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1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
BOST ET AL. v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 24–568. Argued October 8, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026 
Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked
or certified no later than election day and received within two weeks 
of election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political can-
didates filed a lawsuit claiming that counting ballots received after 
election day violates federal law.  They principally contended that do-
ing so conflicts with 2 U. S. C. §7 and 3 U. S. C. §1, which set election
day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November.  The dis-
trict court dismissed the case, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the 
ground that petitioners lacked standing. 
Held: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to chal -
lenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.  Pp. 3– 
10. 
(a) Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have a “per-
sonal stake” in a case to have standing to sue. FDA v. Alliance for 
Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379. An unlawful election rule 
can injure a candidate in several ways: It might cause him to lose the
election, require him to expend additional resources, or decrease his 
vote share and damage his reputati on.  But winning, and doing so as 
inexpensively and decisively as possible, are not a candidate’s only in-
terests in an election. 
Candidates also have an interest in a fair process.  Candidates seek 
to represent the people, and their interest in that prize cannot be sev-
ered from their interest in the elec toral process.  Win or lose, candi-
dates suffer when the process departs from the law.  The harm to can-
didates from an unfair and inaccurate  election is not common to all.

2 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
Syllabus 
While voters also have a general interest in an accurate vote tally, a 
candidate’s interest differs in kind.  Those who spend time and re-
sources seeking to claim the right to  voice the will of the people have 
“an undeniably different—and more particularized—interest” in
knowing what that will is.  Hotze  v. Hudspeth, 16 F. 4th 1121, 1126 
(Oldham, J., dissenting). 
Rules that undermine the integrity of the electoral process also un-
dermine the winner’s political legiti macy.  The counting of unlawful 
votes—or discarding of lawful ones —erodes public confidence in elec -
tion results and the elected repres entative.  “[R]eputational harms” 
are classic Article III injuries.  TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 
413, 425.  And they are particularly concrete for those whose very jobs 
depend on the support of the people.  Pp. 3–6.
(b) Candidates do not need to show a substantial risk that a rule will 
cause them to lose the election or  prevent them from achieving a le-
gally significant vote threshold in order to have standing. Requiring
such a showing could channel many election disputes to shortly before 
election day or after. Only then will many candidates be able to predict 
with any certainty that a rule will be outcome determinative.  Yet the 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should or-
dinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.  Such 
late-breaking, court-ordered rule changes can result in voter confusion
and undermine confidence in the integrity of electoral processes.  The 
democratic consequences can be worse if courts intervene only after 
votes have been counted.  Counting first and ruling upon legality af -
terwards is not a recipe for producing election results that have the 
public acceptance democratic stability requires. 
Premising standing on a candidate’s risk of election loss or failure to
achieve a certain vote threshold wo uld also convert Article III judges 
into political progno sticators and “invite[ ] findings on matters as to 
which neither judges nor anyone else can have any confidence.” Rucho 
v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 711 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). “[A]ccurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a “simple” en-
deavor. Id., at 712. And the limits of federal courts’ jurisdiction do not 
rest upon such “unstable ground  outside judicial expertise.”  Id., at 
713. 
Nor would requiring candidates to plead a substantial risk of harm 
to their vote share leave courts on any surer footing.  Such an approach 
would force judges to assess whether an election rule is likely to disad-
vantage a particular candidate—determinations judges are no better
qualified to make than assessing a candidate’s likelihood of winning or
losing. Candidates would also have to plead and prove that voters who 
take advantage of the challenged rule will favor their rivals, which 
may require divulging information about political vulnerabilities.

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 
Syllabus 
Faced with that prospect, many candidates are sure to wait until after
votes are counted to sue.  
Article III does not require this re sult.  Candidates have a concrete 
and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of 
votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their elec-
toral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns. Their interest 
extends to the integrity of the election—and the democratic process by
which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to repre-
sent.  Pp. 6–10. 
114 F. 4th 634, reversed and remanded. 
R
OBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinio n of the Court, in which T HOMAS, 
ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN, J., joined. JACKSON, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.

_________________ 
_________________ 
1  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 24–568 
MICHAEL J. BOST, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ILLINOIS 
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January 14, 2026]
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Three political candidates challenged Illinois’s procedure
for counting mail-in ballots received after election day.  We 
consider whether the candidates have standing to maintain
their suit. 
I 
Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in bal-
lots postmarked or certified no later than election day and 
received within two weeks of election day. Ill. Comp. Stat.,
ch. 10, §§5/19–8(c), 5/18A–15(a) (West 2022).  In May 2022, 
Congressman Michael Bost and Presidential elector nomi-
nees Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney (petitioners) 
sued the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive 
director (respondents), claiming that counting ballots re -
ceived after election day violat es federal law.  They princi -
pally contended that doing so conflicts with 2 U. S. C. §7 
and 3 U. S. C. §1, which set election day as the Tuesday fol-
lowing the first Monday in November.

2 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
Opinion of the Court 
In their complaint and declarations, petitioners asserted 
several bases for standing as candidates.1  They first argued
that they were “entitled to have their election[] results cer-
tified with votes received in compliance with the federal
Election Day statutes.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a.  And they
alleged that they “rely on provisions of federal and state law 
in conducting their campaigns including, in particular, re-
sources allocated to the post-election certification process.” 
Id., at 87a–88a. Congressman Bost further explained that 
the late counting of ballots would require him to “organize, 
fundraise, and run [his] campaign for fourteen additional
days.” Id., at 66a. This, in turn, would “cost[ his] campaign
time, money, volunteers and other resources” by, for exam-
ple, requiring the campaign to send poll watchers to “mon-
itor late arriving ballots.” Id., at 67a.  He also alleged that
he “risk[ed] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause[d
him] to lose [his] election,” and “because [his] margin of vic-
tory . . . may be reduced.” Id., at 68a.  “A diminished mar-
gin of victory [would] lead to the public perception that [his] 
constituents have concerns about [his] job performance,” 
which would “influence . . . future voters, Congressional
leadership, donors, and potential political opponents.” Id., 
at 68a–69a.
2 
The District Court held that petitioners lacked standing 
and dismissed the suit. 684 F. Supp. 3d 720 (ND Ill. 2023). 
Petitioners appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
114 F. 4th 634 (2024).  The court concluded that the costs 
—————— 
1 At the time, Congressman Bost was a candidate in the 2022 election, 
and Pollastrini and Sweeney planned to seek reappointment as Presi -
dential electors in the 2024 election.  Congressman Bost has served as 
the United States Representative fo r Illinois’s 12th Congressional Dis -
trict since he was first elected in 2014.  And he was previously a member
of the Illinois House of Representatives, to which he was first elected in
1994. 
2 Petitioners also alleged that Illinoi s’s ballot receipt deadline injured
them as voters by “dilut[ing] the weight of [their] votes.”  App. to Pet. for
Cert. 88a.  They have not advanced that argument before this Court.

3  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
to monitor vote counting afte r election day could not sup-
port standing, because those costs would have been volun-
tarily incurred “to avoid a hypothetical future harm—an 
election defeat.” Id., at 642.  In doing so, the court noted 
that Congressman Bost had won the last election with 75% 
of the vote. Ibid. It also rejected petitioners’ asserted
“‘competitive injury,’” reasoning that they “do not (and can-
not) allege that the majority of the votes that will be re-
ceived and counted after Election Day will break against 
them.” Id., at 643. Finally, it dismissed petitioners’ as -
serted injury based on an inaccurate vote tally as unduly
“speculative,” because “the election is months away and the 
voting process has not even started.”  Id ., at 644. Judge
Scudder dissented in part. In his view, Congressman Bost 
had standing based on the extra costs his campaign would 
incur to monitor the counting of late arriving ballots.  We 
granted certiorari. 605 U. S. ___ (2025).  
II 
Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have
a “personal stake” in a case to have standing to sue.  FDA 
v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379 
(2024). They must, in other words, be able to answer a basic 
question: “ ‘What’s it to you?’ ”  A. Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983).  Congressman
Bost has an obvious answer: He is a candidate for office. 
And a candidate has a personal stake in the rules that gov-
ern the counting of votes in his election.
3 
—————— 
3 Because only one plaintiff needs standing for a suit to proceed, we do
not address whether Pollastrini and Sweeney have standing to sue as
prospective Presidential electors. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 
489 (2023).

4 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
Opinion of the Court 
A 
An unlawful election rule can injure a candidate in sev-
eral ways. It might cause him to lose the election.  It might 
require him to expend additional resources.  Or it might de-
crease his vote share and damage his reputation.  Respond-
ents concede that each of these harms can be legally cog-
nizable.  But they contend that Congressman Bost failed to 
adequately plead any such harm here.  We need not resolve 
whether respondents are right, because winning, and doing 
so as inexpensively and decisively as possible, are not a can-
didate’s only interests in an election.
4 
To start, candidates also have an interest in a fair pro-
cess. Candidates are not common competitors in the eco-
nomic marketplace.  They seek to represent the people. And 
their interest in that prize cannot be severed from their in-
terest in the electoral proce ss—a process “of the most fun-
damental significance under our constitutional structure.” 
Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 
173, 184 (1979). Win or lose, candidates suffer when the 
process departs from the law. Thus, the long-shot and shoo-
in alike would suffer harm if a State chose to conduct its 
election by, say, flipping a coin.  The result of such an elec -
tion would not reflect the will of the people, and the candi-
dates would lose the opportunity to compete for the people’s 
support. So too, similar harms would result from less dra-
matic departures—for example, if a State decided to discard
a random 10% of cast votes.  Whether these decisions help, 
hurt, or have no effect on a candidate’s electoral prospects, 
they deprive the candidate of a fair process and an accurate
result. 
—————— 
4 Respondents do not dispute that Congressman Bost pleaded a distinct 
interest in the “election[ ] results [being] certified with [lawful] votes.” 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a.  They argue only that this interest is not legally 
cognizable. Because we disagree, we need not resolve the parties’ plead-
ing dispute.

5  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
Such harm to candidates is in no sense “common to all 
members of the public.”  Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 
440 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Voters, to be sure, also have a “general interest” in an accu-
rate vote tally.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
But a candidate’s interest differs in kind.  An unfair and 
inaccurate election plainly affects those who compete for 
the support of the people in a different way than it affects 
the people who lend their support.  We have no occasion to 
theorize about the “significance of the[se] relative inter-
ests,” contra, post, at 3 (J ACKSON, J., dissenting), or the 
“sincer[ity]” with which they are held, Carney v. Adams , 
592 U. S. 53, 59 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
What matters is that the harm candidates suffer is distinct 
from that suffered by the “people generally.” Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923).  Those who spend un-
told time and resources seekin g to claim the right to voice
the will of the people have “an undeniably different—and 
more particularized—interest” in knowing what that will
is. Hotze v. Hudspeth , 16 F. 4th 1121, 1126 (CA5 2021) 
(Oldham, J., dissenting).
Rules that undermine the “integrity of the electoral pro-
cess” also undermine the winner’s political legitimacy. 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 197 
(2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.). The counting of unlawful
votes—or discarding of lawful ones—erodes public confi-
dence that the election results reflect the people’s will. And 
when public confidence in the election results falters, public
confidence in the elected representative follows.  To the rep-
resentative, that loss of legitimacy—or its diminution—is a
concrete harm. “[R]eputational harms,” as a general mat-
ter, are classic Article III injuries.  TransUnion LLC v. 
Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 425 (2021) (citing Meese v. Keene, 
481 U. S. 465, 473 (1987)).  But they are particularly con-
crete for those whose very jobs depend on the support of the
people.

6 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
Opinion of the Court 
Candidates, in short, are not “mere bystanders” in their 
own elections. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 
606 U. S. 100, 110 (2025).  They have an obvious personal
stake in how the result is determined and regarded. Depar-
tures from the preordained rules cause them particularized
and concrete harm. 5  The same is true of competitors in 
other contests. Each runner in a 100-meter dash, for exam-
ple, would suffer if the race were unexpectedly extended to
105 meters. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 90.  Whether a particular 
runner expects to finish strong or fall off the pace in the 
final five meters, all would be deprived of the chance to com-
pete for the prize that the rules define.  The fastest to run 
105 meters has not won the 100-meter dash.  And in much 
the same way, an unlawful extension of vote counting de-
prives candidates of the opportunity to compete for election 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
B 
Respondents and the dissent dismiss these harms, which 
plainly affect candidates in a “personal and individual
way,” as generalized grievances.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 
U. S. 330, 339 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And they suggest that in order to have standing, plaintiff-
candidates must show some substantial risk that a rule will 
cause them to lose the election, prevent them from achiev-
ing a legally significant vote threshold, or damage their rep-
utation or finances. Brief for Respondents 25–26; post , at 
9. That approach finds no support in Article III’s case or
controversy requirement or our case law interpreting that 
—————— 
5 Contrary to the concurrence’s suggestion, post, at 4 (BARRETT, J., con-
curring in judgment), such harm is far “more particularized and more 
concrete than the mere assertion th at something unlawful benefited [a] 
competitor.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 99 (2013). And it 
bears little resemblance to the specific injury alleged in Already: a risk 
of being sued by a company that had issued an “unconditional and irrev-
ocable” covenant not to sue. Id., at 93.

7  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
requirement.  And it is as practically untenable as it is un-
democratic. 
Premising standing on a candidate’s risk of election loss 
or failure to achieve a certain vote threshold could channel 
many election disputes to sh ortly before election day—or 
worse, after. Only then will many candidates be able to 
predict with any certainty that a rule will be outcome de-
terminative. And only then will they be able to produce the
“manner and degree of evidence required,” particularly at
later “stages of the litigation,” to establish standing.  Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992).
Yet “[t]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower
federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules 
on the eve of an election.”  Republican National Committee 
v. Democratic National Committee , 589 U. S. 423, 424 
(2020) (per curiam).  Such late-breaking, court-ordered rule
changes can “result in voter confusion and consequent in-
centive to remain away from the polls,” and thus undermine
the “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes 
. . . essential to the functioning of our participatory democ-
racy.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2006) ( per cu-
riam); see also Republican Party of Pennsylvania  v. 
Degraffenreid, 592 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (T
HOMAS, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 4–5).  The 
democratic consequences can be even more dire if courts in-
tervene only after votes have been counted.  “Count first, 
and rule upon legality afterwar ds, is not a recipe for pro-
ducing election results that have the public acceptance
democratic stability requires.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 
1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in grant of stay).
Even if some candidates could muster evidence well be -
fore election day that a rule will likely be outcome determi-
native, respondents’ and the dissent’s approach would con-
vert Article III judges into political prognosticators and
“invite[] findings on matters as to which neither judges nor 
anyone else can have any confidence.” Rucho v. Common

8 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
Opinion of the Court 
Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 711 (2019) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). As a number of prominent historical figures can 
attest, not least among them Charles Evans Hughes and 
Thomas Dewey, “accurately predicting electoral outcomes 
is not” a “simple” endeavor. Id., at 712. And if the prognos-
ticators themselves lack the “political clairvoyance” to pre-
dict the winner after all votes have been cast, then surely
judges are poorly positioned to assess whether a candidate’s 
risk of loss, months earlier, is substantial.  Diamond Alter-
native Energy, 606 U. S., at 123; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U. S. 267, 287, n. 8 (2004) (plurality opinion).  The lim-
its of federal courts’ jurisdiction do not rest upon such “un-
stable ground outside judicial expertise.” Rucho, 588 U. S., 
at 713. 
Nor would requiring candidates to plead a substantial 
risk of harm to their vote share leave courts on any surer 
footing. Such an approach would force judges to assess 
whether an election rule is likely to disadvantage a partic-
ular candidate. And at least as respondents suggest, judges
must then also ensure that any disadvantage is linked to 
reputational or financial harm.
6 
Judges are no better qualified to make such determina-
tions than they are to assess a candidate’s likelihood of win-
ning or losing. Even if they could do so, this approach would 
still channel many disputes into postelection litigation.  To 
bring a preelection suit, a candidate would have to plead 
—————— 
6 Respondents at times appear to suggest that “[a] candidate may have
standing if she demonstrates that an election rule disadvantages her rel-
ative to a competitor,” even absent proof of reputational or financial
harm or a risk that she will lose th e election.  Brief for Respondents 26; 
see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 94. Yet it is far from clear why a slight but 
certain competitive disadvantage would qualify as an injury in fact but 
requiring a candidate to compete in an unfair election would not.  Indeed, 
the harm a candidate would suffer from winning 60% of the vote, instead
of 61%, seems less salient than the harm she would suffer if she instead 
won 62% because of an unlawful rule, and the public believed she had 
received an unfair advantage.

9  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
and prove that voters who take advantage of the challenged 
rule will favor his rivals.  Doing so while campaigning for 
those same voters’ support is not just awkward, but politi-
cally dangerous.  Particularly for new election rules, it may 
require divulging information about vulnerabilities that ri-
val candidates could exploit. Faced with that prospect,
many candidates are sure to wait until after votes are
counted to sue. 
Adding monetary harm to the equation, as the concur-
rence proposes, would change none of this.  Post, at 2–3 
(B
ARRETT, J., concurring in judgment).  Plaintiffs cannot 
“manufacture standing by voluntarily” incurring costs. 
Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 
289, 297 (2022).  They must incur those costs to  “mitigate
or avoid” a “ ‘substantial risk’” of some independent harm. 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA , 568 U. S. 398, 414, n. 5 
(2013). Acknowledging as much, the concurrence ulti-
mately speculates that it is “reasonably probable” Con-
gressman Bost’s election will be at risk because of discrep-
ancies in late-arriving ballots. Post, at 3. Such conjecture—
beyond finding little support in the pleadings—carries all 
the concerns we have explained.  And the concurrence’s ap-
proach introduces a new one: Apparently, a candidate who
pays poll watchers a penny would have standing, while one
who relies on volunteers would not. 
Nothing about Article III requires this result. Candi-
dates have a concrete and particularized interest in the 
rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, 
regardless whether those rules harm their electoral pro-
spects or increase the cost of their campaigns.  Their inter-
est extends to the integrity of the election—and the

10 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
Opinion of the Court 
democratic process by which they earn or lose the support
of the people they seek to represent.7 
* * * 
“Courts sometimes make standing law more complicated
than it needs to be.” Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. , 590 U. S. 
538, 547 (2020). We decline respondents’ invitation to do so 
here. As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has 
standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of 
votes in his election. 
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
—————— 
7 We do not share the dissent’s concern that our recognition of this com-
monsense reality will “open[] the floodgates” to candidate-led challenges 
to ballot “format.”  Post, at 11–12.  Indeed, the dissent itself suggests that 
courts already “ ‘often decide ballot-design cases,’ ” pointing to a case in 
which a court concluded that candidates did have standing to challenge 
“ ‘the form of election ballots.’ ” Post, at 12, n. 5 (quoting Kim v. Hanlon, 
99 F. 4th 140, 147, 153 (CA3 2024)).  To the extent the dissent’s concern 
is that federal courts will be inundat ed with more trivial “format” chal-
lenges, post, at 12, to things like “ballot font and typeface,” Brief for Dis-
trict of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 20, it is neither clear why candi-
dates would waste their resources in this way nor on what basis in 
federal law such suits could be brought.  In any event, we address today 
only candidates’ standing to challeng e rules that, like Illinois’s, govern
the counting of votes in their elections.

_________________ 
_________________ 
1  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 24–568 
MICHAEL J. BOST, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ILLINOIS 
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January 14, 2026]
 JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, con-
curring in the judgment. 
While I agree with the Court that Congressman Bost has
standing, I disagree with its reasoning.  In my view, Con-
gressman Bost has standing because he has suffered a tra-
ditional pocketbook injury, not because of his status as a 
candidate. 
I 
The Constitution limits federal courts to deciding “Cases”
and “Controversies.” Art. III, §2.  To satisfy this require-
ment, a plaintiff must show (among other things) that he 
has suffered an actual injury—put colloquially, he must be
able to answer the basic question “‘What’s it to you?’”  Ante, 
at 3. We give content to that maxim by requiring a plaintiff 
to show a “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” 
injury. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA , 568 U. S. 398, 409 
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A “particular-
ized” injury is a harm affecting a plaintiff “in a personal and
individual way,” not a “generalized grievance” shared by 
the public. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 339, and 
n. 7 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “concrete” 
injury is a nonabstract harm of the type “that has tradition-
ally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in Eng-
lish or American courts.”  Id., at 340–341.  And an “actual

2 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 
or imminent” injury is one that is “certainly impending” ra-
ther than “speculative.”  Clapper, 568 U. S., at 401. 
A plaintiff must establish standing at the time of filing 
and maintain it throughout litigation. Carney v. Adams , 
592 U. S. 53, 59 (2020).  He must support each element of
standing “with the manner and degree of evidence required 
at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992).  At the pleading
stage, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from 
the defendant’s conduct may suffice.”  Ibid.; see Spokeo, 578 
U. S., at 338 (a complaint must “ ‘clearly . . . allege facts
demonstrating’” standing). 
Pocketbook harm is a traditional Article III injury.  Tyler 
v. Hennepin County, 598 U. S. 631, 636 (2023).  That is so 
not only when a law directly imposes costs on a plaintiff, 
see, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 430–431 
(1961) (profits lost from Sunday-closing law), but also when
a plaintiff “reasonably incur[s] costs to mitigate or avoid” 
the “‘substantial risk’” of a harm caused by a statute, Clap-
per, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5 (collecting cases).  For instance, 
in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, farmers of conven-
tional alfalfa sought injunctive relief against a rule deregu-
lating (and thus permitting) the planting of genetically 
modified alfalfa.  561 U. S. 139, 153–154 (2010).  The farm-
ers “established a reasonable probability that their organic 
and conventional alfalfa crops will be infected with the en-
gineered gene” through cross-contamination. Id., at 153 
(internal quotation marks omitted). And because the farm-
ers took costly preventative measures to “minimize the like-
lihood of potential contamination,” they suffered an Article 
III injury. Id., at 154–155; see also Virginia v. American 
Booksellers Assn., Inc. , 484 U. S. 383, 392 (1988) (finding 
standing where regulated booksellers must incur compli-
ance costs or risk prosecution).
Like the farmers in Monsanto, Congressman Bost alleges
that he will “reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid” the

3  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 
“‘substantial risk’ ” of harm caused by the challenged stat-
ute. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5.  He claims that Illi-
nois’s ballot-receipt deadline will increase the number of 
late-arriving ballots, which often “have discrepancies (e.g.,
insufficient information, missing signatures, dates, or post-
marks) that need to be resolved.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. 
Invalid ballots, he says, will put his election at risk and 
damage his reputation.  To avoid these reasonably probable
harms, his campaign “has spent, and will spend, money,
time, and resources to monitor and respond as needed to 
ballots received by state election officials after the national 
Election Day.” Id., at 65a.  If poll watchers are not present 
to monitor ballot counting, co unty officials could “accep[t]
possibly deficient ballots in bulk.”  Id., at 67a. Accordingly, 
it is standard practice for campaigns to send poll watchers 
to monitor ballot counting to ensure that any discrepancies 
are resolved appropriately.  See Brief for League of Women 
Voters et al. as Amici Curiae  20 (calling it “political mal -
practice” for candidates not to monitor ballot counting in 
their races). Because Congressman Bost’s expenditures
mitigate a substantial risk of harm, he has pleaded Article 
III injury.* 
II 
Rather than take this straightforward path, the Court 
charts a novel one: To challenge “the rules that govern the
counting of votes in his election,” a candidate need only al-
lege that he is in fact a candidate in that election. Ante, at 
3. The Court makes no attempt to demonstrate that the 
bare fact of facing changed vote-counting rules is a tradi-
tionally recognized harm. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 
—————— 
*JUSTICE JACKSON says it is not reasonably probable that Congressman
Bost will suffer any injury, post at 14 (dissenting opinion), implicitly re-
jecting the view that it is reasonable to employ poll watchers to monitor
for discrepancies.  But on a motion  to dismiss, we credit Congressman
Bost’s factual allegations and draw all inferences in his favor.

4 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 
594 U. S. 413, 424–425 (2021).  Nor does it grapple with Al-
ready, LLC v. Nike, Inc., which holds that a plaintiff cannot 
show an Article III injury by claiming only that an allegedly 
unlawful practice benefits a competitor without any show-
ing of harm to himself.  568 U. S. 85, 99 (2013).  By holding
that a candidate always has an interest in challenging vote-
counting rules, even if those rules do not impose a competi-
tive disadvantage on him, the Court today relieves candi-
dates of having to show any real harm.  See ante, at 4. Can-
didates are apparently entitled to this extraordinarily
forgiving rule because they are “not common competitors in 
the economic marketplace.”  Ibid. 
I cannot join the Court’s creation of a bespoke standing 
rule for candidates.  Elections are important, but so are 
many things in life. We have always held candidates to the 
same standards as any other litigant. See, e.g., Davis v. 
Federal Election Comm’n , 554 U. S. 724, 733–734 (2008) 
(applying ordinary standing analysis to candidate challeng-
ing financial disclosure requirements); Wittman v. Per-
sonhuballah, 578 U. S. 539, 545 (2016) (applying ordinary
standing analysis to legislators running for reelection who 
challenged redistricting plan); Carney, 592 U. S., at 59–60 
(requiring a would-be candidate to show concrete intention 
to seek office to challenge partisan-balance rule).  And we 
have repeatedly rejected requests to create special standing 
rules for particular litigants. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U. S. 811, 821, 830 (1997) (legislator standing); Arizona 
Christian School Tuition Organization  v. Winn , 563 U. S. 
125, 134 (2011) (taxpayer standing); Lujan, 504 U. S., at 
566–567 (animal-enthusiast standing); FDA v. Alliance for 
Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 392–393 (2024) (doctor 
standing). I see no reason to afford candidates favored sta-
tus. 
Nor do the practical realities of running for office warrant
special treatment for candidates. As Congressman Bost
concedes, “candidates could probably articulate their injury

5  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 
in terms of a pocketbook in jury” “in many election law 
cases.” Brief for Petitioners 21.  So in addition to being un-
moored from precedent, the Court’s broader rule is unnec-
essary on Congressman Bost’s own telling. 
* * * 
We need not deviate from established standing principles 
to resolve this case in Congressman Bost’s favor.  I respect-
fully concur only in the judgment.

_________________ 
_________________ 
1  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 24–568 
MICHAEL J. BOST, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ILLINOIS 
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January 14, 2026]
 JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,
dissenting. 
Under our standing precedents, this is an easy case.  Ar-
ticle III requires plaintiffs to assert and establish an “injury 
in fact”—i.e., the “invasion of a legally protected interest”
that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or im-
minent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congressman
Bost has failed to allege that the election-related law he 
seeks to challenge has caused him to suffer any injury that
satisfies those requirements.
A majority of the Court nevertheless concludes that Bost
has standing to sue based solely on his status as a candidate
for office. The Court thereby subtly shifts from our
longstanding actual-injury rule to a presumption that cer-
tain kinds of plaintiffs are sufficiently aggrieved to satisfy 
Article III standing, regardless of whether they will experi-
ence any particularized harm.  In my view, this dubious de-
parture from settled law disregards both the equal treat-
ment of litigants and judicial restraint.
J
USTICE BARRETT rightly rejects today’s bespoke candi-
date-standing rule. See ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in 
judgment). Yet her pocketbook  theory would allow political
candidates to spend their way past Article III’s injury-in-
fact requirement, despite our clear admonition that

2 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to
make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that
is not certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
568 U. S. 398, 402 (2013).
In the end, I would not allow Bost’s suit to move forward 
on grounds that we have deemed insufficient to establish 
Article III standing for other plaintiffs.  Because I believe 
that political candidates can and should be held to the same
actual-injury requirements as other litigants, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
Any litigant who invokes the judicial power of the federal 
courts under Article III “must establish that he has a ‘per-
sonal stake’ in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged in -
jury suffered is particularized as to him.”  Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U. S. 811, 819 (1997).  Today, however, the Court es-
sentially pronounces that this foundational principle no 
longer applies to candidates fo r elected office.  It declares 
that all candidates have standing to challenge election reg-
ulations in light of their interest in a “fair process.”  Ante, 
at 4. No matter that, in a democratic society like ours, the 
interest in a fair electoral process is common to all members 
of the voting public.  The Cou rt thus ignores a core consti-
tutional requirement while unnecessarily thrusting the Ju-
diciary into the political arena. 
A 
The majority’s primary failing is its refusal to recognize 
that the alleged injury it identifies—the suffering that re -
sults from an unfair electoral process—is not particular to
candidate-plaintiffs. The importance of the particularity 
requirement cannot be overstated, for it is this requirement
that “prevents the judicial process from becoming no more 
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of 
concerned bystanders.”  United States v. Students

3  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) , 412 
U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Such a result is incompatible with
our constitutional design, which recognizes that “ ‘abstract
questions of wide public significance’ ” are “most appropri -
ately addressed in the representative branches.”  Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)).  In other words, 
the particularity requirement ensures that the Judiciary
stays in its proper lane, leaving to the people’s representa-
tives the prerogative to decide questions of broad im-
portance in the absence of a litigant with a “direct stake in 
the outcome.” Sierra Club  v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 
(1972). As such, litigants without a direct stake—i.e., those 
who assert no more than “generalized grievances about the 
conduct of government”—cannot satisfy the “case or contro-
versy aspect of standing.”  Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 479 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Today’s decision all but ignores the particularity require-
ment and the democracy-preserving function that it serves. 
This case, the Court says, involves “[a]n unlawful election 
rule,” which necessarily injures candidates’ “interest in a
fair process.” Ante, at 4. But, even assuming that Illinois’s 
rule is unlawful (as we must for standing purposes), the 
Court makes no real attempt to  explain how that injury is
particular to candidates; to the contrary, it acknowledges 
that voters, too, have a stake in a fair electoral process.  See 
ante, at 5. Yet the Court insists that a candidate’s interest 
is “undeniably different” from that of a voter’s, because it is
the candidate—and not the voter—who “compete[s]” in an 
election. Ibid. 
That assessment gets the sign ificance of the relative in-
terests exactly backward.  A pub lic office is a public trust, 
and an election for that office is the ultimate expression of
the will of the people, not a me re competition to be won or 
lost. In the Court’s telling, though, elections are a glorified

4 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
national pastime—the competitors’ success is the main ob-
jective, and voters are mere bystanders who simply “lend
their support.” Ibid. This depiction drastically devalues
the role elections play in a democratic society.1 
The Court similarly misrepresents the harm that occurs
when unlawful election rules “erod[e] public confidence [in] 
the election results.” Ibid.  To be sure, a tainted election 
can hurt a candidate if it undermines the public’s percep-
tion of that officeholder’s legitimacy and harms his reputa-
tion in the process (assuming he makes that allegation). 2 
But voters suffer too—and arguably even more so—when
their fellow citizens lose confidence in the results of an elec-
tion. Indeed, the same loss of faith the majority counts as
injurious to candidates could be a fatal blow to the public’s
interest in democratic governance.
3 
Batting away these foundational truths, the Court finds
“no occasion to theorize” about the relative significance of
voters’ and candidates’ shared interest in free and fair elec-
tions. Ibid. But it is the Court’s own analysis— i.e., its 
—————— 
1 Lest we forget: In a democracy, elections are not mere candidate-cen-
tered bouts; rather, they determine the fate of the community.  Elections, 
after all, are the mechanism throug h which We the People (exercising 
our collective will) decide who gets to  represent us.  In a government of
the people, by the people, and for the people, “those who compete” in an 
election, ante, at 5, are ultimately vying to become public servants—not 
simply winners of a game.  Thus, it is misleading to suggest that those 
who “claim the right to voice the will of the people,” ibid., have an exclu-
sive interest in electoral fairness.  To the contrary, those “who lend their 
support” as voters, ibid., are the primary stakeholders. 
2 Here, Congressman Bost has not alleged that Illinois’s ballot-receipt
deadline will undermine the public’s perception of the legitimacy of any 
future win. 
3 “[I]f a State chose to conduct its election by, say, flipping a coin,” what 
is lost is not just a candidate’s “opportunity to compete for the people’s 
support.” Ante, at 4.  Another injurious consequence would be the lack
of any incentive to vote, leading to both the elimination of democratic
participation and the election of candidates who have no reason to oper-
ate for the public good—in short, the destruction of democracy.

5  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
purported distinction between the interests of candidates 
and voters in fair election outcomes—that raises the com-
parative question, not mine. 
In any event, I agree that we need not “theorize” about 
the significance of these interests, for one thing is indisput-
ably clear: Our democracy was founded on the “self-evident” 
truth that a government is legitimate only insofar as it de-
rives its “just powers from the consent of the governed.”
Declaration of Independence ¶2.  Candidates come and go, 
but the voters’ collective interest in the “right to elect legis-
lators in a free and unimpaired fashion” is enduring and 
indispensable.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964).
Against this backdrop, the Court’s effort to isolate and ele-
vate a candidate’s “distinct” interest in electoral integrity, 
ante, at 5, falls flat. 
For today’s standing purposes, the key realization is that,
in a democracy, the (existential) interest in fair and accu-
rate elections is common to all members of the voting pub-
lic. I acknowledge that “[t]hose who spend untold time and 
resources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the
people,” ibid.—candidates—have a particularized interest 
in getting the job. That is precisely why candidates do have 
Article III standing if an unlawful election rule creates a 
substantial risk of harm to that interest (the risk of an elec-
tion loss). But when what is at stake is the overall fairness 
of the electoral process, it is the people’s shared interest in 
democracy itself (and not just the candidate’s job prospects) 
that hangs in the balance. 
B 
The Court’s standing analysis elides all this by employing 
the commonsense intuition that, “[w]in or lose, candidates 
suffer when the process departs from the law.” Ante, at 4. 
But how is that a particularized injury?  Anyone and every-
one who is governed by law is similarly harmed by any de-
parture from the law’s requirements.  Moreover, this Court

6 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
has repeatedly instructed that litigants “may not sue based 
only on an ‘asserted right to have the Government act in 
accordance with law.’ ”  FDA  v. Alliance for Hippocratic 
Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 381 (2024) (quoting Allen  v. 
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 754 (1984)); see also Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (rejecting theory that 
taxpayers have standing to challenge an allegedly unlawful 
government action requiring the use of public funds be-
cause “[t]he party who invokes the [judicial] power must be 
able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in 
danger of sustaining some direct injury. . . , and not merely 
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with peo-
ple generally”).
Here, the generalized nature of the “fair process” harm is 
indisputable: If Illinois’s vote-count rule is unlawful, all 
participants in the electoral process—not only candidates
for office but also every voter who has cast a ballot in the 
election—would be deprived “of a fair process and an accu-
rate result.” Ante, at 4.  But, as this Court has time and 
again explained, such an assertion of injury “amount[s] to
little more than [an] attemp[t] ‘to employ a federal court as
a forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the 
conduct of government.”  Valley Forge , 454 U. S., at 483 
(omission in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 
106 (1968)).
Indeed, our standing precedents make crystal clear that, 
absent a showing of particularized harm, these sorts of fair-
process grievances must be resolved through the political 
branches. For it is in those branches “where democratic de-
bate can occur and a wide variety of interests and views can
be weighed.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine , 602 U. S., 
at 380. By contrast, the exercise of judicial power, “which
can so profoundly affect the liv es, liberty, and property of 
those to whom it extends,” is a “tool of last resort,” to be 
invoked only “when the question is raised by a party whose

7  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
interests entitle him to raise it.”  Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 
473–474 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Finding no support for a nonparticularized “fair process”
harm in either our precedents or the practices of the lower 
courts, the Court pivots to an analogy.  It suggests that, as 
a candidate running for office who has been told that votes 
will continue to be counted after election day, Bost is no dif-
ferent from a competitor in a 100-meter dash whose race is 
“unexpectedly extended to 105 meters.”  Ante, at 6. Accord-
ing to the majority, each runner in the newly announced 
105-meter race would obviously suffer, regardless of 
whether he “expects to finish strong.”  Ibid.  But whether 
any given runner is harmed by this rule change depends on
a number of factors particular to each competitor, none of 
which the majority deigns to identify.  And, indeed, it is far 
from obvious that a runner with a track record like Bost’s— 
who expects to win both races based on sound statistical 
analyses of his current and past performance—would have 
the injury that begets Article III standing to involve the Ju-
diciary in this rule-change dispute.
Despite the imprecision of its analysis, the Court is clear 
about one thing today: Pinpointing the actual harm to can-
didates for elected office is no longer necessary for standing 
purposes. Its remarkable holding jettisons the injury-in-
fact requirement entirely.  Forget injury; political candi-
dates need only have “a concrete and particularized interest 
in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elec-
tions, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral 
prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns.”  Ante, at 
9 (emphasis added). As J
USTICE BARRETT explains, see 
ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in judgment), this harm-free
Article III standing rule finds no support in our precedents.4 
—————— 
4 The Government, participating as an amicus in support of petition-
ers, also suggests that our typical Article III standing requirements do
not apply here, though for a different reason than the Court.  In its view, 
we can presume that Bost has identified  an injury in fact because he is

8 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
C 
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its novel, harm-free
standing analysis, the Court resorts to policy arguments to
bolster it. It worries that requiring candidates to establish 
that they might lose the election will “channel” lawsuits “to 
shortly before election day—or worse, after.”  Ante, at 7. 
“Only then,” the Court says, w ill a candidate really know 
whether an election regulation has impacted his race.  Ibid. 
And, worse still, a candidate trying to make such a showing 
could find himself in the “awkward” position of having to
“plead and prove that voters who take advantage of the
challenged rule will favor his rivals.” Ante, at 8–9. 
The relevance of these practical concerns is unclear.  We 
have traditionally viewed Article III standing as an “irre -
ducible” constitutional minimum, “not merely a trouble-
some hurdle to be overcome.”  Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 
472, 476. As such, Article III’s “essential and unchanging” 
constitutional mandates do not ordinarily yield to our policy 
judgment about when it would be most convenient for 
courts to hear particular kinds of suits.  Alliance for Hippo-
cratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
—————— 
the “direct object” of I llinois’s ballot-receipt dead line.  Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 21. To be sure, when a plaintiff is the direct 
“object” of “government ac tion or inaction,” there “is ordinarily little 
question that the acti on or inaction has caused him injury.”  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561–562 (1992).  But Bost is not a 
direct object of the Illinois rule at issue.  The rule regulates the conduct
of voters and election officials, dictating how and when ballots are cast 
and counted.  See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, §5/19–8(c) (West Supp. 2025)
(“Each vote by mail voter’s ballot that is mailed to an election authority
and postmarked no later than election day, but that is received . . . before 
the close of the period for counting pr ovisional ballots cast at that elec -
tion, . . . shall be counted”).  And we have recently reaffirmed that, “when 
(as here) a plaintiff challenges the government’s ‘unlawful regulation (or 
lack of regulation) of someone else ,’ ” standing  “ ‘is ordinarily substan -
tially more difficult to establish.’ ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med-
icine, 602 U. S. 367, 382 (2024) (quoting Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562).

9  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
In any event, under our usual standing rules, a candidate
(and our democracy) need not be put in the awkward posi-
tion of waiting until the eve of an election or predicting an 
electoral loss with 100% accuracy. Our cases recognize that
a litigant who bases standing on “[a]n allegation of future 
injury” need only assert a “substantial risk that the harm 
will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List  v. Driehaus , 573 U. S. 
149, 158 (2014) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks 
omitted). The substantial-risk standard is not especially 
exacting; it demands more than mere conjecture, but it does
not require plaintiffs to prove that the alleged future harm 
is “literally certain” to occur. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, 
n. 5. 
Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a candidate
need only plausibly allege that the challenged regulation 
creates a substantial risk of an election loss—he need not 
predict with certainty that the rule will cause him to lose. 
See, e.g., Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F. 3d 582, 
587 (CA5 2006) (concluding that a candidate who alleged
that governmental action “threaten[ed] his election pro-
spects” had established standing). Alternatively, a candi-
date whose win is more secure could allege a substantial 
risk of some other concrete and particularized harm stem-
ming from the challenged rule’s application, such as an ex-
isting or imminent financial or reputational injury.  Cf. Fed-
eral Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 
296 (2022) (recognizing a wi nning candidate’s $10,000 ex-
penditure as a “pocketbook harm” that “constitute[d] an in-
jury in fact”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 473–474 (1987) 
(finding standing where a candidate had “alleged and 
demonstrated” that a challeng ed disclosure rule would, 
among other harms, “adversely affect his reputation in the 
community”). 
Though it may be more difficult for candidates to satisfy 
the “substantial risk” standard at later stages of litigation,
it is nowhere near impossible.  It does not require a

10 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
candidate to prove that the c hallenged rule guarantees his 
loss; it simply requires him to marshal enough evidence 
from which a court could conclude that the challenged rule
presents a significant threat to his victory, his pocketbook,
or his reputation.
As we have recognized in other contexts, that sort of evi-
dence may include an evaluation of the facts on the ground
and statistical analyses.  See, e.g., Department of Commerce 
v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 767–768 (2019) (concluding that
States had standing to challenge the inclusion of a citizen-
ship question on the census, in light of statistical evidence
“establish[ing] that noncitizen households have historically 
responded to the census at lower rates” and “that if noncit-
izen households [were] undercounted by as little as 2%” 
those States would “lose out on federal funds”).  In the elec-
toral arena, preelection polling will often provide a relevant 
data set. Candidates could also rely on historical data
about how a particular rule has affected those who have run
similar campaigns in the past. And the relative advantages
or disadvantages of various electoral processes can be scru-
tinized by the kinds of experts who are routinely hired to 
make these sorts of assessments. See, e.g., Meese, 481 U. S., 
at 473–474 (finding standing where a candidate submitted 
“detailed affidavits, including one describing the results of 
an opinion poll and another containing the views of an ex-
perienced political analyst” to show that a challenged dis -
closure requirement “would substantially harm his chances 
for reelection” (footnote omitted)).
The Court’s suggestion that it is beyond a judge’s compe-
tency to evaluate whether an election rule causes a sub-
stantial risk of electoral loss, ante, at 7–9, is therefore both 
puzzling and unfounded. A “substantial risk” of future 
harm has been the Article III imminent-injury standard for 
decades. See Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5 (collecting 
cases applying this standard).  And federal courts, includ -
ing this one, have routinely applied that standard in a

11  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
variety of circumstances—essentially whenever a plaintiff 
maintains that state action is likely to harm him in the fu-
ture. See, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri , 603 U. S. 43, 57–58 
(2024) (First Amendment challenge related to social media
content moderation); Department of Commerce , 588 U. S., 
at 766–767 (Administrative Procedure Act challenge to
changes to the census); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, 561 U. S. 139, 153–155 (2010) (environmental chal-
lenge to regulations of genetically modified crops). 
In short, our precedents establish that certainty of future 
harm is not the benchmark, as the majority suggests.  Ante, 
at 7. Rather, all that is required is a plausible allegation 
(eventually followed by proof ) of a substantial risk of future 
injury.
Bost fails to clear even that low bar.  At most, he alleges 
that he “risk[s] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause 
[him] to lose [his] election” or “reduc[e ]” his “margin of vic-
tory” in a way that harms his reputation.  App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 68a–69a (emphasis added).  But his complaint and 
supplemental declaration include no—zero—allegations to
support an inference that such risk exists, or is at all sub-
stantial, in his own case; for example, he never alleges that 
untimely ballots are more likely to break against him and 
in favor of his opponent.  Indeed, Bost appears to have dis-
claimed the need to include any such allegations before the
Court of Appeals, where he argued that his “stated injury
is not based on a risk of losing the election” and that “[n]ei-
ther a change to his electoral fortunes nor any other effect
is necessary to afford him st anding.”  Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants in No. 23–2644 (CA7), p. 19.  The Court today 
accepts that unprecedented contention, which flies in the
face of both the particularity requirement and the substan-
tial-risk standard. 
Alarmingly, today’s ruling also has far-reaching implica-
tions beyond Bost’s election , since dispensing with our 
usual standing requirements opens the floodgates to

12 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
exactly the type of troubling election-related litigation the 
Court purportedly wants to avoid.  For example, under the
Court’s new harm-free candidate-standing rule, an elec-
toral candidate who loses in a landslide can apparently still 
file a disruptive legal action in federal court after the elec-
tion is over. All he must do is assert that an election rule 
somehow deprived him of a fair process—even if that rule
played no role in the election’s outcome or otherwise caused 
him harm.  That possibility is especially concerning given 
the host of election-related regulations that States must 
promulgate when exercising their constitutional duty to set 
the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections.”  Art. 
I, §4, cl. 1.  States regulate everything from a ballot’s chain
of custody to its format—all of which the majority would
permit candidates to challenge in court without offering any
theory of how such rules harm them personally. See Brief 
for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 16–22 (de-
scribing the myriad state regulations at risk under Bost’s
broad theory of standing).
5 
It is impossible to square this outcome with the practical
concerns the Court identifies.  See, e.g., ante, at 7 (empha-
sizing that “ ‘federal courts should ordinarily not alter the 
election rules on the eve of an election’ ” (quoting Republi-
can National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 
589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam))). Ironically, then, it 
is the Court’s new and generous candidate-standing rule
that invites late-breaking judi cial intervention into the 
—————— 
5 The Court’s suggestion that these so rts of challenges are unlikely, 
ante, at 10, n. 7, is belied by recent experience.  See, e.g., League of 
Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Florida Secretary of State, 66 F. 4th 905, 929 
(CA11 2023) (considering a challenge to a “drop-box provision” that gov-
erned “the chain of custody of the ballot” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Kim v. Hanlon, 99 F. 4th 140, 147, 153 (CA3 2024) (noting that 
“[c]ourts often decide ballot-design cases” in considering a challenge to 
“the form of election ballots” in th e State of New Jersey).  Without a 
harm-based standing rule for candidat es, these kinds of challenges will
undoubtedly become even more common.

13  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
political process in a manner that is “as practically untena-
ble as it is undemocratic.”  Ante, at 7. 
II 
While more tethered to our standing precedents, JUSTICE 
BARRETT’s pocketbook-injury theory is also insufficient to
support Bost’s standing.  This is because it is well settled— 
in light of our decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 
U. S. 398—that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by 
choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical fu-
ture harm that is not certainly impending.” Id., at 402. 
Bost’s allegations establish only a hypothetical future 
harm, even when crediting them as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor. 
In Clapper, we held that a group of attorneys and human-
rights organizations lacked standing to challenge a provi-
sion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) “au-
thorizing the surveillance of individuals who are not 
‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States.”  Id., at 401 (footnote
omitted) (quoting 50 U. S. C. §1881a).  The attorneys and 
organizations premised their standing argument on the 
possibility that their client s would be surveilled under 
FISA. 568 U. S., at 406.  That possibility, they said, re-
quired them to take “costly and burdensome measures” to 
protect their privacy, including avoiding “certain e-mail and 
phone conversations” and traveling to their clients “so that
they [could] have in-person conversations.” Id., at 415. Yet 
the attorneys and organizations “ha[d] no actual 
knowledge” of the Government’s surveillance practices un-
der FISA. Id., at 411.  They “merely speculate[d] and 
ma[de] assumptions about whether their communications”
would be targeted.  Ibid.  As a result, the measures they 
took to avoid surveillance could not satisfy Article III’s re-
quirements. Id., at 416.  Or, put differently, they could not
“manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on

14 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm 
that [was] not certainly impending.”  Ibid. 
Bost’s alleged pocketbook injury is no different.  He fears 
that Illinois’s ballot-receipt deadline will allow the State to
count illegal votes, which in turn might injure him by cost-
ing him an election or at least resulting in a diminished 
margin of victory that somehow damages his reputation.
Brief for Petitioners 18. He has therefore hired poll watch-
ers to monitor the State’s vote counting for an additional
two weeks.  But, in the absence of any allegation establish-
ing that he actually faces a substantial risk of losing the 
election or having his margin of victory diminished in a 
meaningful way, Bost has taken those precautions based on 
the mere (and by all accounts remote) possibility that such
harms will otherwise materialize.  At bottom, then, Bost 
fears a “hypothetical future harm that is not certainly im-
pending.” 568 U. S., at 416.  So any additional expenses 
Bost incurs to ward off that harm is not a proper basis for
standing. Ibid. 
Bost nevertheless insists that his case is distinct from 
Clapper because he knows that the State will apply its 14-
day ballot-receipt deadline in his next election.  That fact, 
he says, sets him apart from the attorneys and human-
rights organizations in Clapper, who could not prove that 
the Federal Government would invoke FISA against them 
or their clients. Stated differently, Bost is certain that the 
State will apply the ballot-receipt deadline, whereas the 
Clapper plaintiffs could only speculate as to FISA’s future
application.
This contention misunderstands Clapper’s standing rule
and how it applied in that case.  In Clapper, the harm the 
plaintiffs feared (unlawful surveillance) would occur at the 
precise moment that FISA was invoked against them or
their clients. And because th e asserted injury stemmed di-
rectly from the application of the challenged regulation, the 
risk of future harm was tied directly to the risk of FISA’s

15  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
future application to the plaintiffs.  It mattered, then, that 
the possibility of FISA’s application was only speculative. 
Bost’s feared injury—the one he seeks to spend his way 
out of—is different in this respect, but it is no less specula -
tive. The harm Bost fears does not stem from the mere (cer-
tain) application of the State’s 14-day ballot-receipt dead-
line.  Rather, what triggers Bost’s spending is fear of a lost
election or the diminution of his reputation—i.e., the possi-
ble downstream effects of the challenged election rule.
Thus, even though the rule’s application is certain, the 
feared harm is not; Bost has only speculated as to the pos-
sibility that this future, downstream harm will occur.
This means that Bost’s pocketbook injury is similar in all 
relevant respects to that presented by the plaintiffs in Clap-
per: He is spending money to ward off speculative future 
injury. His case differs from Clapper only insofar as the 
source of the harm he is seeking to alleviate is not the (un -
certain) application of the regulation itself, but the (uncer -
tain) effects of that regulation.  In other words, both Bost 
and the plaintiffs in Clapper spent money to mitigate a risk
of injury that was only theoretical, not substantial.  And 
neither can leverage unnecessary expenditures into Article 
III standing.
 Our decision in Monsanto Co.  v. Geertson Seed Farms , 
561 U. S. 139, is not to the contrary. There, we held that 
farmers who “established a reasonable probability” that ge-
netically modified alfalfa seeds would cross-contaminate
their organic alfalfa had standing based on the costly 
measures they had taken to protect their crops. Id., at 153– 
155 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The key phrase from our Monsanto opinion is “reasonable
probability.” The farmers did not simply point to a hypo-
thetical possibility of cross-contamination. Instead, their 
allegations established that their fear of future harm was 
reasonable.  In particular, the farmers explained that mod-
ified alfalfa seeds were actually “‘being planted in all the

16 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
major alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to con-
tamination to non-GMO seed production fields.’ ”  Id., at 
154, n. 3.  The farmers also emphasized “ ‘the compact geo-
graphic area of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas and 
the fact that pollen is distributed by bees that have large
natural range of activity.’”  Ibid.  Accordingly, they reason-
ably predicted that “‘the genetic contamination of the [mod-
ified] seed [would] rapidly spread through the seed growing 
regions.’” Ibid. 
Bost’s allegations, by comparison, fall well short of
demonstrating a reasonable probability of future harm ab-
sent costly mitigation efforts.  He alleges only that he 
“risk[s] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause [him] to
lose” or diminish his “margin of victory,” leading “to the 
public perception that [his] constituents have concerns
about [his] job performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–
69a. Examined closely, Bost’s averment is that, if the vote 
counting continues, he could receive fewer votes, which 
could cause him to lose the election or could damage his
reputation among voters and do nors.  No other allegations
make this harmful outcome likely or otherwise substantiate 
the risk that any of these potential problems might actually 
occur.
 J
USTICE BARRETT nevertheless suggests that the forgiv-
ing standard for motions to di smiss is enough to get Bost 
over the line.  See ante, at 3, n. (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). But that standard cannot benefit a plaintiff like 
Bost, who is “armed with nothing more than conclusions.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009).
6  B o s t ’ s 
—————— 
6 I do not reject the view that it is  reasonable to employ poll watchers 
to monitor discrepancies in the vote count as a general matter.  See ante, 
at 3, n. (BARRETT, J., opinion concurring in judgment).  But a proper Ar-
ticle III standing analysis requires us to answer a different question: 
whether it was reasonable for this particular plaintiff to voluntarily in-
cur such costs under the circumstances presented in his case.  At the 
motion-to-dismiss stage, we are only obligated to credit the plausible

17  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
complaint identifies only a “speculative chain of possibili-
ties,” and, as such, his allegations are insufficient to estab-
lish a reasonable probability of future harm. Clapper, 568 
U. S., at 414.7 
In an ironic twist, the majority correctly rejects J USTICE 
BARRETT’s pocketbook-injury theory analysis due to its
speculative nature. It rightly acknowledges that a plaintiff 
who relies on costs to establish standing “must incur those
costs to ‘mitigate or avoid’ a ‘substantial risk’ of some inde-
pendent harm.” Ante, at 9 (quoting Clapper, 568 U. S., at 
414, n. 5).  And it recognizes that the independent harm 
Bost asserts—“discrepancies in late-arriving ballots”—
amounts to “conjecture,” with “little support in the plead -
ings.” Ante, at 9. But rather than follow that observation 
where it leads, the majority crafts a new candidate-only 
standing rule, ignoring the pa tently speculative nature of 
Bost’s harm based on Bost’s more generalized “interest in a 
fair process.” Ante, at 4. 
With respect to the majority’s harm-free, fair-process
standing theory, J
USTICE BARRETT has the better of that ar-
gument. She correctly observes that the majority’s 
—————— 
assertions of fact the plaintiff makes to support that inference.  We do 
not have to accept Bost’s bald contention that he has to hire poll watchers
in light of Illinois’s rule (or make the inference that it is reasonable for 
him to do so during the upcoming election); indeed, in my view, accepting
that conclusory contention abdicates our responsibility to actually eval-
uate the sufficiency of the plaintiff ’s allegations. 
7 Bost’s concern that his reputation  might be damaged even if he 
wins—due to a diminished margin of victory, see Brief for Petitioners 
18—is especially difficult to fathom, much less designate as plausible.  I 
suppose it is possible that voters and donors will think less of Bost as an
official if he wins by 74% of the vote instead of 75%, regardless of his 
performance while in office.  See 114 F. 4th 634, 642 (CA7 2024) (case 
below) (observing that Bost won the 2022 election with 75% of the vote).
But that result is neither obvious no r intuitive.  In fact, without more 
specific allegations, one might just as easily speculate that a closer race 
would benefit Bost, as it could generate more donations and enthusiasm 
among his core supporters.

18 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
conclusion relieves Bost “of having to show any real harm” 
and fails to hold him to the same standards that we apply 
to all other litigants. Ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). But, given the weaknesses of Bost’s allegations, 
JUSTICE BARRETT’s standing theory would also unjustly 
benefit Bost, by permitting him to voluntarily spend his
way into a federal forum absent any reasonable assertion
that the challenged rule (as opposed to his own unsubstan-
tiated fears and spending proc livities) has caused him to 
suffer an injury in fact. 
III 
Forty-some years ago, in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 
95 (1983), this Court considered whether a plaintiff had 
standing to challenge the Los Angeles Police Department’s
repeated use of life-threatening chokeholds on civilians who 
posed no threat of violence. Id., at 105.  The plaintiff in that 
case, Adolph Lyons, suffered such a chokehold at the hands 
of police, “rendering him unconscious and causing damage 
to his larynx.” Id., at 97–98.  Fearing that he would again
be subjected to a life-threatening chokehold, Lyons filed a 
lawsuit seeking an injunction that would bar the future use
of that technique against civilians who posed no risk to of-
ficer safety. Id., at 98. 
We rejected Lyons’s legal action on standing grounds,
holding that he had failed to establish a “real and immedi-
ate threat” of future harm.  Id., at 105. None of Lyons’s
appeals to fairness or common sense sufficed to persuade a
majority of this Court that he had Article III standing. It 
did not matter, for instance, that Lyons had almost died 
from an illegal chokehold only five months prior to filing his
complaint. See ibid. Nor did it matter that “no less than 
16 persons ha[d] died following the use of a chokehold by an
LAPD police officer” in the preceding decade. Id., at 115– 
116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Because those “odds” did not 
suggest a substantial risk of harm to Lyons in the future,

19  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
we said, he was not entitled to sue for injunctive relief.  Id., 
at 108 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). So, despite the grievous wrong and physical harm that
Lyons (and others like him) had suffered, we “decline[d] the
invitation to slight the preconditions” of Article III. Id., at 
112.
8 
If only the Lyons Court had seen fit to create the sort of 
harm-free, status-based standing rule that the majority 
adopts today.  The majority’s reasoning—leading to today’s 
holding that “[c]andidates have a concrete and particular-
ized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes 
in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm
their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their cam-
paigns,” ante, at 9—would have been useful to Lyons.  Ly-
ons was a Los Angeles resident who had been unfairly tar-
geted by police violence in the past and who wished to move 
freely about in the community. Armed with today’s deci-
sion, Lyons might have successfully relied upon that status 
to claim a “concrete and particularized interest” in the rules 
that governed police officers ’ encounters with certain com -
munity residents, regardless of whether such police prac-
tices would have harmed him in the future. 
—————— 
8 Contemporary commentators predicted that our decision in Lyons
would close the door to “a broad range of analogous lawsuits” aimed at 
systemic misconduct and abuse on th e part of law enforcement.  R. Fal -
lon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N. Y. U.  L. Rev. 1, 71–72 (1984).  That pre-
diction proved accurate.  Today, courts routinely rely on Lyons to deny
plaintiffs standing to seek injunctions against future police behavior. 
See, e.g., J. W. ex rel. Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 
F. 3d 1248, 1267 (CA11 2018) ( per curiam); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F. 3d 
211, 216 (CA2 2004); Whitfield  v. Ridgeland, 876 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787– 
788 (SD Miss. 2012); see also Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U. S. ___, 
___ (2025) (K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 4) (concluding that, 
under Lyons, Latino plaintiffs who were “stopped for immigration ques-
tioning allegedly without reasonable  suspicion of unlawful presence” 
lacked standing to seek an injunction).

20 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 
JACKSON, J., dissenting 
 But the Lyons standing rule focused on actual injury: We
emphasized that a plaintiff must assert (and, ultimately, 
prove) that the allegedly unlawful practice risks injuring
him in a concrete and particularized manner in the future. 
The bare assertion of an interest in general fairness, absent 
the showing of any real and immediate harm, is apparently 
cognizable only if asserted by candidates for office. 
* * * 
I am all for simplifying our standing law.  See ante, at 10. 
But I am against doing so se lectively; either Article III 
standing requires an actual or imminent injury in fact that
is particularized to the plaintiff,  or it does not.  Bost has 
plainly failed to allege facts that support an inference of
standing under our established precedents.  By carving out 
a bespoke rule for candidate-plaintiffs—granting them 
standing “to challenge the rules that govern the counting of
votes,” simply and solely because they are “candidate[s]” for 
office, ibid.—the Court now complicates and destabilizes
both our standing law and America’s electoral processes.

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  Old File: 24-568.pdf 38 pages (221 KB) 1/13/2026 9:57:59 AM Total Changes 1 1/14/2026 3:04:22 PM Compare Results versus Content 1 Replacement 0 Insertions 0 Deletions New File: 24-568new.pdf 38 pages (220 KB) 1/14/2026 3:03:30 PM Styling and Annotations 0 Styling 0 Annotations Go to First Change (…

• #2

  ered from their interest in the elec toral process. Win or lose, candi- dates suffer when the process departs from the law. The harm to can- didates from an unfair and inaccurate election is not common to all. 2 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Syllabus While voters also have a general interest in an ac…

• #3

  ted). “[A]ccurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a “simple” en- deavor. Id., at 712. And the limits of federal courts’ jurisdiction do not rest upon such “unstable ground outside judicial expertise.” Id., at 713. Nor would requiring candidates to plead a substantial risk of harm to their vote share lea…

• #4

  for counting mail-in ballots received after election day. We consider whether the candidates have standing to maintain their suit. I Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in bal- lots postmarked or certified no later than election day and received within two weeks of election day. Ill. Comp. St…

• #5

  114 F. 4th 634 (2024). The court concluded that the costs —————— 1 At the time, Congressman Bost was a candidate in the 2022 election, and Pollastrini and Sweeney planned to seek reappointment as Presi - dential electors in the 2024 election. Congressman Bost has served as the United States Representative fo r …

• #6

  not address whether Pollastrini and Sweeney have standing to sue as prospective Presidential electors. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 489 (2023). 4 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Opinion of the Court A An unlawful election rule can injure a candidate in sev- eral ways. It might cause him to lose…

• #7

  Voters, to be sure, also have a “general interest” in an accu- rate vote tally. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). But a candidate’s interest differs in kind. An unfair and inaccurate election plainly affects those who compete for the support of the people in a different way than it affects the people wh…

• #8

  105 meters. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 90. Whether a particular runner expects to finish strong or fall off the pace in the final five meters, all would be deprived of the chance to com- pete for the prize that the rules define. The fastest to run 105 meters has not won the 100-meter dash. And in much the same way, …

• #9

  v. Democratic National Committee , 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam). Such late-breaking, court-ordered rule changes can “result in voter confusion and consequent in- centive to remain away from the polls,” and thus undermine the “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes . . . essential to t…

• #10

  must then also ensure that any disadvantage is linked to reputational or financial harm. 6 Judges are no better qualified to make such determina- tions than they are to assess a candidate’s likelihood of win- ning or losing. Even if they could do so, this approach would still channel many disputes into postelect…

• #11

  proach introduces a new one: Apparently, a candidate who pays poll watchers a penny would have standing, while one who relies on volunteers would not. Nothing about Article III requires this result. Candi- dates have a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their el…

• #12

  ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [January 14, 2026] JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, con- curring in the judgment. While I agree with the Court that Congressman Bost has standing, I disagree with its reasoning. In my view, Con- gressman Bost has…

• #13

  a plaintiff “reasonably incur[s] costs to mitigate or avoid” the “‘substantial risk’” of a harm caused by a statute, Clap- per, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5 (collecting cases). For instance, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, farmers of conven- tional alfalfa sought injunctive relief against a rule deregu- latin…

• #14

  III injury.* II Rather than take this straightforward path, the Court charts a novel one: To challenge “the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election,” a candidate need only al- lege that he is in fact a candidate in that election. Ante, at 3. The Court makes no attempt to demonstrate that the bar…

• #15

  Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn , 563 U. S. 125, 134 (2011) (taxpayer standing); Lujan, 504 U. S., at 566–567 (animal-enthusiast standing); FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 392–393 (2024) (doctor standing). I see no reason to afford candidates favored sta- tus. Nor do the p…

• #16

  date-standing rule. See ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in judgment). Yet her pocketbook theory would allow political candidates to spend their way past Article III’s injury-in- fact requirement, despite our clear admonition that 2 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS JACKSON, J., dissenting plaintiffs “canno…

• #17

  Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)). In other words, the particularity requirement ensures that the Judiciary stays in its proper lane, leaving to the people’s representa- tives the pr…

• #18

  But voters suffer too—and arguably even more so—when their fellow citizens lose confidence in the results of an elec- tion. Indeed, the same loss of faith the majority counts as injurious to candidates could be a fatal blow to the public’s interest in democratic governance. 3 Batting away these foundational trut…

• #19

  lators in a free and unimpaired fashion” is enduring and indispensable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). Against this backdrop, the Court’s effort to isolate and ele- vate a candidate’s “distinct” interest in electoral integrity, ante, at 5, falls flat. For today’s standing purposes, the key realizat…

• #20

  election—would be deprived “of a fair process and an accu- rate result.” Ante, at 4. But, as this Court has time and again explained, such an assertion of injury “amount[s] to little more than [an] attemp[t] ‘to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of g…

• #21

  purposes. Its remarkable holding jettisons the injury-in- fact requirement entirely. Forget injury; political candi- dates need only have “a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elec- tions, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or i…

• #22

  Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561–562 (1992). But Bost is not a direct object of the Illinois rule at issue. The rule regulates the conduct of voters and election officials, dictating how and when ballots are cast and counted. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, §5/19–8(c) (West Supp. 2025) (“Each vote by mai…

• #23

  296 (2022) (recognizing a wi nning candidate’s $10,000 ex- penditure as a “pocketbook harm” that “constitute[d] an in- jury in fact”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 473–474 (1987) (finding standing where a candidate had “alleged and demonstrated” that a challeng ed disclosure rule would, among other harms, “adve…

• #24

  harm has been the Article III imminent-injury standard for decades. See Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5 (collecting cases applying this standard). And federal courts, includ - ing this one, have routinely applied that standard in a 11 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) JACKSON, J., dissenting variety of circu…

• #25

  exactly the type of troubling election-related litigation the Court purportedly wants to avoid. For example, under the Court’s new harm-free candidate-standing rule, an elec- toral candidate who loses in a landslide can apparently still file a disruptive legal action in federal court after the elec- tion is over…

• #26

  While more tethered to our standing precedents, JUSTICE BARRETT’s pocketbook-injury theory is also insufficient to support Bost’s standing. This is because it is well settled— in light of our decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398—that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make …

• #27

  two weeks. But, in the absence of any allegation establish- ing that he actually faces a substantial risk of losing the election or having his margin of victory diminished in a meaningful way, Bost has taken those precautions based on the mere (and by all accounts remote) possibility that such harms will otherwi…

• #28

  injury. His case differs from Clapper only insofar as the source of the harm he is seeking to alleviate is not the (un - certain) application of the regulation itself, but the (uncer - tain) effects of that regulation. In other words, both Bost and the plaintiffs in Clapper spent money to mitigate a risk of inju…

• #29

  the risk that any of these potential problems might actually occur. J USTICE BARRETT nevertheless suggests that the forgiv- ing standard for motions to di smiss is enough to get Bost over the line. See ante, at 3, n. (opinion concurring in judg- ment). But that standard cannot benefit a plaintiff like Bost, wh…

• #30

  him to do so during the upcoming election); indeed, in my view, accepting that conclusory contention abdicates our responsibility to actually eval- uate the sufficiency of the plaintiff ’s allegations. 7 Bost’s concern that his reputation might be damaged even if he wins—due to a diminished margin of victory, see…

• #31

  appeals to fairness or common sense sufficed to persuade a majority of this Court that he had Article III standing. It did not matter, for instance, that Lyons had almost died from an illegal chokehold only five months prior to filing his complaint. See ibid. Nor did it matter that “no less than 16 persons ha[d] …

• #32

  F. 3d 1248, 1267 (CA11 2018) ( per curiam); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F. 3d 211, 216 (CA2 2004); Whitfield v. Ridgeland, 876 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787– 788 (SD Miss. 2012); see also Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (K AVANAUGH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 4) (concluding that, under Lyons, Latino plain…