Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist

Summary

Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods Market did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when this case was removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judgment in favor of Hain Celestial Group.

Text

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., ET AL. v. PALMQUIST, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF E. P., A MINOR, 
ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 24–724. Argued November 4, 2025—Decided February 24, 2026 
Respondents Sarah and Grant Palmquist fed their child E. P. baby food 
that was made by petitioner Hain Celestial Group, Inc., and that they
purchased from petitioner Whole Foods Market, Inc.  When E. P. was 
2½ years old, he began exhibiting serious developmental disorders and
was diagnosed with a range of physical and mental conditions that 
some doctors attributed to heavy-metal poisoning.  In 2021, a subcom-
mittee of the U. S. House of Repres entatives released a staff report 
finding that certain baby foods, including Hain’s, contained elevated 
levels of toxic heavy metals.  Following the report’s release, the 
Palmquists sued both Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, al-
leging state-law product liability and negligence claims against Hain,
and state-law breach-of-warranty and negligence claims against 
Whole Foods. Hain, a Delaware corp oration with a principal place of 
business in New York, removed the case to federal court based on di-
versity of citizenship, but confronted a problem: Federal courts may 
exercise diversity jurisdiction only when no adverse party is from the 
same State, but Whole Foods and th e Palmquists are all Texas citi-
zens.  As a result, the District Court lacked jurisdiction as the case 
stood upon removal.  Hain sought to cure this problem by arguing in 
its notice of removal that Whole F oods had been improperly joined in 
the lawsuit and should be dismissed, which would have established 
complete diversity between Hain an d the Palmquists.  The District 
Court agreed with Hain, dismisse d Whole Foods, and denied the 
Palmquists’ motion to remand. The case then went to trial against

2 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Syllabus 
Hain alone in federal court. The Di strict Court granted Hain’s motion 
for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, explaining that the 
Palmquists had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove causation. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s improper-
joinder decision and dismissal of Whole Foods.  Because Whole Foods 
had been improperly dismissed, th e Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
District Court lacked diversity juri sdiction, that the District Court’s
judgment had to be vacated, and that  the case had to be remanded to 
state court.  This Court granted certiorari to resolve a divide among
the Courts of Appeals on whether vacatur is required in these circum-
stances. 
Held: Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods 
did not cure the jurisdictional defect  that existed when this case was 
removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judg -
ment in Hain’s favor.  Pp. 4–11.
(a) Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a federal 
court of appeals must “satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but 
also of that of the lower courts in a cause under review.” Mitchell v. 
Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244.  In most cases, federal appellate courts 
assess the district court’s jurisdiction based on “the state of facts that
existed at the time of filing.”  Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 
L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 571. If the court of appeals concludes that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over  the case when it was filed in or 
removed to federal court, then the court of appeals typically must va -
cate any judgment on the merits. 
One exception to this general rule is relevant here: If a district court 
cures a jurisdictional defect before final judgment, then the court of 
appeals is not required to vacate that judgment even if, at some earlier
point in the case, the district court lacked jurisdiction.  The Court dis-
cussed this exception in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, in which 
the nondiverse defendant was fully di smissed with all of the parties’
consent through a partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), leaving behind a completely diverse set of parties be-
fore trial commenced.  In those circumstances, the Court held that the 
jurisdictional defect had been cured and the verdict could stand despite
the District Court’s earlier “ statutory misstep” in denying the motion 
to remand.  Id., at 73.  On the other hand, the Court stated, had the 
jurisdictional defect not been cured and instead “lingered through 
judgment,” then vacatur wo uld have been required.  Id., at 76–77. 
Pp. 5–7.
(b) The core dispute in this case is whether Whole Foods’s erroneous 
dismissal before final judgment cured the jurisdictional defect that ex-
isted at the time of removal.  It did not. The District Court’s dismissal 
of Whole Foods as improperly joined was both erroneous and

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 
Syllabus 
“[i]nterlocutory,” meaning it did “not dispose of the whole case” and
“merge[d] into the final judgment” for “revie[w] on appeal.” Dupree v. 
Younger, 598 U. S. 729, 734, 735.  When the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
District Court’s error, it restored  Whole Foods to the case and thus 
destroyed complete diversity.  As a result, the jurisdictional defect “lin-
gered through judgment” uncured and the judgment “must be va -
cated.”  Caterpillar, 519 U. S., at 77. 
Hain argues that the correctness of the District Court’s dismissal is 
irrelevant because the parties were completely diverse by the time of
final judgment, but the Court has never held that a district court can 
create jurisdiction through its own mistakes.  A rule to the contrary 
would permit courts to enlarge th eir jurisdiction beyond the limits 
Congress imposed.  Hain also appeals to efficiency, arguing that it
would be wasteful to send this case back to state court for a new trial. 
The “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy” recognized in 
Caterpillar, 519 U. S., at 75, however, were relevant only to excusing
noncompliance with the removal statute’s requirement of complete di-
versity at the time of removal afte r a jurisdictional defect has been 
properly and finally cured. As to the jurisdictional requirement itself, 
Caterpillar held that an uncured jurisdictional defect means that “the
judgment must be vacated.” Id., at 76–77. Pp. 7–9.
(c) Finally, Hain argues that Whole Foods should now be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Proc edure 21, which permits a federal 
court to “add or drop a party” “on just terms.”  In Newman-Green, Inc. 
v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 833, 837–838,  the Court held that 
courts may use Rule 21 “to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party” in 
appropriate circumstances, but must “carefully consider whether the
dismissal . . . will prejudice any of th e parties in the litigation.”  This 
case is unlike Newman-Green, in which the plaintiff sought the dismis-
sal, because here a defendant is seeking dismissal of another, non-
diverse defendant.  The identity of  the party asking for the dismissal 
is important because “[t]he plaintiff is ‘the master of the complaint,’ ” 
and generally has the right to choose whether to proceed in federal or 
state court. Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc.  v. Wullschleger, 604 U. S. 22, 
35. Hain’s proposed use of Rule 21 would force the Palmquists to liti-
gate this case in federal court ag ainst their wishes and despite their
right to control the forum for this case.  See Atlantic Marine Constr. 
Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Tex., 571 U. S. 49, 
63. The Palmquists exercised their right to choose a state forum by 
purposefully and proper ly joining a nondiver se defendant against
whom they could not proceed in fede ral court, and diligently asserted
that right by promptly moving to remand the case to state court. Rule 
21 does not permit a court or a defendant to override their choice in 
these circumstances. Pp. 9–10.

4 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Syllabus 
103 F. 4th 294, affirmed and remanded. 
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  THOMAS, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.

_________________ 
_________________ 
1  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 24–724 
THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. SARAH PALMQUIST, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF 
E. P., A MINOR, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[February 24, 2026]
 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and gen-
erally can resolve only the cases that Congress grants them
power to hear. One class of cases over which Congress has 
given federal courts jurisdiction is “diversity” cases between 
“citizens of different States.” 28 U. S. C. §1332(a).
If a federal court of appeals finds that a district court 
lacked jurisdiction over a case (for example, because the
parties turned out not to be from different States), then the 
district court’s judgment on the merits must be vacated.  A 
district court’s judgment can stand, however, if the district
court “cured” the jurisdictional defect before entering final 
judgment, such as by proper ly dismissing a nondiverse 
party from the case. 
This case asks whether a district court’s erroneous dis-
missal of a nondiverse party before final judgment can cure 
a jurisdictional defect that ex isted when the case was re-
moved to federal court. The Fi fth Circuit held that it can -
not, and this Court agrees. In these circumstances, the

2 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Opinion of the Court 
district court’s final judgment must be vacated for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
I 
Respondents Sarah Palmquist and Grant Palmquist have
a young son, E. P., who was born in 2014.  For the first two 
years of E. P.’s life, the Palmquists fed him baby food that 
was made by petitioner Hain Celestial Group, Inc., and that
they purchased from petitioner Whole Foods Market, Inc. 
At first, E. P.’s development progressed ordinarily, and he
was a healthy child. Things changed when E. P. was 2½ 
years old. He began exhibiting serious developmental dis-
orders and was diagnosed with a range of physical and men-
tal conditions. After identifying high levels of arsenic, lead, 
and mercury in E. P.’s blood tests, some doctors attributed
these conditions to heavy-metal poisoning.  In 2021, years 
after E. P.’s diagnosis, a subcommittee of the U. S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform re-
leased a staff report finding that certain baby foods, includ-
ing Hain’s, contained elevated levels of toxic heavy metals. 
See Staff Report, Subcommittee on Economic and Con-
sumer Policy, Baby Foods Are Tainted With Dangerous 
Levels of Arsenic, Lead, Cadmium, and Mercury 2–4 (Feb. 
4, 2021).
Following the report’s release, the Palmquists sued both
Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court.  As to Hain, the 
Palmquists alleged state-law product liability and negli-
gence claims. As to Whole Foods, the Palmquists alleged 
state-law breach of warranty and negligence claims based 
on Whole Foods’s alleged misrepresentation of Hain’s prod-
ucts as safe for consumption.
Hain removed the case to federal court based on the par-
ties’ diversity of citizenship. At the time of removal, how-
ever, Hain confronted a problem.  Generally, 28 U. S. C. 
§1332(a) allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction only 
when the parties are completely diverse, which means that

3  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
no adverse party is from the same State, and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000.  Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 
546 U. S. 81, 89 (2005).  As the case stood upon removal,
though, this requirement was not met. The Palmquists 
were Texas citizens.  Hain was a Delaware corporation with 
a principal place of business in New York, and so was both
a Delaware and New York citizen.  Whole Foods, however, 
was headquartered in Texas and so was, like the 
Palmquists, a Texas citizen. Because Whole Foods and the 
Palmquists were all Texas citi zens, the parties were not
completely diverse.
Hain nevertheless argued in its notice of removal that re-
moval was proper because Whole Foods had been improp -
erly joined and should be dismissed, which would leave only 
parties who were completely diverse in federal court.  The 
Palmquists disagreed, argued that Whole Foods was 
properly joined, and moved to remand the case to state
court given the lack of diversity jurisdiction.
1 
The District Court sided with Hain.  Under Fifth Circuit 
precedent, which was not disputed here, a defendant is im-
properly joined if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim for relief
that is facially plausible” against the defendant.  103 F. 4th 
294, 304 (2024); see Smallwood v. Illinois Central R. Co. , 
385 F. 3d 568, 573 (2004) (en banc).  Applying that test, the
District Court concluded that the Palmquists had not al-
leged a plausible claim against Whole Foods. It thus dis-
missed Whole Foods and denied the Palmquists’ motion to
remand. 
The Palmquists then went to trial against Hain in federal 
court. After the Palmquists rested their case, Hain moved 
for judgment as a matter of law on all claims.  The District 
Court granted that motion in full, explaining that the 
—————— 
1 Improper joinder is also often referred to as “fraudulent joinder.”  Be-
cause there are no allegations of frau d by the Palmquists in this case, 
the Court uses the term “improper joinder.”

4 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Opinion of the Court 
Palmquists had failed to present sufficient evidence to the
jury to prove that “the ingestion of heavy metals can cause 
the array of symptoms that [E. P.] suffers from, much less 
any evidence of at what level those metals would have to be 
ingested to bring about those symptoms.” 103 F. 4th, at 
300. The Palmquists appealed that judgment along with
the District Court’s improper-joinder decision that had dis-
missed Whole Foods. 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the improper-joinder decision
and vacated the District Court’s judgment.  The Court of 
Appeals held that Whole Foods was properly joined because 
the Palmquists had plausibly alleged that Whole Foods had 
violated state law by misrepresenting Hain’s products as 
safe. Given that Whole Foods had been erroneously dis -
missed, the action was not dive rse.  The Court of Appeals
then concluded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
and that the judgment in Hain’s favor had to be vacated.
The Fifth Circuit denied en banc review. 
Hain and Whole Foods filed a timely petition for certio-
rari seeking review of the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the 
District Court’s judgment must be vacated. One other 
Court of Appeals has held that vacatur is not required in 
these circumstances, while another agrees with the Fifth
Circuit and has held that it is.
2  The Court granted certio-
rari to resolve the divide among the Courts of Appeals.  See 
604 U. S. 1267 (2025). 
II 
It is important to emphasize at the outset “two ‘givens’ in 
this case.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 70 (1996).
First, no party asks this Court to revisit the Fifth Circuit’s
holding that the District Court’s improper-joinder decision
was incorrect and that Whole Foods should not have been 
—————— 
2 Compare Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 628 F. 3d 439, 447, 450–451 (CA8 
2010), with Henderson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. , 454 F. 3d 1278, 
1284–1285 (CA11 2006).

5  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
dismissed.  See Brief for Petitioners 7, n. 1.  Second, no 
party disputes that, had the District Court performed the
joinder analysis correctly when the case was initially re-
moved, it would have lacked jurisdiction and would have
been required to remand the case to state court.  See 28 
U. S. C. §§1332(a), 1447(c).  What remains for this Court to 
decide is whether the District Court, having erroneously
dismissed Whole Foods, had jurisdiction to enter a final 
judgment as to Hain.  It did not. 
A 
Federal courts “are all of limited jurisdiction, and their
proceedings are erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown 
upon them.” Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch 173, 185 
(1809) (Marshall, C. J.).  Because of this limitation on fed-
eral courts’ authority, a federal court of appeals must “sat-
isfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of that of 
the lower courts in a cause under review.” Mitchell v. 
Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934).  In most cases, federal 
appellate courts assess the district court’s jurisdiction
based on “the state of facts that existed at the time of filing.” 
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 
571 (2004). If the court of appeals concludes that the dis-
trict court lacked jurisdiction over the case when it was filed
in or removed to federal court, then the court of appeals typ-
ically must vacate any judgment on the merits.  See Wil-
liams v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358, 368 (1980); American Fire 
& Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17–18 (1951).
There is, however, one exception to the general rule rele-
vant to this case.  If a district court “cures” a jurisdictional 
defect prior to final judgment, then the court of appeals is
not required to vacate that judgment even if, at some earlier 
point in the case, the district court lacked jurisdiction. 
The Court discussed this exception in Caterpillar Inc. v. 
Lewis, 519 U. S. 61. In Caterpillar, Lewis was a citizen of 
Kentucky who brought a product-liability suit in state court

6 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Opinion of the Court 
against Caterpillar, a Delaware- and Illinois-based equip-
ment manufacturer, and Whayne Supply, a Kentucky com-
pany that serviced Caterpillar equipment.  Id., at 64–65. 
Lewis’s insurer (a Massachusetts corporation) intervened
as a plaintiff and asserted claims against both Whayne and 
Caterpillar. Id., at 65.  At that point, complete diversity
was lacking, as there was one plaintiff (Lewis) and one de-
fendant (Whayne) from Kentucky. 
Lewis then settled his claims against Whayne. Ibid.  Cat-
erpillar, thinking that the settlement would result in
Whayne’s dismissal from the case, promptly removed the
case to federal court. Ibid.  Lewis moved to remand, point-
ing out that Whayne was still in the case because the in-
surer had not settled its claim against Whayne.  Id., at 65– 
66. Without addressing Lewi s’s argument, the District 
Court erroneously denied the motion to remand, keeping 
the case in federal court. Id., at 66.  Whayne eventually
settled with the insurer and was voluntarily dismissed from 
the case via a partial final judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b). See App. A to Brief for Respondents. 
That dismissal left three completely diverse parties in the 
case: Lewis (from Kentucky), the insurer (from Massachu-
setts), and Caterpillar (from Delaware and Illinois).
The case then went to trial, at which Caterpillar pre-
vailed. 519 U. S., at 66–67.  Lewis appealed, and the Sixth 
Circuit vacated the verdict.  It held that the District Court 
should have remanded the case because, at the time of re-
moval, complete diversity did not exist. Id., at 67. 
This Court reversed. It held that, because Whayne had
been fully dismissed, “the jurisdictional defect [had been]
cured, i.e., complete diversity [had been] established before 
the trial commenced.” Id., at 73. Because “considerations 
of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming” 
after “a diversity case has been tried in federal court,” the 
Court held that the verdict could stand despite the District
Court’s “ statutory misstep” in denying the motion to

7  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
remand. Id., at 73, 75, 77. On the other hand, the Court 
stated, had the jurisdictional defect not been cured and in-
stead “lingered through judgment,” then vacatur would 
have been required. Id., at 76–77. 
B 
The core dispute in this case is whether Whole Foods’s 
erroneous dismissal before final judgment cured the juris-
dictional defect that existed at the time of removal.  It did 
not. Because the jurisdictional defect lingered through 
judgment, the judgment “must be vacated.”  Id., at 77. 
When Hain removed this case to federal court, the Dis-
trict Court was required to determine whether it had juris-
diction by ensuring that none of the plaintiffs was from the 
same State as any of the defendants. Because Whole Foods 
(a defendant) and the Palmquist s (the plaintiffs) were all 
Texas citizens, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It 
then tried to cure that jurisd ictional defect by dismissing 
Whole Foods as improperly joined. 
That dismissal, the Fifth Circuit held, was erroneous. It 
was also “[i]nterlocutory,” meaning that it did “not dispose 
of the whole case.” Dupree v. Younger, 598 U. S. 729, 734 
(2023). The “ ‘general rule’ ” is that parties cannot immedi-
ately appeal interlocutory orders and must instead wait un-
til the end of the case, when those orders “merge into the
final judgment” and are “reviewable on appeal” from that 
judgment. Id., at 735 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996)). Under that general rule, 
once the District Court entered final judgment in Hain’s fa-
vor, the court’s earlier jurisd ictional holding merged into
the judgment and was reviewable by the Court of Appeals
as part of the Palmquists’ post-trial appeal.
On appeal, the question before the Court of Appeals was
whether the District Court had correctly dismissed Whole 
Foods at the outset. If it had, then this case would be more 
like Caterpillar, where the District Court correctly and

8 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Opinion of the Court 
finally dismissed Whayne with the parties’ consent and left 
behind a completely diverse set of parties. 
Whole Foods, however, was not dismissed correctly, and
the interlocutory nature of that dismissal meant that it was 
reversible on appeal from the final judgment in Hain’s fa-
vor. Whole Foods thus was only temporarily and errone-
ously removed from the case; it was not “gone for good.” 
Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U. S. 22, 33 
(2025). When the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s 
error, it restored Whole Foods to the case and correctly held 
that the jurisdictional defect had not been cured.  That 
meant that the defect “lingered through judgment” and that 
the District Court’s judgment therefore “must be vacated.” 
Caterpillar, 519 U. S., at 77. 
In Hain’s view, the correctness of the District Court’s dis-
missal is irrelevant because, like in Caterpillar, the parties 
were completely diverse by the time of final judgment. 
Hain is mistaken. This Court has never held that a district 
court can create jurisdiction through its own mistakes.  A 
rule to the contrary would permit courts to enlarge their
jurisdiction beyond the lim its Congress imposed.  Cf. Kok-
konen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America , 511 U. S. 375, 
377 (1994) (“Federal courts . . . possess only that power au-
thorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be ex-
panded by judicial decree” (citations omitted)).
Hain also appeals to efficien cy, arguing that it would be 
wasteful to send this case back to state court for a new trial. 
This argument also fails. To be sure, Caterpillar recognized
that “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy be-
come overwhelming” after “a di versity case has been tried 
in federal court.” 519 U. S., at 75.  Those considerations, 
however, were relevant only  to excusing noncompliance
with the removal statute’s requirement “that there be com-
plete diversity at the time of removal” after a jurisdictional
defect had been properly and finally cured. Grupo Dataflux, 
541 U. S., at 574. As to the jurisdictional requirement

9  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
itself, Caterpillar held that an uncured jurisdictional defect
means that “the judgment must be vacated,” 519 U. S., at 
76–77, regardless of how efficient it might be to leave the
judgment in place. That the parties may need to litigate a
new trial in state court does not change the jurisdictional
analysis or make the District Court’s error an effective 
cure.
3 
III 
As a fallback, Hain argues that, even if the jurisdictional
defect was not cured, Whole Foods should now be dismissed 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.  That Rule per-
mits a federal court “on its own” to “add or drop a party” “on
just terms.” This argument is unavailing. 4
 In Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826 
(1989), this Court held that, in appropriate circumstances,
courts may use Rule 21 “to dismiss a dispensable non-
diverse party.”  Id., at 833, 837. To do so, courts must “care-
fully consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party 
will prejudice any of the parties in the litigation,” as “[i]t 
may be that the presence of the nondiverse party produced
a tactical advantage for one party or another.”  Id., at 838. 
—————— 
3 Other procedural mechanisms may be available to reduce wasteful 
litigation.  For instance, both partial final judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b) and certification under 28 U. S. C. §1292(b) allow 
district courts to certify matters for early appeal.  Those procedures could 
help resolve any uncertainty over whether a nondiverse party should re-
main in the case at the time of removal and avoid the need to wait until 
a post-trial appeal.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20–23, 34–36. 
4 The Palmquists contend the Rule 21 argument was forfeited, but it is
fairly included within the question presented, was raised in the petition
for certiorari, and was pressed before the Fifth Circuit.  See Pet. for Cert. 
i, 22–24 (arguing that “appellate courts . . . ha[ve] dismissed dispensable
nondiverse parties in order to preserve jurisdiction as to diverse parties”
and citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 834– 
836 (1989)); Brief for Whole Foods in No. 23–40197 (CA5), p. 16; see also
this Court’s Rule 14.1(a).

10 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
Opinion of the Court 
This case is very different from Newman-Green. Here, 
the defendants are seeking dismissal of a nondiverse de-
fendant, whereas in Newman-Green, the plaintiff sought 
the dismissal.  Id., at 829. The identity of the party asking
for the dismissal is important because “[t]he plaintiff is ‘the
master of the complaint,’ ” and generally has the right to 
choose whether to proceed in federal or state court.  Royal 
Canin, 604 U. S., at 35.  Dismissing a nondiverse party with 
the plaintiff ’s consent is consistent with that right, as is a 
plaintiff ’s ability to amend the complaint to “bring the suit
either newly within or newly outside a federal court’s juris-
diction.” Id., at 35–36. 
Hain’s proposed use of Rule 21, however, would force the 
Palmquists to litigate this case in federal court against 
their wishes and despite their right to control the forum for
this case. Hain cites no cases in which a court used Rule 
21, over the plaintiff ’s consistent objections, to dismiss a 
properly joined defendant to preserve jurisdiction over an
incorrectly removed case that never should have been in
federal court. That lack of authority is not surprising.  The 
prejudice to the plaintiff in such circumstances is clear, for
“plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum 
they consider most advantageous.” Atlantic Marine Constr. 
Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Tex. , 
571 U. S. 49, 63 (2013).  The Palmquists exercised their
right to choose a state forum by purposefully and properly 
joining a nondiverse defendant against whom they could
not proceed in federal court, and diligently asserted that 
right by promptly moving to remand the case to state court.
The decision to structure thei r case in this way was the 
Palmquists’ to make; Rule 21 does not permit a court or a 
defendant to override their choice in these circumstances.
5 
—————— 
5 Some courts have used Rule 21 to dismiss nondiverse parties joined
after the case was properly removed to federal court.  See, e.g., Gorfinkle 
v. U. S. Airways, Inc., 431 F. 3d 19, 21–23 (CA1 2005).  Because Whole 
Foods was named in the original stat e-court complaint in this case, the

11  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
Opinion of the Court 
IV 
The District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods 
did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when this
case was improperly removed to federal court.  The Court 
of Appeals therefore correctly vacated the judgment in 
Hain’s favor. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is af-
firmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
—————— 
Court expresses no view on whether using Rule 21 to dismiss a non-
diverse party added after a proper re moval is appropriate.  The Court 
also expresses no view as to Rule 21’ s role in cases or iginally filed by 
plaintiffs in federal court.  See, e.g., Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Roman 
Ceramics Corp., 603 F. 2d 1065, 1067, 1069 (CA3 1979).

_________________ 
_________________ 
1  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
THOMAS, J., concurring 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 24–724 
THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. SARAH PALMQUIST, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF 
E. P., A MINOR, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[February 24, 2026]
 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to
note my skepticism of the do ctrine of “improper joinder,”
which the District Court invoked to dismiss Whole Foods in 
this case. The doctrine appear s to allow federal courts to 
enlarge their jurisdiction by assessing the merits of claims 
over which they lack jurisdiction. 
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”  Kok-
konen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America , 511 U. S. 375, 
377 (1994). As “an essential ingredient of separation and
equilibration of powers,” the Constitution gives Congress
broad power over the scope of federal courts’ jurisdiction. 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 
101 (1998). “When we assume jurisdiction too hastily, we
risk aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of the political 
branches.” Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U. S. 712, 737 
(2025) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting).  Accordingly, if a federal
court determines that it lacks jurisdiction in a case, “the
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing 
the fact and dismissing the cause.”  Ex parte McCardle , 7 
Wall. 506, 514 (1869). 
Federal courts therefore “must determine that they have
jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v.

2 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
THOMAS, J., concurring 
Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 439 (2007) ( per curiam). “The re-
quirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold 
matter spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial 
power of the United States and is inflexible and without ex-
ception.” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 94–95 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). “For a court to pronounce upon” the merits
“when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, 
for a court to act ultra vires.”  Id., at 101–102. 
In this case, federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship. The removing defendant, Hain Celestial
Group, invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§1332(a), which gives district courts jurisdiction over “civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different 
States.” This Court has always interpreted §1332(a)’s lan-
guage “to require ‘complete diversity,’” meaning that a fed-
eral court can exercise jurisdiction only if no plaintiff shares
state citizenship with any defendant. Carden v. Arkoma 
Associates, 494 U. S. 185, 187 (1990) (citing Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806)).
Although the parties in this case were not completely di-
verse, the District Court exercised jurisdiction based on the 
doctrine of “improper joinder.”  Under that doctrine, federal 
courts exercise jurisdiction ov er cases that originally in -
volved nondiverse defendants by first deeming the claims
against those nondiverse defendants sufficiently weak on 
the merits and then dismissing them.  See, e.g., Interna-
tional Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy 
Group, Ltd., 818 F. 3d 193, 205–209 (CA5 2016).  Here, the 
Palmquists, Texas citizens, sued both an out-of-state de-
fendant, Hain Celestial Group, and a Texas defendant,
Whole Foods.  The District Court therefore lacked jurisdic-
tion over the case when it was removed to federal court. 
The District Court nonetheless proceeded to dismiss Whole 
Foods based on its merits assessment that there was not a 
“reasonable basis to predict that [the Palmquists] could

3  Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 
THOMAS, J., concurring 
recover from Whole Foods” under Texas products-liability
law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a–26a.  After dismissing Whole
Foods, it adjudicated the claims against Hain Celestial on 
the merits. 
The Fifth Circuit vacated that merits judgment for lack
of jurisdiction, but not because it thought that conducting 
an improper-joinder inquiry was inappropriate.  103 F. 4th 
294, 302–307 (2024). It simply thought that the Palmquists 
possibly stated meritorious claims against Whole Foods un-
der Texas law. See id., at 305–307.  It reaffirmed that the 
improper-joinder doctrine allows federal courts to engage in
a “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis” of claims against nondiverse
defendants, albeit with legal ambiguities resolved in the 
plaintiffs’ favor. Id., at 306. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6) dismissals, of course, are merits determina-
tions. See Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 
U. S. 394, 399, n. 3 (1981). 
Other federal courts adopt a similar approach to dismiss
claims against nondiverse parties. See, e.g., Johnson v. 
Midwest Div. -RBH, LLC , 88 F. 4th 731, 735–736 (CA8 
2023); Jerome-Duncan, Inc.  v. Auto-By-Tel, L. L. C ., 176 
F. 3d 904, 907–909 (CA6 1999); Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F. 3d 
1317, 1324, 1320–1325 (CA11 2005). Courts justify this ap-
proach based on a group of this Court’s early-20th-century 
precedents that recognized a doctrine called fraudulent
joinder. See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern R. Co.  v. 
Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 217 (1906).* 
—————— 
*Many Circuits still use the “fraudul ent joinder” term today, even 
when they engage in the same merits analysis that the Fifth Circuit more
accurately calls improper joinder.  See, e.g., Johnson, 88 F. 4th, at 735– 
736 (holding that “joinder . . . was fraudulent” because state-law claim 
was unlikely to succeed on the merits); Jerome-Duncan, Inc., 176 F. 3d, 
at 907–909 (affirming “fraudulent joinder” dismissal because of weak-
ness of claim under state law); Cline v. Dart Transit Co., 804 Fed. Appx. 
307, 312 (CA6 2020) (holding that “fraudulent joinder occurred” because
plaintiff lacked “a colorable cause of action”).

4 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC. v. PALMQUIST 
THOMAS, J., concurring 
But this Court’s precedents do not support the lower
courts’ more recent approach. As I read them, this Court’s 
“fraudulent joinder” precedents concerned only whether the
plaintiff avoided federal diversity jurisdiction by bad faith
or actual fraud—such as lying about a party’s conduct or 
citizenship. See Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 200 U. S., 
at 218 (asking whether the plaintiff “attempt[ed] to commit 
a fraud upon the jurisdiction of the Federal courts”); Illinois 
Central R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U. S. 308, 316 (1909) (asking 
whether a claim was “fraudulent and false”); Mecom v. Fitz-
simmons Drilling Co. , 284 U. S. 183, 190 (1931) (asking 
whether the plaintiff committed “actual fraud”).  These 
precedents were limited to cases of “extreme abuse.”  Mur-
riel-Don Coal Co. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd ., 790 F. Supp. 2d 
590, 596 (ED Ky. 2011) (Thapar, J.).  Unlike the lower 
courts’ more recent decisions, they did not appear to turn
on the strength of the claims on the merits.
Federal courts sitting in diversity likely cannot dismiss 
nondiverse parties based on their view of the merits of the 
claims against those parties.  Doing so appears unfaithful
to Congress’s limits on our diversity jurisdiction and incon-
sistent with this Court’s precedents.  As Judge Thapar has 
put it, the improper-joinder doctrine “requires federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction where none exists over ques-
tions of state law that the stat e courts are better suited to 
address themselves.”  Id., at 597. In a future case where 
the issue is briefed and squarely presented, this Court 
should consider the propriety of the improper-joinder doc-
trine.

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the…

• #2

  for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, explaining that the Palmquists had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove causation. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s improper- joinder decision and dismissal of Whole Foods. Because Whole Foods had been improperly dismissed, th e Fi…

• #3

  jurisdictional defect not been cured and instead “lingered through judgment,” then vacatur wo uld have been required. Id., at 76–77. Pp. 5–7. (b) The core dispute in this case is whether Whole Foods’s erroneous dismissal before final judgment cured the jurisdictional defect that ex- isted at the time of removal.…

• #4

  sal, because here a defendant is seeking dismissal of another, non- diverse defendant. The identity of the party asking for the dismissal is important because “[t]he plaintiff is ‘the master of the complaint,’ ” and generally has the right to choose whether to proceed in federal or state court. Royal Canin U. S.…

• #5

  district court’s judgment can stand, however, if the district court “cured” the jurisdictional defect before entering final judgment, such as by proper ly dismissing a nondiverse party from the case. This case asks whether a district court’s erroneous dis- missal of a nondiverse party before final judgment can cu…

• #6

  Opinion of the Court no adverse party is from the same State, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U. S. 81, 89 (2005). As the case stood upon removal, though, this requirement was not met. The Palmquists were Texas citizens. Hain was a Delaware corporation with a …

• #7

  missed Whole Foods. The Fifth Circuit reversed the improper-joinder decision and vacated the District Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals held that Whole Foods was properly joined because the Palmquists had plausibly alleged that Whole Foods had violated state law by misrepresenting Hain’s products as safe. …

• #8

  the lower courts in a cause under review.” Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). In most cases, federal appellate courts assess the district court’s jurisdiction based on “the state of facts that existed at the time of filing.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 571 (2004). If t…

• #9

  setts), and Caterpillar (from Delaware and Illinois). The case then went to trial, at which Caterpillar pre- vailed. 519 U. S., at 66–67. Lewis appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the verdict. It held that the District Court should have remanded the case because, at the time of re- moval, complete diversity…

• #10

  vor, the court’s earlier jurisd ictional holding merged into the judgment and was reviewable by the Court of Appeals as part of the Palmquists’ post-trial appeal. On appeal, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether the District Court had correctly dismissed Whole Foods at the outset. If it had, then t…

• #11

  defect had been properly and finally cured. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U. S., at 574. As to the jurisdictional requirement 9 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court itself, Caterpillar held that an uncured jurisdictional defect means that “the judgment must be vacated,” 519 U. S., at 76–77, regardless of h…

• #12

  This case is very different from Newman-Green. Here, the defendants are seeking dismissal of a nondiverse de- fendant, whereas in Newman-Green, the plaintiff sought the dismissal. Id., at 829. The identity of the party asking for the dismissal is important because “[t]he plaintiff is ‘the master of the complaint…

• #13

  Hain’s favor. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is af- firmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— Court expresses no view on whether using Rule 21 to dismiss a non- diverse party added after a proper re moval is appropriate. The Court also…

• #14

  power of the United States and is inflexible and without ex- ception.” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 94–95 (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a court to pronounce upon” the merits “when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.” Id., at 101–102. In this case, federa…

• #15

  der Texas law. See id., at 305–307. It reaffirmed that the improper-joinder doctrine allows federal courts to engage in a “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis” of claims against nondiverse defendants, albeit with legal ambiguities resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor. Id., at 306. Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 12(b)(6)…

• #16

  precedents were limited to cases of “extreme abuse.” Mur- riel-Don Coal Co. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd ., 790 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 (ED Ky. 2011) (Thapar, J.). Unlike the lower courts’ more recent decisions, they did not appear to turn on the strength of the claims on the merits. Federal courts sitting in diversity li…