Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton

Summary

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).

Text

PRELIMINARY PRINT 
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 
Pages 155–162 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
January 20, 2026 
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 
reporter of decisions 
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2025 155 
Syllabus 
CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v. 
BURTON, chapter 7 trustee for VISTA-PRO 
AUTOMOTIVE, LLC 
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the sixth circuit 
No. 24–808. Argued November 4, 2025—Decided January 20, 2026 
The question in this case is whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(c)(1)'s requirement that parties make Rule 60(b) motions within a 
“reasonable time” applies to a motion seeking relief from an allegedly 
void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, en-
tered bankruptcy in 2014 and initiated adversarial proceedings against 
Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., to collect $50,000 in allegedly 
unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro attempted to serve process on Coney Island 
by mail but purportedly failed to comply with Federal Rule of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(3)'s mail-service requirements. Coney Island 
did not fle an answer, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judg-
ment. Over the next six years, Vista-Pro's bankruptcy trustee at-
tempted to enforce the judgment. These efforts bore fruit in 2021 
when a marshal seized funds from Coney Island's bank account in satis-
faction of the judgment. Coney Island fled a motion to vacate the 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing that Vista-
Pro's failure to make proper service rendered the judgment void. The 
Bankruptcy Court denied relief, holding that Coney Island failed to 
abide by Rule 60's requirement that parties make motions for relief 
within a “reasonable time.” The District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affrmed. 
Held: Rule 60(c)(1)'s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that 
a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). Pp. 158–162. 
(a) The plain text of Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a “motion under Rule 
60(b) must be made within a reasonable time,” and because a motion for 
relief from an allegedly void judgment is a “motion under Rule 60(b),” 
the reasonable-time limit applies. The structure of Rule 60 confrms 
the plain-text interpretation. Rule 60 expressly modifes the default 
reasonable-time limit, imposing a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) motions 
alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud. Yet the Rule does not in-
clude an analogous unlimited-time principle for motions alleging void-
ness. P. 158. 
(b) The Court rejects the argument that because a “void judgment is 
a legal nullity,” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S.

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156 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v. 
BURTON 
Syllabus 
260, 270, no time limit should apply. Even if the passage of time cannot 
cure voidness, the same principle holds true for most legal errors, yet 
statutes and rules routinely limit the time during which a party can 
seek relief from a judgment infected by error. A party would need to 
show that some principle of law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives 
a party the right to allege voidness at any time, but Coney Island dis-
claims any such argument, and the Court cannot divine any such prin-
ciple. Allowing parties to allege voidness at any time would have 
extreme implications, such as allowing parties to ignore deadlines for 
fling notices of appeal or petitions for certiorari when subject-matter 
jurisdiction is contested. The possibility that improper service is dif-
ferent from other legal errors because a party might not learn about 
proceedings until long after judgment issues does not help Coney Island. 
Rule 60(c)(1) accommodates such a scenario by imposing a reasonable-
time requirement rather than a fxed time limit. In the context of a 
default judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to seek 
relief before learning about a plaintiff's attempted enforcement. 
Pp. 159–160. 
(c) The Court rejects Coney Island's argument that courts have his-
torically allowed litigants to seek relief from void judgments at any 
time. No such historical consensus exists, and in any event, for Rule 
60(b) motions, the Rule's text and structure take priority over historical 
practice. The Court also rejects Coney Island's reliance on Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U. S. 694, 
as that case undermines Coney Island's plea for no time limits. Lastly, 
the Court rejects Coney Island's invocation of policy concerns, Rule 60's 
drafting history, and the canon of constitutional avoidance. To the ex-
tent that these interpretive tools carry any weight, they do so only when 
a Rule's language is ambiguous. Pp. 160–161. 
109 F. 4th 438, affrmed. 
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, 
JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
post, p. 162. 
Daniel Ginzburg argued the cause and fled briefs for 
petitioner. 
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her 
on the brief were Charles L. McCloud, Erin M. Sielaff, and 
Phillip G. Young , Jr.

Cite as: 607 U. S. 155 (2026) 157 
Opinion of the Court 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A party seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment 
may fle a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(4). Rule 60(c)(1) requires parties to make Rule 60(b) 
motions within a “reasonable time.” We hold that this time 
limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void. 
I 
Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, entered bankruptcy in 2014. 
As part of its bankruptcy litigation, Vista-Pro initiated ad-
versarial proceedings against Coney Island Auto Parts Un-
limited, Inc., to collect $50,000 in allegedly unpaid invoices. 
Vista-Pro attempted to serve process on Coney Island by 
mail, but in doing so, it purportedly failed to comply with 
the mail-service requirements in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 7004(b)(3). 
Coney Island did not fle an answer in the adversarial pro-
ceedings, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judg-
ment against the company in 2015. Over the next six years, 
Vista-Pro's bankruptcy trustee attempted to enforce that 
judgment against Coney Island. As part of these efforts, 
the trustee sent a demand letter to the company's CEO in 
April 2016. Lower courts concluded that this letter gave 
Coney Island notice of the judgment and the trustee's en-
forcement efforts. 
These efforts bore fruit in 2021 when a marshal seized 
funds from Coney Island's bank account in satisfaction of the 
judgment. In response, Coney Island fled a motion to va-
cate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60. According to Coney Island, Vista-Pro's failure to make 
proper service rendered the judgment void. 
The Bankruptcy Court denied relief. It held that Coney 
Island failed to abide by Rule 60's requirement that parties 
make motions for relief within a “reasonable time.” The 
District Court and Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
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158 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v. 
BURTON 
Opinion of the Court 
affrmed. We granted certiorari to resolve a split of author-
ity on whether Rule 60's reasonable-time limit applies to mo-
tions seeking relief from allegedly void judgments. 1 605 
U. S. 1001 (2025). 
II 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court to “re-
lieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment, order, or proceeding,” 
and subdivision (b)(4) specifcally authorizes a court to grant 
relief from a “void” judgment.
2 Parties may seek relief 
under Rule 60 by fling a motion with the court. 
Rule 60 also imposes a time limit for such motions. Rule 
60(c)(1) provides that a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be 
made within a reasonable time.” Because a motion for relief 
from an allegedly void judgment is a “motion under Rule 
60(b),” the reasonable-time limit applies. Accord, Kemp v. 
United States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022) (“All [Rule 60(b) mo-
tions] must be fled `within a reasonable time' ”). 
The structure of Rule 60 confrms what the plain text of 
subdivision (c)(1) provides. When Rule 60 modifes the de-
fault reasonable-time limit, it does so expressly. For exam-
ple, Rule 60(c)(1) imposes a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) mo-
tions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud. Thus, one 
would expect Rule 60 to include an analogous provision if a 
special, unlimited-time principle applied to motions alleging 
voidness. Cf. Kemp, 596 U. S., at 534–535. But the Rule 
does not. 
1 Compare In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC , 109 F. 4th 438, 444 (CA6 
2024) (case below), with Austin v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 337, 343 (CADC 1962); 
V. T. A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F. 2d 220, 224, and n. 9 (CA10 1979); Rodd 
v. Region Constr. Co., 783 F. 2d 89, 91 (CA7 1986); Hertz Corp. v. Alamo 
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F. 3d 1126, 1130 (CA11 1994); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. 
Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F. 3d 849, 852 (CA1 1998); United States v. 
One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F. 3d 147, 157–158 (CA3 2000) (en banc); 
Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F. 3d 515, 523 (CA5 2002). 
2 Rule 60 governs motions to set aside default judgments, Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 55(c), including those issued in bankruptcy proceedings, Fed. Rules 
Bkrtcy. Proc. 7055 and 9024. 
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Cite as: 607 U. S. 155 (2026) 159 
Opinion of the Court 
Coney Island, several Courts of Appeals, and a prominent 
treatise nonetheless maintain that Rule 60(c)(1)'s reasonable-
time limit does not apply to motions alleging voidness. See 
n. 1, supra; 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 2862, pp. 431–433 (3d ed. 2012). These 
authorities acknowledge that their interpretation clashes 
with Rule 60's text. See, e. g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ce-
ramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F. 3d 849, 852 (CA1 1998). But 
relying on the generally accepted maxim that a “void judg-
ment is a legal nullity,” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. 
Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260, 270 (2010), they argue that the pas-
sage of time cannot turn such a nullity into an enforceable 
judgment. See, e. g., Austin v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 337, 343 
(CADC 1962). 
This argument cannot bear the weight that Coney Island 
and others have placed on it. Even if the passage of time 
cannot cure voidness, the same principle holds true for most 
legal errors. Nevertheless, statutes and rules routinely 
limit the time during which a party can seek relief from a 
judgment infected by error. Therefore, a party in Coney 
Island's position would need to show that some principle of 
law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives a party the right 
to allege voidness at any time. 
Coney Island disclaims any such argument, and we cannot 
divine any principle requiring courts to keep their doors per-
petually open to allegations of voidness. Giving a party a 
“reasonable” time to seek relief from an allegedly void judg-
ment may well be all that due process demands. By con-
trast, the argument that a party may allege voidness at any 
time, if taken to its logical conclusion, would have extreme 
implications. For example, if a federal district court errone-
ously concluded that it possessed subject-matter jurisdiction 
and proceeded to enter a judgment, the adversely affected 
party could wait as long as it wanted before fling a notice of 
appeal. But see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1). Similarly, if 
a federal court of appeals erroneously asserted subject-

160 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v. 
BURTON 
Opinion of the Court 
matter jurisdiction, the adversely affected party would not 
be required to comply with the deadline for fling a petition 
for a writ of certiorari imposed by this Court's Rule 13. It 
is hard to accept the proposition that due process requires 
such a regime.
3 
Coney Island maintains that the alleged defect in this 
case—failure to perform proper service—is different from 
other legal errors that might render a judgment void.
4 
Coney Island emphasizes that when a party does not receive 
proper service, it might not learn about the proceedings until 
long after the judgment issues. But this possibility does not 
help Coney Island's position. Rule 60(c)(1) accommodates 
such a scenario by imposing a reasonable-time requirement, 
rather than a fxed time limit. And in the context of a de-
fault judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to 
seek relief before learning about a plaintiff 's attempted 
enforcement. 
Coney Island separately contends that courts have histori-
cally allowed litigants to seek relief from void judgments at 
any time. But the historical record is not so clear. To be 
sure, courts have granted relief from void judgments long 
after their entry, especially when the issuing court lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e. g., Harris v. Harde-
man, 14 How. 334, 338, 344–346 (1853) (affrming a lower 
court order that set aside a judgment 11 years after its issu-
ance where the plaintiff did not make proper service and 
the defendant did not appear). But there was no historical 
consensus that a party could request such relief at any time. 
3 Justice Sotomayor contends that we should abstain from addressing 
any potential due-process considerations. Post, at 162 (opinion concurring 
in judgment). Although Coney Island disclaims any constitutional argu-
ment, it cites a longstanding consensus of authority holding that a party 
may allege voidness at any time despite the contrary language in Rule 60. 
And the only possible basis for such a holding is a rule of constitutional law 
that prevents the imposition of the Rule's reasonable-time requirement. 
4 We express no view on whether the allegedly defective service in this 
case would render the judgment void. 
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Cite as: 607 U. S. 155 (2026) 161 
Opinion of the Court 
Some courts, for instance, concluded that laches or other 
time limits could bar relief, even when a litigant alleged void-
ness. E. g., Stocking v. Hanson, 35 Minn. 207, 211–212, 28 
N. W. 507, 507–508 (1886); Smith v. Jones, 174 Cal. 513, 515– 
517, 163 P. 890, 890–892 (1917). In any event, for Rule 60(b) 
motions, the Rule's “text and structure” take priority over 
historical practice.
5 See Honeycutt v. United States, 581 
U. S. 443, 453 (2017). 
Coney Island turns next to this Court's decision in Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 
456 U. S. 694 (1982). There, we explained that a defendant 
seeking to dispute personal jurisdiction is “always free to 
ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and 
then challenge that judgment . . . in a collateral proceeding.” 
Id., at 706. Citing this sentence, Coney Island argues that 
defendants need not comply with time limits when alleging 
a lack of personal jurisdiction. But Insurance Corp . also 
recognized that the “expression of legal rights is often sub-
ject to certain procedural rules,” and “the failure to enter a 
timely objection” may result in the loss of a legal right. Id., 
at 705. Thus, Insurance Corp. undermines Coney Island's 
plea for no time limits. 
Coney Island lastly invokes policy concerns, Rule 60's 
drafting history, and the canon of constitutional avoidance. 
To the extent that these interpretive tools carry any weight, 
they do so only when a Rule's language is ambiguous. See 
BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore , 593 U. S. 
230, 245 (2021); Milner v. Department of Navy , 562 U. S. 562, 
572 (2011); Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374, 393– 
394 (2021). Here, the operative language clearly requires 
parties to make Rule 60(b) motions within a reasonable time. 
5 Rule 60(d) preserves parties' ability to obtain relief from a judgment 
in limited ways other than through a Rule 60(b) motion. We express no 
view regarding the limits applicable to obtaining relief through one of 
those methods. 
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162 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v. 
BURTON 
Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment 
III 
Litigants seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(4) must comply 
with Rule 60(c)(1) and fle a motion within a reasonable time. 
Coney Island does not contend that it complied with this re-
quirement. Therefore, we need not expound on whether 
Coney Island's timing was reasonable. The judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is 
affrmed. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment. 
The Court today rightly holds that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion 
to set aside a default judgment that is void for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction must be made “within a reasonable time.” 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(c)(1). Rule 60's text and structure 
require that conclusion, as the majority explains. 
I concur in the judgment because the majority unnecessar-
ily opines on the potential validity of a constitutional chal-
lenge to the “reasonable time” limit under the Due Process 
Clause. Ante, at 159. Coney Island did not make this ar-
gument below and the Sixth Circuit did not pass upon it. 
See In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC , 109 F. 4th 438, 443 
(2024) (“Coney Island does not mount a constitutional attack 
on Rule 60”). In this Court, Coney Island expressly dis-
claimed any due process argument. See Brief for Petitioner 
22 (“To be clear, Coney Island does not contend that Rule 60 
or Rule 60(c)(1) [is] unconstitutional”). This Court does “not 
generally entertain arguments that were not raised below 
and are not advanced in this Court by any party.” Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 721 (2014). There 
is no reason to depart from that practice absent unusual cir-
cumstances, which certainly are not present here. 
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Reporter’s Note 
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional 
edits were made: 
None

Retrieval chunks

• #1

  PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 Pages 155–162 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT January 20, 2026 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to n…

• #2

  relief from an allegedly void judgment is a “motion under Rule 60(b),” the reasonable-time limit applies. The structure of Rule 60 confrms the plain-text interpretation. Rule 60 expressly modifes the default reasonable-time limit, imposing a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) motions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fr…

• #3

  drafting history, and the canon of constitutional avoidance. To the ex- tent that these interpretive tools carry any weight, they do so only when a Rule's language is ambiguous. Pp. 160–161. 109 F. 4th 438, affrmed. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch…

• #4

  make motions for relief within a “reasonable time.” The District Court and Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Page Proof Pending Publication 158 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v. BURTON Opinion of the Court affrmed. We granted certiorari to resolve a split of author- ity on whether Rule 60's reason…

• #5

  Opinion of the Court Coney Island, several Courts of Appeals, and a prominent treatise nonetheless maintain that Rule 60(c)(1)'s reasonable- time limit does not apply to motions alleging voidness. See n. 1, supra; 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Prac- tice and Procedure § 2862, pp. 431–433 (3d ed. 201…

• #6

  Coney Island maintains that the alleged defect in this case—failure to perform proper service—is different from other legal errors that might render a judgment void. 4 Coney Island emphasizes that when a party does not receive proper service, it might not learn about the proceedings until long after the judgment…

• #7

  U. S. 443, 453 (2017). Coney Island turns next to this Court's decision in Insur- ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U. S. 694 (1982). There, we explained that a defendant seeking to dispute personal jurisdiction is “always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgm…

• #8

  I concur in the judgment because the majority unnecessar- ily opines on the potential validity of a constitutional chal- lenge to the “reasonable time” limit under the Due Process Clause. Ante, at 159. Coney Island did not make this ar- gument below and the Sixth Circuit did not pass upon it. See In re Vista-Pro …