all; it is a component of a defendant's prison sentence. 
See § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprison-
ment . . . , may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the 
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment” 
(emphasis added)). Thus, to the extent the dissent thinks that the termi-
nation, extension, modifcation, and revocation of supervised release are 
different “kinds of sentences available” to the court, it is mistaken. 
§ 3553(a)(3). 
The dissent's interpretation is perplexing for another reason too: It 
treats Congress's omission of § 3553(a)(3) from the set of factors that gov-
ern revocation proceedings as nothing more than an inexplicable drafting 
error; under its view, not only may district courts consider § 3553(a)(3), 
they must do so. See post, at 214 (a judge “must consider exactly what 
is set out in § 3553(a)(3)”). Silence is an unusual way to convey such an 
instruction. 
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194 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
the “offense” is the underlying crime of conviction, not the 
violation of the supervised-release conditions. The opening 
provision of Title 18's sentencing chapter clearly uses “of-
fense” to refer to a criminal conviction. See § 3551(a) (stat-
ing that the sentencing provisions apply to “a defendant who 
has been found guilty of an offense described in any Federal 
statute”). Yet conduct that constitutes a violation of super-
vised release “need not be criminal.” Johnson, 529 U. S., 
at 700; see, e. g., § 3583(g)(3) (mandating revocation when a 
defendant fails to comply with drug testing imposed as a 
condition of release). Furthermore, neighboring provisions 
in § 3583 consistently use the word “offense” to refer to the 
defendant's original crime of conviction, while using the 
word “violation” to refer to the conduct that triggers revoca-
tion. Compare § 3583(e)(3) (referencing the “offense that 
resulted in the term of supervised release”); § 3583(h) (“the 
offense that resulted in the original term of supervised re-
lease”), with § 3583(d) (referencing a “violation of a condition 
of supervised release”); § 3583(i) (same).
5 
So the question is this: In determining whether to revoke 
a defendant's term of supervised release (per § 3583(e)), may 
a district court account for the need to exact retribution for 
5 Because § 3553(a)(2)(A) speaks only to the “offense,” and “offense” here 
can mean only the underlying criminal conviction, we address only 
whether § 3583(e) precludes the court from considering retribution for the 
underlying criminal conviction. “Offense” aside, the Government argues 
that § 3553(a)(4)(B) and § 3553(a)(5) authorize courts to consider policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission that sound in retribution 
for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release . See Brief 
for United States 11, 34; § 3583(e) (requiring courts to consider § 3553(a)(4) 
and § 3553(a)(5)). The Commission has adopted the view that “the sen-
tence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the violator for 
failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.” 
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, 
intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024); see also ibid. (in revocation proceedings, a court 
may “sanction” an offender's “breach of trust”). We take no position on 
whether this is a permissible consideration. 
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Opinion of the Court 
the defendant's underlying crime (per § 3553(a)(2)(A))? Es-
teras says no; the Government says yes. 
III 
A 
We agree with Esteras: District courts cannot consider 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. This con-
clusion follows directly from the application of a well estab-
lished canon of statutory interpretation: “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius”—in plain English, “ `expressing one item 
of [an] associated group or series excludes another left un-
mentioned.' ” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S. 
73, 80 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 
65 (2002); alteration in original). Here, § 3553(a) lays out 10 
factors that inform a district court's sentencing decision.
6 
Section 3583(e) provides that a district court may revoke a 
term of supervised release “after considering” 8 of these 10 
factors. The natural implication is that Congress did not 
intend for courts to consider the other two factors, § 3553(a)(2) 
(A) and § 3553(a)(3). Indeed, the expressio unius canon has 
particular force here because the § 3553(a) sentencing factors 
constitute an “established series,” such that any “omission” 
from that series necessarily “bespeaks a negative impli-
cation.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 536 U. S., at 81. And the fact 
that Congress included almost the entire list makes the ex-
clusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) and § 3553(a)(3) all the more glaring. 
The statutory structure confrms this negative inference. 
Neighboring provisions that govern the imposition and revo-
cation of sentences other than supervised release instruct 
the court to consider all the factors in § 3553(a). For in-
stance, when imposing a term of probation, the court “shall 
consider the factors set forth in [§] 3553(a) to the extent that 
6 For those counting: the six factors enumerated in §§ 3553(a)(1), (3), (4), 
(5), (6), and (7), plus the four factors separately enumerated in 
§§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). 
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196 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
they are applicable.” § 3562(a). And the court may revoke 
such a term “after considering the factors set forth in section 
3553(a).” § 3565(a); see also § 3582(a) (same for imposition of 
term of imprisonment); § 3572(a) (same for imposition of a 
fne). So for supervised release—and for supervised release 
only—Congress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A). This, we think, is a 
distinction with a difference. After all, our task is to “give 
effect to, not nullify Congress' choice to include” that factor 
“in some provisions but not others.” Gallardo v. Marstiller, 
596 U. S. 420, 431 (2022). 
Congress's decision to exclude retribution from the calcu-
lus also comports with the role of supervised release in our 
current criminal justice scheme. Fines, probation, and im-
prisonment are a court's primary tools for ensuring that a 
criminal defendant receives just deserts for the original of-
fense. Supervised release, by contrast, “is not a punishment 
in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. Granderson, 511 
U. S. 39, 50 (1994). Rather, it “fulflls rehabilitative ends” 
and “provides individuals with postconfnement assistance.” 
United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60 (2000). So 
when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised 
release, it makes sense that a court must consider the 
forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-
looking purpose of retribution. 
Finally, our conclusion is consistent with this Court's prec-
edent. We have twice interpreted the omission of § 3553(a) 
(2)(A) from the provision governing the imposition of super-
vised release (§ 3583(c)) to mean that district courts may not 
consider that factor when imposing supervised release. In 
Tapia, we stated that, “when imposing a term of supervised 
release,” “a court may not take account of retribution (the 
frst purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2)).” 564 U. S., at 326.
7 So 
7 The dissent suggests that when we said that “ `a court may not take 
account of retribution,' ” we may have actually meant that “a judge, as a 
matter of discretion, may choose not to take retribution into account.” 
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too, in Concepcion v. United States, we remarked that “in 
determining whether to include a term of supervised release, 
and the length of any such term, Congress has expressly pre-
cluded district courts from considering the need for retribu-
tion.” 597 U. S. 481, 494 (2022). Although Tapia and Con-
cepcion both deal with the imposition of supervised release 
under § 3583(c), the same reasoning applies to the revocation 
of supervised release under § 3583(e): The omission of 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of factors means that courts may 
not consider it. 
Text, structure, and precedent all point in the same di-
rection: Congress's decision to exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A) from 
§ 3583(e)'s list of sentencing factors means that district courts 
cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to re-
voke supervised release. 
B 
We are unpersuaded by the Government's and the dissent's 
counterarguments. First, the Government and the dissent 
read the exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) as supporting a different 
inference—namely, that a district court must consider the 
enumerated factors but need not consider the unenumerated 
ones, such as § 3553(a)(2)(A). Because “sentencing judges 
`enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information they may con-
sider,' ” the Government argues, Congress would have used 
more explicit language had it wanted to foreclose courts from 
considering retribution when revoking supervised release. 
Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 491 (quoting Dean v. United States, 
581 U. S. 62, 66 (2017); alteration in original). For example, 
Congress could have said that courts may revoke supervised 
release “after considering only” the enumerated factors. 
Brief for United States 23; see also post, at 210–213 (Alito , 
J., dissenting). 
Post, at 220–221. We leave it to the reader to judge whether this is a 
plausible interpretation. 
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198 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
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When interpretive disputes arise, it is easy to imagine how 
Congress could have drafted the statute to avoid them. But 
Congress cannot anticipate (much less account for) every fu-
ture statutory skirmish—and even if it could, courts have no 
authority to hold Congress to a “perfect as we see it” stand-
ard of drafting. On the contrary, we have “routinely con-
strued statutes to have a particular meaning” even when 
“Congress could have expressed itself more clearly.” Luna 
Torres v. Lynch, 578 U. S. 452, 472 (2016). What Congress 
said here gets its point across just fne: The itemized list in 
§ 3583(e) is exhaustive. As we explained, the provision 
allows district courts to consider all but two of the § 3553(a) 
factors, and because one is inapplicable in this context 
(§ 3553(a)(3)), § 3553(a)(2)(A) is the only consequential omis-
sion. So it makes sense to read § 3583(e) as supplying the 
universe of factors that the district court can consider. And 
while the Government is right that district courts generally 
enjoy discretion over sentencing, see Brief for United States 
21–22, Congress chose to limit that discretion here. 
It makes much less sense to read § 3583(e) as the Govern-
ment does—that is, as listing only the factors that a court 
must consider, while leaving room for the court to consider 
an additional factor if it so chooses. This reading of § 3583(e) 
trivializes the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A). After all, on the 
Government's view, a court may “consider” an enumerated 
factor but give it no weight. Tr. of Oral Arg. 61. The dif-
ference between saying that a court must consider a given 
factor (but may give it no weight) and saying that a court 
may consider a given factor (if the court chooses) is negli-
gible. Why would Congress have bothered to exclude 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list? 
The dissent has no response to this point, so it instead 
analogizes to different—and inapposite—contexts. For ex-
ample, the dissent says, suppose that a law clerk is directed 
to complete a certain number of bench memos before a dead-
line; surely that instruction would not carry the inference 
that the law clerk may not complete more work too. Post, 
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Opinion of the Court 
at 211–212. But the important difference between that con-
text and this one is that sentencing considerations, unlike 
bench memos, can be zero sum: Adding a new consideration 
to the mix reduces the role that the enumerated considera-
tions play. In fact, the new consideration might lead to a 
different result altogether. 
A play on the dissent's own analogy reveals its weak-
nesses. Imagine that a judge tells her hypothetical law 
clerk to prepare a bench memo with a recommendation 
formed “after considering” statutory text, context, and 
structure, as well as any relevant precedent. Having looked 
at these sources, the law clerk is inclined to recommend that 
the judge reverse the court below. But the law clerk de-
cides to look elsewhere—say, to social science studies—and 
she uses these sources to inform her recommendation. In 
the end, she submits a memo recommending that the judge 
vote to affrm the lower court's decision. According to the 
dissent, the law clerk has obeyed her boss's instructions. 
Needless to say, we disagree. 
More to the point, the dissent never explains why Con-
gress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of considerations 
applicable to a revocation proceeding. After all, in the dis-
sent's view, district courts will almost inevitably consider 
that factor. See post, at 210, 214–217, 219–220, n. 7. So why 
did Congress exclude it? In the dissent's view, the omission 
is just hortatory: “Congress may have sought to encourage 
sentencing courts to give greater weight to the remaining 
purposes of sentencing.” Post, at 219, n. 7.
8 But omitting 
consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) altogether would be an odd 
8 Alternatively, the dissent posits that Congress may have understood 
each of the three § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors to “apply in some, though not all, 
hearings regarding the alteration of supervised release.” Post, at 219, 
n. 7. Which hearings make the cut? Frankly, we are not sure. Some 
parts of the dissent's lengthy footnote suggest all; others suggest none; 
and still others suggest that it “depends on context.” Ibid. In our view, 
however, “[t]he Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in 
such a predicament.” Post, at 208. 
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200 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
way of accomplishing that very limited goal. And one need 
not “live in a world of airy abstractions,” post, at 208, to recog-
nize that Congress's drafting decisions have signifcance. 
Next, the Government and the dissent argue that Ester-
as's reading of § 3553(a)(2)(A) is unworkable, because consid-
eration of the other enumerated factors will necessarily 
imply consideration of the retributive principles captured 
by § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Government relies primarily on 
§ 3553(a)(1), which references “the nature and circumstances 
of the offense.” How, the Government asks, is a court to 
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense without 
also considering the “need for the sentence imposed” “to re-
fect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”? 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). 
The answer is straightforward. A court may consider the 
nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant for the 
considerations set forth in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)— 
namely, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—but a 
court cannot consider the nature and circumstances of the 
offense as relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s retributive focus. For 
instance, if the defendant's original offense was particularly 
violent, that fact might inform the court's judgment as to 
whether revocation is necessary “to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant.” § 3553(a)(2)(C). But the 
court could not revoke based on the view that, given the 
violent nature of the underlying offense, the defendant de-
serves additional punishment.
9 
9 The dissent suggests that this will be an impossible task for district 
courts. See post, at 208 (Courts must “engage in mind-bending exer-
cises”); post, at 216 (They must “probe their mental processes to ensure that 
no thoughts of retribution entered in”); post, at 217 (We require a “soul-
searching obligation”). Not so. We routinely require judges and juries 
to attend to some considerations while ignoring others. See, e. g., Samia 
v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 646 (2023) (“Evidence at trial is often ad-
mitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limiting instruction,” and 
“our legal system presumes that jurors will ` “attend closely the particular 
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Opinion of the Court 
The dissent, for its part, argues that we are simply wrong 
to understand § 3553(a)(2)(A) as synonymous with retribu-
tion. Post, at 214–217. Under the dissent's view, § 3553(a) 
(2)(A) serves an extensive (if amorphous) role: The phrase 
“ `to promote respect for the law' ” encompasses “the whole 
point of deterrence,” while the reference to the “ `seriousness 
of the offense' ” invokes the “heightened need for deterrence 
and incapacitation.” Post, at 215–216. But this approach 
renders § 3553(a)(2)(A) largely duplicative of the clear refer-
ences to deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation that 
follow in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D). Recall, too, that there 
are four traditional purposes of sentencing. Given that 
§§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and(D) set forth three of these purposes, 
it is no wonder that § 3553(a)(2)(A) provides the fourth. Not 
to mention that the provision speaks in retributive terms: 
the “seriousness of the offense,” the need “to promote re-
spect for the law,” and, in particular, the need “to provide 
just punishment for the offense.” § 3553(a)(2)(A). In any 
event, we say nothing about the meaning of § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
today that we have not already said before. See Tapia, 564 
U. S., at 326 (“retribution” is “the frst purpose listed in 
§ 3553(a)(2)”); Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 494. 
Finally, the Government suggests that § 3583(g), which 
mandates revocation in certain circumstances, undermines 
Esteras's interpretation of the statute. Section 3583(g) does 
not specify which factors apply when a court determines the 
length of the defendant's postrevocation term of imprison-
ment.
10 So, the Government reasons, reimprisonment under 
§ 3583(g) must be subject to the general rule for prison sen-
language of [such] instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, 
make sense of, and follow” ' them” (alteration in original)). 
10 Section 3583(g) states that, if the defendant violates certain conditions 
of supervised release, “the court shall revoke the term of supervised re-
lease and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to 
exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection 
(e)(3).” (Emphasis added.) 
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202 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
tences articulated in § 3582(a), and that provision directs 
courts to the full list of § 3553(a) factors. It would be anom-
alous, the Government says, if a district court could consider 
retribution as part of a mandatory revocation under 
§ 3583(g) but not as part of a discretionary revocation under 
§ 3583(e)(3). Esteras, for his part, argues for consistency in 
the other direction: He argues that § 3583(e)'s abbreviated 
list governs in both contexts. 
We need not resolve the dispute because it does not affect 
our analysis. To begin, the Government's reading of 
§ 3583(e) does not solve the problem that the Government 
has identifed. As the Government sees it, if revocation is 
discretionary and thus governed by § 3583(e), the court may 
consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), but if revocation is mandatory and 
thus governed by § 3583(g), the court must consider § 3553(a) 
(2)(A). So while the Government says that it would be 
“highly anomalous to have different regimes for determining 
the length of prison terms under Sections 3583(e)(3) and 
3583(g),” that anomaly persists under the Government's own 
reading of the statute. Brief for United States 26. In any 
event, that § 3583(e) might operate differently from § 3583(g) 
is not reason to disregard § 3583(e)'s plain meaning. 
IV 
At oral argument, the Government expressed concern that 
it would be diffcult for appellate courts to determine 
whether a district court has impermissibly relied on § 3553(a) 
(2)(A). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50. So we conclude with a 
few observations about appellate review. 
Much will turn on whether the defendant objects. If the 
defendant does not make the district court aware that it may 
be impermissibly relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), then the defend-
ant's appeal will be governed by plain-error review. See 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). In that event, the district 
court's order revoking supervised release and requiring re-
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Opinion of the Court 
imprisonment will be affrmed unless it is “ `clear' ” or “ `obvi-
ous' ” that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a) 
(2)(A)—because it did so either expressly or by unmistakable 
implication. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734 
(1993). 
If the defendant does object to the district court's reliance 
on § 3553(a)(2)(A), we anticipate that the district court will 
recognize its potential error and clarify its revocation deci-
sion to make clear that it is not taking account of § 3553(a) 
(2)(A). For example, the district court could withdraw any 
impermissible justifcation or explain that a stray reference 
to a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor was intended to bear on another 
§ 3553(a) factor or merely prefatory. If the court nonethe-
less considers the need to exact retribution for the defend-
ant's original criminal offense, and if the error was not harm-
less, then the court of appeals should vacate the court's order 
and remand for the court to apply the correct standard. See 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a). 
This does not mean, as the Government suggests, that our 
reading of § 3583(e) amounts to a “substance-free reverse 
magic-words requirement.” Brief for United States 37. 
The Government confates the proper interpretation of 
§ 3583(e) with an appellate court's ability to enforce that in-
terpretation. The “requirement” here is very much sub-
stantive: District courts may not consider the retributive 
purpose of § 3553(a)(2)(A) before revoking supervised re-
lease. We trust that district courts will heed that instruc-
tion regardless of the practical likelihood of reversal.
11 
11 The dissent takes a curious tack here. It suggests that we lack the 
courage of our convictions because we explain that defendants bear the 
burden of preserving objections, that district courts will generally comply 
with the law once an objection is raised, and that plain-error review ap-
plies to unpreserved claims. See post, at 224–225. But there is nothing 
“remarkable” about our explanation, which simply articulates orthodox 
principles of party presentation and appellate review. Post, at 224. And 
it is surprising that the dissent opens its discussion by suggesting that we 
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204 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of Sotomayor, J. 
* * * 
District courts may revoke a term of supervised release 
after considering the factors enumerated in § 3583(e). Be-
cause § 3553(a)(2)(A) is excluded from that list, district courts 
may not consider it. The judgments of the Sixth Circuit are 
vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins, 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
I join all but Part II–B of the Court's opinion. I agree 
that district courts may not rely on the retributive sentenc-
ing factor set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) to revoke 
supervised release. In my view, however, district courts re-
voking a term of supervised release should not consider ret-
ribution for any purpose. 
The question in these cases is whether, despite Congress's 
omission in the supervised-release statute of any reference 
to retribution, courts may consider retribution when they 
decide whether to revoke a term of supervised release. The 
answer is no. In specifying the factors courts should con-
sider before revoking a term of supervised release, Congress 
cross-referenced eight out of the ten familiar § 3553(a) fac-
tors, including three of the four purposes of sentencing: de-
terrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. “Conspicuously 
missing” from the supervised-release statute, however, “is 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A),” which describes the retributive purpose of 
punishment. Ante, at 188. The straightforward inference, 
as we have said twice before, is that “Congress has expressly 
precluded district courts from considering the need for retri-
bution” in supervised release proceedings. Concepcion v. 
United States, 597 U. S. 481, 494 (2022); see also Tapia v. 
are insuffciently attuned to “the practical effec[t] of [our] holdin[g],” post, 
at 208, yet closes by complaining that we are overly sensitive to its conse-
quences, post, at 224–225. 
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Opinion of Sotomayor, J. 
United States, 564 U. S. 319, 326 (2011). That resolves these 
cases. 
The majority approaches the question differently. “In the 
context of a revocation hearing,” it reasons, the word “ `of-
fense' ” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to “the underlying crime of 
conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release condi-
tions.” Ante, at 193–194. So (the majority continues) by 
excluding § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the supervised-release stat-
ute, Congress precluded courts from accounting “for the need 
to exact retribution for the defendant's underlying crime.” 
Ante, at 194–195. 
The problem with that framing is that it relies on an inter-
pretive question with no clear answer. The term “offense” 
in § 3553(a)(2)(A) has no meaning “[i]n the context of a revo-
cation hearing,” because the supervised-release statute con-
tains no reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) or its directive to “pro-
vide just punishment for the offense.” Cf. ante, at 193–194. 
At most, then, the majority could ask what Congress would 
have meant by “offense” if it had included a reference to 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) in this statute. Yet such speculation is un-
necessary to resolve these cases. Congress studiously omit-
ted all reference to retribution from the supervised-release 
statute, so retribution should play no role in revocation 
hearings. 
Because the majority frames the question as one about 
retribution for the original offense, it never decides whether 
the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exact-
ing retribution for the defendant's supervised-release viola-
tion. Yet the answer to that question is straightforward. 
As the Court holds today, the supervised-release statute 
does not permit consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A). That 
means courts may consider only the remaining eight enumer-
ated factors, none of which contain any reference to retribu-
tion. See § 3583(e). As the majority recognizes, moreover, 
the retributive interest in punishment is ill suited to 
supervised-release proceedings. Supervised release “ `ful-
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206 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of Jackson, J. 
flls rehabilitative ends' and `provides individuals with post-
confnement assistance.' ” Ante, at 196 (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60 (2000)); see also S. Rep. 
No. 98–225, p. 124 (1983) (Senate Report noting that “the 
primary goal” of supervised release “is to ease the defend-
ant's transition into the community . . . or to provide rehabili-
tation”). Thus, “when a defendant violates the conditions of 
his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must con-
sider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, in-
capacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the 
backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Ante, at 196. 
In sum, when a court considers whether a supervised-
release violation warrants revocation and reimprisonment 
(its primary task during revocation hearings), it must look 
only to the forward-looking ends mentioned in the statute. 
As to either a supervised-release violation or the underlying 
offense, the backward-looking end of retribution is out of 
bounds. Although I would have made this point explicit, 
nothing in the Court's opinion is inconsistent with it. Ac-
cordingly, I otherwise join the Court's opinion. 
Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
The question presented in this litigation is whether sen-
tencing courts can reference and rely upon the retributive 
concerns outlined in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking 
a previously imposed term of supervised release. “Esteras 
argues that district courts cannot consider the retributive 
purpose articulated in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking super-
vised release,” while “[t]he Government insists that courts 
can consider it, although they are not required to do so.” 
Ante, at 193. Like the Court, I agree with Esteras: Courts 
cannot consider this omitted sentencing purpose when revok-
ing supervised release. 
That answer is straightforward and responsive. But the 
majority goes further, appearing to opine as to the precise 
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Opinion of Jackson, J. 
contours of the retributive concerns that Congress has taken 
off the table. Ante, at 193–195. Venturing into this terri-
tory is not necessary in the context of this litigation. As 
Justice Sotomayor explains, whatever § 3553(a)(2)(A) calls 
for when Congress has authorized its use, all that the Court 
properly decides today is that Congress has forbidden sen-
tencing judges to rely on that same set of considerations in 
the supervised-release-revocation context. 
I disagree with the Court's discussion of the scope of “of-
fense” in § 3553(a)(2)A) as it relates to § 3583(e) because, in 
my view, that part of the opinion confuses more than it clari-
fes. As sentencing judges know, revocation of supervised 
release occurs in response to new—often criminal—conduct. 
It is entirely conceivable, and perhaps even likely, that when 
Congress removed from the list of permissible revocation 
considerations § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s “need for the sentence im-
posed” to exact retribution, it sought to prevent the promo-
tion of retribution with respect to whatever new offense trig-
gered the call for revocation of supervised release. At the 
very least, that possibility counsels against defnitively as-
serting that § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s conspicuous omission only 
speaks to whether a district court can “account for the need 
to exact retribution for the defendant's underlying crime .” 
Ante, at 194–195 (emphasis added). 
In any event, because § 3553(a) requires district courts to 
impose sentences that are “suffcient, but not greater than 
necessary” to promote certain purposes of punishment, the 
kind of hairsplitting that the majority's opinion invites is 
entirely impractical. Sentences either “refect,” “afford,” 
or “provide” for the listed purposes of punishment (retribu-
tion, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation) or they don't. 
§ 3553(a)(2). It is hard to fathom that Congress meant for 
retribution to be both operable and inoperable as it relates 
to the imposition of a single revocation sanction, and it is 
even harder to imagine how a sentencing court can effec-
tively achieve that binary objective. 
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208 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
Part II–B of the majority's opinion is both unnecessary to 
the outcome of this litigation and inscrutable in light of how 
revocation sentences are actually determined and imposed. 
Therefore, I cannot join that Part of the opinion. 
Justice Alito , with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, 
dissenting. 
Veteran trial judges often complain that their appellate 
colleagues live in a world of airy abstractions and do not 
give enough thought to the practical effects of their holdings. 
Today's decision is likely to earn the rank of Exhibit A in 
the trial bench's catalog of appellate otherworldliness. The 
Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean that 
a federal district-court judge, when considering whether to 
impose or alter a term of supervised release, must engage in 
mind-bending exercises. The judge must take into account 
“the nature and circumstances” of a defendant's offense but 
is forbidden to consider “the seriousness of the offense.” 18 
U. S. C. § 3553(a). The judge must consider what is needed 
to “dete[r]” violations of the law or to rehabilitate a defend-
ant, i. e., to cause him to lead a law-abiding life, but cannot 
be infuenced by a desire “to promote respect for the law.” 
Ibid. 
The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges 
in such a predicament. Neither the statutory text, the in-
terpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the structure 
of the Act supports the Court's interpretation. 
I 
A 
In order to understand these cases and the points on which 
the majority and I disagree, some background information 
about federal sentencing is required. When a defendant is 
“found guilty of an offense,” he may be sentenced to “a term 
of probation,” “a fne,” or “a term of imprisonment.” 
§ 3551(b). And in crafting a sentence, the court is required 
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Alito, J., dissenting 
to consider the 10 factors that are set out in § 3553(a). (For 
convenience, I will call these the sentencing factors.) 
If a sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment, the 
court generally has discretion to include “as a part of the 
sentence” a term of supervised release. § 3583(a).
1 “Super-
vised release is `a form of postconfnement monitoring' that 
permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty by allowing 
him to serve part of his sentence outside of prison.” Mont 
v. United States, 587 U. S. 514, 523 (2019) (quoting Johnson 
v. United States, 529 U. S. 694, 697 (2000)). In deciding 
whether to impose and in devising a term of supervised re-
lease, a judge is required to consider 8 of the 10 sentencing 
factors noted above, specifically, §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). (For con-
venience, I will call these the supervised-release factors.) 
During a term of supervised release, a defendant must 
comply with certain standard conditions, such as reporting 
to a probation offcer, as well as any special conditions that 
are “tailored specifcally” to “the individual case.” Adminis-
trative Offce of the U. S. Courts, Overview of Probation and 
Supervised Release Conditions 8 (2024). If a defendant fails 
to comply with these conditions, revocation of supervised re-
lease is sometimes mandatory, see, e. g., § 3583(g), but in most 
cases, the court has discretion to choose the appropriate re-
sponse. For example, it may “extend” supervised release 
“if less than the maximum authorized term was previously 
imposed”; “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of super-
vised release”; or, more seriously, “revoke” supervised re-
lease and “require the defendant to serve in prison all or 
part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute 
for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised re-
lease.” §§ 3583(e)(2), (3). In deciding whether to alter a 
term of supervised release, the court is required to consider 
1 In some cases, the imposition of supervised release is mandatory. See, 
e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3583(k) (kidnapping offenses); § 3583(j) (terrorism of-
fenses); 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(b), 960(b) (drug-traffcking offenses). 
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210 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
the same eight factors that had to be taken into account in 
imposing the term of supervised release in the frst place. 
In these cases, the lead petitioner, Edgardo Esteras, vio-
lated a term of his supervised release by assaulting the 
mother of his children and shooting at her vehicle. The sen-
tencing judge revoked supervised release and, in doing so, 
referred to Esteras's criminal history and the need to “en-
courage [him] to be respectful of the law.” App. 96a. Cit-
ing these remarks, Esteras contends that the judge based 
her decision on an impermissible factor, namely, a desire to 
“promote respect for the law.” This factor, which appears 
in § 3553(a)(2)(A), is one of the two sentencing factors omit-
ted from the list of supervised-release factors. Esteras 
argues, and the Court now agrees, that the omission of 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of supervised-release factors 
means that it cannot be considered. In other words, the 
judge in Esteras's case was obligated to put out of her mind 
any desire “to promote respect for the law.” Before today, 
one might have thought that every aspect of a federal judge's 
work should aim to “promote respect for the law.” Appar-
ently, that is no longer true. 
B 
The question in these cases is what to make of the omission 
of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of supervised-release factors. 
The Court infers that consideration of this factor is forbid-
den, and, in so doing, relies almost entirely on a canon of 
interpretation that bears the Latin name expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. In English, that means “[t]he expression 
of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” A. Scalia & 
B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
107 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). To modify a classic example 
slightly, suppose a sign at the entrance of a park said: “No 
gasoline- or electric-powered vehicles allowed.” Under the 
expressio unius canon, it would be fair to infer that standard 
bikes are permitted. See H. Hart, Positivism and the Sepa-
ration of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958).

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Alito, J., dissenting 
Although this canon has its place, Reading Law empha-
sizes that it “must be applied with great caution, since its 
application depends so much on context.” Scalia & Garner 
107. Our cases have made the same point and have often 
rejected use of the canon because of the context in which the 
expression appeared. See, e. g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 
580 U. S. 288, 302 (2017) (“The expressio unius canon applies 
only when circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that 
the term left out must have been meant to be excluded” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal 
Co., 537 U. S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[T]he canon expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing 
or grouping”). Reading Law also contains this important 
warning: “Even when an all-inclusive sense seems apparent, 
one must still identify the scope of the inclusiveness (thereby 
limiting [the] implied exclusion).” Scalia & Garner 108 (em-
phasis added). 
In these cases, I agree with the Court that the omission 
of two of the sentencing factors from the list of supervised 
release factors gives rise to a negative inference, but I dis-
agree with the Court about the nature of that inference. 
The most likely—and in my view, the appropriate—inference 
is simply that § 3583(e), the provision listing the supervised-
release factors, sets out an exclusive list of mandatory fac-
tors. That is “the scope of the inclusiveness.” The Court, 
however, goes further and infers not just that there are no 
other mandatory factors but that there are no other permis-
sible factors. That aggressive application of the expressio 
unius canon goes too far. While the inference produced by 
that canon is always dependent on context, the enumeration 
of things that must be done generally does not suggest that 
no other things may be done. 
Consider this example. Suppose I tell my law clerks on a 
Monday that by the end of the week they must complete the 
bench memos in 6 of the 12 cases scheduled for argument 
during the next sitting. That statement would strongly 
imply that completion of other bench memos by the end of

212 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
the week is not mandatory. But the statement would not 
suggest that fnishing other bench memos is forbidden. 
Many other similar examples could be provided. 
To salvage its far-reaching inference, the Court offers its 
own variation on the law-clerk hypothetical. In the Court's 
hypothetical, a judge tells a clerk “to prepare a bench memo 
with a recommendation formed `after considering' statutory 
text, context, and structure, as well as any relevant prece-
dent.” Ante, at 199. As the Court sees it, if the law clerk 
also reviews secondary sources “to inform her recommenda-
tion,” the law clerk did not “obe[y] her boss's instructions.” 
Ibid. 
But nothing about the Court's hypothetical suggests the 
law clerk must exclusively consider those four factors. 
Would the clerk necessarily infer from the judge's instruction 
that nothing else could be considered? I doubt it. And if 
the clerk knows that the judge thinks that other factors, such 
as statutory purpose or legislative history, are relevant con-
siderations, the inference is unlikely. 
For this reason, the Court's use of the expressio unius 
canon exceeds its customary and proper use, and the Court 
provides no good reason for its aggressive use of that inter-
pretive tool. The Court fnds it signifcant that Congress 
included in the list of supervised-release factors “almost the 
entire list” of sentencing factors but left out § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
Ante, at 195. According to the Court, this makes “all the 
more glaring” Congress's intention that sentencing courts 
should not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when modifying a term of 
supervised release. Ibid. 
This is illogical. When a provision sets out a rule and 
lists items to which the rule applies, the length of the list 
may bolster the strength of the inference that the list is ex-
haustive, but it does not alter the scope of the rule. Suppose 
I tell friends who are visiting Washington, D. C., for the frst 
time that they must visit a list of enumerated sites. If the 
list is long, they might infer that I do not think that there are 
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Alito, J., dissenting 
any other sites that they should necessarily try to squeeze 
in. But it is doubtful that they would infer that I am sug-
gesting that they should necessarily avoid seeing anything 
else that might catch their interest. 
In short, the expressio unius canon is insuffcient to sup-
port the Court's interpretation. 
II 
The Court's interpretation is also inconsistent with the 
text and structure of the Sentencing Reform Act. 
A 
Starting with the text, I note three features that counsel 
against acceptance of the Court's interpretation. 
First, the relevant provisions of the Sentencing Reform 
Act lack language like that included in other provisions of 
the Act that limit a court's consideration of specifed factors. 
For example, § 3582(a)—the provision that directly precedes 
the provision setting out the mandatory supervised-release 
factors in § 3583—expressly states that a judge's decision 
whether to impose a term of imprisonment may not be based 
on a desire to “promot[e] correction and rehabilitation.” 
When “Congress includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, 
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello 
v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Or take § 3565(b), which (as amended in 
1988) contains an implicit prohibition on consideration of the 
sentencing factors. See 102 Stat. 4361. That provision 
mandates revocation of probation if certain conditions are 
met, and Congress apparently gave courts no discretion to 
even consider the sentencing factors. As a result, the ab-
sence of any even remotely similar language in § 3583(e) is 
telling. 
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214 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
Second, we can infer that the Sentencing Reform Act 
allows a judge to consider all the sentencing factors because 
there are some situations in which factors omitted from the 
list of supervised-release factors must be considered. One 
such situation occurs when a judge decides how to respond 
to a defendant's violation of the terms of supervised release 
because in that situation the judge must consider exactly 
what is set out in § 3553(a)(3), which is one of the sentencing 
factors omitted from the list of supervised-release factors. 
That provision refers to “the kinds of sentences available,” 
and when a judge is deciding what to do about a defendant 
who has violated the terms of supervised release, the judge 
must consider the available options, which include termi-
nation, extension, modifcation, and revocation. § 3583(e). 
Because a term of supervised release is “part of a sentence,” 
each one of these options changes the defendant's sentence. 
And therefore, this list of options constitutes a list of “the 
kinds of sentences available.” 
2 
Consideration of “the kinds of sentences available” may be 
required during a revocation proceeding for yet another 
reason. When a sentencing court revokes a term of super-
vised release and sends the defendant back to prison, the 
maximum period of additional confnement authorized de-
pends on the class of the underlying offense. See § 3583(e)(3). 
So a sentencing court determining the permissible range of 
reimprisonment will necessarily consider the “kinds of sen-
tences” authorized under the statute of conviction. 
Third, and most important, the Court's interpretation can-
not account for the inextricable relationship between the 
2 The Court argues that these options are not “kinds of sentences” be-
cause the Sentencing Reform Act recognizes only three types of sentences: 
probation, fnes, and imprisonment. See ante, at 193, n. 4. According to 
the Court, supervised release is not a “ `kin[d] of sentenc[e]' ” but is instead 
merely “a component of a defendant's prison sentence.” Ibid. But the 
Sentencing Reform Act never says that there are only three “kinds” of 
sentences. See § 3551(b). 
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Alito, J., dissenting 
omitted sentencing factor at issue in these cases, i. e., 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), and the sentencing factors that a judge must 
consider in deciding whether to alter a term of supervised 
release. Recall that § 3553(a)(2)(A) requires, among other 
things, consideration of “the seriousness of the offense,” and 
according to the Court, taking that factor into account is pro-
hibited. But it is undisputed that a judge must consider 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense” when altering 
a term of supervised release. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3583(e). Since 
“the seriousness of the offense” is part of “the nature of the 
offense,” the Court's interpretation gives district judges ir-
reconcilable instructions. 
Another part of § 3553(a)(2)(A) creates a similar problem 
for the Court. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to “the need . . . 
to promote respect for the law,” and because that provision 
is omitted from the supervised-release factors, the Court 
holds that consideration of this factor is not allowed either. 
But the Sentencing Reform Act demands consideration of 
factors that are hard to separate from “promot[ing] respect 
for the law.” In deciding whether to alter a term of super-
vised release, a judge must consider “the need . . . to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” § 3553(a)(2)(B), 
and the whole point of deterrence is to encourage respect for 
and compliance with the law. 
The Court struggles in vain to explain away this clash be-
tween what its interpretation forbids and what the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act demands. It entirely ignores the relation-
ship between “afford[ing] adequate deterrence” (a 
mandatory consideration) and “promot[ing] respect for the 
law” (outlawed under its interpretation). And as for the 
confict between requiring consideration of the “nature and 
circumstances of the offense” and banning consideration of 
“the seriousness of the offense,” the Court's response is an 
elaborate theory that has no grounding in the statutory text. 
The Court begins by claiming that § 3553(a)(2)(A) relates 
solely to retribution and not to any of the other three permit-
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216 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
ted goals of punishment—deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. See ante, at 200. But that is simply 
not true with respect to two of the objectives to which 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) refers, i. e., the need for a sentence to refect 
“the seriousness of the offense” and “to promote respect for 
the law.” These two factors implicate other purposes of 
punishment too. For example, if the offense in question is 
very serious, there is a heightened need for deterrence and 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation may be harder. So the 
Court's theory veers off course at the start. 
After that fawed beginning, the Court tells us that the 
supervised-release factors operate as a kind of purpose flter. 
Section 3553(a)(2) enumerates four factors that, in the 
Court's view, refect the four recognized purposes of punish-
ment. The Court tells us that the “nature and circum-
stances of the offense” must be considered in light of one 
of those four purposes. See ante, at 200; accord, Brief for 
Petitioners 34–35. The supervised-release factors, however, 
include only three of those four purposes and exclude the 
goal of retribution supposedly encapsulated in § 3553(a) 
(2)(A). So, in the Court's view, the supervised-release stat-
ute flters out § 3553(a)(2)(A) and thereby prohibits a court 
from any consideration of the “nature and circumstances of 
the offense” in light of § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s supposedly “retribu-
tive focus” and concern with the “seriousness of the offense.” 
Ante, at 200. 
None of this has any textual support, and it does not solve 
the problem faced by a judge who is compelled to consider 
the nature and circumstances of an offense but forbidden to 
consider its seriousness. If taken seriously, it does not alter 
in any way the information that judges may consider. In-
stead, it merely calls on them to probe their mental processes 
to ensure that no thoughts of retribution entered in.
3 Im-
3 Here is an example. Suppose a defendant's offense of conviction was 
interstate travel in violation of a protective order prohibiting threats, har-
assment, or contact with his former wife. See 18 U. S. C. § 2262(a). And 
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posing such a soul-searching obligation as a requirement that 
may be enforced in litigation is utterly impractical. 
B 
No more is needed to reject the Court's interpretation, but 
I note for good measure that the structure of the Sentencing 
Reform Act also weighs against the Court's interpretation. 
The Act gives express instructions about the way in which 
the sentencing factors apply to decisions regarding the impo-
sition of each of the Act's three primary penalties (i. e., im-
prisonment, probation, fnes). These instructions fall into 
one of two categories. Instructions in the frst category 
either mandate consideration of all the sentencing factors
4 or 
require their consideration to the extent they are relevant to 
suppose that the trial evidence showed the defendant engaged in conduct 
that caused his former wife very severe emotional distress. After serv-
ing his sentence, the defendant is given supervised release but quickly 
violates a condition of release by resuming the very conduct that landed 
him in prison in the frst place. The judge must decide what to do. 
Heeding the requirement to consider “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense,” the judge calls to mind the trial evidence. Then, as required by 
the Sentencing Reform Act, the judge considers whether this information 
suggests that reimprisonment is needed either to “afford adequate deter-
rence,” § 3553(a)(2)(B) (i. e., to cause the defendant to leave his former wife 
alone), or to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” 
§ 3553(a)(2)(C) (i. e., to keep the defendant's former wife safe during the 
period of reimprisonment). 
The effect of the Court's fltering scheme is to complicate the judge's 
consideration of all these matters by demanding that he search his con-
science and ask: “Have I let any thought of retribution enter into my 
thinking? I am inclined to send the defendant back to prison for x 
months, and I think I'm doing that to achieve deterrence and incapacita-
tion. But was I somehow infuenced by moral disapproval of the defend-
ant's conduct and the feeling that at least part of the x additional months 
is simply what he deserves?” 
4 See § 3572(a) (requiring the consideration of all sentencing factors in 
imposing fnes); § 3584(b) (same for the decision whether to run sentences 
concurrently or consecutively).

218 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
the type of sentence in question. 5 By contrast, instructions 
in the second category expressly prohibit consideration of 
specifc sentencing factors. 6 
What is remarkable about § 3583(e), which lists the manda-
tory supervised-release factors, is that it does not fall into 
either of these categories. It neither demands consideration 
of all relevant sentencing factors nor prohibits consideration 
of some or all of them. Instead, it requires consideration of 
some of the mandatory sentencing factors but says nothing 
about the rest. The appropriate inference is that § 3583(e) 
is meant to have a different effect: namely, to give sentencing 
courts discretion to consider the omitted factors. 
Such discretion is consistent with the Sentencing Reform 
Act's general approach to supervised release, which confers 
broad discretion on trial judges. In most cases, sentencing 
courts “may include” a term of supervised release “as a part” 
of “a sentence to a term of imprisonment,” § 3583(a), and 
5 See § 3562(a) (requiring the consideration of all sentencing factors “to 
the extent that they are applicable” in imposing an initial term of proba-
tion); § 3564(c) (same for early termination of probation); § 3565(a) (same 
for the revocation of probation). 
6 Section 3582(a) prohibits consideration of rehabilitation in deciding on 
a sentence of imprisonment. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 
332 (2011). Similarly, in § 3563(b), Congress confned the discretion of sen-
tencing courts to a particular subset of the § 3553(a) factors. Under that 
provision, sentencing courts may set conditions of probation “to the extent 
that such conditions are reasonably related to the factors set forth in sec-
tion 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent that such conditions involve 
only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary 
for the purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2).” Congress's use of limit-
ing language (“to the extent that” and “as are reasonably necessary”) 
makes its restrictive intent clear. Another provision of the Act appears 
to go even further by removing a sentencing court's discretion to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors at all. Section 3565(b) provides that a sentencing 
court “shall revoke [a] sentence of probation” if the defendant possesses 
controlled substances or frearms, refuses to comply with drug testing, or 
fails a drug test more than three times over the course of a year. No 
mention of the § 3553(a) factors is made. 
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“may” terminate, extend, or revoke supervised release, 
§ 3583(e). 
This grant of discretion tracks the background principles 
against which the Act was drafted, namely, “the established 
tradition of district courts' sentencing discretion.” Concep-
cion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, 495 (2022). As we re-
cently noted, “[t]he only limitations on a court's discretion to 
consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in 
modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in 
a statute or by the Constitution.” Id., at 494; see § 3661. 
“Congress is not shy about placing such limits” on sentencing 
discretion, id., at 494, and its failure to do so in § 3583(e) 
permits the inference that sentencing courts retain discre-
tion to consider “any relevant materials,” including the omit-
ted § 3553(a) factors, ibid.
7 
7 Congress's decision to omit § 3553(a)(2)(A) specifcally has its own logic. 
Congress may have sought to encourage sentencing courts to give greater 
weight to the remaining purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2) to 
ensure that “[s]upervised release fulflls [its] rehabilitative ends.” United 
States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59 (2000). But in doing so, Congress likely 
understood that sealing off any discretion to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s re-
tributive factors would be impracticable. Supervised release is “a part 
of” “a term of imprisonment for” the defendant's offense, § 3583(a), and 
when a sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment for the offense, 
it must consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), see § 3582(a). 
Congress may have rendered the three § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors discretion-
ary because it understood that each factor may apply in some, though not 
all, hearings regarding the alteration of supervised release. The need “to 
promote respect for law” strikes me as an evergreen concern when a court 
is considering what remedy best enables a defendant to “learn to obey the 
conditions of his supervised release.” 88 F. 4th 1163, 1167 (CA6 2023) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). But the need “to provide just punish-
ment for the offense” seems less relevant when a sentencing court ad-
dresses a violation of supervised release. And the relevance of the re-
maining § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor—the need “to refect the seriousness of the 
offense”—depends on context. If, for example, a sentencing court decides 
to revoke supervised release following a defendant's violation, it must, as 
already explained, examine how Congress categorized the offense's “seri-
ousness” to determine the authorized term of reimprisonment. See

220 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
III 
A 
The Court attempts to buttress its interpretation by citing 
statements made in two of our prior cases, but the holdings 
in those cases were far afeld from the question presented 
here, and the comments in question simply provided back-
ground. In Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319 (2011), we 
held that a sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed or 
extended to foster a defendant's rehabilitation. Before di-
rectly addressing that issue in Part III of the opinion, Part 
II provided “statutory background.” Id., at 323. After 
noting the four purposes of sentencing, the opinion stated 
that under the Sentencing Reform Act, “a particular purpose 
may apply differently, or even not at all, depending on the 
kind of sentence under consideration.” Id., at 326. As an 
example, the opinion stated that under § 3583(c), “a court 
may not take account of retribution (the frst purpose listed 
in § 3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised release.” 
Ibid . (emphasis in original). Because the wording of 
§ 3583(c) is similar to that of § 3583(e)—the provision that 
controls alteration of a term of supervised release—the 
Court today treats Tapia's statement as strong support for 
its decision. 
This reads too much into what is plainly peripheral dicta. 
For one thing, it is not even clear that the statement means 
what the Court claims. The verb “may” sometimes denotes 
“permission” and sometimes denotes “possibility.” Random 
House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1189 (2d ed. 2001). 
The Court reads the statement in Tapia to mean permission: 
a judge may not consider retribution because that is not al-
lowed. But the statement could also mean “possibility”: a 
§ 3583(e)(3). But if the court instead opts for a less-severe sanction, such 
as the modifcation of a condition of release, it is not necessarily required 
to consider how Congress scored the underlying offense's “seriousness.” 
See § 3583(e)(2). 
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Alito, J., dissenting 
judge, as a matter of discretion, may choose not to take retri-
bution into account. It is debatable which reading is better, 
and in any event, as the opinion stated twice, the statement 
was merely “statutory background.” 564 U. S., at 323, 326. 
Moreover, Tapia “dealt with a different sentencing law” con-
cerned with imposing imprisonment, not supervised release, 
and the Court's drive-by analysis of § 3583(c) did nothing to 
reckon with Congress's lack of “explicit directions” as to the 
omitted sentencing factors. 88 F. 4th 1163, 1168 (CA6 2023). 
Such “[d]ictum settles nothing, even in the court that utters 
it.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 
U. S. 335, 351, n. 12 (2005). 
The Court's other precedent, Concepcion v. United States, 
597 U. S. 481, is no better. The holding in that case—that 
sentencing courts adjudicating motions to reduce a sentence 
under the First Step Act have discretion to consider inter-
vening changes in the law or relevant facts—is far removed 
from the question here. After emphasizing that sentencing 
judges have generally exercised broad discretion regarding 
the facts considered in sentencing determinations, the opin-
ion noted that Congress has sometimes imposed restrictions; 
as an illustration, it simply cited the statement made in 
Tapia. See 597 U. S., at 494. 
Whatever weight these dicta merit, they are surely insuf-
fcient to support today's decision. 
B 
The Court attempts to justify its interpretation by draw-
ing a hard line between the Act's primary penalties— 
“[f]ines, probation, and imprisonment”—and supervised re-
lease. Ante, at 196. In its view, the former are a court's 
main “tools for ensuring that a criminal defendant receives 
just deserts for the original offense.” Ibid. But “when a de-
fendant violates the conditions of his supervised release,” the 
Court reasons, “it makes sense that a court must consider 
the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapac-
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222 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
itation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the 
backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Ibid. 
This argument exaggerates the distinction between the 
two classes of penalties to which the Court refers. Contrary 
to the Court's suggestion, a decision about the revocation 
of supervised release may call for consideration of certain 
backward-looking factors. For example, under § 3583(e)(3), 
the limits of the discretion enjoyed by a court considering 
the revocation of supervised release depend on the class (A, 
B, C, or D) of the “statute for the offense that resulted in 
[the] term of supervised release.” Section 3583(e) also man-
dates consideration of § 3553(a)(6), which, in turn, requires 
consideration of “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.” In assessing that fac-
tor, a sentencing court must necessarily look back to the de-
fendant's offense conduct and also consider the past offense 
conduct of similarly situated defendants. 
A defendant's original offense may also be important when 
a judge is considering whether a violation of a condition of 
supervised release is serious enough to justify sending the 
violator back to prison for a particular length of time. Con-
sider a defendant convicted for the possession of child por-
nography who later violates a special condition of his release 
restricting his viewing of any sexually explicit materials, in-
cluding material that depicts teenagers who are not actually 
under the age of 18. In such a case, the serious nature of 
the original crime may be thought to have a bearing on the 
implications of the later violation and the need for reimpris-
onment to deter the defendant from future backsliding, to 
protect society from the consequences of child pornography, 
or to provide the opportunity for further rehabilitation ef-
forts in prison. 
It is revealing that the Court only half-heartedly buys its 
forward-looking/ backward-looking distinction. In a foot-
note, the Court refuses to take a position on the question 
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whether a sentencing court may revoke supervised release 
in retribution “for the violation of the conditions of the su-
pervised release.” Ante, at 194, n. 5 (emphasis deleted). 
IV 
In addition to all these faults, the Court's interpretation, 
as I emphasized at the outset of this opinion, defes com-
mon sense. 
The Court's interpretation of which sentencing factors a 
court may consider in altering a term of supervised release 
must also apply when a court is initially imposing a term 
of supervised release. The relevant wording in § 3583(c), 
which governs the imposition of supervised release, and 
§ 3583(e), which governs the alteration of supervised release, 
cannot be meaningfully distinguished. But applying the 
Court's interpretation to the original imposition of super-
vised released creates a huge practical problem. A term of 
imprisonment and a term of supervised release are often im-
posed at the same time. In imposing a prison term, a court 
must consider all of the 10 sentencing factors, but under to-
day's reading of the Sentencing Reform Act, the court is pro-
hibited from considering 2 of those factors when it turns to 
the issue of supervised release. How this will work in prac-
tice is anyone's guess. Must sentencing courts “adjourn the 
hearing after imposing” imprisonment and then “start over 
with a new unblemished inquiry” and without giving any 
thought to the omitted § 3553(a) factors? 88 F. 4th, at 1168. 
The Sixth Circuit feared that might be required. Many dis-
trict judges may soon face this problem because “[t]he vast 
majority (95.1%)” of offenders convicted of a felony or Class 
A misdemeanor are also “sentenced to terms of supervised 
release.” United States Sentencing Commission, Federal 
Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release 50 (2010). In-
deed, in 2024, supervised release was imposed in 50,865 
cases. See United States Sentencing Commission, 2024 
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 41. 
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224 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES 
Alito, J., dissenting 
Other daunting practical problems will arise when judges 
are deciding whether to alter a defendant's term of super-
vised release. When sending a violator of supervised re-
lease back to prison, a court must carefully control every 
word that is uttered to explain the decision. Avoiding the 
language of § 3553(a)(2)(A)—“the seriousness of the offense,” 
“respect for the law,” and “just punishment for the of-
fense”—is obviously essential. But what about synonyms 
and other arguably related words and phrases? Not only 
must sentencing judges avoid verbal missteps, they must do 
so while heeding the requirement to consider mandatory 
supervised-release factors that are essentially inseparable 
from the factors that are fatal. See supra, at 215. 
The potential consequences of the Court's interpretation 
are so alarming that many of the lower courts that have 
adopted today's interpretation have squirmed to avoid its ef-
fects. See, e. g., United States v. Miqbel, 444 F. 3d 1173, 1182 
(CA9 2006) (“[A] sentence would be unreasonable if the court 
based it primarily on an omitted factor, such as a factor 
provided for in § 3553(a)(2)(A). . . . We do not suggest that a 
mere reference to promoting respect for the law would in 
itself render a sentence unreasonable” (emphasis added)); 
United States v. Sanchez, 900 F. 3d 678, 684, n. 5 (CA5 2018) 
(“Of course, this is not to say that any use of words like 
`punish,' `serious,' or `respect' automatically renders a revo-
cation sentence void. Mere mention of impermissible fac-
tors is acceptable; to constitute reversible error . . . the for-
bidden factor must be `dominant' ” (quoting United States v. 
Rivera, 784 F. 3d 1012, 1017 (CA5 2015))). 
Today's decision is similar. After adopting an impractical 
interpretation, the decision takes the remarkable step of out-
lining ways in which sentencing judges and courts of appeals 
can avoid strict compliance. At the trial level, if the defense 
objects that a comment made by the judge crosses the line, 
the Court counsels that the judge can easily ward off rever-
sal. The judge can “withdraw any impermissible” remark 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 225 
Alito, J., dissenting 
or recast any “stray reference to a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor” as 
“merely prefatory.” Ante, at 203. In addition, the judge 
may “explain that a stray reference” to a prohibited factor 
was actually “intended to bear on” a mandatory factor with 
which it is closely related. Ibid. 
After providing this roadmap for district judges, the Court 
turns to the courts of appeals. The Court reminds circuit 
judges that an appeal based on today's decision “will be gov-
erned by plain-error review,” assuming the defendant fails 
to object in the district court. Ante, at 202. And plain-
error review, as we have long observed, is an “exacting” 
standard and is meant to correct “only particularly egregious 
errors” that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Young, 
470 U. S. 1, 15 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Reading between the lines, the Court's message is clear. 
Unless a district judge obdurately fails to backtrack as rec-
ommended when there is an objection based on today's deci-
sion, there should be few problems. The Court's outline 
shows that it has a low opinion of the value of its handiwork, 
and that should seal the case that the whole effort is a 
mistake. 
* * * 
For these reasons, I cannot agree with the Court's deci-
sion, and I therefore respectfully dissent. 
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 
punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 
p. 210, line 10: “his” is changed to “her” 
p. 210, line 17: “his” is changed to “her”

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 185–225 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT June 20, 2025 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to noti…

• #2

  whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release, § 3583(e) provides that the same eight factors apply. So the question is this: In determining whether to revoke supervised release, may a district court account for these omitted factors—and specifcally § 3553(a)(2)(A)? Es- teras says no; the Government s…

• #3

  that district courts may not consider that factor. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319; Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481. Al- though Tapia and Concepcion both deal with the imposition of super- vised release under § 3583(c), the same reasoning applies to revocation under § 3583(e): the omission of …

• #4

  consider retribution in mandatory revocations under § 3583(g) but not in discretionary revocations under § 3583(e)(3). The correct reading of § 3583(g) does not affect the Court's analysis. That § 3583(e) might op- erate differently from § 3583(g) is no reason to disregard § 3583(e)'s plain meaning. Pp. 197–202. …

• #5

  § 3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions, then the district court may revoke the term of supervised release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(…

• #6

  lenient.” App. 96a. The District Court revoked his super- vised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, an upward variation from the advisory 6-to-12-month range, with three more years of supervised release to follow. At this point, Esteras's counsel objected, arguing that the District Court had impermis…

• #7

  v. Williams, 443 F. 3d 35, 47–48 (CA2 2006); United States v. Young, 634 F. 3d 233, 238–242 (CA3 2011). By contrast, the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a court may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A). See United States v. Crudup, 461 F. 3d 433, 439 (CA4 2006); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F. 3d 1173, 11…

• #8

  correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” “These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, inca- pacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of sen- in their revocation proceedings had improperly considered § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit held that these arguments were foreclosed by Este…

• #9

  § 3553(a) factors—that is, all but two—applies. § 3583(e)(3). 3 3 The same list of factors also applies when a district court modifes the terms of supervised release, such as by terminating supervised release early, by extending the term of supervised release, or by altering the conditions of supervised release. …

• #10

  The dissent's interpretation is perplexing for another reason too: It treats Congress's omission of § 3553(a)(3) from the set of factors that gov- ern revocation proceedings as nothing more than an inexplicable drafting error; under its view, not only may district courts consider § 3553(a)(3), they must do so. See…

• #11

  and § 3553(a)(5)). The Commission has adopted the view that “the sen- tence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024); see also…

• #12

  §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). Page Proof Pending Publication 196 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court they are applicable.” § 3562(a). And the court may revoke such a term “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” § 3565(a); see also § 3582(a) (same for imposition of term of imprisonment); …

• #13

  and the length of any such term, Congress has expressly pre- cluded district courts from considering the need for retribu- tion.” 597 U. S. 481, 494 (2022). Although Tapia and Con- cepcion both deal with the imposition of supervised release under § 3583(c), the same reasoning applies to the revocation of supervis…

• #14

  allows district courts to consider all but two of the § 3553(a) factors, and because one is inapplicable in this context (§ 3553(a)(3)), § 3553(a)(2)(A) is the only consequential omis- sion. So it makes sense to read § 3583(e) as supplying the universe of factors that the district court can consider. And while th…

• #15

  the end, she submits a memo recommending that the judge vote to affrm the lower court's decision. According to the dissent, the law clerk has obeyed her boss's instructions. Needless to say, we disagree. More to the point, the dissent never explains why Con- gress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of consider…

• #16

  namely, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—but a court cannot consider the nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s retributive focus. For instance, if the defendant's original offense was particularly violent, that fact might inform the court's judgment as to whether r…

• #17

  event, we say nothing about the meaning of § 3553(a)(2)(A) today that we have not already said before. See Tapia, 564 U. S., at 326 (“retribution” is “the frst purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2)”); Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 494. Finally, the Government suggests that § 3583(g), which mandates revocation in certain cir…

• #18

  At oral argument, the Government expressed concern that it would be diffcult for appellate courts to determine whether a district court has impermissibly relied on § 3553(a) (2)(A). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50. So we conclude with a few observations about appellate review. Much will turn on whether the defendant o…

• #19

  burden of preserving objections, that district courts will generally comply with the law once an objection is raised, and that plain-error review ap- plies to unpreserved claims. See post, at 224–225. But there is nothing “remarkable” about our explanation, which simply articulates orthodox principles of party pre…

• #20

  Page Proof Pending Publication Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 205 Opinion of Sotomayor, J. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 326 (2011). That resolves these cases. The majority approaches the question differently. “In the context of a revocation hearing,” it reasons, the word “ `of- fense' ” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) refer…

• #21

  primary goal” of supervised release “is to ease the defend- ant's transition into the community . . . or to provide rehabili- tation”). Thus, “when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must con- sider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, in- cap…

• #22

  my view, that part of the opinion confuses more than it clari- fes. As sentencing judges know, revocation of supervised release occurs in response to new—often criminal—conduct. It is entirely conceivable, and perhaps even likely, that when Congress removed from the list of permissible revocation considerations §…

• #23

  “the nature and circumstances” of a defendant's offense but is forbidden to consider “the seriousness of the offense.” 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a). The judge must consider what is needed to “dete[r]” violations of the law or to rehabilitate a defend- ant, i. e., to cause him to lead a law-abiding life, but cannot be in…

• #24

  cases, the court has discretion to choose the appropriate re- sponse. For example, it may “extend” supervised release “if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed”; “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of super- vised release”; or, more seriously, “revoke” supervised re- lease and “requi…

• #25

  exclusio alterius. In English, that means “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). To modify a classic example slightly, suppose a sign at the entrance of a park said: “No gasoline- or elect…

• #26

  no other things may be done. Consider this example. Suppose I tell my law clerks on a Monday that by the end of the week they must complete the bench memos in 6 of the 12 cases scheduled for argument during the next sitting. That statement would strongly imply that completion of other bench memos by the end of 2…

• #27

  Cite as: 606 U. S. 185 (2025) 213 Alito, J., dissenting any other sites that they should necessarily try to squeeze in. But it is doubtful that they would infer that I am sug- gesting that they should necessarily avoid seeing anything else that might catch their interest. In short, the expressio unius canon is i…

• #28

  That provision refers to “the kinds of sentences available,” and when a judge is deciding what to do about a defendant who has violated the terms of supervised release, the judge must consider the available options, which include termi- nation, extension, modifcation, and revocation. § 3583(e). Because a term of …

• #29

  for the Court. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to “the need . . . to promote respect for the law,” and because that provision is omitted from the supervised-release factors, the Court holds that consideration of this factor is not allowed either. But the Sentencing Reform Act demands consideration of factors that ar…

• #30

  include only three of those four purposes and exclude the goal of retribution supposedly encapsulated in § 3553(a) (2)(A). So, in the Court's view, the supervised-release stat- ute flters out § 3553(a)(2)(A) and thereby prohibits a court from any consideration of the “nature and circumstances of the offense” in l…

• #31

  the Sentencing Reform Act, the judge considers whether this information suggests that reimprisonment is needed either to “afford adequate deter- rence,” § 3553(a)(2)(B) (i. e., to cause the defendant to leave his former wife alone), or to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(C) (…

• #32

  6 Section 3582(a) prohibits consideration of rehabilitation in deciding on a sentence of imprisonment. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 332 (2011). Similarly, in § 3563(b), Congress confned the discretion of sen- tencing courts to a particular subset of the § 3553(a) factors. Under that provision, senten…

• #33

  ensure that “[s]upervised release fulflls [its] rehabilitative ends.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59 (2000). But in doing so, Congress likely understood that sealing off any discretion to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s re- tributive factors would be impracticable. Supervised release is “a part of” “a term …

• #34

  in § 3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised release.” Ibid . (emphasis in original). Because the wording of § 3583(c) is similar to that of § 3583(e)—the provision that controls alteration of a term of supervised release—the Court today treats Tapia's statement as strong support for its decision. This re…

• #35

  Whatever weight these dicta merit, they are surely insuf- fcient to support today's decision. B The Court attempts to justify its interpretation by draw- ing a hard line between the Act's primary penalties— “[f]ines, probation, and imprisonment”—and supervised re- lease. Ante, at 196. In its view, the former are…

• #36

  onment to deter the defendant from future backsliding, to protect society from the consequences of child pornography, or to provide the opportunity for further rehabilitation ef- forts in prison. It is revealing that the Court only half-heartedly buys its forward-looking/ backward-looking distinction. In a foot- …

• #37

  224 ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES Alito, J., dissenting Other daunting practical problems will arise when judges are deciding whether to alter a defendant's term of super- vised release. When sending a violator of supervised re- lease back to prison, a court must carefully control every word that is uttered to explai…

• #38

  was actually “intended to bear on” a mandatory factor with which it is closely related. Ibid. After providing this roadmap for district judges, the Court turns to the courts of appeals. The Court reminds circuit judges that an appeal based on today's decision “will be gov- erned by plain-error review,” assuming t…